



Monitoring System of the Implementation of Projects and Programmes  
of External Co-operation financed by the EU – ENPI

# ***Result-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) for European Neighbourhood Countries***

## **Quick Scans 2010**

February 2010



This project is funded by  
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### Project synopsis

Project Title:	Service Contract for a “Results-oriented Monitoring system of the Implementation of Projects and Programmes of External Co-operation”, Lot 1 – European Neighbourhood Countries.
Project Number:	EVA/2007/146-595
Country:	European Neighbourhood countries

Overall objective	European Commission external assistance is increasingly effective and accountable.
Specific objective	Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) acts as an independent early warning system supporting EC project management with useful recommendations.
Planned outputs	Independent, well-targeted, timely and results-oriented information on project implementation.
Expected results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>R.1 Ongoing projects and regional programmes (Budget &gt; 1M€) are monitored at least once a year</li><li>R.2 A representative sample of projects of less than €1M (mainly of thematic budget lines) are monitored</li><li>R.3 A selected number of ex-post ROM and SPSP ROM are conducted consolidating the test phase</li><li>R.4 Special reports on individual programmes, thematic or sectoral issues are elaborated upon request of the EC</li><li>R.5 The work, findings and conclusions are presented to stakeholders</li><li>R.6 A regional monitoring capacity is developed and the Monitoring Programme is exemplarily well managed</li></ul>
Project starting date	01 December 2007 ENPI East - 22 January 2008 ENPI South Extended to 30 November 2010
Project duration	Max 36 months.

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**1. Quick Scans ENPI East**

**1.1. Quick scan Armenia**



This project is funded by the European Union

## EU Results-oriented Monitoring Programme European Neighbourhood Countries



### Quick Scan EC Funded Projects in Armenia 2009

#### 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

#### 2. Approach

The Quick Scan is based on an overview of the 92 monitoring reports issued in the period 2006-2009, including as well Country Monitoring Reports on Interstate Projects.

Starting from the Action Plan 2006, the new ENP Instruments are being introduced in Armenia (Budget Support, Twinning, TAIEX, etc.), incorporating cross-cutting, thematic and targeted actions. This review concentrates, however, on the foregoing projects (mainly Tacis): so far only one Sector Budget Support programme was monitored. The first Twinning project will be monitored in February-March 2010.

An additional feature of the application of the new ENP Instruments in Armenia is the EC Advisory Group project, which was started in 2009 and aims to support selected ministries with high level assistance for ENP implementation. As such, this project intends to make the ENP Instruments a complete package. The project will be monitored in spring 2010 and therefore, its effectiveness has not yet been assessed.

#### 3. Aggregated Review

A general assessment is presented in the table below, providing average scores of standard monitoring criteria. Due to implementation and continuity specifics, the Nuclear Safety projects are presented separately.

**Table 1. Average scores of EC funded projects in Armenia, 2006-2009**

	National	Nuclear Safety	Interstate	Overall Armenia	ENPI east
Number of monitoring reports	<b>36</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>92</b>	
Quality of project design	2.86	3.05	2.84	<b>2.91</b>	<b>2.92</b>
Efficiency of implementation	2.67	2.90	2.56	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.76</b>
Effectiveness to date	2.90	2.94	2.78	<b>2.87</b>	<b>2.85</b>
Impact prospects	2.82	2.99	2.87	<b>2.89</b>	<b>2.94</b>
Potential sustainability	2.73	2.72	2.77	<b>2.74</b>	<b>2.90</b>
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>2.92</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>2.87</b>

Note: score 4=very good, 3=good, 2=problems, and 1=serious deficiency. 'On track'= 2.5.

The main conclusions of Table 1 are that in the period 2006 – 2009:

- Projects implemented in Armenia scored on average in line with (or slightly less than) the projects implemented in the total region ENP East. In fact, only sustainability in Armenia is slightly worse than in ENP East.
- Nuclear Safety projects scored on average slightly better than the projects implemented in ENP East. A separate assessment of the Nuclear Safety sector has been made, showing that a high level of commitment of the beneficiaries, efficient Contractors and peer-to-peer relations were the main characteristics of the Nuclear Safety projects in general, and as concluded below, this applies also to Armenian Nuclear Safety projects.
- Country Monitoring Reports on Armenia show that the national components of Interstate projects score also in line with the overall Interstate projects (2.81 for Armenia; 2.79 for overall project). In this respect it can be noted that project management of most Interstate projects is still done in Brussels, and that there is little involvement of the EC Delegation and NCU.

**Table 2. Scores of National Projects in Armenia, monitored in 2009 1)**

	Relevance/quality of design	Efficiency of implementation	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability	Overall
<b>Nuclear</b>						
Task J: Enhancement of nuclear materials accountancy and control at NPP Medzador	3.40	2.60	2.50	3.00	3.30	<b>2.96</b>
A3.01/07: support to the Nuclear Safety Authority	3.05	3.08	3.00	3.20	2.70	<b>3.01</b>
A3.01/06: enhancement of safety assessment capabilities of ANRA for licensing safety improvements	3.00	3.40	3.50	3.00	3.20	<b>3.22</b>
A1.01/06: On-Site Assistance to NPP	3.00	3.35	3.50	3.00	2.70	<b>3.01</b>
<b>OTHERS</b>						
Support to the energy policy in Armenia	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	<b>3.00</b>
AEPLAC V	3.30	3.25	3.00	2.40	3.20	<b>3.03</b>
Regional network for development in regions of Ararat and Vayot Dzor (REDAM II)	2.65	2.25	3.00	3.00	3.00	<b>2.78</b>
Support to the PAO	3.00	2.55	3.00	2.00	2.00	<b>2.51</b>
Support to the reforms in childcare and child protection	3.00	2.75	3.00	3.00	2.20	<b>2.79</b>
<b>Average scores</b>	<b>3.04</b>	<b>2.91</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>2.84</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>2.92</b>
<b>Average scores National Projects in ENP East 2009</b>	<b>2.97</b>	<b>2.87</b>	<b>2.96</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>2.94</b>	<b>2.95</b>

1. Excluding the monitored Interstate projects.

The main sectors supported and respective achievements and challenges were the following:

### **Energy**

EC funded projects provided substantial support to assuring the energy supply and to improving nuclear safety. Projects concerned the development of alternative energy sources and the management of gas sector. The ex-post monitoring of the project "Support to the energy policy" showed:

- The project was, and still is, relevant, in-time and supportive to developing energy policies, because Armenia has few energy resources and expansion of alternative energy has priority for the Government.
- The project's results and effects continued also after the project.

The nuclear safety projects concerned the nuclear Operator (Armenian Nuclear Power Plant - ANPP), the Armenian Regulatory Authority, as well as other Beneficiary Authorities related to safeguards for possession, storage and transfer of nuclear materials.

Notable achievements were:

- Improved safety culture at ANPP through transferred equipment and practices; license review based on EU practices supporting the Armenian Regulatory Authority; progress in ANPP's Decommissioning Strategy;
- Creation of data base with likely feasible projects in alternative energy;
- Introduction of a quality assurance process at the main gas company.

ANPP improvement projects are supported through the dedicated EC Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and benefit from coordination of international assistance through an IAEA-assisted annual coordination meeting promoting an optimal use of limited resources.

The Nuclear Safety projects did not met major obstacles, but limited resources at ANPP require continued support for improvements. In early 2008, the Armenian Regulatory Authority, previously being a department of the Ministry of Nature Protection, obtained a more independent position and was directly subordinated to the Cabinet. This improved its status and remuneration, and allowed it to expand its staff (albeit to still insufficient levels).

### **Social Consequences of Transition**

#### ***Vocational Education and Training***

Projects include both Tacis and SPSP and have been mainly aimed at rehabilitation and development of the Vocational Education system (VET). Though particular projects were successful in producing sustainable results, contributing to rehabilitation of numerous institutions, their overall impact is still low. This is mainly because the reform of the VET sector is not supported by corresponding reforms in the labour market and in its policy and regulatory system. Moreover, a stronger interagency cooperation between educational, social, labour and economic authorities with a focus on improving the employment conditions would be beneficial. These issues are supported by the consequent phase of SPSP in VET.

#### ***Childcare***

Here, the EC assistance also includes both Tacis projects and SPSP, which visibly support the improvement of the sector. The main factors for success are existence of straightforward governmental policy and good level of inter-agency cooperation. This explains the relative good scores for the project monitored in 2009 (except for the sustainability criteria, which was relatively low because proper funding of Child Protection Units still needed to be addressed), as well as for the SPSP monitored in 2008.

#### **Regional and Rural Development**

The projects (including the REDAM II project monitored in 2009) concerned the establishment of a strategy for regional development and planning, and for investments in the agricultural and business infrastructure. Infrastructures have been created for local businesses which resulted on

increased agricultural capacities and production. These results demonstrate that the projects were properly geared to the demands for business infrastructures (collection, processing and transportation) and transferred relevant know-how for the further development. However, the strategy and policy level is still weak and little was done to address such institutional issues as access to markets and risk management.

### **Horizontal (cross-cutting) actions**

The main cross-cutting project since 2003 has been the Armenian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (AEPLAC), which was reported as an 'EC prominent project' and a success case on EuropeAid's web-site and in recent programming documents. With the support of the project, Armenia was the first CIS country to elaborate and adopt a comprehensive "National Programme on PCA Implementation" according to accession countries' methodologies and criteria for such document. For five years, this project was the focal point for the legal-institutional reforms' strategies and the Consultant providing essential services to the Government and EC Delegation.

This project was followed up by a new AEPLAC project, which has less a leading role than the previous projects and which has to work in tandem with and is to support the other ENP Instruments. The current basis for the work of the new AEPLAC in combination with EU Advisory group and other key Instruments is the ENP Action Plan and Governmental Programme of Actions 2009-2011 adopted in May 2009, to some extent, replacing the PCA National Programme. So far, based on monitoring of its Inception Phase, the project succeeds well in its mandate.

The new intervention of SIGMA started generally successfully. The intervention was monitored in December 2009. It corresponded well to the ongoing reforms in Public Finance, Civil Service and Public Procurement ongoing in the country for already several years.

## **4. Key Findings and Recommendations**

- The sector specific approach proved to be effective in self-mobilisation of recipients and, sometimes, for formulation of strategies and policies. However, for more effective contribution and full impact these interventions need to be lined-up with horizontal concepts to address cross-cutting issues (e.g. the VET and labour market policy) and to address common policy, institutional and administrative issues (e.g. reflected in PCA National Programme and in Governmental Programme 2009-2011). The last three Action Programmes (2002-2006) introduced somewhat scattered sector interventions. This is being addressed by formation of a more complete package of ENP Instruments, specifically by the EC advisory Group project; this project will be monitored in spring 2010, and as such it is too early to say whether this concept is effective.
- The sustainability of projects, although being slightly lower than in the overall region ENP East, is generally satisfactory thanks to their general relevance, and, hence to ownership and political support. However, this is often endangered because of temporary lack of resources (financial, human) and management experience. In these cases, follow-up actions are needed to keep the positive line of benefits and future development of attained results, which is, however, not always the practice.

1.2. Quick scan Azerbaijan



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**EU Results-oriented Monitoring  
Programme**  
**European Neighbourhood Countries**



**Quick Scan**  
**EC Funded Projects in Azerbaijan 2009**

**1. Origin of request and purpose**

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

**2. Approach**

This Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Azerbaijan is based upon the Quick Scan of October 2009 and focuses on projects in the field of energy and economic development because these areas are most prominent in the ENP Action Plan for Azerbaijan.

**2. Aggregated review**

In the period 2006 – 2009 the national projects implemented in Azerbaijan scored on average slightly worse than in the total region ENP East. This is specially reflected in a lower score for relevance-design.

**Table 1. Average scores of EC funded projects in Azerbaijan, 2006-2009**

	National projects	Interstate projects	Overall Azerbaijan	ENPI east
Number of monitoring reports	<b>49</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>87</b>	
Quality of project design	2.67	2.75	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.92</b>
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.79	2.56	<b>2.68</b>	<b>2.76</b>
Effectiveness to date	2.76	2.71	<b>2.73</b>	<b>2.85</b>
Impact prospects	2.86	2.83	<b>2.85</b>	<b>2.94</b>
Potential sustainability	2.80	2.77	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.90</b>
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.78</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>2.75</b>	<b>2.87</b>

Notes:

1. Score: 4=very good, 3=good, 2=problems, and 1=serious deficiency. 'On track'= 2.5.
2. Scores for Interstate projects concern only the national components.

As to Interstate projects, Country Monitoring Reports on Azerbaijan show that the national components of these projects scores also slightly lower than the overall project (2.64 for Azerbaijan; 2.79 for overall project). In this respect it can be noted that project management of most Interstate projects are still done in Brussels, and that there is little involvement of the EC Delegation and NCU.

### 3. National projects monitoring in 2009

In 2009 9 National Projects have been monitored, of which 3 Twinning projects (Inception Phase) and 6 projects still financed under Tacis (of which 3 were in the Inception Phase).

In general terms the National Projects monitored in 2009 showed the same overall picture as in earlier: the average scores for National Projects in Azerbaijan are lower than the averages scores for National Projects monitored in ENP East, and the largest difference concerns the design criteria.

**Table 2. Scores of EC funded projects in Azerbaijan monitored in 2009 1)**

	Relevance/quality of design	Efficiency of implementation	Effectiveness	Impact prospects	Sustainability	Overall
<b>TWINNING</b>						
Improvement legal and technical aspects of food quality and certification of fishery products	2.70	2.55	2.50	3.00	3.00	<b>2.75</b>
Standardization, metrology, conformity assessment & accreditation in SASMP	3.00	2.90	3.00	3.00	3.00	<b>2.98</b>
Legal approximation and structural reform in the energy sector of Azerbaijan.	2.40	3.00	2.00	2.40	2.80	<b>2.52</b>
<b>OTHERS</b>						
Support to the Ministry of Economic Development	2.70	2.55	3.00	3.00	2.40	<b>2.73</b>
Support for the improvement of investment and export promotion climate	2.40	2.80	3.00	3.00	2.50	<b>2.74</b>
Vocational education and training reforms strategy and pilot implementation in a selected region in Azerbaijan	3.00	2.55	3.00	3.00	2.80	<b>2.87</b>
Support to the NCU and to the PCA implementation	2.10	2.55	2.00	2.40	2.20	<b>2.25</b>
Reform of the social protection sector	2.80	3.80	4.00	4.00	3.50	<b>3.62</b>
Task F: Implementation of measures to combat illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear material	2.70	2.45	3.00	3.00	2.40	<b>2.71</b>
<b>Average scores national projects Azerbaijan 2009</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>2.98</b>	<b>2.73</b>	<b>2.80</b>
<b>Average scores national projects ENP East 2009</b>	<b>2.97</b>	<b>2.87</b>	<b>2.96</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>2.94</b>	<b>2.95</b>

1. Excluding the monitored Interstate projects.

Looking at the National Projects monitored in 2009, it appears that the problems is the design criteria are mainly concentrated on underestimation of risks in the design and that the risks concern to a large extent insufficient staffing and/ or unclear situation of the supported institutions (e.g. first and foremost NCU, but also AZPROMO, AIC, as well as of PAO) and contracting interest of the involved parties (in Twinning project on legal approximation.

#### **4. Sectoral Review**

In the following a brief review is presented of the projects in energy and economic development. This review concerns a wider period, starting from 1995.

##### **Energy**

In the period 1995-2009 the energy sector of Azerbaijan significantly developed and during this period 16 national energy projects and 10 INOGATE projects were implemented in Azerbaijan. The national projects can be divided in three groups: institutional development and capacity building in the Ministry of Fuel and Energy; assistance to implementation of structural reforms in the energy sector; and introduction of international norms and standards in oil and gas equipment manufacturing industry. The INOGATE programme in Azerbaijan is more focused on policy development, capacity building in oil and gas sector, identification of priority investment projects in the energy sector, and harmonisation of technical standards.

##### ***Institutional Development***

During 1998-2001 the EC assisted in creation the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, which was established in 2002. The assistance continued after the creation of the Ministry, but the efficiency of this assistance was not high due to the permanent reorganisation and restructuring in the Ministry during 2002-2008. In fact, the Ministry is still not fully staffed.

##### ***Energy Sector Restructuring***

The projects implemented were not very successful, mainly because poorly prepared ToRs. Tasks and objectives were often not relevant to the real needs of the beneficiaries and during implementation the Contractors were not in position to adapt the project implementation strategy. Hence, the project beneficiary was reluctant to implement the recommendations.

##### ***Harmonisation of Technical Standards***

The EC assistance in harmonisation of existing technical standards can be considered as one of the most successful projects, also because the Government is highly interested to adopt ISO and API standards in the oil and gas manufacturing industry.

##### ***Interstate projects***

The efficiency of the INOGATE Programme was low in Azerbaijan because the interstate projects not always matched with the Government policy and priorities. However, the Energy Ministerial Conference in Baku on 13 November 2004 ("Baku Initiative") initiated a fundamental transformation of the INOGATE Programme into a wider policy dialogue aiming at enhancing energy cooperation between the EU, littoral states of the Black and Caspian Seas and their neighbouring countries.

At 2nd Ministerial Conference (November 2006 in Kazakhstan) the EU and countries of the Caspian and Black Sea regions adopted the Energy Road Map. After this Conference the Government of Azerbaijan approved the 10-year State Programme for the Development of the Non-oil Energy Sector and the Agency for Alternative and Renewable Energy Resources was established in 2009 (this decision can be considered as indirect impact of the EC projects). On the other hand, the recent take-over of Azerigas by SOCAR can not be considered as a step towards a more open market structure.

## **Economic Development**

Overall, the EC has been quite active in the provision of technical assistance for the development of the Economic / Financial sector of Azerbaijan – 13 full-scale national projects were implemented in the last 8 years. At the same time, it is difficult to identify a sector strategy/ approach in the planning, design and launching of the projects, since direct linkages/ correlations between the projects were rather weak. As a matter of fact, the projects were more “discrete interventions” of a fragmentary character, which were not assembled in some modules with wider targets or a sectoral approach.

Most projects were completed successfully, despite problems met during implementation. Positive effects of some projects became distinguishable some time after completion.

## **5. Key Findings and Conclusions**

The main conclusions of the brief review made are the following:

- The ToRs, especially those related to policy support and institutional reform, not always take sufficiently into account the existing realities and policies, including limited capacity of beneficiaries in implementing policy and restructuring reforms and recognition that the reform processes have their own dynamics. In fact, the most successful projects are the ones where the project design was significantly adapted in these respects.
- Two “factors of success” can be distinguished: (i) high quality expertise provided by the Contractors; and (ii) close cooperation between the project teams and direct counterparts/ beneficiaries, leading (inter alia) to a high degree of ownership.
- Impact of the projects comes often quite some time after completion of the projects (especially when it concerns policy and institutional reforms). A flexible “after service” would help to gain full impact and to prevent loss of project results.
- Interstate projects are still not efficacious instruments in Azerbaijan. More involvement of EC Delegation and NCU would be beneficial.

1.3. Quick scan Belarus



## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

Brussels Central Office



### Quick Scan EU Funded Projects in Belarus 2009

#### 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

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#### 2. Approach of this review

The review is the result of screening of the monitoring reports produced during 2009 and of the current situation relating to the development of EU funded projects/ programmes in Belarus.

#### 3. Sectoral Review

EU assistance to Belarus under Tacis focused on justice and home affairs, environment protection, cross-border infrastructure, social protection, nuclear safety, education, standards, metrology and local administration. The main beneficiaries were Ministry of Interior Affairs, State Border Committee, State Customs Committee, Ministry of Emergency, Ministry of Nature, Ministry of Education, regional executive committees and some NGOs.

Within ENPI starting from 2007 the EU provides assistance to Belarus under National, Regional-East, Interregional (including TAIEX), Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) and Thematic programmes.

The main priorities identified in the Country Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013 and the National Indicative Programme for the period 2007-2010 are: (I) "Social and Economic Development" including actions to alleviate the consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe; and (II) "Democratic Development and Good Governance". The sectoral approach for 2009 is "Standards". Regional priorities (East) are transport and energy; environment and forestry; border management and fight against trans-national organised crime.

The Ministry of Economy determines national programmes for international technical assistance (TA). These programmes set national priorities for attracting and using TA. Currently, the National Programme for 2006-2013 is in force. It is based on two state documents: the National Programme of Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Belarus for 2006-2010 and the National Strategy of Sustainable Socio-Economic Development for the period till 2020.

Belarus participates in ENPI CBC programmes, such as the "Baltic Sea Region" (15 projects with Belarusian partners), "Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus" (14 projects with Belarusian partners) and "Poland-Ukraine-Belarus" (7 projects with Belarusian partners). ENPI CBC was preceded by the Neighbourhood Programme (NP) 2004-2006. Among Belarusian partners were Ministry of Nature, Ministry of Emergency, Academy of Sciences, Chamber of Commerce, Polytechnic Academy, Oblast Executive Committees and various NGOs. This was the first try of such a wide participation

and involvement of regional institutions and authorities in cooperation with the neighbouring countries.

Although Belarusian partners performed well, they did not use the offered support and the opportunity to “promote sustainable economic and social development” (the overall objective of the NP) to the full extent. This was a result of the comparatively low proactive involvement of local authorities and the acquired habit to keep a “low profile” vis-à-vis the central administration. Secondly, at local level there was a lack of information, access to appropriate communication technology, low absorption capacity and language barriers as the main working language and source of information is in English.

The lessons learned from the gained experience were used in the process of the Belarusian participation in the ENPI. Interestingly, with the warming up of the relationships with the EU the attitude towards foreign aid has also changed for the better.

Overall performance of Belarus projects is good. Some exceptions are as follows.

- The Tacis RAP 2006 project “Support to Kyoto Protocol Implementation in the Tacis countries” aims at assisting participating countries in combating climate change, both by using the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms and by supporting the formulation of appropriate mitigation and adaptation strategies at each country level. The project does not enjoy the support of the partner, the Ministry of Nature, as project activities do not clearly address needs relevant for Belarus. In the opinion of the key counterpart and other stakeholders most of the tasks presented by the project for implementation have already been achieved. As a result, the project in Belarus has not been registered due to a lack of commitment of the key counterpart. Insufficient attention to the country’s needs decreased the level of local ownership.
- “Support to Energy Markets Integration and Sustainable Energy in the NIS”. It is unclear whether the needs of the beneficiaries in Belarus will be taken on board in the final project design and included in the work plan. The contractor has not made it clear to what extent the project assistance could be adapted to the country needs.
- The project “Harmonisation of Gas and Oil Technical Standards and Practices in Eastern Europe and Caucasus” is designed to contribute to the convergence of energy markets. The project objectives are relevant to the country and energy sector policies, which state the principle of prioritised application of international standards. Project activities in Belarus were delayed. This was beyond the consultant’s control, as, for example, the Statement of Endorsement was received from Belarus only in November 2008, while the project started in December 2007. The following remarks expressed by the partners could have improved the consultant’s performance: “The activity of selecting standards could have proceeded at a much faster pace, had the project expert oriented the audience’s attention more to European Directives than to clarifying partners’ preferences”. Another remark by the stakeholders refers to the low quality of the project expert’s report on standardisation in Belarus presented at the Inter-Regional Meeting..

#### **4. Regional programmes**

Besides the aforementioned problem projects Belarus participates in a number of regional initiatives, which are effective and promise broad impacts. These pertain to the INOGATE Programme, Water Governance, Environment Protection, Integration of Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), Border Crossing Points, and Harmonisation of Electricity Standards. The objectives of these projects are all relevant to Belarus.

#### **5. National projects**

National projects “Border Management” (Bombel III), “Preventing, Fighting and Addressing the Social Consequences of Trafficking in Human Beings”, “Migrabel”, “Migration and Asylum” and also CBC – “Strengthening Regional Capabilities for Prevention and Response to Chemical Emergencies” are implemented successfully due to the fact that their project partners are the

Ministry of Interior, Border Guards Committee, Customs Committee and the Ministry of Emergencies. Projects with these partners generally achieve planned results on time and cost-efficiently.

All donor-assisted TA projects have to be registered with the Ministry of Economy. In some cases this lengthy procedure has resulted in a reduced project duration, or even loss of projects because the remaining time before the Final Date of Implementation was too short to start activities. On the other hand, the registration itself is an indicator that the Government wants the project, usually resulting in good ownership and institutional and policy support.

The table below shows the scoring of the Belarusian projects as compared to the ENPI regional and national projects' average scoring.

## 6. ROM scores compared with ENPI-East average

Reporting period: 01/01/2009 – 31/12/2009

Summary of conclusions	Belarus national projects	ENPI East national projects	Belarus regional programmes	ENPI East regional programmes
Relevance/quality of design	3.10	2.97	2.92	2.85
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.89	2.87	2.73	2.73
Effectiveness to date	3.14	2.96	2.85	2.73
Impact prospects	3.07	3.00	3.00	2.88
Potential sustainability	3.01	2.94	3.01	2.75
<b>Average Score in total</b>	<b>3.04</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>2.90</b>	<b>2.79</b>

As is evident, the average scores in Belarus are higher compared to ENPI East average. The general observation is that Belarus provides a favourable climate for cooperation assistance. However, the interventions are not devoid of accompanying difficulties. Among the most common ones are delayed starts, tax exemption issues, long and complicated project registration process.

## 5. Key findings and recommendations.

During the regional conference organised by the NCU on the 10<sup>th</sup> of February 2010 and dedicated to the Completion of the Tacis Programme, participants expressed their gratitude to Tacis and high appreciation of the EU cooperation with Belarusian partners.

Below are some of the recommendations, wishes and observations expressed by the participants:

- regional projects covering several countries should be able to take on board each country's needs;
- application forms for project registration, and the whole process of registration should be simplified;
- works Contractors are not to hire foreign companies as there is a problem with licensing;
- establish an agency to accumulate know-how and skills to manage projects financed under new Instruments; within the Eastern Partnership, create an agency on all issues pertaining to the EaP, possibly on the basis of the NCU;
- TAIEX becomes more and more popular with Belarusian stakeholders.

1.4. Quick scan Georgia



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**EU Results-oriented Monitoring  
Programme  
European Neighbourhood Countries**



**Quick Scan  
EC Funded Projects in Georgia 2009**

**1. Origin of request and purpose**

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

**2. Approach**

This is a brief review of the monitored EC projects implemented in the period 2006 – 2009. This period is characterised by a gradual move towards a “modular” approach, focused on specific sectors/ sub-sectors and combining different types of projects in approaching respective targets: technical assistance, rapid reaction mechanism, supply contracts and rehabilitation. In addition, a start was made with the introduction of new ENP Instruments: Budget Support programmes are implemented in PFM, Rule of Law and IDPs; several SIGMA projects are ongoing; and a few Twinning instrument projects have started.

This Quick Scan follows this modular grouping of projects and concentrates on the achievements and difficulties met. The review is based on the Monitoring Reports of 2006-2009 and generalises qualitative and quantitative characteristics of respective projects.

**3. Aggregated Review**

The projects implemented can be grouped in five modules: Health Care; Rule of Law; Regional Projects (poverty reduction/ economic development); Others; and Interstate (as progressed in Georgia). A general assessment is presented in the table below, providing average scores of standard monitoring criteria:

**Table 1. Average scores of EC funded projects in Georgia, 2006-2009**

	Health Care	Rule of Law	Regional project	Others	Inter-state	Overall Georgia	ENPI East
No. of monitoring reports	<b>24</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>138</b>	
Quality of project design	2.86	2.87	2.73	2.72	2.75	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.92</b>
Efficiency of implementation	2.76	2.80	2.75	2.78	2.63	<b>2.75</b>	<b>2.76</b>
Effectiveness	2.75	2.92	2.87	2.68	2.74	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.85</b>
Impact prospects	2.62	2.64	2.41	2.72	2.68	<b>2.61</b>	<b>2.94</b>
Potential sustainability	2.58	2.79	2.45	2.67	2.59	<b>2.61</b>	<b>2.90</b>
<b>Overall average score</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.68</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.87</b>

Score: 4=very good, 3=good, 2=problems, and 1=serious deficiency. 'On track'= 2.5.

In the period 2006 – 2009 the projects implemented in Georgia scored on average slightly worse than in the total region ENP East. This concerns especially relevance-design (including high risks due to uncertain policy environment and high turnover of top management in beneficiaries), impact and sustainability, while project implementation (as reflected in efficiency and effectiveness) was in line with the total region ENP East. In other words, the Contractors are doing an equally good job as in the ENP East, but the project environment is more challenging than in other countries.

As to Interstate projects, Country Monitoring Reports on Georgian show that the national components of these projects scores also slightly lower than the overall project (2.64 for Georgia; 2.79 for overall project). In this respect it can be noted that project management of most Interstate projects is still done in Brussels, and that there is little involvement of the EC Delegation and NCU.

**Table 2. Scores of National Projects in Georgia, monitored in 2009 1)**

	Relevance/ design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability	Overall
<b>Health care</b>						
Improving access to PHC for IDPS and other vulnerable groups in Samegrelo region	2.70	2.88	2.75	2.20	2.30	<b>2.57</b>
Support to Child Welfare Reform	3.05	2.90	3.00	3.00	2.80	<b>2.95</b>
Primary Health Care reform support project	2.70	2.35	2.00	2.60	2.50	<b>2.43</b>
<b>Rule of law</b>						
Support to the reform of the Ministry of Justice	3.00	3.25	3.00	3.00	3.20	<b>3.09</b>
Support to the Public Defender's Office 2)	3.00	2.83	3.00	2.70	2.60	<b>2.83</b>
Accomplishment and extension of juveniles advocacy and development system in Adjara	2.70	3.25	3.00	3.00	2.70	<b>2.93</b>
Reform options for the penitentiary and probation system for convicted child offenders	3.40	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.70	<b>3.02</b>
Capacity building in support of Rule of Law	3.30	2.55	3.00	2.00	2.50	<b>2.67</b>

<b>Regional projects</b>						
Integrated poverty reduction programmed in vulnerable rural communities in Kvemo-Kartli	2.70	2.60	3.00	2.00	2.30	<b>2.52</b>
<b>Others</b>						
Establishment of a Centre for European Studies at Tbilisi State University	3.10	3.55	4.00	3.00	2.80	<b>3.29</b>
Support to the reform of Parliament	2.70	2.60	2.00	2.60	2.40	<b>2.46</b>
Support to implementation of Art.51 (quality management system) of the PCA	2.70	2.60	2.50	2.60	2.50	<b>2.58</b>
Developing capacities of democratic institutions for fair electoral processes and active civil participation	2.70	2.55	2.00	2.00	2.20	<b>2.29</b>
Support to strengthening the PAO	2.10	2.75	2.50	2.60	2.70	<b>2.53</b>
<b>Average scores National Projects in Georgia 2009</b>	<b>2.85</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>2.77</b>	<b>2.59</b>	<b>2.59</b>	<b>2.73</b>
<b>Average scores National Projects in ENP East 2009</b>	<b>2.97</b>	<b>2.87</b>	<b>2.96</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>2.94</b>	<b>2.95</b>

1. Excluding the monitored Interstate projects.
2. Concerns the first monitoring in beginning 2009 and the second monitoring done in December 2009, but submitted in January 2010

### Health Care

The modular interventions started with supporting the Primary Health Care (PHC) reform by introducing Family Medicine services, as a pilot in Kakheti. Three projects were monitored before 2009 (and not included in Table 2): introduction of a new PHC financing system; retraining of PHC specialists for the delivery of Family Medicine services; and rehabilitation and equipping of PHC facilities in Kakheti region. The main achievements and difficulties met in this process are:

- Although each project contributed to the introduction of the new PHC system in Kakheti, so far only a few Family Medicine teams have been contracted and operate in the region.
- The main problems met by the projects concerned:
  - Difficulties related to the coordination/ synchronisation of the projects. In particular, the delay with rehabilitation of PHC facilities impeded the start of the newly prepared Family Medicine teams and the introduction of the new PHC financing system.
  - Fragmented and continuous changes in the Government policy in the last 5 years.
  - Long debates on the project framework between the recipient and contractor of the project concerning the development of the “Public Health Purchaser”. This revealed also problems related to the project design.

This intervention in the PHC sector of the country is being continued by the next EC technical assistance project (launched in February 2008), which completes logically the previous projects. This is reflected well in its design. In particular, the new project expands the previous EC projects' area of intervention and the tasks defined concern the overall PHC sector. Nevertheless, implementation of this project is progressing slowly, as the government's PHC reform policy remains somewhat vague and inconsistent.

The project “improving access to PHC for IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Samegrelo region” was not directly related to the modular approach, although it also concerned access to health facilities and insurance. The project served its purpose as emergency assistance but the project approach and design became irrelevant because of the changed government policy.

On the other hand, the project “support to child welfare reform” was successful, also because it directly supported the ongoing reform process.

### **Rule of Law**

The modular intervention in the sector has a wider coverage: overall, it concerns the judicial reform in the country; specifically, the interventions pertain to the Ministry of Justice and its services (Penitentiary service; Probation; Civil Registry) as well as to the Procuracy and the Ministry of Interior. In fact, the main achievement of the modular intervention is precisely this wide coverage of institutions of the sector.

This has been followed up by a Budget Support programme, which will be monitored in the first months of 2010.

Regarding the projects monitored in 2009, they are in general well designed and adjusted to the needs of the beneficiaries. The main difficulties met are related to the implementation process. In this regard, the main problem pertains to the frequent changes of the top management in partner institutions, which reduces the impact of this entire intervention – e.g. the Minister of Justice was changed six times during the last five years; the Public Defender was changed in the beginning of the project (leading to delays and uncertainties, which were resolved after the appointment of the new Public Defender).

### **Regional projects**

The modular intervention comprises 3 projects (Akhalkalaki, Samegrelo, Kvemo Kartli) implemented by NGOs and combining technical assistance with the provision of grants to farmers. The monitoring of the 3 projects shows mixed results: one of them was very good; two less than average (see Table 2 for the scores of the one project monitored in 2009).

All 3 projects demonstrated good flexibility and adaptability to local realities and needs, but the 2 with lower than average scores had respectively a relatively large number of activities/ geographical area, and weak management by the Implementing NGO. A peculiarity of all 3 projects is their relation with authorities: the projects cooperate mainly with regional/ district administrations; the Central Government provides low political support and plays an insignificant role; this affects the sustainability of the project results. In 2010 these project will be monitored ex-post, in order to assess their long-term impact and sustainability.

### **Others**

The category “other” projects consists of unrelated group of projects, but a few general conclusions can be drawn. This concerns first of all the relevancy/ design: with the exception of the Tbilisi State University project, the other projects all experienced problems in this field, ranging from an over-ambitious ToR (Parliament project) to high risks (PAO project, with chronic under-funding, similar to previous NCU projects).

#### **4. Key Findings and Conclusions**

The main conclusions of the brief review made are the following:

- The modular implementation of EC funded projects undertaken in Georgia can be considered as a preparation for the ENP Sector Budget Support instrument in the country. The modular approach in the health sector shows that one of the main issues in this process is the coordination/ synchronisation of actions of the involved parties.
- The commitment of the Georgian Government in the utilisation of ENP instruments needs to be clearly articulated. The role of the PAO is essential in this process, but the PAO is understaffed and has insufficient standing in the Government hierarchy.
- Common problems in project implementation in Georgia are the rapidly changing policies (necessitating changes in project design) and to a high frequency of changing of Ministers and subsequently changes in top management in the Ministries (at minimum leading to delays, but often to significant design changes). The challenge for the projects (including the Contractor and EC Delegation) is to react flexible to these changes.
- It is still too early to assess the TWINNING instrument in Georgia, as only the first monitoring was done. This monitoring showed that implementers and recipients of these projects will need preliminary preparation for clarification of their roles and obligations, and creation of realistic expectations of each other.
- Interstate projects are still not efficacious instruments in Georgia. More involvement of EC Delegation and NCU would be beneficial.

1.5. Quick scan Moldova



## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

Brussels Central Office



### Quick Scan EC Funded Projects in Moldova 2009

#### 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

#### 2. Approach

This review presents the main achievements of cooperation under the Tacis programme and an overview of new instrument under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Findings, lessons learned and suggestions, presented below are reflecting the most stringent problems and possible remedy actions to improve the general performance of the programmes and projects in Moldova. This review has been developed based on the analysis of monitoring reports, hands-on experience and practical knowledge of Monitors in the region.

#### 3. Sectoral Review

The general assessment, presented in the table below, provides average scores of standard monitoring criteria for national and regional projects, as compared to the average scores for all ENPI East projects. It can be observed that the overall average score for the country is lower than the one for the region. However, compared to 2008, the overall performance has improved, particularly in national projects.

Technical assistance focused on:

- Support for institutional, legal and administrative reform;
- Support to the private sector and assistance to economic development;
- Addressing the social consequences of transition.

#### Support for institutional, legal and administrative reform:

The core interventions were directed at the improvement of the judicial system, enabling local authorities to fight corruption and money laundering, supporting harmonization of legislation to the *acquis communautaire*, facilitating implementation of agreements between Moldova and the EU, and assisting the health reform.

The offered technical assistance contributed to:

- an improved legal approximation mechanism, including the creation of the Centre for Legal Harmonization;

- establishment of the National Institute of Justice, reform of the General Prosecutor Office, improved enforcement of courts' decisions;
- sustained legal initiatives' mechanism aimed at diminishing the level of corruption; consolidated capacities of institutions involved in preventing corruption and combating money laundering;
- development of methodologies and concrete instruments for raising the quality of health services, improvement of financial management of medical institutions, separation of primary and secondary health care, strengthening of the primary health care services quality.

**Support to the private sector and assistance to economic development:**

The main areas of concentration are export promotion / investment attraction and regional / rural development. Projects were launched with a considerable delay. The resulting gap reduced the overall effectiveness of the TA and its impact. Examples are "Export Promotion and Investment Attraction", Regional Development projects and an earlier implemented project dealing with support to the establishment of regional/rural development institutions. This negative trend was complicated by changes in strategic visions and insufficient commitment from the government. As a consequence, resources were partly re-directed as a contribution to the World Bank programme dealing with regional / rural development and social protection (EC Trust Fund).

The two-year "Support to Export Promotion and Investment Attraction" project, which started in November 2008, concentrates its efforts on the creation of strong institutional capacities, able to meet the major needs of exporters and to assist in the local market. At the same time, this project takes care of another initiative dealing with procurement of testing laboratory equipment, preparation of accreditation and training of the laboratory personnel. However, the weak management capacities of the project partners limit the absorption of the transferred expertise and reduce the chances for successful accomplishment of the project objectives.

**Addressing the social consequences of transition:**

The main target of the offered support in this sector is focused at helping the government to develop a sustainable social protection system, which is addressing the needs of the most vulnerable groups of the Moldovan population, with special attention to ensuring an efficient and effective administration and reducing social inequality.

**Sector Budget Support under the ENPI**

The first budget support programme in Moldova supports the social sector (SPSP 2007) with a total budget of MEUR 21.0. The main objective is to assist the government in designing and implementing sound macro-economic policies, as well as a social assistance policy addressing the issue of extreme poverty in an effective and efficient manner. Three tranches amounting to about MEUR 17.0 have already been released.

Furthermore, SPSP 2008 Health Sector Policy Support programme (MEUR 46.6) and SPSP 2009 Water Sector Policy Support programme (MEUR 45.0) are currently being implemented.

This assistance is accompanied by targeted TA projects, envisaged to enable the national authorities to better implement the sector policies and spend the limited available resources more rationally. It is logical that a proper foundation shall be created by the accompanying TA projects in order to make the absorption of future SPSPs more efficient. Unfortunately these TA projects are significantly delayed. For example, the first tranche from the Social Sector Budget Support programme was disbursed on 30/09/2008, while the accompanying TA project started only on 25/05/2009. Additionally, the TA duration was shortened from 24 to 13 months. The above, combined with the political, economical and institutional instability in Moldova, has considerably reduced project effectiveness.

At the same time, interventions in these areas of cooperation funded under the NAP 2005 contributed to meeting concrete SPSP 2007 and 2008 Policy Matrix benchmarks. This refers

particularly to the projects “Addressing Needs of Vulnerable Layers of Population” and “Support to Health Reform and Strengthening of Primary Health Care”.

### **Twinning Programme**

Generally, it was assumed that the Twinning Programme would become a driving force in Moldova’s European integration aspirations. However, the reality differs. From one side, the political ambitions remained intact. The Moldova-EU negotiation process on the Association Agreement has started and European integration is still a top priority on the country’s agenda. On the other hand, little progress has been achieved at the grass-root / executive level in turning political statements into practical actions with concrete targets. Moreover, the institutional approximation is neither clearly reflected in corresponding strategies, e.g. public sector reform, nor persistently monitored by national authorities. This creates a lot of difficulties in the launching of twinning projects. General operational and financial unpreparedness of institutions for the twinning exercise is the main reason for slow progress. Thus, only two out of seven projects have been launched so far, but even those are facing difficulties.

### **4. Regional programmes**

Moldova participates in a number of regional initiatives, which have different effectiveness and impact. When a project has a too large geographical coverage, the concrete benefits are not always tangible at country level. In a number of cases, this has a negative influence on the project stakeholders’ motivation and commitment.

Usually projects which take the needs of each participant country into consideration have more chances to successfully accomplish the planned goals. The latest examples of such projects are: BUMAD, Water Governance, and Environmental Collaboration for the Black Sea, where tangible results and strong ownership of the stakeholders have been achieved.

At the same time, a number of projects are not showing any satisfactory outcomes or are under-performing, e.g. Sustainable Integrated Land Use of Eurasian Steppes, and Support to Kyoto Protocol Implementation.

Eleven projects under the Tacis Neighbourhood Programme 2004-2006 have been contracted with an overall budget of about MEUR 3.4. These projects are mainly focused on development of rural tourism, cultural exchange, social services, improvement of infrastructure and environment. Most of these projects, with very few exceptions, are producing concrete and good results and have a positive impact on local level. The most frequent challenge is the mobilisation of the local contribution.

### **5. ROM scores compared with ENPI-East average**

*Reporting period: 01/01/2009 – 31/12/2009*

Summary of conclusions	Moldova national projects	ENPI East national projects	Moldova regional programmes	ENPI East regional programmes
Relevance/quality of design	2.81	2.97	2.85	2.85
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.72	2.87	2.57	2.73
Effectiveness to date	3.00	2.96	2.60	2.73
Impact prospects	2.95	3.00	2.67	2.88
Potential sustainability	2.92	2.94	2.58	2.75
<b>Average Score in total</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>2.79</b>

In a nutshell, the overall performance of National projects in Moldova has improved compared to 2008. Although the general trend has remained the same, i.e. the average scores in Moldova are lower compared to ENPI East region, the scoring related to Impact and Sustainability indicators is close to the overall ones, while Effectiveness is even higher.

Concerning regional projects, the situation has regrettably declined, especially regarding Sustainability. This may be related to the insignificant role which Moldova plays in solving problems of regional scale. Furthermore, scarce country resources hamper the potential sustainability and give limited chances to achieve tangible results and a wider impact.

A general observation is that since the end of 2008 the country is passing through a continuous series of election campaigns, which divert significant resources and distract the public's attention from important economic and social issues. During this period quite a number of projects have experienced unsatisfactory cooperation efforts from the side of the local counterparts.

#### **6. Key findings and recommendations:**

- European integration, the Transnistria issue, poverty alleviation and economic development remain the most important country objectives. EC interventions are focused on assisting the country to efficiently face these challenges with the help of various instruments and tools. However, it would be advisable to give more attention to the development of an adequate capacity for efficient and effective use of external support in order to ensure a higher rate of absorption. This relates particularly to the timely allocation of TA to support SPSPs. Real partnership assumes equal responsibilities, commitment and participation, which includes institutional readiness, financial and human resource contribution, legal and regulatory reforms (where necessary) and proper enforcement. Otherwise, considerable efforts may be wasted.

The majority of previous findings and recommendations remain valid and are listed below:

- Significant gaps between successive interventions should be eliminated or reduced to a minimum.
- EC assistance and national agendas should be coherent. This will permit to channel assistance in the best way and timely respond to the country needs.
- Legal approximation still remains an important area of interventions. However, there is a serious need to also improve law enforcement mechanisms in accordance with EU standards.
- Institutional reforms and effective law enforcement are important conditions to ensure a conducive environment for the 'laws to rule'.

1.6. Quick scan Russia



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## EU Results-oriented Monitoring Programme European Neighbourhood Countries



### Quick Scan on scoring results of monitored EC Funded Projects in the Russian Federation in 2009

#### 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

#### 2. Approach

This is a brief review of the results of monitored EC funded projects in the Russian Federation in 2009. This review attempts to identify the main characteristics of project success in the RF and applicable findings and suggestions. Also, some scoring figures require a more sophisticated interpretation depending on the project type.

Over the past years the project portfolio implemented in the RF has changed and this change started to reflect on the ROM portfolio since 2008. The number of implemented national projects (NAT) reduced from 60 in 2007, over 34 in 2008 to 19 on-going in 2009. The decrease was less marked in the nuclear safety (NUC) sector where from 34 projects in 2007 still 27 were implemented in 2009. The number of regional projects (REG) in which the RF participated was always limited and reduced from 8 monitored in 2007 to 4 in 2009. Therefore in 2008, upon request from the ECD Moscow, 12 small projects from the IBP (SPP) and 8 Tempus (TEM) projects were included in the ROM portfolio. These new project types were consequently continued in 2009 where also projects from the various CBC programmes were added. Again, for the first time in 2009 the Erasmus Mundus Cooperation Window in Russia (EMECW) was assessed as well as three projects concerning Human Rights (THE).

This Quick Scan follows the grouping according to project types and concentrates on the achievements and difficulties met. The review is based on comparison of data between 2008 and 2009. For the sake of reproducibility it is not based on averaged figures but on the full list of scoring results for all sub-criteria of Monitoring Reports grouped according to project types. For quick visibility, all critical marks of 2.5 and below are highlighted in red and all marks of 3.00 and above in green.

#### 3. General observations

Concerning the Russian Federation, despite difficulties in the relationship with the European Union, the cooperation is gradually moving towards a partnership. And this positive development is reflected in the scores of monitoring reports on projects implemented under the different financing instruments. In other words, a main reason for the high scores of EU financed projects



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## EU Results-oriented Monitoring Programme European Neighbourhood Countries



in the RF is a high degree of involvement of Project Partners in the project formulation. In several cases, the Project Partners even initiated the project idea. Consequently, the identified project objectives meet real needs well, being it of institutions (mainly national and NUC projects) or of final beneficiaries (IBPP, EIDHR, CBC projects) and are thus highly relevant. (All project types monitored in the RF in 2009 score the sub-criteria 1.1 between 3,00 and 3,52.) Majority of project aims correspond also well with either sector reforms or sector programmes of the RF government. Another consequence of the PPs participation in the formulation is a fairly clear understanding of the project aims and hence a usually good support of the project by stakeholders. (National, NUC and CBC projects score 1.3 between 3,05 and 3,26.) Due to such high interest, in the majority of all projects in the RF, PPs are well involved in implementation of the interventions. This is accordingly reflected by an exceptionally high average score of 3,05 for all monitored projects under the sub-criteria 2.4 Partner contribution/ involvement. Naturally, the project partners are highly interested in achieving the results (scores between 3,00 and 3,11 for national, NUC, CBC, EIDHR and EMECW projects for sub-criteria 3.1 Achievement of planned results) and take full ownership over the project results. The latter is accordingly reflected by the highest average score among sub-criteria for all in 2009 monitored projects under 5.2 Ownership over project results with 3,29. Such success vividly demonstrates the importance of confident and experienced project partners.

Another factor contributing to the high scores in RF projects is the fact that chances for initiating new EU financed projects have drastically decreased over the past two years since no new Action Plans were signed. This concerns foremost the national and NUC projects where the number of monitoring reports declined from 46 and 34 in 2008 to 29 (including ex-post) and 27 reports respectively in 2009. Therefore, the few in 2009 remaining classical TA projects (national and NUC) were much appreciated by the project partners who were trying to get the most benefits out of the interventions (e.g. MR-040862.02 Support to establishment of a European Studies Institute...; MR-040859.03 Rehabilitation System Services for the disabled). Other projects have rather strategic importance for particular sectors also, in light of harmonisation of rules and regulations with international standards, like MR-114100.02 Eurosystem cooperation programme on banking supervision and internal audit... or MR-040844.04 Interpol Network Modernisation.

With the decrease of classical TA projects implemented by EU contractors, the importance of other project types implemented by RF contractors/ NGOs on the basis of Grant Proposals has risen. Following this development, the Moscow ROM office took on board in 2009 other project types upon the request of the EC Delegation. This concerned CBC, IBPP, EIDHR, Tempus projects and RF universities that participated in the first EMECW programme 2007/2008 (IAMONET). Consequently, a good proportion of RF projects monitored in 2009 (over 40 %) are based on Grant Proposals where by the nature of the interventions, ownership from the partner side is commonly high. This again, is a key factor for success.

After a certain decline of average scores of the entire project portfolio in the RF in 2008 (much related to the widening of the project portfolio), in 2009 most project categories improved their scores under all five criteria, encompassing the relevance of project objectives, the performance but also impact prospects and potential sustainability. This is particularly evident for national projects and Tempus projects whereas the nuclear safety projects and IBPPs remained at an already high scoring level. Apparently, the vast majority of project actions is well managed and communication and cooperation between the three project key players, the EC Project Manager, the implementing body (contractor, NGO, institution) and the Russian project partner is fairly well functioning.



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## EU Results-oriented Monitoring Programme European Neighbourhood Countries



Only the regional projects implemented and monitored in the RF dropped scores further in 2009 to a critical stage of averaging 2,55.

### 3. Observations per project type

#### Nuclear Safety

These are the best performing projects with exceptionally high scores under all five monitoring criteria with a single minor weakness in producing outputs with delays. This however, has in several cases objective reasons, frequently lying outside the project's influence.

#### National Projects

From the 19 national on-going projects 10 belong to the sector 1-SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES, seven to 2-ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES, one to the Production Sector (Approximation of Standardisation and technical regulation) and one completed project belonged to 4-MULTISECTOR/ CROSSLINKING.

In the RF all national projects are well progressing and perform well with the exception of three projects. The reasons for success are: an increasing number of well prepared TOR with a fairly clear outlined intervention logic; the participation of project partners in the project formulation (or even initiating the project ideas) and hence a good understanding of project aims and support of the project; project partners are skilled, experienced and confident and demand certain results from contractors; consequently, ownership over results is high and facilitates good to very good impact prospects and, at the same time, a good financial/ economic viability of results and deriving benefits.

#### Key observations from Synthesis Report on ex-post monitoring of 7 national projects MR-127800.01

*The results of projects selected for ex-post analysis are continuing to add value towards their respective OO's. This can be attributed to a number of factors, not least the relevance of the project design, the commitment and buy-in by the respective Project Partners, the timeliness of project implementation, and the ability of the key stakeholders involved to successfully mitigate against most negative unplanned effects that appeared during its lifetime. The sustainability of the interventions' results as a whole can be judged as "good", with the flow of benefits continuing at the time of ex-post monitoring. This is due to a number of reasons, the most important being a sustained ownership by the key stakeholders, a generally supportive policy framework which, in the majority of cases, has strengthened at the time of ex-post monitoring, and the building of sustainable institutional and management capacity by the respective Contractors – something that was invariably done very well.*

*External factors have affected relevance - the most notable being the global economic crisis which has either accentuated or detracted from relevance depending on the project's specific situation. The vast majority of the projects were successful in achieving their Specific Objectives. The underlying reasons include strong political support for project implementation by the Project Partners, a design which fully met the needs of key stakeholders, and the strong motivation by all those involved into the implementation process.*

#### Small Projects

The IBPPs are performing generally very well with an outstanding high efficiency in terms of input-output ratio and substantial impacts in both directions, planned and positive unplanned effects.



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Two main factors of success can be distinguished: (i) the Russian project partner is usually 'part and parcel' when the project is designed, and therefore, aims are well focused on specific needs of identified target groups, and (ii) the high commitment and contributions from project partners/beneficiaries adds value to the achieved project results and leads to a high degree of ownership over results. It is worth mentioning that in the RF most objectives of IBPPs are also mainly in line with governmental policies or programmes.

In addition, the visibility of EU assistance among the Russian population is very high through IBPPs. Activities generally involve a much wider audience during implementation than in national projects implemented by a contractor and results, following the philosophy of these project type, have frequently positive effects for the population of an area or even region.

Only the financial/ economic viability of results is scored quite critical with 2,30. This should not mistakenly be taken as weakness of the implementing NGO or of project managers. Instead it reflects the prevailing situation of civil society structures, like NGOs in the Russian society, which indeed is still critical. Not many Russian NGOs were able to survive until to date and almost all depend on donor funding. So in this particular case, it is rather a justification for further required funding and support of RF NGOs.

### Some recommendations from the Synthesis Report on five IBPPs on Civil Society MR-126780.01

The ECD services are advised in future projects to: a) either reinforce the use of LFM as management tool with SMART OVI or the use of result-oriented workplans. Also helpful would be to revise the IBPP reporting requirements for focusing more on the reporting of achieved Results instead of a mere description of activities. b) to promote a higher focus on dissemination activities of best practices available in different parts of Russia on a particular subject; c) to keep civil servants from state social institutions as main target groups for project-organised training activities.

### Some recommendations from the Synthesis Report on three IBPPs on Culture MR-123840.01

For future call the EC services are advised:

- To encourage the involvement of young generations and identify mechanisms to get closer to their needs and interest;
- Support the participation of representatives of the private sector within the partnership, so as to strengthen the management capacities of project partners and enhance sustainability prospects;
- Continue to focus on local cultural institutions and regional authorities to pave the way for the wider acknowledgement at the level of state authorities, thus facilitating the introduction of innovative approaches and legislative changes in the field of culture and youth policies correspondent to the needs of the target groups;

The sample of **Human Rights projects** monitored in 2009 is actually too small to apply the first visible tendencies to all EIDHR projects. Therefore, this exercise will continue in 2010 with another group of EIDHRs selected for monitoring by the EC Delegation Moscow.

However, the three assessed projects performed quite well only with still unclear impact prospects at the time of monitoring. Concerning financial/ economic viability of results, for NGOs working in the field of human rights, the same issue as for NGOs implementing IBPPs applies as stated above. In addition, for the monitored human rights projects the sub-criteria 5.3 Policy support scored the critical mark of 2,00. Again, this should not be misinterpreted as weakness of the implementing NGO or of project managers. Instead it reflects the prevailing relation of governmental bodies (regional or federal level) in practical terms to activities on human right issues implemented by NGOs. So this is rather an indication that more projects on human rights are required for changing the perception of the society at large.

### Some key observations from the Synthesis Report on three EIDHR projects MR-127863.01



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*Experienced NGOs working on a specific thematic subject usually produce consistent and transparent project designs. The long-lasting presence of these NGOs in their field of activity and the established cooperation with law enforcement agencies laid a good basis for targeting through the projects torture and violence in places of detention.*

*Future grant holders should include activities on cooperation/ networking with other relevant NGOs/ agencies working in the same field with the same target groups in order to increase impact prospects. Cooperation with the Ministry of Interior is of importance and should be reinforced. The MOI significant reform planned for 2010 by the RF President could lay the ground for potential good relations with HR NGOs.*

### Regional projects

The involvement of RF project partners in the project design does not exist and hence the acceptance of such projects is very low or even participation refused by the Russian side. Moreover, the project design is a general one for all participating countries and does not reflect specific needs of the RF. This is the start of a chain, leading to a delayed start of implementation, little partner contribution, only partly achievement of results and objectives, a moderate impact and problematic sustainability of results. Also, the Russian project partners feel a bit lost concerning their questions as the project manager is far way and most of the time, also the office of the contractor. So one could conclude that as presently designed and managed, for the Russian Federation, regional project components are not sufficiently functioning instruments for adequately addressing needs of the country.

### CBC projects

Upon the request of the ECD Moscow, in 2009 eight on-going and nine completed CBC projects were monitored and respectively ex-post monitored. The general comment is that these are quite efficient instruments characterised by a generally high relevance of aims, well implemented by the project partners leading to a good level of achieving envisaged results, with a good impact and an acceptable potential sustainability of results. This is evidenced by 50% of sub-scores being at 3,00 or above, reaching even 3,56 under 5.2 Ownership over project results by project partners.

However, tendencies of weaknesses can be seen under 1.2 with a 'C' score as indeed CBC projects have some problems with clear formulation of aims that are frequently blurry. Since CBC applicants do not have to draw any logframe they do not identify possible obstacles (assumptions, risks) to project implementation. Consequently also no milestones/ indicators of progress are defined. This design weakness in many cases reflects on delays of the actual start of implementation and hence is reflected in the 2,44 score under sub-criteria 2.2 Implementation of activities. These weaknesses do not much affect the final results and impacts since the current CBC projects are quite straight-forward and simple actions that can be understood by stakeholders even when objectives are not clearly formulated.

### Key observations & recommendations from the Synthesis report on on-going CBCs MR-127900.01

*The introduction of a logframe as a standard requirement should be considered on the programme level. The project plans would gain clarity and precision with coherently formulated OOs, SOs, results and activities as well as related OVs and assumptions/ risks.*

*The preliminary costs of studies and construction works are not correctly estimated. Thus, drafting too detailed specification for the repair works in the Tacis CBC projects budget cannot be feasible in real conditions.*



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*The projects succeed to facilitate a strong local ownership of the Russian partners and their financial responsibilities. The experience gained in designing and implementing the CBC projects is very valuable capacity improvement.*

*The EC Task Manager is recommended: (i) to consider a logframe as a standard requirement for CBC projects; (ii) to allocate a lump sum for sub-contracting without artificial specifications; (iii) to require a phase-out strategy at the middle stage of a project.*

### **Erasmus Mundus Cooperation Window (IAMONET)**

The six RF universities that participated in the first IAMONET Programme 2007/ 2008 and were monitored did quite well, except for the Moscow State University. In fact the average scores for these 6 universities even outreach the scores for Tempus projects in the criteria effectiveness (2,92), impact prospects (3,03) and potential sustainability (2,95).

#### *Some key observations from the Synthesis Report on IAMONET, MR-126940.07*

The IAMONET coordinators at each university and/or the universities' International Departments ensure that the programme is coordinated efficiently with other donor interventions. Results are not specifically formulated in the Programme documents but some can be found in the grant proposal. Therefore, an explicit logical structure between activities, results and objectives is not evident in the Programme design. All Russian Project Partners are fully committed to the IAMONET Programme. The Consortium Partners actively participate in the implementation of the mobilities and also in the co-ordination meetings, except the MSU and, consequently enjoy a high ownership over project results.

1.7. Quick scan Ukraine



## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

Brussels Central Office



### Quick Scan EC Funded Projects in Ukraine 2009

#### 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

#### 2. Approach

In Ukraine the ROM portfolio covers almost all cooperation instruments with the exception of sector budget support and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) where ROM monitoring is currently not foreseen in. This review presents the main characteristic, achievements and difficulties of EU cooperation, and applicable findings and suggestions. This brief review is based on the overview of monitoring reports, hands-on experience and practical knowledge of Monitors in the region.

#### 3. Sectoral Review

Assistance to Ukraine under the Tacis programme focused on i) support for institutional, legal and administrative reform, ii) support to the private sector and assistance for economic development and iii) support in addressing the social consequences of transition. Regional and inter-state cooperation addressed in particular issues related to transport, energy and sustainable management of natural resources. Technical assistance in the area of nuclear safety provided support to Energoatom.

Strategic priorities under ENPI include energy, environment, transport, reform of the judiciary, EU approximation, border management, removal of trade barriers, local and regional development, and a shift from project to sector approach and budget support.

The majority of national and regional projects implemented – and monitored – in 2009 were still financed from Tacis NAP 2005 and 2006. A general assessment is presented in the table below, providing average scores of standard monitoring criteria for national and regional projects, as compared to the average scores for all ENPI East projects.

##### ***Support for institutional, legal and administrative reform:***

The core interventions were directed at improvement of transparency and efficiency of the judicial system. This assistance is channelled through the Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (UEPLAC), support to PCA Implementation, enabling local authorities to fight corruption and money laundering, assistance in the health and social service sectors and institutional

changes within the structure of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers strengthening co-ordination of the EU integration process.

Good progress has been achieved in the improvement of the judicial administration and assistance in establishing an independent and professional judiciary, despite frequent changes in the management of the partner institutions. Project “*Transparency and efficiency of the judicial system of Ukraine*” contributed to the adoption of an anti-corruption package of laws by the Parliament of Ukraine; and the setting-up of the Institute of the Government Agency for Anti-corruption policy.

Successful co-operation was also maintained with the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) of Ukraine. Project “**Reinforcing the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine’s Human Resources Management System – HUREMAS II**” is a good example for effective donor cooperation between the EC, EU member states and US donors. The project contributed to reforming the Ukrainian SBGS towards a non-military service. SBGS is determined to continue this reform process to bring their human resource management system closer to European standards. A new US-funded project aims at improving the system of training of SBGS staff and at further developing the system of multiplicators, thereby complementing the results achieved under the EC intervention.

#### ***Support to the private sector and assistance to economic development:***

The main aim in this area is to increase the competitiveness of the SME Sector by facilitating commercial links with EU companies and other foreign enterprises. The strengthening of the market economy in the country will facilitate increased business activities, improve the investment climate and general economic growth. Project “Harmonisation of Competition and Public Procurement Systems in Ukraine with EU Standards” supports legislation and enforcement mechanisms on competition, state aid, subsidies and public procurement compatible with the PCA and the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.

However, key problems in the SME sector remain lack of technical knowledge, an unfavourable regulatory and legal environment, underdeveloped financial institutions services and difficult access for SMEs to the banking sector.

#### ***Addressing the social consequences of transition:***

Cooperation in this area aims at designing a Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) for women and children’s rights with a particular focus on government capacity to implement its gender strategy and its action plan for children, gender culture and stereotypes, and labour market issues. Ukraine has made progress in establishing a legal framework in these areas, but gaps in the enforcement of policies and practices still exist.

The comprehensive SWAP is realised through several complementary projects in cooperation with the Council of Europe, UNDP, ILO and UNICEF. The specific practical expertise of these international organisations is beneficial for Ukraine, as is documented by their good performance (2.94) relative to the ENPI-wide average (2.70).

#### ***Nuclear Safety:***

The Nuclear Safety programme evolved from provision of technical assistance to cooperation between qualified expert organisations. New projects in Ukraine successfully made the transition to more focus on ‘Soft Activities’ i.e. cooperation on best practices for operation and maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) with only limited supply of equipment. This transition promotes ownership. The reduced presence of EU experts requires more coordination by the NPPs themselves. The Joint Support Office in Kiev actively promotes the transition to ‘Soft Activities’ by facilitating a systematic identification, selection, and prioritisation of proposals which were duly elaborated by NPP experts for final decision making. Energoatom, the operator of nuclear power plants in Ukraine, established internal procedures and structures to support this process. The average score of projects monitored in 2009 was 2.99.

### **Sector Budget Support**

Currently ongoing sector budget support programmes are "Support to the implementation of Ukraine's Energy strategy (Euro 82 million) and "Promoting mutual trade by removing technical barriers to trade between Ukraine and the European Union" (Euro 39 million). Further programmes under preparation are in the sectors of energy efficiency, transport, environment and border management.

For the time being no ROM monitoring of sector budget support programmes is envisaged.

### **4. Regional / Thematic programmes**

Ukraine participates in a number of regional programmes in the areas of transport (e.g. TRACECA), energy (e.g. INOGATE) and environment (e.g. Black Sea cooperation, support to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol).

Regional programmes tend to score lower than national projects for a number of reasons. Objectives of regional programmes often conflict with national priorities. Political and institutional support differs from country to country. It is therefore of paramount importance to involve project partners of all participating countries in the design phase. Furthermore, regional programmes are often more difficult to implement than national projects due to their complex operating environment and the multitude of project partners and national interests. It is essential for efficient implementation to establish good cooperation between all stakeholders and ensure that all participating countries share the same level of interest and have similar implementation and absorption capacities.

On the other hand the country shows a strong commitment in some regional environmental projects, both at national (Ministry for Environmental Protection) and local level. Legislative and institutional improvements, leading to environmental, economic and social benefits, give evidence for that.

It is interesting to note that deconcentrated regional projects/programmes tend to score higher (3.02) than the ones managed by AIDCO (2.83), confirming the objective of the devolvement exercise.

### **5. ROM scores compared with ENPI-East average**

*Reporting period: 01/01/2009 – 31/12/2009*

Summary of conclusions	Ukraine national projects	ENPI East national projects	Ukraine regional programmes	ENPI East regional programmes
Relevance/quality of design	3.01	2.97	3.05	2.85
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.89	2.87	2.74	2.73
Effectiveness to date	2.94	2.96	2.89	2.73
Impact prospects	3.06	3.00	3.03	2.88
Potential sustainability	2.96	2.94	2.78	2.75
<b>Average Score in total</b>	<b>2.97</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>2.90</b>	<b>2.79</b>

Both scores are higher than the average for ENPI East, and also for the overall ENPI score which stands at 2.82 in 2009. With an overall score of 2.96 for national projects, Ukraine stands on third place in ENPI East behind Belarus (3.02) and Russia (2.98).

## **6. Key findings and recommendations:**

Despite the inherent political instability, all political parties in Ukraine pursue a European orientation and favour the approximation of legislation to EU standards. This explains that, independently of the changes at top level in Ministries, the process of transfer of EU best practices and procedures is earnestly supported by the management and staff of the Ukrainian organisations involved in technical cooperation.

Following years of successful implementation of Tacis projects, the new instrument ENPI aims at the same goals, namely transition to democracy and market economy through advice and sharing of know-how on many structures in the country. The monitors observed that the instrument currently used for technical assistance, and in particular the project approach, successfully delivered valuable inputs to the change process in many different areas.

Projects specifically designed to support the change process have to a large extent been very successful because the following conditions were in place:

- Firm commitment from beneficiary senior management
- An open, collaborative, trusting relationship between the project partners
- Committed and effective project management
- A responsive attitude from the beneficiary to new ideas and suggestions
- A dynamic and well supported 'Steering Committee'

Proper participatory preparation of the projects and adequate tendering and selection procedures allowed the provision of high quality technical assistance. In addition, involvement of international and EU-sponsored organisations like UNDP, UNHCR, IOM, Council of Europe, etc. was made possible on a large scale by signing specific grant agreements on topics better attended by specialised international bodies. These organisations have played an important part in securing success from a number of individual projects.

## **2. Quick Scans ENPI South**

### **2.1. Quick scan Algeria**




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## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

- Brussels Central Office -



### Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Algeria 2009



Algeria: ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	3	2.616.120,00
MED	9	191.000.000,00
ENPI	2	57.000.000,00
TWINNING	0	0
SPSP	0	0
Ex-post	3	77.277.978,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>327.894.098,00</b>

## **1. Origin of request and purpose**

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

## **2. Approach**

The series of quickscans which follow are based on a similar blend of qualitative and quantitative data:

- Quantitative:
  - o the ROM scoring found in monitoring reports
  - o the ROM scoring found in background conclusion sheets
- Qualitative:
  - o the ROM key observations found in monitoring reports
  - o inhouse knowledge of team leaders and mission leaders

## **3. Reminder: ROM scoring**

<b>ROM scores</b>	<b>From</b>	<b>To</b>
A (very good)	3.51	4.00
B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

#### 4. General review

Algeria is a difficult country to operate in and security is a factor especially when monitors are travelling to project sites. One mission took place in 2009 in November 2009 (with the exception of one project that was monitored in April).

17 projects were monitored in Algeria in 2009. Three out of the 17 projects were ex-posts and, given their different performance as compared to ongoing projects, it is not methodologically sound that their scores be included in the quantitative analysis of the sample.

Summary of conclusions	Algeria 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	14	132
Relevance/quality of design	2.73	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.39	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.50	2.72
Impact prospects	2.81	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.81	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>2.79</b>

In 2009, the portfolio of projects monitored performed overall above the 2.51 cut off between problematic and good. However, Efficiency and Effectiveness fall below 2.51 into the range defined as problematic (please see above reminder table of scores).

Indeed, the portfolio of projects monitored in Algeria performed slightly below the average for national projects in the ENPI South region in all aspects except sustainability. This in part due to the negative impact of one project which has performed badly - CAERT†.

A look at the sub-criteria for sustainability reveals that the performance of projects monitored in Algeria in 2009 was particularly good in terms of financial and economic viability – which is well above the average performance in ENPI South. To a large extent this derives from the abundant financial resources of the Algerian State which is more likely than other ENPI states to continue financial support to reforms initiated with EC support.

Potential sustainability	Algeria 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Financial / economic viability?	2.93	2.61
What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups?	2.86	2.90
What is the level of policy support provided?	2.64	2.70
How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	2.71	2.86
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>2.76</b>

\* Ongoing projects

† This project is implemented under the rules of the African Union

The high sustainability of projects is also due to their good relevance. However, two thirds of the portfolio demonstrated problematic or worse design, mostly because the majority of projects face administrative difficulties which were underestimated at the design stage.

On the other hand, Algeria suffers from problematic efficiency of implementation compared with the ENPI South region. Though it follows the same approximate trends of the region as a whole – which is low efficiency compared to the other ROM criteria, of which availability of means and inputs is generally the lowest sub-criterion – its performance is more extreme than the average.

Efficiency of implementation to date	Algeria 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
How well is the Availability/Usage of means/inputs managed?	2.21	2.65
How well is the implementation of activities managed?	2.50	2.73
How well are outputs achieved?	2.36	2.70
How well is the Partner Contribution / Involvement working?	2.50	2.79
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.39</b>	<b>2.72</b>

Indeed, the above clearly shows that the portfolio of projects monitored in Algeria in 2009, showed problems in all aspects of efficiency, from partner contribution, to implementation of activities and achievement of outputs.

This again mostly reflects implementation difficulties derived from the often excessively rigid attitude of the Algerian bureaucracy. In particular, the majority of projects had a delayed start of activities. On average, it took more than one year between the signature of financial agreements and the start up of activities. Furthermore, the procurement process was cumbersome for most projects, resulting in difficulties to meet the N+3 deadlines. Even after funds have been committed, the heavy administrative procedures and practices of the Algerian administration routinely hamper outputs.

The number of and actual projects in the portfolio vary from year to year. As such, any analysis comparing year on year performance of such a small sample would be misleading. The table below comparing average ROM performance between 2008 and 2009 is presented for informational purposes only.

Summary of conclusions	Algeria 2009 National projects*	Algeria 2008 National projects*
Number of reports	14	10
Relevance/quality of design	2.73	2.71
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.39	2.24
Effectiveness to date	2.50	2.60
Impact prospects	2.81	2.53
Potential sustainability	2.81	3.12
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>2.64</b>

\* Ongoing projects

## 5. Sector review

In broad terms, EC assistance to Algeria aims at supporting the country's transition to a market economy and to restore the social fabric in rural areas severely damaged by more than ten years of wide scale terrorism. Both overall objectives are key to the future of Algeria. Institutional support also aims at preparing the implementation of the Association Agreement.

Projects fall in four main categories as shown on the following table:

Projects / Programmes	EC contribution	Completion Date
<b>INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT</b>		
Programme d'appui à la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord d'Association	10 000 000	14/08/2011
Management de l'économie (AMECO)	20 000 000	15/11/2010
Programme d'appui à la réforme du système pénitentiaire	17 000 000	16/06/2012
Programme d'appui au secteur des transports	20 000 000	31/08/2010
<b>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</b>		
Facilitation du Commerce	5 000 000	15/02/2011
Programme d'appui aux PME/PMI et la maîtrise des technologies d'information et de communication (PME II)	40 000 000	31/12/2011
Appui à la mise à niveau du système de formation professionnelle en Algérie	45 000 000	31/12/2009
<b>SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICES</b>		
Appui au Développement socio-économique local dans le nord-est de l'Algérie (Appui au filet social)	50 000 000	15/12/2009
Programme d'appui au Plan National de Développement Agricole Rural - Proximité rurale	11 000 000	15/01/2012
Programme d'appui au secteur des ressources en eau	20 000 000	01/09/2010
Appui aux communautés de base pour le développement durable dans la région des Monts de Chenoua	616 120	01/03/2010
Projet d'Appui aux Associations algérienne de Développement (ONG II)	10 000 000	01/01/2010
<b>SPECIAL PROJECTS</b>		
Renforcement de l'action du Centre africain d'études et de recherche sur le terrorisme (CAERT)	1 000 000	25/12/2010
Restauration de la Basilique Notre Dame d'Afrique	1 000 000	31/12/2010

### Institutional support:

High revenues from oil and gas have created little incentive for modernising the administration and official bodies. The government is conscious that it needs to improve the efficiency of civil service and of national and regional institutions. The government's will to introduce in-depth reforms is reflected in the Association Agreement.

To date the "Programme d'appui à la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord d'Association" has not yet produced tangible results. The first twinning projects are expected to be effective mid-2010. Other programmes are supporting institutional modernisation. The AMECO programme (Programme d'appui au management de l'économie) is quite relevant and is expected to result in significant improvement of the country's economic management tools but it is failing to build synergies between the various administrations involved.

The "programme d'appui au secteur des transports" is being implemented satisfactorily. It is expected to bring substantial improvements in the organisation, planning and operation of transports and customs at national level. In a very different sector, the reform of penitentiary institutions supported by a specific programme, is hampered by the lack of a national penitentiary policy. Also, its efficiency is weakened by the absence of cooperation between the various institutions involved in its implementation. This is a general issue with most projects in Algeria.

### **Economic development**

The three programmes under this item cover sectors which are essential to the transition of Algeria from a centrally planned to a market economy. Each of them also includes a strong component of institutional building.

It is too early to assess the likely impact of the two projects aiming at modernising enterprises and trade. As often in Algeria, the start up phase of both projects has been plagued by delays and administrative difficulties (see below). Measures have been recommended and should lead to an adequate level of efficiency.

The outcomes of the project supporting vocational training are clearly below expectations.

### **Social development and public services**

Bringing support to local communities and NGOs is quite relevant, considering that most rural areas have been considerably affected by more than ten years of terrorism. Programmes which bring support directly to rural communities and NGOs are very well received by populations and their expected impact is satisfactory, although reporting is often below standard.

The programme related to water supply in rural areas - Programme d'appui au secteur des ressources en eau – has also experienced delays in its start-up phase. Given the importance of the water sector for rural development, it should be seen as a pilot project, from which local authorities and possibly donors could draw lessons for future action.

**Cooperation with Algeria differs from other ENPI countries.** First of all, it should be reminded that no budget support programme is implemented in Algeria. All projects are therefore based on TA. This is because Algeria derives ample financial resources from oil and gas. Algerian authorities clearly state that what they need is expertise, not money. A lot of emphasis is therefore put on institutional building.

Most Algerian official bodies and administrations need important reforms both in their structures and in their operating practices. Through a series of projects, the EC has brought TA to most of the ministries which are involved in the transition and modernisation process of the country. The implementation of most projects has suffered delays, principally at the beginning. On average, more than one year elapsed between the signature of Financing Agreements and the actual start up of activities. This is essentially due to Beneficiaries' heavy bureaucratic procedures and practices.

Projects related to institutional support and economic development are headed by Project Directors, who are Algerian civil servants seconded by Beneficiary administrations to the projects. Project Directors are assisted by Project Support Units (UAPs). This approach replaces the more traditional parallel project implementation setting. It results in better ownership of projects by the Beneficiaries, but at the same time increases the exposure of projects to difficulties derived from internal rivalries between and within Beneficiary institutions.

Algerian administrations and official institutions have proven almost unable to work together in a constructive way. Arranging common TA programmes or training sessions is virtually impossible, with each institution trying to impose its views on the others. This results in important losses of potential synergies not only between different projects but also between various beneficiaries of a given project. A good example of that is the AMECO programme which was designed with four beneficiaries, three of which belong to the Ministry of Finance. The idea was to promote cooperation between them, which made a lot of sense. Project management and the EU

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Algeria 2009

Delegation have invested a lot of time and energy to promote such cooperation. In practice, it did not work and this objective of the project will not be achieved.

For the same reasons, contracting and procurement is cumbersome. This results in a lot of energy being wasted into fruitless discussions and even conflicts between beneficiary institutions, the PIUs, and the EU Delegation. Some beneficiary institutions or administrations show better ownership and absorption capacities than others. Consequently, projects' outcomes often vary significantly from one recipient to another, even under the same project.

Algerian beneficiary official institutions insist on receiving high quality expertise. They are very selective and do not hesitate to ask for replacements. Given the volume of short term expertise they will need, EU financed projects may be faced with a shortage of skilled French speaking experts. There is already a shortage of local experts, particularly in projects related to economic development, because few local people have the experience of a market economy. Projects related to social development do not have this type of difficulty as they rely mostly on local expertise.

The capacity of absorption of TA by Algerian administrations and official institutions may also become an issue. Many technical ministries are understaffed. A significant number of positions are not staffed, even in the Ministry of Finance. Also civil servants are often transferred from one position to another, even outside their ministry, resulting in a waste of training efforts.

## 6. Findings & conclusion

The 2009 ROM of 16 projects has shown three main areas of concern.

### 1. Start up

All projects started late. The average delay between the signature of the Financing Agreement and the beginning of activities is 14 months. This is mostly due to the bureaucratic practices of Algerian institutions and officials, compounded with EU's tendering rules. Because of the uncertainties generated by Algerian administrative practices, procedures that would enable the EU Delegation to speed up EU's tendering process cannot be applied. As a consequence of such delays, the implementation period of projects is significantly shortened. Meeting the N+3 limit date for procurement becomes crucial and absorbs most of the energy of project Directors and Project Support Unit, often to the detriment of core activities. Furthermore, most projects have to be extended.

There is no obvious solution to this issue, since EU rules cannot be changed to be better adapted to Algerian constraints.

### 2. Algero-algerian conflicts

Building cooperation and synergies between several Algerian official entities has proven extremely difficult, even if they belong to the same ministry. This puts limits to creating synergies between various entities. One typical example is the AMECO project which was rightly designed to promote cooperation between three divisions of the Ministry of Finance, respectively in charge of statistics, studies and prospective planning and one department of the Ministry of Public Works. Building cooperation between the four beneficiaries and even between the three divisions of the Ministry of Finance was impossible.

There is little solution to this type of problem, except to limit the number of beneficiaries of each programme. Ideally there should be only one beneficiary, with the drawback of limiting the scope of certain projects.

### 3. Availability of expertise

Competent Local consultants are in limited number, especially in sectors related to the economy. This is because Algeria has had no sizeable private business and virtually no exports since the 1970s.

The amount of foreign expertise to be supplied under ongoing projects is very large. For instance, the PME2 project is expected to field 30000 m/d over a period of less than two years. On the other hand, francophone foreign consultants tend to prioritise Morocco or Tunisia over Algeria, whose image remains affected by years of insecurity. This may result in a shortage of competent foreign expertise too.

One recommendation would be to extend the timeframe of projects with large requirements of expertise. Also, the availability of expertise should be considered at the design stage of potential new projects.

## 7. Case study

### 10413.03 "PROGRAMME D'APPUI AU SECTEUR DES RESSOURCES EN EAU", Algeria, Contract n. 17326

Ref. No with sequence	Budget	PM location	Response Sheet	Report date	Design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
MR-10413.03	20.000.000	ECD Algeria		24/12/2009	C	C	C	C	B

The **Overall Objective (OO)** of this Project is to "implement the necessary activities to support the water sector in order to modernize its management". The water sector is very important in Algeria and hence, it is important to analyze what is working and what is not working in this project.

The **B** rate in *Sustainability* can be justified by:

- The services and results will need institutional support, but the financial issue is not a problem in Algeria due to the financial incomes coming from hydrocarbons.
- Government policies give priority to Water management and this makes the sustainability of the services/results very high.
- At this moment, all services in the 9 Directorates of the Ministry for Water Resources (MWR) are involved (or have been involved) in the programme: every directorate has appointed a Team Leader for each of the 17 activities (projects) and every directorate takes advantage (or has taken) of the training provided by the long term and short term experts. If we take this into account, we can conclude that the probability of continuing with the services and results is high.

However, this project had C scores in the rest of the sub criteria, due to the following reasons:

- Relevance: the previous MR pointed out gaps in the logical framework (LF). However, this monitoring report was not transmitted to the Programme staff which was not able to improve its LF. Moreover, this report recommended an extension amendment to the project, but this suggestion has not been taken into account; it is now too late for the programme to achieve the Overall Objective.
- Efficiency: delays have led to an Operational Yearly Plan 2009 without any financial commitment. Due to internal reasons within the MWR, this plan was not approved until May 2009 and signed in June 2009. The ECD have decided to audit the programme.
- Effectiveness: it is regrettable that the mid-term evaluation, a useful instrument during the project life, was not mobilized until very late in 2009 and that the office chosen to carry it out was not able to achieve their contract. The project has suffered from the 2007 crisis as well as from the Algeria's reputation which has had a negative effect on finding the necessary expertise.
- Impact: Unfortunately, we cannot see a great impact concerning the project contribution. Nonetheless, an impact has occurred in raising awareness and interest in managing the water resources.

2.2. Quick scan Egypt




This Project is  
funded by the EU

## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

- Brussels Central Office -



### Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Egypt 2009



Egypt: ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	3	380.577,00
MED	6	109.101.058,00
ENPI	0	0
TWINNING	3	4.300.000,00
SPSP	0	0
Ex-post	1	2.095.319,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>115.876.954,00</b>

## 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

The quick scans will be used as supporting documentation for the meeting of ENPI country Heads of Delegations on March 11 2010.

It is understood that the interest in ROM figures by country stems from the annual ROM presentation on 28 January 2010 presenting the 2009 ROM achievements (please refer to the minutes of this meeting for more information).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes.

In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

## 2. Approach

The series of quickscans which follow are based on a similar blend of qualitative and quantitative data:

- Quantitative:
  - o the ROM scoring found in monitoring reports
  - o the ROM scoring found in background conclusion sheets
- Qualitative:
  - o the ROM key observations found in monitoring reports
  - o inhouse knowledge of team leaders and mission leaders

## 3. Reminder: ROM scoring

ROM scores	From	To
A (very good)	3.51	4.00
B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

#### 4. General review

Two ROM missions were carried out in 2009, covering a total of 12 ongoing national projects. Please refer to the country scoring list in annex for a detailed overview of the projects monitored.

In 2009, the portfolio of projects monitored performed overall above the 2.51 cut off point between problematic and good performance (please see above reminder table of scores).

Summary of conclusions	Egypt 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	12	132
Relevance/quality of design	2.88	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.72	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.63	2.72
Impact prospects	2.83	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.58	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.73</b>	<b>2.79</b>

As visible in the above table, the portfolio of projects monitored in Egypt performed slightly below the overall average for national projects in the ENPI South region. Differences become clearer when looking at the “potential sustainability” criterion:

Potential sustainability	Egypt 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Financial / economic viability?	2.42	2.61
What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups?	2.75	2.90
What is the level of policy support provided?	2.42	2.70
How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	2.75	2.86
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.58</b>	<b>2.76</b>

Particularly problematic in the performance of projects in Egypt are the BCS sub-criteria “Financial and economic viability” and a weak level of policy support. While this reflects the general performance trends of projects ENPI South, it appears to be more pronounced in Egypt. The scoring data reflects weaknesses on the part of the Egyptian partners to provide timely policy and legislative support to the reform processes supported by the projects. Furthermore, lack of government funding and lack of dedicated budget lines often put the financial sustainability of project benefits at risk.

Another issue is posed by the relevance and design of projects. Relevance tends to be the highest scoring criterion overall for projects monitored in Egypt. However, a look at the sub-criterion of

\* Ongoing projects

Relevance and design show a mixed picture in their performance. Relevance of projects tends to be high, as they are well embedded in a wider strategic framework, such as the Association Agreement. However, strong relevance has not always been adequately translated into a clear, coherent and realistic intervention logic. Knowledge of the PCM methodology and stringent application of these principles in the design of a Logical Framework Matrix are lacking. Many projects are entirely output-driven, without sufficient focus on outcomes (results). The figures below imply that over 50% of the portfolio of projects monitored had problems or serious deficiencies in their design.

Relevance & quality of design	Egypt 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
What is the present level of relevance of the project?	3.33	3.42
As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	2.67	2.58
Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	2.58	2.80
Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	3.00	2.88
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>2.92</b>

The low scoring of stakeholder support of current design suggest that the design process is insufficiently participatory and still too often a top-down process, not taking the project partners and beneficiaries sufficiently into the fold.

##### 5. Comparison over time

With the exception of “impact prospects, all criteria – especially effectiveness and sustainability - performed slightly lower in 2009 as compared to 2008. In most cases variations are minimal.

Summary of conclusions	Egypt 2009 National projects*	Egypt 2008 National projects*
Number of reports	12	20
Relevance/quality of design	2.88	2.89
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.72	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.63	2.88
Impact prospects	2.83	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.58	2.84
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.73</b>	<b>2.83</b>

It is worth elaborating on the pronounced drops in performance in “Effectiveness” and “Potential sustainability”. As indicated in the Annual Report 2009, these changes appear to be linked to the introduction of a new BCS. A formal differentiation between outputs and results in the BCS has highlighted the weaknesses in this regard, as a majority of designs tend to be output rather than outcome-oriented. Equally, the reduction of Sustainability to 4 sub-criteria, although representing an improvement in methodology, has led to a decrease of the scoring averages for this criterion.

\* Ongoing projects

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Egypt 2009

As the number of and actual projects in the portfolio vary from year to year, any analysis comparing year on year performance of such a small sample would be misleading. The table above comparing average ROM performance between 2008 and 2009 is presented for informational purposes only.

## 6. Sector review

None of the projects monitored in Egypt in 2009 were funded under the ENPI budget line. Projects can be broadly split into institutional strengthening (MED and TWINNING projects), Social Development (MED), and civil society projects (DDH).

Projects / Programmes	EC contribution	Completion Date
<b>INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT</b>		
SAAP II: WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT	1,300,000	21.12.2009
SAAP II: ASSISTANCE TO THE EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT FOR REFORMING RAILWAYS SAFETY REGULATION	1,500,000	21.12.2009
SAAP II: INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR INVESTMENT AND FREE TRADE ZONES (GAFI)	1,500,000	21.12.2009
SUPPORT TO THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT PROGRAMME OPERATIONAL FUND	20,170,448	10.07.2009
EIB - INTEREST RATES SUBSIDY FOR EGYPTIAN POLLUTION ABATEMENT PROJECT (EPAP II)	10,000,000	10.07.2009
<b>SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICES</b>		
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SUPPORT TO SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (SSD)	1,798,300	10.07.2009
SOUTH SINAI REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	63,285,880	10.07.2009
TA CONTRACT II FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ETPS IN FOUR SECTORS	7,016,450	10.07.2009
TA III FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 7 ETPS	6,829,980	10.07.2009
<b>CIVIL SOCIETY PROJECTS</b>		
TOMORROW STARTS NOW	99,900	10.07.2009
MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS OF TORTURE IN EGYPT	180,677	10.07.2009
THE EGYPTIAN DEMOCRATIC STATUS WATCH	100,000	10.07.2009

### Institutional Support

There is a high relevance of projects related to institutional support – these tend to be well embedded in the framework of the Association Agreement, the implementation of which is supported by a series of Support to Association Agreement Programmes (SAAP).

Twining is the main instrument applied by the SAAP (please refer to separate section on Twining). The PAO in charge of implementing the SAAP has been performing well, despite being faced with a steep learning curve and initial problems. The decentralised status of the PAO initially led to some misunderstanding concerning roles and responsibilities and initial criticism of micro-management on part of ECD. These have now been resolved. A weakness in design is the

possible underfunding of PAO, as management funds are limited to 7% of TA budget, which may not cover the full period, forcing the PAO to sign and disburse follow up phases earlier and quicker than planned.

Generally, the SAAP has successfully introduced TWG instrument in Egypt and a planned series of 4 SAAP phases is likely to make a significant contribution to the institutional reform processes, although it is clear that institutional and cultural change processes take a long time and long-term commitment.

The TWG projects monitored demonstrate that the design of individual TWG projects based on BA proposals ensure a high degree of ownership and commitment. However, a 2-year project period is generally considered too short to achieve all results, especially where legislative components are involved.

Varying performance of the TWG was noted regarding Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability. TWG performance is strongly dependent on the degree of "twin-ability" of the BA and the institutional and personal chemistry between the twinning partners.

### **Social Development and Public Services**

South Sinai Regional Development (SSRD) – the programme is highly relevant, however, its design is over-ambitious to be delivered in 4 years. The programme is achieving tangible results, although implementation could be more efficient – there is a problem with the Monitoring Information System (MIS) to be developed, and with reorganisation of Project Support Unit (PSU) with technical assistance team. Nevertheless, results are visible in many projects and impact prospects are good. Sustainability is questionable in many of the small interventions.

Support to Social Development (SSD) – the technical assistance team is supporting the decentralised process of the Social Fund for Development (SFD). While relevance is high, its design is over-ambitious given the available time & resources. The project has already requested a Rider (after 1 year) for TA support to infrastructure works and CDA/NGOs, SFD Regional officers.

Establishment of ETPs – there are two overlapping contracts aiming at providing vocational training for professions in 7 different sectors. The underlying concept and design are good and the project (TA contract II for establishment of ETPs in four sectors) could become a real success and make a significant contribution to TVET policy development. The formation, based on a decree of the Prime Minister, of a ministerial committee for Vocational Education, offers an important step forward to formulating a coherent TVET strategy and policy for Egypt.

### **Civil society**

The nature of the three civil society projects were quite different, with the 'Management and Rehabilitation of victims of Torture' being a long term delivery of services.

Nonetheless, some similarities between the projects exist:

- Mirroring the performance of the portfolio in Egypt as a whole, these projects demonstrate good relevance in all cases, the translation of which into feasible project designs was weak in 2 out of 3 cases.
- There are problems in efficiency across all three projects. CDA/NGOs have weak experience in preparing project proposals according to EC Procedures and ensuing implementation sometimes suffers as a result, e.g. delays, misunderstandings of financial and technical reporting requirements.
- Impact and Sustainability remain limited – these are small endeavours in a charged political environment, with generally weak coordination mechanisms with similar actors, weak contacts with policy support, and weak financial sustainability.
- The question of EC visibility is interesting to note. Of the three civil society projects, two are not seen as contributing to EC visibility. In both cases it is debatable whether

increasing EC visibility is advisable in view of the sensitive topic. Moreover, it is interesting to consider what EC visibility means? Is it 'tick the box' awareness of the EC as a donor, or is it a broader awareness of the EC's presence in Egypt and the EU's values.

### **TWINNING**

Twinning has become a prominent institution building instrument in the ENPI (and IPA) region. Indeed, Twinning has emerged as one of the few genuinely ENPI-wide programmes. The ROM experience of Twinning to date highlights that the specificities of the Twinning instrument pose challenges at several levels for many of its stakeholders; it was the very particularities of this instrument, which initiated a regional workshop held in Cairo in November 2009.

Topics discussed and analysed during the seminar and the 2009 ROM exercise included:

- Added value of Twinning compared to Technical Assistance and pre-conditions for the identification of the best-suited 'package' of institutional capacity building tools;
- Implications of the different management structures (centralised versus de-centralised);
- Creation of synergies between reporting, internal monitoring and external ROM through identification of complementary reporting mechanisms;
- Presentation of an internal 'Activity oriented monitoring tool' designed by the ENPI monitoring team to facilitate the project's joint internal assessment.

A few key points extracted from the minutes of the workshop:

#### **Incentive and motivation for TWG**

- Lack of EU accession perspectives in ENPI countries may reduce reform incentives compared to former candidate countries. ENPI TWG to be seen as a voluntary rather than a mandatory reform process.
- TWG is more demanding than Technical Assistance (TA) and may represent an additional "burden" for the Beneficiary Administration (BA). BA absorption capacity and sufficient resourcing is essential and must not be overlooked. TWG should not be regarded as the "default" instrument for institutional reform.
- Formal and informal criteria to assess if the BA is "twin-able" should be clearly spelled out

#### **Added value of TWG compared to TA**

- The peer-to-peer dimension and joint responsibility
- Selection of the proposal based on quality and not on price
- Better sustainability due to political support and ownership
- Long term relationship established between the partners often beyond project duration

#### **Planning and design**

- Duration between project identification and activity start is a main constraints of TWG
- Mandatory results are often overambitious for the short 2-year duration. To achieve real change a follow-up phase often seems required
- Benchmarks often expressed as outputs, at the detriment of the outcome or result level

#### **Implementation & management**

- Role and responsibilities of the Project Administration Office (PAO)
- PAO's role is to moderate, facilitate, assist and monitor. Its institutional embeddedness in national structures varies from ENPI-East to ENPI-South. There is scope for harmonisation
- The PAO is a (temporary) facilitator. Resources should suffice to cope with its responsibilities; however, its long term institutional sustainability is not envisaged

#### **Balance between flexibility and mandatory results**

- TWG procedures may result in parties becoming 'hostage' to rigid designs. Project fiches are often taken as final, even if outdated compared to new realities at project launch.

- Ideally, and if required by partners, the first 2-3 inception months could involve re-negotiation of benchmarks. However, flexibility should remain an exception
- Room may exist for introducing adjustments rather than radical changes (mandatory results)

**But: TWG is appropriate only if certain conditions are met:**

- Well defined sector strategy is in place
- High degree of institutional stability
- Good absorption capacity
- High level of commitment at BA level
- Presence of transferable EU best practices adequate to the BA concerned

## 7. Case study

### a. 115180.01 - "SUPPORT TO THE BANKING SUPERVISION IN EGYPT", Egypt, Contract n. 110989

Ref. No with sequence	Budget	PM location	Response Sheet	Report date	Design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
MR-115180.01	2.095.319	ECD Egypt	1	10/07/2009	B	A	A	A	A

The **Overall Objective (OO)** of this project is the modernisation of the Egyptian financial sector. The project was designed in helping the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) to achieve a major reform of its operating mode in order to be more in line with current supervisory methods and to improve its internal efficiency.

It is an Ex-post project, which has been a great success.

The excellent performance of this project under all main criteria is directly linked to its high relevance. CBE was followed by a second project (CBE II) now under implementation, whose objectives correspond to a further phase of the modernisation of the Egyptian banking system.

The project proved an excellent level of *Efficiency* and *Effectiveness*, with immediate and clear benefits for the CBE. A larger group of national banks benefited indirectly from it, thanks to the stronger and more efficient supervision from the CBE. This certainly was an important factor to help Egyptian banks overcoming the present financial crisis.

In addition:

- The work-plan was elaborated by the project in close cooperation with the CBE and was followed closely. Contacts between Egyptian and European experts were frequent enough to allow for continuous adjustments as necessary.
- Relations between the bankers and the CBE have changed. CBE staff is no longer concerned with administrative checks but is now much more professional, with an understanding of the conditions and constraints of the banks, and a risk-based approach instead of the former compliance-based one.

The project's potential *Impact* and the *Sustainability* prospects materialised in practice, with particular reference to the following elements:

- The project played a part in cushioning the potential implications that a major financial crisis could have had on the Egyptian financial system. Contrary to other countries, in Egypt there has been no major banking crisis, nor run on the deposits, loss of jobs at financial institutions etc.
- The CBE showed a very strong ownership of the project's results and smoothly proceeded to the implementation of the approved recommendations. This continued even after the end of the project. Local ownership was strong from the start (and still is), as was decision-making. Moreover, the mechanisms and methods put in place with the CBE with the assistance of the project are still operational.

**b. 10381.03 - "SOUTH SINAI REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME",  
Egypt, Decision nr. 5717**

Ref. No with sequence	Budget	PM location	Response Sheet	Report date	Design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
MR-10381.03	63.285.880	ECD Egypt	1	10/07/2009	C	B	B	B	C

The **Overall Objectives (OO)** of this project are as follows: 1) The promotion of sustainable, diversified and environmentally sensitive economic activities; 2) The promotion of social development to meet the very diverse needs of the local population and of rapidly expanding non-local Egyptian population attracted by the tourism industry; 3) The continued development of appropriate environmental management systems to protect the fragile land and maritime environment, which is the region's main economic asset; 4) The preservation of the cultural heritage in this region.

The **C** score under the first monitoring criterion is mainly linked to the weaknesses in project Design. The following evidence was collected in the monitoring report:

- The intervention logic was incomplete, with Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs) not going into the necessary level of detail. Assumptions are also generic and have not been revised as the project evolved. Previous monitoring reports recommended revising the Logframe, but this was not put into practice.
- Design did not take into the consideration the magnitude of the OO and severely underestimated the amount of Technical Assistance required to support such a sizeable programme. The programme is very ambitious, with a disproportion between the many activities to be delivered and the short duration.
- The capacity of the beneficiaries to understand the EC procedural requirements and fulfil the technical and financial requirements was largely overestimated. As a result, project beneficiaries were unable to deliver the intended results within the given timeframe.
- Related to the above, the dedication and commitment of the Programme Support Unit (PSU) Director and the Technical Assistance Team Leader to drive the programme forward needs to be reinforced.

Sustainability was not embedded in project design. Moreover:

- Sustainability of some grants awarded to local communities has an uncertain future. The Bedouin community may not be able to translate them into viable business ideas without external support.
- Despite the high catalyst potential of this project, there is still no policy in the Governorate of South Sinai towards Regional Development.

For all these reasons and in order to avoid these problems in the future, more consideration should be given at design stage to identify: i) a sufficient level of capacity among potential target groups; ii) a realistic timeframe of inputs/TA, particularly in relation to grants and works contracts awarded through a de-centralised process. Moreover, the project should give priority to the formulation of a sustainability strategy, to ensure the dissemination of results to participating stakeholders.

2.3. Quick scan Israel



This Project is funded by the EU

# EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme

## for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

## - Brussels Central Office -



# Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Israel 2009



Israel: ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	5	1.677.263,00
MED	0	0
ENPI	0	0
TWINNING	1	970.000,00
SPSP	0	0
Ex-post	1	188.735,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2.835.998,00</b>

## 1. Introduction

EU cooperation with Israel has been limited due to the high economic development of Israel. Projects and programmes in place are in support of civil society, mainly in the context of the EU Partnership for Peace Programme (PPP), the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and a few multi-country/regional programmes (RP). Participation in regional activities has proved difficult considering the absence of bilateral diplomatic relations between Israel and some Euromed partner countries. Under the ENPI some bilateral funding has been allocated this includes support to the ENP action plan mainly through institutional cooperation under the Twinning programme.

This review is based on the Monitoring Reports of 2009 and generalises qualitative and quantitative characteristics of projects monitored.

## 2. ROM Portfolio 2009

In 2009 7 national/ bilateral projects were monitored. 6 of them were ongoing, for one finished project an ex-post monitoring was conducted. Among those, 5 projects are financed under the Partnership of Peace Programme, one under the EIDHR and one is a Twinning project providing support to the ENP Action plan. Budget covered by ROM reached € 2.6 M, a slight increase compared to 2008 (€ 2.4 M).

## 3. ROM Findings

### *Relevance and Design*

The aggregated **ROM Score of 3.03 for 2009**, is not only well above average in the Southern ENPI Region (2.77), it further marks the **second highest score for bilateral/national ongoing projects in the entire ENPI region**. This is an almost equally high result compared to 2008, where ROM index for Israel showed 3.07. However, it has to be noted that a small selection of projects were monitored and only one project in the portfolio was already monitored in 2008.

**Projects monitored were highly relevant** this is reflected by a very high score for *Relevance* (3,67). At the same time some **interventions lacking a coherent design logic** and consequent oversight of the implementation, hence respective score for *Present Design* is relatively low with 2.83. Systematic application of the logical framework approach is missing and objectives formulated are frequently over ambitious. With the exception of the Twinning programme, this can be generalised for all projects in the 2009 portfolio. Findings of that kind are linked with the incentive NGOs have to overplay the potential of their offers in order to increase the likeliness for donor funding. Moreover, civil-society organisations in the region often do not have enough manpower and know how to fully apply complex PCM methods.

The targeted stakeholders followed for the most part those intended in the project proposals, with the exception of stakeholders from the majority population. In fact, there was repeatedly rather **limited involvement by Jewish individuals, NGOs, academics, practitioners and policymakers** etc. in project design and implementation, who are clearly key stakeholders, if there is to be change/impact to be expected. In a broader sense, it also raises the questions of i) how well organised civil society is - on both the Arab and Jewish sides - in supporting and serving the interests of Arab Palestinians in Israel and promoting dialogue between the groups ii) how the international community can best organise itself to support this following best practice principles under the Paris process of donor coordination.

### *Efficiency and Effectiveness*

**Very satisfactory findings under Efficiency and Effectiveness** were stated, with a high overall score of 3.28 and 3.00, proves that organisation were well chosen, as they were able to compensate design/ planning weaknesses with know how to ensure efficient and effective implementation.

#### ***Impact prospects***

Generally, **high prospects for impact on micro-level** were reported. This was often substantiated by the fact that relatively small projects (average funding around 400.000) have achieved a variety of small, but practical and often symbolic benefits for relatively large groups of beneficiaries. Moreover, those created a variety of venues for increased social inclusion by bringing together the different groups. Overall this is contributing positively to the programme objectives of the Partnership for Peace Programme.

#### ***Potential Sustainability***

As monitoring **findings under Sustainability are mixed**, it is rather questionable whether the achieved results can be sustained in the long run. Monitors have frequently encountered problems with: i) the economic and financial viability of the achieved results, where 70% of the projects monitored signalled problems, and ii) a low level of policy support, where half of the projects monitored have problems, some even serious deficiencies. Obviously it is very difficult to change the political situation the small projects are facing. One area of weakness frequently occurred in this respect is the **lack of formal engagement with the Israeli state authorities**. On the one hand, the proposals make clear the projects' ambition to seriously engage with these bodies; on the other, it seems that the interaction between an Arab Palestinian civil society organisation is rarely straightforward, even if cooperation between the Government and the organisations is taking place at various levels (for example some organisations being recipients of funding). More specifically, project participants often appear to adopt a position of disengagement with Israeli institutions and society. While the reasons for this are understandable, it does little to help achieve the broader objectives of the Partnership for Peace programme.

Contrary other key factors influencing the potential sustainability of results are weighed up positively, among those are ownership (3.00) and the contribution to the institutional and management capacities (3.17). Underlining good indications that project stakeholders are committed and activities trigger learning processes.

#### **4. Recommendations (related to the PPP)**

For future projects, it could be considered by those who implement/ plan projects:

- Focus exclusively on technical matters (environment, statistics, social problems) for which intermediate solutions can be found on the working level with avoidance of discussions on the geopolitical context; (Those technical matters are also surely linked to the political context, however, by inviting technical experts to the projects, the opportunity of discussing politics is limited);
- Focus on small and pragmatic steps to achieve early successes on small scale which increase the credibility of dialogue and cooperation and gives arguments against pessimism and cynicism;
- Take into account the organisation's role and functioning within broader civil society as a whole and consider partnerships wherever possible, this includes especially all linked public authorities;
- Monitor closely the direct political and institutional environment in order to anticipate and develop strategic reactions for various scenarios (i.e. refusal to co-operate);
- Ensuring financial sustainability of results achieved;

- Arrange for clear ownership of the advocacy activities, as there are often no real strategies in place from the design stage on to build and sustain advocacy activities in specific areas once the projects are completed;
- Emphasis on a results-chain approach whereby activities lead to outputs lead to outcomes lead to impacts. Such an understanding would ensure that logical frameworks are more coherent, that final expected outcomes are clear from the beginning, and that reporting is carried out according to a results-based approach. It would also help clarify from the very beginning who the important stakeholders are for project success. All of this would help ensure that the hard work of project stakeholders is more likely to result in effective and sustainable project results.

For future projects, it could be considered by the EC:

- If one of the activities, and one of the expected result areas, could be clear capacity development in this area, thus improving the ability of the organisation to deliver effective assistance in years to come;
- If micro-project financing under the PPP could allow for increasing the number of small, but symbolic success stories, which usually will not find funding from elsewhere (e.g. some projects funded by the PPP, have small "sub"-projects which should seek self-funding and would be benefiting from this);
- If further networking under the PPP participants could be enabled with simple measures such as sharing of contact details or the facilitation of networking events;
- If strict requirements for duly and simple results-oriented reporting and planning could help to enforce the self-monitoring abilities of the implementing NGOs;
- If sector co-coordination for projects with broad objectives of social and political change underlying them, - either by the EC acting on its own, or in coordination with other donors – could help to
  - a) design projects best to take advantage of the strengths and profiles of other organisations active in the sector, and
  - b) identify how the project itself can best support broader sectoral capacity and not just at the level of the individual organisation implementing an individual project.

***ROM Portfolio 2009 included one of the first Twinning programmes implemented in Israel:***

**Twinning project providing support to the ENP Action plan “Strengthening Data protection”**  
Project Authority: Israeli Law, Information and Technology Centre (ILITA); Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos)  
Budget: 970,000 €.

Highly relevant project whose implementation is still in the very initial stages and which is highly appreciated by the beneficiary for providing examples of best practice in data protection elsewhere in Europe. The timing for the project is appropriate as it is being deployed at a time when ILITA grows into its new role as sole regulator for data protection in Israel and when the Authority is actively pursuing closer links with other European regulators.

The project does not have a very explicit linkage to approximating specific parts of *acquis* which is usually the case in other twinning projects; nevertheless, progress in this area is certainly in line with the broader objectives of the EU-Israel relations under the Neighbourhood policy, particularly in the areas of trade and investment and improved cooperation between Justice and Home Affairs bodies.

Provided project implementation remains on track, there is every likelihood that the project purpose of contributing to a fully functioning data protection agency which is operating according to international best practice and is well-recognised in Israel can be achieved. Impact will depend on the success of the project and ultimately the Authority to make Israeli consumers and economic actors more aware of their rights and obligations under data protection laws. In a broader sense, accreditation by the European Union of the Israeli government's ability to ensure adequate levels of data protection should have a significant economic impact given the Israeli's economy strengths in the information technology and financial services sectors.


Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Israel 2009

5. Annex:

Israel ROM 2009 National/bilateral projects	Ongoing	Ex-post ROM
PPP	4	1
EIDHR	1	
Twinning	1	
Budget covered € Mio	2,6	0,6


Summary of conclusions	Average Score 2008	Average Score 2009
Relevance/quality of design	3,10	3,27
Efficiency of implementation to date	3,33	3,28
Effectiveness to date	3,02	3,00
Impact prospects	3,25	2,90
Potential sustainability	2,64	2,70
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>3,07</b>	<b>3,03</b>

**Note:** A = very good (4); B = good (3); C = problems (2); D = serious deficiencies (1)



Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Israel 2009

Potential sustainability 2009	Average Score
BCS 5.1 - Financial / economic viability?	2,33
BCS 5.2 - What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups?	3,00
BCS 5.3 - What is the level of policy support provided?	2,33
BCS 5.4 - How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	3,17
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2,70</b>



2.4. Quick scan Jordan



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**EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme  
for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries**

- Brussels Central Office -



**Quick Scan of  
EC Funded Projects in Jordan 2009**

Jordan : ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	5	3.536.204,00
MED	8	58.023.805,00
ENPI	2	19.500.000,00
TWINNING	2	1.800.000,00
SPSP	0	0
EPR	1	2.000.000,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>84.860.009,00</b>

## 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

## 2. Approach

The series of quickscans which follow are based on a similar blend of qualitative and quantitative data:

- Quantitative:
  - o the ROM scoring found in monitoring reports
  - o the ROM scoring found in background conclusion sheets
- Qualitative:
  - o the ROM key observations found in monitoring reports
  - o inhouse knowledge of team leaders and mission leaders

## 3. Reminder: ROM scoring

ROM scores	From	To
A (very good)	3.51	4.00
B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

#### 4. General review

1 ROM mission was carried out in June/July 2009.

18 projects were monitored in Jordan in 2009. One of these was an ex-post and, given the different performance of closed as compared to ongoing projects, it is not methodologically sound that this score be included in the quantitative analysis of the sample.

Summary of conclusions	Jordan 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	17	132
Relevance/quality of design	3.02	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.82	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.91	2.72
Impact prospects	2.91	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.99	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>2.79</b>

In 2009, the portfolio of 17 projects monitored in Jordan performed better (2.93) than the average for national projects in the ENPI South region (2.79). The grade of 3.02 for relevance and quality of design is noteworthy.

Although every criterion scores higher than ENPI South average, it is particularly noticeable in the potential Sustainability of projects, which stands at a solid “good”, with 2.99:

Potential sustainability	Jordan 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Financial / economic viability	2.82	2.61
ownership of the project by target groups	3.29	2.90
level of policy support provided	2.88	2.70
contribution to institutional & management capacity	2.88	2.86
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.99</b>	<b>2.76</b>

Jordan – compared to other ENPI South countries, has above average policy support (2.88) for projects.

This aspect is mirrored in the assessment of the relevance of EC assistance to the partner government policies, which is rated very positively with 3.53. However, it must be noted that despite the very good level of relevance and policy support, monitors noted problems among over 40% of projects with the “level of support given by all stakeholders to the current design”. This apparent contradiction might indicate that at the highest levels of government, where policy is determined, the vision is reform-minded and set on advancement but in the middle echelons of

\* Ongoing projects

the bureaucracy or management structures, the mindset is less forward looking. Hence, despite the framework of good policies, support for project design is not always observed at every level.

Efficiency of the 2009 ongoing portfolio is, with a still relatively good 2.82, the lowest among the five ROM criteria.

Efficiency	Jordan 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
How well is the Availability/Usage of means/inputs managed?	2.71	2.65
How well is the implementation of activities managed?	2.82	2.73
How well are outputs achieved?	2.76	2.70
How well is the Partner Contribution / Involvement working?	3.00	2.79
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.82</b>	<b>2.72</b>

This score is the result of 4 weighted sub-criteria listed in the above table. Performance in the efficiency of the Jordan portfolio mirrors the performance of the overall ENPI South portfolio, where efficiency is generally the lowest scoring criterion of projects, of which the availability of inputs is weakest.

In the case of Jordan, the availability of inputs stands at 2.71, which is rather good overall, however, this conceals that 30 - 40% of projects were noted to have efficiency problems and over 40 % of the monitored projects have problems or even serious deficiencies in the way inputs are provided. It is interesting to note that the 2 projects with the most severe problems with inputs are providing assistance to refugees:

- Assistance To Palestine Ex-Gaza Refugees In Jesash Camp, Jordan
- The Promotion Of Legal Literacy And Resource To Legal Services For Women In The Hitteen And Hussain Camp Areas And Surrounding Communities

##### 5. Comparison over time

Summary of conclusions	Jordan 2009 National projects*	Jordan 2008 National projects*
Number of reports	17	8
Relevance/quality of design	3.02	3.20
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.82	2.85
Effectiveness to date	2.91	2.91
Impact prospects	2.91	3.07
Potential sustainability	2.99	3.14
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>3.03</b>

The performance of Jordan is marginally down in 2009, if compared to 2008. However, the number of and actual projects in the portfolio vary from year to year. As such, any analysis comparing year on year performance of such a small sample would be misleading. The table

\* Ongoing projects

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Jordan 2009

above comparing average ROM performance between 2008 and 2009 is presented for informational purposes only.

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Jordan 2009

## 6. Sector review

Projects monitored in Jordan in 2009, can be categorised as follows according to the CRS code.

CRS	Budget	Project Title	End date
<b>Secondary Education</b>			
11330	2.500.000	Assistance To Palestine Ex-Gaza Refugees In Jesash Camp, Jordan	22/9//2010
<b>Water Supply and Sanitation</b>			
14010	5.000.000	Al Meyah - Supporting Management Of Water Resources In Jordan	31/12/2010
<b>Government and Civil Society</b>			
15066	4.500.000	Northern Border Clearance Project - Nbcpc	23/4//2010
15130	3.000.000	Support To Human Rights And Good Governance	30/6//2011
15160	99.486	Promotion Of Women In Democracy And Human Rights In Irbid Governorate / Jordan	13/12/2010
15160	100.000	The Promotion Of Legal Literacy And Resource To Legal Services For Women In The Hitteen And Hussain Camp Areas And Surrounding Communities	31/3//2010
15160	385.175	Support Of The Jwu Shelter To Provide: Protection; Legal, Social And Psychological Counselling; And Rehabilitative Vocational Training Vulnerable And Abused Women In Jordan	9//4//2010
15160	1.445.000	Human Rights And Good Governance - Decision 18179	30/6//2011
<b>Conflict Prevention And Resolution, Peace And Security</b>			
15210	1.000.000	Saap II: Improving The Penitentiary System	8//1//2010
<b>Telecommunications</b>			
22020	3.599.805	Technical Assistance To The Telecom Regulatory Commission In Jordan	19/7//2009
<b>Energy Generation and Supply</b>			
23082	800.000	Saap III: Capacity Building For The National Energy Research Centre	19/7//2009
<b>Business and Other Services</b>			
25010	15.000.000	Services Modernisation Programme (Smp)	17/9//2014
25020	4.979.000	Technical Assistance For The Jordanian Executive Privatisation Commission	4//9//2009
25020	20.000.000	Support For Regulatory Reform And Privatisation (Srrp)	14/2//2010
<b>Trade Policy</b>			
33110	15.000.000	Support To The Implementation Of The Association Agreement - Saap II	30/6//2010
<b>Research</b>			
43082	5.000.000	Support To Research & Technological Development & Innovation Initiatives & Strategies In Jordan (Srtd)	31/12/2010
<b>Support to NGOs</b>			
92020	451.543	A Pilot Programme In The Ajloun Forest Region As A Replicable Model Of Sustainable Resource Management And Fight Against Poverty In The Conflict Affected Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan	31/1//2010

Breaking up the projects into sector reveals that the portfolio in Jordan covers a wide array indeed.

### **Secondary Education**

The education project is problematic throughout the ROM criteria except design. The root of the difficulties lie in efficiency, notably the serious problems observed concerning management of inputs and activities.

### **Water Supply and Sanitation**

Apart from being relevant, and that its activities are well managed, the water supply project is problematic. This indicates that commitment to real change still needs to be demonstrated for the project to be successful.

### **Government and Civil Society**

There are 6 projects in this sector, which are quite varied in their aims, from demining to the promotion of women in democracy. Overall, performance in this sector is weaker than in the rest of the Jordan portfolio – all projects exhibit problems on 2 or more ROM criteria. Only “Promotion of Women in Democracy and Human Rights” is solidly good throughout, the monitor having expressed concern only for its sustainability.

### **Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Peace and Security**

The Penitentiary project is a twinning with Austrian Police. It is good in every respect, and very efficiently managed.

### **Telecommunications**

Likewise, the Telecom project is good throughout the ROM criteria.

### **Energy Generation and Supply**

This project is rated as very good, especially at design and efficiency levels.

### **Business and Other Services**

This is an important sector, covered by three projects with an overall budget of €40m. The 2 projects which are over 5 years old and in their end phase (Technical Assistance for the Jordanian Executive Privatisation Commission; Support for Regulatory Reform and Privatisation (Srrp)) are doing well in every ROM criterion. However, the recently started “Services Modernisation Programme (SMP)” is experiencing problems, apparently exacerbated by weak design, low support of stakeholders and difficulties with implementation.

### **Trade Policy**

There is just one project in this sector – the Support to the Implementation of the Association Agreement - Saap II – which is rated as excellent.

### **Research**

Likewise, in Research, there is one project, with good performance, deemed to be especially effective by the monitor. This would imply that the direct beneficiaries are very pleased with the results and are taking them fully on board.

### **Support to NGOs**

The forestry project was rated as very good, especially at design level. Interestingly, the monitor noted that sustainability can be expected to be remarkably high, meaning that the final beneficiaries are in agreement with project design and are adopting its results.

## 7. Case study

### a. *MR-10426.03: "Support to the implementation of the Association Agreement – SAAP II", Jordan, project nr. 17549*

Ref. No with sequence	Budget	PM location	Response Sheet	Report date	Design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
MR-10426.03	15.000.000	ECD Jordan		23/07/2009	A	A	A	A	A

The A scores in all criteria can be justified by:

- SAAP II has been designed to be demand driven. This materialised in the strong linkage of the Programme with the deliberations and conclusions of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement Committee and its 10 thematic Sub-committees. This linkage offers a practical way to continuously keep the Programme well oriented towards provision of service to the needs of its target groups and avoid derailing.
- Flexibility is in-built into the Programme. Activities of all projects under SAAP II relate well with the expected outputs and these with the expected results, leading reasonably to targeted specific objectives (PP/ SOs).
- As a rule of SAAP II, key stakeholders are heavily involved in the individual projects. Beneficiaries have also a say in the evaluation of the submitted offers and the selection procedure.
- The four ongoing Twinning projects are developing according to plan. Moreover, all outputs, delivered so far point to positive contribution for achievement of the intended results.
- A very interesting unplanned positive impact has emerged from the support which SAAP II offered to the beneficiary administrations. In fact, it is a case of synergy between two elements of support offered to beneficiaries. Moreover, there is good coordination amongst donors
- The support offered by the Programme does not entail a significant increase in operational expenses for the beneficiaries, making them affordable even after SAAP II end.
- All support provided under SAAP II is ideally embedded in the corresponding Jordanian structures, in charge of the subject matter of each element of support.

b. *MR-115223.01: "Support to research & technological development & innovation initiatives & strategies in Jordan (SRTD)", Jordan, project nr. 18209*

Ref. No with sequence	Budget	PM location	Response Sheet	Report date	Design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
MR-115223.01	5,000,000	ECD Jordan		31/08/2009	B	B	A	B	B

The Project Purpose (PP) is the following:

"To develop Jordan's scientific and technological capacity with a focus on the use of RTD results by the industrial and Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector and therefore accelerate the integration of Jordan into the European Research Area and the Community Framework Programme".

The A score for *Effectiveness* can be justified by:

- The project has almost finished the establishment of the 50 Focal Points, 42 being in place.
- The number of start-ups "graduating" from the incubators by moving out of the incubators is an astonishing 35/, proof for both efficient pre-selection and guidance through the initial start-up phase.
- The quality of the internships and training sessions abroad is very high and reveals an excellent knowledge of the European business incubator scene and the providers of different services to start ups.

2.5. Quick scan Lebanon



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## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

- Brussels Central Office -



### Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Lebanon 2009

Lebanon: ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	9	26.522.338,00
MED	5	36.000.000,00
ENPI	0	0
TWINNING	0	0
SPSP	0	0
EIB	1	993.160,00
Ex-post	4	22.818.285,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>86.333.783,00</b>

## 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

The quick scans will be used as supporting documentation for the meeting of ENPI country Heads of Delegations on March 11 2010.

It is understood that the interest in ROM figures by country stems from the annual ROM presentation on 28 January 2010 presenting the 2009 ROM achievements (please refer to the minutes of this meeting for more information).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes.

In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

## 2. Approach

The series of quickscans which follow are based on a similar blend of qualitative and quantitative data:

- Quantitative:
  - o the ROM scoring found in monitoring reports
  - o the ROM scoring found in background conclusion sheets
- Qualitative:
  - o the ROM key observations found in monitoring reports
  - o inhouse knowledge of team leaders and mission leaders

## 3. Reminder: ROM scoring

ROM scores	From	To
A (very good)	3.51	4.00
B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

#### 4. General review

One ROM mission to Lebanon took place in 2009 in July (with the exception of two projects that were postponed to September and October).

19 projects were monitored in Lebanon in 2009. Four out of the 19 projects were ex-posts and, given their different performance as compared to ongoing projects, it is not methodologically sound that their scores be included in the quantitative analysis of the sample.

Summary of conclusions	Lebanon 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	15	132
Relevance/quality of design	2.76	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.66	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.67	2.72
Impact prospects	2.60	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.43	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.62</b>	<b>2.79</b>

In 2009, the performance of the projects monitored in Lebanon was below the average for national projects in the ENPI South region overall. In fact, the overall portfolio of projects perform above, but in the lower margins, the 2.51 statistical cut off point between problematic and good (please see above table of scores).

All ROM criteria assessing performance performed above the cut off point with the exception of the “Potential Sustainability” criterion – in other words, the extent to which results will be sustained after project end.

A closer look at the BCS sub-criteria of Potential Sustainability reveals that projects monitored in Lebanon have suffered from several aspects, namely, close to three-quarters of the projects monitored exhibited problematic or worse financial viability of results; close to two-thirds of the projects monitored suffered from problematic or worse policy support towards sustaining the results achieved; and 40% of the projects were not seen as adequately contributing to institutional and management capacity. Generally, it emerged that institutional support to the Lebanese Government projects present a better sustainability perspective as compared to those targeted at the civil society or channelled through UNRWA.

Potential sustainability	Lebanon 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Financial / economic viability?	2.20	2.61
What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups?	2.67	2.90
What is the level of policy support provided?	2.33	2.70
How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	2.53	2.86

\* Ongoing projects

<b>Average Score in Total</b>	2.43	2.76
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These critical sustainability issues are mirrored in the “relevance/design” criterion despite the seemingly positive overall score for this criterion. In fact, a look at the sub-criteria of Relevance and design show a mixed picture in their performance. Despite being strongly relevant, close to half of the projects monitored suffered from problematic or worse quality of project designs. In addition, in 40% of the projects monitored, stakeholder consultation in design was seen as problematic.

<b>Relevance &amp; quality of design</b>	<b>Lebanon 2009 National projects*</b>	<b>ENPI South 2009 National projects*</b>
What is the present level of relevance of the project?	3.20	3.42
As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	2.33	2.58
Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	2.67	2.80
Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	3.00	2.88
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>2.92</b>

This discrepancy between Relevance and Design is typical of the performance patterns for the entire ENPI region, with Relevance generally scoring better than Design. This discrepancy is based on the fact that while projects are generally well embedded in existing strategic frameworks (such as the Association Agreement) and thus relevant, the translation of such relevance into a clear, coherent and realistic intervention logic tends to be weak.

As far as Relevance is concerned, in a country such as Lebanon, where EC external assistance is frequently channelled through civil society or interim (OMSAR, UNRWA) organisations, the issue of Relevance becomes more complex to assess as it relates differently to different stakeholder needs and objectives (government objectives, interim organisation objectives, EC objectives, end beneficiary needs).

As far as Design is concerned, weaknesses have been noted with regards to clear linkage between hierachal levels of the intervention logic and there is generally a focus on mere outputs rather than outcomes (results). Knowledge of the PCM and related Logical Framework methodology tends to be weak, especially among civil society organisations, which appear not to be sufficiently familiar with the EC methodologies and consequently often present design proposals of poor quality.

Virtually all recent projects in Lebanon have been adversely affected by the July 2006 war and the poor security situation in the country, coupled with a political deadlock and general government incapacity, which made important policy decisions virtually impossible. Following the parliamentary elections in spring 2008, the situation has slightly improved, however, a continued state of government indecision and inactivity has been noted, which particularly affects projects with a legislative component. Furthermore, as a result of weak government structures, many social services normally provided by the state, are provided by CSO in Lebanon. The latter, however, do not receive government funding and thus require continued external support to

\* Ongoing projects

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Lebanon 2009

continue their role and grow from an activist role into an increasingly more sophisticated role as partners in development.

**Comparison over time**

Summary of conclusions	Lebanon 2009 National projects*	Lebanon 2008 National projects*
Number of reports	15	12
Relevance/quality of design	2.76	3.04
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.66	3.02
Effectiveness to date	2.67	3.08
Impact prospects	2.60	2.84
Potential sustainability	2.43	2.84
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.62</b>	<b>2.96</b>

Generally, all main criteria have performed lower in 2009 as compared to 2008. However, the number of and actual projects in the portfolio vary from year to year. As such, any analysis comparing year on year performance of such a small sample would be misleading. The table below comparing average ROM performance between 2008 and 2009 is presented for informational purposes only.

As before-mentioned, the particular situation in Lebanon as a consequence of war, insecurity and political stalemate due to lack of consensus among the many political factions participating in the government, have slowed down progress and affected the performance of most ongoing projects.

For example, the Bekaa Water Utility remained without administrative council throughout the year and the replacement of the Director remained unsolved. The new executive power established in November 2009 could possibly improve the situation in 2010, if no political blockage appears among the main Lebanese factions.

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\* Ongoing projects

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Lebanon 2009

## 5. Sector review

The 15 ongoing monitored projects can be broadly split into 3 categories – listed below. Only 5 projects were directly targeted at Lebanese government institutions, of which 2 related to investments and 3 to policy support. Seven other projects were channelled through civil society structures (NGOs), one of which was targeted at Palestinian refugees. Three projects were targeted at the Palestinian refugees through UNRWA institutional support.

Projects / Programmes	EC contribution	Completion Date
<b>Infrastructure and Institutional support</b>		
EIB – TA for the Lebanese highways project	993.160,00	01/07/2010
Reconstruction Assistance Facility	10.000.000,00	31/11/2011
Operational Fund and PAO functioning	4.000.000,00	31/12/2010
Support to reforms and local governance (priority 1, support to ENP initiatives)	14.000.000,00	31/12/2010
Set up of water technical management tools (priority 4, water reform and environment)	5.000.000,00	12/12/2010
<b>OTHERS – Civil society</b>		
Medical, social and psychological assistance for victims of torture	642.000,00	04/04/2010
Rehabilitation programme for torture survivors	348.693,00	30/04/2010
People with disabilities – Economic and social inclusion project	582.663,00	01/04/2011
Développement de la compétitivité de la production rurale en faveur des communautés marginalisées affectées par la guerre	743.357,00	01/12/2009
Empowering local Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon working with children and youth	750.000,00	30/08/2009
Reinforcement of Civil Society Afnak II	3.000.000,00	30/09/2009
Renforcement de l'intégration socio-économique d'enfants et de jeunes en difficulté au Liban	1.455.625,00	31/12/2009
<b>UNRWA – Palestinian refugees institutional support</b>		
Improve education of young Palestine refugees in Lebanon for better employment opportunities	15.000.000,00	26/01/2010
EU scholarships for Palestine refugees in Lebanon	3.000.000,00	22/04/2011
Refugee camp improvement for health infrastructure for Palestine refugees in Lebanon	4.000.000,00	05/12/2011

Involvement of civil society and an adequately participatory approach are lacking in two out of five institutional support projects, as well as in two out of three UNRWA projects. This weakness applies only to two out of six civil society projects.

Besides, four out of five institutional projects and two out of three UNRWA projects require work on their logical framework matrix and related indicators. The same applies to three civil society projects out of six.

Generally, the best results are attained among those projects aimed at institutional support to the Lebanese government. Given the weaknesses of Lebanese government institutions as a result of the civil war and a highly complex political environment, these results are rather encouraging.

On the other hand, projects targeted at the civil society organisations (CSO) have shown the highest discrepancies of performance scores. Management and human resources quality have been highlighted as limiting factors in several projects. This does not come as a surprise as few CSO have a stable, full-time work force. Additional problems are posed by sustainability issues, as these CSO are – although often performing roles and responsibilities normally assumed by a functioning state - entirely dependent on external donor support.

Generally, UNRWA does not perform differently from the civil society organisations in Lebanon.

Two of the CSO projects deal with the rehabilitation of torture victims. The 2 projects present a high discrepancy in their results. While the 'Rehabilitation programme for torture survivors' (118165) has been managed in an efficient and transparent manner, the 'Medical, social and psychological assistance for victims of torture' (18123) lacked transparency in its management and attained weak results.

Projects aimed at strengthening the civil society on the whole and CSO in particular, most notably the AFKAR 2 programme, have been able to make a significant contribution to the sector and provide a catalytic effect on the growing number of genuine CSO. Almost all of the 24 grant beneficiaries in the programme have achieved their objectives and been able to make an impact on their respective target communities, despite a difficult political and security environment. The success of the programme has reconfirmed the relevance of the forthcoming AFKAR 3 programme.

In addition, projects directly supporting CSOs (such as Mouvement Social Libanais) active in the education sector have been successful in attaining their results and objectives, which could serve as a model for future government policies in the sector. This particular project has served as a pilot in preparation of the sector policy support programme in cooperation with the Ministry of Education.

The projects aimed at supporting Palestinian refugee camps need to be analysed separately as the Lebanese government neither participates nor interferes in their management. The implementing agency, UNRWA, tends to be conservative in their approach and stick to old public management rules supported by line budgeting. In this public management approach, quantitative targets are more important than qualitative ones. As a result, tangible (or "hard") inputs are generally preferred over "soft" (i.e. methodological) inputs.

Besides, the existing coordination mechanisms with other projects or structures within and beyond the camps are weak. This applies especially to the two projects related to education. The community involvement is also a weak point, while the main consultations remain channelled through the Palestinian political organisations. UNRWA suffers from a marked organisational inertia, which limits the scope for change.

## 6. Findings & conclusion

The key qualitative findings that deserve to be taken into consideration:

- continue strengthening both the civil society as well as building capacity in relevant state institutions to allow the emergence of a coherent sector policy
- consider specific training or assistance to draft and use the Logical Framework Matrix and to define result indicators;
- remind the project authorities to establish a proper plan for coordination with stakeholders within and outside the project and to apply it;
- foresee the involvement of civil society in control mechanisms;
- foresee project results dissemination strategy;
- prioritise soft rather than infrastructure projects with UNRWA.

## 7. Case study

**107060.02 "Empowering local Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon working with children and youth", Lebanon, Project no. 118617**

Ref. No with sequence	Budget	PM location	Response Sheet	Report date	Design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
MR-107060.02	1.455.625	ECD Lebanon		10/08/2009	B	B	B	B	C

The **Overall Objective (OO)** of this Project is to (i) improve the educational benefits and standards for youth in difficulties have been improved and disparities in accessing education have been lowered, (ii) reduce poverty by enhancing socio-economic integration of young people with difficulties.

The project has addressed the problem of high school drop out rates and related problems of poverty, unemployment and exclusion from the state education system among large numbers of Lebanese youths.

The project was implemented by a longstanding Lebanese CSO, the Mouvement Social Libanais (MSL), and has achieved good performance in all main criteria except sustainability.

As a pilot project, it has been successful in developing a workable model in combating the problem of dropping out of school and youth unemployment. This has been achieved by establishing an alliance between various stakeholders including pilot schools, teachers, parents, representatives of the Ministry of Education (MoE), as well as Municipalities.

However, its wider impact and sustainability depends on adoption at a policy level by the MoE. However, the MoE remains a weak institution, lacking a qualified and permanent mid level management tier. The MoE requires significant institutional development, administrative reform and capacity building to enable it to play an effective policy formulating and implementing role. While the project has developed the model, the current weaknesses of the relevant state institution prevent its immediate adoption and replication on a national scale. The forthcoming sector policy support programme for the education sector aims at addressing these institutional weaknesses.

2.6. Quick scan Morocco



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## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

- Brussels Central Office -



### Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Morocco 2009



Morocco: ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	2	994.569
MED	6	199.218.500
ENPI	0	0
TWINNING	2	2.710.000
SPSP	0	0
EIB	6	14.613.548
Ex-post	1	2.600.000
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>220.136.617</b>

## **Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Morocco 2009**

### **1. Origin of request and purpose**

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

### **2. Approach**

The series of quickscans which follow are based on a similar blend of qualitative and quantitative data:

- Quantitative:
  - o the ROM scoring found in monitoring reports
  - o the ROM scoring found in background conclusion sheets
- Qualitative:
  - o the ROM key observations found in monitoring reports
  - o inhouse knowledge of team leaders and mission leaders

### **3. Reminder: ROM scoring**

<b>ROM scores</b>	<b>From</b>	<b>To</b>
A (very good)	3.51	4.00
B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

## Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Morocco 2009

### 4. General review

2 ROM missions to Morocco were conducted in 2009; one in May, and a second in October. In total, 18 projects were monitored in Morocco in 2009. One of the 18 projects was an ex-post monitoring. Given the difference performance of ex-post monitoring, it is not methodologically sound that the scores be included in the quantitative analysis of the sample.

Summary of conclusions	Morocco 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	17	132
Relevance/quality of design	2.91	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.74	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.81	2.72
Impact prospects	2.93	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.95	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.87</b>	<b>2.79</b>

In 2009, the portfolio of projects monitored performed on average above the 2.51 cut off between problematic and good (please see above reminder table of scores).

However, the portfolio shows mixed performance compared with the average for national projects in the ENPI South region overall. Impact and Sustainability in Morocco perform above the ENPI South average, reflecting a satisfactory average level of ownership acquired during the implementation of projects. On the other hand, Relevance/design and Efficiency perform slightly below the ENPI South average, reflecting the fact that administrative difficulties were often underestimated at the design stage.

However, it should be noted that the weak performance of the INTERREG IIIA and IIIB programme (MR-115284.01) had an important impact on the global performance of ROM portfolio in Morocco in 2009. This is primarily due to the complex design of the programme which did not allow for transparent cooperation between the various European and Moroccan stakeholders.

Differences between the performance of the overall ENPI South ROM portfolio, and that of the Morocco ROM portfolio are particularly visible in the potential sustainability of projects:

Potential sustainability	Morocco 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Financial / economic viability?	2.75	2.61
What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups?	3.13	2.90
What is the level of policy support provided?	3.00	2.70
How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	2.94	2.86
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>2.76</b>

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\* Ongoing projects

## Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Morocco 2009

The performance of projects monitored in Morocco demonstrated particularly strong levels of ownership by the target groups and strong levels of policy support. This aspect is primarily due to the high relevance of the projects monitored which responded well to the expectations of the target groups. This is visible in the table below which compares the performance of Relevance/design of the entire ENPI South ROM portfolio with that of the Morocco ROM portfolio in 2009:

Relevance & quality of design	Morocco 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
What is the present level of relevance of the project?	3.44	3.42
As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	2.50	2.58
Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	2.81	2.80
Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	2.88	2.88
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.91</b>	<b>2.92</b>

Clearly, the patterns in performance which appeared in the portfolio of projects monitored in Morocco follow the trends of the overall ENPI South portfolio – in other words, it reflects a discrepancy between strong relevance, and weak project design. While the high levels of Relevance certainly play a role in promoting the Sustainability of project results, the fact that over 50% of projects monitored demonstrated problematic or worse project designs is undoubtedly having a negative impact on the performance of these projects during their lifetime.

For example, it is worth noting that the lowest scoring aspect of performance of projects in Morocco is Efficiency:

Efficiency of implementation to date	Morocco 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
How well is the Availability/Usage of means/inputs managed?	2.75	2.65
How well is the implementation of activities managed?	2.50	2.73
How well are outputs achieved?	2.81	2.70
How well is the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	2.81	2.79
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.74</b>	<b>2.72</b>

A closer look at the sub-scores reveals that the implementation of activities is particularly problematic and very much below the overall ENPI South average. The above score implies that close to half of the projects monitored in 2009 demonstrated problematic or worse implementation of activities. This is essentially due to administrative hurdles that project activities are often faced with.

For instance, in several projects, the set-up of the Technical Assistance, and its acceptance by the national counterparts posed problems which slowed the implementation of these projects. In

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\* Ongoing projects

## **Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Morocco 2009**

other cases, for example 'Développement des provinces du Nord', contracting of private companies was very time consuming. In the future, this difficulty will have important consequences in view of the N+3 procedure. This procedure has already negatively affected the 'Arganier' project which had to commit all its funds in 2005.

The number of and actual projects in the portfolio vary from year to year. As such, any analysis comparing year on year performance of such a small sample would be misleading. The table below comparing average ROM performance in Morocco between 2008 and 2009 is presented for informational purposes only.

<b>Summary of conclusions</b>	<b>Morocco 2009 National projects*</b>	<b>Morocco 2008 National projects*</b>
Number of reports	16	22
Relevance/quality of design	2.91	2.94
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.74	2.70
Effectiveness to date	2.81	2.74
Impact prospects	2.93	2.98
Potential sustainability	2.95	3.01
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.87</b>	<b>2.87</b>

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\* Ongoing projects

**Quick Scan of  
EC Funded Projects in Morocco 2009**

## 5. Sector review

It should be noted from the start that ROM in Morocco did not cover SPSPs. All projects monitored financed TA except two of them which financed infrastructure works.

Projects fall in four main categories as shown on the following table:

<b>RURAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT</b>		
Promouvoir un développement inclusif de la région Souss-Massa-Draa au Maroc	423 750	1//3//2010
Appui à l'amélioration de la situation de l'emploi de la femme rurale et gestion durable de l'arganeraie dans le sud-ouest du Maroc (projet arganier)	6 000 000	2//11/2010
Appui aux actions de réparation en faveur des régions touchées par les violations des droits de l'homme	3 000 000	4//7//2011
Développement rural et participatif dans le moyen atlas central - Khenifra	15 000 000	21/12/2009
Appui aux initiatives de développement humain local dans la ville de Casablanca dans le domaine de l'enfance de la rue - Maroc	570 819	29/8//2010
<b>INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT</b>		
PAAA III: renforcement des capacités de l'inspection générale de l'administration territoriale	1 210 000	28/2//2010
PAAA II: appui aux autorités chargées de la concurrence	1 500 000	31/3//2010
Projet d'appui aux institutions financières de garantie aux PME au Maroc (PAIGAM)	30 000 000	3//7//2009
Programme de voisinage MEDA 2005: coopération transnationale / transfrontalière	9 400 000	30/6//2011
<b>INFRASTRUCTURES</b>		
Développement des provinces du nord - infrastructures de désenclavement	20 733 500	31/12/2012
Rocade Méditerranéenne	124 485 000	31/12/2010
<b>EIB PROJECTS</b>		
EIB - Assainissement du bassin du Sebou - appui à la planification et la prise en charge du service d'assainissement des centres	1 047 675	9//4//2011
EIB - Assainissement du bassin du Sebou - AT à L'UGP	1 391 400	14/4//2012
EIB - Secteur santé - mise en œuvre du programme d'établissements hospitaliers	6 694 520	5//1//2014
EIB - AT au sein de la DCRC pour le 2e programme national des routes rurales (PNRR)	1 484 320	31/12/2012
EIB - Infrastructure logement social - AT à la holding Al Omrane	2 995 633	7//11/2010
EIB - Etude sur la délégation du service de l'eau du périmètre de Loukkos	1 000 000	31/12/2010

### Rural and social development

Four of the five projects in this category aim at increasing the income of populations living in poor rural areas. Their performance is clearly above average, reflecting high relevance and strong ownership by beneficiary populations.

The two rural development programmes 'Développement Rural et Participatif dans le Moyen Atlas Central' and 'Appui à l'amélioration de l'emploi de la femme rurale en gestion durable de l'arganeraie dans le sud-ouest du Maroc, Projet Arganier' both had difficult start ups, and were only able to achieve their objectives thanks to time extensions.

The projects 'Appui aux actions de réparation en faveur des régions touchées par les violations des droits de l'homme' and 'Promouvoir un développement inclusif de la région Souss-Massa-Draa au Maroc' are typical examples of programmes responding to real beneficiary needs - in this case, disadvantaged groups who are either victims of human rights violations or persons with a disability.

## **Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Morocco 2009**

The fifth project, aimed at helping abandoned children in Casablanca, faces some organisational difficulties, but is also expected to produce sustainable results.

### **Institutional support**

The four projects under this sector show contrasted outcomes.

The first, entitled "Projet d'appui aux institutions financières de garantie aux PME au Maroc (PAIGAM)", had design shortcomings but gave good results. It took time to reach the originally intended level of activities.

Of the two twinning projects, one was rated very favourably whereas the other was obviously plagued by a lack of ownership by the Moroccan administration. The fourth project, relying on cross border cooperation in the field of immigration also shows poor outcomes – these are primarily due to a weak and complex project design.

When outcomes are below expectations, it appears clearly that ownership by beneficiary institutions is too low. Possibly more so than in other countries, securing the support of beneficiary institutions and administrations in Morocco is essential for achieving satisfactory results. Convincing officials at all levels of the relevance of projects may take time.

### **Infrastructures**

Both infrastructure projects involve large investments and were poorly rated by the ROM monitoring team. These two projects suffered primarily due to their preparation phases which either did not deliver timely results, (Développement des Provinces du Nord) or delivered weak feasibility studies (Rocade Méditerranéenne). Unfortunately, feasibility studies of poor quality are a recurrent issue in a number of countries.

Both projects were plagued by delays and poor coordination between the parties involved, resulting in low efficiency. Coordination between the Moroccan administration and contractors seem to be inadequate.

As in institutional building, infrastructure projects should rely on clear implementation arrangements and on strong ownership by the Moroccan beneficiary administrations.

### **EIB projects**

The EIB is quite active in Morocco. Six projects were monitored in 2009 which on average performed well. This good performance should take certain aspects into account, for example:

- EIB projects are linked to the design and realisation of visible works, which usually receive more active support from local authorities.
- With the exception of the 'Infrastructure logement social' programme signed in March 2007, the remaining projects were signed in 2008 or 2009. As such, five of the EIB projects are in their first year of implementation. Indeed, the projects 'Etude sur la délégation du service de l'eau du périmètre de Loukkos' and 'Assainissement du bassin du Sebou - appui à la planification et la prise en charge du service d'assainissement des centres' are two studies that, at the time of monitoring, had only just completed the first phase of their evaluation. One of the EIB projects also got a generally negative review because it failed to adapt to changes in the absorption capacities of the beneficiary (ONEP).
- Finally, and in contrast to other external assistance programmes, the monitoring of EIB projects was requested to focus solely on Technical Assistance, rather than the overall EIB programme – in other words, the ROM exercise assessed outputs rather than outcomes.

## **Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Morocco 2009**

### **6. Findings & conclusions**

Morocco is embarked on a long term modernisation process. The Association Agreement signed with the EU provides a framework and a road map for a wide array of reforms. There is a clear political will to implement those reforms and to reduce poverty. In this context, aid to Morocco should increasingly rely on Sector Policy Support Programmes. However, reforms are often hampered or delayed by the burden of an administration whose modernisation is far from being achieved. Inasmuch as possible, projects should include a component supporting institutional build up and legislative reforms.

Moreover, in view of the different EC external assistance programmes towards the modernisation process (Programme d'Appuis aux Entreprises, Projet d'appui aux institutions financières de garantie aux PME au Maroc, Programme d'Appui aux Associations Professionnelles, Appui au développement de la formation professionnelle in the tourism, textile and NTIC sectors, in addition to support provided through the EIB), it would be useful to conduct a global evaluation of the efforts to date to provide findings and conclusions for future programmes in this sector.

However, project designers should bear in mind that the legislative process in Morocco is long and cumbersome. Institutional reforms can remain blocked for years if they involve passing new legislation. This is what happened, for instance, in the case of the twinning project dealing with competition. It does not mean that efforts aimed at modernising legislation should be abandoned, but careful attention should be paid to coordinating project activities and administrative or legislative reforms.

It is also striking that human and rural development projects were favourably evaluated by the ROM missions. Poor rural areas of the country seem to have the capacity of developing good project ownership and of making efficient use of development aid. All four rural development projects monitored in 2009 show high sustainability potential. This is important because many rural areas in Morocco remain poor, with more than 30% of the population below the poverty level.

Similarly to the modernisation process, EC external assistance to Morocco tends towards the use of budgetary support in rural development. It would be useful if the design of such efforts could rely on the results of previous actions in the sector (for example, Projet Arganier, Développement Rural Intégré des zones forestières et péri-forestières de Chefchaouen, or projet Sahla).

On the basis of the 2009 ROM exercise, the implementation of EC external assistance programmes in Morocco was upset by various factors such as the N+3 procedure, the delay in building project ownership by national counterparts, sometimes incomplete feasibility studies (infrastructure projects). As such, it would be useful to ensure ex-ante evaluations to ensure that pre-conditions are in place prior to the signature of financing agreements.

In lieu of ex-ante evaluations, project managers remain the key actors responsible for the implementation of a financing agreement – whether well designed or not. A frequently ignored aspects in several projects/programmes, is the importance of the inception phase. The end of the inception phase should result in an Inception report including an updated project design and/or terms of reference, as well as a work plan for the entire duration of the action.

2.7. Quick scan occupied Palestinian territories




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- Brussels Central Office -



### Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Occupied Palestinian Territories 2009



oPt: ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	17	27.579.115,00
MED	2	6.825.000,00
ENPI	1	4.438.988,00
TWINNING	0	0
SPSP	0	0
Ex-post	1	213.109,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>39.056.212,00</b>

## 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

The quick scans will be used as supporting documentation for the meeting of ENPI country Heads of Delegations on March 11 2010.

It is understood that the interest in ROM figures by country stems from the annual ROM presentation on 28 January 2010 presenting the 2009 ROM achievements (please refer to the minutes of this meeting for more information).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes.

In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

## 2. Approach

The series of quickscans which follow are based on a similar blend of qualitative and quantitative data:

- Quantitative:
  - o the ROM scoring found in monitoring reports
  - o the ROM scoring found in background conclusion sheets
- Qualitative:
  - o the ROM key observations found in monitoring reports
  - o inhouse knowledge of team leaders and mission leaders

## 3. Reminder: ROM scoring

ROM scores	From	To
A (very good)	3.51	4.00
B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

#### 4. General review

Two ROM missions were carried out in 2009 (one in March, and a second in November) covering a total of 21 projects. One of the 21 projects was ex-post and, given the different performance of closed as compared to ongoing projects, it is not methodologically sound that these scores be included in the quantitative analysis of the sample.

Please refer to the country scoring list in annex for a detailed overview of the projects monitored.

Summary of conclusions	oPt 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	20	132
Relevance/quality of design	2.88	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.82	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.78	2.72
Impact prospects	2.76	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.74	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.79</b>

In 2009, the portfolio of projects monitored performed overall above the 2.51 cut off between problematic and good (please see above reminder table of scores).

On average, the oPt projects performed on par (2.79) with the national projects in the ENPI South region. Half of the projects monitored were good or very good in each of the 5 ROM criteria (Relevance/quality of design, Efficiency of implementation, Effectiveness, Impact prospects and potential Sustainability). 6 projects presented a mixed picture, while 4 of the projects were problematic throughout, from design through implementation to sustainability. These are:

- Poverty Reduction through enhancing capabilities of women in Gaza Strip;
- Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation in the Middle East;
- Development of an Architectural Heritage Preservation Institute;
- Infrastructure Facility 2005 - Roads - Jenin, Tulkarem, Qarawat, Bani Hassan, Beit Sahour Surda.

**Every project** was deemed by the monitors to be of **high or very high relevance**, but 40% of the projects presented design or intervention logic problems. Although some design problems may be due to a need to revise the formulation of objectives and indicators during project implementation, the fundamental weaknesses remain at the appraisal and design phases of the project cycle, prior to contract signature. It is apparent that the reasons for weak intervention logic and for weak implementation of activities ought to be further looked into.

Despite a difficult environment, Efficiency of implementation was higher for oPt than for the ENPI National projects. Having said this, projects monitored in oPt in 2009 did however demonstrate difficulties in implementation of activities.

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\* Ongoing projects

Efficiency of implementation to date	oPt 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects+
How well is the Availability/Usage of means/inputs managed?	2.70	2.65
How well is the implementation of activities managed?	2.55	2.73
How well are outputs achieved?	2.95	2.70
How well is the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	2.95	2.79
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.82</b>	<b>2.72</b>

Higher than average efficiency is attributable to better achievement of outputs, ostensibly as a consequence of higher partner contribution and involvement, as may be expected for NGO projects. However, it must be borne in mind that 30% of projects experienced problems with inputs, and 40% have problems with implementation of activities.

Potential sustainability is also worth a closer look. While overall, it would appear that the projects monitored in 2009 in oPt perform approximately as the rest of the ENPI South portfolio, a look at the sub-criteria reveals a different picture.

Potential sustainability	oPt 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects
Financial / economic viability?	2.60	2.61
What is the level of ownership of the project by target groups?	2.80	2.90
What is the level of policy support provided?	2.45	2.70
How well is the project contributing to institutional and management capacity?	3.15	2.86
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.74</b>	<b>2.76</b>

Indeed, policy support is seen as problematic in over half the projects monitored. This is strikingly low compared with the overall ENPI South average, and indicates that the projects are struggling in an adverse policy environment.

##### 5. Comparison over time

Summary of conclusions	oPt 2009 National projects*	oPt 2008 National projects*
Number of reports	20	14
Relevance/quality of design	2.88	2.56
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.82	2.87
Effectiveness to date	2.78	2.89
Impact prospects	2.76	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.74	3.00

\* Ongoing projects

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Occupied Palestinian Territories 2009

<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.83</b>
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The average score, from 2008 to 2009, shows a drop in all ROM criteria, apart from Relevance / Design which considerably increases.

However, as the number of and actual projects in the portfolio vary from year to year, any analysis comparing year on year performance of such a small sample would be misleading. The table above comparing average ROM performance between 2008 and 2009 is presented for informational purposes only.

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Occupied Palestinian Territories 2009

## 6. Sector review

The portfolio of 20 projects monitored in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is characterised by a large proportion of Grant Projects, 17, which cover a wide range of sectors. Of these grant projects, 1 concerns health care, 5 concern government and civil society, 2 concern conflict prevention, 6 concern social infrastructure and services, 2 are agricultural and 1 is to do with industry. Of the remaining projects, 2 are Infrastructure Facility projects (roads + water) and 1 is services (judicial system).

Project Title	Budget	End date
<b>Government And Civil Society</b>		
Bridging Gaps - Security Forces & Journalist Rights	159.968	15/6/2010
Sustaining And Enhancing Comprehensive, Community-Based Service Delivery To Victims Of Torture And Politically Motivated Violence Living In The North And South Of The West Bank	1.199.874	1//1/2012
Utilizing And Activating Media For Promoting And Spreading Children's Rights	187.026	24/12/2009
Poverty Reduction Through Enhancing Capabilites Of The Women In The Southern Area Of Gaza Strip	174.066	30/9/2010
Seyada II - Empowering The Palestinian Judicial System	4.432.988	3//8/2012
<b>Basic Health Care</b>		
Mental Health And Psychosocial Services Support	3.400.000	30/6/2011
<b>Conflict Prevention and resolution</b>		
Our Voices: Refugee Youth Magazine	249.525	31/12/2011
Institute For Historical Justice And Reconciliation Middle East Project	267.463	5//4/2009
<b>Social Infrastructure And Services</b>		
Improving Access To Rehabilitation And Ability Development For Out-Of-Reach Persons With Disabilities, Elders And Patients In Jericho District And NW/E Jerusalem District In The West Bank	400.000	1//1/2011
The Palestine National Orchestra	48.681	1//1/2011
Population, Housing And Establishment Census - 2007 And Support To The Pcb's Statistical Program	1.000.000	11/3/2010
Improving The Quality Of Life Of Deaf And Other Marginalized People In The Gaza Strip	750.000	1//1/2010
Ramallah Contemporary Dance Festival	50.000	1//8/2009
Development Of An Architectural Heritage Preservation Institute	700.000	31/8/2010
<b>Agriculture</b>		
Promoting Olive Oil Production And Market Access For Small-Scale Olive Farmers	1.795.785	1//7/2010
Increasing Marketing Competitive Abilities For Palestinian Olive Oil	1.712.070	1//1/2011
<b>Industry</b>		
Emergency Support To The Private Sector In The West Bank, Gaza And East Jerusalem	14.500.000	7//12/2011
<b>Services</b>		
Community Based Development Programme In The Palestine Territories For The Palestinian Population	984.657	1//12/2010
<b>Infrastructure Facility</b>		
Infrastructure Facility 2005 - Water Projects In Beit Dajan And Furik, Kuffer Deek And Brinqu And Idhna	4.010.000	15/6/2009
Infrastructure Facility 2005 - Roads Project In Jenin, Tulkarem, Qarawat Bani Hassan, Beit Sahour, Surda	2.815.000	6//6/2009

It must be noted that certain projects cover more than one sector. For example, while the “Access To Rehabilitation and Ability Development” is ranked as a social infrastructure project, it is also clearly a health project.

#### **Government and Civil Society**

This sector provides half of the problematic projects in the oPt portfolio, which is a relatively high proportion. The “Victims of Torture” project stands out as a very well designed and managed project, with high impact prospects. The SEYADA II Judicial System project – the only service contract in this sector - has the biggest budget in this group of projects. The project is straining with a weak design, but is well managed and expected to achieve high impact.

#### **Basic Health Care**

The Mental Health Project was re-monitored in 2009. After detailed recommendations in the 2008 monitoring exercise to review the design, the project was found to have extensively reworked its intervention logic, with valuable support from ECTAO.

#### **Conflict Prevention and resolution**

The “Our Voices” project was monitored as good to very good throughout. Nevertheless, the ECTAO was reminded that for small projects support to prepare the logframe and training in project cycle management would be opportune. Also, systematic cooperation with the participants would help to overcome barriers to youth participation and to get a more structured and comprehensive feedback on project results. The “Institute for Historical Justice Project” stands out as problematic.

#### **Social Infrastructure and Services**

This is the sector with the most consistent and highest performance – 5 of the 6 projects are good throughout. Only the “National Orchestra” project shows weaknesses, with problems appearing at efficiency and effectiveness levels. Upon examination of the sub-criteria, it appears that the problems can be traced to “availability of inputs”, which was exacerbated as the co-funding did not materialise. Apart from this special case, it seems that “Social Infrastructure and Services is a successful sector.

#### **Agriculture**

Both of the agriculture projects are performing well. The recommendations pertain to scaling up impact and preparing the exit strategies.

#### **Industry**

This is by far the project with the highest budget. It is reported as a high performing project.

#### **Services**

The Community Based Development Programme is well perceived, however it shows severe problems with cross-cutting issues at the design level, and impact prospects are low.

#### **Infrastructure Facility**

This covers nearly € 7m. While the Water Project is generally perceived as very good, the roads project is problematic throughout all the criteria.

## 7. Findings & conclusion

Generally speaking, Monitors noted a weak capacity of the Governmental organisations for bilateral projects. The vast majority of grant projects monitored in 2009 in oPt were also all characterised by weak policy support.

More specifically:

### **Quality Support Group (QSG)**

The reasons for weak intervention logic and for weak implementation of activities ought to be further looked into. QSG inputs were available for only 2 of the 20 oPt projects monitored – the 2 olive oil projects. The reasons are that projects financed under the Infrastructure Facility Financing Agreement were initially signed in 2005, i.e. before the introduction of the QSG inputs, and projects run by NGOs were not submitted to QSG comments. In view of the recurrent observations on weak design, and the impracticality of altering design after contract signature, the EC services ought to look into instituting a type of QSG feedback procedure during the appraisal phase of NGO applications.

### **Capacity building**

The NGO reporting format was recurrently seen as being too activity-oriented and too long. In the Human Rights and Non-State Actors Calls for proposal, the monitoring team noted a deficiency in rigorous programme approach.

Following on from the above, project Cycle Management training ought to be foreseen for grant applicants, prior to contract signature.

### **Cross-cutting Issues**

While only 30% of projects mainstreamed environmental needs, up to 70% addressed good governance and 75% addressed human rights. Only half of the projects were deemed to have properly taken gender interests into account.

2.8. Quick scan Syria



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
# EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme

## for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

- Brussels Central Office -



# Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Syria 2009



Syria: ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	2	3.228.648
MED	8	103.139.890
ENPI	2	20.000.000
TWINNING	0	0
SPSP	0	0
EIB	4	11.693.838
Ex-post	3	19.893.461
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>157.955.837</b>

## 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes.

In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

## 2. Approach

The series of quickscans which follow are based on a similar blend of qualitative and quantitative data:

- Quantitative:
  - o the ROM scoring found in monitoring reports
  - o the ROM scoring found in background conclusion sheets
- Qualitative:
  - o the ROM key observations found in monitoring reports
  - o inhouse knowledge of team leaders and mission leaders

## 3. Reminder: ROM scoring

ROM scores	From	To
A (very good)	3.51	4.00
B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

#### 4. General Review

The ROM Syria-2009 portfolio was covered through two ROM missions in March-April 2009 and October 2009. The 2009 Syria ROM portfolio contains 19 projects, worth a total of €138,062,376. 3 of the 19 projects were monitored ex-post and, given their different performance as compared to ongoing projects, it is not methodologically sound that their scores be included in the quantitative analysis of the sample. Please refer to the country scoring list in annex for a detailed overview of the projects monitored.

In 2009, the overall portfolio of projects monitored performed above the 2.51 cut off between problematic and good (please see above reminder table of scores). In fact, overall performance stood at 2.95, well into the “good” area, and above the average ENPI South rate (2.79), thanks to all five specific criteria scoring higher than the respective figures for the ENPI South region.

Relevance/Quality of Design is the best scoring criterion (3.10), whereas Effectiveness is the lowest-scoring one (2.88). It is worth noting that along with Syria, Jordan, Israel, Tunisia and Yemen all demonstrate very good relevance as well, though sometime with mixed performance in other ROM criteria.

Summary of conclusions	Syria 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	16	132
Relevance/quality of design	3.10	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.91	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.88	2.72
Impact prospects	2.96	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.91	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>2.79</b>

Another interesting quantitative finding relates to the performance of the 2009 ROM portfolio as compared to the one a year earlier, in 2008 (see table below): the overall score of the projects monitored in 2009 (2.95) is higher than the respective 2008 figure (2.86). All of the five specific criteria score higher than the respective ones in 2008. This seems to reflect an enhanced ownership of projects by beneficiaries. However, the number of and actual projects in the portfolio vary from year to year. Indeed, in 2009, the good scores of TA projects linked to EIB loans have had an impact on the average scoring.

Summary of conclusions	Syria 2009 National projects*	Syria 2008 National projects*
Number of reports	16	11
Relevance/quality of design	3.10	2.99
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.91	2.84
Effectiveness to date	2.88	2.83
Impact prospects	2.96	2.83
Potential sustainability	2.91	2.82
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>2.86</b>

\* Ongoing projects

## 5. Sector review

With an estimated GDP per capita of US \$ 4 700, Syria remains the poorest country around the Mediterranean. In broad terms, EC assistance to Syria aims at supporting the country's integration in the global economy and to modernise the delivery of basic social services to the populations. An additional component of EC assistance goes to refugees from Palestine and Iraq established in Syria.

Projects monitored in 2009 fall in four main categories:

- Economic development, aimed at creating an adequate framework for the country's economic take off
- Reinforcement of institutions directly involved in poverty reduction
- Assistance to refugees
- TA linked to EIB financing

A list of projects is shown in the table below.

Projects/Programmes	EC contribution	End dates
<b>Economic development</b>		
QUALITY AND STANDARDS PROGRAMME (PRIORITY 2. INDUSTRIAL MODERNISATION)	12 000 000	27/12/2011
TA FOR SME SUPPORT PROGRAMME	10 139 890	30/06/2010
BANKING SECTOR SUPPORT PROGRAMME II	6 000 000	30/06/2009
TRADE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME (TEP)	15 000 000	31/12/2012
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SIMPLIFICATION PROGRAMME (BESP)	5 000 000	31/12/2012
<b>Institutional building, poverty reduction</b>		
HEALTH SECTOR MODERNISATION PROGRAMME	30 000 001	30/04/2010
STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF THE SYRIAN FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION (SFPA)	728 648	30/04/2011
UPGRADING THE HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR IN SYRIA	10 000 000	01/09/2011
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION MODERNISATION	18 000 000	31/12/2009
<b>Refugees</b>		
IMPROVING EMPLOYABILITY OF PALESTINE REFUGEES IN SYRIA	2 500 000	22/09/2010
WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION IN SUPPORT OF TWO PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS	8 000 000	30/06/2009
SPECIAL MEASURE TO SUPPORT SYRIA HEALTH SYSTEM COPING WITH THE LARGE INFLUX OF IRAQI REFUGEES	9 000 000	27/12/2010
<b>European Investment Bank</b>		
EIB - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE SMALL AND MEDIUM CREDIT FACILITY II	2 800 000	11/06/2011
EIB - SUPPORT TO THE PMU OF THE SYRIAN TELECOMMUNICATION ESTABLISHMENT	3 000 000	31/08/2011
EIB - DAMASCUS RURAL WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT - PMU	3 875 000	31/03/2012
EIB - DAMASCUS RURAL WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE	2 018 838	21/04/2010

**Economic development**

## Quick scan of EC funded projects Syria 2009

It is the Government's will to gradually integrate Syria into the global economy to boost economic growth. In this outlook, the Association Agreement with the EU is expected to be signed shortly. Syria also intends to join the WTO.

Syrian legislative and institutional structures were built under strong influence of the socialist block and therefore require thorough transformation. EU financed technical assistance projects bring an essential contribution to it. No budget support programme has yet been implemented in Syria.

Three among the five projects monitored in 2009 scored quite well, namely TA FOR SME SUPPORT PROGRAMME, TRADE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME (TEP), and BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SIMPLIFICATION PROGRAMME (BESP). It should be noted that these projects are hosted by the Syrian Enterprise Business Centre (SEBC). The SEBC was previously the Syrian European Business Centre, established thanks to EC funding. The experience and clout of the SEBC is important if not crucial to the success of projects in the area of economic development and corresponding legislative and institutional reforms.

The two other projects, which do not benefit from the support of the SEBC, namely the BANKING SECTOR SUPPORT PROGRAMME II and the QUALITY AND STANDARDS PROGRAMME, face more implementation difficulties. This is mainly because they aim at introducing substantial changes into Syrian legislation. Introducing changes into legislation and administrative working habits in Syria is a long and cumbersome process. In spite of a clear will from the government to modernise the country's economy, the resistance to changes from civil servants is often quite strong, affecting the efficiency and the effectiveness of TA. The design of these two projects was overly optimistic and assumed that commitment at government level would translate into collective support of the whole public administration. This assumption has not held true. Consequently, many outputs of the programmes are unlikely to be transformed into results.

### **Institutional building, poverty reduction**

Projects outcome in this sector are mixed. But here again it seems that efficiency is often impaired by bureaucratic hurdles. Project ownership is usually high at mid administrative level, and among beneficiaries outside the administration. But when a ministry is the beneficiary, overall programme leadership and decision-making is concentrated too high up within the hierarchy. Decision-making is not de-centralised and is generally slow. This is particularly true of the Ministry of Higher Education, where project stakeholders are fully committed to the project objectives and strategy. But project implementation suffers from the MoHE's centralized culture, compartmentalization of the sector institutions and weak involvement of the Steering committee. In contrast, the project supporting the Syrian Family Planning Association is clearly more efficient and effective, because its implementation does not depend on decisions by the administration.

### **Refugees**

The three projects bringing aid to refugees are of quite different nature and drawing common conclusions on their implementation would not be relevant.

One is clearly designed as an emergency support to Syria which faces a large influx of Iraqi refugees.

The two projects whose beneficiary is the UNRWA deal with long term Palestinian refugees. Both are nearing completion. Good results are expected from the project dealing with water and sanitation. The results of the other one, expected to raise the employability of Palestinian refugees, will be more difficult to assess.

### **European Investment Bank**

Four of the projects monitored in 2009 were linked to EIB financing. On average, they score better than other projects. This is not specific to Syria and can be attributed to several factors:

- projects' activities are usually pure TA. Their success is therefore assessed more in terms of outputs than of outcomes
- the timeframe of most projects linked to EIB loans bears less constraints: it is usually longer (5 years is common) and projects are not subject to strict implementation constraints such as the N + 3 rule for instance. The FEMIP imposes little time constraint on beneficiaries, thereby relieving the time pressure on efficiency
- the outcomes of the TA depend very little on decisions made by the local administration. They usually relate to the progress of works such as construction of sanitation or water supply facilities, and not to new legislation or changes in administrative practices.

That said, the scoring of the four projects is satisfactory.

## 6. Findings and Conclusions

After decades of isolation, the Government of Syria has decided to launch a series of reforms aimed at modernising the country. It has opened a dialogue with the EU and almost finalised the negotiation of an Association Agreement. This has resulted in a considerable increase of the aid flow from the EU. Other donors are becoming more active on the market: World Bank, Canada Aid, Dfid.

However, the government's capacity to implement rapidly sweeping reforms should not be overestimated. The Alaoui minority in power since the 1970's is too small (15% of total population) to take the risk of antagonising large segments of the population. Therefore, and in spite of its authoritarian image and of the centralised decision making processes widely in use, the government tends to prioritise consensus when dealing with reforms affecting civil society and administrative practices. For instance, the government has not yet implemented significant reforms of state-owned industries for fear of social unrest among employees. For similar reasons, the legislative process in Syria is long and cumbersome. Unless it is imposed by State authorities at the highest level, a new law will typically need two years to be passed. This has a direct impact on EU projects as follows:

1. Projects or components of projects which involve legislative changes and/or administrative restructuring are faced with delays and difficulties which impact negatively on their efficiency and effectiveness. This is for instance the case of the HEALTH SECTOR MODERNISATION PROGRAMME and of the QUALITY AND STANDARDS PROGRAMME. In spite of the government's will to modernise regulations and administration practices, administrative officers often take very conservative attitudes and block reforms. Implementing the government's official policy would require a radical change of attitude from the Syrian administration, especially through actual de-centralisation of the decision making process. Given the commitment to modernisation expressed by the government, there is no reason at this stage to doubt that such reform in the management of public administration will happen. But it is likely to take more time than expected, thereby jeopardizing the impact of several programmes.
2. One consequence is also the difficulty to raise programme ownership among Syrian high and medium ranking civil servants. Few of them want to take the risk of taking a leading role in reforming the country. Programme implementation arrangements are parallel, albeit in many cases with long term experts embedded in the administrations.
3. Another risk linked to the slow pace of reforms is that people trained under EU programmes may leave their institutions and find jobs in other government bodies or in the private sector. This would benefit the Syrian economy in general, but would have a negative direct impact on the programme.

In spite of the above, EU cooperation with Syria is likely to yield quite positive results, even if sometimes at a lower pace than expected. Some flexibility should be introduced in logframes, so that project mechanisms and expected results could be adapted, and consensuses with stakeholders be reached on implementation timeframes.

Also, because the volume of TA to be delivered is large, delivery mechanisms and absorption capacity by beneficiary institutions may become areas of concern, especially if more donors become involved in supporting Syria's reforms. This is true for instance of the Trade Enhancement Programme. Designers of future projects should ensure that beneficiary institutions have the capacity to absorb the foreseen TA and training services.

2.9. Quick scan Tunisia



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## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

- Brussels Central Office -



### Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Tunisia 2009

Tunisia: ROM 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	1	375.000,00
MED	1	50.000.000,00
ENPI	1	30.000.000,00
TWINNING	2	2.250.000,00
EIB	5	26.611.950,00
SPSP	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>109.236.950,00</b>

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While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information should not be over estimated. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management. Findings of ROM then evolve over time according to management and environmental changes.

In light of this, it should be borne in mind that ROM has limits when it comes to acting as a source of country level information.

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B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

#### 4. General review

The portfolio of projects monitored in Tunisia in 2009 and 2008 is small. As such, the aggregate statistics result from the good/bad performance of individual projects, and cannot be considered as a trend.

Also, five out of ten projects are linked to EIB financing, either through interest subsidies or technical assistance. Consequently the EU Delegation does not follow them up as closely as other projects which are under its direct and sole responsibility.

Summary of conclusions	Tunisia 2009 National projects*	ENPI 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	10	132
Relevance/quality of design	3.05	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.57	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.50	2.72
Impact prospects	2.88	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.97	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.79</b>

In 2009, the portfolio of projects monitored performed on average above the 2.51 cut off between problematic and good (please see above reminder table of scores). All ROM criteria assessing performance also performed above the cut off point with the exception of Effectiveness to date – in other words, the extent to which results are achieved (i.e. beneficiary access or use) and how this determines the achievement of the project's objective is seen as problematic.

Effectiveness to date	Tunisia 2009 National projects*	ENPI 2009 National projects*
How well is the project achieving its planned results?	2.40	2.67
As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the PP to be achieved?	2.60	2.77
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.50</b>	<b>2.72</b>

A look at the details of how effectiveness is assessed reveals that there are particularly problems with the achievement of results. Effectiveness is the key point where the joint implementation and sharing of responsibility between the stakeholders becomes obvious.

Taking a step back and having a look at the Efficiency of implementation to date, will help us to understand what has happened down stream:

Efficiency of implementation to date	Tunisia 2009 National projects*	ENPI 2009 National projects*
How well is the Availability/Usage of means/inputs managed?	2.70	2.65

\* Ongoing projects

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Tunisia 2009

How well is the implementation of activities managed?	2.80	2.73
How well are outputs achieved?	2.40	2.70
How well is the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	2.50	2.79
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.57</b>	<b>2.72</b>

The pattern followed by Tunisia is unusual compared with the performance of the ENPI South portfolio in general. As said above this derives to a large extend from the fact that half of the projects monitored in Tunisia in 2009 are related to EIB financing and therefore are not followed up by the EUD as closely as others.

Projects monitored in Tunisia in 2009, suffered from problematic achievement of outputs and of partner contribution – which would explain problems downstream in Effectiveness. Again this is due to a large extent to the negative impact of four projects related to EIB loans. Be interest subsidies or TA, the implementation of EIB financed projects takes usually a long time. TA linked to these projects is financed under EC rules, which impose a very strict timeframe. As a result, several projects have not yet produced inputs two years after their start-up date, leading to low efficiency and effectiveness rating.

These issues do not jeopardize the expected impact and sustainability of the projects outright, explaining why they are rated above the average for the ENPI South portfolio in general.

Summary of conclusions	Tunisia 2009 National projects*	Tunisia 2008 National projects*
Number of reports	10	6
Relevance/quality of design	3.05	2.95
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.57	2.67
Effectiveness to date	2.50	2.91
Impact prospects	2.88	2.89
Potential sustainability	2.97	3.35
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.95</b>

\* Ongoing projects

## 5. Sector review

It should first be mentioned that none of the SPSPs currently being implemented in Tunisia was monitored in 2009. Also, of the ten projects which were monitored, five were related to EIB loans (two interest subsidies and three TA). Consequently, the portfolio of projects monitored in 2009 does not provide a complete picture of the support brought to Tunisia by the EU.

Projects fall in four categories as shown on the following table.

SECTORS	EU contribution	End date
<b>Institutional Building</b>		
Développement du système d'informations statistiques sur les entreprises à l'Institut National de la Statistique	1 050 000	31/12/2009
Administration fiscale	1 200 000	31/3//2010
Programme d'appui à l'accord d'association et au plan d'action (PAAA II)	30 000 000	31/12/2011
<b>Social Development</b>		
Sport et handicap: pour une meilleure insertion des personnes handicapées en Tunisie	375 000	28/2//2011
<b>Private Sector Development</b>		
Programme de modernisation industrielle	50 000 000	31/3//2010
<b>EIB</b>		
Subvention - EIB - dépollution phosphogypse - bonification d'intérêts	11 500 000	31/12/2014
Subvention - EIB - bonification d'intérêts ONAS IV	10 000 000	15/10/2011
EIB - adaptation of financial products to worker's remittances in Tunisia	500 000	31/7//2010
EIB - ONAS - UGP	2 534 900	31/12/2013
EIB - assistance technique à la mise en place et au développement de 5 technopoles en Tunisie	2 087 550	11/10/10

Over the past years, one key sector of interest in the country was private sector support. Only one project now remains, which was positively assessed by the monitoring mission (see below). This reflects the fact that, with the help of the EC, Tunisia's industry has succeeded in reaching a level of competitiveness which enables Tunisian enterprises to thrive on EU markets. In January 2008, Tunisia was the first country from the southern rim of the Mediterranean to join the free trade zone of Europe. There is still scope for support to the private sector in Tunisia, but it now essentially has to do with improving the country's regulatory framework and public administration efficiency. The EU Delegation has therefore quite rightly oriented projects towards direct TA to administrations and official bodies, particularly through twinning projects within the framework of the PAAA. SPSPs are also good cooperation instruments for supporting the modernisation of the regulatory framework. In Tunisia, the MDCI (Ministère de la Coopération Internationale) effectively manages and coordinates donors' action. The government clearly the future of the country as closely linked to that of Europe and cleverly uses EU support.

Quick scan of EC funded projects  
Tunisia 2009

Half of the projects monitored in 2009 were linked to EIB financing. This definitely has an impact on scoring. The main reason is that the timeframe of EIB loans is very flexible, whereas that of EU aid projects is not. An extreme example is the interest subsidies project "bonification d'intérêts ONAS IV" whose implementation is foreseen over a period of 15 years. EU financed TA to projects financed by the EIB often starts and ends up too early, as in the case of "assistance technique à la mise en place et au développement de 5 technopoles en Tunisie", where TA arrived at a stage when most "technopoles" existed only on paper. In spite of an extension of one year, TA will leave when it would still be very much needed; the project scored well, but it could have scored even better with better implementation timing. Also, the EIB does not seem to have enough human resources to ensure a proper following-up of TA projects.

Only one project, of limited size and scope, was monitored in the social sector. It scored rather favourably.

## 6. Findings & conclusion

To be able to bring a significant overview of EU's support to Tunisia, monitoring should also cover SPSPs. This is likely to become more and more true with the increasing recourse to budget support instruments in development aid. SPSPs are probably well adapted to a country like Tunisia, with a well structured administration – even if still in need of modernisation –, and good Public Finance Management practices.

As the EIB is quite active in Tunisia, more TA projects linked to EIB loans are likely to be launched. There efficiency and effectiveness could probably be improved through a better coordination between the EIB, the beneficiaries and the EU Delegation. The TA implementation time schedule should be based on a realistic assessment of the implementation schedule of EIB financed infrastructure projects. The EIB should realise that in most cases a better planned TA could be more efficient, thereby increasing the effectiveness of EU funding.

## 7. Case study

### **10217.06- " PROGRAMME DE MODERNISATION INDUSTRIELLE", Tunisia, Decision n. 4726**

Ref. No with sequence	Budget	PM location	Response Sheet	Report date	Design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
MR-10217.06	50.000.000	ECD Tunisia	1	15/06/2009	B	B	B	B	B

Among all the projects monitored in Tunisia in 2009, the "Programme de modernisation industrielle" represents a good example of success story. Its good scores show this positive trend.

The overall objective of this project is to support the Tunisian Government in its economic and social development. This objective has been fully achieved. In fact, the Tunisian economy has registered an improvement in the global economic market.

The project objectives are manifold: innovation, quality-metrology, industrial property and financing. However these objectives will always need permanent improvements over the time (e.g. modernisation of the enterprises, enhancing of the quality structures, etc.). The Tunisian Government has to achieve these objectives in order to be competitive in the international markets of the industrialised countries. However, the main problems of the project are related to the monopole of the central of experts and the delay in implementing some activities. This point is quite crucial: as the Tunisian industry is improving, the need of very good and specialised experts has become of major importance. However, the project registered an increase of actions in favour of the Tunisian enterprises, and an increase and improvement of the marketing, financing and quality. So far, 1350 Tunisian enterprises out of 5700 registered at the *Agence de Promotion Industrielle* have been concerned by this programme. In particular, the project contributed to the creation and enhancement of the quality structures, it also contributed to the normalisation, industrial property, financing and development of the Technical Centres.

Moreover, the financial organisations (Sotugar, BFPME) created under this programme, facilitate the Tunisian enterprises to have access to the financing (e.g. 750 projects have been financed by the BFPME and more than 400 only in 2009). Furthermore, this programme offered to the Tunisian enterprises a lot of tools in order to fully take part into the global market according to the Association Agreements. This aspect will strengthen the Tunisian enterprises to better face the concurrence and the global crisis.

Finally, this programme benefited from a big support from the Tunisian Government. In fact, all actions promoted by the PMI, actually have been achieved thanks to a lot of governmental financings (e.g. quality programme, creation and strengthen of the financing organisations, the Agency for the Industrial Promotion, the Technical Centres, etc). This aspect underlines the Government's will of guaranteeing a good sustainability for this project.

The project represents a good reference for future projects. The lessons learned under the PMI should be taken into account for future cooperation and development EC projects, especially in the private sector.

2.10. Quick scan Yemen



This Project is  
funded by the EU

## EU Results-Oriented Monitoring Programme for European Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries

- Brussels Central Office -



### Quick Scan of EC Funded Projects in Yemen 2009



Yemen: ROM Portfolio 2009		
Assistance type	Number of projects	Budget
Grant	1	2.000.000
MED	5	28.500.000
ENPI	0	0
FOOD	1	1.025.000
SPSP	0	0
Ex-post	2	2.365.610
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>33.896.610</b>

## 1. Origin of request and purpose

The series of country performance overviews (known as quick scans) for ENPI countries was requested by ROM task management in A1 (ENPI East ROM region) and A2 (ENPI South ROM region and overall ENPI ROM management).

While ROM is a good source of up to date project information, its use as a source of country information is limited. ROM provides aggregate information on the projects which are monitored a particular year. However, a significant proportion of EC external assistance (works, supplies, ECHO, budget support, as well as a number of projects) are not subject to ROM monitoring. Moreover, ROM is a rapid appreciation of the project results achieved to date serving as an independent support to project management.

## 2. Approach

The series of quickscans which follow are based on a similar blend of qualitative and quantitative data:

- Quantitative:
  - o the ROM scoring found in monitoring reports
  - o the ROM scoring found in background conclusion sheets
- Qualitative:
  - o the ROM key observations found in monitoring reports
  - o inhouse knowledge of team leaders and mission leaders

## 3. Reminder: ROM scoring

ROM scores	From	To
A (very good)	3.51	4.00
B (good)	2.51	3.51
C (problems)	1.51	2.51
D (serious deficiencies)	1.00	1.51

#### 4. General review

Yemen is a difficult country to operate in. Security is a major factor especially when monitors are travelling to project sites. The mission that took place in 2009 was postponed from 2008 for security reasons. Similarly, the 2009 mission has now been postponed to 2010 for security reasons.

The 2009 ROM mission was carefully designed and carried out in close coordination with the ECD in Sana'a, particularly with a view to security restrictions imposed on monitors. Approval was required for all travel outside of Sana'a (including flights to Aden), with the ECD taking care of arrangements with the Ministry of Interior/Tourism Police.

Nine (9) projects were monitored in Yemen in 2009, a rather small sample that does not allow one to draw solid aggregate conclusions. Furthermore, two out of the nine projects were ex-posts and, given their different performance as compared to ongoing projects, it is not methodologically sound that their scores be included in the quantitative analysis of the sample.

Please refer to the country scoring list in annex for a detailed overview of the projects monitored.

In 2009, the overall portfolio of projects monitored performed below the 2.51 cut off between problematic and good (please see above reminder table of scores). Furthermore, the average performance of the Yemen 2009 portfolio was below the average for national projects in the ENPI South region.

The most prominent deviation of the Yemen 2009 portfolio from the respective ENPI South scores relates to Efficiency. The best scoring indicator of the Yemen 2009 portfolio is Relevance/Quality of Design. Both shall be reviewed below in more detail.

Summary of conclusions	Yemen 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
Number of reports	7	132
Relevance/quality of design	2.83	2.92
Efficiency of implementation to date	2.08	2.72
Effectiveness to date	2.21	2.72
Impact prospects	2.34	2.81
Potential sustainability	2.27	2.76
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.35</b>	<b>2.79</b>

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\* Ongoing projects

Quick scan of EC Funded Projects  
Yemen 2009

The table below presents the sub-criteria of Efficiency - the lowest-scoring ROM criterion. From the table, it is clear that:

1. All the four sub-criteria are in the “problems” area (between 1.51 and 2.51) and are below the respective ENPI South scores;
2. The degree to which outputs are achieved is very low (1.86) and calls for attention.

Efficiency of implementation to date	Yemen 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
How well is the Availability/Usage of means/inputs managed?	2.14	2.65
How well is the implementation of activities managed?	2.14	2.73
How well are outputs achieved?	1.86	2.70
How well is the Partner Contribution/Involvement working?	2.29	2.79
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.08</b>	<b>2.72</b>

A close look at the sub-criteria presented below shows that the relatively high score on Relevance/Quality of Design can be attributed to the following factors:

1. In principle, the overall relevance of projects monitored in Yemen in 2009 is very high (3.57), notably higher than the ENPI South average (3.42).
2. At the same time, the other three sub-criteria that relate to the intervention logic and design score below the respective ENPI South rates.
3. A tentative conclusion to be considered is that, while a country as poor as Yemen is in need of substantial external assistance (as reflected in policy documents of the national government, the EC and interim implementing agencies), the modalities of intervention pose significant challenges.

Relevance & quality of design	Yemen 2009 National projects*	ENPI South 2009 National projects*
What is the present level of relevance of the project?	3.57	3.42
As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true?	2.43	2.58
Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	2.57	2.80
Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account?	2.57	2.88
<b>Average Score in Total</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>2.92</b>

\* Ongoing projects

## 5. Findings & conclusions

The 2009 ROM mission to Yemen brings in the added value of very useful insights, thanks to exchanges with the ECD and local stakeholders. Here are some of the key qualitative findings that deserve to be taken into consideration:

### Relevance/Quality of Design

- The EC is supporting highly relevant and significant projects, particularly in areas not covered by other donors.
- At the same time, there appears to be demand (on the part of the ECD) for a gradual shift towards SWAP and 'pooling funds' for Yemen.
- In some cases project design is not well-understood by beneficiaries, due to the complexity of components.

### Efficiency

- A major weakness relates to the limited management and absorption capacity of Ministries, with a direct bearing on efficiency.
- There have been cases of contractors underperforming as well (e.g. GOPA, GTZ).

### Effectiveness

- Monitors report that LogFrames either do not exist or are of a low quality or are not used at all. As a result, outputs are not integrated in the work programmes of implementing partners.
- This seems to confirm and explain the quantitative finding that the degree to which outputs are achieved is very low.

### Impact

- Impact is generally low, obviously as a function of limited effectiveness. Not least of all, there are too many vertical lines within ministries and no cross-fertilisation.
- At the same time, at least one project (Health Sector and Demography Support in Lahej) could serve as model for replication in the region.

### Sustainability

- Yemen is heavily donor dependent, including for many projects monitored in 2009.

## 6. Lessons Learned and Key Recommendations

- Project design should be carefully considered in the specific institutional context of Yemen
- Most beneficiaries, Ministries and NGOs alike, are in need of capacity building in relation to design and use of LogFrames, EC reporting and financial procedures.
- The ECD should oversee a policy of contractors delivering training courses to project partners on the design and use of LogFrames as "hand-holding" exercises on EC reporting and financial procedures.
- Experts need to be contracted as soon as possible and progressively, so that time is saved.
- Project partners should be encouraged to carry out regular reviews of their risk management plans, so that unplanned negative effects are mitigated and emerging delays are minimised.
- Project partners should regularly provide the ECD with comprehensive and detailed project progress reports.
- Project partners should be encouraged to establish a communication system ensuring a continuous flow of information between all stakeholders.
- There is room for ECD visibility to be further boosted.

## 7. Case study

### 10366.03 - "HEALTH SECTOR AND DEMOGRAPHY SUPPORT", Yemen, Decision n. 5973

Ref. No with sequence	Budget	PM location	Response Sheet	Report date	Design	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
MR-10366.03	8.000.000	ECD Yemen		13/03/2009	B	B	C	B	B

The **Overall Objective** (OO) of the Health Sector and Demography Support Programme (HSDS) is to: 'Contribute to the improvement of the health status of the population of Yemen, especially of the poorest segments (particular emphasis will be given to improve the access of women to health services).'

The **C** score under the *Effectiveness* criterion is mainly linked to a weak Technical Assistance (TA). All partners involved agreed that the improvements made by the HSDS were particularly due to a most committed technical assistance (TA) team. However, the TA Team has left Yemen in December 2008 and since then a decline in ability to follow up / to ensure technical collaboration of the line ministry has been observed by the Delegation. Moreover:

- The gender gap already discussed in prior ROM reporting remains. There is a clear OO and there are activities that also benefit women. Yet, in the structural analysis, women's participation in upgrading and planning capacity strengthening is weak.
- Under a letter of 1 February 2009, The Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP) has informed the ECD that it has stopped all activities in Taiz due to a lack of funding.

For all these reasons, especially concerning the gender gap, and to avoid similar problems in future projects, particular emphasis to improve the access of women to health services needs to be understood in a more comprehensive manner. Women are completely under-represented at the core decision-making level of the governorate, this being the Health Development Councils (HDC). A quota system reserving 30% of all seats on the HDC for women representatives should therefore be implemented in order to fulfil the OO of the Programme.

Furthermore, The MoPHP should continue its valuable support to HSDS and strengthen comprehensive monitoring, evaluation, reporting and day-to day management at the central level. The programme is understaffed there, at the moment.

Finally, an agreement has to be made between the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Civil Service (MCS) so as to regularize the posts being created under HSDS. Otherwise the programme will be considered supplementary and additional, and therefore vulnerable in the national budget context.