THE EU ROADMAPS FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 2018-2020

Key lessons learnt from the process so far and regional perspectives

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Authors:

Bea Sanz Corella
Juan Enrique Nicolas Adan
Tine Veldkamp
Susana El-kum Molina
LLuis Castellar
Pam van de Bunt

Glossary

CARIFORUM	the Caribbean Forum
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CUSRI	Chulangkorn University
DAP	Democracy Action Plan
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
EDF	European Development Fund
EEI	Enabling Environment Index
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBS	General Budget Support
HDSP	Social Protection and Human Development Support
HIC	High Income Country
HoC	Head of Cooperation
HoM	Head of Mission
IADB	Inter-America Development Bankl
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
LAC	Latin America Caribbean
LIC	Lower Income Country
MIC	Middle Income Country
MS	Member States
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSA	Non State Actors
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDSF	Policy Dialogue Support Facility
PFM	Public Finance Management
PPP	Private Private Partnerships
RePaSOC	Renforcement et Participation de la Société Civile
RM	Roadmap
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UMIC	Upper-Middle Income Country

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This report is made by the Support Facility Roadmaps for engagement with Civil Society, implemented by a consortium led by EPRD.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE PROCESS SO FAR

In 2014, a worldwide effort was initiated to develop the EU Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society. Conceived as a **joint initiative between the European Union and Member States**, Roadmaps were designed to **strengthen the EU's engagement with Civil Society** and to develop a comprehensive and strategic approach to supporting Civil Society Organisations, in line with the policy priorities of the 2012 communication "The Roots of Democracy". Throughout the initial period, 107 Roadmaps were finalised and implemented in varying degrees, using a combination of research, policy dialogue and operational support. The process was delayed in a number of countries due to conflict and/or fragile contexts (in Yemen, for instance), by the Ebola crisis in West Africa and limited resources, especially in the so-called "graduated" countries (i.e. where there was no bilateral cooperation).

In 2016, an initial stock-taking exercise was conducted by the Roadmap Facility, leading to the publication of a number of reports. These were drafted according to geographical perspective and the typology of countries. Focusing on the added value of the process, the reports highlighted a number of lessons learnt. These include:

- Many Delegations used the Roadmaps as a starting point to reach out to a wider range of CSOs, rather than the usual interlocutors and grantees. Several Delegations used the Roadmaps to engage in extended processes of dialogue, beyond the question of financial support.

- The Roadmaps process allowed the involvement of EUD interlocutors more accustomed to working on political matters, trade and operational support, rather than simply Civil Society focal points. Roadmaps also helped a number of Delegations to promote greater mainstreaming of Civil Society in all relevant aspects of policy dialogue and operational support. This was the case particularly in focal sectors of EU cooperation in partner countries.

- Some Roadmaps were also instrumental in strengthening collaboration and coordination with Member States and other international players. In a number of cases they served as useful building blocks for EU joint programming processes. Similarly, Roadmaps gave more visibility to the important work carried out by the EU in the area of Civil Society engagement.

- All in all, progress made through the introduction of the Roadmaps was encouraging. The process of drawing up Roadmaps itself created a new dynamic. Despite significant challenges, the majority of Roadmaps established a solid base on which the EU can build and develop further implementation, monitoring and communication.

In 2017, as the end of the first phase of RMs was approaching, several EU Delegations started to review and update their Roadmaps for the period 2018-2020 and beyond. They took into consideration the new, overarching 2030 Agenda and EU commitments as outlined in the EU New Consensus on Development. To date, more than 70 new Roadmaps have been finalised and a dozen others are under way.

What follows is a short, consolidated report based on the second stock-taking process conducted in 2019. The report focuses on Roadmaps for the period 2018-2020. The aim is to distil the main lessons learnt, to evaluate improvements made, identify the main challenges encountered and highlight good practices which can inspire and inform other Delegations in their updating and implementing efforts.

This report cannot be considered as an outcome evaluation, given the fact that most Roadmaps covering the period 2018-2020 are currently being implemented and stock-taking is mostly based on their elaboration processes and resulting documents.

Short and concise in purpose, the findings of the report are substantiated by the more in-depth assessments offered in the three regional stock-taking reports covering Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. The report is also informed by the results of survey responses from 38 EUDs[1]. The hands-on experience of the Roadmap Facility, which has provided support to 75 EUDs since the beginning of the process back in 2014, has also been instrumental in the drafting of the stock-taking note for the second phase. The three regional stock-taking reports can be found in Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

1. We live in a new and changing world

A shrinking civic space worldwide

Analysis of the new Roadmaps indicates that the **three ambitions of the 2012 Communication on EU engagement with Civil Society,** "The Roots of Democracy", **remain fully relevant, if not more relevant, today. This is a consequence of the unsettling global trends related to civic space that we have been witnessing over the past years.**

Indeed, despite widespread recognition of CSOs as critical development actors, and the landmark that Agenda 2030 represents in this regard, numerous governments in various parts of the world are imposing obstructive laws and practices, further restricting citizens' freedoms of association and assembly. Restrictions range from unreasonable bureaucratic hurdles (i.e. to register CSOs, to register projects and request permissions to operate, etc.) to restrictive or repressive laws increasingly targeting international funding, and finally, to direct threats on the personal security of civil society activists. The media is also increasingly being targeted, together with telecommunications and the Internet.

According to the 2019 CIVICUS report[2], 111 countries have, in one way or another, violated civic space to a significant degree in the past years. Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa are the most affected regions[3] and it is often argued that larger countries, such as Russia, are increasingly seen as models for smaller countries which take similar measures to restrict civic space. The report also states that the global clampdown on civil society has deepened and accelerated in recent years to the stage where only four per cent of the world's population live in countries where the fundamental freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression are fully respected.

1 The survey of EU Delegations concerning Civil Society Roadmaps (RM) 2018-2020 was launched during the month of February 2019. It got 38 responses distributed as follows: 53% from EU Delegations in Africa, 28% from EU Delegations in Asia and 17% from EU Delegations in the Latin America and Caribbean region. NEAR region was not covered.

2 2019 Report on the State of Civil Society. CIVICUS (https://www.civicus.org/index.php/state-of-civil-society-report-2019)

3 Heinrich Boll Stiftung (2016): The CSO's Shrinking and Closing Space Tendency – How EU Institutions can support CSOs worldwide. Published Apr 07, 2016 by Rebecca Wagner and Julia Dankova

Number of people per rating category

(Pie chart based on CIVICUS "State of civil society report 2019 - Overview")



Source: https://www.civicus.org/documents/reports-and-publications/SOCS/2019/state-of-civil-society-report-2019_executive-summary.pdf

Echoing the report commissioned by the European Parliament about the EU response to the shrinking space[4], this trend appears to be part of a general authoritarian restraint of democracy. However, as the report also acknowledges, it is more than that, as it exhibits different characteristics in different countries, is driven by different factors and affects CSOs in different ways (i.e. often targeting specifically governance and human rights related organisations). Neither is this trend simply a crusade against human rights defenders. Restrictions on Civil Society are intensifying in non-democratic countries, but they are also becoming evident in a number of countries which were traditionally considered democratic. In many countries, freedoms that had long been enjoyed are now taken away rapidly and simultaneously. Every time political space and/or rights are lost, they are difficult to regain.

The EU has responded to the shrinking space through a wide range of specific policy mechanisms and instruments. In particular, it has been focusing on how to 'systematically identify and support CSOs which are at risk, as well as new kinds of civil society actors' who are considered less vulnerable to restrictive measures. In addition to the dedicated policy mechanisms and instruments to act against the shrinking space phenomenon, the Roadmaps, both the first ones covering the period 2014-2017, as well as the new updated documents covering the period 2018-2020, have also been instrumental in the EU response to the shrinking space worldwide.

Analysis of the new Roadmaps confirms that several Roadmaps are playing an important role in assessing and, in some case even proactively supporting the revision, updating and/or streamlining of the legal and institutional framework governing CSOs (e.g. Botswana, Malawi, Uganda, etc). Compared to their predecessors, several Roadmaps are more vocal in strongly advocating to trigger the use of EU leverage, through diplomacy and political discussion, in order to open up spaces for dialogue, as well as, where possible, influencing and counterbalancing the trend towards a narrowing operating space for both CSOs and individuals. Last but not least, Roadmaps are also helping to promote fundamental rights and freedoms, including the protection of human rights defenders, particularly in fragile contexts and where space for CSOs is shrinking (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Burundi, Central African Republic, etc.)

4 idem

Moreover, in a number of countries where restrictions or administrative constraints have fallen upon the funding of CSOs, RMs address the adaptation and mitigation that donors have to adopt in terms of priorities and modalities. The RMs address also the question of CSOs financial sustainability, and in the context of Middle-Income Countries, where several donors have withdrawn, the evolution of priorities for support towards more governance related issues tackling the involvement of CSOs in domestic policies (e.g. Angola, Thailand, China, Indonesia, etc.)

Advocating for the Enabling Environment in Malawi

In its exchange with authorities, the EUD of Malawi is a strong advocate of the enabling environment for Civil Society. The EUD attended all meetings regarding the revision of the NGO policy and held several meetings to advocate on this issue. During Heads of Missions/Heads of Cooperation meetings where coordination takes place, the questions of CSOs' space and of the draft NGO policy have been often discussed during the past three years. The EU engages with CSOs very frequently and involves them in the context of identification and formulation of new EU interventions. The EU also supports a variety of policy dialogues and knowledge dissemination events organised by CSOs.

New contexts, new rules of engagement

Analysis of the Roadmaps also illustrates **how the rules of engagement are changing** because contexts are rapidly evolving. Different and often innovative approaches are required within the overall policy framework offered by the new Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (the so-called "EU global strategy"). Two particular cases are worth mentioning: fragile environments on the one hand, and middle and upper-income countries, on the other hand, where the EU, particularly in large MICS (such as India, China, Indonesia, etc), has limited leverage.

According to the World Bank, by 2030 almost half of the world's poor population will live in countries affected by fragility, conflict or violence[5]. Addressing fragility and building resilience have become one of the central priorities of EU external relations and development policy, in the search for a comprehensive approach. As reiterated in the new EU European Consensus on Development, fragile contexts or those affected by conflict require special attention and sustained international engagement. CSOs play a vital role in such contexts, often being the only actors providing emergency relief and delivering services to the most vulnerable and conflict-affected populations. CSOs also facilitate dialogue and create networks and connections across boundaries. What is more, in contexts such as Iraq, where state/institution building is a key priority, CSOs are key contributors to the demand-side of governance. They provide inputs on the direction the state-building process should take, promoting active citizenship and supporting social cohesion and resilience.

5 See www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview

However, the reality of fragile environments and CSOs in such contexts is also more complex. In divided societies, Civil Society can often reflect both social cleavages within society and can intensify these cleavages and the exclusivity of power systems. Also, CSOs may only represent one specific sector or group of society and/or only embrace certain sections of the community. More serious moral questions arise when choices for cooperative work include actors such as warlords or private militias. All in all, it is hard to generalise considering the extremely diverse nature of fragile states. The EC refers to four broad categories of context, with distinct principles of engagement. CSOs also play specific roles in such contexts[6], resulting in different priorities for engagement with CSOs.

Not all fragile environments have developed a RM for engagement with CSOs, due to the urgent need for support in these countries. This leads to a lack of medium to long-term strategic vision. Nonetheless, those which have developed RMs include countries such as Burundi, the Central African Republic and Somalia. Efforts are also being made in several fragile contexts **to develop a more strategic approach when engaging with local CSOs at operational level and also on policy dialogue.** This is the case in countries such as Yemen or Iraq.

A more strategic approach developed in a fragile environment: the example of Yemen

The EUD in Yemen is currently engaged in the process of setting up a dedicated CS facility in support of Civil Society in Yemen. The aim is not only to support Civil Society actors in their humanitarian and developmental responses to the Yemeni crisis, but also for the EU to strengthen the network of CSOs and therefore increase the impact of its support to the country. The facility will aim to strengthen the partnership between the EU and Yemeni actors. More specifically, the facility will aim at:

a) initiating and sustaining a more structured and regular dialogue between the EUD and like-minded donors, Yemeni CSOs and INGOs active in the country. This will provide a basis for EU-Yemen policy discussions and assist actors in overcoming their isolation and fragmentation of efforts.

b) enhancing the operational, technical and financial capacities of Yemen CSOs, and

c) providing assistance in the localisation of the humanitarian response and contribute to early recovery, economic development, capacity-building, and other non-humanitarian aspects.

6 These four categories are:
1) Countries in track, where there is willingness/efforts to improve performance with some tangible results and/or there are some windows of opportunity for positive change
2) Countries partly on track (i.e. post conflict transition/ early recovery), where there is willingness/efforts to improve performance, but it is too soon to assess results; the capacity of authorities is often low and there is a risk of return to conflict
3) Countries partly off track (i.e. "arrested development"), where there is a lack of willingness and failure to use state authority for equitable or pro-poor outcomes; weak rule of law. Authorities may be anarchic or authoritarian; economic stagnation; high levels of unresolved grievance and high risk of return to conflict and persistence of corruption and of self-enriching elites
4) Countries off track (i.e. deterioration), where the capacity and willingness of the state to perform core state functions is in decline; there are high levels of corruption and/or self-enriching elites and erosion of government authority (there may even be more than one authority in a fragmented territory) and security remains a key concern with areas affected by armed conflict

For more information see: EU Approach to Fragility and Resilience. Elisabeth Pape Acting Head of Unit DEVCO B7 – Fragility and Resilience European Commission – DG DEVCO EuropeAid. EU External Action: Fragility, Security and Development in a Changing World 27 - 29 April 2016

With regard to **more advanced developing countries,** analysis of the Roadmaps confirms a progressive paradigm shift away from a donor-recipient relationship towards a more balanced partnership approach. This mean cooperation is based less on grant-financed bilateral projects and more on policy dialogue related to development priorities and issues of common interest and responsibility. This is the case in countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Vietnam, Mexico or Argentina, to mention a few. The analysis **confirms the paramount role played by Civil Society actors** in such environments in the search for more innovative and tailored forms of engagement, particularly when the leverage of the EU is very limited. It also highlights the value of the Roadmap documents in providing a strategic vision for such engagement.

The SDGs: a new over-arching development agenda

The analysis also confirms how Roadmaps are progressively applying the new, over-arching agenda of the **Sustainable Development Goals** (SDGs), also known as **Agenda 2030.** Some Roadmaps have elaborated this more and include a number of specific actions to strengthen EU support to CSOs involvement in the 2030 Agenda, at different levels (i.e. to sensitize communities and local authorities about the 2030 Agenda, to deepen the involvement of CSOs in Voluntary National Review processes or produce shadow reports around the implementation of the Agenda, to pilot multi stakeholder initiatives, etc.) This has been the case of Thailand (see box below), Ecuador, Malaysia and Brazil, to mention a few examples. It is expected that more Roadmaps will adopt the new Agenda, as it becomes further mainstreamed into EU external action, more generally.

Compared to their predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals, SDGs are far more ambitious. They acknowledge, for the first time, the paramount role played by actors other than national governments. These include Civil Society Organisations, the private sector and the general public. The new Agenda also calls on all actors, and in particular national governments, to promote the establishment of **multi-stakeholder partnerships**. This is considered a goal in itself (Goal 17), and at the same time is an effective and innovative instrument for realising the objectives of the 2030 Agenda and, ultimately, ensuring that "**no one is left behind**".

One could argue **that the very essence of Roadmaps is their contribution to the localisation of the SDGs,** by fostering a strengthened role for CSOs in domestic policies. In particular and even if not explicitly acknowledging the links, they contribute to Goal 17 in their aim of augmenting Civil Society space, its involvement in domestic policies and its capacity to be proactive as development actor. However, explicit and more direct linkages are not yet fully developed and, to date, only a few RM documents are using the new framework to articulate the EU strategy for engagement with CSOs. This is the case in several "graduated" countries including Thailand, India, and China.

The analysis also indicates how the new framework offered by the Agenda 2030 is particularly relevant in restrictive environments, where the space for CS is constrained, and the 2030 Agenda offers a non-contested, all-embracing foundation. This legitimises multi-stakeholder partnerships, particularly in non-sensitive areas such as health, education, food security, etc. It also calls for strengthened CS involvement in reaching out to the most vulnerable population sectors and to pioneer services.

Finally, the themes and areas specified in the New European Consensus on Development (climate change, migration, etc.) and in line with the new EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy are also being progressively mainstreamed, although this process is still in the early stages.

Relating the EU CS Roadmap to the 2030 Agenda: the example of Thailand

The Government of Thailand has shown a strong commitment to Agenda 2030, namely through the 20-year National Strategy (2017-2036) and the 12th National Economic and Social Development Plan (2017-2021). The SDGs have great potential and present a unique opportunity as an 'entry point' to create common spaces for dialogue and collaboration in the different phases of the public policy cycle. They provide opportunities for Civil Society and the authorities to work together at local, regional or national level.

Echoing the above, the Thailand RM relates to the SDGs, with a focus on Civil Society participation, localisation of international commitments, public advocacy and communication as well as Civil Society joint work and collaboration. Within this framework, the EUD is currently basing its support to Civil Society on different EU instruments such as the EU Policy Dialogue Support Facility (PDSF). The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment are developing their Roadmap for SDG implementation. Additionally, the EU supports the Social Research Institute of Chulalongkorn University (CUSRI) in providing recommendations for the establishment of a mechanism for increasing CSOs' participation in implementing and monitoring Thailand's SDGs.

All in all, one can conclude that the three priorities of the 2012 Communication and the Roadmaps themselves remain relevant, if not more relevant, considering the changes in the environment briefly described above, and the new policy frameworks at European and global level. Roadmaps are proving to be a very effective means of **localising EU engagement with CSOs at country level** as well as EU commitment to the principle of **multi-stakeholder engagement enshrined in the New European Consensus on Development and, in a broader context, Agenda 2030**.

2. Doing less, doing it better and being more accountable

From knowledge to action

Whereas several of the first Roadmaps 2014-2017 **were very strong on analysis of the environment in which Civil Society operates and the dynamics within Civil Society**, they were generally weaker in the strategy sections. A particular effort has been made to make the new Roadmaps more achievable. The new processes and resulting documents confirm that better and greater knowledge of the Civil Society landscape and its inner dynamics is necessary if not essential in informing the strategy. However, this knowledge is not enough in itself; it needs to be coupled to an affirmative and clear plan to be sustained by specific actions. These, on the one hand, take the form of research, policy and political dialogue or operational support/funding with identifiable means and, on the other, thematic programmes, bilateral programmes, Member States programmes, etc. As a result, effective implementation of the Roadmaps has started in most cases, as indicated by the survey of EUDs in early 2019.

Fewer and more focused priorities

Compared to their predecessors, the **new Roadmaps are based on fewer and more focused priorities in an effort to make the new strategic frameworks more realistic and implementable**. Nearly all result frameworks are clear about what is to be achieved through the RM priorities in terms of strategic objectives. Some overarching priorities, that were set out in the first RMs, were still valid; others needed to be revised or fine-tuned because of significant changes in the operating context. Actions and means of implementation are also better considered (even though there is still room for improvement as the graph below shows), making RMs more practicable as they become more than a simple declaration of intentions or a strong analytical document (which was the case of several of the previous Roadmap documents).

The new RM template has been very helpful to this end, putting the emphasis not so much on analysis, but rather on the priorities, intended actions and required means of implementation (i.e. dedicated programmes, other sources of funding, policy and political dialogue). This means considering links with the key elements emerging from the assessment on the one hand, and the actions and means of implementation on the other. This is particularly relevant in MICs countries where a more selective consideration of actions and allocation of means is needed, considering the hitherto limited cooperation resources.

Are the priorities clearly spelled out and the means of implementation defined?



Source: Survey to EUDs 2019.

With regards to the themes, most Roadmaps and selected priorities **indicate recognition of the multiple roles that CSOs play,** the promotion of civic space, including the monitoring of that space and access to public information. Several Roadmaps draw attention to improved coordination, collaboration, networking and collective actions of CSOs and better structuration of CS. Even greater emphasis is placed on the strengthening of CSOs' voices and dialogue (support to inter-linkages among CSOs, horizontal and vertical), to their effectiveness in engagement with government, emphasising the Civil Society voice and to CSOs' contribution to peace. Economic development also remains an evolving area, particularly for the Middle-Income countries, where CSOs are being supported in their engagement in the monitoring of the implementation of various partnership, economic and even trade agreements, and working better with the private sector to develop strategic practices of Corporate Social Responsibility. Several Roadmaps are also embracing the social business approach, by supporting innovative CSOs initiatives, the role of CSOs in job creation and inclusive growth as well as CSOs' capacity to advocate better sustainable local economic development in their respective regions.

Counting what really counts

Finally, as the RM results-based frameworks have improved, and become more aligned with the EU Results Based Frameworks, Roadmaps are also becoming **more measurable, contributing to a more predictable, transparent and accountable way of working with CSOs**. The general trend is towards fewer and better indicators, adapted to the means at the disposal of EUDs. Proxy indicators are also on the rise, in an effort to build on what already exists. Follow-up mechanisms are planned in most of the Roadmaps.

Solid monitoring and follow-up of the RM: the example of Brazil

The Brazil EUD, articulated around the 2030 Agenda, is one of those that have developed a monitoring and follow-up system in a "learning by doing" process. EUD/MS have introduced an annual monitoring report in which they have fine-tuned the RM dashboard, establishing a baseline for annual progress values. This permits assessment of the current situation and establishment of targets to achieve the ultimate goal. Outcome indicators have been clearly defined, describing the extent to which progress has been achieved and showing that the level of data disaggregation has also been correctly addressed. It is worth highlighting that the monitoring report specifies the good practices and achievements that add value to the reporting process under the different RM priorities. The report describes contributions from the MS in a clear and concise way.

Furthermore, the Brazil EUD has given increasing importance to the 2030 Agenda, adding a comprehensive analysis of the contribution supported projects have made to the implementation of SDGs. The same applies to the Gender Action Plan.

3. Dialogue, dialogue and more real dialogue

CSOs want us to listen

The process of developing the new Roadmaps confirms that **CSOs want the EU to listen to them. They are not solely interested in funds; they want to be heard - not just sporadically,** but on a regular basis. They want to see more structure, due anticipation and inclusiveness, proper feedback and a real chance to discuss relevant political and policy issues. *Ad-hoc* consultations and, even more so, "tick-box" consultations can be counterproductive; the syndrome of "consultation fatigue" grows amongst CSOs when they have limited time and resources and even, sometimes, capacity, to effectively engage.

The importance of dialogue is particularly true in Middle-Income countries, where the EU is moving away from a "development-tinted" engagement with CSOs towards more policy, and even politically-oriented forms of engagement, but it is a general trend across regions, regardless of context. **Dialogue is seen as paramount on the path towards greater engagement with CSOs**. Fragile environments also deserve a special mention. Open conflict, fragmentation of the territory and security constraints, increased polarisation of CSOs and lack of adequate infrastructure to support communications can mean that local actors are often isolated and cut off from any cooperation with their peers, let alone dialogue with donors - who may have even relocated to neighbouring countries.

Combined methodology for CSO involvement in Afghanistan

As in the first RM, countrywide consultations were held with stakeholders in Kabul and five regions (North, South, East, West, Central Highlands). Additional questionnaires were designed to obtain the views of five MS and 24 INGOs engaged in Afghanistan. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were carried out with three types of actors: registered NGOs; trades unions/guilds and their provincial branches; youth groups, student associations and volunteer networks. A FGD questionnaire was developed, and FGDs included at least ten representatives from each group in each region, ensuring gender balance as much as possible. FGDs were conducted in Kabul and the five regional capital hubs (Mazar-e Sharif, Herat City, Bamyan Centre, Jalalabad, and Kandahar City). Additional FGDs were conducted in Daykundi. Key Informant Interviews with relevant stakeholders and the donor community (diplomatic representations and INGOs), government and representatives of CS networks were used to identify progress on priorities outlined in the previous Roadmap. A final workshop was conducted in Kabul in August 2017, bringing together 21 CSOs.

Aware of these considerations, several EUDs have engaged in **better, often more inclusive and even decentralised consultations with CSOs**, in an effort to make the RM process more participatory and take account of CSOs' views and voices. All new RM processes have implied some level of consultations with CSOs. One third of the consultations were done thematically or in a decentralised manner, in addition to central workshops.

How you categorize the consultation with CSOs ?



Would you say that the consultation with CSOs improved or worsened compared those organized for the previous RM?



Source: Survey to EUDs 2019.

What is more, in a number of countries, several EUDs are applying the afore-mentioned and more ambitious forms of dialogue, **thereby establishing more permanent and structured spaces.** In this regard, half of the EUDs consulted noted an improvement in consultations with CSOs during the RM process, compared with the previous RM exercise.

The example of Ecuador: a Roadmap owned by CSOs – towards defining a structured dialogue with CS

One of the main outcomes of the Ecuador RM to date is the level of ownership and participation by CSOs, stimulated by the establishment of more regular and structured dialogue with CSOs around the key issues faced by CSOs in the country, including their involvement in the Agenda 2030. The wave of consultations undertaken to elaborate the first RM generated a steering committee which drove the process forward, while a plenary assembly had already approved annual action plans and oversaw the whole strategy. As an example of this proactive approach, three working groups made progress, sharing local and regional experience. This embraced a review of the legal framework, alliances between CSOs and universities, and political incidence and platforms/networking. Tangible results have been obtained, such as the organic law proposal and the creation of a Confederation of Social Organisations, which embraces more than 100 CSOs. The updated RM is also the outcome of this participatory approach, demonstrating the high commitment of Ecuadorian Civil Society as well as its appropriation of the process.

The shift towards partnerships

There is, however, ample room for improvement, not just in creating contacts between the EU and CSOs bilaterally when they do not exist, but in making them more inclusive and accountable. This means reaching out **to actors beyond the traditional EU grantees** and making more room for CSOs in design and implementation. This is evidenced by experiences such as in Ecuador where the dialogue is co-owned and co-led with CSOs.

There is also **room for improvement in coordination and integration in the efforts currently under way at national level to implement and follow up Agenda 2030**. This is particularly true in the establishment of multi-stakeholder spaces, where national and local authorities, as well as other actors, are present, in line with the priorities enshrined in the New Consensus on Development. As acknowledged by the New Consensus, stronger partnerships are at the heart of the EU's approach to SDG implementation. Accordingly, the EU and its Member States will work more closely with all other relevant actors to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and strengthen capacity for democratic ownership.

More specific engagement with networks

Roadmaps also confirm the **interest of the EU in furthering engagement with network and umbrella organisations and in using intermediate organisations to ensure better outre**ach. This is relevant across countries and contexts, considering the diversity of Civil Society and the limitations of EUDs in reaching out to all kinds of CSOs, particularly those at the peripheral, grass roots and community level. Evidence suggests specific engagement is necessary.

Effective networks and umbrella organisations have particular importance as representatives of the collective interests of Civil Society and can therefore contribute to an improved distribution of resources and enhanced intra-CSO coordination, acting as a channel for dialogue with the authorities and with donors, with enhanced trust and visibility, etc. However, they are not in themselves a panacea. The call is for the EU to avoid a "network support blueprint" which is too dogmatic, as there are risks of causing more harm than good without a proper assessment of capacity, legitimacy and relationships. This is particularly true when networks do not develop organically and are being fostered by external actors. Evidence also points to networks and collective efforts working best when they are issue-based or involve actors with similar goals and agendas.

Intensive CSO involvement, including networks, in Pakistan and Thailand

In Pakistan, 250 CSOs from different backgrounds and at different levels (NGOs, INGOs, private foundations, **networks and coalitions,** *trades unions, etc.), have been consulted for the update of the RM. This involved: a) an online survey; b) regional seminars covering all Pakistani territory; c) a final workshop organised in September 2018 in Islamabad and d) in-depth interviews. Other relevant stakeholders were also consulted, including government officials.*

In Thailand, 144 entities took part in consultations: CSOs from a **wide range of networks and platforms;** *policy and academic research institutes; individual NGOs; public media; scholars from universities and representatives from organisations and provincial/regional Civil Society networks. They participated in four CSO consultation workshops from 22 August to 5 September 2017. These were held in the Southern Region (Hatyai/Songkhla), the Northeastern Region (Khon Kaen), Bangkok and the Eastern Region (Bangkok) and the Northern Region (Chiang Mai).*

Reaching out to new actors

The new Roadmaps also **confirm the growing interest of the EU in engaging with new players**, who have hitherto been beyond the scope of the EU. These include: the diaspora, particularly in fragile environments (e.g. Somalia); philanthropic structures working on social services and occasionally crossing over to governance issues and advocacy: private sector organisations and foundations (e.g. Brazil, Uganda); traditional and/or religious leaders together with faith-based organisations (e.g. Angola, Mali, Indonesia, etc) and; new forms of civil action which are often social media based and youth-led. They all cut across the traditional boundaries of CSOs and challenge the established forms of EU engagement, requiring innovative approaches to engagement and new support modalities.

They are all, in one way or another, particularly relevant today in the context of the EU's renewed interest in youth, as expressed in the New European Consensus on Development; the fight against radicalisation, in which faith-based organisations and religious leaders can also play a prominent role, and more globally, the shift towards new forms of engagement in several partner countries with new agendas (i.e. trade, security, migration, etc) are being consolidated.

An example of extensive engagement with a variety of CS actors in Uganda

In Uganda, the EUD invited a variety of CSO actors, including **people who challenged EU thinking, and asked for honest feedback about current EU engagement with Civil Society**. *Non-traditional guiding questions revealed how CSOs see the EU/MS, whether or not they feel connected and how they think that the EU/MS should relate to them. The EUD presence and engagement contributed to a very open atmosphere and paved the way for stock-taking and frank exchanges regarding the RM priorities. The sincere intention of the delegation to improve the Roadmap and its use has been recognised by participants. Quote: 'There was something different if we compare it with other EU meetings. We were enabled to give real feedback and to reflect on EU engagement in a new way'.*

4. Civil Society and civic space are concerns for everyone inside the delegation

Whereas - with a few exceptions - several of the 2014-2017 Roadmaps were perceived "as being the sole responsibility of the CS focal point", it is evident that the new RM process and the resulting documents are in the ownership of EUDs generally and not simply of the CS focal point. In many cases they have been discussed and agreed with sectoral colleagues, political sections and trade colleagues - at least for information purposes.

As a result, Roadmaps are progressively becoming "more meaningful" for Delegations, both in terms of their inherent strategic character and the resulting approach. This entails the involvement of other delegation colleagues, **making mainstreaming of CS a reality.**

Within the EUDs, there seems to be a high level of involvement in the RM process. Almost 90% of the EUDs consulted stated positive trends in this regard.

Level of involvement of the EUD in the review/updating process



Source: Survey to EUDs 2019.

It is also interesting to note that more and more Roadmaps are being drafted taking into account not just the situation of CSOs as a starting point, but with a **more informed consideration of EU engagement with CSOs in the given country – embracing all sectors.** The resulting strategy is therefore based on a greater appreciation of the EU's standing in the country. This means asking: "Where are we today? How do we engage across the spectrum of political, trade and other cooperation?" It means that engagement is not just as an aspiration.

There is, however, a room for improvement and additional efforts are therefore needed in many EUDs to ensure the necessary participation of sectoral task managers, political staff and senior management. Particularly in restrictive environments, exchanges with the political section regarding the RM and related EU/MS public engagement should be integrated into the RM process. Cooperation and engagement in relation to shrinking space and to certain sectors of society can be highly political.

The Regional Pacific Roadmap: a clear example of CS mainstreaming and financial predictability

The new Regional Pacific Roadmap 2018-2020 prioritises CSO capacity building. This involves policy and budget analysis, evidence-based research and advocacy, coalition building, influencing and the use of capacity needs assessments. These tools are used to engage with and to promote, monitor and report on the performance of regional institutions on prioritised themes. The RM outlines a sound action plan linked to a combination of programmes as well as detailing different grants, projects and the forecast budget (NSA programme under the 10th and 11th EDF along with other instruments such as DCI 2015). These provide a sound base for CSO mainstreaming and constitute good practice on financial predictability. Under the country priorities, the RM introduces a clear plan to boost national capacities of CSOs to engage in policy dialogue with the EU and government under the EU specific sectoral programmes of the different islands. These include CS components within programmes such as waste management, energy and fisheries. All in all, the RM represents a sound path to promoting structured dialogue with Pacific CSOs throughout the various DCI/EDF projects over the next three to five years, at both regional and national level.

5. The benefits of working better with Member States

Coordination for the sake of coordination has its limits

The new Roadmaps confirm once more the benefits of **working better together**, taking into account the respective EU and MS comparative advantages. This is one of the key principles of the framework for engagement outlined in the New Consensus on Development, in response to new global challenges. It includes improving effectiveness and impact through greater coordination and coherence, by applying development effectiveness principles and by delivering development cooperation as one part of overall internal and external action to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

Compared to the first Roadmaps, MS now appear to be better informed and fully aware of the process. However, their contribution to the process, beyond information sharing and involvement in the design of the RM, varies greatly.

Would you say that the consultation with MS improved or worsened compared those organized for the previous RM?



Would you say that involvement of MS improved or worsened compared to that for previous RM?



Source: Survey to EUDs 2019.

The level of MS participation often depends on a combination of factors. These include MS representation and capacity in terms of human resources, MS ownership of CSOs' agenda and existence of aid programmes, MS historical/strategic bonds with countries, prior participation in HRDCS and gender gap strategies as well as the existence of a joint programming process. In countries where joint programming is at some stage of development, the level of coordination with the RM has varied greatly, but there is huge potential for better alignment, as recent cases show (Cambodia, Honduras, Bolivia, etc.) Roadmaps can be used to leverage more and better CS involvement in the joint programming process.

The example of Malaysia: enhanced involvement of EU Member States

Representatives of the 18 EU Member States attending the Heads of Mission meeting on 25th May 2017: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the EU. No European development partners have bilateral cooperation programmes in Malaysia and Malaysia has not received funding from the thematic programmes, but the EUD and MS are actively using the RM as a tool in their common Human Rights and Democratisation Strategy.

The nature of the country (fragile, restricted, graduated) also plays an important role as does EUD leadership of RM processes. Interestingly enough, in several countries, beyond participating in the design, MS are becoming involved in a number of initiatives around political and policy dialogue with CSOs. This is the case, for instance of the involvement of MS together with the EUYD in the dialogue with Cambodian CSOs on the EE, or the involvement of MS in the fourth edition of the Forum with CSOs in Vietnam, where discussions around the EE and about CS involvement in the trade and SDG Agenda took place). Malawi is another interesting example, as shown below.

This collective EU engagement, beyond operational support, contributes to the impact and credibility of the RM process, also vis-a-vis governments. This is particularly relevant in restrictive environments as well as in graduated countries, in line with the shift towards a more partnership-based type of engagement.

All in all, an important lesson emerging from this new phase of the process is that "coordination for the sake of coordination" has its limits and Roadmaps need to bring real added value to MS in order to be meaningful for them. Coordination takes a lot of time and MS have limited resources. If they are to be brought on board, efforts are needed to make the added value of the RMs more tangible for MS (i.e. in the form of reduced fragmentation; development of common actions including common positions and agreed political messages, enhanced visibility of the EU support to Civil Society; etc).

Strong involvement of Member States in Colombia

The updated RM 2018-2020 for Colombia is the result of a high participation process involving 16 MS. It seeks to provide continuity and to consolidate the achievements made by its predecessor. It is also a response to the country challenges that demand greater efforts in the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement, the undertaking of all political action related to the construction of a new National Development Plan and compliance with international agendas (2030 Agenda, climate change, etc.). It has resulted in greater cooperation and division of labour between the EUD and MS. In fact, RMs need to be understood as learning processes in themselves. The EUD and MS in Colombia have been cooperating for 15 years. During this time, they have gained great experience in interventions aimed at peace-building through permanent and effective structured multi-stakeholder dialogues seeking to bring together CSOs, the EUD, MS and the government. This long-standing relationship was crucial to reconciling positions, promoting agreements, generating action proposals and building trust among actors.

Roadmaps and joint programming: a win-win

As briefly outlined above, Roadmaps can be an important building block in the joint programming process, which the New Consensus on Development confirms as the preferred "*modus operandi*". Results have been mixed until now, as the two processes have not always been effectively coordinated, but the potential for improvement is great.

Several Roadmaps are preceded and informed by previous mappings, political economy assessments or other knowledge-oriented exercises. These records identify like-minded Civil Society voices, demonstrate which CSOs have influence with decision-makers and show how support to Civil Society is complementary to other programming in a country.

Roadmaps therefore demonstrate the relevance of programming within a partner country's political economy context. They aim at strengthening the 'demand side of governance' by supporting citizens' voices in national and local decision-making processes and by contributing to greater transparency and accountability in public policies and administration.

Roadmaps also represent a comprehensive notion of engagement, encompassing actions related not just to operational support but also to research and political and policy dialogue. They can therefore contribute to the implementation of a rights-based approach in Joint Programming. In particular they contribute directly to Principles two (participation and access to the decision-making process), four (accountability and access to rule of law) and five (transparency and access to information). Indirectly they contribute to the other principles.

Bolivia - towards an integrated approach between the Roadmap and Joint Programming, including Civil Society in the EU Joint Programming cycle

The EUD, EU MS and Switzerland (signatories of both the RM and JP documents) are improving the alignment between the RM and the EU Joint Strategy. The aim is to localise both processes at a thematic level, with the clear intention of integrating Civil Society into the processes. As a first step, particular efforts are being made to broaden the scope of CSOs involved in dialogue with the EU. Several studies will be launched at sectoral level in order to identify the most relevant CS actors in each sector, which will lead to a greater understanding of Bolivian Civil Society and its challenges. In addition, the EU intends to start by opening some of the ongoing sectoral annual meetings to CSOs. This will involve then in discussion, both at operational and political level, according to priorities of each sector and avoiding the creation of new mechanisms. Justice and gender seem of particular interest., This thematic dialogue will be the basis for a solid consultation mechanism for the JP document 2021-2027. Also, in the framework of the JP strategy's M&E mechanism, European partners intend to insert one or several indicators to measure the quality and quantity of Civil Society participation in the JP process. In particular relation to the new Roadmap, which will cover the period 2019-2022, coherence with the JP process will be ensured through the inclusion of clear links between both documents regarding priorities, actions and indicators. This will strengthen the alignment and simultaneous follow-up of both mechanisms. It will also enable the establishment of a structured dialogue mechanism on the EU Joint Strategy Sectoral Groups but linked to both the RM and the JP processes and potentially supported by a local facility.

6. The challenge of maintaining momentum

The new Roadmaps phase confirms the efficacy of the process beyond the elaboration of the document. Whereas few of the previous Roadmaps were used as guiding frameworks for engagement with CSOs on a continuing basis, more and more Delegations are seeing the value of "maintaining the momentum" and of using the Roadmaps as a living document to steer their engagement with CSOs. They are revitalising the follow-up of the Roadmaps so that they can be used to frame and guide their programmes and regularly assess if and how they are contributing to the agreed priorities. Roadmaps are also being used to sensitize sectoral colleagues inside the Delegations and support, within the overall agreed framework, CSOs within sectoral interventions where Civil Society is but one actor, and often not the principal actor. Last but not least, Roadmaps are also being used to frame structure the dialogue with CSOs (and regularly assess how the context evolves and what EU response is required) and even as useful tools to influence policy and even political dialogue with the Government.



Source: Survey to EUDs 2019.

Three trends are particularly worth noting. The first is the **establishment of more permanent forms of dialogue with CSOs** (as already described under the section on dialogue with CSOs). This is the case in several countries such as Cambodia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Myanmar, Honduras, Benin, etc., where Roadmaps provide a user-friendly framework for dialogue and an up-to-date chart of engagement with CSOs[7].

An illustration of an increased, widened engagement with CS: the example of Myanmar

In 2014, the EU adopted the 2014 – 2017 EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Myanmar. This represented the first attempt to improve the predictability and visibility of the EU's engagement with CSOs in the country. An assessment of the Roadmap at the end of 2017 showed significant room for improvement. Lessons learnt from the Roadmap implementation and feedback from large regional and national CSO consultations were taken into account in the development of the new EU strategy for a strengthened partnership with CSOs covering the period 2018-2020. This strategy aims at strengthening the partnership between the EU and CSOs to promote an enabling environment for Civil Society's participation in policy-making and policy implementation processes. An innovation was development of the new strategy alongside a very detailed workplan (in an effort to make it implementable) and the hiring of dedicated support for the delegation and MS in the process.

7 This may be done thorough the establishment of a dedicated Civil Society technical assistance team to the delegation and Member States for the organisation and facilitation of dialogue sessions and, more generally, for the implementation and follow-up of the RM (e.g. Myanmar/ ideas for Yemen and Iraq) and/or using existing EU support programmes (e.g. Cameroon/Uganda/etc.)

The second is the **institutionalisation of follow-up mechanisms**, by making the best use of the existing coordination spaces for political and policy dialogue, including the Heads of Mission (HoM) and Heads of Cooperation (HoC)/ Development Counsellors' meetings and other relevant sectoral meetings. This is the case for instance in Tanzania, as illustrated below.

Stronger follow up mechanisms to ensure that the RM becomes a meaningful living document and process in Tanzania

In Tanzania, the new Roadmap for engagement with CSOs, which covers the period 2019-2021 has been conceived as a tool for:

- *Better collective action by combining (individual or joint partner) programmatic interventions and dialogue around common concerns;*
- *Providing a framework for both day-to-day and periodic dialogue with civil society organisations, academia, the media, trade unions and other non-state actors.*
- *Providing a framework for increased collaboration and coordination on programmes supporting common concerns*
- *Making sense of a rapidly changing context and how programmes and dialogue relate to that context*
- *Becoming a public statement to all people in Tanzania about the position of the EU and its Member States on engagement with civil society and on how they intend to implement articles 17 and 62 of the New Consensus for Development in practice*

To make the above possible, Roadmap implementation will be backed up by consistent monitoring, which will take place in a variety of ways, including through existing mechanisms and processes:

- *Heads of Cooperation (HoC) and Heads of Mission (HoM) meetings*
- *Governance and Gender working group meetings*
- *A penholder (EU or a MS) will be selected for each of the three objectives to draft a brief annual report discussing broad progress and challenges on each objective. Reports will be shared with HoCs and HoMs, and might be incorporated into other EU reporting, monitoring and dialogue mechanisms (HRCS, DAP, GBS Underlying Principles, and Article 8 dialogue)*
- *In order to guarantee the required leadership and linkage between the work of technical-level officers and management, a HoM or HoC will be selected to act as a champion for each of the three objectives.*

The third relevant trend is the **deeper integration of the RM into the Joint Programming process**. This is the case of countries such as Cambodia, Senegal or Kenya, where the two processes are closely intertwined. Considering that Joint programming has been confirmed as the preferred way of programming in the New Consensus of Development, this trend will be amplified in the coming years, within the new post 2020 cycle.

7. The consolidation of a process that has proved successful

All in all, the balance is a very positive one. A second generation of Roadmaps is 'in place' in most countries. Reportedly, as evidenced throughout the report, Roadmaps offer a real opportunity for EUDs and MS to share a common language and develop a common vision and agenda for engagement with CSOs, appropriate to the sometimes rapidly changing country dynamics.

What is more, and compared to their predecessors, the new Roadmaps have evolved from an analytical exercise, where the EU broadened its knowledge of the Civil Society landscape, to a strategic tool which is reportedly, **more inclusive, better designed and more effective**.

In a number of countries, thanks to the engagement of many who conducted serious and extensive consultations, Roadmaps appear to be much more than an instrument or a tool for the EU. The orientation that the Roadmap provides is **also proving to be extremely important for CSOs, particularly in environments with much uncertainty, fragmentation and instability**. CSOs in fragile environments feel supported and listened to. CSOs in MICs are accompanied as they move towards more active and complex roles and engagement with government. The efforts of EUDs and MS to define a strategy of engagement with Civil Society in dialogue with all stakeholders, are starting to bear fruit. The RM process promotes in many countries a climate of trust between CSOs and the EU, which CSOs no longer view as donor only, but also as a partner.

Would you say that the process and resulting document have improved *vis-à-vis* the previous one?



Source: Survey to EUDs 2019.

Today, almost half way through the new cycle (2018-2020), the priority is **to activate the Roadmaps effectively**. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate (with concrete results) that Roadmaps can bring about real changes in the ways the EU engages with CSOs, in line with the provisions of the 2030 Agenda, as well as in the quality of EU support strategies and modalities towards CSOs.

All in all, do you believe the RM is a useful document and process?



Source: Survey to EUDs 2019.

This will only happen if EU Delegations, EU Member States and like-minded development partners maintain their engagement towards building and implementing the common vision they have developed. This means building on the increased awareness that the EU and its partners have raised of the notion of working better together with a common plan. The plan is for engaging better, more profoundly and with a broader view with Civil Society (including Foundations, faith-based organisations, the diaspora, the youth, etc) all over the world.

There are a number of challenges ahead.

First and foremost, Roadmap processes imply a different way of working between the EUDs and MS when it comes to CS engagement. In other words, RMs call for a more political and diverse role for EUDs in their engagement with CSOs. This includes facilitation, brokering, mediation, etc., in an effort to bring CSOs closer to their respective authorities and progressively strengthen CS involvement in key political processes as well as in the development, oversight and monitoring of national policy priorities.

Additional efforts are therefore needed in many EUDs to **have a better and more refined understanding of the context** (through regular dialogue, cooperation with thinks tanks and academia, political economy assessments and mappings, etc) and **to obtain the necessary participation of sectoral task managers, and of the political and trade sections inside Delegations**. This is particularly relevant in MICs (where the trade agenda is becoming more prominent) as well as in restrictive environments, which require tailored responses and better coordination between the operational and political sections, and the Human rights and CS agendas.

As evidence shows, the shrinking space for CSOs is a global trend, yet it is enabled by diverse factors and its forms are context-dependent, therefore **requiring innovative responses which also have to be diverse, context-specific and three-fold**, i.e. addressing the preservation of the space, supporting CS adaptation techniques when facing restrictions and, promoting, where possible, the expansion of the space. All in all, the call is for EUDs to continue, refine and even upgrade their efforts to address the shrinking space, using an adapted mix of political, policy and funding instruments.

Globally, but particularly in MICs countries where resources are more limited, **a more strategic and selective allocation of fund is needed**, aligning support through the thematic programmes and dedicated instruments to the strategic objectives of the EU, and to the overall objective of promoting a deeper engagement of CSOs in relevant domestic public policies and agendas (e.g. trade agreements, SDG Agenda, etc.) Notwithstanding the differences across contexts, some areas appear to be in particular need of attention:

- Supporting coordination efforts by Civil Society at national, regional and local level, led by local networks (also issue-based) and supporting their information, awareness-raising and accountability efforts in their constituencies

- Supporting CS efforts to reach out and develop broad coalitions and build alliances, including new actors (i.e. private sector, the media, the academia, tech community, the youth and new generation of civic leaders, etc).

- Supporting capacity development efforts in evidence research and advocacy and policy dialogue, to better equip CSOs in their constructive engagement with the authorities.

- Supporting, data-gathering, monitoring and reviewing efforts led by Civil Society, including collection of alternative data, production of parallel and shadow reports and smart use of social media.

- Supporting positive efforts to promote the inclusion of youth, women and specific vulnerable groups and minorities, in an effort to" leave no one behind', the principle which underpins the 2030 Agenda.

Experience gained throughout the first phase of the Roadmaps also shows that the implementation of the RM requires adequate time and resources, which are not always available from EUDs and MS staff considering the competing priorities and demands that often overburden staff. This is particularly relevant if the EUD and MS are interested in **developing a sustained dialogue with CSOs** and if the Roadmap is to become a living strategic document and process.

Last but not least, as affirmed in different parts of the report, there is a need to **deepen current efforts to engage with new actors and new forms of Civil Society**, beyond the traditional types of actors, including foundations and the private sector, the media, religious leaders and faith-based organisations, youth-led fluid forms of civic action, and even the tech community.

STOCKTAKING OF THE ROADMAPS 2018–2020 IN AFRICA

1. Introduction

The Roadmaps (RM) for strategic engagement with Civil Society identify long-term, country-specific objectives of EU cooperation and were introduced in 2014. They are meant to improve the impact, predictability and visibility of EU actions, to consider the views and challenges of CSOs and to trigger coordination and sharing of good practices with the EU member states and other international actors. Between 2014-2017, EU Delegations and Member States in Africa developed the first RMs for a more strategic engagement with civil society (Table 1)

Table 1: Country Roadmaps in Africa 2014-2017

Country Roadmaps in Africa 2014-2017		
Region	Country	No
Africa/ East	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda	9
Africa/ Central	Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, The Congo Republic, Democratic republ;ic of Congo, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe	8
Africa/ South & Indian Ocean	Angola, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe	13
Africa/ West	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo	14
Total		**44**

From 2016 onwards, EUDs[8] in Africa started to update their RMs for engagement with CSOs, in view of changes in the environment, new Civil Society programmes and/or broader governance initiatives launched. This note presents the results of a stocktaking exercise aimed at gaining a better understanding of these updated RMs in Africa and of the processes leading to them.

1.1 Number and typology of countries[9]

The total number of countries in Africa included in the stocktaking is 48. So far 22 RMs are complete and approved, 10 RMs are under way and 16 need to be updated when the previous RM comes to an end (see figure 1 /Table 2).

8 Including the EU Strategy for engagement with Panafrican civil society.

9 The 48 Africa countries include East: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda; Central: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, The Congo Republic., Congo Democratic Republic, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe; South & Indian Ocean: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe; West: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast , The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

Figure 1: Africa – Stocktaking RM 2018 - 2020

Africa-Total number of countries: 48



Table 2: Africa Regions -Stocktaking RM - 2019 - Number of countries

Region	The number of RMs completed	The number of RMs under way	The number of other RMs	Total
Africa/East	3	3	3	9
Africa/Central	3	2	4	9
Africa / South & Indian Ocean	8	2	4	14
Africa/West	8	3	5	16
	22	**10**	**16**	**48**

Qualitative data (such as a signed RM, a draft RM, a country mission report of the RM facility and/or intermediate deliverables from a RMF support mission) were available from 30 out of 48 countries. (See Annex 1). They comprise all countries that completed the RM (22) and 8 of the 10 countries where work is under way (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, CAR, Angola, The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone).

Country Typology -

According to the World Bank updated country INCOME classifications for 2019, 28 out of the 48 countries under research in this paper are classified as Low-Income Countries (LICs) and 14 as Lower-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs). As illustrated in figure 2, the number of countries with a defined level of prosperity is low. They are mostly concentrated in Africa/South & Indian Ocean and classified as Upper-Middle-Income Countries (UMICs): Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa - and High-Income Countries (HICs) - Seychelles.

Figure 2: Updated Road Maps WB Country income classifications 2019



Newly **GRADUATED** (or to be graduated) countries, where EU bilateral cooperation has been phased out given the income nature of their economies, are Botswana and Namibia. However, both countries still face numerous challenges in the fight against poverty and unemployment. South Africa still has bilateral cooperation, although the country will be transitioning towards graduation and has already inserted, in the RM, several initiatives focused mostly on political dialogue, on thematic instruments and on CSOs' financial sustainability (philanthropy among others).

The **FRAGILE STATES INDEX**, which classifies 178 countries according to cohesion, economic, political and social indicators, shows that 34 of the countries analysed in this paper rank lower than number 50 of the 178 countries. [10]Civil Society in fragile states is often fragmented and itself suffers from the fragility. The political and legal environment in which Civil Society operates in these countries is generally fairly closed to active participation. States tend to lack responsiveness to Civil Society's demands[11]. The quality of the **ENABLING ENVIRONMENT**, that gives CSOs the right in law and in practice to associate and secure funding, coupled with freedom of expression, access to information and participation in public life, is, in most countries, very weak.

All CSOs in **East Africa** operate in a restricted environment, facing absence of an effective legal, regulatory and institutional framework (Somalia) or increased pressure and control, further narrowing space and decline in respect for human rights (Uganda, Tanzania). According to the Civic Freedom Monitor, it is still an uphill battle for many CSOs, despite national strategies (Djibouti), positive statements about CSOs (Sudan) or the legislative and regulatory environments that are broadly helpful to CSO operations (Uganda and Kenya).

Many CSOs in **Africa/ South & Indian Ocean** operate in a fairly permissive enabling environment when it comes to legal provisions that guarantee the space for CSOs to operate. At the same time, however, barriers have emerged in several countries regarding registration, access to public information, harassment of journalists and /or respect for human rights (Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar).

In recent years, quite a few countries in **Africa/ West** have moved to a more conducive environment for citizen engagement and free expression (Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau). However,

10 Africa/East – 8; Africa/Central -7; Africa/ South & Indian Ocean – 6; Africa/West – 13. T**he Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe are a**mong the 10 most fragile countries in the Index.

11 Strengthening Civil Society? Reflections on international engagement in fragile states, ECDPM, Discussion Paper No. 135

several factors continue to negatively impact civic space conditions in the region: (1) political and social instability (Mali, Ivory Coast, DRC, Guinea-Bissau); (2) tensions over power and resources (Sierra Leone); (3) concerns about the security of citizens and Civil Society (Ivory Coast); (4) reports of government intimidation, harassment and the arrest of protestors (Liberia) and (5) pressure on the media in many countries. A truly conducive environment can be found in Benin, where a vibrant and pluralistic Civil Society works freely on a broad range of issues.

1.2 A quick overview of the first Roadmaps in Africa (2014-2017)

In the Gambia, Rwanda, and Uganda, the 2014-2017 RM process was internally developed and validated without any built-in mechanism to monitor and evaluate the implementation. This hampered informed decision-making in the context of the 2018-2020 RM. In Cameroon, an evaluation of the first RM in 2016 revealed that more than 70% of the planned activities had been realised. The cancelling of a justice project, lack of formal engagement of CSOs in human right issues, weak articulation of some actions and lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities explain why some actions were not carried out. In some African countries' unforeseen circumstances like the Ebola outbreak, the political and security situation and the suspension of direct aid by the EU overshadowed more strategic engagement with Civil Society. In the majority of countries, the first RMs provided a framework for dialogue and led to a better appreciation of the role of Civil Society. Many generated commitments from donors to harmonise support strategies and created opportunities for Civil Society to be involved in the identification of priorities for funding.

2. The process leading to the updated RMs

2.1. Inclusiveness and accountability

Almost all EUDs and MS in Africa carried out intense to very intense consultation processes with CSOs. These were not simply box-ticking exercises but were well organised to best accomplish the purpose. However, the degree of intensity of these processes varied in terms of approach, number and character of meetings (formal/informal), selection of participants (number/spectrum), the location (central/ decentralised), the methods used (surveys, workshops, focus group meetings, bilateral interviews), the time and finances allocated for preparation, consultation and publicity, and the degree of transparency about the process and its results (open/restricted).

Approach: As far as the consultation approaches are concerned, a distinction can be made between (1) RM consultations that were uniquely organised as stand-alone activities to collect input from different categories of stakeholders to update the RM and (2) consultations that were integrated in the agendas of other ongoing events, and which at the same time served as an opportunity to feed into the RM process. These included: the programme formulation consultation for the 11th FED in Djibouti, a project seminar organised by EU grant beneficiaries and co-applicants in Kenya; a training workshop on EU proposal-writing for Somalian CSOs, and the project consultation with a fixed group of CSOs regarding the HIBISCUS project in Mali. In Swaziland, consultations were undertaken under the EU-funded project 'fostering cooperation and communication amongst NGOs'.

BOX 1: DEDUCATED CONSULTATIONS IN CONGO BRAZAVILLE

During the two consultation workshops organised with CSOs during February and March 2019 for the elaboration of the new Roadmap, a number of working groups were organized around (i) the environment in which the CS operates in Congo; (ii) the relevance of the priorities of the 2014-2017 Roadmap and; (iii) the sectors of concentration of the EU in the country for the period 2014-2020 and CS roles with regards to such sectors. One group also worked more in-depth on the recommendations to be submitted to the DUE as a result of the reflections of these different groups. This method was particularly useful for ensuring the consistency of the Rm document and the ownership of both CSOs and the different sections in the EU Delegation.

Geographic reach: The consultations ranged from *national level to decentralised* consultations, enabling people from remote locations to present their views in person. Botswana organised four consultative workshops with CSOs in-country and a central validation workshop with all actors consulted. Angola carried out one-on-one meetings in Luanda and Lunda Sul, and Guinea Bissau organised seven workshops. The EUD in Cameroon consulted CSOs in 10 regions of the country. The EUD in The Gambia chose the *combination of urban and rural consultations* to s*hed broader light on the democratic transition the country is currently going through.* Zimbabwe conducted a four-month, country-wide exercise with a broad range of local CSOs, and Somalia, which remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world, organised consultations outside the country.

Which CSOs were invited?[12] Attendance details of consultations or survey responses are only available from a few countries. Consultation processes in the CAR and Burundi revealed the need to get a better picture of the landscape of CSOs that play a relevant role in different sectors, in order to support a more representative participation. There is a tendency to invite CSOs from within the support circle and not to include the diversity of Civil Society in consultations. In Benin and Rwanda, for instance, only consultations with CSOs that already receive EU support or participate in sectoral programme formulation were considered fit for purpose. Questions about representativeness and legitimacy prompted many EUDs to invite platforms and networks, with their members and sometimes non-members, to the consultation tables (CAR, Guinea, Lesotho, The Gambia, Senegal, Uganda).

12 In many countries, the number and location of consultations is not well specified. Very general information from Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe .No information regarding who was invited from Djibouti, Namibia, Guinea Bissau, South Sudan, Burkina Faso.

BOX 2: FRESH PERSPECTIVES IN UGANDA

In Uganda, the EUD invited a variety of CSO actors, selected people who challenged EU thinking and asked for honest feedback about the current EU engagement with Civil Society. Non-traditional guiding questions uncovered how CSOs see the EU/MS, whether or not they feel connected and how they think that the EU/MS should relate to them. The EUD presence and engagement contributed to a very open atmosphere and paved the way for stocktaking and real exchanges about the RM priorities. The genuine intention of the delegation to improve the Roadmap and its use has been recognised by participants.

"There was something different if we compare it with other EU meetings, we were enabled to give real feedback and to reflect on EU engagement in a new way."

Separate meetings were sometimes organised for women, youth, and/or faith-based organisations. Mozambique included 88 national CSOs in the consultations, while countries like Liberia and Burundi organised dialogue with International CSOs which play an important role in a context of fragility and in the absence of strong state institutions. Mauritania organised a consultation with 80 representatives of CSOs while presenting the final version of the updated RM.

2.2. Development effectiveness

The engagement of Member States has been gauged by looking at their active involvement in surveys, workshops or specific consultation and in validation meetings. The conclusion is that the strength of engagement depends, among other things, on the number of MS with a presence in the country, the duration of their country presence, whether or not they carry out substantial activities regarding Civil Society, the urgency to join forces and MS's appreciation of the RM process. 19 RMs have been signed by MS. Engagement can be limited because of the political and security situation (Somalia, Burundi), or because MS are only recently represented in the country or concentrate only on humanitarian aid, such as Italy in the Central African Republic.

In some countries, consultations were conducted with international organisations, especially UN agencies or included the most relevant and active non-EU development partners in the RM exercise.

BOX 3: A COMPREHENSIVE AND THOROUGH PROCESS OF ENGAGEMENT LEADING TO THE NEW ROADMAP IN ANGOLA

The process of designing the new Roadmap was implemented between March and May 2018. It entailed a thorough process pf engagement with many different stakeholders to ensure that their voices were included. The approach included: a) a review of existing secondary information, particularly building on the experiences of on-going EU support programmes and related reports/documents, including a mapping study and external evaluations; b) meetings with EUD, including regular briefings with the development cooperation section, meetings with officers responsible for political dialogue and communication, and an initial briefing with the Head of the Delegation; c) extensive consultations with CSOs through one-on-one meetings in Luanda and Lunda Sul, one focus group discussion held at EU Delegation, and an online questionnaire; d) meetings with like-minded partners beyond the EU Member States (i.e. Swiss Embassy, Norwegian Embassy, World Bank, OSISA, Norwegian Church Aid); e) a validation workshop in Luanda with all the key stakeholders (i.e. CSOs, EU member states, development partners, EU Delegation) to ensure their ownership over the contents and process of the Roadmap.

Joint programming: MS engagement also relates to willingness to invest in joint programming. Perceptions that joint programming represents an administrative burden without clear benefits may indirectly have a negative impact on support for the RM. However, numerous MS and EUDs see the importance of working together and of joint programming. In Uganda, meaningful support modalities include the provision of joint support through the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), funding opportunities. Due to its very existence and pooled funding, the DGF provides the donor community with a stronger and more united voice and, for Civil Society and others, a sense of solidarity. Synergies are being encouraged and developed across the programme and reduce CSO duplication of effort.

2.3. Communication and visibility

> *"The consultations have brought us up to be more visible to CSOs and to build partnership in different regions and with different groups"*

In several countries on and off-line surveys have been conducted to gauge the views, analyses and proposals from stakeholders on how to reinforce the EU/CSOs partnership. E-mails have been sent out to notify stakeholders about the purpose of the RM and the process. Different PowerPoint presentations have been used during consultation meetings; short inspirational videos about Civil Society and change brought energy into consultation rooms and created a sense of presence and engagement. In some countries the absence of a relevant contact database and/or and lack of institutional memory made it difficult to contact wider Civil Society. It is not clear which tools, if any, the EUDs used to provide participants with feedback information on how their inputs affected the end result and follow-up.

BOX 4: VISUAL COMMUNICATION IN THE GAMBIA

PHOTOVOICE *has been used as a communication tool during the consultation process in The Gambia. This methodology, which uses photo images instead of words to capture aspects of CSOs' environment, provided a culturally grounded and contextually situated site for reflection on visual images, associated meanings, and social action. The invited Gambian CSOs highlight, through images, their reality from 2016 to date as well as the impact of the election results and democratic transition on Civil Society. This innovative approach could be applied in other countries that are going through a process of democratic transition or that need to achieve consensus among CSOs.*

The documents used in the stocktaking don't reveal information about promotional activities that may have been used to give visibility to the RM process, or about the use of social media or press releases that were issued. However, the 15 African updated RMs with a full or partial public status contain a declaration to all citizens of these countries regarding the position of the EU and its MS on engagement with Civil Society. General information about the RMs can be found on the EU websites. Political or security considerations, for instance in Burundi, limited possibilities to make information about the context analysis and previous EU engagement accessible to the public. In The Gambia, the opportunity given to the EUD and RM facility to meet the Vice President of the country, Mrs Fatoumata Tambajang, increased the visibility of EU engagement with CSOs.

3. The contents of the EU engagement with CSOs

3.1. The quality of EU engagement with CSOs and policy coherence at global level

Nearly all result frameworks are clear about what is to be achieved through the RM priorities in terms of strategic objectives. Some overarching priorities, that were set out in the first RMs, were still valid; others needed to be revised because of significant changes in the operating context (for instance in Tanzania, Angola, Burundi and The Gambia). The result frameworks present a high degree of coherence between CSOs' needs and selected priorities. That is a great achievement. However, sometimes the frameworks are based on the assumption that the selected actions will bring them to the goal. They may not. The frameworks would benefit from more considered reflection on how change occurs and what in reality may be expected from certain interventions. Angola developed a very valuable approach, anticipating different realities of what might happen and what the RM response and/or actions in those cases could be.

In general, the result frameworks show high ambitions. Expecting too much within the given timeframe might be a pitfall and may lead to frustration. It is important that result frameworks comprise feasible actions and indicators that really make sense in the reality of the country. The actions are often too general and, in most cases, roles and responsibilities could be much better articulated. Countries that formulate indicators in terms of 'level of participation' or mention 'percentage x' need to have baseline information. The baseline data information could be improved. The same programmes and instruments are often repeated as a means to realise actions, but not much information is given about what would be available, or about the follow-up procedure. Almost all RMs have contextualized the three priorities of the 2012 Communication to country realities. However, they don't make explicit reference to the New Consensus of Development or the 2030 agenda. An exception is the second priority of the RM of Botswana that promotes multi-stakeholder dialogues among others, in line with the Agenda 2030.

Many RMs and selected priorities indicate recognition of the multiple roles that CSOs play, the promotion of civic space, including the monitoring of that space (Malawi) and access to public information (Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Cameroon, Benin). Several Roadmaps draw attention to improved coordination, collaboration, networking and collective actions of CSOs (Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Rwanda, Liberia) and better structuration of CS (Mali, Mauritania, Benin). Even greater emphasis is placed on the strengthening of CSOs' voices and dialogue (support to inter-linkages among CSOs, horizontal and vertical), to their effectiveness in engagement with government, emphasising the Civil Society voice (Angola, Somalia), and to CSOs' contribution to peace (Mali, Cameroon). More than in the first African RMs, attention has been given in the analysis and/or actions to the increasing role of the influence of diaspora (Somalia) and of new potential key players. These include: philanthropic structures working on social services and occasionally crossing over to governance issues and advocacy; non-traditional donors, such as China and international private sector organisations such as insurance companies and foundations, for example Bill Gates and Wellspring in Uganda. We also see CSOs as economic actors: young entrepreneurs (Malawi); the role and commercial interests of the private sector (Somalia); trades unions, employers' organisations and professional associations (Cameroon) and agriculture cooperatives (Burundi). Economic development also remains an evolving area for the graduated countries. The RMs of Botswana and Namibia concentrate, amongst other things, on the contribution of CSOs to sustainable economic development. Support targets meaningful participation of CSOs in monitoring implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement, and strategic practices of Corporate Social Responsibility. It also embraces the social business approach, innovative CSOs initiatives, the role of CSOs in job creation and inclusive growth as well as CSOs' capacity to advocate better sustainable local economic development in their respective regions.

3.2. Policy coherence at country level

CSOs' mainstreaming requires the integration of Civil Society's perspective in policies, addressing the representation of CSOs in dialogue and taking steps to improve political recognition for CSOs. Many delegations aim to make policies more effectively responsive to the needs of CSOs and citizens. According to EUD task managers in Uganda, the RM process has triggered reflection among EUD/MS, including those without specific CS programmes, on how to engage with CS across the entire portfolio of development cooperation and policy dialogue. They underlined the need for the EUD to prioritise engagement with CS, but beyond the human rights and democracy sectors, both for service delivery and policy dialogue. In Mauritania, coordination between the EUD and MS in the field of Civil Society, at both the level of cooperation and at the diplomatic level, has intensified thanks also to the follow-up activities of the 2015-2017 Roadmap.

BOX 5: ADVOCATING FOR THE ENABLING ENVIRONEMNET IN MALAWI

In its exchange with authorities, the EUD of Malawi is a strong advocate of the enabling environment for Civil Society. The EUD attended all meetings regarding the revision of the NGO policy and held several meetings to advocate on this issue. During Heads of Missions/Heads of Cooperation meetings where coordination takes place, the questions of CSOs' space and of the draft NGO policy have been often discussed during the past three years. The EU engages with CSOs very frequently and involves them in the context of identification and formulation of new EU interventions. The EU also supports a variety of policy dialogues and knowledge dissemination events organised by CSOs.

In Senegal the joint programming document will promote the mainstreaming of CSOs' participation in the different focal sectors. In addition to the support provided to Civil Society in the priority areas of the Roadmap, the EUD and EU MS in Namibia also support CSOs working in the EU focal sectors of cooperation (education, rural development, environment, energy and climate change) as well as in the cross-cutting issues (gender, human rights.) Guinea Bissau mainstreams CSOs into EU sectors, specifically in food security and public finance management (PFM).

In Zimbabwe, the RM is used as a reference document in the preparation of the human rights country strategy, which is developed jointly with EU Member States and in consultation with CSOs. In the CAR, consultation took place with the political section to ensure consistency with the human rights country strategy. Rwanda, Namibia and Liberia also have a high degree of complementarity between the RM and human rights strategy, and a focus on gender equality. In Djibouti the RM is linked to the long-term strategy "Vision Djibouti 2035" which foresees capacity strengthening of CSOs so that they can play a relevant role in the conception, implementation and monitoring of development programmes focused on poverty reduction, unemployment and internal migration. The EU played a lead role in the formulation and finalisation of the Somali Compact. This explicitly recognises the need for citizen and Civil Society engagement, including 'sound civic dialogue', citing the 'dynamism of the Somali people and the linkages between the different layers of Somali society, the government and its international partners'. Current EU engagement aims to advance the progress of Compact implementation. The RM is aligned to the Somali Compact and New Deal, which provides a strategic framework for coordinating political, security and development efforts through five peace and state-building goals.

4. Means of implementation and follow-up

4.1. The means of implementation

Many RMs make reference to a call for proposals and thematic lines: CSO&LA and EIDHR, the 11th EDF Civil Society support programme, and funds and projects of MS. Political dialogue, better exchange between the political and cooperation section of the EUD (Angola) and better organised structured dialogue are also being considered as important means to achieve results in the areas of the selected priorities. Burkina Faso underlines that improving the coordination of the interventions of the EU + group is an essential condition of successful implementation of priority actions of the Roadmap. Currently, the EU group members support CS very differently in terms of implementation/type of financing modalities and periodicity, which does not facilitate coordinated support. Mozambique mentions, among others, bilateral and collective dialogue for better communication between CSOs and government, between Roadmap signatories and CSOs, and joint core funding mechanisms (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, EU), sector support mechanisms and district, municipal and provincial collaboration mechanisms.

4.2. Means of follow-up

In Senegal, CSOs would like to set up a discussion forum with EUD and MS for more strategic and political exchanges. I*n Angola, follow-up of the RM is integrated in one of the RM priorities, namely a strategic shift towards structured dialogue.* Sierra Leone sees understaffing and limited in-house resources as the main obstacle that the EUD faces in the follow-up of the RM process . The RM has been drafted taking this relevant factor into account, namely by: simplifying the priorities and aligning them to the EU portfolio; detailing the means and actors as much as possible and limiting the number of indicators to the maximum extent possible. During a review of the first RM process in Benin In 2017 it was suggested in Benin to integrate monitoring of

the RM with the activities of the accountability group of technical and financial partners and to provide technical support of the RePaSOC[13] programme (EU) for the follow-up process of the RM. Programme evaluations between 2018-2020 will provide information about the dynamics involved. The information from Tanzania reveals that, in order to be strategic in practice, the Roadmap will need to be backed up by consistent use and effective monitoring. The EUD plans to select a penholder (EU or a MS) for each of the three objectives, to draft a brief (one page) annual report discussing broad progress and challenges on each objective. Reports will be shared with Heads of Cooperation (HoC) and Heads of Mission (HoMs), and can be incorporated into other EU reporting, monitoring and dialogue mechanisms (Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategies, Gender Action Plans, etc). In order to guarantee the required leadership and linkage between the work of technical-level officers and management, a HoM or HoC will be selected to act as a champion for each of the three objectives.

BOX 6: THE NEED FOR STRONGER FOLLOW UP IN TANZANIA

In Tanzania, the new Roadmap for engagement with CSOs, which covers the period 2019-2021 has been conceived as a tool for:

- *Better collective action by combining (individual or joint partner) programmatic interventions and dialogue around common concerns;*
- *Providing a framework for both day-to-day and periodic dialogue with civil society organisations, academia, the media, trade unions and other non-state actors.*
- *Providing a framework for increased collaboration and coordination on programmes supporting common concerns*
- *Making sense of a rapidly changing context and how programmes and dialogue relate to that context*
- *Becoming a public statement to all people in Tanzania about the position of the EU and its Member States on engagement with civil society and on how they intend to implement articles 17 and 62 of the New Consensus for Development in practice*

To make the above possible, Roadmap implementation will be backed up by consistent monitoring, which will take place in a variety of ways, including through existing mechanisms and processes:

- *HOCs and HOMs meetings*
- *Governance and Gender working group meetings*
- *A penholder (EU or a MS) will be selected for each of the three objectives to draft a brief annual report discussing broad progress and challenges on each objective. Reports will be shared with HoCs and HoMs, and might be incorporated into other EU reporting, monitoring and dialogue mechanisms (HRCS, DAP, GBS Underlying Principles, and Article 8 dialogue)*
- *In order to guarantee the required leadership and linkage between the work of technical-level officers and management, a HoM or HoC will be selected to act as a champion for each of the three objectives.*

13 "Renforcement et Participation de la Société Civile» (***RePaSOC***)

5. Conclusions

All in all, the processes leading to the RMs 2018-2020 have been intensive and valuable. The absence, in the first RMs, of a built-in mechanism to question and exchange regarding progress hindered timely learning from practice. However, thanks to the engagement of many who conducted serious and extensive consultations in their respective countries, the RM appears to be much more than an instrument or a tool. The orientation that the RM provides is extremely important for all CSOs in an environment with much uncertainty, fragmentation and instability. CSOs in graduated countries feel supported as they move towards more active and complex roles and engagement with government. The efforts of EUDs and MS to define a strategy of engagement with Civil Society in dialogue with all stakeholders, are starting to bear fruit. The RM process promoted in many countries a climate of trust between CSOs and the EU, which CSOs no longer view as donor only, but also as a partner. Instead of repetitive dialogue with a preferred group of CSOs in the capital cities, country wide exercises with a broad range of local CSOs need to be promoted to get a better picture of the landscape of CSOs and their concerns. EUD invitations to members and non- members of platforms and networks to take a seat at the consultation tables strengthened the representativeness and legitimacy of the process and ensured recognition of the RM.

Ownership of the Roadmap and of the RM priorities increases. EUDs, MS and international partners dialogue more about their vision of Civil Society and about their support strategies and activities. They come closer to their capacity to influence and to support change. They seek synergy of action. The success of the implementation will determine the way forward. It will be important to get the countries that still need to update their RMs on board and to assist others with monitoring.

STOCKTAKING OF THE ROADMAPS 2018–2020 IN ASIA

1. Introduction

Since the issuing of the 2012 Communication from the Commission "The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations" (hereinafter "The Communication") the strategy to roll out Roadmaps (RM) for engagement with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) across the world has become a reality. The EU's RM strategy marks a breakthrough in the way EU Delegations (EUD) and Member States (MS) engage with domestic CSOs in partner countries. While there is still a long path ahead, RMs are providing a more informed and in-depth understanding of the landscape in partner countries, including the potential as well as the challenges that Civil Society confronts at both the regional and local level. RMs have also facilitated a renewed joint commitment by EUD and MS as well as more strategic and structured cooperation with Civil Society in the Asia-Pacific region. There is a gradual move from an ***ad-hoc***, project-based (or issue-based) approach towards a longer-term, more strategic and focused, results-oriented process approach.

As the Communication anticipated, this renewed EU commitment to Civil Society is being made within a worrying and shrinking environment for CSOs across the world[14]. This difficulty is particularly acute in the Asia-Pacific region where almost all countries with an updated or new Roadmap for the period 2018-2020 (and beyond) are considered to have a restrictive environment for CSOs. (Only Nepal and East Timor report positive trends.) Evidence of this non-conducive environment comes from the fact that 22 RM documents[15] in Asia-Pacific classified the environment as restricted. Another feature of the Asia-Pacific region is the high number of open armed conflicts in different countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines and Yemen.) Surprisingly, restrictive environments are not only found in the numerous Lower Income Countries (LICs) and conflict-affected countries in the region, but also in more stable countries, including countries recently ***graduated*** from EU development aid, as well as at the regional level.

All these factors have shaped the forms and roles of Civil Society groups in Asia-Pacific societies. There is also a prevailing climate of distrust and discomfort between governments and CSOs, particularly in relation to those organisations engaged in human rights and governance issues and/or holding a position "critical" of the government and/or working on sensitive issues such as land rights, minority rights, etc.

Figure 1: State-of-Play of 2nd-gen RM



14 As shown by different indicators (CIVITAS) and, more importantly, portrayed in detail by the RMs 2018-2020.

15 Three restricted RMs for the period 2015-2017 are now public in their new/updated version (Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and East Timor) while in the case of Kyrgyzstan and the Solomon Islands, the first RMs 2014-2017 were public and are now restricted for the period 2018-2020.

Against this largely restrictive backdrop, Roadmaps are designed to equip EUD and active MS with a renewed strategic and structured framework. This needs to be sufficiently flexible to be customised to the specific circumstances of each country and consistent with the implementation of EU worldwide policy, and with the aims of the 2030 Agenda. The ultimate goal is for the RM process to better prepare the EU to champion support to Civil Society organisations in this vast region where EU leverage in several countries is rather limited and decreasing (India, China, Indonesia, etc.) The aim is also to partner with like-minded CSOs to contribute to the EU's mandate to promote democracy, human rights, peace-building and gender equality across the world.

1.1 Number and typology of countries

The vast Asia-Pacific region covered by this report includes 22 Roadmaps for the period 2018-2020 and beyond[16], of which 15 are ***completed*** and six were ***underway at the time of the drafting of the report*** [17]. Most cover the period 2018-2020, except for four which extend to 2021. Ongoing processes in Iraq and Yemen, even if not necessarily leading to a RM document as such, are also assessed. Asia-Pacific countries without a RM are Macao, Turkmenistan and Bhutan[18] as well as High-Income Countries (HICs) and Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs), none of which is a recipient of Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) funds[19].

In addition to national RMs, there is one innovative regional RM: for the Pacific Region (with a two-fold strategy, aiming at both the regional and national level[20]). Interesting lessons can be learned from it as it constitutes an example of good practice for other regions across the globe.

BOX 1: The Pacific Roadmap for engagement with CSOs 2018-2020

Building on the first RM experience, it was decided to develop a specific Pacific regional RM, covering Fiji, Regional Pacific, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and the Solomon Islands. This establishes both regional and country priorities for the 2018-2020 period, taking into account that RM implementation has been challenging due to: i) the geography of the region; ii) the need to contribute to cementing national-regional links and iii) the need to rationalise the multiplicity of EU programmes and instruments. The new Regional Pacific Roadmap 2018-2020 prioritises CSO capacity building. This embraces policy and budget analysis, evidence-based research and advocacy, coalition building, influencing and the use of capacity needs assessments to engage with and to advocate, monitor and report on the performance of regional institutions on prioritised themes. The RM outlines a sound action plan linked to a combination of programmes as well as detailing different grants and projects and the forecast budget. The NSA programme under the 10th and 11th EDF, along with other instruments such as DCI 2015 provide a clear base for CSO mainstreaming and constitute good practice on financial predictability. Under the country priorities, the RM introduces a clear strategy to boost national capacities of CSOs to engage in policy dialogue with the EU and governments under the EU specific sector programmes of the different islands' CSOs. This includes programmes including CS components within sectoral programmes such as waste management, energy, and fisheries. All in all, the RM represents a clear path to promoting structured dialogue with Pacific CSOs across the various DCI/EDF projects over the next three to five years, at both regional and national level.

16 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pacific Regional, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, East Timor, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
17 China, India, Thailand, India, Pakistan and Yemen.
18 An identification mission to Bhutan was conducted by the EU, defining another mechanism to support Civil Society.
19 Such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, South Korea, North Korea and Japan.
20 For the period 2014-2017 there were five RM documents: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and another covering the rest of the islands.

Regarding the typology of countries with RM, the immense Asia-Pacific region includes numerous countries of very diverse nature, ethnic grouping and social and political backgrounds as well as varying levels of income and human development. Broadly similar features are a late decolonisation from European powers, and some of the world's highest population densities (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia). There are enduring religious and ethnic tensions (Afghanistan, India, Irak, Pakistan), authoritarian regimes (several with a communist past) which rarely consider CSOs as key players for development; there are huge development differences between urban and rural areas, primeval representations of Civil Society and, overall, challenging enabling environments for Civil Society marked by a number of restrictive issues. All these factors appreciably shape the nature and role of CSOs in the Asian and Pacific countries.

The majority of the countries with RMs are countries classified as LICs (14)[21] followed by six UMICs[22] (graduated) and only one LMIC[23] as per the World Bank classification.

Figure 2: Status of 2nd-gen RM documents



The Asia-Pacific region is marked by a large number of fragile states[24] and conflict-affected countries which are recipients of special attention by the EU. Another common factor is the restrictive environment for CSOs, where the environment is considered non-conducive based on the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index (EEI)[25]. Paradoxically, the situation is not better in countries considered stable, including countries recently ***graduated*** from EU development aid. As a result, most of the countries (22) in the grand Asia-Pacific region are restricted, while only four are Public (Pacific, East Timor, Papua New Guinea and Myanmar, all of which were restricted in their first versions).

Another main challenge, as reported in the RM of graduated countries in the Asia-Pacific region, is the difficulties for EUDs to keep supporting CSOs in graduated countries which are no longer eligible for Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) funding and where the EU has limited, and even decreasing, leverage. Of the 6 countries graduated in Asia (China, India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the Maldives and Thailand) Malaysia and Thailand have been completed. India and China updated RMs are under way.

21 Low-Income Countries (LICs): 14. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen.
22 Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs): 6. China, Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Thailand, Iraq
23 Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs): 1. India
24 Based on OECD definition embraced by the EU.
25 The Enabling Environment Index (EEI). http://www.civicus.org/eei/

2. The process leading to the Roadmaps 2018–2020

2.1. Inclusiveness and accountability

Another dimension of EU attention is the improvement in EU dialogue with CSOs. Seeking a renewed partnership with Civil Society, the rollout of the first RM processes (2014-2017) allowed the EU to engage in a more knowledgeable and participatory way. That was the result of a) systematic research and assessment of the three priorities of the COM2012 in each country and b) the required process of wide consultation with CSOs. Building on lessons learned from the first consultations and establishment of joint priorities, the RMs for the period 2018-2020 have, in many countries, raised the level and quality of dialogue with CSOs to a new level.

Figure 3: CSO consultation in RM design



To renew the RMs 2014-2016, many EUDs started, in 2017, updating their RMs for the period 2018-2020 and beyond. Of the 21 updated RMs analysed, six reveal an intense level of RM consultation with Civil Society for the RM design and 15 cases are deemed moderate. Afghanistan (244 CSOs via survey), India (around 200 CSOs), Pakistan (250 CSOs), Thailand (144 CSOs) and Timor (40 CSOs) are countries where consultations included a larger number of CSOs, regional consultations and surveys.

BOX 2: Combined methodology for CSO involvement in Afghanistan (in a conflict-affected country)

As implemented for the first RM, countrywide consultations were held with stakeholders in Kabul and five regions (North, South, East, West, Central Highlands). Additional questionnaires were designed to collect the views of 5 MS and 24 INGOs engaged in Afghanistan. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were carried out with several types of actors: registered NGOs, trades unions/guilds and their provincial branches, youth groups, student associations and volunteer networks. A FGD questionnaire was developed, and FGDs involved at least ten representatives from each group in each region, ensuring gender balance as much as possible. FGDs were conducted in Kabul and the five regional capital hubs (Mazar-e Sharif, Herat City, Bamyan Centre, Jalalabad, and Kandahar City). Additional FGDs were conducted in Daykundi. Key Informant Interviews were conducted with relevant stakeholders and the donor community (diplomatic representations and INGOs), government and representatives of CS networks. These were used to identify progress on priorities outlined in the previous Roadmap. A final workshop was conducted in Kabul in August 2017, bringing together 21 CSOs.

Consultation methods were wider and more methodological that in the past, and included meetings in the capitals, decentralised meetings in regions as well as surveys, thematic workshops or focus groups discussions. In the other countries, consultations are deemed moderate, being based on ***ad hoc*** meetings and the general information provided. Some countries, such as Cambodia and Myanmar, have initiated more ambitious, structured dialogue with CSOs to make consultations more systematic.

BOX 3: Intense CSO involvement in Pakistan and Thailand

In Pakistan, 250 CSOs from different backgrounds and levels (NGOs, INGOs, private foundations, networks and coalitions, trades unions, etc.), have been consulted for the update of the RM through (i) an online survey; (ii) regional seminars covering all Pakistani territory; (ii) a final workshop organised in Islamabad and (iv) in-depth interviews. Other relevant stakeholders were also consulted, including government officials.

In Thailand, 144 entities took part in the consultations: CSOs of a wide range of networks and platforms; policy and academic research entities; individual NGOs; public media; scholars from universities and representatives from organisations. Provincial/regional Civil Society networks also participated in four CSOs consultation workshops held in the Southern Region (Hatyai/Songkhla), the North--Eastern Region (Khon Kaen), Bangkok and the Eastern Region (Bangkok) and the Northern Region (Chiang Mai)

2.2. Development effectiveness

Looking at several indicators (i.e. the number of MS signatories, level of MS involvement in the RM design, MS efforts – operational and political – included in the RM logical framework, and RM provisions for MS coordination or joint programming) the quality of MS involvement in the RMs 2018-2020 in Asia-Pacific varies significantly between countries and RM phases, but shows encouraging trends as compared to the RMs 2014-2017.

Beyond participating in the design in many countries, MS are gradually becoming involved in political and policy dialogue which adds to the impact and credibility of the RM process ***vis-a-vis*** governments. In a few cases, MS are included in the RM logical framework as a means of implementation. This is the case in Laos (France, Germany and Switzerland), East Timor (Portugal and Finland), Malaysia (UK and Netherlands) and Papua New Guinea (French Embassy, UK). Uzbekistan adds as priority one strengthening cooperation and coordination among donors and Nepal includes a horizontal pillar to coordinate EUD and MS efforts while Laos and Pakistan set up a EU + MS political dialogue mechanism. Links to joint programming are limited to Laos while Afghanistan mentions it as an aspiration. Norway in Nepal and Switzerland in Laos are non-EU MS joining RM efforts reflected in their logical frameworks.

Considering the above-mentioned criteria, the level of MS engagement is deemed as follows:

- Intense: Laos, Malaysia, Vietnam, Pakistan, Nepal, Vietnam
- Moderate: Afghanistan, India, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Tajikistan, East Timor, Myanmar
- Basic:, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Regional Pacific, Sri Lanka.

Often, the degree of MS participation depends on a combination of factors. These include: MS representation (MS participation in the Maldives is by six MS based in Sri Lanka; MS presence in the Regional Pacific is limited); the existence of aid programmes; MS historical/strategic bonds with countries; MS ownership of CSOs' agenda and prior participation in HR and gender gap strategies; the nature of the country - fragile, restricted or graduated - and EUDs' leadership of RM processes. Several RMs do not specify the level of MS engagement.

BOX 4: Strong MS involvement in a graduated country: Malaysia

Representatives of 18 EU Member States attended the Heads of Mission Meeting on 25th May 2017: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK and the EU. No European development partners have bilateral cooperation programmes in Malaysia. Malaysia has not received funding from the thematic programmes, yet the EUD and MS are actively using the RM as a tool in their common Human Rights and Democratisation Strategy.

2.3. Communication and visibility

The generally restrictive environment for CSOs in the Asia-Pacific region remains an insurmountable impediment for the development of sound plans of communication and visibility of RMs in the region. Of the 22 RMs finalised for the period 2018-2020, only three are public. The adoption of a more simplified RM document has not significantly contributed to having RM documents publicised and shared with national authorities. Against this backdrop, the production of visibility and communication products is scarce. These figures contrast with the situation in the LAC region where 9 of the 11 RMs for the period 2018-2020 are public and only 2 restricted.

Exceptions are Nepal, which will use the website and social media to inform on access to grants, and Pakistan which foresees setting up a virtual knowledge webpage where information on the legal and institutional framework, and other relevant information is made available to CSOs and the public. Papua New Guinea has published a brochure which illustrates RM priorities in a clear, reader-friendly way.

3. The contents of EU engagement with CSOs

3.1. The quality of EU engagement with CSOs and policy coherence at global level

The newly-introduced, results-oriented framework aims at the so-called operationalisation of RM actions to be achieved within the typical three-year lifespan of a RM to contribute to long-term priorities. Compared to the preceding RMs, the quality of the results-based framework shows a critical improvement based on the new, simplified template and both remote and country support which were offered to delegations.

Overall, there is a visible improvement in the technical quality of RMs. Compared to the RMs for the period 2014-2017, most of the new RMs included a more focused approach with fewer priorities and a logical pathway between actions, means and indicators. Priorities are also tailored to the conditions of each country beyond the simple transcription of the three COM2102 pillars. Also, a majority of the new RMs in Asia-Pacific (13 - 68% - as opposed to the previous six or 32%) are using the new results-based framework that will allow follow-up based on action indicators, baseline and means of verification.

In this respect it is worth highlighting the high technical quality of several RMs. India provided a sound display of entry points combining operational and political actions on subjects accepted by goverment; the Maldives offered a simple framework focused on the Enabling Environement using sectors to progress the CSO agenda;, Malaysia employed a good, prudent framework focusing on national agenda higlights and trying to overcome the funding shortage of a graduated country; the Pacific Region's RM has the logical framework of a capacity-focused RM, combining regional and national priorities, with strong links to means of implementation; the East Timor RM has a sound in-built monitoring system with simple baseline and target and links to all focal sectors; Thailand presented a robust logical framework, mainstreaming support to the SDG agenda; the Papua New Guinea RM is simple but is focused on developing goverment openness to CSOs. These RMs are providing a sound results-based logical framework in support of CSOs.

The quality of each RM also depends on the degree of ambition it represents. Afghanistan, Nepal, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan still use the first RM template. The logical frameworks of RMs in Bangladesh and Indonesia reflect low ambition, including only actions. The Philippines uses a very specific format including the six EU sector priorities and indicators from the Multi annual Indicative programe (MIP), but without specifically focusing actions on CSOs. Lastly, Myanmar presents an interesting document without a results-oriented framework but setting out a throrough national and regional methodology which lays the ground for an ambitious, structured engagement with CSOs.

Used the results-based framework: India, Laos, Malaysia, East Timor, the Maldives, Pacific Region, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.

Did not use the results-based framework: Afghanistan, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Myanmar, and Tajikistan still used the first RM template; Bangladesh and Indonesia display low-ambitious RMs with actions only.

BOX 5: A simple, results-oriented approach tailored to the EUD for RM operationalisation in East Timor

To overcome the challenges to operationalise their first RM, East Timor updated the RM document by incorporating all EU bilateral and thematic programmes (CSO mainstreaming) as well as introducing a simple built-in monitoring framework of priorities and actions and a follow-up mechanism. A hands-on document aligns ongoing and future EU actions in support of CS and democracy, this document to be shared with CSOs and other stakeholders compared to the previous restricted one.

Overall, the strategies of the RMs for the period 2018-2020 continue to revolve around the 3 priorities of the COM2012:

PRIORITY.1 Given the overall shrinking space for CSos in Asia-Pacific countries, most RMs include sound actions to trigger reform of existing legal and institutional frameworks (Afghanistan, Laos). Malaysia priority one explicitly states a 'slowing and reversing of the shrinking space for Civil Society', In Tajikistan there has been a 'contribution to enhancing the level playing field for CSOs by creating peer pressure through diplomacy and political dialogue with the government and by publicly raising human rights concerns'. Countries such as East Timor and Pakistan – which included the promotion of a multi-stakeholder and evidence-based approach to support the reform of the legal and institutional environment regulating CSO registration and functioning– undertake a mapping study. Nepal will organise an annual Civil Society forum dialogue to enhance dialogue on EE between the EU and CSOs. Papua New Guinea is creating a strong platform for Civil Society participation in policy dialogue. East Timor plans to carry out a sectoral mapping in the focal sectors of EU cooperation.

In India and Pakistan, there are interesting actions regarding corporate social responsibility and private philanthropy support to CSOs as entry points to tackle financial sustainability. In Pakistan the aim is to promote private-private partnerships (PPP) between CS and business, industry and social enterprises.

PRIORITY.2 Often, due to the impact of a restrictive EE and the lack of openness by governments with CSO engagement in policy dialogue, or CSOs' limited capacities for meaningful policy-dialogue engagement (with governments) or sometimes a lack of legitimacy and representativeness of capital-based CSO networks – or even the absence of them, the level of participation in domestic policies of partner countries in Asia-Pacific remains suboptimal. Consequently, most RMs include wide-ranging actions to promote meaningful and structured participation of CSOs. Correctly, several RMs stress the importance of EU/CSO policy dialogue within programmes in EU focal sectors. Vietnam includes CSOs' participation in policy discussions on EU budget support (health, energy and Public Financial Management). Tajikistan's priority one focuses on Civil Society's watchdog role and meaningful participation in the strengthening and monitoring of activities promoted in the focal sectors of EU and EU MS cooperation. In Papua New Guinea the government is developing a state-CSO Partnership Policy for service delivery, which should provide the framework for partnerships in development and nation building. It stresses the importance of prompting CSO collaboration with government on institutional and policy reforms. Indonesia promotes CSOs' involvement

through the *Musrenbang* and improves networking and coordination on the monitoring and implementation of Agenda 2030. Nepal is promoting the participation/consultation of CSOs in two main policy exercises: the Post Disaster Recovery Framework and the 14th three-year development plan (led by the National Planning Commission). Uzbekistan, due to the government's mistrust of international donors' support, prefers as entry point the less political areas of RM engagement such as environment, youth entrepreneurship, rural development, women and children's rights, disabled people's rights, labour rights, social services. Several RMs foresee activities involving GONGOS as an entry point to normalise the EU engagement with CSOs and their role as development players, even those fully aligned with governments, in not conducive environments.

PRIORITY.3 As indicated by many RMs, capacity-building remains paramount in RMs. In a clear evolution from pre-RM, EU capacity-building support, a diversity of capacity-building priorities and actions of some of the RMs are now aligned with the COM2012 pillars and especially in dialogue with EU and in analysis, advocacy, monitoring and negotiation with governments. One area of particular attention is strengthening coordination and cooperation among CSOs. In this regard, the RM Regional Pacific emphasises capacity development around the support to networking and alliance-building at both national and regional levels. Tajikistan focused on decreasing the gap between urban and rural CSOs as well as foreseeing targeted training for think tanks and women's rights groups. India earmarks part of EU support to capacity-building for CSOs in the North-East. Regional Pacific devotes priority one to enhancing the capacities of national organisations and regional networks to engage in policy dialogue in the EU focal sectors. Another capacity-building priority is to contribute to policy discussions with state institutions. Laos focuses on the capacity of CSOs to implement sustainable development projects and prioritises boosting Lao citizens' awareness and rights-related networking capacities. Pakistan and Afghanistan stress the importance of CS accountability and transparency by promoting the development of self-governance standards, including codes of conduct and certification mechanisms.

Financial sustainability is a high priority in several RMs. In Tajikistan, sustainability of the Civil Society sector will be sought through identification and boosting of domestic funding sources. Likewise, Sri Lanka introduces a third priority to ensure CSOs reduce dependency on short-term, foreign donor funding and improve their local resource generation skills. The China, India and Pakistan RMs emphasise engagement with the private sector and philanthropy to enhance the role and funding of CSOs.

The 2030 Agenda SDGs have become a central entry point to support in the relationship between the EU and CSOs, for example in India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. A wide range of actions - thematic seminars, calls for proposals, etc. – are included in support of the implementation of the SDGs at different levels. In the case of Thailand, all priorities are entirely aligned with the national SDG agenda. In India, strong emphasis is placed on supporting CSO initiatives to monitor off-track SDGs, address SDG 16, and provide independent research on India's progress and on challenges to the implementation of flagship programmes relevant to the SDG framework. This approach looks fitting in countries where a clear tendency towards a restricted environment can be seen. The EU has emphasised its engagement with CSOs around the 2030 Agenda and the countries' commitments towards SDGs. This has allowed a new openness from governments in engaging with CSOs, which had never been seen before.

BOX 6: RMs strongly aligned with the 2030 Agenda: the case of Thailand

Given the high commitment the Government of Thailand has shown towards SDGs (the 20-year National Strategy, 2017-2036 and the 12th National Economic and Social Development Plan, 2017-2021) the Thailand RM is based on the SDGs with a focus on Civil Society participation, localisation of international commitments, public advocacy and communication as well as Civil Society joint work and collaboration. These elements can constitute the basis for fostering relations between CS and public actors.

Given this commitment, SDGs have strong potential and present a unique opportunity as an 'entry point' to create common spaces for dialogue and collaboration in the different phases of the public policy cycle, which foster opportunities for joint work between governments and CSOs at the local, regional and national level. Also, SDGs has proven a common agenda around which public-private actions (government and private sector) are sought.

The "SDG-centred" approach is used by the EUD to develop its support to Civil Society through different EU instruments such as the EU Policy Dialogue Support Facility (PDSF), which works with different line ministries and agencies (such as the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment) in developing their roadmap for SDG implementation. Additionally, the EU supports the Social Research Institute of Chulalongkorn University (CUSRI) in providing recommendations to establish a mechanism for increasing CSOs' participation in implementing and monitoring Thailand's SDGs.

3.2. Policy coherence at the country level

As explained in the section below, one key feature of the RMs 2018-2020 in Asia-Pacific is the wider allocation of countrywide and regional programmes of bilateral cooperation (DCI). Bilateral programmes under the DCI for Asia and the 10th and 11th EDF for the Pacific region are used by many RMs. Having incorporated bilateral cooperation into the RMs is a key trigger for CSO mainstreaming across EU focal sectors.

Coherence with other key EU strategies – namely the Human Rights and Democratisation Country Strategies and the Gender Action Plans- are evident in many countries. Pakistan and Afghanistan include human rights defenders as a sub-priority in HR policy dialogue. Several RMs (nine) clearly link to two key EU agendas: the human rights and democratisation strategy and the EU gender action plan. These are Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, China, Laos and Malaysia. In terms of policy dialogue, RM implementation has benefited from EU (EUD+MS) prior policy dialogue on human rights and gender. Moreover, RMs have become complementary to the policy dialogue efforts of EUD and MS in these fields.

RMs are instrumental in many delegations in promoting mainstreaming of Civil Society in across policy dialogue and operational support. Beyond thematic programmes, one key feature of the new RMs in Asia-Pacific is the allocation of countrywide and regional programmes of bilateral cooperation. . This approach has allowed EUDs to better rationalise all support targeted to CSOs but also, in several advanced RMs, to mainstream Civil Society across EU sectors and bilateral cooperation. While CS mainstreaming continues in early stages to measure actual impact, there is a wealth of action planned.

The Philippines plans CSO mainstreaming into EU focal sectors (*'partnership with Filipino CSOs'*) through bilateral programmes under the six priorities of the RM 2017-2020. India explicitly foresees promoting EU-India cooperation through CSO engagement on trade and a possible EU-India FTA. Papua New Guinea includes WASH, rural entrepreneurship and trade and investment funding. East Timor's flagship social audit programme and the EDF PFM programme are part of the RM strategy. Thailand used the Thai-EU bilateral programme of Policy Dialogue Support Facility (PDSF) operating from mid-2013 to 2017, the Switch Asia, the Global Public Good and Challenges and the Foreign Policy Instruments. Pakistan's bilateral sectoral programmes (nutrition, TVET, youth employability) are factored in. Tajikistan stresses the complementarity of the Poverty Reduction Programme within the Sector Policy Support (SPSP) and the Social Protection and Human Development Support (HDSP), combining budget support, grants to CSOs and technical assistance. The Maldives mainstreams focal sectors (social development and inclusive and sustainable growth) as well as two ongoing programmes with the WB under the Climate Change Trust Fund.

Specific mention should be made of the Pacific regional RMs, as the updating process started with a mainstreaming workshop organised by the EUD to better understand the work of and engagement with CSOs and possibilities across different sectors. The Rm is articulated around the existing programmes, both at regional and national level, with specific allocations of means. In particular, priority Four of the RM Regional Pacific plans to strengthen the voices and capacities of in-country organisations to better engage in the focal sectors of EU cooperation.

4. Means of implementation and follow-up

4.1. The means of implementation

The RM documents are countrywide strategies drawn up through a participatory process by each EUD to better engage with domestic Civil Society and to establish a joint Roadmap for improvement around the three well-known priorities of the COM2012. RMs do not include allocated budget lines to implement activities planned. Instead, RMs align their priorities and actions to ongoing or forthcoming EU funding mechanisms, programmes and projects. Adding to the previous action dashboard which included a combination of policy dialogue and operational support analysis, there is a new framework to implement policy and monitor RM progress.

Policy and political dialogue has become a fundamental aspect of EU support to CS, particularly in middle-income countries where development assistance has been graduated. With different levels of ambition, all RMs include policy dialogue. This may be bilateral, between the EU and CSOs, with several countries, such as Myanmar and Cambodia, shifting towards more permanent and structured forms of dialogue. It may be tripartite dialogue, involving governments at the national and local level and where the EU plays "a broker" role, supporting invited spaces created by the authorities (in line with the Agenda 2030 but not directly linked to it) or even spaces led by CSOs themselves.

In extremely restricted countries, RMs have identified an entry point for political dialogue. This is the case in countries such as China, India, Pakistan, Myanmar and Vietnam among others. With regard to political dialogue, given the deteriorating environment in many countries in Asia-Pacific, several RMs placed special emphasis on the enabling environment and the structured dialogue dimensions of the Communication. For example, the Vietnam RM highlights the EU role as a broker facilitating CSOs' structured involvement and participation in domestic policies. In China, the RM explores the spaces where dialogue is welcomed by the authorities, in parallel with EU affirmative action to support human rights defenders. The RM in India promotes the idea of increasing the number and diversity of CSO partners engaged in policy dialogue on priorities of EU-India cooperation, trade and a possible EU-India FTA and EU-India cooperation. India instructs all EUD sections to expand the number and diversity of CSO partners in policy dialogue. In terms of policy dialogue, RM implementation has benefited from EU (EUD+MS) prior policy dialogue in the human rights and gender agendas. Moreover, RMs have become complementary to the policy dialogue efforts of EUD and MS in these fields. RMs are also instrumental in some delegations in promoting CSO mainstreaming of Civil Society in all relevant aspects of policy dialogue and operational support.

Operational support: the range of programmes and instruments available at the country level for EUDs includes the two main thematic programmes CSO&LA and EIDHR (CBSS and HQ). These remain the fundamental tools in support of Civil Society in most RMs. Some of the RM documents assessed still make a generic reference to CSO&LA and EIDHR. CSO&LA and EIDHR and the RMs have significantly benefited from each other. Most RM actions have been funded through CSO&LA and EIDHR projects, while the exhaustive knowledge of CSOs imparted by RM documents is key to informing EIDHR and CSO-LA Call for Proposals and enhancing the quality of consultations with CSO grantees. Another thematic programme, Aid to Uprooted People (AUP) is used in RMs such as Thailand and Afghanistan.

4.2. Means of follow-up

RMs for the period 2018-2020 are meant to enhance follow-up through i) the addition to the logical framework in the new template of a baseline and means/sources of verification for the indicators and ii) introduction of follow-up structures.

Most RMs in Asia-Pacific (13 - 68%) are using the new results-based framework that will allow follow-up against action indicators, baseline and means of verification. In this respect it is worth highlighting, East Timor, Thailand, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Malaysia as RMs rolling out a sound results-based logical framework in support of CSOs. The means of following-up RMs also depends on the degree of ambition of each RM/EUD as well as the regularity of follow-up exercises.

Concerning the structures to follow-up, compared to the LAC region, structures and stable mechanisms to implement and monitor RMs are an exception in the Asia-Pacific region. Only 6 out of 21 have foreseen specific follow-up mechanisms. An interesting case is Myanmar, where Terms of Reference have been developed to roll out an ambitious plan to implement and follow-up the RM through structured dialogue at national and local levels. East Timor foresees the establishment of the RM dialogue group and a matrix (perhaps along sector subgroups) to follow-up and take actions in the promotion of the EE and sustainability for CSOs. Without furthering the functioning, Afghanistan plans to initiate a coordination group to monitor the RM and organise follow-up workshops with partner CSOs to identify lessons learned and means to overcoming challenges. Laos is planning periodic surveys among CSOs and Vietnam also aims to include annual meetings to update and review the status of the RM implementation that could result in the establishment of permanent schemes.

While many RMs do not elaborate on follow-up mechanisms, it is assumed that RM follow-up will take place though *ad hoc* exercises or though existing regular EU Human Rights Coordination Groups, HoC meetings or country-established working groups between donors and CSOs (Tajikistan). Reflecting the predictability principle, the Pacific region details funding allocation to NSA Regional Programme (Phase 1 - 2015-2018 and phase 2 - 2018-2020) and Malaysia includes funding provisions for 2018 and 2017 of the thematic programmes CSO-LA and EIDHR.

BOX 7: The mechanism to follow-up the Roadmap in Myanmar

In 2014, the EU adopted the EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Myanmar (2014 – 2017). This constituted the first attempt to improve the predictability and visibility of the EU's engagement with CSOs in the country. An assessment of the EU Roadmap at the end of 2017 showed significant room for improvement. Lessons learnt from the EU Roadmap implementation and feedback from large regional and national CSO consultations were taken into account for the development of the new EU strategy for a strengthened partnership with CSOs, covering the period 2018-2020. This aims at strengthening the partnership between the EU and CSOs to promote an enabling environment for Civil Society's participation in policy-making and policy implementation processes.

As an innovation, the new strategy was developed alongside a very detailed work plan (in an effort to make it implementable) with the hiring of dedicated technical assistance to support the Delegation and MS in the process. There are three specific objectives of this dedicated facility:

- *To strengthen Civil Society capacity to advocate and influence public policies through supporting the EUD to organise structured dialogues with CSOs at regional, state and national level*
- *To strengthen information-sharing, communication and learning between the EU and CSOs*
- *To enhance mutual understanding and communication between the EUD and Civil Society organisations in terms of policy and operational support.*

5. Conclusions

The new RMs are a much more technical, thorough exercise, balancing the circumstances of the countries with the means at the disposal of EUDs and MS. The newly-introduced, results-oriented framework aims at the so-called operalisation of RM actions to be achieved within the typical three-year lifespan of a RM to contribute to long-term priorities. Regarding the quality of the results-based framework, compared to the previous RMs covering the period 2014-2017, there is a critical improvement based on the new, simplified template and both remote and country support was offered to delegations. Overall, there is a visible improvement in the technical quality of RMs. Compared to their predecessors, the new RMs for the period 2018-2020 include more focus, with fewer priorities and a logical pathway between actions, means and indicators and also included priorities tailored to the conditions of each country, beyond the simple transcription of the 3 COM2102 pillars. They are also using the new results-based framework as opposed to the 32% or six which do not. This means sound methodological CS strategies equipped with follow-up mechanisms including actions, indicators, baselines, targets and means of verification.

In many delegations RMs are instrumental in promoting the mainstreaming of Civil Society in all relevant aspects of policy dialogue and operational support. Beyond thematic programmes, one key feature of the new RMs in Asia-Pacific is the wider allocation of countrywide and regional sector programmes of bilateral cooperation.

In a region with an overall shrinking environment for CSOs, many RMs are used in a strategic way to defend and promote basic civil and political rights and to promote the very concept and role of CSOs as well as the life of HR defenders. For this, EUDs are using RMs customized to the enabling environment realities and exploring tailored and innovative ways to move the CSO agenda forward in the region.

To renew the RMs 2014-2016, many EUDs started, in 2017, updating their RMs for the period 2018-2020 and beyond. Of the 21 updated RMs analysed, six reveal an intense level of RM consultation with Civil Society for the RM's design and 15 cases are deemed moderate. Consultation methods are wider and more methodological that in the past.

Looking at several indicators (numbers of MS signatories, levels of MS involvement in the RM design, MS efforts – operational and political – included in RMs, logical framework and RM provisions for MS coordination or joint programming), the quality of MS involvement in the RMs 2018-2020 in Asia-Pacific varies significantly between countries and RM phases but shows encouraging trends as compared to the RMs for the preceding period 2014-2017.

The 2030 Agenda SDGs have become a central entry point in support of the relationship between the EU and CSOs (India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka the Maldives). These support a wide range of actions (thematic seminars, calls for proposals, etc.) in support of the implementation of the SDGs at different levels. In the case of Thailand all priorities are entirely aligned with the national SDG agenda. In India, strong emphasis is placed on supporting CSO initiatives to monitor off-track SDGs, address SDG 16, and provide independent research on India's progress and on challenges of implementation of flagship programmes relevant to the SDG framework. This approach looks fitting in countries where a clear tendency towards a restricted environment can be seen. The EU has emphasised its engagement with CSOs based on the 2030 Agenda and the countries' commitments to SDGs. This has allowed a new openness from governments in engaging with CSOs, something which had never been seen before.

Overall, the roll-out of the RM strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is in good shape. So far, 21 RMs are much better developed to operationalise strategic actions in support of CSOs for the period 2018-2020 through a combination of operational and political action following a thorough plan.

STOCKTAKING OF THE ROADMAPS 2018–2020 IN THE LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES

1. Introduction

The elaboration of Roadmaps (RM) for engagement with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries started in 2014. They represent a new way of working with CSOs for EU Delegations (EUD) and Member States (MS), allowing for more structured and strategic cooperation with Civil Society, shifting from an often ***ad-hoc*** project-based approach to a long-term process approach, supporting CSOs as actors in both development and democratic governance.

The first RMs covered the period 2014-2016/2017. Today, their status of implementation varies a great deal: in some countries, they are still under implementation while in others they are already moving into follow-up phases, taking the initiative for updating and reviewing RMs to guide their engagement for the period 2018-2020 and beyond.

The report that follows has been conceived as a stock-tacking and learning exercise in an effort to assist EUDs in further developing their on-going RM as well as launching the process in the remaining countries. The trends outlined are the result of the analysis of a total of 12 RM documents.

1.1 Number and typology of countries

Of the 26 countries in the LAC region[26], 21 signed RMs for this initial period 2014-2016 and more than half have signed updated RMs (for the period 2018-2020) or are planning to do so in the near future (i.e. Venezuela and Bolivia). Paraguay, Chile, Cuba, Panamá and Costa Rica have not participated in the RM process yet.

Figure 1: Number of updated RMs



26 The LAC countries include Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad y Tobago, Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Guyana, Surinam, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Concerning the typology of countries where a RM process is taking place, one relates to a fragile context (Haiti) and one to a country where the environment is considered non-conducive based on the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index (i.e. Honduras). The remaining 9 RMs relate to countries with a relatively stable and conducive environment for CSOs. Core freedoms of association, assembly and expression are constitutionally recognised in most LAC countries, and mechanisms for civil society participation are increasingly being institutionalised in the region. But against this, legal administrative barriers to the creation, functioning and resourcing affect the work of CSOs, Human Right defenders, and journalist engaged in advocacy to hold government account in numerous LAC countries. The effects of restrictions have been greatest on CSOs that prioritise advocacy and policy work [27].

Furthermore, according to the World Bank categorisation[28], 3 of them are High Income Countries (HICs): Argentina, Barbados and The Eastern Caribbean islands, and Trinidad & Tobago; 4 are Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs): Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Surinam and 2 are Lower Middle-Income Countries (LMICs): Ecuador and Guyana. It is important to note that in most middle- and upper-income countries the EU has limited political leverage, as bilateral cooperation is phasing out.

1.2 A quick overview of the previous Roadmaps (2014-2017)

The previous RMs (2014-2017) were strongly focused on understanding the roles, potential, capacities and weaknesses of domestic and external CSOs and in situating the actors within the political/economic context. In that sense, most of the countries assessed have a well-functioning, pro-active and comparatively capable Civil Society with strong roots and a quite productive relationship with government, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, etc. They have been active in holding governmental authorities to account, challenging existing unequal power relations, contributing to the necessary checks and balances that are key to fostering democratic processes and good governance. They have promoted participation, advocacy for transparency, defence of human rights, and the creation of learning spaces, acting as incubators for new ideas, complementing the state as service providers and creating channels for expression of culture and identity. Nevertheless, in some countries, human rights organisations, women's organisations, indigenous peoples' movements and environmental organisations are still subject to harassment and accusations from different government levels.

All in all, this first phase constituted a good basis for developing a more strategic framework to guide engagement between the EU and CSOs. Building on the RMs, and using them as reference documents, most EUDs have started to develop more detailed implementation plans and have also set up mechanisms for their follow-up, including the launching of base-line studies (e.g. Brazil) and establishment of reference groups with MS and CSOs (e.g. Honduras, Ecuador, Guatemala) to steer the RM implementation process. What is more, the new, simplified RM format has proved to be a crucial element enabling RMs to become a planning and management tool that guides EUDs to better articulate, coordinate and focus on strategic actions.

27 Read more about LAC enabling environment: CIVICUS report. "Threats to civil space in LAC" (2016): http://www.civicus.org/images/ThreatsToCivicSpaceInLACountriesEN.pdf

28 New classification as of July 2018

2. The process leading to the new Roadmaps (2018–2020)

2.1. Inclusiveness and accountability

RM processes have become a key milestone in EUD-CSOs relations, with significant improvements in dialogue, which is now far more structured and mature, compared to what it was prior to the RM process.

In an effort to achieve common understanding and ownership, dialogue and consultation with local Civil Society has become, since the RM process was launched, a key aspect of developing objectives and implementation mechanisms. This has also allowed EUDs to develop non-financial relations with a variety of Civil Society actors, reaching out more broadly to CSOs, including not only NGOs but also trades unions, community-based organisations, social movements, faith-based institutions, charitable organisations, research centres, foundations, student organisations, professional associations, etc. (e.g. Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, etc.)

EUDs have made significant progress in establishing a more institutionalised dialogue with CSOs that goes beyond an *ad-hoc* event. Different formats for consultations have been established, ranging from a more regular and structured dialogue with permanent and systematic meetings (e.g. Ecuador and Peru), to decentralised processes in the country (e.g. Guatemala) and online surveys reaching out to a wide spectrum of CSOs (e.g. Brazil).

Of the 12 updated RMs analysed, more than half depict an intense level of consultation with Civil Society. 59% of RM consultation processes were labelled as intense; in 33% of cases, there was moderate consultation during the process (Guyana, Surinam, Trinidad & Tobago); for around 8% of the RMs, CSOs were less consulted. In Haiti several meetings and one consultation were held with local and international CSOs for the update of the RM. However, since 2016, meetings with CSOs were limited to information sessions concerning calls for proposals.

Figure 2: Level of consultation with CSOs



In countries where the environment is challenging for CSOs, such as Honduras, the EUD was among the first delegations to roll out a consultation process with a wide range of local and international CSOs, to design a RM for the 2014-2017 period. In 2016, a new participatory process took place to update and operationalise the RM. This included a new matrix of priorities, concrete actions and indicators to follow up the implementation of the RM through a continuous and structured process with Honduran CSOs.

EUDs are managing to reach out more widely and more locally. In Guatemala, for example, important efforts were made to secure input from and meetings with a wide variety and a large number of CSOs. There were consultations in both urban and rural areas and these included local and international CSOs/NGOs. In the capital, 8 focus groups were organised and in 7 country regions a total of 14 workshops were held. More than 150 CSOs participated at national, regional and local level.

In order to foster understanding and ownership and opportunities for partnerships, and to ensure matching expectations, a further step has been taken in the design of some RM strategies in close consultation with CSOs, creating a transparent and structured dialogue. In Guatemala, for instance, a structured dialogue with Civil Society has also recently been launched. This is the result of the learning process created by the "*Grupo Filtro*" in which regular meetings are held between the EUD and MS with representative groups of human rights defenders. These draw on previous dialogue experience in Guatemala such as the "*Mesodialogo*"[29] and also on lessons from the process of joint consultations with Civil Society within the framework of the EU-MS joint programming process.

BOX1: Consultation for the Ecuador RM

One of the main outcomes of the Ecuador RM to date is the level of ownership and participation of the RM process by CSOs, stimulated through the establishment of more regular and structured dialogue with CSOs. The wave of consultations undertaken to elaborate the first RM developed into a steering committee which drove the process forward, while a plenary assembly had already approved annual action plans and oversaw the whole strategy. As an example of this proactive approach, 3 working groups made progress, sharing local and regional experience: on a review of the legal framework; on alliances between CSOs and universities and on political incidence and platforms/networking. Tangible results have been obtained, such as the organic law proposal and the creation of a Confederation of Social Organisations, which embraces more than 100 CSOs. The updated RM is also the outcome of this participatory approach, demonstrating the high commitment of Ecuadorian Civil Society as well as its appropriation of the process.

29 In 1999, the EUD launched a pilot project for Guatemala called "*Mesodialogo*" with the aim of initiating a regular dialogue between Civil Society in Guatemala and in Europe, with representatives of the EUD discussing EU cooperation policies in Guatemala and formulating practical recommendations. This discussion group was later enlarged to include representatives of the government of Guatemala and the EU. The main activities of "*Mesodialogo*" focused on strengthening Civil Society, decentralisation and information dissemination.

Civil Society Organisations are increasingly regarded by the EUDs as partners, not only in implementing donor-funded actions, but also in contributing to sectoral and policy dialogue (Honduras, Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, etc.). For instance, in order to broaden the knowledge and understanding of CS involvement, the Honduras EUD has conducted a sectoral mapping in the focal sectors of EU cooperation. The EUD of Peru has also undertaken a similar exercise and other EUDs appear to be following this lead. However, the issue of mainstreaming a Civil Society component into more general sectoral and feasibility studies needs to be further developed.

2.2. Development effectiveness

In a large number of countries in the LAC region, MS have taken an active part in the development of the RM from its very early stages and supported the EUD with written contributions, regular attendance and coordination meetings, the creation of a working group of EUD/MSs for the development of the RM, etc. As acknowledged by the EUDs, such strong participation has presented an opportunity to harmonise visions, increase coordination and to share thoughts on the complementarities and division of labour. It has also brought credibility to the RM process.

Figure 3: MS involvement



All of the RM documents analysed indicate involvement of MS during the update of their RMs, apart from Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean where the UK is the only resident MS and due to leave in 2018-2020. Half of the updated RMs analysed show a high level of involvement by MS (e.g. Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru). This particularly applies where the process inside the EUD has been led by or co-led with the political section (e.g. Colombia).

In other countries, MS participation has been more limited, with MS being involved in a series of meetings. Although endorsing the RMs, their contributions and feedback were rather limited (in particular in graduated countries such as Argentina). The difficulty of getting MS fully on board and actively contributing to the process is not due to a lack of will but rather to a lack of resources and time constraints on the side of both EUDs and MSs (e.g. Haiti). In some countries, the RM still needs to be better integrated into the process of political dialogue.

A few RMs mention other donors. For instance, in Colombia the whole process was carried out in close cooperation with MS and like-minded countries, in particular Switzerland. In Guatemala, the RM was also shared with the UNDP for input and comments, as the agency is also an active donor supporting CSOs in the country. In Trinidad & Tobago, a CSO donor coordination mechanism has been identified with the UNDP and the Inter-America Development Bank (IADB) as a RM Priority.

With regard to the mechanisms, they vary from the use of already existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. Head of Cooperation and Head of Mission meetings) to new task forces on governance and Civil Society coordination groups. This is the case, for instance, in Ecuador, Peru and Honduras where a task force EUD/MS is leading the whole process and EUDs assume the coordination role.

BOX2: Strong MS involvement in Colombia

The updated RM 2018-2020 in Colombia is the result of a high participatory process signed by 16 MS. It seeks to give continuity and consolidate the achievements made by its predecessor, as well as responding to the country challenges that demand greater efforts for the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement, the implementation of all political actions related to the construction of a new National Development Plan and compliance with international agendas (2030 Agenda, climate change, etc.). It has resulted in greater cooperation and division of labour amongst the EUD and MS. In fact, RMs need to be understood as learning processes in themselves. EUD and MS in Colombia have been in this process of cooperation for 15 years during which they have gained great experience in interventions aimed at peacebuilding through permanent and effective structured multistakeholder dialogues that seek to bring together CSOs, EUD, MS and the Government. This long-standing relationship was crucial to reconciling positions, promoting agreements, generating advocacy actions and building trust among actors. It is worth highlighting that an external facilitation has supported the whole process of updating the RM in order to encourage the development of a common vision and ensure enhanced cooperation between the operational and political sections.

Moreover, when the country is already a pilot country for Joint Programming, which is the case for example in Guatemala, EUD/MS have always been active in the implementation of the RM priorities as they are already in close coordination on cooperation issues. On the other hand, in Honduras the RM Reference Group EUD-MS-CSOs has been added important value in the JP process. Haiti is also a good example where the updated RM has encouraged JP planning to move forward to integrate resilience issues much more systematically, including relief, reconstruction and development.

2.3. Communication and visibility

Of the 12 LAC updated RMs which have been finalised, 9 are public[30] and available at the capacity4dev platform (http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/roadmaps). Only 3 RMs remain restricted[31]. The adoption of a more simplified RM document focusing on priorities, actions and planning has made it more easily available to the public and shared with national authorities.

Most of the EUDs have also used their own communication channels to publicise the RMs and the process at country level. Most of them have published the RM on the EUD website and on MS webpages. Some EUDs included information on the process and presented the key priorities that will guide EU engagement with CSOs. In some webpages a video with a brief statement from the Head of Delegation confirming the EU engagement has been uploaded (e.g. Ecuador[32]). The case of Colombia is worth mentioning, as EUD/MS have created a RM webpage (https://www.hojaderuta.co/web/) in order to provide key stakeholders engaged in the process (EUD, MS, CSOs and Government) with regular communication updates on the state of play of implementation of the RM. In some other cases, the EUDs, together with MS, have also organised an event and a press conference on the launch of the reviewed RM (e.g. Guatemala[33], Colombia[34]), seizing the opportunity to explain the importance of the RM to a wide public.

In order to maintain momentum, proper communication in parallel with implementation and follow-up of the RMs is also a first step to promoting joint ownership for all stakeholders involved. In Honduras, specific action is foreseen under the updated RM to improve communication and information on the programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU cooperation through the systematic maintenance of consultations with CSOs (through the Reference Group). Also, in Haiti, it is planned to develop and disseminate a communication strategy on the existing dialogue between public authorities and CSOs. In Peru, it is foreseen to identify and implement a joint communication strategy on SC contribution to the country and inform national authorities (Chancellery, sectoral conciliation tables, National Agreement, etc.) on the RM. However, for a number of countries, more effort should go into a more active approach to communication between EUDs and MS on the one hand, and CSOs and other stakeholders on the other.

30 The capacity4dev platform contains a repository of the RMs in order to ensure that the RMs remain easily accessible for anybody interested.
31 Brazil and Barbados & Caribbean Islands. In Peru a simplified version has been published.
32 Example: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/39079/la-ue-lanza-su-hoja-de-ruta-2018-2020-para-el-compromiso-con-la-sociedad-civil-de-ecuador_pt
33 Example: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/43517/la-unión-europea-presenta-la-hoja-de-ruta-y-lanza-el-diálogo-estructurado-como-compromiso-con_fr
34 Example: https://www.facebook.com/euincolombia/videos/hoy-la-unioneuropea-lanza-su-hoja-de-ruta-con-la-sociedad-civil-y-jorge-tovar-de/1046907238795412/

3. The contents of EU engagement with CSOs

3.1. The quality of EU engagement with CSOs and Policy coherence at global level

On average, updated RMs assessed 3 priorities, most of them in line with the 3 ambitions of the 2012 Communication[35]. Compared to the previous RMs (2014-2017), important efforts have been made to fine-tune and precise priorities as well as defining measurable indicators that are connected to concrete actions and contextualised priorities.

Priorities linked to the enabling environment are included in 8 of the 12 RMs assessed (but not in Argentina, Barbados, Guyana and Suriname) as this offers an opportunity for promoting change. It contributes to reforms, monitoring public action, identifying challenges and building confidence particularly at the level of partner governments. It is interesting to highlight that in almost half of the RMs analysed (e.g. Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, Barbados and the Caribbean Islands, etc.) the need for supporting a structured dialogue mechanism between CSOs, EU/MS and national governments has been set as a priority. In Barbados and the Caribbean islands two priorities have been defined, one related to re-consolidating Non State Actors Advisory Panels[36], the other to facilitating participation of CARIFORUM Civil Society in the regional development and integration process.

Priorities linked to promoting Civil Society participation in public policies and dialogue are also widely represented in all the updated RMs assessed. All RMs have at least one priority devoted to enhancing Civil Society participation in national, regional, local and/or sectoral policies. Exceptions are Surinam and Guyana, which have prioritised a thematic approach: climate change, gender, business climate, media, etc. EU actors have understood that they have an important role to play as catalysts for promoting engagement between Civil Society, national, regional and local governments.

Capacity building is also well represented in all the RMs assessed. Apart from Argentina and Surinam, all countries include at least one priority related to this third ambition of the 2012 Communication. Overall, capacity development needs to embrace networking, fundraising, internal governance and enhanced legitimacy as well as budget monitoring. One area of particular importance is the strengthening of coordination and cooperation among CSOs and the reduction of divisions between organisations, in an effort to overcome the challenges that hinder CSO capacity to influence and promote change. Partnerships are also sought with the private sector (e.g. Surinam).

35 2012 Communication "The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations"

36 NSA Panels were Initiated under 9 EDF in Barbados and 6 OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States) countries to become vehicle for ensuring CS participation in programming, monitoring, evaluation and document reviewing.

In the 2030 Agenda, SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) have become a central element in the updated RMs of Brazil, Colombia and Peru, with the RMs supporting several actions prioritising the implementation of the SDGs at different levels. In the case of Brazil, SDGs have been defined as a priority to expand the coverage of the 2030 Agenda with CSOs and strengthen means for its implementation, establishing strategic partnerships to make sure that the SDG goals are effectively translated into national and local policies. A broad consultation seminar on SDGs has been organised. Calls for proposals that prioritise the implementation of the 2030 Agenda are also foreseen. In the case of Colombia, social dialogues are expected to make sure that the goals are effectively translated into national and local policies. In Peru, a follow-up mechanism for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda as well as several multi-stakeholder seminars (CSO, state, academia, media, private sector), are planned on 2018.

3.2. Policy coherence at country level

The RMs process has improved the coordination and synergy of EU support and the mainstreaming of CSOs. The exchange of information with other EUD sections is seen as a sign of greater interest in moving towards a more extensive, more coherent and strategic partnership with Civil Society. For instance in Brazil, the updated RM has been seen as an opportunity to promote mainstreaming of CS inside other EU operations, using available instruments and programmes in a complementary manner. These include thematic programmes, international urban cooperation, strategic partnership for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, EU-Brazil sectoral dialogues, a win-win programme, low carbon business action in Brazil, etc. In Haiti, the 11th EDF[37]–CSO programme is the main tool of the RM and has been used to increase the involvement of CSOs under different 11th EDF focal sectors (urban development, food security, education and state reform). Mainstreaming of CSOs into EU focal sectors of cooperation has been highlighted as a priority in some RMs assessed (e.g. Guatemala and Haiti). The link to Human Right and Democracy Country Strategy (HRCDS) and Gender Action Plan (GAP) processes has also been translated into specific RM priorities describing the exact tools or entry point that will be used to promote mainstreaming (e.g. Brazil, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana). This adds value by increasing the political profile of the RM.

37 European Development Fund

4. Means of implementation and follow-up

4.1. The means of implementation

RMs are not programmatic documents themselves and their implementation relies on the spectrum of programmes and instruments available at the level of the EUD and MS. Examples include the thematic programmes CSO&LA[38], EIDHR[39], bilateral programmes providing support to CSOs but also through support to CSOs in specific sectors, budget support programmes, etc.

In Ecuador, for instance, a remarkable outcome of the updated RM is the alignment with the EU Thematic Programmes EIDHR and CSO&LA, which are used to directly support the implementation of the priorities of the RM. However, most of the RM documents assessed merely still make a generic reference to some bilateral/regional programmes and/or thematic programmes

Several of the countries in the region are graduated and bilateral cooperation is therefore phasing out, as in Argentina, Brazil, Barbados & the Caribbean Islands, Trinidad &Tobago, etc. This, coupled with the often "limited political leverage" of the EU in these countries, means EUDs have been prompted to develop new strategies. These relate to political and sectoral dialogue to promote fundamental reforms on the one hand, and on the other to developing programmes addressing social and economic inequality, bearing in mind the disparities that exist in several of these countries. There is a need, in these countries, for a more focused use of thematic instruments (CSO&LA and EIDHR), fine-tuning further the eligibility criteria and being more selective in funding. This is the case in Brazil, as already described under 3.2, and in Trinidad & Tobago where CSOs are asked to be engaged in implementing and monitoring budget support operations.

MS involvement in the implementation and follow-up is generally unclear or insufficiently developed, although there are some exceptions (e.g. Haiti and Peru). In most cases guidance on MS contributions to the achievement of the priorities defined could be improved.

Some RMs clearly reflect their linkages with other on-going processes. For instance, in Brazil they have used the RM updating exercise to reorient EU-CS engagement strategies towards SDG as well as integrating human rights and gender equality as a centrepiece in relations between the EU and Brazilian CS.

4.2. Means of follow-up

60% of RMs assessed[40] (e.g. Brazil, Haiti, Guatemala, etc.) have worked extensively in further defining, in their dashboards, the establishment of baselines and targets. Very quickly, following the start of implementation in 2017, several EUDs (Honduras, Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil) took the initiative in updating/reviewing their RMs and started fine-tuning in order to lay the ground for the establishment of a solid follow-up system. The system established in Brazil may be applicable in other countries.

38 Thematic programme Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities
39 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
40 Surprisingly in Peru, even if the level of consultation held with Peruvian CSO and MS involvement in the RM process have been significant, the updated RM does not contain an outcome indicators table to follow up on the process and strategy.

BOX 3 Solid monitoring and follow-up of Brazilian RM

Brazil is one of the EUDs that have developed a monitoring and follow-up system in a "learning by doing" process. EUD/MS have established an annual monitoring report in which they have fine-tuned the RM dashboard, establishing a baseline for annual progress values, in order to assess the current state of play, and targets to identify the ultimate goal. Outcome indicators have been clearly defined, describing the extent to which progress has been achieved and showing that the level of data disaggregation has also been correctly addressed. It is worth highlighting that the monitoring report includes a selection of good practices and achievements under the different RM priorities that add value to the reporting process. Likewise, it describes contributions from the MS in a clear and concise way. Furthermore, the Brazil EUD has given increasing importance to the 2030 Agenda, adding a monitoring analysis of the contribution of projects supported for the implementation of SDG, and equally of the Gender Action Plan.

However, even if the number of indicators in the 12 RMs assessed has been reduced and indicators are more relevant than in previous RMs (as their link to priorities is clearer), there is still room for improvement. This is because, in some cases, indicators are formulated as output indicators (instead of outcomes) and, in other cases, their measurability presents some challenges. This result from the large reach of the indicator and the high level of resources needed to calculate it (e.g. degree of participation of CSOs in the policy definition processes, public level of participation in instances of political dialogues, etc.). As already mentioned, several countries (e.g. Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala and Honduras) have set up an institutionalised mechanism to review the process and to determine progress towards defined priorities.

Special mention needs to be made of the phasing out of bilateral cooperation in graduated countries, which brings with it a severe decrease in human resources in EUD operational sections. This remains a challenge if EUDs are to prevent the RM exercise from being diluted.

5. Conclusions

As evidenced by the report, the RM process in the LAC region is offering a real opportunity for EUDs and MS to be better equipped with sound knowledge of the CS landscape, to share a common language and develop a common vision for engagement in governance matters.

As a matter of fact, the emphasis on governance has also motivated governments to adopt this language and be proactive in using it. In this regard EUDs are transitioning towards a more political role, providing the RM process with adequate political weight and ensuring that the RM is not seen as a purely developmental tool.

Many EUDs are now engaged in the promotion of an enabling environment and supporting dialogue spaces between the public sector and Civil Society actors to generate fundamental reforms. Some policy areas are particularly relevant in the LAC region. These include economic and social cohesion (considering the disparities that exist in several of these countries), public finance management and, more generally, sustainable development and Civil Society contribution to national development. The questions of the rights of children, women and minorities are an important part of the EU agenda of engagement with CSOs.

In this regard, governments very often tend to be reluctant to accept donor interference, particularly where the environment for promoting a human rights and governance agenda becomes more restricted. This puts pressure on EUDs to acquire greater skills in political economic analysis and a capacity to assess and identify suitable entry points for supporting reformist forces (the so-called drivers for change). This is particularly relevant in the case of countries where cooperation is being graduated (e.g. high and upper middle countries), as more efforts are needed to raise awareness inside EUDs about the political nature of the RM.

Another dimension of EU attention is the improvement of the EU dialogue with CSOs. In this regard, as some country experiences have shown, the setting up of institutionalised mechanisms at country level to follow up on the process and progress towards priorities has proved to be a relevant tool. Several updated RMs are already moving in this direction, supporting established and effective coordination mechanisms (donor governance/CS coordination groups) or setting up a new space. This means becoming more systematic, more predictable and also better structured in addressing key societal and development challenges. In several countries dialogue between the EU and CSOs is no longer simply about funding.

Capacity development support (mainly focused on Civil Society networking, building partnerships and strategic alliances) is part of an effort to prevent Civil Society fragmentation and to build a common agenda, at both national and regional levels. The question of financial sustainability is also seen as key, particularly in contexts where donors are pulling out and local philanthropy is still at a very early stage of development. Lastly, issues of internal governance, creation of platforms for knowledge-sharing and the improvement of relations between local and international CSOs are also acknowledged in several RMs.

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