**Joint Implementation with the EU Practitioners' Network:
Lessons Learnt and Good Practices**

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This study was produced with the financial support of the European Union and the Practitioners' Network. Its content is the sole responsibility of the consultant and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the Practitioners' Network or its members.

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Executive Summary

In September 2018, the European Union (EU) and the Practitioners' Network commissioned a short study on joint implementation to identify added value and good practices from projects implemented jointly by the EU and the Practitioners' Network members. Six case studies are presented: two regional projects and the remaining four are implemented in Cambodia, Morocco, Senegal and Togo.

Joint implementation is a tool for development effectiveness because it reduces transaction costs for partner governments, enhances trust and builds relationships. It also improves the quality of programming, by mobilising a wider array of technical resources and methodological approaches. Critically, joint implementation often uncovers solutions that were difficult to identify amongst the many silos that define the cooperation landscape. It thus measurably improves analysis and lessons learnt by facilitating greater knowledge sharing and giving access to a wider variety of expertise.

Joint implementation is at the heart of the New European Consensus on Development (2017), calling the EU and its Member States to seek to support partner countries through joint implementation. Joint implementation is a way of promoting more coherent, effective and coordinated EU support based on shared objectives.

The PN mobilises local networks, often overlooked in programming cooperation, something that happens at the national level and only in formalised settings. Good practices in joint implementation, for example, highlighted the rich networks that can be mobilised, including peer-to-peer relationships between public officials, standing relationships with legislatures and oversight organisations, alumni networks, historically strong and deep networks with communities, local and regional governments and trusted partnerships with civil society and academia.

Joint implementation can also reduce the costs of implementation for donors by harmonising human resource systems (e.g. per diem rates and salary scales) in partner countries, utilising joint monitoring, studies and evaluation in implementation and pooling visibility resources such as those related to joint project launches and related events. Most clearly, by pooling resources for joint procurement, economies of scale are achieved.

The case studies show that joint implementation has often proven to be a critical driver of joint programming. On one hand, it quickly becomes a visible example of what is to be achieved in joint programming. On the other hand, joint implementation serves as corner stone or vital early building block for Joint Programming. In this regard, joint implementation makes information accessible and embeds knowhow into the institutional memories of participating partners at little or no extra cost; it therefore lowers the cost of entry into a sector for donors.

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Context

In July 2018, the European Union - specifically the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) - and the Practitioners' Network (PN) agreed to jointly finance a 42 day study to capture the added value of joint implementation activities between European partners, as well as their good practice attributes. Six case studies were selected from a list of over 50 joint implementation initiatives, implemented by PN members and the Commission: EuroSocial+ (ES) (pilot case study), Partnership for Accountability and Transparency in Cambodia (C), Lomé Electricity Network PEREL (T), Develop the employment of Senegal (S), Vocational Training in Morocco (M) and EuroClima (EC).

Based on the pilot case study, the below eight areas of interest were retained from the original Terms of Reference. The other areas (e.g. result-orientation, public sector expertise and use of country systems), were excluded from further analysis due to lack of evidence of addition impact from joint activity.

1. Sovereign demand-oriented approach, in the interests of partner country governments

This criterion should assess whether/how a demand-oriented approach influences joint implementation (JI) between the EU and Member States, or vice versa; how JI enhances demand orientation. For example, partner countries may prefer JI because it offers the best of different approaches or a catalogue of different areas of expertise.

2. Impact of JI on partner-ownership and sustainability

This criterion should assess whether JI approaches encourage more ownership from the partner country and therefore more sustainability than bilateral cooperation.

3. Relevance of JI for political and policy dialogue processes, with a specific emphasis on sector policy impact and leverage

This criterion should assess whether JI enhances political and policy dialogue with the partner country and if not, what the obstacles are. Does JI enhance European leverage? For example, the EU and its Member States working together could extend the scope of the policy dialogue and provide an influencing power on the partner country with regard to approaches/policies, where working bilaterally would not be powerful enough.

4. Aspects of South-South or Triangular cooperation

This criterion takes stock of any south-south/ triangular cooperation elements in JI activity. Does JI make South-South or Triangular cooperation more effective?

5. Efficiency of JI in terms of resources, both financial and human, including reduced transaction costs

This criterion should assess whether JI, as opposed to having carried out the project bilaterally, provides better value for money. For example, project savings could be made on scoping and design costs with one partner taking the lead, common office space, carrying out joint political dialogues instead of bilateral ones, monitoring & evaluation or communication

& visibility. More widely, JI could enhance information and coordination outside the project in the sector concerned or in related areas.

If evidence is available, practical details on how coordination is maximised, and duplication avoided would be useful. As an example, the PN members have agreed to a *Partnership Template* for every joint implementation project between them. This reduces the negotiations, i.e. the governance structure and consequently the transaction costs of future joint projects between PN members.

6. Innovative approaches that resulted from delivering together

This criterion should assess whether innovative approaches resulted through JI, from an exposure to other ways of doing things. For example, JI may enable brainstorming and stimulate solutions which may not have been found bilaterally, as actors were only basing their reasoning on their own experiences.

7. Link between JI and the Joint Programming (JP) process

This criterion should describe any links of JI with the JP process: if a JP process is ongoing, did it stimulate JI? Has JI contributed to a shared understanding on country level, to a joined-up analysis or to laying the foundation for JP?

8. Visibility

Under this criterion visibility aspects should be summarised; both the visibility of the European group as well as the visibility of each intervening Member State individually.

The study is not an evaluation nor a review and was constrained by resource; with four working days allocated to each case study (two for the literature review, one for the questionnaire and interview and the remaining one day for drafting the case study and incorporating comments). As such, it serves as a basis for further exploration by the Practitioners' Network members and the Commission.

Working jointly with the EU and its Member States and their agencies is a foreign policy priority set out in the **2016 EU Global Strategy**: "From Vision to Action: We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent way. To fulfil our goals, we must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union."

Joint implementation is also at the heart of the **New European Consensus on Development 2017**. "The EU and its Member States will also seek to support partner countries through joint implementation, whenever appropriate. Joint implementation is a way of promoting more coherent, effective and coordinated EU support based on shared objectives in selected sectors or […] themes, tailored to country contexts."

Joint implementation is cited as good practice in development effectiveness literature. The New Consensus calls on the EU and its Member State agencies to work together to deliver development initiatives. Through this, the New Consensus is referring to the 'supply side' of development effectiveness and using a joined-up approach to get the principles in place for effective development cooperation even before projects are designed and implementation has begun.

As most of the case studies are endeavours designed and implemented before joint implementation became an objective, the value that emerges from working more closely together often comes as a surprise to the partners and is rarely something predicted in the design phase. Partnerships often deliver unexpected results that, when successful, surpass the original motivations for the partnership. For example, the idea that one should work unilaterally unless there is a solid business case for a joined-up approach neglects to take account of unexpected opportunities. In cooperation, where activities happen in rapidly changing contexts, failing to get positioned to take advantage of unexpected opportunities or to mitigate unexpected challenges is short-sighted at best. The point of a partnership is not to deliver on what we think is possible but rather to imagine what is possible to achieve together that is inconceivable to do on one's own.

Approach

The case studies started with a desk review of project documents, followed by a questionnaire to project representatives that focused on capturing the perceived added value. The questionnaire was complemented with telephone interviews. The eight themes identified form the key findings of this exercise and the structure of this brief report.

1 and 2. Sovereign Demand, Ownership and Sustainability

The first criterion assessed whether a demand-oriented approach influenced joint implementation, i.e. whether partner countries were requesting or were attracted to a project with a combination of European partners. The second criterion considered the extent to which joint implementation enabled greater partner country ownership and therefore an increased likelihood of sustainability.

Sovereign demand or ownership is demonstrated by a project's alignment to the national policies of a partner country – an example of good practice in place with all the case studies.

Two projects were regional in nature (EuroSocial+ and EuroClima+) and focused on making global goods a reality at country level through regional approaches. These cases showed that sovereign demand is strengthened in concurrence with a regional approach that deploys **South-South peer pressure and peer-to-peer learning mechanisms**. By joining up, the projects were able to access deeper and more extensive networks which have in turn increased the incentives for partner countries to be more ambitious at a policy level. EuroSocial+ is an example of mobilising peer-to-peer learning and behind the scenes networks as an incentive for ambitious partner government decision makers who want to improve social cohesion.

A national development plan is always a mix of stated policy priorities, some of which the government wants and others that the government is only interested in pursuing if there are sufficient political incentives for government decision makers to act on. **Joint implementation combines relationship, technical and financial resources to increase the political incentives and corresponding likelihood that the partner government takes ownership**. This is particularly the case with priorities for which there may be sovereign demand, but insufficient political incentives to act on that demand other than through lip-service.

This study found that the way this works is counter-intuitive to many donors, because they tend to see demand and ownership through the structures that define their formal relationship with partner governments. In more than one case, it is surmised as a lack of ownership based on uneven dialogue between national ministries and donor officials. Their measure was based on the quality of dialogue in a designated sector coordination structure. The nature of Member State Organisations' engagement and relationships in-country are very different, formed by their respective networks at all levels, such as regional and local governments, extensive local/national civil society networks, alumni networks, peer-to-peer arrangements or through influential nationals living in the partner country. One donor official, for example, commented in late 2018: "in the sector group I chaired we were providing almost 1% of GDP but the minister was never available to meet me…. However, when it came to [peer learning] activities that typically do not cost more than EUR 40,000, the minister would tell me that whilst he was too busy to meet during office hours, I should come to his personal residence and discuss over breakfast."

Joint implementation with EU Member State agencies mobilises a greater number of institutional allies. Each European partner and its respective agencies have different networks within partner countries, which can be used in a complementary and coherent way: building coalitions with other influential national actors such as those in regional or local governments, in education institutions, civil society or even being part of a faction within a line ministry. The more these networks can be tapped into, the greater the potential that sovereign demand for reform can be increased.

3. Relevance for Political and Policy Dialogue

This criterion assessed whether joint implementation enhances political and policy dialogue with the partner country and if not, considered the obstacles to it. It reflects upon whether joint implementation enhances European leverage.

The case studies show that across the board, joint implementation has provided opportunities to improve the European leverage and coherence in political and policy dialogue. In some cases, this leverage has been used to great effect. In Cambodia and Togo, joint implementation demonstrated how the EU, its Member States and the partner country had a shared understanding of the importance of donor-partner country-society dialogue. In the case of Togo this resulted in empowering the government to take the lead in establishing an effective sector coordination structure. In Cambodia, the joint implementation approach worked directly with the legislature and other independent oversight institutions in partnership with local civil society, to complementing dialogue with the line ministry. The sharing of minds through joint implementation led to an approach whereby the European Union and the Member States were more visible. The evidence implies that, as should be expected, **when joint implementation is used, it increases the EU and its Member States' impact in dialogue, particularly at the sector level.**

Joint implementation that takes advantage of Member State agency networks (see sections above) has enabled the dialogue to be better targeted, greatly increasing leverage and visibility for the European group. For example, with EuroSocial+ the use of peer-to-peer arrangements has demonstrated a *de facto* coalition of like-minded officials in Europe and Latin America who believe more can be done to improve social cohesion. This network allows the EU to reality-check and adjust messaging before raising sensitive issues in political and policy dialogue. Similarly, in Morocco the Member State agencies that had deeper networks at the local and regional levels were able to test messages and improve impact through speaking with one voice to complement dialogue at the national level.

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4. South-South or Triangular Cooperation

This criterion focused on South-South and Triangular cooperation elements and whether joint implementation makes South-South or Triangular cooperation more effective.

Only one of the case studies (EuroSocial+) explicitly uses South-South and Triangular cooperation as an engagement tool. EuroSocial+ is a good example of South-South and Triangular cooperation in that it fosters relations between Southern partners, and through EU financing pays for the logistical costs related to transfer of knowhow between Southern partners. There is evidence that such an approach yields significant benefits. Nevertheless, several of the case studies elicited some understanding that there are opportunities to expand the project's influence using such approaches.

5. Efficiency of Joint Implementation

This criterion assessed whether there was evidence that joint implementation is more cost effective and offers better value for money through savings on scoping and design costs (with one partner taking the lead), common programme office space, carrying out joint policy dialogues instead of bilateral ones, and joint efforts on monitoring & evaluation or communication & visibility.

A clear advantage of joint implementation is that when procurement exercises are merged, economy of scale benefits can accrue in terms of attracting fiercer competition for tenders. At the same time, economy of scale is achieved through reducing the inherent administrative cost of running multiple procurement processes.

There is the possibility of utilising the most adequate procurement mechanism available within the consortium of agencies delivering a joint implementation programme. Evidence suggests that depending on geography or context, some agencies have more flexible procurement processes that can strengthen the execution of the programme. Being able to draw on the most effective procurement process from within the consortium could enhance overall effectiveness of joint implementation on the ground.

Several projects pointed to the potential cost savings through establishing shared offices. More commonly, visibility costs were reduced through doing joint project launches, joint events and through joint outreach and consultations. To fully take advantage of these benefits, greater mutual reliance is required and needs to be steadily institutionalised.

There are also signs that the quality of deliverables is improved through exchange of experiences, knowhow and lessons learnt in design and implementation. This becomes clear, for example, when designing a project or conducting a scoping/feasibility exercise where participating Member State agencies pool expertise as a joined means to resolving a bigger developmental challenge (as is the objective of all the case studies covered).

A common misunderstanding pertains to contract management. In some cases, donor officials highlighted the management of multiple contracts as a transaction cost. But, if the EU had signed a PAGoDA Co-delegation contract or a contract with one Member State Agency who then sub-granted or sub-contracted to the participating agencies, this would not be a transaction cost saving. It would simply transfer the transaction cost of managing contacts from the EU to the lead agency. Transaction costs are not reduced by sub-contracting tedious work to a third party.

Most problematically, the 7% overhead costs related to EU financing overshadow discussions on joint implementation. Of course, this only relates to the EU's contribution to all forms of financial joint implementation that include Delegation Agreements and is not a factor related to co-financing by others.

Much of the added value of joint implementation is lost in maintaining an 'intellectual/knowledge' firewall amongst the EU Member State agencies themselves, and between the EU Member State agencies and the EU. This barrier is conceived from a theoretical understanding that programming and implementation are separate and disconnected activities, something this is largely untrue when it comes to the Member State agencies. The analysis uncovered significant resistance to taking advantage of Member State agencies' knowhow and networks in project design and in policy dialogue: much of this resistance related to fears of potential conflict of interest. Joint implementation gives access to much larger networks and pools intelligence and analysis on what is achievable in cooperation. To take advantage of these networks, the knowledge of implementers should be fed into the programming cycle and the strategic dialogue, whether that be within the EU family on country strategies or at partner country level in sector working groups. In this regard, fear of potential improper influence is directly undermining the capacity of the EU and its Member States to project itself as an influential cooperation partner at country level. The answer to this is to separate out dialogue and consultation on content from that of contracting: where there is ongoing work on analysis and strategy the EU and its Member States should be open to as many like-minded partners as possible. It is only when it comes to direct procurement processes that agencies should be kept at arms-length.

6. Innovative approaches that resulted from delivering together

The projects were asked to report on innovative approaches that resulted from working jointly. Many of the case studies used innovative approaches to implementing activities but this exercise focused on innovative approaches that explicitly derive from working jointly.

The most compelling example of innovative approaches is the fact that the EU Member States mobilise different networks than the EU may do alone, and this enables dialogue to be built and improves leverage in policy making processes. The example from Cambodia demonstrates the leverage that peer-to-peer exchanges between oversight institutions such as parliament and audit authorities can bring, to better position the EU as a driver of good public financial management practices, i.e. a wider perspective and range of analysis. Equally, EuroSocial+ provides good evidence as to how influence in policy processes can be cost-effectively sourced through peer-to-peer networks. Another example comes from Morocco whereby through working jointly with EU Member State agencies, the project improved its leverage through building coalitions with local and regional authorities and vocational training institutions in complementing national level policy dialogue.

Furthermore, innovative approaches are borne out of collaborative thinking between implementing agencies in the form of combinations and associations of individual approaches and methodologies. Some examples of such a model are found whenever activities between partners are complementary, thereby delivering fringe or collateral impact that would otherwise not have been part of the offer.

In the mind of the author of this study, the biggest innovation achieved through joint implementation is in recognising that ambitious cooperation is always about positively impacting policy making. This requires a strategic approach and cannot be easily achieved

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through traditional project approaches which often make insufficient use of deep and long-standing networks between EU Delegations, EU Member States, their agencies and local influencers who, if mobilised appropriately, can be instrumental in encouraging governments to make policy reform a reality.

7. Link between Joint Implementation and Joint Programming

This criterion reviewed the linkages between joint implementation and joint programming processes, and whether joint implementation contributed to better understanding of joint programming or vice versa.

There was no link between joint implementation and joint programming when it came to the regional programmes of EuroSocial+ and EuroClima+; however, this is understandable because regional joint programming processes do not currently exist.

Of the remaining projects, most were perceived as complementary, or in preparation to country specific joint programming processes. In terms of value add to joint programming, in all cases joint implementation has increased the incentives to agree a joint programme at country level. These incentives are increased practically in that ***joint implementation makes visible what it is possible to achieve through joint programming***. More importantly though, by implementing jointly, participating agencies have identified greater and more pressing challenges and opportunities that are better addressed jointly than bilaterally.

One finding worth paying significantly more attention to is the ‘intellectual/conceptual’ firewall that separates programming from implementation. In most cases, this divide is forced to avoid potential conflicts of interest, such as through an implementing partner lobbying for their issues in programming rather than allowing programming to focus on what is most strategic - the bigger programming vision of ensuring that the EU has leverage, influence and visibility on a global stage. In this regard, it is strongly advised to solicit the knowhow and influence of Member State agencies in developing the shared vision for joint programming at country levels. In a context where donors are increasingly competing against increasingly powerful emerging powers, the EU should summon as much institutional support and know-how from the field as possible.

8. Visibility

Projects were reviewed to assess the extent to which joint implementation impacted on visibility.

This is still a highly contested area and one in which conflict over arbitrary details often overshadows the big picture objectives. The big picture objective is that partner country officials look to the EU and its Member States as an ally and a source of support for positive policy reforms. If this visibility goal is realised, then the EU as a whole increases its leverage in partner countries. This objective is about joint project launches, joint study tours, joint analysis and joint dialogue, all of which convince partner countries that the desired reform is worth the risk because the entirety of the EU family lends their support. There are certainly examples where this objective is delivered, such as in the cases that oriented themselves to strengthening sector working groups and ensuring influence with the partner government in policy dialogue.

Critically, having Member State agencies jointly implementing sector reform programmes at scale under the European banner provides for greater coherence of development cooperation in the country, and by definition offers greater visibility for EU development efforts.

However, this objective is simply not shared by a sufficient number of officials from EU Member States and EU Member State implementing organisations. The case studies evidence a considerable amount of time and effort focused on formal visibility issues like using common business cards or agreeing to always give prominence to the EU logo. This latter issue is branding or advertising – whilst important, it is an administrative requirement. In joint programming this has been resolved in some cases through encouraging communications officers to work together and developing joint visibility strategies.

Visibility should focus on identifying the key interlocutors in the partner country, how relationships will be built with influential local elites to get the influence needed and which resources can be utilised by pooling the combined resources and networks of the EU family in service of the overarching priority that everybody in the sector should care about.

Concluding Observations

1. Joint implementation is about achieving more than the sum of the parts; **value is found when partners work jointly on defining a homogeneous theory of change based on the mutualisation of respective competencies and expertise.** If that rationale is not shared or actively sought, joint implementation becomes nothing more than a bouquet of contracts and a division of labour and geographies.

   If the EU and the Practitioners' Network are serious about joint implementation, it is recommended **to have a champion, whose job it is to make the joint approach work and convince participating partners of the shared vision**. Depending on the circumstances, this champion could be appointed within the project itself, be instilled as a role in a steering or management committee or even be a secretary/coordinator to a sector working group or coordination structure. That champion needs to demonstrate value to the partner government and diplomatic representations whilst also investing in conflict resolution amongst partners, so as to build 'the team' and ensure that the interests of the project itself have primacy over the interests of the implementing partners. Champions are only effective when they work on behalf of the shared ambitions and they are only credible when they do not demonstrate bias for any one agency or financier.

2. **Joint analysis and joint research** are where the Practitioners' Network can punt significantly above their weight. This is because the PN can build on their own existing evidence base to determine the best course of action and ensure that programming show-cases the know-how and technical expertise of the EU, its Member States and EU Member State implementing organisations as a competent and trustworthy partner. Evidence is only as valuable as the trust the audience has in the actor delivering the evidence. An underutilised yet key value is when the EU, its Member States and EU Member State development structures **communicate jointly on policy using evidence they support - they are seen as authoritative** because of the reputational standing of the respective EU Member State and their agencies in-country. A similar approach should be taken to **mainstreaming joint monitoring & evaluation, and programming activities,** recognising that the end goal is to influence positive policy change; something that is better achieved through demonstrating a consensus on the best way forward.

3. Joint dialogue that takes advantage of EU Member State agencies' social, economic, political, cultural and alumni networks is **a largely untapped resource, and a resource that is ripe to play a much bigger role in cooperation**. The EU and the Practitioners' Network would benefit from the development of **an influence mechanism[1] that leverages the members' joint resources/networks** so as to advance the EU's shared objectives in country.

   The PN should strategically use the array of networks that are available to impact partner governments' policies. The problem is that most PN organisations as well as the EU and its Member States tend to see cooperation as project design and implementation, and consistently undervalue the influence they have. Most of the cases evidence an overwhelming bias to technical aspects of delivery and almost no resources allocated to mobilising networks increase influence. Whilst many respondents inherently understood that relationships are much more important than the size of the financial envelope, the majority of respondents interviewed did not seem to have digested this possibility into their conceptual approach. An influence tool that could be institutionalised and thus applied in all project design and evaluation will go a long way to demonstrating the value that the agencies have when it comes to being able to mobilise relationships to create incentives for change.

4. The principle added value of joint implementation is that it **gives the EU access to much wider and deeper networks and information as well as know how: shared albeit at a marginal but additional cost**. This added value is not found if implementation is compartmentalised from dialogue and strategy. **EU Member State agencies need to be brought into the analysis work and tasked with adding value to it by contributing their perspective on what the country and sector context tells them about potential impact**. The EU Member States should reflect on the role of their agencies in the programming cycle.

5. The Practitioners' Network could develop **good practice principles and recommendations for joint implementation that clearly articulate practical** ideas that facilitate successful joint implementation. These should include establishing a **joint project office, closer alignment on local working conditions, working with the diplomatic representations on a joint visibility strategy (, having a clear role and commitment to contributing to development effectiveness in the sector (e.g. through strengthening the national sector coordination structure), adopting sector definitions that clearly align to the partner country's political and policy objectives and synchronising programming and dialogue with the partner country's project and political cycles.**

6. An associated issue is also that the PN network needs to do more to make the **case for joint implementation to its own members**. In this regard, it is worthwhile taking a real political perspective.

7. A risk to joint implementation is that it becomes just about dividing up existing resource amongst participating implementing organisations. There needs to be a hard-line discipline implemented on ensuring that joint implementation is **first and foremost**

[1] The concept of using joint implementation and taking advantage of the Member States agency networks as a means to influencing policy needs to be further developed and could be considered as a follow-on exercise.

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about setting ambitious programming objectives and looking at how the combined efforts/resources/networks of the Member States and their implementing organisations can help achieve these objectives. The roots to achieving this relate to points 1, 3 and 5 above. The big risk is that agencies approach projects with the goal of dividing the pie before considering the bigger picture objectives: if this is not checked, we risk not succeeding in effective and transparent joint implementation.

8. A risk to effectiveness in joint implementation is when there is no clear management or coordinating authority to ensure harmonisation amongst the Member State agencies. Governance and harmonisation are essential because there will always be times when hard decisions have to be made in order to to do things that are in the interest of the project but may not be in the interest of one organisation. When agencies speak with one voice, they are able to deliver key messages to government and do not undermine the confidence of partners in European expertise through competing views. At a bare minimum, to address this risk, it is advised to **ensure project steering committees at country level report in a transparent way on progress to the EU, its Member States, partner governments and beneficiary representatives (civil society, the local legislature and the private sector)**. The PN could work with the Commission on guidelines for project governance, including identifying the roles and responsibilities for key stakeholders within the Steering Committee.

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Case Study 1: EuroSocial+ Social Cohesion in Latin America

Introduction

EuroSocial+ is the third and latest iteration of a policy dialogue project in Latin America financed by the EU. The first version dates back to 2005; the current project implements a EUR 32 million grant on social cohesion through peer learning. The sharing of expertise and relationship building designed into these activities contribute to and enable policy dialogue between the officials of public institutions of the EU, EU Member States and Latin American countries. Through sharing knowhow, officials are better equipped to support and implement social cohesion minded reform processes in three policy areas: governance, social policy and gender.

Implementation Partnership

EuroSocial+ is jointly implemented by EU Member State agencies: International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP) of Spain, Expertise France (EF) of France and Instituto Internazionale Italo-Latino Americana (IILA) of Italy, and international organiation based in Italy. Whilst the grant is signed by FIIAPP, the project is co-implemented with IIFA and EF both of whom have dedicated staff supporting implementation.

This project relies heavily on trusted relationships between European and Latin American government officials that have been progressively built over generations. It is this legacy and these networks that ensure that Latin American officials confide with the agencies on sensitive social reforms, something that would not have been possible without access to the networks of multiple EU Member States in Latin America.

Project Analysis

Sovereign Demand Orientation[2]:

Whilst structural reforms pursued during the eighties and nineties in Latin America delivered economic growth, they equally exacerbated inequalities and fractured the social fabric of the region. Informants explained that some Latin American officials and intellectuals at the time, shared a sense of frustration with many European officials of the dominance of free market capitalism (without accordant social protections) as the proffered economic policy solution in international development cooperation. What emerged was an **alliance between European and Latin American officials** based on their shared political interests in protecting and advocating for economic growth models that deliver social cohesion.

The subject of social and economic cohesion is a constant at the EU-Latin American Heads of State summit which takes place every two years and an area which is an **EU success story**. 2004-2005 saw the biggest inequities in Latin America at that point in history, and social cohesion became a point of mutual interest and indeed the start of EuroSocial: "Civil servants on both sides considered social cohesion as a primary objective of the public service", explained a senior EuroSocial+ official.

[2] The dialogue with partner countries starts from the basis of their national agenda (combined with a look at the regional agenda); An interaction between institutions is established, is within this interaction that partner country institutions express their "demands", that is to say, priority policies for which it would be useful to have the support from Eurosocial Programme (i.e. the possibility to know similar experiences). Eurosocial Actions are designed based on /inspired by the above mentioned "demands" of the partner country institutions

Latin America wanted to broaden and deepen its learning about alternative economic models. The demand to understand the European model and the accordant interest by European officials in understanding how European models could deliver in emerging countries drove joint implementation of the project between the EU and multiple Member States.



Partner Ownership and Sustainability:
EuroSocial+ delivers partner ownership because it is **motivated by the interests and networks of appointed officials.** These officials measure success to the extent the project delivers value in their day-to-day work.

The decision on what specific activity to support is taken by the programme according to various criteria, combining methodology and operational criteria: citizens orientation; results orientation; the demand-driven policy in place; complementarity; intersectionality; balance between countries and policy areas; and decisions taken by the Coordination Committee. **Latin American and EU officials are on equal footing** for implementation and the justification for the choice is how the value of their respective experiences can contribute to a unique reform process. This means activities are negotiated context specific rather than ranked and operationalised. Ownership is demonstrated by the specific official advocating for the reform asking for support from EuroSocial+.

The EU and EU Member States is perceived as valuable because the EU has institutional knowhow about working together that mirrors the regional dimension of Latin America. Accessing this institutional knowhow is what makes the project and what it can offer in terms of skills and experience attractive, something that necessarily calls for a joined-up approach amongst EU Member State agencies.

Policy Dialogue Processes:
Amongst the **most important lessons** to be learned from EuroSocial+ is that the project is largely deemed valuable because it has created an enabling environment for meaningful dialogue. The partnership between the EU and Latin American countries has been nurtured because the **relationship is focused exclusively on sharing experiences and transfer of knowledge; j**oint implementation by EU partners enhances the content of these exchanges because it brings in a richer collection of knowledge resources. Joint implementation also enhances the soft power strength by working in collective.

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As Eurosocial+ is a project that is demand driven, aiming to modify public policies, the dialogue is not accompanied by discussions related to EU financing. It enables the partner governments' space to dialogue with the EU on **policy and aspirational plans** in direct contrast to dialogue on financing. Dialogue based on aspirations is typically more compelling and interesting to officials because it is potentially politically valuable. "In Costa Rica, the combined donor financing to education was 1% of GDP but the minister rarely had time to talk to donors about this…. On the contrary when we wanted to talk about EuroSocial which costs Euro 60,000 maximum, the minister would invite us to a breakfast meeting at his residence", explained one EU official.

Another important feature of EuroSocial+ that can be **accrued to it being jointly implemented by EU Member State organisations** is that the project **evolved and progressively improved with each iteration**. For example, since the beginning there have been concerns that the EuroSocial+ activities could fragment or distract from ongoing dialogue between EU Delegations and the partner governments. To address this risk, EuroSocial+ partners were required to proactively inform and involve EU Delegations of their activities. Moreover, since this project has included several European MS organisations under one contract, this has reduced considerably the risk of fragmentation as there is a contractual framework in which to exchange.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation:
EuroSocial+ is a good example of **South-South and Triangular** cooperation in that it fosters relations between Southern partners and that with the EU financing it pays for the logistical costs related to transfer of knowhow between Southern partners. The project has purportedly emboldened Latin American officials and enriched the work of EU officials. EuroSocial+ has institutionalised equal standing and a partnership of peers between the EU and Latin American officials that exchange knowhow. In fact, of the just over two thousand experts utilised in EuroSocial 2, more than half were Latin American experts. At the same time, EuroSocial+ strives to ensure that expertise be provided from all EU Member States to maintain the ethos of the project as being between the EU as a whole and participating Latin American countries.

Joint implementation in this context has enhanced South-South and triangular cooperation by bringing in a wider range of networks both in Latin America and in the EU. This has enlarged the pool of expertise, delivering a richer learning experience. In the case of EuroSocial+, triangular cooperation has encouraged Joint Implementation because of the need and desire to access information from wider networks.

Coordination and Efficiencies
The interviews yielded a sense that the project uniquely benefits from its joined approach, however, in terms of accurately measuring the efficiencies accrued from working jointly, it is difficult to quantify in terms of hard costs and benefits because what EuroSocial+ provides is unlikely to be provided by any other actor. The technical expertise delivered is, in some cases, pro bono with the only costs charge to the EU being the associated administrative, travel and logistical costs. The expertise is provided pro bono because of the relationships and good will established by the EuroSocial implementing partners over the past decade: the cost of building such an expansive

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relationship and convincing officials to give their time free of charge (on top of their regular day to day work) simply cannot be credibly calculated.

Innovative Approaches

EuroSocial+ applies a rigorous demand driven selection process whilst also sustaining a network of officials who are competing for support. There is a strong technical bias that ensures the proposed activity is results oriented and is a good return on investment. Indeed, the project activities (e.g. information and experience sharing) are inexpensive, while they are excellent means to build greater trust among institutions and as such contribute to making reform processes viable and worth the political capital required to implement them. EuroSocial+ supports activities that contribute to a high-profile reform, reforms that deliver measurable benefits to citizens. In the words of one senior respondent: "EuroSocial+ is demand driven: identification missions are conducted with relevant ministries but avoid supporting activities that are exclusively in the interest of the government in power at the time…. the problem needs to be politically relevant to the country and thus not partisan. It is always justified in pursuit of big policy or legislative improvements."[3]

The innovation with EuroSocial+ is that by mobilising the EU Member State agencies through Joint Implementation, the EU has secured access to much larger and deeper networks that has ensure the project is important to Latin American current as well as emerging decision makers.

Joint Implementation and Joint Programming

The 2018 **Joint Programming** Guidance explains that joint implementation requires development of a **shared vision** or "narrative on how like-minded partners should work together to address strategic issues and what results could be envisaged." EuroSocial is unique and a good practice because it is fundamentally built on a shared vision and narrative that is politically important to EU MS and Latin American decision makers.

Visibility and Communication

The **project continues to evolve** too. There are still opportunities to improve visibility in that the consortium partners are too often perceived by partners as being separate from the EU. Clearly there is a need to find a way for Latin America officials to better understand that EuroSocial+ is a project financed by the EU and implemented by EU Member State agencies.

Lessons Learnt

- Member States' networks and relationships (that exist alongside programming) can be used to build a dialogue amongst equals.
- When Member State agencies work jointly, they can demonstrate greater reach and ambition, and attract support for more ambitious priorities.
- The transfer of specialised technical knowledge from EU MS officials to partner country officials could be used to deepen and strengthen dialogue in partner country contexts. The desire for effective policy dialogue is a primary motivator for more European joint up action in the field. Accordingly, making use of means to improve

[3] Interview, Senior EU Official involved in design of the project and management of the EuroSocial+ contract.

policy dialogue (such as that of EuroSocial+) could be valuable to advancing JP in other contexts where policy dialogue is lacking.

- The changing global context and the priority to jointly deliver on Agenda 2030 means that good, long lasting and more credible partnerships of equals are required. EuroSocial+ demonstrates how a space for dialogue on aspirational policy objectives can be better enabled by separating such dialogue from grant making and lending.
- By encouraging MSOs to work jointly in this regard, they build these relationships as an EU grouping rather than for exclusively bilateral purposes…this enhances EU visibility and bilateral leverage.
- Designing a project that delivers activities that are politically relevant (like is the case with EuroSocial+) defies the typical problem identification-based approach. Instead of identifying problems and then designing a project to overcome these problems, a project that thinks and works politically must start with identifying where there is access to politically influential decision makers. Afterall, activities that are not directed at influencing decision makers are bound to be politically irrelevant. EuroSocial+ is a success because it started with the agencies and where they already have access to politically influential decision makers – the project activities, then, take advantage of these networks and pursue multiplier effects available through these special relationships.
- In reading, EuroSocial+ it is essential not to mis-categorize the return on investment. Policy dialogue ambitions are typically associated with budget support and access to partner countries' policy making processes are negotiated in return for tranches frequently exceeding hundreds of millions of Euros (especially when budget support is in partnership with other development partners.) EuroSocial+ delivers access to these same policy dialogue processes at a fraction of the price and it does so by making use of established networks and relationships that the implementing agencies have built over generations.

Case Study 2: Partnership for Accountability and Transparency in Cambodia



Introduction

The Partnership for Accountability and Transparency (PAT) in Cambodia is a EUR 10.63 million[4] project co-financed by the EU and Sweden to strengthen transparency in public financial management in Cambodia. The project complements an EU EUR 21 million budget support programme supporting public financial management reform in Cambodia; the budget support allocations and the EU's contribution to the partnership are financed from the same agreement with the Government of Cambodia. The goal of the project is to strengthen the enabling environment for Public Finance Management reforms in Cambodia through improving public accountability. This includes strengthening statistics, domestic resource mobilization, transparency and effectiveness of external audits, parliamentary oversight and enhanced public accountability through greater financial and public budgeting literacy.

Implementation Partnership

The decision by the EU and Sweden to jointly invest in the PAT is based on their long-standing commitment to public financial management reform in Cambodia. Based on lessons learned over the previous decade from a range of sector reforms and implementing partnerships with other cooperation partners (such as, the World Bank or the United Nations agencies), the EU and Sweden concluded that reforms must be addressed through strengthening capacity of the responsible line ministries but complemented with strengthening transparency and accountability. Whereas the public finance management reform was showing positive results on strengthening budget credibility, financial management and strengthening links between policy and budgeting, the reform was still behind schedule on developing transparency and accountability systems, as well as decentralizing financial management to line ministries. Public finance reform might influence the balance of power, enabling the role of the legislature and oversight institutions, as well as, citizens' engagement and creating an evidence base for policy decisions. In response to this, PAT mobilised existing working relationships with Swedish national entities to build a peer-to-peer based programming in support of statistics, which was complemented with new relations with tax and audit authorities. PAT also mobilised Transparency International under a grant arrangement to strengthen budget literacy amongst citizens and civil society, and to raise awareness of corruption and how to combat it.

[4] EUR 7.41 million is provided by the EU; the remaining EUR 3.24 million is from Sweden.

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Through PAT, a special component on budget analysis was also added to the on-going Swedish core-funding to the Cambodian NGO Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia, who's programme focuses on strengthening the research, analysis and outreach capacity of the legislature.

Project Analysis

Sovereign Demand Orientation

Programming support to public financial management reforms is impossible without national ownership because activities necessarily require ownership by and leadership from senior government officials. Strong ownership was a key motivator for funding the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PFMRP) in Cambodia (initially implemented through a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank). However, there were untapped opportunities to accelerate the reforms by broadening ownership to oversight institutions such as the parliament and National Audit Authority (NAA). The EU and Sweden realised that to go beyond ownership by national institutions and to include elected leaders and civil society, it needed to open complementary channels for dialogue with these constituencies.

Evaluations and reviews confirmed the EU and Sweden's assessment, that several weaknesses were located outside the remits of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF); and therefore, the reform would benefit from reaching out to other actors in society. Key areas included budget transparency, oversight and scrutiny of the national budget and its implementation. Additionally, the evaluations drew attention to important opportunities to improve the evidence base in monitoring and policy making such as regarding national statistics and internal revenue mobilization.

Capacity development in these new areas required a context specific intervention approach: the type of assistance provided is highly sensitive required diplomatic finesse and relationships of trust. Mistrust between the citizens and government is persistent when it comes to public budgeting. At the same time, many in the government are reluctant to engage with or confide in civil society, neither locally nor internationally. In this context, the EU investigated peer-to-peer capacity building approaches that could mitigate trust deficits and build a more conducive environment to work on sensitive reforms. Sweden had already reached this conclusion previously and was using its reputation and expertise to build impactful partnerships in taxation, oversight and other aspects of public financial management. The EU and Sweden, then, decided to join up their respective programming in the public financial management space and to construct a joint implementation arrangement.

Partner Ownership and Sustainability

Complementing a budget support programme with grants and capacity building of a wider range of Cambodian partners resulted in stronger national ownership. This wider ownership was achieved because activities were developed, carried out and led by the beneficiary government and oversight institutions. Another enabling factor for strong ownership was that civil society was able to direct the programming support to better align with their own organizational mandates because Sweden provided core funding (e.g. to Transparency International Cambodia), something which is procedurally difficult for the EU to do. Core funding enables civil society the confidence to adjust activities to the needs on the ground and to respond primarily to the organisations mandate, allowing for changing circumstances in a way that activity-based contracting which is pursued by the EU, does not encourage. Further, by involving Transparency International Cambodia intimately with the broader public finance reform objectives, a greater sense of shared purpose emerged between donors in the sector and civil society.



A notable achievement was that this improved relationship delivered a greater sense of common purpose. When the project started, only a quarter of budget documents were made available to the public in a timely manner, currently seven out of eight budget documents are publicly available, which illustrates greater budget transparency. This improvement is associated both with expanded and better-quality dialogue delivered by PAT and high level policy dialogue conveyed in the overarching Budget Support intervention.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation

The project reported no significant activities that used South-South or Triangular cooperation.

Policy Dialogue Processes

The joint implementation package (i.e. complementing the budget support with PAT) enhanced the depth and technical level of policy dialogue between the EU, Sweden and Cambodian Government. By working closely with parliament, revenue services, statistics and civil society, the EU and Sweden got greater access to internal meetings and discussions. The visibility of the EU and Sweden as champions of PFM reform increased with the EU's Head of Delegation, for example, playing a more visible role in the formal annual PFM coordination group (the EU was a development partner co-chair with the World Bank) meeting. The Ministry also agreed to invite Transparency International and the NGO Forum to join the PFM coordination group following requests by the EU and Sweden.



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Joint implementation is recognised by the EU and Sweden as improving the breadth and depth of policy dialogue whilst also reinforcing the authority of European voices in the sector. The EU is now consulted much earlier in PFM policy processes, with the Cambodian Government often consulting the EU prior to or alongside the Bretton Woods Institutions. Being invested *both* in PFM reform *and* in reform initiatives at a more technical level allows the EUD and Sweden to have more in-depth and specific knowledge, covering a wider range of topics which then can be discussed together with other government institutions. Because the EU and Sweden used joint implementation for greater information sharing and exchange, there is a clear sense that the capacity of the EU family to lead in the sector has been enhanced.

Coordination and Efficiencies

It is notable that most of the funding channelled through the PAT is for services provided by not-for-profit institutions or national public sector agencies, implying that any added value accrues to organizations working in Cambodia's public interest (rather than external shareholders). The investment in Transparency International Cambodia, for example, is an investment in a local advocacy institution. Any retained value (e.g. knowhow, institutional memory and expertise), then, resides in country and is likely deployed in line with the organisations mandate, thus representing a reduction in the proportion of funds that exit the sector through profit margins and transfers to shareholders.

At the outset it is also notable that the project was made possible through joint scoping, analysis and feasibility done by the EU and Sweden. By working together, the two financiers were able to deliver more comprehensive analysis for the same costs: indeed, the relevance of this programming is entirely due to the EU and Sweden working in complement with each other and in consideration of differing perspectives on how to address a common challenge.

By working together considerably more time was spent on negotiating and agreeing a common perspective and identifying a common evidence base to inform programming. The single biggest return in this case was the realization that were the EU and Sweden to sustain programming to the sector in the same way, there was a high risk of piece-meal impact and sustained unambitious policy dialogue. The type of preparatory activities carried out by the EU and Sweden are often wrongly categorised as transaction costs: more time was allocated to scoping and inception but this was only due to the realisation that were the EU and Sweden to proceed without all the facts and analysis at hand, the bigger financial investment (in the PAT) was more likely to be wasted. In this case, the EU and Sweden greatly benefited from investing more resources in analysis and scoping for new project initiatives. Whilst time consuming, the best return on investment is ensuring projects are properly contextualised. After all, the biggest transaction cost donors face is when analysis and design are rushed – this leads to programming not being relevant, having limited or detrimental impacts, under-estimating risk and overly relying on assumptions.

Innovative Approaches

More importantly **JI encouraged innovation in Cambodia** through enabling the EU and Sweden to do jointly what was unachievable bilaterally. The EU did not have easy access to the broader set of institutions and to the peer-to-peer cooperation modality which enabled quick and cost-effective access through existing relationships of trust. On the other hand, Sweden did not have the financial means to secure an influential role in the budget support policy dialogue, something it achieved through the partnership with the EU. The biggest added value to the sector writ large, however, accrued from partnering with influential Cambodian institutions (such as parliament) that are not easily involved through a traditional budget support approach.

Another innovation of PAT is that the comprehensive joint activities were made possible. An often-cited example relates to the joint visit to Stockholm by National Audit Authority (NAA) and the Senate to visit the Swedish National Audit Office and the Parliamentary Research Department, something the EU had access to and benefited from through its partnership with Sweden.

Another innovation relates to **visibility,** in that the EU's requirements on communication and visibility led Sweden to invest considerably more resources in communication and visibility, than in Sweden's standard policies and procedures. The focus by the EU and Sweden on advocating more budget transparency directly resulted in Sweden proposing additional communication activities for the PAT partners such as developing brochures and animated films in the form of cartoons explaining why citizens should pay taxes as well as the role and mandate of NAA. In consulting with the Cambodian Government on these communication and visibility activities the EU and Sweden manged to deliver the unexpected result of convincing the government to include some of these activities in the PFM action plan, something that is regularly monitored and reported on by the government.

Joint Implementation and Joint Programming

In Cambodia, a **Joint Programming (JP)** process was initiated in 2012: the close cooperation between European partners in designing the joint programming strategy and in pooling analysis directly contributed to the acknowledgement of shared interests by the EU and Sweden in the PFM sector. This led to the JP strategy explicitly committing to mobilise domestic resources, strengthen institutional capacity and governance of public and oversight institutions, as well as, to enhance budget credibility and transparency. These strategy commitments led to PFM featuring prominently as a joint results indicator in the joint results framework Joint Programming stimulated discussions on what European partners present in the same sector could do together. The EU and Sweden's approach to joint implementation in the PFM sector now provides a benchmark for what can be achieved in other sectors too.

Visibility and Communication

Through working in a joined-up manner, the European partners group became more visible. At sector level, visibility increased through more contacts with technical departments. This joint implementation has also further strengthened the EU in its role as a co-chair of the PFM Technical Working Group and accordant policy dialogue in the sector. The EU's reputation as a supporter of transparency has also been expanded particularly due to its association with Transparency International Cambodia.

Lessons Learnt

1. By working in partnership with each other the EU and Sweden were able to improve the quality of policy dialogue. On the one hand the quality of policy dialogue was improved because of the EU and Sweden being better resourced to participate in dialogue due to their now working on related technical areas such as statistics and budgeting. However, the real added value came from the increased standing that the EU and Sweden achieved through building a relationship of trust with Cambodia's oversight institutions (e.g. parliament). This relationship of trust was delivered to the EU in a cost-effective manner by taking advantage of deep and extensive networks that Sweden had already invested in. In return, Sweden got access to and influence in budget support related policy dialogue based on the EU's budget support contributions.
2. Through open dialogue between the EU and Sweden on challenges at the sector level, space was created for joint scoping of the sector which led to a more relevant programming approach. Essentially through pooling information, analysis and institutional knowledge between the EU and Sweden, programming was able to be better designed to fit the local political context.
3. By working together, the EU and Sweden were better able to influence agendas in high-level policy debates. Whereas before the donors worked together, the policy dialogue agenda was largely set by multilaterals in the sector, by mobilising civil society networks and relationships with the legislature, the EU and Sweden had much more sway in terms of setting the policy dialogue agenda.
4. Visibility was improved through expanding the EU and Sweden's access to each other's networks (e.g. with parliament, Transparency International Cambodia, Statistics, Audit and general budget support policy dialogue processes) in the sector.
5. The incentives to use a joint implementation approach in Cambodia were increased because of Cambodia's Joint Programming process. In turn, successful joint implementation in public financial management has created aspirational incentives that are instrumental to driving and sustaining a new phase of Joint Programming in Cambodia.
6. By investing time in coordination, sharing analysis and experience, the EU and Sweden were able to avoid the unacceptably high transaction cost of financing activities that are not politically relevant nor likely to have significant impact.

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Case Study 3: Extension of the Lomé Electricity Network (PEREL)

Introduction

is a co-financed project in support of extending the electricity network in Lomé, Togo. The project aims to improve the quality and quantity of energy as well as to strengthen the financial integrity of Togo's electricity providers. This is done through extending the power grid to peri-urban communities, connecting 20,000 households and upgrading the power grid controls and functions.

Implementation Partnership

PEREL is implemented by way of blending an EU GRANT (EUR 7.8 million)with a German Financial Development Corporation (KFW) grant (EUR 10 million) and a French Development Agency (AFD) EUR 30 million loan (20 years loan including five years grace period). An MRI[5] (Mutual Reliance Initiative) arrangement is also used to facilitate coordination and reduce transaction costs between AFD and KfW.

AFD was supporting the energy sector because of its potential to catalyse economic development but was following Togo's negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because once an agreement was in place[6] it would allow AFD more ambitious programming through providing loans to the sector. At that stage, AFD was not mandated to officially dialogue with the government but by working with the EU they got access to policy and strategy dialogue with the government because the EUD was entering the energy sector through grants. At the same time EU, France and Germany started talking about developing a joint strategy (and Joint Programming document) in Togo. The interim Joint Programming document was designed in 2013-2014 and included a plan to involve and partner with AFD once the IMF agreement was in place for the energy (amongst other) sector. This became the basis to adopt a joint implementation arrangement to the energy sector in Togo.

[5] MRI started in January 2013 with the signature of Operational Guidelines between AFD, KfW and EIB. MRI is a mechanism by which, when co-financing projects, one of the three partners takes the role of lead financier, relying on its standards and procedures as long as the minimum requirements of the other partners are met.

[6] For certain countries including Togo, to be eligible for French Government soft loans, an IMF agreement is typically a pre-condition.

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The joint project began in earnest with an initial feasibility study financed by the EU in 2015. In this context and through close dialogue between the EU and AFD there was an identified need to reduce the risk of duplication. At the same time the need to reduce the risk of duplication inside the EU family was accompanied by a concern that more could and should be done to improve coordination in the energy sector in Togo, a sector that was at the time steadily seeing more investment from development partners. These findings led to a joint implementation arrangement that both reduced duplication risks amongst the EU family and contributed to Government ownership by supporting better coordination and harmonisation in the sector in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration Aid Effectiveness principles or ownership and alignment with the partner country's strategy. This latter contribution is particularly important in Togo where government officials frequently express concern that international development partner investments are not coordinated effectively, thus undermining the potential for ownership and significantly eroding the likelihood of sustainable results.

Project Analysis
Sovereign Demand Orientation

The project responded to sovereign demand: Togo's 'Strategy Accelerated growth and Job Promotion (SCAPE) 2013-2017' provides a medium-term development framework for making Togo a more vibrant and stronger economy by 2030. The project contributes to the dual objective, including poverty reduction and the strengthening of shared prosperity. Most economic activities would be impossible without energy. The project helps Togo increase access to reliable and affordable electricity, an essential aspect for business development, job creation, income generation and international competitiveness.

In dialogue with the Government of Togo, officials also made clear their perception that energy was akin to an orphaned sector both in terms of investment and related to policy dialogue. The government wanted to see cooperating in the energy sector bench-marked

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with good practices like that in the education sector, where international development partners coordinate programming and support sector coordination and harmonized policy dialogue. At the same time, AFD and the EU invested significant time in working closely with the World Bank so that the other big financier in the sector was working in complement and coordination with the EU family.

Partner Ownership and Sustainability
The government's continued attention to dialogue and coordination at the sector level has improved the enabling environment for sustainability. Informal feedback from government officials related to their having greater access to information and being emboldened to lead at sector level imply that the joint implementation approach has enabled partner ownership.

The administrative capacity of the partner government was not sufficient to easily and closely follow, monitor and hold accountable procurement in the sector with multiple new projects as would have been the case if the implementing partners had programmed bilaterally. The joint implementation reduced the actual number of procurements and activities to be monitored by the government thus enabling greater ownership. Equally in having one rather than three steering committees, the government can easier participate in project governance.

Policy Dialogue Processes:

From an operational point of view, Joint Implementation allows participating developing partners to speak with a clear voice and more authority because of the cumulative size of investment and the fact that it represents a consensus between three important investment partners. This prevents operational misunderstanding and reduces the risk of disagreement between AFD, the EU and KFW as decisions are first discussed internally between financiers before being announced to the beneficiary. This has garnered the EU family with the reputational benefit of being more coherent and consistent when it comes to making formal statements.

Consistent and coherent messaging was essential because promoting good governance and accountability was a central objective of the project: before launching, the EU and AFD insisted on technical and financial audits on the national company (CEET) to gauge its weaknesses. Concrete corrective measures were then proposed to decrease its technical gaps and financial loss. This work in the identification and inception phases acted as a precondition to financing and highlighted the importance of good economic governance to delivering effectively in the sector. The audit findings confirmed major problems that became the basis of an agreement between the three responsible Ministers (Energy, Finance, Planning). Accordingly, the project went beyond improvements to the grid to include an explicit commitment from the Minister of Finance "to progressively solve…problems and improve the overall management of the CEET". Dialogue on these sensitive issues resulted in an accompanying action plan to strengthen governance in the sector and of CEET.

This project was the first investment in the sector for the EU and France (German financial cooperation already has several projects in implementation through the West African Power Pool). Concurrently, the EU and German Development Cooperation (GIZ) developed a much needed institutional and policy support programme. In its entirety the European strategy in the sector has led to new dynamism of the sector in Togo in terms of coordination and policy dialogue: the EU and AFD launched the Energy Sector Working Group with the Government, led today by the German Cooperation. Sector dialogue has improved markedly in the past 2 years thanks to the long-term and sustained commitment of European partners to the sector.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation
South-South and Triangular Cooperation is not a feature of this project.

Coordination and Efficiencies
Streamlining project design and implementation processes for the beneficiary government had a clear added value and measurable transaction cost benefit because the government would now only need to over-see joint work contracts that incorporated contributions from all three development partners. Further one third of the procurement processes and bidding processes. This is a key and huge added value in the sector. Also, by pooling resources the donors have achieved greater competition in the sector. Economies of scales.

Further, the project would have had a much less ambitious scope and impact without joint financing. As importantly the blending of medium-term grants with a twenty-year long-term loan financing means that participating donors accrue the reputational benefit of supporting the sector for two decades even though the grant components were of much shorter time periods.

Transaction costs were measurably reduced in burden sharing throughout the project cycle. For example, the EU led during the feasibility phase and then AFD and KFW took over from the appraisal phase onwards. The appraisal and follow up of the project are under AFD's responsibility (via blending agreement between AFD and EU + Mutual Reliance Initiative between AFD and KFW), with joint appraisal/supervision missions leading to lower costs from the donor's perspective but also for the partner in terms of mobilization. The monitoring/evaluation as well as communication and visibility are implemented jointly.

Typically, AFD would have financed a portion of the project towards capacity building but because the EU was already invested in capacity building, they decided not to in this case. Finally, because a 'no-objection process' was agreed early on in implementation, Joint Implementation allowed important time savings related to administrative processes.

Innovative Approaches
Adopting a joint implementation approach allowed participating development partners to phase in their involvement at different phases allowing for a more realistic period for engaging in the design, negotiation and dialogue phase. For example, AFD followed the EU's dialogue process and negotiation from before their mandate for lending was secured. The EU was able to lead in the identification and formulation phase and then to hand over to AFD and KFW during appraisal and implementation, this taking advantage of comparative advantages. Another innovative approach has been in linking joint implementation to high level priorities for the EU (i.e. as a formative step towards Joint Programming) and for the government such as in relation to the desire to use joint implementation to kick-start sector wide coordination and dialogue that will improve development effectiveness for all actors in the sector.

Joint Implementation and Joint Programming
The project was both enabled by and became a corner stone of Joint Programming in Togo as is illustrated in it featuring in the 2013-2014 Interim Joint Programming Strategy for Togo. In this strategy, joint implementation in the energy sector is also posited to measurably improve development effectiveness in Togo too.

Visibility and Communication
Under this criterion visibility aspects should be summarised, both the visibility of the European group as well as the visibility of each intervening MS individually. At the implementation phase the project also benefited from pooling costs such as relating to holding a joint signing event rather than thre separate bilateral visibility events. The result is that the EU, AFD and KFW are now seen as a much more influential actor in the sector. Dialogue in the energy sector is now much deeper and stronger. By pooling resources and investing in coordination and dialogue with the government in visibility was increased. The government and government owned entities now see coordination in the sector as vital. Coordination initially started as an EU JP approach but because the EU family is seen as being instrumental it speaks with more authority.

Lessons Learnt

- Streamlining project design and implementation processes had a clear added value for the beneficiary government had and measurably reduced transaction costs.
- Merging procurement and bidding processes improved governance, oversight and ownership in the sector whilst also improving returns for participating development partners through creating greater competition (for bigger contracts) and opportunities for economies of scale.
- The project became much more ambitious and increased its scope through joint financing. As importantly the blending of medium-term grants with a twenty-year long-term loan financing means the participating donors accrue the reputational benefit of supporting the sector for two decades even though the grant components were of much shorter time periods.
- The Join Programming process created an incentive for Joint Implementation; successfully agreeing joint implementation provided a corner stone and good practice example for the EU family to be more ambitious about opportunities for joined-up actions and activities.

- Transaction costs were measurably reduced in burden sharing throughout the project cycle – e.g. the EU and AFD took the lead in different phases in the project cycle as per their capacity and comparative advantage.
- Joint Implementation allowed important time savings related to administrative processes through agreeing a ‘no approval’ process for internal project decisions.
- Joint Implementation has garnered the EU family reputational benefits: the EU and EU Member States are now perceived to be more coherent and consistent in Togo.
- Adopting a joint implementation approach allowed participating development partners to phase in their involvement at different phases allowing for a more realistic period for engaging in the design, negotiation and dialogue phase whilst also providing for a longer horizon (the loan component is twenty years) for dialogue with the government on implementing and monitoring impact.
- The success of joint implementation in this case is attributed to the EU, France and Germany putting their shared values of good governance and accountability at the heart of programming in the energy sector.

Case Study 4: Senegal "Développer l'emploi au Sénégal"

Introduction
"Developper l'emploi au Senegal" is a EUR 40 million, EU financed project focussed on job creation in Senegal. The activities are clustered around vocational training, access to finance and Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) development.

Implementation Partnership
The project was launched in late 2016 and is jointly implemented by the French Development Agency (AFD) and the Luxembourg Agency for Development Cooperation (LuxDev), two NGOs, Positive Planet International and GRET, and a communication agency. The project is a joint programme, although it is implemented through individual contracts managed by the EUD with each of the implementing partners.

The project originated out of the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) that was established in 2015 to address the root causes of the migration crisis. To identify the programme, the EU Delegation coordinated dialogues with stakeholders in Senegal, such as national and local authorities and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and representatives of EU Member States' development cooperation agencies. The objective was to formulate projects that could be rapidly implemented and up scaled: EUTF focuses on implementation modalities that ensure a swift and flexible delivery of results, impact and cost effectiveness. In order to strengthen coordination and collaboration, the EUTF places emphasis on programmes implemented by a consortium of implementing partners.

Based on their experience in Senegal, France and Luxembourg offered to focus in the support to SMEs (France) and the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET and related activities - Luxembourg) following the logic that improve access to good work and wealth creation opportunities in Senegal would increase the incentives for economic migrants to direct their attentions at opportunities in the local economy. The EU reviewed the project proposals and proposed a joint programme because it had the potential to improve complementarity and impact through building a continuum between TVET, job placement, support to entrepreneurship and SMEs.

Project Analysis
Sovereign Demand Orientation
The project activities are impossible to implement without local private sector demand meaning they are clearly oriented to local demands. At the activity level the project orients itself to Senegal's Small and Medium enterprises, entrepreneurs, local financiers, job seekers and bigger corporates in delivering appropriate and in demand vocation training. One of the key reasons the project was approved is that France and Luxembourg had demonstrable historical relationships with the responsible Senegalese line ministries. These relationships were based on an alignment of programming with sovereign policies and strategies.

The joined-up approach promotes a better Division of Labour between the EU and EU Member States, and a greater alignment of programming with the national development plan. Senegal has many development partners in country and, to reduce fragmentation, the national aid architecture is structured around the G-15 group named after the fifteen biggest development partners in the sector. Reporting to this group are technical sub-groups (for instance one on business climate and competitiveness and one on TVET). The EU, France and Luxembourg ensure coordination, harmonisation, alignment and dialogue through participating in these groups.

Partner Ownership and Sustainability
The contractual framework of the Programme involves the Senegalese Government at various levels:
- A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the partner country Ministry of Economy and Finance, the involved line ministries (Ministry in charge of Trade and SMEs, and Ministry in charge of TVET) and State Agencies (Bureau de Mise à Niveau and ADEPME), the EU, and the implementing partners (AFD and LuxDev);
- AFD signed a financing agreement with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which in turn signed delegation agreement with the State Agencies (BMN and ADEPME);
- LuxDev signed agreements with the TVET line Ministry, as well as with the State bodies involved in the implementation (such as 3 FPT – Fonds de Financement de la Formation Professionnelle et Technique or ONFP – Office National de la Formation Professionnelle).

Ownership and sustainability are further ensured through a Project Steering Committee that meets twice yearly to endorse decisions and review progress.

Policy Dialogue Processes
Policy Dialogue is happening through the group relevant G-15 sub-groups (see above).

South-South and Triangular Cooperation:
South-South and Triangular Cooperation is not a feature of the project although LuxDev did contract a Brazilian Consulting firm to share experience and transfer knowhow on the use of vocational education mobile units.

Coordination and Efficiencies
EU MS Agencies (LuxDev and AFD) are both long-term partners of Senegal in the sectors (TVET for LuxDev and SMEs support for AFD). This reduced the EU’s cost of entry into the sectors. This is a good example of EU joint implementation as encouraged by the EU Joint Programming. It has also facilitated the elaboration of the “Jobs and Growth Compact”. In addition, the improvement of business environment is a key priority for the EU Cooperation and political dialogue in Senegal, and this programme brings an important added value in that matter.

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A joint logical framework and the joint indicator matrix were also discussed as the basis for monitoring and evaluation in an ad hoc group, comprising Luxdev and AFD.

However, because the implementing partners are managed through individual contracts and management is not merged, there are no apparent cost-savings at the logistical level. Nonetheless by building the continuum of activities, the joint approach has led to more ambitious programming objectives implying a potential better return on investment.

Innovative Approaches:
The joint implementation approach has led to important innovations such as the adoption of an inclusive approach to providing inter-related services vocational training, support to entrepreneurship, access to finance, financial and technical support to SMEs in coordination to enable a continuum for beneficiaries. Information sharing and lessons learning are also improved through regular concertation fora, both at strategic and technical levels. Further because of the larger scope the project has been able to use the combined weight of implementing partners to create momentum on job creation in five Senegal's regions.

Joint Implementation and Joint Programming:
Joint Programming in Senegal has been institutionalised in 2018 with the agreement of a Joint Strategy for 2018-2023. Joint Implementation in this programme can be considered as an example of what can be achieved in Joint Programming (JP). Further, during the JP process, France and Luxembourg were very committed in the JP Technical Working Group on Employment, Private Sector and Vocational Training.

Visibility and Communication
The project has enjoyed a high level of visibility thanks to a joint information and communication campaign (called "Tekki fii" – which means "Make it here" in Wolof, the main Senegalese language). The campaign is directly managed by the EU and implemented by a communication agency, with the involvement of all implementing partners. This arrangement has worked well to raise the visibility of the project as well as individually for the implementing partners.

Lessons Learnt:
- The EU can play an influential role in identifying common objectives between funding proposals to encourage joint implementation.
- There is an opportunity to further reduce transaction costs; in this case the EU still contracted the implementing partners separately which means managing multiple contracts.
- The project management would have also been more cost effective by merging the management units although this would have faced the tricky challenge of resolving different implementation approaches between the partners.
- Visibility is improved through using joint communication services.
- Transaction cost savings accrue through joint monitoring and evaluation; equally impact of lessons learned is improved by reducing the risk of competing monitoring and evaluation reports that could have potentially muddied the messaging (a common problem in congested sectors).

Case Study 5: KAFAAT LILJAMIA: Vocational Training Project in Morocco

Introduction

Kafaat Liljamia is a EUR 2.4 million project jointly implemented by the Spanish International Cooperation Agency for Development (AECID), the British Council and the EU. The project is programmed in complement to the European Union's Vocational Education response in Morocco which also includes a larger EUR 60 million budget support programme titled "Vocational training: development of human capital in Morocco". Spain contributes an additional EUR 1.5 million to the sector budget support programme. The overarching objective of the programme is to enable social and economic development through strengthening human capital in Morocco.

Vocational training has long been a developmental priority in Morocco but gained a sense of greater urgency since the 2011 Arab Spring. Large-scale protests[7] dominated the political space in Morocco between February 2011 and August 2012, commonly associated with frustrations related to youth unemployment rates. University students were quick to join the demonstrations as early as April 2011, as the inability of tertiary education to secure gainful employment became a rallying cry in the demonstrations.

To tackle the employment issue, the government committed to improving the quality and access to vocational training. This commitment became the basis for ambitious reform targets that defined conditions for disbursing the EU's budget support tranches.

At the same time, the National Strategy of Vocational Training in Morocco, in the regionalisation context, became a regional competence and had to be implemented in consultation and partnership with civil society and private sector. This change led the EU to look for a partner in vocational training that already had working partnerships with civil society, regional and local decision makers. After exploring options in country, it became apparent that AECID was able to contribute access to an existing network of civil society organizations at regional and local levels that work on vocation training. In complement, the British Council offered relationships with regional and local organizations through which it had experience delivering institutional and governance strengthening support. These two components make up Kafaat Liljamia, the activities of which focus on tangible visible benefits to citizens at the local and regional levels.

[7] Protests organized by the 20 February Movement took place starting in February 2011 and running for more than a year, the biggest of which was of 60,000 protestors on June 5th, 2011 in Rabat and Casablanca.

Implementation Partnership
Kafaat Liljamia is jointly implemented by AECID and the British Council and financed with EU funds. The British Council acts as the lead for contracting purposes. AECID and the British Council jointly implement the project from a shared project office put at their disposal by the Moroccan authorities. The internal division of labour has AECID focusing on local associations and civil society, whilst the British Council focuses on strengthening governance and overall coordination.

Whilst vocational training is the remit of the State Secretary of Vocational Training, under the national Ministry of Education, it needs to be contextualised to local and regional economies and implemented through education providers at the local and regional levels. In this context, Kafaat Liljamia contributes to dialogue between regional and local officials and policy makers at the national level and provides room for bottom-up information to feed into the sector budget support dialogue mechanism. Internally, Morocco needs to reality check proposed reforms by way of consultation between national level decision makers and those that implement vocational training at the local and regional levels. AECID and the British Council help enunciate local demands through a close and sustained consultation with local and regional actors. AECID's networks and existing relationships with civil society and the private sector were combined with the British Council's expert knowledge and experience working on governance with regional authorities, making a larger project which builds local coalitions based on sustained relationships. Therefore, AECID and the British Council together had access to more and better evidence on best practice in vocational training. In addition, EU Member State organizations may be considered as trusted partners with a privileged link to MS and relevant policy dialogue processes. They furthermore offer a soft power dimension to their work.

Project Analysis
Sovereign Demand Orientation:
Kafaat Liljamia is part of the EU's wider vocational education programme which includes a budget support project that is owned by the Government of Morocco and in support of national education policy. While Kafaat Liljamia is coordinated with the State Secretary, its ownership goes deeper: through working with the implementing partners jointly the project responds to the interests of local and regional authorities, the civil society and the private sector. This is due to combining the longstanding relationships that implementing partners' have at

the local[8] and regional levels and leveraging those combined relationships to ensure the local demands are considered by the regional authorities. Kafaat Liljamia has been able to translate the project aspirations into objectives that align with regional and local decentralization processes, and that deliver tangible benefits. Vocational training is now seen in many parts of Morocco as a potential visible public good that will accrue from reform.

"Vocational training is an opportunity to rescue youngsters who do not complete high school or feel there is no jobs coming through formal education."

The project demonstrably responds to the expanded definition of democratic country ownership, a specific commitment of the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

Partner Ownership and Sustainability:
Whilst vocational education receives only a small budget from the exchequer, the government has ensured a revenue stream through taxes on the private sector. Further, because it builds on existing AECID and British Council networks at local and regional levels, the activities are perceived to be part of long-term local strategies with demonstrable signs of ownership by local and regional decision makers. For example, one strand of the project aims at developing regional stakeholder partnerships to improve the planning and delivery of VET whilst the other aims to provide grants which pilot more relevant provision by CSOs to disadvantaged groups. Joint implementation has meant that the regional partnerships are aware of the pilot projects and able to give advice on how the selected grant projects were refined (they were presented to them and discussed). This means that they will have greater profile and lessons learnt from the pilot projects are more likely to be mainstreamed by other partners.

Policy Dialogue Processes:
Joint implementation with AECID and the British Council allowed for messaging towards policy dialogue as AECID's and the British Council's local networks ensured consultations with local and regional authorities, the private sector and civil society. Kafaat Liljamia thus affords the EU and other donors easy and cost-effective access through existing established networks to perspectives at the sub-national level.

Furthermore, the access of the implementing partners (through their diplomatic mission) to high-level policy dialogue processes contributes to more effective project implementation. For example, when facing a challenge to get the support of decision makers in Tangier Region, the implementing partners were able to pool their access to political dialogue though the influence of their Ambassadors[9]. This access was used to better understand the reasons for resistance and to craft a more nuanced message to convince regional authorities to endorse the project.

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[8] AECID has been supporting local government associations in Morocco for more than twenty years and the British Council been working on governance in Morocco for more than fifty years.

[9] The Heads of Mission of Spain and the UK.

Coordination and Efficiencies:
The project enjoys notable efficiencies through better coordination achieved by implementing jointly, the most visible of which is the use of a single, shared project office provided by the partner country. What is much more valuable albeit less visible, is the sharing of networks and contacts. This enables easier access to implementing partners and decision makers. It also gives the project expanded access to information, thus improving the capacity to monitor and reduce risks at no identifiable cost to the project. Further, by implementing jointly the project has benefited from better standing at the local level – the perception that the project is connected to the British, EU and Spanish missions has granted the project reputational benefit and improved its convening authority and accordant access to influential locals. Finally, there is a notable expanded access to specialist expertise that has accrued from jointly implementing the project.

One lesson learned is that further efficiencies are achievable through harmonising operational procedures and remuneration practices (e.g. salaries, consultancy and per diem rates). Particularly when it comes to recruiting local consultants or local staff and paying per diem rates, a harmonised approach reduces office resentment and the risk that local staff approach their career path from the perspective of working for the best paying implementing partner.

Innovative Approaches:
Innovative approaches have accrued from AECID and the British Council learning from each other through implementing jointly and working from a shared office. For example, the British Council has a strong child protection policy and was invited to mobilise internal child protection expertise (at little to no cost) to deliver training and support on how this relates to the implementation of the project. Lesson learning between the two implementing partners is also leading to greater exchange of information on institutional practices – for example, AECID participated in the recruitment of some British Council staff and experts included in the project and the British Council participated in the selection of local projects in an AECID call for proposals. Creative and shared solutions have also accrued by learning and sharing from each of the partners core competencies (in governance and institution building). For example, AECID have significant experience of managing grants for CSOs in Morocco and this is their main mandate. To date CSOs have mainly focused on providing employability skills to disadvantaged groups rather than skills directly demanded by employers. Drawing on the British Council's experience of engaging employers and AECID's experience with CSO grant management the project was able to develop a grant programme which whilst targeting CSOs (As required by AECID's mandate) also encouraged partnership with employers and the private sector. Joint field missions are now common practice and dialogue with authorities and other partners is often done jointly, thus demonstrating a greater unity and better conveying the sense of a more compelling shared vision for the sector.

Joint Implementation and Joint Programming:
AECID has been involved with the EU delegation and the EU Member States on Joint Programming in Morocco since early on. The EU partners have been working on a joint results framework and inviting external joint programming experts from the European Training Foundation to facilitate. However, a joint analysis and joint programming strategy have still not been agreed. The EUD, wanting to advance on the Joint Programming process, proposed a joint implementation arrangement under the sector

budget support. Spain and the UK acknowledge that through jointly implementing the project, a greater sense of unity and shared interests amongst the 'EU family' were generated. With a tangible example of what could be gained through joint up actions in implementation, the motivation for Joint Programming and its prospects for success in Morocco were strengthened.

Visibility and Communication

The project team reports that by working jointly visibility was greatly enhanced in Morocco. Especially in a context where advocacy is important to the reform process, the combined messaging of the EU, Spain and the UK has led to more effective communication. Many interlocutors accept project priorities with less suspicion because of the consensual approach of the EU partners and the Government of Morocco on what is needed in the vocational education sector. Further, having a team composing Spanish, Moroccans, French and British experts has enriched communication and made the project more amenable to a wider array of audiences. By joining up, visibility was improved, and communication made more effective.

Lessons Learnt

1. Joint implementation can take advantage of the multi-lingual and multi-cultural features of the European Union to deliver better visibility and improve the effectiveness of messaging to different audiences using different languages and cultural approaches,
2. Joint Programming is enabled through joint implementation – joint implementation demonstrates the value of working in a joined-up manner which in turn motivates the development of a joint strategy which then creates a virtuous cycle promoting greater use of joint implementation. Joint implementation thus becomes a tangible and replicable example of team work/working in a joined-up approach,
3. By pooling Member State resources in the same office focusing on shared objectives, Member States not only save on office costs, but learn from each other, improve their own capacities and expand their reach.
4. Member State agencies that have been in the partner country for an extended period tend to have extensive and deep networks that can be cost-effectively mobilised to improve consultation, strengthen partnerships and improve the relevance of programming,
5. Existing networks of EU partners can allow messaging from the implementation level to the policy dialogue level with the result that programming strategies become more relevant by making use of greater evidence from the implementation levels, be it local, regional or national. Equally, reforms are more likely to be supported because by linking directly to the end beneficiary level, reforms are more tangible and potential benefits are easier communicated.
6. It is important to find the right balance between the autonomy of the co-delegates to implement their respective component and the requirements of the lead organisation

to technically coordinate the whole project, in line with specific objectives. In this respect, project governance is key, and the team leader should have a hierarchical role to the whole team and should be fully involved in the achievement of all major milestones, even if the delivery of those milestones is under the responsibility of another co-delegate. The PN could discuss this matter further and decide on the necessary structure for all JI projects.

7. It is positive for co-delegates to jointly participated in the recruitment process of the wider team. This helps build trust in the team and cohesion between co-delegates.
8. It would be helpful to share information about each co-delegates processes and systems in advance, so that the project formulation is well defined. If this does not happen, there is a risk that projects will not be able to deliver what was promised. The PN could take the time to share information about the systems upon which they are pillar assessed.

Case Study 6: EuroClima+ Latin America Regional Environment and Climate Change Programme

Introduction

EuroClima+ is a EUR 94 million[10] (as of April 2019) regional environmental sustainability and climate change project. EUR 88 million is provided under the EU's Development Cooperation Instrument's Multiannual Indicative Regional Programme for Latin America 2014-2020. This is the third phase of EuroClima, which originally started in 2010. The EU has expressed its interest in providing further financing for EuroClima+ to continue in 2020 and onwards.

Implementation Partnership

The programme is managed in a delegated partnership between five EU Member State Agencies AECID, AFD, FIIAPP, Expertise France and GIZ. The programme also includes actions implemented by United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and United Nations Environment (UNE). There is also a programme secretariat appointed under a service contract and also staffed with representatives from EU Member State Agencies (currently FIIAP and GIZ); the secretariat coordinates and supports overall activities. The agencies all have separate delegation agreements with specific tasks, all related to the overall goals of the programme. In practice the programme is an EU driven initiative delegated for implementation to EU Member State agencies and coordinated under one umbrella and vision. In terms of governance, there is a Steering Committees that meets annually to make strategic decisions and includes officials from the eighteen partner countries, together with United Nations Agencies, the Member States Agencies (MSAs) and the EU. A Management committee (with MSA delegates) meets approx. every two months to ensure a coordinated approach; the meetings commonly take place in Brussels in the presence of EU Devco G2, Member State Agencies, partner UN agencies and the secretariat. The management committee is the key operational decision making body. Additionally, the programme maintains sector working groups for each of the six sectors that include the implementing agencies and three representatives of the partner countries who together represent the eighteen partner countries, as well as EU DEVCO G2 (with observer status).

EuroClima+ relies on partner commitment to foster a joined-up approach (sectors have a lead agency and a co-lead agency). However, in the course of programme implementation, some opportunities could be seized to improve coherence or coordination. For example, there are opportunities to improve debate on strategic orientation (e.g. on adaptation, on policies, implementation, etc.) and the coherence of dialogue by speaking using one harmonised message, particularly at partner country level, or by coordinating and harmonising as far as possible the processes in the selection or implementation phases. Building consensus on what are shared priorities and approaches is invaluable to support decision making that strengthens environmental governance: for that a decision-making process must be defined. The complexity of the programme is a challenge but also an opportunity to improve the coordination and visibility of European cooperation vis-à-vis Latin American governments and actors at country and at regional levels; coordination (among Member State Agencies and EU DG DEVCO G2) is a major feature to build

[10] The 2015 Action Document includes an estimate of EUR 6 million contributed from implementing partners.

synergies, use the complementary of European development actors and be able to mobilise a broad network of European experts for the benefit of Latin American partners and mitigate risks such as duplication. Coordination is also a huge challenge in the 18 LA countries at all level (National Focal Points –NFP- in his/her own ministry, NFP and other ministries, public bodies and civil society organizations, with the private sector…)



Project Analysis

Sovereign Demand

In 2016/7 the National Focal Points (NFP) of the 18 partner countries have reached an agreement to prioritize six sectors and to apply calls for proposals as the main process for country-demand driven actions, through selecting projects that could be funded under the programme. During these processes the NFPs were closely involved and consulted. In addition, each sectoral component has organized a launching workshop involving the NFPs in the definition of the specific selection criteria of each call for proposal. In this sense, the whole programme has a sovereign demand-oriented approach, in order to assure the alignment of activities with national priorities and NDCs of Latin American partner countries.

EuroClima+ is a regional programme and responds to sovereign demand at the regional level with the eighteen partner countries. Nonetheless, many activities, such as those carried out under the climate governance component, happen at partner country level Climate governance is about supporting partner country climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, plans and strategies. It is always designed in such a way to ensure consistency with sovereign demand through coherence with partner country policies.

Partner Ownership and Sustainability

EUROCLIMA+ is supporting ownership at the national and regional levels through helping institutionalise the climate change inter-ministerial platforms. This is an important step towards sustainability because climate change requires a regional focus as much as it does at country and global levels.

In implementing activities, partners have come to a better understanding of the breadth and complementarity of different partner approaches and partnerships. This has led to the understanding that there are always opportunities to better exchange lessons learned, improve complementarity and to constantly adjust to everchanging political contexts. EuroClima+ has thus committed to a philosophy of constant improvement and refinement through pooling the collective knowhow of the partner agencies. In order to even better voice the respective expertise and lessons learned of the partners jointly on country level, the establishing of a new core mechanism that expands inclusive in-country dialogue is currently being launched (so far as a pilot initiative). This in-country dialogue is meant to be the major asset for identification of further activities (at local, national and regional levels) to be carried out under Euroclima+ processes.

Concerning the sectors, the National Focal Points were directly involved in the first phase of selecting projects in BBE, DRR, UM, Resilient Food Production, Energy Efficiency and Water components. To further increase ownership at government level, in most of the components the preselection on national level was given to National Focal Points who could prioritise a limited number of project proposals (3 or 4) for their respective country. This was also complemented with country missions (e.g. launching mission in each country involved into BBE component projects). Their "no – objection" letter was a requirement for the project proposals to be considered in the selection process. These criteria imply alignment with the national policies and at the same time a partner ownership that could improve the sustainability in the future. This procedure has been applied based on the lessons learnt in previous sectoral call for proposals, where the NFP were strongly invited to express their comments (regarding alignment with national policies) and to give a written no-objection letter. Nevertheless, this "new" procedure is not a guarantee for selecting "good" projects (in the vision and ambition of the programme and looking for a no-BAU approach regarding CC challenges): therefore, further analysis to the procedure should be realized in order to be able to formulate recommendations.

Policy Dialogue Processes
What the project has also promoted is a regional dialogue on climate change. This is something that was broadly recognised as necessary but lacking sufficient forums and concrete opportunities to engage. EuroClima+ thus provides a space for the eighteen member countries to dialogue with the EU, the agencies and the each other on climate issues that have regional consequences.

Regarding policy dialogue at country level, EuroClima+ is also piloting in-country dialogues related to climate governance; these in-country dialogue processes will be expanded to all partner countries interested.

South-South or Triangular Cooperation
Most activities and actions financed and implemented under the programme classify as South-South and Triangular cooperation. Good practices have been incorporated into programming and because many of the sectoral projects work regionally there is a strong dimension of South-South exchange of knowhow and cooperation. To take into consideration that for ex. in the BBE, the EE and the RRD calls for proposal, the regional dimension was qualified as a "plus" in selection.

Coordination and Efficiencies
Joint implementation has provided a unique opportunity to building the implementing partners interests in improving coordination. On the one hand this has been built into the programme design with the establishment of a coordination secretariat and on the other hand it is being addressed through close coordination (weekly calls) among MSAs, management committee meetings and the programme steering committee. The convergence of procedures applied for the management of calls for proposals has shown to be helpful in terms of efficiency.

There is a built in common vision and a convergence of procedures among agencies involved in sectoral components. This provides a significant added value and should be considered in the future phase of the programme.

Innovative Approaches
Working together has led to an agreement to 2019 strengthen climate governance through establishing **dialogue mechanisms at the country level ("country dialogue")**. These mechanisms have been piloted in Paraguay, Honduras, Ecuador and Cuba to the satisfaction of participants, and a joint methodology for these dialogues has been elaborated on programme level.

Combining the advantages of technical cooperation (with financial cooperation and complementary expertise of MS organisations in a joint project is an innovative approach for development cooperation and could lead to better efficiency in public policy or project preparation, financing and monitoring, that will be measured once the programme will be able to demonstrate concrete results in terms of climate change adaptation or mitigation.

Joint Implementation and Joint Programming
EuroClima+ is a regional programme and not part of a corresponding regional Joint Programming initiative.

Visibility

Cofinanciado por:

Implementado por:

A joint communication plan has been developed to ensure uniform and aligned communication amongst the implementing partners. Joint communication also includes a website, and presence on social networks. Implementing partners are committed to showcasing the involvement of all the partners and the EU in their respective activities.

Lessons Learned
- By working more closely together the implementing partners have come to acknowledge the opportunity to strengthen their shared approach at the operational level when it comes to adopting a common theory of change. Harmonising and adopting shared procedures for procurements and calls for proposals significantly reduces transaction costs.
- Joint Implementation should ideally be based on a shared understanding of what demand driven approaches mean, how the response to partner demand should be matched with the priorities of Global and EU policy priorities and how demands should be prioritised according to the best added value that the programme - and in particular the implementing agencies are able and willing to bring according to their own priorities and features. That is why this has been and is being developed on programme level. In fact, the planned decision-making mechanism is designed to do precisely that.

- To work even better jointly, efforts have been made and need to continue throughout the formulation and identification phases in building a shared and common vision and also insuring transparent decision-making processes.

- Member States' networks and relationships (that exist alongside programming) can be used to build a dialogue on climate change (NDC implementation) amongst equals between EU and Latin America.

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Annex: Joint Implementation Activities of the Practitioners Network: Good Practices and Added Value

Methodological Comments

In late July 2018 EuroSocial+ was identified as a pilot for what will eventually be an analysis based on six case studies. The case studies will be collated into a paper on good practices and added value in Joint Implementation. The EuroSocial+ case was initially based on a four-page questionnaire and sharing of project documentation with the intention that the research would be primarily desk based. The assumption that the information needed could be extracted from desk research proved incorrect. The questionnaire provided good background, but the information provided was focused on technical and administrative measures, much of which did not illuminate the rationale for and good practices embedded in EuroSocial+, at least not in terms of the criteria required for the analysis.

The criteria for the analysis were included in the original Terms of Reference and are listed below with respect to the findings from the pilot:

1. Sovereign Demand-Oriented Approach: This criterion requires an understanding and demonstration of the political context that the project responds to something that is better explained by senior officials than project implementing staff. The questionnaire did not provide this information.
2. Results-Oriented Approach: The project asserts it has a results-oriented approach, but it is difficult to differentiate how or why the approach is any different from other projects without understanding the political context (same as above).
3. Relevance and orientation towards Political and Policy Dialogue Processes: EuroSocial+ is a policy dialogue project but many of its officials only tangentially associate the policy dialogue with the political dialogue and high-level political objectives of the project's principles. The details are embedded in the documents and with officials experience but it is difficult to access without responses from senior officials and/or those that are aware of the historical political incentives that led to the project being formulated in the first place.
4. Aspects of South-South or Triangular cooperation: This data was easy to extract from the documentation and interviews with EuroSocial+ primarily because triangular cooperation is an objective and means of implementing the project.
5. Strengthening or use of country systems: EuroSocial+ is a peer learning project. It relates to strengthening country systems but not in a typical aid effectiveness manner. For example, there is no financing put on budget per se, there is no procurement using partner country systems and the project is regional without a regional contracting authority. EuroSocial+ is implemented by the EU directly and not in service of a particular country or regional organisation's systems.
6. Improved coordination that resulted in reduced transaction costs: Relating to coordination, there are some questions about whether this is something that could be improved with EuroSocial+.

Regarding transaction costs, however, EuroSocial+ is not a typical project that can be easily benchmarked mainly because the costs are primarily for facilitation. The actual services provided by participating officials are not costed nor budgeted for. Taking a standard transaction cost perspective would measure EuroSocial+ unfairly because more than 50% of the grant budget goes on staffing and institutional overheads. One metric that could be used would be to cost the learning provided by participating officials through peer learning. It is likely that benchmarking these services with what it would cost to procure them on the open market could provide evidence the project is cost effective. However, this is not advisable for the following three reasons: 1. Quantifying the expertise provided on the open market would open EuroSocial+ to criticism that better expertise could be procured on the open market through a free, open and competitive process. 2. If one were to opt to cost the actual time of officials involved in peer learning (i.e. as a proportional cost of employment) it is likely the project would undervalue the expertise, much of which would be more expensive to source on the open market. 3. Comparing the cost of expertise to the open market would simply miss the value of the project which is about building networks and lasting relationships between officials involved, something which is simply not compatible with a project approach that uses open market principles to source the best expertise at the lowest price.

7. Innovative Approaches: EuroSocial+ has several important innovative approaches but these were identified through key informant interviews rather than from the documents and questionnaire. The innovations embedded in EuroSocial+ are not well documented and those innovations documented are not innovations easy to explain to an uninformed reader.
8. Joint Implementation and Joint Programming: There is a gap here in that there is no current relationship. However, there are important lessons to be learned for both Joint Implementation and Joint Programming, lessons that are highlighted in the case below.

Revised Methodology

Going forward, it is essential to point out that delays in responses and challenges in getting access to senior EuroSocial+ officials has been a major impediment to completing the case study. What was initially intended as a four working day case study has taken close to three months to complete and the expert has failed to secure all the desired interviews. The most important lesson, then, is that remaining case studies should be selected based on the availability of senior staff. Understandably senior officials may be too busy to do an interview and answer follow up questions, but such circumstances should be a basis for precluding a project from initial selection.

Instead of sending out a detailed questionnaire that is likely to be delegated to junior staff who may not have been party to the dialogue that explains the political rationale for the project, it is suggested that the remaining studies be based on an initial collection of data by email. The initial email exchange should then be followed with a limited number of interviews with senior staff and officials who can speak to the political motivation for the project. Ideally, interviews need to cover project staff, officials and EU officials who can explain:

- The history, political dialogue/strategy and institutional arrangements (and incentives) that resulted in the project coming to fruition,
- How the management of the project is arranged, who has responsibility, where the checks and balances are, what the coordination and contracting arrangements are,
- The split of work, responsibilities and resources between the various implementing partner,
- The selection/competition, contracting, procurement and budgeting arrangements.

The suggestion, then, is to initiate the subsequent case studies with an email confirming availability of senior project staff and officials (including the responsible EU official) for a telephone interview (circa 40 minutes per interview). The initial email will be sent with a request to send the following documents:

- The ‘project document’/grant agreement/delegated cooperation agreement/financing agreement,
- Budget,
- Work Plan,
- Recent Report,
- Visibility/Communication Document,
- Any independent evaluation or review.

The email should also be accompanied with a request to explain how the project delivers added value for each of the 8 criteria listed above with the specific request that respondents give a practical example to illustrate each of the criteria.

Based on the email response and availability of senior project staff and officials for an interview, the data collection process should then proceed. Respondents should be promised confidentiality in responding and told they will be given the opportunity to correct, review and revise the case study once it is drafted. To build confidence in the process and avoid the sort of resistance that is often accompanied by perceptions that this exercise is being done by an outsider, it might be valuable to tell respondents that their case studies will not be finalized without their respective approval. Here it is essential to point out that the case analysis is not a review or evaluation and only about identifying and show casing good practices. This might go a long way to removing suspicion and encouraging participation and cooperation.

In terms of the allocation of resources, whilst the pilot has taken much longer than expected, it is still advisable to stick to the initial projection of 4 working days per case study. It is acknowledged that the pilot case study is longer than the initially planned maximum of 3 pages, but this should be understood as resulting from the fact of it being a pilot and not about setting a standard for later case studies. Subsequent cases should aim to be kept to the 3-page maximum to keep the repot short and easily digestible. This and maintaining the day limit on the case studies are essential if the exercise is to be completed by May 2019 as proposed.

The contracting arrangement should be adjusted in acknowledging that the Joint Programming contract concludes in January 2019. The Practitioner's network contract of 21 working days, should be used to cover 3 remaining case studies (12 days), the final report (6 days), incorporating comments for each of the 6 case studies (3 days) and developing the PowerPoint presentation for AMGA in Paris days comprising 21 working days in total. The Joint Programming contract should then cover two more case studies (8 days remaining of the 21 working days originally allocated).

Acknowledging that this report is now being submitted in October 2018, it is imperative that the remaining five case studies be identified as soon as possible, and the analysis proceed with the written support of the Practitioners' Network particularly regarding introducing the research and encouraging future case study projects to allocate the time necessary to complete the cases in time.

Terms of Reference

Analysis of Joint Implementation Activities of the Practitioners Network (42 days)

1. Background and purpose

The Practitioners' Network (PN - http://www.dev-practitioners.eu/) is a platform for exchange, coordination and harmonisation between European development cooperation organisations with a public mandate and the European Institutions, with a specific focus on the practitioners' perspective.

Engaging in dialogue and exchange in different areas of the EU external action, the Effective Partnerships Working Group (EP WG) leads the contribution of the Network to **improved joint implementation actions and practices**.

In November 2016, the CEOs from the various PN members responded to the Council Conclusions on "Stepping up Joint Programming", with a declaration which committed to intensify Joint Implementation activities. The PN believes that Joint Implementation adds value – it combines European expertise to respond to common global and European challenges and imperatives in an efficient and effective manner, while providing impact at scale.

Since then, then network has:

a) Defined Joint Implementation, describing the objective, scope, principles and typology under which actions are considered "joint" (see annex 1);
b) Initiated work to simplify contractual/operational arrangements in Joint Implementation between members;
c) Initiated work to define good practice in Joint Implementation. This work has included:
   i) A study investigated coordination mechanisms in fragile states and reviewed both Joint Programming and Joint Implementation, making suggestions about how to optimise coordination (see annex 2);
   ii) An initial list of 51 Joint Implementation initiatives. This list has been drawn up according to set criteria thus is not exhaustive. It serves as an indicative database from which we can analysis and extract lessons learned to enhance future Joint Implementation initiatives (see annex 3);
   iii) A Joint Implementation analysis grid has been drafted which will be used to analyse Joint Implementation projects according to standardised criteria (see annex 4);
   iv) Three jointly implemented projects from the list have been presented to the PN Effective Partners working group using the Joint Implementation analysis grid to guide the presentation on their Joint Implementation experience (see annex 5).

Whilst a few key themes were clearly identifiable from the projects presented (the necessity of a joint project office, the usefulness of having an EU Delegation play a coordinating role), the PN sees the need to deepen the analysis to provide objectively defined and concreate criteria for success.

With this in mind, the Practitioners' Network is **seeking a consultant to analyse a sample of Joint Implementation activities.**

The purpose of the consultancy is to use evidence to draw concrete conclusions and recommendations on what factors enabled joint implementation to succeed and what added value was achieved through implementing jointly (even if not identified as an explicit goal at the outset), as compared to projects implemented by one European organisation. The research report should focus on:

a) Good practice in Joint Implementation – practical/implementation orientated guidance on what works and what does not, and which are the key constraints and enablers identified;
b) Added-value of Joint Implementation - when is it considered most useful and when is it not appropriate.

The study will be in two phases. In **Phase One**, Eurosocial+'s Latin America Dialogue project will serve as a pilot. The pilot will be used to refine the questionnaire and the structure of the report.
To do this, the consultant will:

a) review the annexes mentioned above;
b) use Eurosocial+ as a pilot project to review the draft analysis grid (annex 3) and make proposals about how to refine it in order to define the necessary indicators to draw the desired conclusions. This will include identifying clear criteria upon which to derive trends and draw conclusions about the good practice and added value of Joint Implementation;
c) refine grid as agreed;

Phase Two of the study will include:

d) agree on a sample of 6 projects (including the pilot) from annex 2 (PN database on Joint Implementation projects). Projects chosen will cover a wide geographic and thematic range, as well as, a wide range of PN members and different contracting modes, i.e. PAGoDA Co, direct grants, etc;
e) use the refined analysis grid to analyse the selected projects. This should be done via telephone interviews with key project staff from PN members, key responsible officials from EU Delegations (and/or DEVCO/NEAR Headquarters) and wherever possible, key counterparts from the partner country. These individuals will be identified by the relevant PN member and the European Commission, and formally introduced to the consultant before interviews start;
f) draft a 2-3 page conclusion report for each project analysed and amend as agreed;
g) conduct a field visit to two agreed projects and analyse further;
h) amend the conclusion reports of these projects visited according to field findings;
i) draft a 20 page review report which responds to the objectives of this consultancy and amend as agreed;
j) present the final report to PN members at the Annual General Assembly in Paris in May 2019.

In doing so, the consultant should verify the relevance of the following areas of interest and/or propose alternatives for the analysis of the case studies:

- Sovereign demand-oriented approach (both in the interests of partner country governments, participating donor governments and the European organisations themselves);
- Result-oriented approach (identifying where the desired results originated, such as in a partner country's development plan, a joint results framework, a regional strategy or through identifiable political dialogue);
- Relevance and orientation of the project vis-a-vis political and policy dialogue processes (with a specific emphasis on sector policy impact, leverage and visibility);
- Aspects of South-South or Triangular cooperation;
- Impact of JI on partner-ownership of the projects and strengthening or use of country systems;
- Efficiency of working together in terms of resources, both financial and human;
- Effectiveness of working together, i.e. the way that we can leverage of each other's bilateral relationships, i.e. political dialogue and work;
- Impact of working together on sustainability;
- Potential impact of JI on the monitoring system
- Any improved coordination practice that resulted in reduced transaction costs, lower risk of duplication, including concrete practical details on how coordination is ensured and how it can be replicated (or should be strengthened in cases where it is weak);
- Innovative approaches that resulted from delivering better together;
- How joint implementation relates to Joint Programming processes at country level and/or whether the joint implementation has contributed to a shared understanding / joined-up analysis or to laying the foundation for Joint Programming in-country or at regional level.

2. Deliverables

a) A brief Methodological Approach subject to comments – estimated number of working days: 6

During Phase One of the study, the consultant will review the existing documents (Annex 1-4) and present a brief methodological approach to the PN Presidency, EP co-leaders and the EC, hereinafter known as the “client”. The Methodological Approach will consider reflections made on the literature and review of the Eurosocial+ pilot, and will include:

i. an outline of the methodological approach to be used, describing the indicators (qualitative and quantitative) and criteria which will be used to make assumptions about good practice and added value;
ii. a draft 2-3 page conclusion report, which presents the pilot and that will then serve as the format for the remaining five case studies;
iii. a refined analysis grid and proposed changes, including an explanation for the proposed refinement linked to the indicators.
iv. a proposal of the list of projects to be analysed (base on prior communication with the PN and the EU);

b) Draft conclusion reports (2-3 pages per report) subject to comments by the client for each project analysed – estimated number of working days: 20 (including interview time)

During Phase Two, the consultant will review 5 projects and produce a draft report per project to be presented to the client after all 5 projects have been reviewed. The consultant will finalise the reports taking into consideration comments made by the client.

c) Amend conclusion reports, subject to comments by the client, of projects visited on the spot – estimated number of working days: 11 (5 days for field mission plus 1/2 day to amend report x 2 projects)

Following the draft conclusion reports, the client and the consultant will agree upon 2 projects to visit on-the-spot to deepen the analysis that was done by phone interview. Following these visits, the consultant will amend the conclusion reports previously produced for each project, to take into account the findings from the field visits. The consultant will present the amended reports to the client and finalise them taking into consideration comments made by the client.

d) Draft overall conclusion report (20 pages) subject to comments which responds to the objectives of this consultancy - estimated number of working days: 5

The consultant will finalise the report taking into consideration comments made. The final report will include:

- An executive summary (2 pages max.);
- A comparative analysis report presenting the findings, and contextualising them;
  - A conclusions section which responds to the purpose of this study and includes an evidence-based analysis template that can be used to assess the added value of Joint Implementation and clear guidance on good practice for the PN to consider when embarking upon future Joint Implementation initiatives and an evidence-based analysis template;
  - A Power point presentation for the AMGA in Paris.

3. Indicative Timeframe and next steps

erable	**Date**
nt Methodological Approach to client	ptember 2018
5 projects to be reviewed	commencing 1st October 2018
Present draft conclusion reports to client	ek November 2018
out Field Missions	December 2018 and January 2019
nt amended conclusion reports to client	eek of January 2019
nt draft overall conclusion report to client	ebruary 2019
nt Final Report to client	ebruary 2019
ntation at PN Annual General Assembly Meeting	ay 2019 (TBC)

4. Application

- Submit CV, a short cover letter and sample of research together with expected fee

5. Selection and profile of the consultant

(i) Selection procedure

According to article 39 of the Practitioners' Network's Charter, in entering contracts, the Practitioner's Network respects principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and fair access, as recommended by good international practices. The contracts entered into on behalf of the Practitioners' Network will be carried out upon a competitive bidding procedure. The successful candidate will be selected according to his/her profile, the quality of his/her proposal and the financial offer he/she has made.

It is important to note that some aspects of the research may be completed prior to contracting such as on the pilot and in adding case studies. Additionally, the allocation of days may be revised to account for travel related to possible field visits (point e above). As such, parts of this Terms of Reference may be amended prior to contracting.

(ii) Profile of the consultant

The selected candidate(s) should have demonstrable experience with:

- Designing projects in international cooperation;
- Developing programming strategies at the policy dialogue level;
- Demonstrable experience linking project activities to policy dialogue and ensuring relevance for political dialogue;
- Demonstrable experience on project monitoring and evaluation, particularly looking at the impact of project implementation methodology on the monitoring criteria – Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability;
- Practicable experience working on joint programming or joint implementation involving multiple development partners;
- Demonstrable experience working for partner government aid coordination or planning units in negotiating with donors to ensure sovereign / national ownership;
- Knowledge of the public sector expertise;
- Applied/action research experience in international cooperation.

Depending on the skill set and experience, the contractor may select either one senior consultant (with more ten years of demonstrable experience designing and/or conducting analysis on joint projects in the field of technical cooperation in developing countries) or a senior and a junior consultant (the junior should demonstrate at least five years of demonstrable experience relevant to the assignment).