

RAPID ASSESSMENT OF CAPACITY (RAC)

THREE TESTS: UKRAINE, CHAD AND BOLIVIA

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Workshop Discussion

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*(Evaluation managed by **DRN**)*

Presentation of the 3 case studies

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The three programmes selected for testing the RAC are important sectoral programmes with significant and relatively explicit institutional development components:

1. Support to SWAp in Agriculture and Rural Development in Ukraine
2. Support to the new government's approaches to fight against drug trafficking in Bolivia
3. Strengthening of Transport sector in Chad

The Ukraine and Chad programmes are typical TC programmes, while in the Bolivia one TC is closely linked to Budget Support.

The three cases present very different opportunity frameworks and the motivation of the institutions and staff are very different. They have provided a diversified sample, for testing.

UKRAINE: SWAp in ARD

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The project intended to support a


Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) in Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD),

through the achievement of the following results:

- **Institutional Development of Ministry and decentralised inst. (policy, donors' coordination, monitoring, statistics, etc.):**
- **Food Safety: adoption of the European standards and institutional models**
- **Strengthening market infrastructure**
- **Rural Development: European model strategy (local initiative, future ARD programme)**

Ukraine - The opportunity framework.

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- Europeanization of the agricultural policies had a strong political support, at the conception, but during the execution the political framework was reversed.
- Political and policy sectoral dialogue were not available to adjust, since they focused only on phytosanitary standards for FTA and did not prioritise ARD policies.
- The establishment of a modern Europeanised institution was no more a government priority and MAPF was submitted to administrative cuts and changes that hampered the internal processes.


Ukraine - The quality criteria

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- Fits to the context: the context has changed, though the project was already pioneering at the time (ARD is not an ENP priority – No policy dialogue framework)
- Supported by demands and commitments: objectively yes (WTO access and integration needed competitive agriculture), but were the people aware and ready to support?
- Link to the results: modernising the MAPF; policy supported in

Food safety, Domestic market and Rural development: clear and appropriate policy results expected – but no more realistic after political change!

- Harmonised support: good coordination in early stages (UNDP, bilateral). Then US-EU competition (political change)
- Transfer of know-how: rather traditional (top-down) Tacis style



Ukraine – Capacity Outputs

- Staff: lot of horizontal (general skill) and vertical (sector specialists) good training, but little institutional mainstreaming
- Procedures and approaches: contribution to sectoral improvement though weak sustainability (donor coordination; Food safety; Rural development)




- Structure and functions: weak new units and structures though some innovations (WTO, EU and international coop units; new Phytosanitary dpt.). Market infrastructure very weak and RD still in the process of sensitisation.
- Organisational instability and unclear functional priorities

Ukraine – Capacity Outcomes

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- **Initiative - Autonomous policy making**: MAPF has suffered the political pressure – marginalised. Outputs not mainstreamed.
- **Networking - Stakeholders' participation**: positive, but limited outcomes, (decentralised participation in RD and marketing).
- **Results - SWAP, Ministry leadership**, no strategic guidance (e.g. in President stops RD and decides on Food Safety). No control of and learning from results.
- **Adaptation - Adjustment to the external changes**: weak reaction to administrative and budget reform. Donors' coordination stopped and not guided.
- **Coherence - Policy and institutional improvements in key areas**: Food safety only area where a coherent effort was possible, but undermined by weak restructuring and staffing and interferences.



Ukraine test - Overall considerations

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- The political (and administrative) framework of marginalisation and instability, which affects the programme and the whole sector has influenced as well the specific conditions of the RAC test.
- The Ministry Staff were generally demotivated, although the logic and the significance of the exercise was understood and shared and a basic collaboration was provided. NGOs and external partners were more available.
- The interviews to the Ministry staff have involved 7 directors of different departments. The questionnaire was introduced in preparatory meetings and/or submitted in advance and the single interviews were limited to thirty minutes.
- The other 6 interviews were much more open and long and allowed also cross checking the interviews of the Ministry staff. They regarded the representatives of two decentralised stakeholders, two local NGOs, and two independent Research Institutions.
- The final workshop was mainly a commented restitution of the conclusions of the consultants, which raised a general consensus, despite their harshness.
- The Delegation played a key role in guiding and facilitating the exercise.

CHAD: Sectoral Support for Transport

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The project intended to support the
Strengthening the domestic transport network as a pillar of the sustainable development of the Chadian economy and the reduction of poverty.

Through the achievement of the following results:

Comprehensive institutional development to ensure:

- i) Domestic network maintained annually and periodically;
- ii) Local SMEs take part in road maintenance;
- iii) Economic axis of the South of Chad viable all the year;
- iv) Layout of a connection axis in East Chad

Chad - The effectiveness of the RAC in the assessment of the Enabling Factors

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□ Opportunity Framework

In Chad, the project is largely based on the big oil-related growth opportunities of the country and a political need to give access; but its institutional results are hampered by the political framework, the civil war, corruption and a non-professional public sector.

- Initial hypotheses relating to motivation for CD/ID were easily given a reality check and found wanting, but only at end of RAC process
- State-building was assumed to be rational and transparent, but RAC showed that determining factors (corruption, lack of institutional coherence, poor professionalism and weak standards for employee performance, sense of poor institutional capability overall including management, etc.) were serious constraints that effectively blocked input-output transformation.
- RAC helped identify the disconnect between strategic definition and operational activity. It also showed that Chad institutional culture was not based on institutional effectiveness leading to results; EC design was supposed to be performance-based but contracting strategy led to focus on provision and leverage of individual inputs rather than strategic institution building.

□ Quality Criteria

- Local contractor, NAO and EUD were instrumental in defining historical contexts.
- RAC's focus on QC and OF significantly helped to focus everyone on levels and causality of outcomes, as well as appropriateness of outputs to CD and ID requirements.
- Logic paradox was how can Chad do so much construction while not improving internal capability? Challenge was to discover why so much public political commitment was not met with “pull” for CD by ministry (ies).
- RAC was instrumental in clarifying appropriateness of implementation strategies. Predictability was high as a result and validation simplified.

Chad - The effectiveness of the RAC in the assessment of:

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□ Capacity outputs

- Different research tools were used to get beneficiaries to speak to outputs as a stepping stone to institutional capacity, but reaction was input and process-based. Unaided recall did not generate long lists of outputs.
- Evaluators had to prompt because beneficiaries did not recognise products of TA as outputs (see report)
- Tried to classify and structure responses further along in RAC but same result. RAC helped to quickly identify lack of appropriation and to validate that with beneficiaries.
- RAC needed to be supported by definitions. Ex. what is a capacity? What is performance (standards, levels, competencies)?
- RAC helped to quickly identify that the beneficiaries were not prepared to execute their share of responsibility for ID, including defining what they wanted and what level of performance they were looking to attain
- On-site TA clarified outputs and sustainability of AGER. RAC predicted future problems that were validated by TA and Sr. Ministry officials (ex. independence, standards, priorities)

Chad - The effectiveness of the RAC in the assessment of:

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Capacity outcomes

- RAC model (incl. beneficiaries) helped to create clear hypotheses concerning the nature and level of outcomes. These were validated with all concerned on site.
- Adherence to RAC helped to conclude that outcomes planned by EC were short-circuited by important institutional and individual behaviours that were evident even when the EC design was done (Corruption, serious lack of motivation at individual level, high turnover, poor level of personnel for specialised tasks
- Using RAC it was concluded that design (TA-mentoring) was inappropriate and always has been. Contracts should have been stopped/changed a long time ago.
- RAC followed accountability trail and found that no one felt accountable for strategic or operational results of ID. RAC helped identify why or why not and what systems are in place to support accountability.
- RAC helped to identify what kinds of business systems and strategies needed to be in place to fulfil mandate, and helped to identify main gaps. These were validated by Sr. officials and the NAO office.

Chad - The effectiveness of the RAC in the assessment of:

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Links between outputs and outcomes

- ❑ Using simple frameworks and other analysis tools, the RAC process forced the evaluators to identify the links between the outputs created and appropriated and increased capacity, but there were very few.
- ❑ These, in total would have a marginal effect on overall capability. Exceptions: private sector development and AGER (potentially).
- ❑ TA have, however, contributed to specific operational quality control because they have been used to advance (technically) individual activities and projects.

RAC in BOLIVIA

Brief overview of the programme considered

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TITLE PROGRAMA DE APOYO AL PLAN NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL CON COCA (PAPS)

General: to support the GoB in its fight against the drug trafficking in a concertation and peace framework.

Results: Design and implementation of certain components of the ID sectoral policy, defining its scopes, limits and interrelation with other sub-national sectors and levels to obtain a shared political vision.

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN PROJECT DESIGN

- ▣ Inputs: AT for the institutional and programmatic strengthening of the Vice ministry and other involved governmental instances in the fight against drug trafficking
- ▣ Outputs: Better interinstitutional & sectorial concertation, better resources requests' capacity, etc.
- ▣ Induced outputs: The sectors and social actors demand, with technical & admin capacities, the implementation of relevant initiatives, social participation
- ▣ Results: Positioning from national, subnational inst. and social actors of resources to the sector

RAC in BOLIVIA

Enabling factors

To what extent was the context already fertile for the development of capacities at the time the program was launched?

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OPPORTUNITY FRAMEWORK:

ENABLING FACTORS:

- ✓ **Societal** : negotiation capacity
- ✓ **Institutional**: independence and autonomy of the GoB in its dialogue with donors and with the ultimate beneficiaries
- ✓ **Sectoral**: high priority programme, existence of a sectoral policy and of an institutional strategic plan

LIMITATIVE FACTORS:

- ✓ **Institutional** : insufficient coordination between ID with coca & drug trafficking policies
- ✓ **Sectoral**: insufficient coordination at regional level

QUALITY CRITERIA:

- i. **Fits to the context**: Based on the sectoral policy of the GoB (and it supports its elaboration) and contributes to its effective implementation.
- ii. **Demand and commitment**: Yes. It also responds to the GoB strategy of achieving national sovereignty
- iii. **Harmonised support**: It foresees a better coordination among donors. And the acceptance of the ID policy by international community.
- iv. **Link to the results and expected outcomes**: both via its TA component and by means of the promotion of a greater inter-institutional agreement between the different actors. It also intends to enhance the technical and administrative capacities of the social actors to improve the project proposals to be funded.
- v. **Implementation arrangements**: The EC has a permanent dialogue with the GoB and centers its aid in the definition and implementation of the GoB's sectoral policy.

RAC in BOLIVIA

Capacity - outputs

What have you learned in the interaction with the PAPS?

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INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES:

PERSONAL AND RELATIONSHIP:

- ✓ Greater vision of professional career and acknowledgment of competitive professional profile
- ✓ Greater capacity for social dialogue, concertation between State and organizations

ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT:

- ✓ Better knowledge of/better capacity in managing resources, in planning, and in monitoring and evaluation
- ✓ Transfer of know-how

ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITIES:

RELATIONSHIP:

- ✓ Negotiation/coordination with international cooperation, Government, etc.
- ✓ Capacity of interaction with stakeholders in the formulation of strategies (ownership and participation)

ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT:

- ✓ Greater use of norms and national procedures
- ✓ Increased organizational responsibility and commitment

RAC in BOLIVIA

Capacity - outcomes

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- ✓ **ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND ACT** appears to be more individual and acts as an organizational impetus for the same. Increased capacity for initiative that contributes to rapprochement (proximity) and interaction.
- ✓ However, the **ABILITY TO ACHIEVE RESULTS** is more organizational and includes factors such as risk prevention, the use of indicators, and setting targets; as well as improved management of technical and administrative processes
- ✓ **ABILITY TO RELATE** capacities are simultaneously developed at the individual and organizational levels. Valuing the community network.. Generation of complex networks at different levels (national, international and intra & interinstitutional), that in turns generation confidence.
- ✓ **ABILITY TO SELF-RENEW** is seen as a predominantly individual category. The importance of evaluations / assessments prior to decision-making stands out as a key factor. Finally, the importance of the capacity for beneficiaries to correct and reorient the allocation of resources must be stressed.
- ✓ **ABILITY TO LINK STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS** is a more organizational category of capacities and consists mainly of: the capacity for greater transparency and accountability, coherence between national and sectorial policies, and related budgets.

How the RAC in Bolivia achieved these results

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SIMPLIFICATION OF THE TERMINOLOGY

- ✓ The team decided to use the terms: “capacity outputs” and “capacity outcomes”.
- ✓ To explain the transition through different stages, the term “learning process” was introduced.

COACHING SESSIONS

- ✓ The capacity outputs and capacity outcomes were identified by the stakeholders themselves
- ✓ Collective coaching was addressed to a group of people within the same institution. These coaching made the whole RAC exercise interesting and stimulating.
- ✓ The coaching sessions were carried out after an individual interview with the person in charge of the relevant institution.

WORKSHOP

- ✓ In-depth half-day working session with all stakeholders for analysis of the Opportunity Framework and of the capacity outputs and capacity outcomes. The workshop was therefore less a dissemination exercise than a joint exercise for analysis of individual and organisational capacity development experiences gained through interaction with the PAPS.
- ✓ The workshop allowed the confirmation, updating and ranking of the list of individual and organisational capacity-outputs and capacity-outcomes.
- ✓ The workshop concluded with the identification, by the same stakeholders, of the main correlations between capacity outputs and capacity outcomes.

General conclusions on the three case studies

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RAC is a relatively short and manageable exercise, but it's not trivial and needs adequate training of local consultants.

The main difficulties in the administration and processing of the questionnaire are:

- Understanding the difference between capacity outputs and outcomes;
- Guiding the interviewees in the identification of the capacity outcomes, through the use of adapted issues and indicators;
- Distinguishing between the identification of the actual changes and their causal imputation: to the project and other inputs (in the case of the outputs), and to the outputs and other factors (in the case of the outcomes);

The final workshop should be, when possible, a participated exercise, where the interviewees run the analysis and the interpretation of the results (as in the Bolivia case, which is rather particular, however).

The assessment of the enabling factors needs specific skills. Until it is not incorporated into the PPCM as proposed, a specific high level expertise is necessary for that.