ecdpm

Making policies work

Beyond good intentions:
THE NEW EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP

AU-EU

By Alfonso Medinilla and Chloe Teevan

March 2020

The EU and Africa are each trying to find their place in an unstable world. This paper argues that the needs and expectations on both sides call for a new and more interest-driven partnership between the EU and Africa, one that does not brush over contention, but recognises diverging views and priorities, negotiates concrete solutions that work for both sides, and lays the foundations of a real political alliance in global affairs.

EU-Africa relations are haunted by their history, their inability to move beyond rhetoric, and recent contention about migration, but the case for close cooperation has never been stronger. The EU recognises that it needs Africa more than ever, as an ally in multilateral affairs, as a growing market for European investments and trade, as the testing ground for its 'geopolitical' ambitions, and to ensure that Africa's growing population can meet its aspirations at home. Africa in turn is diversifying its foreign partnerships, but the EU and its member states are still its main trade and investment partner, the main supporter of its continental peace and security agenda, and can be an important partner in support of Africa's economic integration agenda.

The paper looks at six thematic priorities of the partnership – some longstanding and some more recent: jobs, investment and trade, climate change, digitalisation, peace and security, democracy and human rights, migration and mobility. It examines common and diverging interests, the status of cooperation and the potential way forward across these different areas.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Acronyms

AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AGN	African Group of Negotiators
AI	Artificial intelligence
ANC	African National Congress
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
BEPS	Base erosion and profit shifting
CAR	Central African Republic
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
JAES	Joint Africa EU Strategy
ICT	Information and communications technology
IFI	International financial institution
LDC	Least developed country
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for African Development
PRIDA	Policy and Regulation Initiative for Digital Africa
REC	Regional Economic Community
R&I	Research and innovation
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
UN	United Nations
UNGA	UN's General Assembly

Introduction

"Certainly, we have some differences. [...] These differences are normal, given our cultural, sociological and even spiritual diversity. Only the recognition and acceptance of these differences, the language of openness will allow us to remove the obstacles that may hinder our cooperation."
Moussa Faki, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, 27 February 2020.

"This is what the essence of a good partnership and a good friendship is: you build on a solid foundation with common projects you can work on. But you're able to mark very clearly where differences are, trying to convince each other and to move forward together."
Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, 27 February 2020.

Changes in Africa and in the EU are forcing a review of their aging partnership. The year 2020 will be marked by a series of important events culminating in the sixth AU-EU Summit, gathering leaders from the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) in October 2020.

On the EU side, there has been a major build up in momentum and ambition, marked most notably by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen prioritisation of the partnership even before taking office, and her trip to Addis Ababa in December 2019, her first outside of the EU (Teevan and Sherriff 2019, Bisong and Teevan 2019). On the African side, there is a growing awareness of the need for the AU to develop a more ambitious and demanding negotiating position. 2019 was a year of reforms, and saw the much-anticipated signature of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which in its implementation will force a rethink of external relations, including with the EU (Lopes 2018).

With its 'geopolitical ambitions', the von der Leyen Commission is attempting to position the EU as a leader in the multilateral space and to build the tools necessary to defend European interests more overtly. This new outward perspective also means that the EU is looking for allies, and is looking to consolidate and mobilise the partnerships it already has, including with the African Union and its member states.

The AU in turn is both riding the momentum of its own reforms, and benefiting from the growing interest of an increasing number of partners and investors, including China, Russia, India, Turkey and the Gulf. Yet, the AU still needs to overcome a lot of internal hurdles to become the "strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner" it aims to be (African Union).

Beyond the narrative of equal partnership, the African and European Union's futures are connected by their shared history and proximity. The AU and EU will need to continue to work together on common interests, while recognising their differences, but if they hope to deliver something truly ambitious, they will also need to demonstrate a willingness to meet each other halfway on vital questions, from trade to climate change to migration. This paper examines six thematic priority areas, exploring the current room for cooperation between the two continents, and proposes policy options to move the relationship forward.

EU-Africa relations at the start of a new decade

The EU-Africa partnership is one with a lot of baggage, but at the start of a new decade the need for a reset is clear; interests have shifted and the relations between the two continents have moved on from the development focused, often unidirectional engagement between the EU and Africa that dominated over the past decades. The

EU finds itself increasingly isolated in its defence of the rules-based international order and in need of new partners and new solutions for dealing with its neighbours as it faces up to the reality of an increasingly unreliable United States, a bellicose Russia on its doorstep, and the growing global economic footprint of China. The AU has adopted ambitious plans for further economic integration, but has a lot to gain from working closely with the EU, Africa's biggest trading partner.

The EU's new "geopolitical" commission is a recognition that if the EU wishes to be a real player in global politics, it will need to develop a stronger and more unified foreign policy, strengthen those areas where it has a competitive advantage, and develop areas where it is currently falling behind other major global powers (Borrell 2020). Thus the new commission recognises the necessity of investing in traditional foreign policy, including building the European Defence Union, strengthening European leadership at multilateral fora and trying to forge unity amongst its member states in the wake of Brexit (von der Leyen 2019ab).

Of equal significance for the EU's role in the world is the new Commission's promise of an ambitious overhaul of its own economic tools, and by extension how it projects its significant economic and regulatory power. This is apparent in the initial proposals around the EU Green Deal, Europe's digital vision, and in the initial leaked details around the upcoming EU Industrial Plan to be released in March (EU 2019a, EU 2020a, Kayali et al. 2020, Fox et al., 2020).

But the EU has once again seen itself eclipsed by other powers in early 2020 due to its continued inability to present a united front in response to crises in its neighbourhood - notably in Libya (Jégo et al. 2020). Furthermore, how all these aims play out in practice will be greatly affected by the contentious negotiations for the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the year 2021-2027 that are currently ongoing. Both the overall amount of the budget, and the breakdown of the final amount will be vital if the EU is to truly be more strategic with its resources (Jones and Ahairwe 2020).

In Africa, the AU reform agenda promises an ambitious path forward and has raised the bar for continental integration. Institutional reforms are going hand in hand with new and ambitious initiatives such as the transformation of the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) into an AU development agency, and a new push for regional infrastructure development on the continent (NEPAD 2020). The signature of the AfCFTA proposes a route towards deeper market integration in the years to come, and important steps are being taken to increase African financing for its continental peace and security agenda. It will, however, take a great deal more energy to make all these continental ambitions a reality. The AfCFTA is currently little more than a statement of intent, while only 16 of 55 member states have implemented the 0.2% levy on imports that was designed to make the African Union more financially self-sufficient (Apiko and Miyandazi 2019).

Consecutive AU summits and reforms have also sought to better position the AU in the global affairs of its member states, repeatedly calling for a more unified approach to summits with third parties and mandating its member states to uphold common African positions, both in multilateral fora and in their bilateral relations. Attempts are also ongoing to centralise Africa's external engagement in a representative group of member states and to strengthen the role of the Bureau of the Assembly, an elected group of five member states that support the chair of the Assembly in its duties (in 2020, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Kenya and Egypt are supporting South Africa). While AU member states will continue to pursue their own separate foreign policies, the increasingly outward-looking perspective of the AU is gradually changing Africa's terms of engagement.

The AU-EU partnership is currently the only one where the AU Commission also has a critical agenda-setting role. In 2018, this even led it to challenge its own member states and the EU on the continued relevance of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States as a channel for securing African interests vis-à-vis the EU (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2019). The AU member states initially agreed to charge the AU and its Commission with

the negotiation of a new partnership agreement with the EU on behalf of African countries within the framework of the post-Cotonou negotiations. While in the end this fell through due to a lack of agreement amongst AU member states, it was a clear attempt by the AU to position itself in a high-stakes negotiation, and a precedent for AU agency in the foreign relations of the continent.

Von der Leyen's call for a "partnership of equals" is not new, but was in fact a mantra of the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007 and was omnipresent in the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) in 2007, which laid out ambitious goals, but did not include a sufficiently ambitious follow-through (AU and EU 2007, Keijzer and Medinilla 2017, Bossuyt 2017). More recently, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker launched the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs, which also adopted the language of partnership (EU 2018). But while the Alliance's focus on moving from an aid-focused approach to an investment focused one was certainly in keeping with what a growing number of African leaders are asking for, that particular initiative lacked prior consultation with African stakeholders, while it involved quite a bit of repackaging of existing EU initiatives.

It is unclear whether a "partnership of equals" is even possible given the weight of history and the continued weight of economics. However, if the EU is to truly turn a page on its history of cooperation with Africa, then it will need to show a willingness to take a different approach.

One area where taking a different approach will be vital is at multilateral fora, where the EU hopes for deeper cooperation between the two institutions. During her trip to Addis Ababa, von der Leyen said of the EU and AU: "we can be the backbone of the United Nations' system, but we also can be very strong partners within the United Nations system" (von der Leyen 2019c). However, European and African interests are not necessarily the same at the UN, and at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), African states vote with the G77+China more often than with the EU (Medinilla et al 2019). If the EU really wishes to develop a strong partnership with Africa, then it should not expect African countries to simply follow its lead, but will also need to be prepared to support a greater number of African resolutions at UNGA.

Ahead of past summits, the EU has developed a rather standard protocol, starting with a joint European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS) Communication laying out ambitions for the summit agenda, followed by Council Conclusions signed off by EU member state leaders setting the tone for European positions throughout the year. There was generally a tacit understanding that while member states play a role, it was the European institutions that took the lead. This apparent harmony in presenting a united EU position does not mean that all member states felt bound by the EU's position, and member states such as France and the UK tended to run parallel Africa policies.

The African Union has had more difficulty in channelling the diverse interests of its member states, lacking both the process experience and institutional power to convene its member states around a partnership as dense as the one with the EU. This has long forced the AU into a more reactive position as opposed to an EU well versed in the art of organising partnership summits. This is something European officials often find difficult to navigate, but it is also an increasing source of frustration on the African side. African officials often lament being presented with 'joint' agendas, strategies or action plans by their European counterparts at one summit after another.

As Africa's internal coherence and external ambitions continue to grow, AU member states may be able to elaborate more common positions on African interests, but the EU should not dismiss out of hand those that are not in line with European interests.

Box 1: Who drives the partnership? The role of institutions and member states.

While the EU and AU are the most obvious units to examine EU-Africa collaboration, the role of the member states on both sides should not be underestimated. The new European Commission's focus on Africa reflects the growth in interest in Africa among many of its member states in the aftermath of the migration and refugee crises, perhaps best epitomised by Germany's 2017 "Marshall Plan with Africa" (BMZ 2017). Where previously, political engagement with Africa was concentrated in a handful of European member states with clear historical ties, many are now rushing to elaborate their own Africa strategies. These may enrich the debate about engagement with Africa over the coming months, but they also complicate the job of the European institutions that need to reconcile these multiple visions into one united European vision ahead of the Summit. Further, some of the bigger EU member states are likely to continue to unilaterally pursue their own interests in Africa, regardless of the common EU position.

On the African side, the role of member states in moving policies forward is even more evident and was perhaps best epitomised by the ambitious direction provided by Rwandan President Paul Kagame's chairmanship of the African Union in 2018. If anything, the way in which he pushed the AU reform and AfCFTA agendas shows that the role can be a real position of power. This further raises expectations on South African President Cyril Ramaphosa to take the continental agenda forward in 2020. Yet while his internal position as a reformer of the African National Congress (ANC) will likely give him the necessary political capital in Addis Ababa, there are concerns that considerable challenges at home will make it difficult for him to also drive the continental agenda forward.

The power of institutions can be more difficult to grasp. African continental integration in particular is easily misunderstood by European and their member state officials who tend to approach the AU through a Eurocentric lens, whereby they expect the AU to function in a similar way to the EU. In the past this has led to unrealistic expectations for the AU-EU partnership and its various strategies and action plans. While the EU and AU appear similar in the way they are structured, there is a fundamental difference in the way that European and African integration unfolds. African regional integration is built around a fundamentally deliberative intergovernmental logic, whereas European observers often assume that the path to integration in Africa necessarily involves African leaders empowering supranational organisations to deliver on the basis of agreements they have signed up to. AU decisions and positions therefore often lack a clear path to achievement. Implementation is a negotiated process involving reconciling member state priorities and sub-regional dynamics.

For the EU-Africa partnership, this meant that past summit declarations announced high ambitions, not least on sensitive matters such as human rights, democracy and good governance, and yet these consistently failed to produce tangible results. This was not due to a lack of agreement on the need for action, but rather due to the AU signing up to EU-led initiatives – often symbolically – without sufficient buy-in from African states to also put these into practice. AU-EU frameworks often lacked the mechanisms and authority to drive these agendas forward. Recognising and adapting to the very different institutional set up at the African Union will thus be key to working meaningfully together.

A summit year offers a timely opportunity to reframe the partnership between the EU and Africa. Yet making the EU's ambitions in Africa work side by side with Africa's external ambitions requires more than a summit alone. EU-Africa relations run far deeper than a process of intercontinental diplomacy, and can be seen as a string of different areas where the two continents meet, including trade relations, development cooperation, peace and security cooperation and migration, each with its own history of cooperation and/or contestation.

The following section looks at six such areas of cooperation between the EU and AU and their member states. It takes into account that some areas are more developed than others and that interests and political incentives often diverge. For each area of cooperation, we assess: (1) the level of political urgency on both sides, (2) the degree of common (or diverging) interests, (3) existing joint process(es) for cooperation, and examine the future prospects for cooperation in the years to come.

Jobs, investment and trade

By 2025, close to a quarter of the global population aged 24 and younger will be living in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2030, its labour force is projected to expand by more than the rest of the world combined and by even more after 2030 (Annunziata and Kramer 2015). Increased public and private investment will be necessary to create quality jobs for this growing population, including investments in infrastructure, human capital, energy, agriculture and industry. Both the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) aim to create economies of scale, which offer greater potential returns for private investment, but require significant public investments to be achieved. As 70% of Sub-Saharan Africa's population depends on agriculture for their livelihoods, and 20% still suffers from hunger (FAO 2019), the sustainable transformation of Africa's agri-food sector and rural economy are a priority. All of this will have to happen, while addressing climate change, developing clean energy and protecting biodiversity at the same time.

Common interests

HIGH

Both the EU and African countries have a common interest in increasing investment in infrastructure, energy, and sustainable agriculture and industry in Africa. The AU and EU also have a shared interest in the successful implementation of the AfCFTA to increase intra-African trade with a view to the economic growth and job opportunities it is expected to create, and for the EU with a view to a future continent-to-continent free trade agreement (von der Leyen 2019d), that could eventually succeed the often controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) the EU has been negotiating with Sub-Saharan African regions since 2000. While African countries are keen to gain (or retain) preferential access to European markets, many worry about how to meet European regulatory standards, and are not keen to grant the EU reciprocal access to their markets, fearing that this may impede their own agricultural and industrial development. Interests may also diverge on agriculture if European investment maintains current patterns of African exports of raw commodities to Europe rather than incentivising the development of intra-African food value chains.

Political urgency

HIGH

Foreign investment (not just from Europe) that leads to sustainable economic growth and job creation is high on the political agenda of pretty much every African country. The implementation of the AfCFTA is one of the most urgent items on the AU's agenda. European support to the latter is not the main priority for the AU, but European experiences of integration, and investments in infrastructure can help to support implementation.

In Europe, the agenda for investment and job creation in Africa has increasingly been tied to European domestic interest of limiting migration, bringing it higher on the agenda of the EU and member states. The EU is also concerned about China's growing influence on the continent, and it sees the implementation of the AfCFTA as an opportunity to work towards a future continent-to-continent free trade agreement.

Joint process

There is no one single framework through which the EU, AU and their member states work together on investment. The EU has multiple different vehicles for facilitating investment in Africa, but has no joint vehicle with the AU. Following the announcement of the 2018 Juncker Alliance for investment and jobs, joint action groups were created in four different economic areas (digital solutions, energy, transport and agriculture) with a view to putting together actionable recommendations. This was achieved in the case of the adoption of the AU-EU Agricultural Ministerial Declaration in June 2019 and its joint "Action Agenda"; but with the change in the European Commission the implementation was halted. The EU supports the AU directly with its efforts to implement the AfCFTA and has long supported the RECs in their efforts to boost regional trade, while EU trade relations with African states and groups of states are governed by multiple arrangements, including five regional EPAs with Sub-Saharan African countries and bilateral free-trade agreements with North African countries, some of which are still being negotiated.

Future perspectives

While the EU has multiple instruments for facilitating investment in Africa, none of these is truly in partnership with the AU or other African institutions. The EU and AU could consider developing a joint continental investment platform, bringing together the international financial institutions (IFIs) and other policymakers from both the EU and Africa, to design jointly investment programmes.

The EU and many of its member states are worried about Chinese competition in African countries, and seek to lock African markets into the European sphere of influence. However, African countries are eager to increase the volume and quality of trade and investment, including through increased competition between investors where useful.

There are also good prospects for cooperation in the agricultural sector, but perspectives might slightly differ between the EU and Africa, especially without transformation of the traditional investment and trade patterns (mostly foreign direct investment in large scale farming and incentives to export raw commodities from Africa). Crucially, the EU's External Investment Plan and other EU member states' bilateral blending initiatives and instruments should be coordinated for the concrete benefit of those who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.

On trade, there is a strong perspective for cooperation on supporting implementation of the AfCFTA, including through investments in infrastructure and continued support for the practical aspects of implementing it. The prospect of a continent-to-continent trade agreement could also provide the framework to rationalise the EU's various trade agreements with Africa. While at present African countries have differing interests regarding their trade relationships with Europe and thus have no appetite for a one-size-fits-all approach to a trade agreement with Europe, most African countries do want preferential access to the European market.

The climate crisis

World leaders failed to agree on common rules for carbon markets at COP25 in late 2019 amidst growing climate protests. In 2020, the EU is trying to pick up some of the slack with its ambitious new Green Deal agenda, which proposes to transform fundamentally the European economy to achieve zero net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050. The EU also seeks to take its newfound ambitions to the global level, as a "constructive, but also assertive partner" in climate diplomacy (European Council 2020). African countries, in turn, are among the most vulnerable to climate change, yet they have done little to cause it (Knaepen 2019). Climate-induced disasters are forcing millions to flee their homes and are exacerbating existing tensions and insecurity, especially in the Sahel, leading the AU's Peace and Security Council to label climate change as a major security threat in 2019. At the same time, Africa is not just a victim, but also a battleground for sustainable transition and investment in renewable energy.

Common interests `HIGH`

Both continents have a strong and clearly stated interest in accelerating global climate ambitions, but the pathways for transition to a low-carbon future are very different between Africa and the EU. The EU seeks to transform its aging infrastructure and industry, built on a history of uncontrolled emissions, while African economies face difficult choices and potentially high costs to power economic growth while also keeping emissions in check.

One key challenge for Europe and Africa is to find common ground on the two core climate actions:

➡ **Adaptation – climate vulnerability and adaptation needs in Africa are high.** African countries expect developed countries to finance this through the principle of common and differentiated responsibilities; and

➡ **Mitigation – reducing emissions globally is a precondition to limit climate breakdown.** Yet mitigation (through transitioning to renewable energy and low-carbon industry) is also seen as an investment opportunity and a technological race in which Europe is competing. It therefore often gets priority on the European agenda.

Political urgency `MEDIUM`

Regardless of the perceived level of urgency in both EU and AU policy statements, many countries have little incentives to step up their contribution to climate mitigation, let alone adaptation in the absence of a global commitment and clear rules.

Joint process

While the Joint Africa EU Strategy and several summit declarations commit the two continents to working together on climate change, these efforts have had little success. Both the EU and AU have positioned themselves as global players in climate debates. The EU's Green Deal process is meant to further emphasise the EU's external profile, building on an ambitious internal agenda. The AU has several diplomatic formats in which it works on the climate agenda, including the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), a group of African delegates that engages in climate negotiations, and prepares common positions for African ministers and heads of state at the conferences of the parties.

Future perspectives

The Green Deal has the makings of a 'climate club', which can incentivise member states to take action on emissions reductions, and possibly even penalise underperformers. Climate mitigation, however, is an agenda that cannot be achieved in isolation. Positioning the "EU as a global leader" on climate also calls for stronger alliances. EU climate diplomacy has until now focused mainly on G20, least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS). The AGN presents an opportunity for scaling up, creating a strong intercontinental alliance on climate.

This also means that steps will need to be taken to meet Africa halfway on climate finance and adaptation (e.g. the use of EU and Green Climate Fund resources to concretely help African smallholders to adapt). This may include supporting other climate-related alliances, focusing on sustainable agriculture, ecosystem-based adaptation, water diplomacy and sustainable cities.

In 2020, climate has moved from a latent emergency to an acute crisis. AU-EU cooperation on climate has a strong 'transactional' component (e.g. investment, climate finance), yet it is short on what makes it a 'political alliance', making the 2020 summit an opportunity to make progress on joint climate diplomacy.

A digital future

Digitalisation is essential not just to the functioning of a modern economy, but increasingly to governance, to education and to full participation in modern societies. The new European Commission has ambitions to reposition the EU as a leader in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, to rebuild trust in technology and to leverage its regulatory and market power to assert "European technological sovereignty" (EU 2020a). In Africa, the Smart Africa Manifesto, endorsed by the Assembly of the AU in 2014, aims to accelerate socio-economic development through the championing of information and communications technology (ICT). There are still many challenges to roll out broadband across the continent, to develop the skills necessary to make the most of the digital economy, and to develop rules and regulations to improve the business environment. China's dominant position in African digital markets is a potential area of contention.

Common interests

MEDIUM

The EU and Africa have common interests in many aspects of digitalisation, including working together on improving broadband access across Africa, supporting the development of Africa's digital single market, supporting digital skills development, and developing e-governance (AU and EU, 2019). EU and African economies also have a strong shared interest in working together to ensure that multinational tech companies are fairly taxed, and many are members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) (OECD 2019).

However, the EU also has a keen interest in developing and selling its own technology, and in countering Chinese dominance of the digital sphere for both political and economic reasons. Yet many African countries have already adopted Chinese infrastructure because it is simply more affordable than Western technologies.

The EU also fears that China's digital silk road will not only secure Chinese digital infrastructure dominance, but also entail China working with authoritarian governments in Africa to police the internet and thus control the digital sphere in a manner similar to what it does domestically, with negative effects for freedom of information and the media, for democracy and also potentially for Western economic interests.

Political urgency

HIGH

On the European side, the urgency of working with Africa is part of a wider bid for geopolitical relevance, that would mean extending both its economic footprint on the continent through investments in infrastructure, not the least in the upcoming roll-out of 5G, where European companies (Ericsson and Nokia) are in direct competition with Chinese ones (Huawei and ZTE) for contracts with service providers, both in the EU and abroad. The EU is trying to build a competitive edge in new-generation technology using industrial data and machine learning. It is also trying to build on the global success

of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which sets a new standard for data protection worldwide, including in Africa (Kenya, Nigeria and Benin have adopted GDPR inspired legislation), and further extends its regulatory footprint, setting rules for responsible AI, and leveraging European data for global influence (EU 2020a, Renda 2020).

While digitalisation is a critical priority for African countries and for the AU, the urgency for most African countries is less to compete and more to catch up, namely closing their digital infrastructure gap to accelerate Africa's own digital transformation. This also means that most African countries are willing to work with whichever partner offers the best deals, and many leaders are willing to work with China even where this means that their citizens' data is ill-protected, while others may indeed be keen to access Chinese digital surveillance technologies (Kendall-Taylor et al. 2020: 110, 113).

Joint process

IT'S COMPLICATED

The EU-Africa Digital Economy Partnership addresses a variety of important questions, while the EU Pan-African Programme is currently supporting the Policy and Regulation Initiative for Digital Africa (PRIDA), but the big political questions around who provides digital infrastructure to African countries and how much will most likely be decided on a country-to-country basis in Africa (AU and EUb).

Future perspectives

As on the wider partnership for investments, there is a lot of room for European investments in Africa to facilitate the rolling out of the digital economy and to work with African governments on digital education, e-government and much more. The EU should continue to provide insight into its experience of rolling out the digital single market, the benefits and challenges of GDPR, and eventually share its experiences of the single market for data and regulating artificial intelligence.

Yet, if the EU wants to compete with China in terms of rolling out the African digital economy, then the European technological offer may need to be adapted to African priorities, both in terms of price and scale. Further, where African countries such as Kenya are inspired by EU models, such as GDPR, the EU must be prepared to follow up with a wider digital toolbox to ensure that the economies of these countries are not then negatively impacted.

Ultimately, the digital economy is driven by research and innovation (R&I), and despite limited funding African entrepreneurs have shown a remarkable ability to innovate, allowing them to address local problems (e.g. fintech, incubators, etc.) and to leapfrog outdated and more expensive technology. For Africa to reach its full potential in the digital economy, the continent will require much greater investment in R&I and better access to start-up funding (Diop 2017). The EU and AU both have an interest in supporting fundamental research, and in connecting digital economy research initiatives between Europe and Africa. The EU's external investment plan can also be used to ensure that sufficient funds are available to fund innovative ideas in Africa.

Peace and security

Over the years the AU has gradually assumed a stronger role in conflict management in Africa. Some recent successes include Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR), where the AU was able to assert its leadership, despite regional differences (Crisis Group 2020). In other crises, it is less present (e.g. Libya). The AU is also investing significantly in capabilities for continental and regional responses to violent conflict in Africa ('African solutions to African problems'), and the EU supports this via the African Peace Facility (APF). The EU is now faced with a growing number of complex emergencies in its wider neighbourhood, and is looking to strengthen its role as a security actor. This means the EU is also looking beyond the partnership with the AU at more flexible, ad hoc arrangements with individual countries and coalitions. This may not always play out in the interest of the AU. At the same time, diverging interests amongst EU member states and a strong focus on preventing irregular migration have sometimes impeded European effectiveness, notably in Libya.

Common interests

HIGH

Both the AU and EU benefit from promoting stability and peace on the African continent, although priorities often diverge. The EU has long supported African peace and security agendas and remains committed to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Yet with conflicts that prove hard to contain in its wider neighbourhood (Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso), it has come under increased domestic pressure to focus on containing (perceived) threats with possible domestic repercussions such as violent extremism and irregular migration.

From the African side, there is a perception that European actions are increasingly inconsistent and insufficiently aligned with the AU. In Libya, for example, EU member states have tended to pursue their own often-conflicting interests with little or no consultation with the AU. And while some member states (the Netherlands, Finland) favour a continuation of the partnership with the APSA as it exists now, others (France) argue for a more flexible, bilateral approach, without having to go through the AU. Within Africa, positions also diverge. The AU tries to emphasise conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction and development, yet its member states and regional actors often prioritise finding solutions to burning conflicts. Some member states also directly benefit from existing direct funding arrangements from the EU (e.g. troop allowances, 'border management') or bi-lateral security agreements with EU member states e.g. with France, which can compromise the AU position.

Political urgency

The AU theme for 2020 is 'Silencing the Guns', reflecting the AU's ambition for realising a conflict-free Africa. Since 2018, important steps have been taken to mobilise more African resources for peace and security. Expectations are high that President Ramaphosa – the current Chairman of the AU – will keep peace and security high on the agenda and secure further funding for African operations, especially with South Africa holding a seat on the UN Security Council in 2019-2020. The EU's push for more flexibility in who it works with could be seen as a risk for the AU-EU partnership. Yet while the importance of EU support is well understood in African capitals, there is no clear AU line on this.

Joint process

Peace and security is mentioned as one of the partnerships under the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, and generally considered a successful component. The EU is committed to supporting the APSA 2016-2020 Roadmap (which was developed with EU support) although there is little ownership of the roadmap by the AU, which prefers the 'Silencing the Guns Master Roadmap' as its guiding framework. As both strategies run out at the end of this year, the AU will have to develop its own approach to further operationalise the APSA, in a way addresses APSA's limitations and lessons learnt so far.

Future perspectives

The EU's quest to be a stronger security actor drives it towards more direct engagement and ad-hoc coalitions, including direct military assistance. The AU could see this as undermining the AU-EU partnership on peace and security. The AU would like to see international partners, particularly the EU and UN, channel their support to African peace support operations and peacebuilding efforts through the AU, and has set up the AU Peace Fund to fundraise from its own member states. It remains to be seen whether and under what conditions the EU (and UN) will agree to this approach.

While some EU member states (the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland) want to deepen cooperation with the AU, others (France) want a more flexible (or transactional) approach. Brexit will also change the internal dynamics of EU decision making related to African peace and security, although on security the UK is likely to remain broadly aligned to the EU. The AU itself is increasingly mobilising African resources for the AU Peace Fund (Apiko and Miyandazi 2019) and is trying to mobilise UN assessed contributions for AU operations, but this has thus far been blocked by the US. The AU will likely have to rely on EU funding for some time, and has an interest in leveraging the AU-EU partnership for this.

Democracy, human rights and good governance

The EU has a long history of projecting its democracy, human rights and good governance agenda onto Africa. This has had mixed results at best, and as the EU tries to face up to power politics and instability on its borders it is increasingly struggling to balance its principles with a more pragmatic engagement in Africa. Meanwhile, political and regime change are increasingly decided in the streets, in many parts of Africa (as elsewhere in the world). This is a reality that both the AU and EU often struggle to respond to. In the past few years the AU has shown leadership in a number of contested elections and coups d'état, while in other areas (e.g. closing space for civic action, rule of law, good governance) it is less able to steer the domestic affairs of its member states. While democracy, governance and human rights remain on the AU-EU partnership agenda, little progress has been made in this area since 2007.

Common interests

MEDIUM

On paper, there is a clear common agenda between the EU and AU. The shared values narrative on both sides is remarkably similar, and the African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance reflects many of the same priorities as those of the EU. In practice, however, both sides have long been unable to use the AU-EU partnership to promote political change, and EU-Africa dialogue on this has been weighed down by growing frustrations. African leaders in particular have developed a certain normative fatigue when it comes to the EU. The EU, in turn, appears to be caught in an internal struggle between advancing its strategic interests in Africa (doing business, preventing irregular migration, and maintaining European security) and projecting its normative model, which sparks further scepticism in African capitals, especially considering growing authoritarian forces within Europe itself.

Political urgency

LOW

In Europe, the normative mandate of the EU comes back on the agenda regularly, as was the case briefly after the Arab uprisings in 2010-2011. Since then the EU's external narrative however has moved from 'principled pragmatism' to geopolitics, leaving less space for normative action. On the African side, political affairs remains one of the four continental priorities, yet this may be overshadowed by other urgent priorities such as the AfCFTA and peace and security.

Joint process

The history of EU-Africa cooperation on democracy, human rights and good governance has been dominated by a one-sided approach and overreliance on conditional bilateral aid. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the AU-EU summit process had a strong normative component from the start, yet it was unable to make any real progress on these issues. Growing African frustrations with the EU's approach also made it increasingly awkward to keep repeating the same calls for action, which remained largely inconsequential. Since the 2014 summit in Brussels, the topic has been given less prominence on the agenda, and in the Abidjan outcome document it was even further hidden, grouped under the objective of strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance. While this is not an outright rejection of AU-EU normative agendas, it does recognise that the AU-EU summit process is not suitable to advance common interests in this field.

Future perspectives

Overly heavy and conditional approaches are not compatible with the EU's discourse of partnership with Africa, and while this does not mean that the EU should drop its external normative agenda completely, it does mean that it should become smarter about how it supports political change and good governance in Africa.

In its political messaging, the EU will need to find a better balance between denouncing anything anywhere and selective silence when it may hurt European interests. Strategic cooperation should not eliminate constructive criticism, and double standards should be avoided. This requires greater discipline from EU member states, as well as working with (institutional) allies such as the AU wherever possible. When the AU takes a stand, and the EU is unable to do so (e.g. Egypt, 2013) this hurts the future legitimacy of the EU in relation to good governance in Africa.

The EU should also rethink how it works towards better governance in its external action. Rather than insisting on a comprehensive master plan for democracy, it should focus on specific problems and solutions that can directly or indirectly strengthen domestic accountability mechanisms. This includes sectoral support (e.g. justice), supporting local and city governance systems. Equally important, however, is to work with those African initiatives, movements and civic actors that can exert popular pressure on governments and authorities for political change. These tend to matter far more than donor-imposed accountability.

The EU should also be more self critical about its own internal democratic governance. The EU itself is going through a crisis of democratic legitimacy, and nationalist movements across the continent are challenging the European conception of liberal democratic standards from within, using many of the same tactics the EU tends to denounce abroad. Linked to this, the AU may also need to question the EU more on the rights of Africans in Europe and call on European leaders to reject the growing normalisation of xenophobic sentiments in European political discourse and to ensure the safety and wellbeing of African migrants, and the wider African diaspora in Europe.

Migration and mobility

Migration and mobility is a sensitive topic for both the EU and Africa. The number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe from Africa has fallen greatly since peaking in 2015 and 2016 (IOM 2019). At the same time, since 2010 legal pathways for African migration to Europe appear to have first declined and then stagnated (EU 2018b). European and African actors continue to hold regular dialogues on migration, but the challenge is that EU and African interests and priorities often diverge. Although multiple partnerships between the EU and different configurations of African countries exist on paper (e.g. Valletta, Rabat and Khartoum processes), they are unevenly implemented and do not always take place in the spirit of 'partnership'.

Common interests **MEDIUM**

Both the EU and African countries have a strong interest in addressing the drivers or 'root causes' of irregular migration. This mostly translates to an increased focus on job creation for young people, although the link between youth employment and migration remains ambiguous as the motivations to migrate are manifold (de Haas 2020). Interests can also converge around the developmental aspects of migration, such as reducing the cost of sending remittances or working with diasporas. African states also have a clear security interest in fighting people trafficking, whether with the EU or unilaterally (MEDAM 2019). The return and relocation of migrants caught in the crisis in Libya is another joint concern and in 2017, a joint AU-EU-UN task force was set up to work on this (AU 2019).

At the same time, African countries continue to have a strong interest in legal pathways for migration to Europe and visa facilitation. Yet, despite funds set aside by the European Commission for pilot schemes for legal migration, the resistance of many EU member states means that very few projects have been launched to date. Slow progress in improving conditions for labour mobility also sparks frustrations among African partners, while European actors continue to put pressure on African countries to accept return and readmission of rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants, including of third country nationals in some cases. In contrast, many African countries prefer to take only voluntary returns and have no interest in accepting third country nationals.

Political urgency **MEDIUM**

Migration remains high on the political agenda of the European Commission and of multiple EU member states. 34% of Europeans still consider immigration as the most important issue facing the EU. (Eurobarometer 2019: 15). Internal disagreement about reforming the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), means that the European focus continues to be on the external dimension of migration. This includes a strong focus on cooperating with North African and Sahel countries to control borders, combat human trafficking, to develop legal frameworks for dealing with refugees and other migrants, as well as efforts to return rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants to their countries of origin.

For African states, the urgency of working with the EU on migration varies significantly. The South African Presidency of the AU does not list migration as a high priority topic for the AU to deal with in 2020, although there is likely to be a continued focus on the humanitarian situation in Libya. The AU is mainly focused on questions of migration and development, labour mobility and eventually developing the free movement of people within Africa alongside the AfCFTA. This contrasts with the EU's framing of migration as a security challenge. African countries have struggled to develop a joint approach to irregular migration towards Europe. North African countries consider it politically urgent to manage their borders and prevent onward migration to Europe because they fear becoming major transit hubs for people trafficking and ultimately destination countries by default. But even their approaches vary greatly; Morocco has chosen to intensify bilateral cooperation with the EU, whereas Algeria deals with the issue unilaterally.

Joint process

IT'S COMPLICATED

Following the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in 2007, the Africa-EU migration and mobility dialogue was created to govern migration and mobility (AU and EUa). But as the AU has no mandate to discuss returns and readmission or how to curtail irregular migration on behalf of its member states, the EU increasingly works with African countries bilaterally. The Valletta Summit in November 2015 brought together selected African and European leaders to strengthen cooperation on migration and mobility (European Council 2015). The EU also convened regional fora such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes. The EU and certain EU member states also pursue bilateral partnerships with selected countries. This oversupply of frameworks means that countries can go venue shopping; using the platforms that fits their specific purposes, while bypassing other commitments including those enshrined in international treaties or human rights commitments in some extreme cases.

Future perspectives

Cooperation between the EU and African countries is largely transactional. The European Commission increasingly applies a conditional, 'more for more', approach; the new EU Visa Code, for example directly ties visa facilitation to the readmission of irregular migrants (European Council 2019). This is also apparent in the use of development aid to promote more restrictive border measures. Given the political urgency of migration in Europe, such an approach is likely to continue.

A real common interest-based partnership between the EU and Africa on migration requires a shift in focus from short-term management to long-term partnership. The EU, the AU and their member states would need to be willing to discuss clear and concrete steps (even if modest ones) towards safe and legal migration on the one hand, and towards facilitating return and readmission of irregular migrants on the other. Cooperation would also need to take account of Africa's aspirations in promoting the free movement of people in the continent.

In the absence of a common narrative on migration, the EU and African countries will likely continue to cooperate around specific areas of interest such as human trafficking, job creation or humanitarian support in cases of displacement, while advancing hesitantly on others like visa facilitation and legal pathways for migration.

How to rebuild a partnership?

The EU-Africa partnership has long been weighed down by history, contention around migration, and previous unsuccessful attempts at re-energising cooperation. Today, needs and expectations have shifted on both sides, which calls for a fundamental rethink on how the EU and Africa engage.

The new European Commission is acutely aware that it needs a more compelling narrative for its partnership with Africa, which led it to once more revive the language of equal partnership. As the AU begins to find its place as a global actor, it may also demand more of its European partners.

The case for a genuine interest-driven partnership is clear. The way forward is not. Both EU and AU member states may be tempted to continue business as usual, leading to aspirational statements with limited follow-through. A more useful way forward would look not just for areas of common interests, but would also recognise diverging views where they exist. This means confronting the difficult issues rather than papering over the cracks with statements about equal partnership that lack any credibility.

The result would be a partnership narrative that is less focused on the notional equality of the partners, and more about establishing where each partner needs the other most, and how to come to solutions that work for both sides. Each of the six areas of cooperation covered in this paper offers opportunities for the EU and Africa to work together more effectively, but each must be approached with a willingness to negotiate truly shared solutions. Action is needed on both sides of the table.

For the EU this means:

- **Maintaining high-level political sponsorship beyond the Summit.** Whereas Juncker went to Africa late in his term, von der Leyen prioritised Africa at the very start of her term. 20 European Commissioners joined von der Leyen in Addis Ababa for an initial College-to-College meeting on 27 February 2020, an important step towards mainstreaming the partnership across the Commission. Borrell and the rest of the Commissioners will need to maintain the momentum beyond the October Summit.

- **Avoiding unilateral agenda-setting.** While it can be hard to contain the European Commission's agenda-setting drive, the EU has a strong interest in ensuring the AU and its member states have shared ownership of the partnership agenda and put their demands on the table. It also means consulting with diverse sets of African and European stakeholders.

- **Ensuring EU member state ownership (and discipline)**. European Council president Charles Michel will need to rally EU member states behind a common and constructive narrative. Efforts will also be needed to ensure member states support AU-EU engagement both in words and in actions. This may also mean committing to supporting the AU institutional approach in the long-term (e.g. on peace and security or even migration), even when a bilateral approach with individual African countries may seem more convenient in the short run.

- **Aligning with African integration.** European expectations for the partnership are high, but the EU should also be more aware of the politics of regional integration in Africa. This means taking internal African dynamics into account and paying attention to how common positions are formed at the AU. It also means considering the effects of parallel EU frameworks like the ACP-EU cooperation and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) on African continental agenda setting.

- **Following through on commitments**. The conclusion of the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027 and the programming of the new EU external financing instruments are opportunities to substantiate the stated ambitions of the AU-EU partnership, and to ensure that what is agreed is followed up with solid initiatives. The budgetary cycle also offers an opportunity to ensure that strategic components of the partnership such as research and innovation, peace and security, digitalisation and migration are given sufficient priority

For Africa, this means:

- **Clarifying African demands towards Europe.** While a summit is often but a snapshot of the political reality of the time, it is also an opportunity to refine ambitions and demands around a concrete process. AU member states have every interest in using this year to develop a coherent set of common positions, especially in areas where interests diverge between the EU and African countries.

- **Owning up to its own ambitions.** While the AU and some of its member states are increasingly vocal about their desire for a new type of interest-driven relationship, many African governments are equally keen to retain a traditional donor-recipient relationship, both with the EU and with some of the larger EU member states. This weakens the continental agenda and contributes to the fragmentation of Africa's partnerships. Some AU member states may need to prioritise long-term continental objectives over short-term governmental gains or vested interests.

- **Using AU-EU relations to amplify "Africa's global voice".** The African Union plays a key role in EU-Africa relations, and can leverage this role in its bid to position the AU as a stronger global player. By speaking as one in discussions with the EU on global issues such as climate and security, the AU can set a new precedent for AU action at the global level.

For the AU-EU partnership, this means:

- **Building a new multilateral alliance in the UN**. The EU is now looking to the AU as a potential partner at multilateral fora. The AU wishes to play a stronger role in the world and thus not just to follow the lead of others. Yet, both have a strong interest in seeing multilateral fora strengthened. More coordination and reciprocity will be necessary to make this happen. The EU should be ready to back more African initiatives and to offer more than symbolic support to Africa's bid for permanent UN Security Council representation.

- **Working towards an EU-Africa climate deal.** Both the EU and Africa have an interest in tackling climate change. While each has different interests, neither can do it alone. The momentum for change in the EU can open the door to a more ambitious and integrated deal on climate between the EU and the AU, which brings together industrialised and developing economies. A successful AU-EU alliance on climate could become a new driving force in global climate diplomacy.

- **Moving beyond formal institutions and diplomatic venues.** It is essential that the AU-EU partnership includes not just the voices of political leaders, but generates a meaningful participation of civil society, young people, diaspora networks, business leaders and artists, beyond summits and fora. Efforts and funding are needed to facilitate social, cultural and economic exchange that contributes to mutual understanding and dialogue between societies.

Bibliography

African Group of Negotiators. *About the AGN*.

Annunziata M. and Kramer, S. 2015. *Building strong workforces to power Africa's growth. The future of work in Africa*, July 2015.

Apiko, P. & Miyandazi, L. 2019. *Self-financing the African Union: One levy, multiple reforms*, ECDPM paper, September 2019

AU. *Our Aspirations for the Africa We Want.*

AU. 2019. *Meeting of the Joint AU-EU-UN Taskforce to Address the Migrant and Refugee Situation in Libya,* press release, 25 September 2019.

AU and EUa. *Support to the Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue*, project.

AU and EUb. *Policy and Regulation Initiative for Digital Africa (PRIDA)*, project.

AU and EU. 2007. *The Africa-EU strategic partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, 9th draft, 28 April 2006. AU and EU. 2019. *New Africa-Europe Digital Economy Partnership - report of the EU-AU Digital Economy Task Force*, 13 June 2019.

Bisong, A. and Teevan, C. 2019. *Von der Leyen in Addis Ababa: Seven ingredients for a successful first date*, Euractiv, 6 December 2019.

BMZ. 2017. *A new partnership for development, peace and a better future. A Marshall Plan with Africa*, Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), January 2017.

Borrell, J. 2020. *Embracing Europe's Power*, Project Syndicate - the world's opinion page, 8 February 2020.

Bossuyt, J. 2017. *Can EU-Africa relations be deepened? A political economy perspective on power relations, interests and incentives*, Briefing Note 97.

De Haas, H. 2020. *Why development will not stop migration*, blog, 7 February 2020.

Diop, M. 2017. *Africa can enjoy leapfrog development*, 11 October 2017.

EU. 2018a. *Africa-Europe Alliance. Boosting investment and trade for sustainable growth and jobs*.

EU. 2018b. *Many more to come? Migration from and within Africa*, Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission's science and knowledge service, March 2018. EU. 2019a. *A European Green Deal. Striving to be the first climate-neutral continent*.

EU. 2020a. *Communication Shaping Europe's Digital Future*, February 2020.

Eurobarometer. 2019. *Standard Eurobarometer 92*, December 2019.

European Council. 2015. Valletta Summit on migration, 11-12 November 2015.

European Council. 2019. *Visa policy: EU updates rules to facilitate legitimate travel and fight illegal migration*, press release, 6 June 2019.

European Council. 2020. *Draft Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy*, Brussels, 20 January 2020. Faki, M. 2020. *Statement of H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission at the AU-EU College to College Meeting*. 27 February 2020.

FAO. 2019. *New UN report reveals that hunger in Africa continues to rise*, 13 February 2019.

Fox, B., Fortuna, G., Morgan, S., Stolto, S. and Michalopoulos, S. 2020. *LEAK: EU charts 6G future in ambitious industrial plan*, 24 January 2020.

Kayali, L., Heikillä M. and Delcker J. 2020. *Europe's digital vision, explained*, 19 February 2019.

Kendall-Taylor, A., Frantz, E. and Wright, J. 2020. *The Digital Dictators. How Technology Strengthens Autocracy*. Foreign Affairs, pp. 103-115.

Knaepen, H. 2019. *COP25: The eternal challenge of competing interests*, ECDPM blog, 16 December 2019.

International Crisis Group. 2020. *Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2020*, Briefing 151, 7 February 2020.

IOM. 2019. *Europe − Mixed Migration Flows To Europe Monthly Overview*, December 2019.

Jégo, M., Vitkine B., et Bobin, F. 2020. *En Libye, le grand marchandage entre Moscou et Ankara*, Le Monde, 24 January 2020.

Jones, A. and Ahairwe, P. 2020. *The state of the negotiations on the long-term EU budget after summit ends with black smoke*, ECDPM blog, 24 February 2020

Keijzer, N. and Medinilla, A. 2017. *Can the EU prioritise both the African Union and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific group?* Brussels: ETTG.

Lopes, C. 2018. *The Untapped Potential of EU-Africa Trade*, Project Syndicate - the world's opinion page, 22 October 2018.

MEDAM. 2019. *The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Nigeria*, 27 December 2019.

Medinilla, A. and Bossuyt, J. 2019. *Africa-EU relations and post-Cotonou: African collective action or further fragmentation of partnerships?* ECDPM Briefing note, March 2019.

Medinilla, A. Veron, P. and Mazzara, V. 2019. *EU-UN cooperation: Confronting change in the multilateral system*, ECDPM paper, September 2019.

NEPAD. 2020. *The Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative Report*, February 2020.

OECD. 2019. *OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS. Progress report July 2018 – May 2019*.

Renda, A. 2020. *Europe's Digital Independence Day*, CEPS, 19 February 2020.

Teevan, C. and Sherriff, A. 2019. *Mission possible? The Geopolitical Commission and the partnership with Africa*, ECDPM Briefing note 113, October 2019.

Von der Leyen, U. 2019a. *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission*, Mission letter, 1 December 2019.

Von der Leyen, U. 2019b. *A Union that strives for more. My agenda for Europe*, Political Guidelines For The Next European Commission 2019-2024.

Von der Leyen, U. 2019c. *Remarks by President von der Leyen at the joint press statement with Moussa Faki*, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, 7 December 2019.

Von der Leyen, U. 2019d. *Commissioner-designate for Trade*, Mission letter, 10 September 2019.

Von der Leyen, U. 2020. *Remarks by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with Moussa Faki, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, following the 10th EU-AU Commission-to-Commission meeting plenary session*. 27 February 2020.

About ECDPM

The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) is an independent 'think and do' tank working on international cooperation and development policy in Europe and Africa.

Since 1986 our staff members provide research and analysis, advice and practical support to policymakers and practitioners across Europe and Africa – to make policies work for sustainable and inclusive global development.

Our main areas of work include:

- European external affairs
- African institutions
- Regional integration
- Security and resilience
- Migration
- Sustainable food systems
- Finance, trade and investment
- Private sector engagement

For more information please visit www.ecdpm.org

This publication benefits from the structural support by ECDPM's institutional partners: The Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Austria.

ISSN1571-7577