



## GENERAL INFORMATION

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Update of a previous Roadmap (2014-2017): Yes

Approved by: Office of the EU Representative and the EU Member States together with Norway and Switzerland

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Joint European Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Palestine<sup>1</sup> 2018-2020 is embedded in the European Joint Strategy in support of Palestine 2017-2020<sup>2</sup>. The Joint Strategy explicitly refers to the Roadmap and emphasises the importance that the European Union (EU) and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland (European Development Partners), attach to the role of civil society<sup>3</sup> in policy development and in monitoring the implementation of laws and policies. This is all the more important in the absence of functioning democratic governance structures and adequate representation for Palestinians. Efforts to enhance the integrity, transparency and accountability of public institutions are vital, and civil society has a crucial role to play in this context.

The objective of the Roadmap is to help creating an environment where Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are able to fully play their legitimate role in Palestinian society not only as service providers, but also as advocates and watchdogs. This objective illustrates the importance of European engagement in contributing to an enabling environment for civil society and strong, inclusive and democratic Palestinian institutions, based on the Rule of Law and respect for Human Rights. The Roadmap identifies priorities for European engagement with CSOs and encompasses dialogue as well as operational support. These priorities have been defined through a structured dialogue with CSOs.

The Roadmap consists of three parts: (i) A brief analysis of the context and past European engagement; (ii) The European strategy and action plan to engage with CSOs; and (iii) Follow-up on the process and strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> \* This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

<sup>2</sup> European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine 2017-2020: "Towards a Democratic and Accountable Palestinian State" ([https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/european\\_joint\\_strategy\\_in\\_support\\_of\\_palestine\\_2017-2020.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/european_joint_strategy_in_support_of_palestine_2017-2020.pdf)).

<sup>3</sup> For the purpose of this Roadmap, civil society is defined as an arena, distinct from the state, the market and the individual household, created by individual, groups and organisations acting together to promote common interests.



In the analytical part, it is noted that the territorial, legal and political fragmentation affecting Palestine has had an impact on civil society actors and their role as development and humanitarian actors, as well as on their participation in public policy setting, monitoring and service provision. In this fragmented context, CSOs in Palestine are increasingly marginalised by all three duty bearers: The Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas as the *de facto* authority in the Gaza Strip. Their space to operate in Palestine is being challenged from new and different angles, including financial, political and cultural pressures as well as violence and intimidation.

The European strategy and action plan to overcome challenges faced by CSOs includes the following priorities and actions for engagement with civil society in Palestine:

**1. Shrinking space for civil society and citizens:**

- Promote and strengthen the enabling environment and space for CSOs;
- Reinforce the representation of citizens' rights and voices in the state-building agenda and inclusive development plans;
- Foster a common, coherent approach among European Development Partners and adopt and promote a policy against public defamation (in particular against Human Rights Defenders).

**2. Poor participation of CSOs in policy-making:**

- Strengthen the role of CSOs in decision-making processes at national and local level;
- Increase the role of CSOs as representatives of citizens, not just implementers of projects;
- Support civil society efforts to enhance their internal governance, transparency and accountability.

**3. Occupation/Political environment:**

- Enhance connectivity and joint analysis/actions between the representations of the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv;
- Counteract incitement to violence.

As regards follow-up on the process and strategy, the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, commit to ensure continuous engagement with civil society in Palestine through a structured dialogue.



## **INTRODUCTION – STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK**

In July 2018, the Heads of the European Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah endorsed the first European Joint Strategy in support of Palestine 2017-2020. It was the result of extensive discussions with Palestinian partners in ministries and agencies, consultations with civil society and the private sector, as well as much internal reflection among the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland. The vision of a future Palestinian state that underpins the Palestinian National Policy Agenda 2017-2022 forms the basis of the European Joint Strategy in support of Palestine 2017-2020. The EU and its Member States together with Norway and Switzerland are committed to working jointly to see this vision come to life.

The European Joint Strategy provides a framework through which European Development Partners can support Palestinian partners, including the Palestinian Authority (PA) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), in a more coordinated way. It allows the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, to collectively address the developmental and political challenges facing Palestinian state-builders and to work more effectively together to support improvements in the lives of the approximately five million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as well as Palestine Refugees across the Middle East.

The Joint European Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Palestine 2018-2020 is embedded in the European Joint Strategy in support of Palestine 2017-2020. The Joint Strategy explicitly refers to the Roadmap and emphasizes the importance that the EU, together with Norway and Switzerland, attach to a vibrant, viable and pluralistic civil society that effectively contributes to poverty reduction in all its dimensions, including the promotion of democracy, equality, freedom of expression, association and assembly. This is all the more crucial in the absence of functioning democratic governance structures and adequate representation for Palestinians. Efforts to enhance the integrity, transparency and accountability of public institutions are vital and civil society should play a strong role in this context.

The Roadmap illustrates the importance of development cooperation in contributing to an enabling environment for civil society in Palestine. It identifies long-term objectives for European cooperation with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and encompasses dialogue as well as operational support. Implementing the Roadmap in complementarity with the European Joint Strategy contributes to strong, inclusive and democratic Palestinian institutions, based on the Rule of Law and respect for Human Rights. This is also linked to the principle of protecting social cohesion, so that risks associated with the potential fragmentation of Palestinian social fabric and national identity are contained.



## PART I – ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEXT AND PAST EU ENGAGEMENT

Territorial, legal and political fragmentation continue to affect Palestine, where the Palestinian Authority only partially governs the West Bank<sup>4</sup>, East Jerusalem has been illegally annexed by Israel<sup>5</sup>, Hamas continue to be the *de facto* authority in the Gaza Strip. This fragmentation has had an impact on the functioning of civil society actors and their role in development and humanitarian actions, as well as on their participation in public policy setting and monitoring and service provision.

In this fragmented context, the space for CSOs to operate in Palestine is increasingly being challenged from new and different angles, including financial, political and cultural pressures as well as violence and intimidation. At this current juncture, CSOs in Palestine are being marginalized by all governing bodies/duty bearers: the Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas as the *de facto* authority in the Gaza Strip and the Government of Israel. The Government of Israel is applying particular pressure on Palestinian CSOs present in East Jerusalem as well as Israeli Human Rights organisations active in Palestine. The charges brought during the summer of 2016 against some international CSOs active in the Gaza Strip (coupled with allegations of aid diversion) have also put at risk the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable. In April 2014, Palestine acceded to all major human rights treaties without reservations. This places the PA under international obligations which prohibit the use of means to restrict the space for CSOs, especially those protecting human rights. In spite of this, CSOs have reported an increase in the deployment of such measures in recent years.

## 1. STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

### 1.1. ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

The past three years have witnessed a dramatic spike in repressive actions against civil society, and in particular those advocating for human rights, by the Government of Israel and the PA as well as the *de facto* authority in the Gaza Strip. The increasingly restrictive policies employed by the three duty bearers have affected the fundamental freedoms necessary for civil society and the media to operate and have had an undeniable impact, creating a "chilling effect", silencing debate and leading to self-censorship in Palestinian society.

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<sup>4</sup>Following the Oslo Agreements, the West Bank, except for East Jerusalem, has been administratively divided into three zones: Area A under Palestinian civil and security control; Area B under Palestinian civil and shared Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C under full Israeli security control and Israeli civilian control. Area C composes the largest portion of the West Bank territory (62 %).

<sup>5</sup> Israeli control over East Jerusalem has been strengthened by a decision of the United States (US) on 6 December 2017 to formally recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, departing from decades of international consensus. On 15 May 2018, the US moved its Embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.



On the one hand, several critical Israeli legislative acts have been passed or have been proposed, specifically targeting human rights groups and organisations that oppose the occupation, while public defamation of leading human rights organisations and activists has intensified<sup>6</sup>.

While these restrictive Israeli laws and policies affect both Israeli and Palestinian CSOs, they are particularly harmful to all Palestinian organisations working in occupied East Jerusalem. Israel's growing restrictions on Palestinian access to East Jerusalem since 1990 (a closure policy with checkpoints, the construction of the separation barrier and imposing a permit regime for non-Jerusalem residents' employees) have severely undermined the capacities of Palestinian CSOs working in East Jerusalem to operate, support the Palestinian population and protect their rights and presence in the city. Many other challenges have been documented and reported, among which closure of bank accounts at Israeli banks, defamation campaigns by Israel-lobby groups, office raids, confiscation/destruction of equipment and materials, etc. As a result of those measures and policies, a large number of Palestinian CSOs had gradually been forced to close down their Jerusalem offices permanently or temporarily in the period between May 2002 and April 2008<sup>7</sup>. The remaining Palestinian CSOs working in East Jerusalem are isolated and face a continuous threat of closure by Israeli authorities, limited access to resources and a high financial burden to carry out their activities.

On the other hand, Palestinian and international CSOs operating in areas under the control of the PA are subject to the terms of the "*Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations*" from 2000 (Law 1/2000) as well as a growing number of more recent restrictive legislative and policy measures. These new measures have increased the administrative burden for CSOs, requiring more steps in the registration process, complex financial procedures, administrative obstacles to setting up a bank account and/or receiving and transferring funds. Palestinian civil society actors see these increased administrative burdens as disabling, as they further divert their energies away from service delivery and advocacy work, in an already difficult operating environment.

Furthermore, in Gaza the *de facto* authority continues to exercise strict control over CSOs. It regularly seeks to carry out audits, review CSO staff or beneficiary lists or to introduce new permit requirements and restrictions on work in certain areas of the Strip.

### **Legal Framework**

The different legal frameworks regulating the Palestinian civil society sector pose challenges to the organisations' ability to operate in an effective and sustainable way, in addition to the increased use of harassment and intimidation against them, including the strategic use of defamation. Public accusations of corruption against CSOs have also increased.

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<sup>6</sup> For more details and reference to Israeli laws, see EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Israel 2018-2020.

<sup>7</sup> Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations Network: "*Attacks on Palestinian Civil Society Organisations in Occupied East Jerusalem*", 2018.



The aforementioned Law 1/2000 formalises the right of Palestinian citizens “to practice social, cultural, professional and scientific activity in all freedom, including the right to establish and run Associations and Community Organizations” (Article 1). The Law includes the following definitions: An association and organisation, a community activity, the procedure for registration with the Ministry of Interior, the obligations and entitlements of the associations and modalities and reasons for dissolving an association.

In 2010 and 2017, new laws were adopted to regulate the work of Palestinian Cooperatives under the Ministry of Labour. In 2015, a decree by the Palestinian Council of Ministers prevented CSOs registered as not-for-profit from accessing grants without prior approval by the Cabinet. In early 2016, the Council of Ministers set up a committee to prepare a new draft law on associations. The committee comprises of representatives of several ministries, but CSOs are not represented. Furthermore, the PA established a centralised fund, through which all funding for Palestinian CSOs should be channeled, further centralising and consolidating control over independent organisations. It also presented a proposal that all Palestinian CSOs board members should reside in Palestine, thus significantly reducing the scope of diaspora Palestinians from engaging with civil society activity.

Against this background, Law 1/2000 has been the subject of debate with a view to making improvements (e.g. clear implementing regulations). On the one hand, for the PA the issue of coordination between civil society and public authorities is not well defined; no monitoring mechanism exists over the activities carried out by CSOs and their impact. They allege that CSOs often hide specific political or private interests. On the other hand, CSOs would like to enjoy greater autonomy and independence, and call for a more effective implementation of the law - in particular a reduction of the bureaucratic burden for registration of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Both CSOs and public authorities consider Law 1/2000 inadequate to guarantee the quality of the organisations and their actions. Both sides call for greater attention to be paid to corruption and internal governance amongst civil society actors.

In September 2018, a draft-proposal for amendments to Law 1/2000 came into the public domain. If adopted this amendment would further tighten PA control over CSOs and increase the PA’s room for manoeuvre, including allowing for government takeover of CSO assets. Both CSOs and European Development Partners have called upon the PA to consult relevant stakeholders on any formal proposals for amendments to this Law.

It should be highlighted that the implementation of Law 1/2000 is difficult in the parts of Palestine which remain under full Israeli control following the Oslo Agreement. In East Jerusalem, Palestinian organisations are compelled to abide by the "Israeli Law of Association" as well, meaning Palestinian CSOs in the city have to register with and report to two authorities (one Israeli, one Palestinian) to comply with legal requirements. In Area C, Israeli control also poses challenges to the organisations, which are often constrained by movement restrictions or reporting requests on projects and activities.

In Gaza, organisations have been subject to special requirements imposed by the *de facto* authority which serve to restrict their activities, for example by requesting them to obtain permits for organising public activities or events, or by pressuring them for more detailed information on their organisation, under threat of a forcibly imposed dissolution.



### **Organisational and financial sustainability**

The process of CSO registration does not distinguish between different kinds of association. The only distinction made in the registration process is between organisations based on “voluntary work” and those using paid workers. However, increasingly “voluntary work” is paid and in addition, a growing number of small local organisations tend to self-define themselves as CSOs in order to access donor funding. CSOs are highly dependent on foreign funding. This dependency limits the financial sustainability of the organisations and their ability to define long-term strategic planning. The high number of CSOs and this high dependency on external funding has made the Palestinian CSO sector competitive, sometimes producing rivalry rather than cooperation between CSOs.

### **Participation in public life**

The proliferation of registered CSOs weakens any possibility of verifying accurately the quality of their actions and interventions and their internal governance. The law obliges registered organisations to submit reports to relevant competent ministries. Studies covering a number of selected CSOs appear to suggest that while the majority of organisations are committed to transparency in their activities through annual and financial reporting, PA ministries seemingly lack the ability to sufficiently monitor the overall governance of the civil society organisations reporting to them.

Law 1/2000 also stipulates requirements relating to representativeness and membership of each organisation, organisational and regulatory abilities, the regularity of events and activities and cooperation and coordination amongst organisations to comply with internal governance obligations. While this activity can be performed by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) for a relatively small number of organisations, it has by now become an impossible task since these organisations number in the thousands, each with different features.

## **1.2. PARTICIPATION AND ROLES**

### **Participation in public policy formulation**

In recent years, there has been a slow-down in Palestine in the pace of democratic development, with national electoral processes stalled and little progress as regards democratic accountability and oversight. Palestine is in need of renewed efforts to develop robust democratic institutions and to reinforce the ways in which citizens and civil society actors can participate in public decision-making.

Civil society in Palestine is increasingly expected to play a role as a policy actor, participating in the setting of policies and assuming a special function in monitoring and assessing the implementation of laws and policies by the PA. Although modalities for CSO participation in national planning processes are in place (e.g. workshops, consultations and meetings), they are deemed as ‘superficial’ by civil society, which considers its influence on policy formulation, legislation and budgeting to be limited and moderate. There is no legislation to regulate national decision-making and planning processes.



Civil society has participated in the formulation of the National Development Plans (NDPs) 2011-2013 and 2014-2016 and the National Policy Agenda (NPA) 2017-2022. Initially, participation was focused on individual sector strategies and mostly limited to big CSOs, located at the center of the West Bank. The quality and type of participation was also affected by the weak preparedness of organisations to play a proactive role in the process with poor technical abilities and limited coordination and cooperation amongst civil society actors. However, it is reported that the process as regards the formulation of the NPA 2017-2022 was more consultative than previous planning processes. During this process, several consultative sessions were held with representatives from civil society, the private sector and international development partners. Strong involvement from within and outside of the PA is believed to have made the process more transparent and inclusive than ever.

Gender, human rights and agricultural and rural development are the three policy areas where civil society is most active. CSOs have limited capacity to promote economic development and to address socio-economic distortions caused by the market, even if their representatives are part of the tripartite committee created to ensure social dialogue.

Over the years, the political division between the West Bank dominated by Fatah and the Gaza Strip ruled by Hamas as the *de facto* authority, has created a further burden for the civil society sector, as CSOs associated with one or the other political movement can be subject to retaliatory measures by the authorities. Civil society reports an increasing tendency on the part of both authorities, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to control and limit CSOs' activities. The independence and impartiality of the civil society sector is compromised where the authorities are successful in this respect. Restrictions by authorities on CSOs and selective implementation of the law (e.g. security clearance requirements for members as part of the registration process, confiscation of assets in case of forced closure, exit permits for staff in Gaza) continue to restrict their capacities and effectiveness.

In 2012, a Presidential decree established a "NGO Affairs Commission" with the aim of organising CSO relations with the PA. The Commission is not yet operational and its mandate has not been clearly and explicitly defined. Civil society, including unions and networks, and the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) have questioned the establishment of the Commission.

A focus on citizenship and on the representation of citizens in state-building could be a potential area for significant development amongst Palestinian civil society. This would require a series of reforms, such as: Increasing CSO participation in policy setting (providing the PA with information and knowledge, facilitating the integration of citizens' perspectives in public policies), monitoring of public policies and services at the national and local levels and advocating for greater transparency and accountability of public authorities. This would necessitate further effort by civil society to cooperate with public authorities beyond service delivery, as well as by governing authorities to establish spaces for policy dialogue with civil society actors.





### **Transparency and accountability: Civilian oversight**

In Palestine, the holding of those who govern to account (the “watchdog” function) is particularly important in the absence of a functioning parliament (the Palestinian Legislative Council has not been functioning since 2007 and was dissolved by the President following a decision of the Constitutional Court in December 2018). Civil society participation in budgeting processes (analysis, proposals, monitoring and tracking of public revenues and expenditures) is still very limited, with very limited progress seen in recent years. In some cases, CSOs have been reluctant to play an active role in the setting and monitoring of public policies, because of the political division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

### **Service delivery**

Palestinian civil society emerged and grew in the absence of a national state authority in order to support the Palestinian population in the context of the Israeli occupation. This particular context gave rise to a high number of development-oriented CSOs, providing basic social services for the Palestinian population in particular in the health, education and social protection sectors.

After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, a state structure started emerging, playing an increasing role in the management of basic and fundamental services. Consequently, the role of CSOs as service providers decreased. They are now increasingly expected to play a role as policy actor, participating in policy formulation, monitoring government activity and advocating for better public services and citizens' rights. These dual roles, as service provider and policy actor, have not always been fulfilled in an optimal manner. In this context, resources managed by CSOs are frequently perceived as “escaping” public control and impeding the role of public authorities. Service provision by CSOs remains vital in locations outside of PA control, especially in Area C and East Jerusalem.

### **Conflict prevention, peace-building and state-building**

The Israeli occupation creates a permanent condition of insecurity and emergency. Palestinian civil society has supported citizens, increasing the resilience of Palestinians through relief activities. This support has facilitated the creation of “grassroots governance” to fill a political vacuum. However, work according to emergencies has limited the possibility for Palestinian CSOs to develop institutional and operational capacities and to operate on a long-term and sustainable basis.

The occupation has also shaped the diversity of Palestinian civil society, whereby some CSOs continue to focus on promoting the Palestinian perspective and/or fostering peace-building, while others focus on service provision, avoiding direct engagement on “conflict-related activities”. Those Palestinian CSOs that continue to promote greater understanding and respect and foster peace-building often do so in cooperation with Israeli and international CSOs.

In recent years, with the growing influence of the non-violent Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement amongst Palestinian civil society, the willingness of Palestinian actors to cooperate with Israeli partners has generally declined.



### 1.3. CAPACITY

#### **Legitimacy, credibility and internal governance**

Palestinian CSOs are experienced, flexible and capable of coping with social and political changes. They are diversified in terms of geography, target groups and sector coverage. Overall, the CSO sector enjoys a fairly high level of professionalism and independence from the public sector.

Palestinian civil society is structured according to the following four tiers or main organisational levels: (i) the first level includes grassroots groups and community-based organisations; (ii) the second level is composed of CSOs and other intermediary organisations (e.g. no-profit resource centers, charities); (iii) the third level comprises aggregations of CSOs focusing on a certain sector, geographical area or campaign; and (iv) the fourth level consists of general larger aggregations of CSOs, such as the national civil society platforms.

#### *First tier*

A vibrant civil society exists at the grassroots level, made up of different groups and community-based organisations (CBOs) carrying out several types of activities, from cultural initiatives to monitoring violations of fundamental rights and responding to local needs and preferences.

Formal institutional requirements are generally respected by CBOs, as most of them have an assembly and governing bodies that are functioning according to the organisations' own by-laws. In some cases, and in addition to the formal bodies, informal committees or executive committees exist for facilitating the work of the organisations. Despite these institutional features, often CBOs are very dependent on the personality of their founders (a dependency that is increased by the small number of members that CBOs normally have).

There is a strong linkage with communities and the willingness to respond to the wide range of "community needs" is often present because of the involvement of community members in the organisations. The existing legal framework and the structural dependence of CBOs as beneficiaries of CSO actions and programmes tends to reduce grassroots organisations' visibility and public recognition as relevant actors for governance and policy-making. The focus on service delivery and the dependency on external resources are factors contributing to a process that has seen many CBOs strive towards becoming professionalized CSOs.

#### *Second tier*

The second tier of civil society actors represents citizens' organisations. They are commonly characterised as being permanent, having a formally recognised status (meaning official registration) and a stable structure, supporting a wider group of beneficiaries beyond simply "organisation members".

Second-tier organisations are engaged in all sectors, from scientific and technological research to education (particularly focusing on special education or on higher -graduate and post-graduate education) to health, agriculture, water, the environment, human rights, democracy, gender, youth-related issues,



peace building, etc. Almost all such organisations carry out “service delivery” activities, while a smaller percentage is involved in advocacy activities, policy monitoring or in the work of policy dialogue at local and national levels.

The presence of a large number of organisations with a long history implies the emergence of a generational issue. In most organisations, the founders are still active and still play a leadership role. As a consequence, often younger professionals tend to create new organisations (producing a proliferation of CSOs) or follow new emerging professional opportunities (including in international CSOs), which produces a high staff turnover and a low capacity to retain skilled staff.

#### *Third tier*

The third level is represented by coalitions of organisations focusing on a particular sector, geographical area or campaign. As these organisations are often created for coordinating a specific action or for being a discussion forum on a special issue, the mandate and scope of these organisations are in most cases well-defined and delimited. Moreover, the fact that these organisations maintain a completely or partially informal status, obliges them to adhere closely to their original mandate. When the scope of action changes or does not respond to the needs and expectations of members anymore, these coalitions are dissolved. Coalitions do not have direct access to funding sources and are sustained by the resources of their member organisations.

#### *Fourth tier*

Fourth-level organisations consist of the general aggregations of CSOs, such as the national civil society platforms. In Palestine, there are five national platforms: The Palestinian General Union of Charitable Societies (PGUS), the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), the General Palestinian Union for NGOs in Gaza (GPU), the Palestinian National Institute of NGOs (PNIN) and The Palestinian Council for Human Rights Organizations.

From the institutional point of view and from the perspective of transparency and accountability, the umbrella organisations appear to be in compliance with the “Associations’ Law” 1/2000 (in fact, they are often subject to comparatively more intense scrutiny than other CSOs).

Despite the fact that such platforms collect a large pool of certain resources in terms of knowledge, capacity and even finance, they actually suffer from a lack of resources in other areas (particularly adequate permanent staff) and from limited engagement by member organisations, undermining their ability to foster a stronger role for such umbrella organisations.

#### *Features common to the four tiers of civil society organisations*

Links with their own constituency actually present a major risk for Palestinian civil society actors. When organisations adopt a “service provider” reference model, the risk is that they will focus on their own “sustainability” rather than on the interests and needs of the constituency they represent. Recognising the constituencies of civil society and CSOs would infer a transition away from an approach based on



“targeting beneficiaries” to one focused on participation and support for the actual exercise of citizenship.

Another concern arises from the fact that CSOs are increasingly project-oriented and less focused on their mandate and objectives. This increases the risk that they work in isolation and outside the framework of the Palestinian National Policy Agenda.

In recent years, the decrease in foreign funding has threatened Palestinian civil society, producing crises and conflict among organisations. The following phenomena can be considered indicators of these frictions:

- The proliferation of CSOs without a real constituency and without a mid- or a long-term vision;
- The competition for qualified human resources;
- The increasing dependency not only concerning financial resources but also regarding the setting of agendas and the identification of activities and projects;
- The growing tendency of organisations to act as simple “implementing agencies” or “contractors”;
- The widening of the gap between larger organisations and those that were created primarily for implementing a project;
- A tendency amongst CBOs to adopt the shape and features of second-level organisations, in order to access available funds without the intermediation of other actors;
- The tendency among smaller organisations to perceive themselves as being in competition with others for financial resources, resulting in a reduction of inter-organisational cooperation and communication;
- The increasing provision by donors of project-based funds, which impact the ability of CSOs to cover all their expenditures.

In general, and even though most Palestinian organisations have sought to report their financial statements and prepare audit reports on an annual basis, there exists space for further strengthening of internal democratic structures and scrutiny. Despite the adoption of a “Code of conduct”<sup>8</sup>, participation, transparency, accountability and rotation of representatives inside the organisations remain limited. As a consequence, publication and disclosure of reports and information to the general public about their activities and resource management is still poor. However, CSOs regularly submit and disseminate reports and information to donors, mainly in relation to the implementation of activities funded by the donor rather than on the entire performance of the organisations.

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<sup>8</sup> The Palestinian NGOs Code of Conduct (2008): Is the standard for the ethical and work behavioural patterns within the framework of the functioning of NGOs. It specifies the ground rules needed to be observed by the Board, Administration and staff while fulfilling their tasks.



### **Organisation, coordination and collaboration**

The structural, governance and political divisions between the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip have prevented the creation of a unified civil society vision and common position. The problems of competition, lack of coordination, duplication of work and fragmentation of efforts continue to exist within the civil society sector, particularly among discrete civil society components (i.e. youth unions, women's movements, student organisations, trade unions, media, business associations, academic centres). In addition, there is weak complementarity between larger CSOs and grassroots communities, especially in rural areas.

Some improvements have been achieved in certain matters of coordination, overcoming the fragmentation and enhancing the organisations' governance through the work of four national platforms, which in March 2013 produced a *Strategic Framework to Strengthen the Palestinian NGO Sector (2013-2017)*. The formulation of this sector strategy was based on an intensive consultation process with a wide range of CSOs in different regions of Palestine. The process ensured the ownership of the strategy by the civil society sector. It will be jointly implemented by the CSOs registered with the Ministry of the Interior.

In view of further elaborating a unified vision and common position for Palestinian CSOs, a Coordination Council of Palestinian CSOs was established on 28 December 2013. The Coordination Council includes three of the four existing Civil Society Platforms (nine members; three members from each of the three platforms). The General Palestinian Union in Gaza decided not to join. The Coordination Council meets every three months.

In some cases, international CSOs have played a unifying role, facilitating a single project to be carried out in a coordinated way in the different areas of the occupied Palestinian territory, with different local partners.

### **International Civil Society Organisations operating in Palestine**

The total number of International Civil Society Organisation (ICSOs), including Israeli CSOs, operating in Palestine is not precisely known. While some ICSOs have a permanent office in Palestine, others simply provide funding from abroad. About 80 ICSOs implement activities and are involved in long-term engagement in Palestine through the Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA), an umbrella grouping representing ICSOs in Palestine.<sup>9</sup>

Over the years, ICSOs operating in Palestine have played different roles, including:

- Advocating for Palestinian rights at an international level;
- Direct implementation of local development and humanitarian projects, relief activities and service delivery, often mobilising local CSOs as implementing partners at a local level;

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<sup>9</sup> AIDA is a membership-based body having mainly coordination functions and was founded in 1995. AIDA is currently organised in sub-committees concerning the main intervention areas of ICSOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, such as advocacy, health, agriculture and education (<http://www.aidajerusalem.org>).



- Provision of funding to Palestinian CSOs;
- Formation of project-based partnerships with Palestinian CSOs, involving the direct intervention of international partners in the delivery of activities or services;
- Setting up long-term, strategic partnerships, in which the international partners provide "core funding" and/or technical assistance to local partners, based on "institutional development plans" or "strategic plans";
- Promotion/participation in international or regional project-based partnerships, using international funds and sometimes involving CSOs from Israel and other neighbouring countries;
- Direct involvement in activity implementation and engagement (mainly with a leadership role) in project-based partnerships and funding (sometimes channeling bilateral agency funds), particularly (but not limited to) assisting where there are restrictions on movement for Palestinian CSOs. Direct funding is rather substituted by different types of delegated and indirect cooperation;
- In some cases, ICSOs directly implement activities or manage short-term partnerships with local CSOs carrying out bridging actions, facilitating the access of local CSOs to knowledge and innovation, international networks and funding opportunities. Also, ICSOs have directly played a role protecting local CSOs from political risks and, in some cases, "legitimizing" and recognising first-tier CSOs as relevant policy actors at a local level.

These actions and roles are not widely recognised by local CSOs. When talking about ICSOs, Palestinian organisations have reported the following difficulties:

- Competition in fundraising: ICSOs are blamed for having a greater capacity in project formulation and in administrative management, resulting in unfair competition in the accessing of international funding opportunities;
- The creation of "unbalanced" partnerships with ICSOs where local organisations are mostly involved as providers of labour;
- Competition in recruitment of human resources, as ICSOs can offer better wages than those of local organisations;
- Tendency to impose agendas and approaches coming from abroad and little-adapted to local conditions;
- Maintaining of local partners in a dependency situation, as ICSOs are often the sole channel for national CSOs to access international donor resources. Therefore, local autonomous capacities and conditions to access resources are not developed;
- Limited coordination between ICSOs and local CSOs, with certain sectoral exceptions, for example in human rights and education.



In early 2018, concrete steps were taken by AIDA towards increasing cooperation and partnership with Palestinian civil society (PNGO) through development of partnership documents and joint activities including increased alignment and engagement on priorities and advocacy.

ICSOs have reported continued problems in securing registration under Israeli law. Delays and the freezing of the issuance of recommendation letters by the Israeli Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs needed for ICSO workers to get a working visa has been a recurrent problem, limiting humanitarian access and risking the harming of operations. Since late 2016, ICSOs already registered in Israel have faced similar difficulties in the securing the renewal of work permits for international staff, with potentially serious consequences for their capacity to operate and fulfil their mandates. The international staff of ICSOs is further affected by the Israeli control of movement within Palestine.

Within the West Bank, the PA requests ICSOs to pay income tax in Ramallah for Gaza-based staff. ICSOs have been threatened with the closure of their bank accounts if the taxes are not paid. ICSOs fear that paying the tax to the PA without agreement with the *de facto* authorities in Gaza on this issue would put their operational capacity in Gaza at risk. ICSOs are largely unable to pay taxes directly to the *de facto* authorities in Gaza due to the anti-terror legislation of their donor states or their own countries of origin.

### **Israeli Civil Society Organisations operating in Palestine<sup>10</sup>**

Israeli CSOs operating in Palestine are vibrant and dynamic, and focus specifically on issues related to International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Israel-civil society relations are inevitably shaped and influenced by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The rights of Palestinians living under occupation, as well as Arab Israelis, form the focus of much of the human rights activity undertaken by Israeli CSOs where there is a growing tendency for the Government of Israel to portray and perceive human rights organisations as a threat.

A number of measures have been taken recently which hamper the work of human rights organisations that play a crucial role in monitoring and securing accountability for the violations of IHL and human rights by Israeli and Palestinian duty bearers.

Human rights actors further report that organisations that discredit the work of Palestinian and Israeli human rights organisations have gained significant political and media influence both locally and abroad, contributing to the mounting pressure.

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<sup>10</sup> For more details, see also the EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Israel 2018-2020.



## 2. CURRENT EU ENGAGEMENT

### 2.1. EUROPEAN DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

Since 2010, the Office of the EU Representative (EUREP) and the EU Member States have established and maintained a dialogue with civil society in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and programming processes. Palestinian civil society has been involved workshops, consultations and information sessions throughout Palestine.

In 2016, during the development of the European Joint Strategy in support of Palestine 2017-2020, the European Development Partners extensively consulted with both local and international CSOs, in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. This consultative process was conducted in a transparent and inclusive manner. The European Joint Strategy mainstreams civil society in all pillars and sectors of intervention. The European Joint Strategy, foresees support to Palestinian civil society on the basis of their right to initiate and undertake specific activities (e.g. advocacy, opening or enlargement of spaces of dialogue, monitoring of public authorities, service delivery, etc.), by investing in organisations' capacity development, as well as promoting alliances and platforms, in order to strengthen the role of civil society as well as their capacities, in Palestine's processes of governance and development.

Policy dialogue with civil society takes place regularly on relevant issues contained within the EU-Palestine Action Plan and, in order to prepare the EU-Palestine Sub-Committees which take place every year in six domains, promoting the participation of CSOs in domestic policy formation and implementation. Prior to the relevant EU-Palestine Sub-Committees, a consultation with civil society is organised both in the West Bank and Gaza, to discuss civil society priorities and concerns in the relevant area. In parallel, a consultation is carried out in Brussels, in which Brussels-based CSOs also convey their concerns. These consultations facilitate input from civil society into the EU-PA policy dialogue across a wide range of sectoral policies, mainly relating to human rights, rule of law, governance and social affairs. After the EU-Palestine Sub-Committee meetings, a debriefing with civil society is organised to ensure follow-up.

Contacts are also regularly maintained with CSOs to discuss specific policy issues (e.g. gender based violence) or concerns (e.g. the introduction of new requirements by the *de-facto* authorities in Gaza) or to monitor conflict evolution. These contacts can take place through the dedicated EU Working Group on Civil Society (EU-CSWG), or in other coordination fora or by EUREP and/or Member States individually.

EUREP as well as several EU Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) plus Norway and Switzerland have established bilateral dialogue mechanisms with Palestinian civil society (e.g. consultations, workshops) to discuss their multi-annual strategic plans, their projects/programmes and civil society relations with the PA. These mechanisms allow civil society concerns to be raised during policy dialogue between the EU and the PA across a wide range of sector policies (e.g. human rights, gender equity, rule of law and governance, etc.). Moreover, some funding has been provided to CSO networks on a project basis to enable better coordination within specific sectors and with other CSO platforms.





## 2.2. POLICY DIALOGUE FOR AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

While generally speaking the enabling environment for civil society is quite positive, at least according to regional standards, European Development Partners have remained vigilant following the recent trends and key developments observed in both Palestine and in Israel during the past two years whereby the space for CSOs has become volatile and insecure, leading unfortunately to a rather **disenabling environment** for civil society actors. New ways are to be sought to overcome those challenges.

In this context, the EU has regularly conveyed its concerns as regards freedom of association and of expression to the Palestinian Authority, in particular as regards the establishment of an "NGO Affairs Commission" and possible amendments to Law 1/2000 that could be used as a means of control. European Development Partners have also called on the PA to ensure a gender mainstreamed participatory approach for the implementation of the Palestinian National Policy Agenda 2017-2022. Most EU Member States have expressed their concerns about civil society space during their regular meetings with the PA. Some of them have used their leverage in a specific sector to defend a particular space for civil society.

Whenever projects with CSOs face difficulties in their implementation because of interference from public authorities, the relevant EU Member State or the EUREP holds *ad hoc* consultations with the PA to overcome the difficulties. Despite the fact that these *ad hoc* meetings essentially focus on concrete operational issues related to specific projects, the EU puts emphasis on the importance of preserving an enabling environment for Palestinian civil society.

## 2.3. MAINSTREAMING CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society mainstreaming in EU development cooperation is a means to ensure an inclusive approach focusing on citizens, acknowledging and supporting their roles and responsibilities, as well as promoting their rights and a democratic culture and values at all levels. Since 2010, civil society has been formally incorporated into EU programming and monitoring exercises. At EUREP level, since 2010, civil society has been widely consulted on all civil society-oriented programmes and instruments<sup>11</sup> to discuss strategic priorities, objectives and future recommendations.

The mainstreaming of civil society within EU Member State programmes has increased over time. Many Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, hold bilateral consultations with civil society actors to take into consideration their views before preparing their multi-annual strategic plans. Furthermore, civil society actors are regularly invited to speak with official missions and delegations, offering an important recognition of their critical role and work in creating a just and democratic society and maintaining peace and security. Member States look to support the participation of civil society in the fields of intervention where they could be a key actor for change (i.e. gender, youth empowerment, human rights and local development).

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<sup>11</sup> e.g. Thematic Programme "Non-State Actors-Local Authorities (NSA-LA) in Development"; European instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); Partnership for Peace; and East Jerusalem Programme.



## 2.4. COORDINATION

### Intra-European coordination

Civil society matters are discussed at the relevant EU coordination meetings, such as EU Heads of Mission, Heads of Cooperation and Heads of Political Sections, which include participation by the EU Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the two CSDP missions EU EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM RAFAH. Whenever deemed useful, Palestinian civil society representatives are invited to participate in these coordination meetings.

In addition, a dedicated EU Working Group on Civil Society (EUCSWG) meets on a regular basis to coordinate support to CSOs and discuss pertinent civil society matters. This Working Group also has exchanges of views with CSOs on specific issues, both concerning civil society (i.e. restrictions to civil society imposed by the three duty bearers) or related issues (e.g. human rights violations).

At operational level, coordination between European Development Partners is framed by the European Joint Strategy, which outlines the political and operational framework conditions for operating in Palestine. The European Joint Strategy takes stock of discussions and commitments that have taken place at both global and local level, including the September 2012 EC Communication "Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe's Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations". Within this framework, there exist some tools which facilitate an operational coordination and exchange of information on civil society support: (i) Joint sector strategies, which are to be developed under the guidance of the relevant EU lead donor (e.g. EU local strategy on Gender Equality and Women Empowerment); (ii) The development of EU matrixes on support provided (e.g. operations in Area C; in East Jerusalem, on gender and on support to civil society sector); (iii) Online discussion groups hosted by Capacity4Dev (e.g. discussion group on gender), and; (iv) Mappings (e.g. 2012 mapping on EU donors strategies on Gender; 2011 civil society mapping).

### Coordination with the Palestinian Authority and other donors

Coordination between European Development Partners and the PA, other donors and international agencies and civil society is carried out through the Local Aid Coordination Structure (LACS), which includes 15 Sector Working Groups that align to the National Priorities of the Palestinian National Policy Agenda 2017-2022. Each European Development Partner that is Deputy-Chair of one of the 15 Sector Working Groups is encouraged to mainstream gender and to involve civil society in discussions.

## 2.5. LESSONS LEARNT

Dialogue with civil society over the past eight years within the various above mentioned processes have had a positive impact on the credibility of European Development Partners in supporting Palestinian civil society and in promoting networking among local civil society actors.

The EU funding support provided to the four Palestinian NGOs Platforms has been instrumental in improving the relationship and cooperation among the networks, as well as in fostering the dialogue and partnership between the EUREP and the civil society networks.



EUREP has conducted several external evaluations on their engagement with civil society, from which some lessons have been earned. Some EU Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, have also reviewed their support for civil society.

The 2014 external evaluation of development cooperation between the PA and the EU (2008-2013) showed that since 2011, EU development cooperation with Palestine has served to strengthen the role of civil society as a partner. This support to civil society however is still primarily structured through funding mechanisms under thematic programmes. Resources for CSO engagement in local and national governance and policy dialogue activities have been relatively modest. The evaluators stressed the need to focus support at the community level, to introduce a stronger culture of accountability.

Furthermore, some of the lessons learnt are the following:

1. There is a need to maintain dialogue with Palestinian CSOs as genuine partners in a consistent and structured way whereby successive meetings are used to follow up on issues and tasks agreed upon in previous meetings for both the EU and CSOs;
2. The EU should work in a complementary way, whereby both Palestinian CSOs and Israeli CSOs are encouraged to influence policies and issues related to improving Human Rights, good governance and democracy, keeping in mind that democracy and good governance in Israel have a direct impact on Palestinian society;
3. Building the capacities of CSOs and their networks in understanding and contributing to policy formulation at the level of the EU and its Member States is needed in order to enhance their advocacy skills (where and to whom to advocate);
4. There is a need to support CSOs' access to official data (mainly PA data) in order to improve their abilities and capacities to produce accurate information on several services (health, education, etc.) with clear baselines, and therefore act as agents for change in the sectors in which they are active.

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## PART II – EU STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN TO ENGAGE WITH CSOs

| KEY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES                      | PRIORITIES FOR EU ENGAGEMENT WITH CS   | TARGETS OF EU ENGAGEMENT WITH CS  | ACTIONS/ACTIVITIES (analysis, policy dialogue, financial or non-financial support)   | INDICATIVE MEANS (programmes/instruments, etc.)  |
|---|--|---|--|--|
| General EU engagement with civil society              |  |   |  |  |
| <b>Shrinking space for civil society and citizens</b> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote and strengthen the enabling environment and space for CSOs</li> <li>Reinforce the representation of citizens' rights and voices in the state-building agenda and inclusive development plans</li> <li>Foster a common, coherent approach, adopt and promote a policy against public defamation (mainly against HRDs)</li> </ol> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The space to operate for CSOs and citizens is enhanced.</li> <li>CSOs are capable to promote joint responses to public defamation (mainly against HRDs)</li> <li>CSOs are capable to promote joint responses to public defamation (mainly against HRDs)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dialogue with PA</li> <li>Priorities for the grants to CSOs addressing shrinking space</li> <li>Effective communication and visibility campaigns on EU constructive support to NGOs from a wide spectrum</li> <li>Improve mutual trust between PA and EU insofar as EU support to NGOs is concerned</li> <li>Support to initiatives promoting basic freedoms and supporting human rights defenders</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continuous dialogue between EU and PA on good governance, human rights and democracy within the regular meetings established in the framework of the EU-Palestine sub-committees, as well as within all existing dialogue mechanisms that provide policy dialogue between the EU and EUMS (and Norway and Switzerland) and the PA.</li> <li>Make use of opportunities at international level for accountability related diplomacy and policy dialogues</li> <li>Programmes from the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, working with CSOs, namely EU thematic programmes (CSO-LA and EIDHR)</li> <li>Communication and visibility activities</li> </ul> |

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| <p><b>Poor participation of CSOs in policy making</b></p> | <p>4. To strengthen CSOs role in decision making processes at national and local level through different means (policy dialogue/consultations and advocacy).</p> <p>5. Increase the role of CSOs as representatives of citizens, not just implementers of projects.</p> <p>6. Effective support to local civil society efforts to enhance their internal governance, transparency and accountability</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CSOs participation in decision making processes has improved at local and national level</li> <li>- CSOs accountability towards citizens (downward accountability) is improved by 2020</li> <li>- More capable, transparent, accountable, and sustainable CSOs by 2020, in particular empower small and medium sized CSOs</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Thematic consultations with CSOs prior to EU-Palestine Sub Committees</li> <li>- Annual EU-CSOs meeting (Structure Dialogue) on the implementation of the roadmap</li> <li>- Support to initiatives with component(s) on organisational capacity building, particularly for sectors less participative in policy areas: e.g. economic development or women's issues, in order to have better access to funds, information and to better represent their members.</li> <li>- Support to initiatives that improve pluralism and support citizens' ability to hold governments accountable</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Continuous dialogue with the PA on the introduction of mandatory consultation with CSOs in order to regulate national legislative decision-making and review of laws in line with international standards of conventions and treaties that Palestine has acceded to, including the NGO law, Family Protection Bill and publication of CEDAW.</li> <li>- Programmes from the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, working with CSOs</li> <li>- Donor coordination meetings</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Occupation / Political environment</b></p>          | <p>7. Support CSOs efforts to counter the coercive environment/occupation/</p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CSOs speak with one voice on important policy issues</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support to initiatives - Promote constructive political discourses</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Alignment with EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Israel 2018-2020</li> </ul>  |

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|  | <p>societal and territorial fragmentation both politically and through financial support</p> <p>8. Address issues related to incitement to violence</p> | <p>- CSOs promote a constructive discourse</p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enhance connectivity and joint analysis and action between the EU-MS representations in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv</li> <li>- Support to initiatives with component(s) on actions to address political fragmentation from a Civil Society shared vision angle</li> </ul> | <p>- Programmes from the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, working with CSOs, in particular the EUIP programme</p>  |
| <b>Engagement with civil society in priority sector "Strengthening Institutions and good governance"</b>                             |   |  |   |   |
| <p>Civil society in general, and target groups in particular, do not participate in policy making processes in a relevant manner</p> | <p>9. Promote capacity development of local civil society</p>   | <p>- Increased participation of CSOs in general and vulnerable groups in particular in decision-making processes</p> | <p>- Support to initiatives with component(s) on organisational and/or technical capacity building, with particular attention to advocacy</p>   | <p>- Programmes from the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, working with CSOs, namely EU thematic programmes (CSO-LA and European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights - EIDHR)</p> |
| <b>Engagement with civil society in priority sector "Inclusive society and protection of Human Rights"</b>                           |   |  |   |   |
| <p>Civil Society in Palestine is subject to heavy</p>  | <p>10. Promote realization of Fundamental Rights i.e.<br/>- Freedom of Association</p>  | <p>- The space to operate for CSOs and individuals is enhanced.</p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public and silent diplomacy</li> <li>- Operational support</li> </ul>  | <p>- Programmes from the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, working</p>  |

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| scrutiny and shrinking space to operate freely                            | - Freedom of expression  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The authorities ease the pressure on civil society.</li> <li>- The authorities simplify and ease legislative processes and restrictions on registration of organisations, funding and international technical assistance projects.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support to initiatives promoting basic freedoms and supporting human rights defenders</li> </ul>  | with CSOs   |
| Civil society plays an important role as promoter of an inclusive society | 11.Promote implementation of Agenda 2030, following its guiding principle of Leaving No One Behind (LNOB) and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Clear progress in the implementation of International conventions signed by PA, notably CEDAW, UNCPRD and the Leave no One Behind Principle, to advance a more inclusive society.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Policy dialogue</li> <li>- Operational support</li> <li>- Support to initiatives promoting implementation of international conventions particularly in social protection sectors, with special attention to Gender Based Violence (GBV) and to marginalized groups, e.g. Disabled People Organisations</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programmes from the EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, working with CSOs</li> </ul> |

\* The EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, will assure continuous engagement with civil society in Palestine in all Pillars and sectors as covered by the European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine (2017-2020).

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### PART III– FOLLOW-UP ON THE PROCESS AND STRATEGY

| Process indicators   |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| INDICATOR  | TARGET  | BASE LINE INFORMATION AND FURTHER COMMENTS   |
| Involvement of EU Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland in the Road Map. | EU Member States present in the country as well as Norway and Switzerland are actively involved in the Roadmap process. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Palestine 2018-2020 is embedded in the European Joint Strategy.</li> <li>- The EU Working Group on Civil Society (EU-CSWG) (Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland), chaired by the EU Representative Office, has drafted collectively this Roadmap.</li> <li>- Numerous meetings and consultations have taken place during 2018, both at technical level and at the level of Heads of Cooperation and Political Counsellors from the EU Member States.</li> <li>- EU HoMs endorsed the Roadmap on 25 March 2019.</li> </ul> |



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| <p>Number and quality of consultations held.</p> <p>Number and diversity (in terms of location, sector, capacities) of CSOs consulted regarding the RM.</p> | <p>The Roadmap entails consultations with a broad range of locally based CSOs. Ultimately it leads to a more permanent and structured dialogue.</p>                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The EU and its Member States, together with Norway and Switzerland, have committed to engage with civil society through a "structured dialogue" in a planned, regular, timely predictable and transparent manner.</li> <li>- There have been three rounds of structured dialogue meetings with CSOs on the contents of the Roadmap (both in Ramallah and Gaza).</li> <li>- The CSOs involved in this dialogue were identified in August 2018 with the support of an external consultant and included representatives from both the main Civil Society platforms and organisations that are active in different sectors but do not feel represented by these platforms.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Complementarity of the Roadmap vis-à-vis related EU and other Donor partners' processes.</p>   | <p>The Roadmap is complementary to related processes including human rights and democracy country strategies, the rights-based approach to development, gender action plans, etc.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Palestine 2018-2020 is embedded in the European Joint Strategy. The Joint Strategy explicitly refers to the Roadmap and emphasizes the importance that the EU, together with Norway and Switzerland, attach to the role of civil society in policy development and in monitoring and assessing the implementation of laws and policies of national and local authorities.</li> </ul>  |

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| Outcome indicators  |   |  |   |  |
|---|---|--|---|--|
| PRIORITIES  | TARGET  | INDICATORS   | BASELINE INFORMATION<br>(if available)                                    | SOURCES OF INFORMATION & MEANS OF<br>VERIFICATION  |
| 4/ To strengthen CSOs role in decision making process at local and national level through different means (policy dialogue/consultations and advocacy). | - CSOs participation in decision making processes has improved at local and national level  | - Number and type of CSOs invited to contribute to the analysis and design of the civil society legal framework  |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Laws and other regulations on civil society (i.e. laws, by-laws, decrees, etc.)</li> <li>- Public consultation reports and minutes of Government and CSOs meetings</li> </ul> |
| 6/ Effective support to local civil society efforts to enhance their internal governance, transparency and accountability                               | - More capable, transparent, accountable, and sustainable CSOs by 2020, in particular empower small and medium sized CSOs including self-representative organisations (e.g. DPOs) | - Percentage of CSOs publishing their governance structure and internal documents (statutes, codes of conduct etc.), audited financial accounts and annual reports |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Civil Society platform/NGO coordination body reports</li> <li>- CSOs activities reports</li> </ul>  |
| 11/ Promote implementation of Agenda 2030, following its guiding principle of Leaving No One Behind   | - Clear progress in the implementation of International conventions signed by the PA, notably   | - Level of compliance by the State with international standards and conventions in   | - Concluding observations on the initial report of the State of Palestine | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CEDAW report and CEDAW shadow report</li> <li>- Upcoming state report and shadow reports on the UN CRPD</li> <li>- EU Gender Country Profile</li> </ul>                       |

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| (LNOB) and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  | CEDAW , UNCRPD and the Leave no One Behind Principle, to advance a more inclusive society  | relation to fundamental rights (possibly disaggregated by priority topics) and freedoms of expression/assembly /association is increased   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU Gender country profile 2018</li> <li>- UN Common Country Analysis on LNOB in Palestine 2016</li> </ul> | - Continuous dialogue with the PA on advancing a more inclusive society (i.e. through increasing of women participation in labour force)             |
| 10/ Promote realization of Fundamental Rights i.e. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Freedom of Association</li> <li>- Freedom of expression</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The space to operate for CSOs and individuals is enhanced</li> <li>- The authorities ease the pressure on civil society</li> <li>- The authorities simplify and ease legislative processes and restrictions on registration of organisations, funding and international technical assistance projects.</li> </ul> | - Level of compliance by the PA with international standards and conventions in relation to fundamental rights (disaggregated by priority topics) and freedoms of expression/assembly /association |  | - Different Israeli, Palestinian and International human rights reports (i.e. Human Rights Watch reports (on a specific country) and shadow reports) |

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| Promote capacity development of local civil society | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased participation of CSO in general and vulnerable groups in particular to decision making processes</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Existence of sector consultation mechanisms with civil society organised by relevant line Ministries and/or the EU and its Member States, plus Norway and Switzerland</li> <li>- Evidence (nature and scope) of targeted CSO advocacy strategies (and related tools &amp; practices) in place and being implemented</li> </ul> |  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CSOs activities reports CSO platform/NGO coordination body/etc. reports</li> </ul> |
|---|--|---|--|---|