



# Assessing Existing Practices in Capacity Building and Experience Sharing for the Central European New Donors

**Final report of the mapping exercise  
commissioned by the World Bank  
Institute**

# Assessing Existing Practices in Capacity Building and Experience Sharing for the Central European New Donors

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

ACU	Administrative and Contracting Unit of the UNDP-Slovak Trust Fund
ADA	Austrian Development Agency
B3	the Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia)
CAS	country assistance strategy
CBIE	Canadian Bureau for International Education
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CoE	Council of Europe
CONCORD	European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development
CRS	creditor reporting system of the OECD
DfID	Department for International Development of the UK
EC	European Commission
ETC	European Transition Compendium
EDF	European Development Fund
EDI	Emerging Donors Initiative
ENPI	European Neighborhood Policy Instrument
EU	European Union
FOND	Romanian NGDO Platform
FORS	Czech Forum for Development Co-operation
GE/DE	global and development education
GENE	The European Network of Funding Agencies for Global and Development Education
GNI	gross national income
HAND	Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid
HUN-IDA	Hungarian International Development Agency Non-Profit Company
IDA	International Development Association

IDP	institutional development plan
IFI	international financial institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MP	member of parliament
MVRO	Slovak NGDO Platform
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NGDO	non-governmental development organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
OA	official assistance
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODACE	Official Development Assistance in Central Europe
OECD DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RPP	Regional Partnership Program of the Austrian Development Agency
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SLOGA	Slovenian NGDO Platform
SNIECODA	Strengthening National Institutional and Educational Capacity to Carry out ODA programs/projects
TAIEX	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument
TESCO	International Technical and Scientific Cooperation Office
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDP RBEC	UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States in Bratislava
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID RSC	USAID Regional Service Center in Budapest
V4	The Visegrád group of countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia)

## Key messages

This report was commissioned by the World Bank Institute (WBI) from the Faculty of Economics at Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. The goal of the report is to map the capacity development projects and programs provided by established donor agencies and multilateral institutions to assist the ten new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the creation and advancement of their official development assistance (ODA) policies. This mapping exercise focused on identifying the main donors, describing the contents of their capacity development projects and programs, and identifying still existing capacity development needs among the CEE new donors. The mapping exercise was carried out using a combination of web-based research, document analysis and a number of qualitative interviews with key personnel from donor agencies and CEE foreign ministries alike.

Several donors have provided capacity development assistance to the new CEE donors, the most important such programs were the Canadian International Development Agency's 'Official Development Assistance in Central Europe' program and the United Nations Development Program's 'Emerging Donors Initiative.' These programs were instrumental in forming CEE development policies early on, through providing staff training, assistance in building institutions and strategies, and mobilizing resources for bilateral assistance. Besides these two large and comprehensive programs, several other donor agencies have also provided capacity development assistance, with varying degrees of formality, levels of engagement, contents and scope. The report describes all of the major programs briefly, and also provides detailed case studies on six of them in the annexes.

The report discusses the tools most commonly used in the capacity development programs among the CEE new donors. These programs have relied on a rich and varied toolkit, ranging from both formal and learning-by-doing training for development staff through expert advice in a number of issues (such as drafting policy documents and strategies, setting up institutions, delivery mechanisms and processes) to joint project financing in the form of trilateral cooperation. Based on the overview of the donors and their toolkits, a number of best practices emerge, which may have relevance for future capacity building programs: tailoring the assistance to the requirements of the individual CEE partners, addressing all development stakeholders in the country, flexibility, the necessity to ensure that the experience transferred is actually implemented, and the need to move beyond formal training and the organization of stand-alone workshops.

While not an evaluation exercise, the report does attempt to draw some tentative conclusions on the impact of these capacity development programs, as no such meta-evaluation has been carried out so far. The picture is mixed. On the one hand, capacity development assistance from the established donors played a crucial role in forming ODA policies in the CEE countries, through introducing these countries to modern development practices, strategic planning, project cycle management, OECD DAC reporting, etc. and strengthening both official development stakeholders like Ministries of Foreign Affairs and private ones like non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, factors like high staff turnover, a lack of political will to go forward with ODA and the global economic crisis have dampened the positive effects.

The lack of political willingness and a sort of 'apathy' towards development cooperation prevalent in many (though not all) of the CEE countries is especially disturbing, as it is difficult to address and has a negative effect on the impact of any future capacity development program as well.

The report identifies several areas in which the CEE donors may require further capacity development assistance:

- increasing the transparency of national ODA policies;
- the evaluation of projects and country assistance;
- communicating results;
- increasing the usage of program-based approaches;
- institutional development, including assistance in creating branch offices;
- trilateral programming and joint project implementation;
- strategic planning, with a focus on creating and implementing country assistance strategies;
- support for staff training through the creation of an e-learning repository;
- strengthening and involving non-state development stakeholders.



# 1. Introduction

The ten Central and Eastern European (CEE) new member states of the European Union (EU) have (re-)emerged as donors of foreign aid in the past ten years. Mainly driven by their accession to the EU, they have all created the necessary structures and institutions, and have started financing bilateral and multilateral development cooperation programs. While their international development policies are still rather in their infancy in terms of both quantity and quality, and thus cannot be compared with the policies of the leading established donors, the fact remains that these countries have turned from being recipients of foreign aid to donors.

Established donors and international organizations have provided important assistance to these new donors in formulating their emerging international development policies. International assistance was vital in formulating the first policy documents, setting up the organizational background and augmenting the resources these new donors have for bilateral development cooperation. Such assistance also played a role in building up new donor capacities by providing staff training, study visits, internships, workshops and other networking opportunities. These programs have contributed to strengthening non-state development stakeholders as well, mainly non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

This report maps the capacity development and knowledge sharing programs provided to the CEE new donors in the past decade. It identifies the most important donors that have provided such assistance to the CEE countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) between 2001 and 2011 and describes the major programs in detail, focusing on tools and methods of delivery, the actual knowledge transferred, outputs and outcomes. The report also seeks to synthesize the main elements of the capacity development assistance programs provided to the new donors, and to identify the areas where future similar interventions can have an added value. While this report is not an evaluation exercise and does not attempt to draw any strong conclusions on the impact of these capacity development programs, some tentative conclusions on impacts and sustainability will be made.

The report is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the methodology used for this report. Section 3 presents the brief history and the main characteristics of official development policies in the CEE countries and section 4 discusses why there is still a need for further capacity building among these new donors. Section 5 presents the capacity development projects and programs that have attempted to address these issues in the past decade. Section 6 groups and analyses the main tools and approaches used in these programs. Section 7 attempts to provide some tentative conclusions on the impact of these exercises, and section 8 collects the best practices in CEE emerging donor capacity building, and provides recommendations for any future capacity development program in the region. Section 9 concludes the report.

The annexes to the report include detailed case studies on six significant capacity development projects/programs. In case of larger, pan-CEE programs, the case studies focus on how the

program was implemented in a specific country, in order to give the case study scope and depth. The case studies elaborate the detailed contents of each program, and also discuss how they were planned and implemented. The main goal of the case studies is to provide a wealth of descriptive details on some of the more important programs, and also discuss issues related to their impact and lessons learnt.

## **2. Methodology of the report**

In mapping the capacity development projects among the CEE donors, a two step approach was adopted. In the first step, the websites (including online project databases and relevant publications such as annual reports) of the established donors and multilateral agencies were scanned for information on capacity development projects provided to the new CEE member states. The full list of agencies scanned can be found at the end of the report.

In order to complement the data found on the websites of the donor agencies, two additional web-based sources were also consulted: (1) the websites of the foreign ministries and/or aid implementing agencies of the CEE emerging donors, including the annual reviews of their development policy; and (2) NGO-published reviews on CEE development policies, using the websites of the national NGO platforms in the CEE countries (FORS in the Czech Republic; Zagranica Group in Poland; HAND in Hungary; SLOGA in Slovenia; MVRO in Slovakia; FOND in Romania, etc).

Using this web search approach, it was possible to identify basically all major capacity development projects that have taken place in the past 10 years. However, the web search in most cases did not yield sufficient information to allow a thorough understanding and analysis of these projects. Therefore, in the second step of the research, individual contact persons were identified at each established donor agency or multilateral organization, who may have sufficient knowledge on the given programs. These people were contacted to provide further information, either by granting access to non-public documents (such as concept papers, planning documents or evaluation reports of the programs) or by providing a possibility for an interview. In some cases, it was not possible to identify suitable contact persons at the established donor agencies, mostly because the capacity development project had ended several (often 4-5) years earlier, and due to staff turnover the agency could not identify the person who has knowledge of the program. In other cases, the agency or the identified contact persons did not reply, despite repeated efforts to contact them via e-mail and telephone. In these cases, information on the program was obtained from the receiving side, i.e. foreign ministry staff from the CEE countries.

In all, 21 experts at established donors, international organizations, CEE ministries and implementing agencies provided information or were interviewed (their names and affiliations are listed at the end of this report). In many cases these experts were able to provide written documentation on the capacity development projects of their agencies in the CEE new donors. Any remaining questions not answered by the analysis of these documents were followed up by detailed qualitative interviews. The interviews were carried out in March and April 2012.

### 3. Background

Although the CEE donors are often called 'new' or 'emerging' donors of foreign aid, this is not completely precise. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia all had relatively extensive foreign assistance policies during the Communist regimes, under the name of 'technical and scientific cooperation'. During the Cold War the countries of the Eastern Block did not have sovereign foreign policies, and thus their international development efforts were also subordinated to the political, military and other interests of the Soviet Union. Their international cooperation policies consisted mainly of the supply of various equipment, experts and professional know-how, scholarships and tied-aid credit. Main recipients included the so-called 'developing socialist brother' countries, like Mongolia, North-Korea, (North-)Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Cuba, as well as other developing countries which oriented themselves towards the Soviet-bloc at one time or another during the Cold War, such as Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and South-Yemen. It was almost exclusively state organs that carried out the programs, and aid programs at the time did not make a difference between development and military aid, and as such had significant military dimensions (HUN-IDA 2004).

After the transition process began in CEE, basically all countries ceased their international development activities and turned from being donors to recipients. International organizations like the World Bank and the European Union, as well as countries like the United States, Germany, Japan or the Netherlands appeared as donors to support the transition process. During the 1990's, the CEE countries were not very active in development cooperation, their activities were limited to smaller ad hoc contributions to multilateral development organizations, humanitarian aid and a limited number of scholarships to students from developing countries.

After the turn of the Millennium however, the eight CEE countries which joined the EU in 2004, began recreating their international development policies. The process began later in Romania and Bulgaria. The main reason for this was external pressure: creating an international development policy in-line with the EU's relevant *acquis communautaire* was an explicit requirement during the accession negotiations. Beyond this, the EU voiced little further requirements (Carbone 2004), and as the 'hard' (legally binding) *acquis* on member state development policies was rather limited (Horky 2010), actual implementation was left to the accession countries. Many donors, most notably the Canadian International Development Agency, the United Nations Development Program and also the European Commission stepped in to help the accession countries in this process.

By 2003, all of the eight new member states had operational international development policies and had begun implementing their first bilateral development projects. Non-state development stakeholders also gained a voice with the creation of the national development NGO platforms. Based on their similar historical, political, socio-economic characteristics, the CEE donors have a number of common characteristics and challenges in their international development policies.

- The resources they devote to international development cooperation are rather small; in 2010 these amounts ranged from 0.08% of their GNI's (Poland) to 0.13% (Slovenia).

This is far from the OECD DAC average of 0.32% and also far from the commitment of the CEE countries within the EU to raise spending to 0.17% in 2010 and 0.33% by 2015.

- Most of these small resources are multilateral assistance, i.e. contributions to international organizations, of which the most important is the development share of their contributions to the EU budget. Typically, the multilateral share of their development budgets makes up 60-90%, which is much higher than the 30% OECD DAC average.
- The small remaining bilateral shares are heavily fragmented. While talking about limiting their number of partners, the CEE emerging donors actually have a wide number of partner countries, which can be comparable to the number of partner countries more established donors have. Average project sizes are therefore very small; projects with values around a couple of thousand dollars are not uncommon.
- The institutional settings for aid delivery in most countries are highly fragmented (the Czech Republic and Slovakia being notable exceptions). Too many organizations and ministries are involved, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) playing a coordinating role. However, the MFA in most cases has little influence on the other players (OECD 2007: 14; Szent-Iványi 2012b).
- The most important partner countries are selected either from the neighborhood (i.e. the Western Balkans and the former Soviet countries) or from among the countries with which the CEE countries have had previous (pre-1989) development relations. Iraq and Afghanistan also figure prominently among the most important recipients due to the close alliance of the CEE countries with the United States. Most CEE countries have little activities in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin-America, for which they mainly cite high fixed costs as a deterrent (such as maintaining embassies with a high number of permanent staff). For more information on CEE aid allocation, see Szent-Iványi (2012a).
- The CEE donors consider the 'transfer of transition experience' as their main comparative advantage compared to other donors. As they have more or less successfully completed their transition processes from centrally planned economies to market economies and from authoritarian rule to democracy, they have gained vast experience, which may be transferable to other settings. While actual specialization on transition experience is still limited (Horky 2012), this may be an issue in which the CEE donors can carve a niche for themselves in international development cooperation.
- The development policies of the CEE countries are highly donor-driven, the recipients have little influence on planning and programming resources. Recipient 'ownership', is difficult to identify in practice (OECD 2007: 20).
- The impact evaluation of development projects is not given a large emphasis, feedback and forces leading to organizational learning seem to be limited (OECD 2007: 21).
- The questions of international development are usually not part of the public discourse agendas, and public awareness about these issues is also much lower than in the more established donors. Bucar and Mrak (2007: 11) argue that there is no significant constituency for development cooperation in the CEE countries.

These characteristics and challenges point to a number of issues where the CEE new donors may require capacity development assistance. While some of the characteristics originate from deeper structural issues (such as foreign policy and security interests, which dictate giving larger amounts of aid to the Western Balkans and the former Soviet countries) and thus cannot be changed in the short run, other issues can be helped with external knowledge and financing.

The following section details the main reasons why the CEE emerging donors were and still are in need of capacity development assistance from more established donors.

## **4. The need for capacity development**

The Central and Eastern European new donors needed and still need capacity development assistance for a number of reasons and also concerning a number of issues. This section briefly reviews the rationale for continued capacity development efforts.

- As mentioned, the CEE countries spend low amounts on bilateral development assistance, which severely limits the impact and visibility of their ODA policy, and thus makes it difficult to justify for domestic constituencies. While the severity of this problem may decrease in time (it can be assumed that as the CEE countries themselves develop, they will gradually increase their development spending), it will still be present for perhaps decades. External capacity building assistance projects in the past have put a large emphasis on mobilizing domestic resources and also complementing them.
- The number of development staff in foreign ministries and implementing agencies is relatively low. There are, for example, only 8 experts working on development cooperation in the Hungarian MFA (down from a high of 15 in 2008). Due to the fragmentation of projects, this limited number of experts is stretched relatively thin.
- As in most other ministries and development agencies around the world, the turnover of staff in the MFAs of the CEE countries is relatively high. This can lead to a loss of expertise and also severely decrease the effectiveness of external capacity building projects. The high turnover of staff however is especially serious if coupled with the low staff numbers, which makes organizational learning extremely difficult and periodically even erases organizational memory.
- In most CEE MFAs there is no clear strategy for training development staff, whose training needs would be highly different than those of other diplomatic staff. In most countries, there is training for the diplomatic staff in general, but development staff requires specialized knowledge on development planning and programming, project cycle management, contracting, evaluation, budgeting and legal issues. Providing such internal training is often not given high priority.
- Capacities of foreign ministries also need to be strengthened towards other government line ministries involved in implementing international development policy. While the Czech Republic has moved to an implementing agency model, most other CEE countries rely on an extensive division of labor between the line ministries. The MFA rarely has enough capacity to influence the allocation decisions of the other ministries, and thus implementing a coherent development strategy can become problematic, as line ministries often have different understandings of international development policy.

While the CEE countries did have often quite extensive development cooperation policies before 1989, there are two factors which do not allow them to capitalize on this knowledge today.

- The pre-1989 era was very different than what today's 'international consensus' on official development assistance (embodied in documents like the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda, the Busan Partnership or the European Consensus) prescribes. Much of the foreign assistance provided by the CEE countries before 1989 would not qualify as ODA today. Tied credits and scholarships played a much larger role, and there was no clear separation between military and development aid, as already mentioned (Baginski 2002).
- As there was a 12-14 year break (even longer in the case of Romania and Bulgaria) in official development policy (between 1989 and 2001-2003), much of the experts working in the field of development policy have either retired, or have moved on to other lines of profession, effectively taking their expertise and experience with them. While some of these experts have returned to work in the new development policies (mostly in senior positions), in most CEE countries no formal efforts were made to re-connect with these people and re-engage them in the formulation of the country's international development policy.

Based on the above, there is still need for further capacity development and external knowledge sharing (and perhaps even financial resources) in the new CEE donor countries. In order to provide a basis for any such program, this report continues by providing a comprehensive analysis of the capacity development projects carried out in the region so far by established donors.

## **5. Overview of the main capacity development programs**

This section briefly overviews the capacity development programs delivered by established donors, focusing first on bilateral donors and then on multilateral institutions. The order in which the programs are presented is chronological and should not be taken as any indication of relative importance.

### **5.1. Capacity development by bilateral donor agencies**

#### **5.1.1. CIDA's ODACE program, 2001-2008**

The Official Development Assistance in Central Europe (ODACE) program of the Canadian Development Agency (CIDA) was the first capacity development program for the CEE countries, and was instrumental in providing the necessary expertise for restarting development policies in the region. When the CEE countries joined the EU in 2004, they graduated from CIDA assistance, and the ODACE program was one of CIDA's initiatives to ease this graduation process ('gracious graduation'), and help these countries transform from recipients to donors. It also aimed at fostering a longer term relationship between CIDA and the new donors, and thus represented an effort at donor harmonization and alignment.

The project included a total funding of USD 12 million (CDN 15 million) for the seven year period. Initially the project covered the four Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and was later expanded to the three Baltic countries and Slovenia. An important aspect of the ODACE program was its 'whole of country' approach, meaning that it did not only restrict assistance to MFAs and aid agencies, but was also instrumental in organizing national NGDO platforms, raising awareness on development issues among politicians, staff from other ministries, academics and also the wider public. This wide approach was instrumental in creating a broad acceptance for the program and is an important lesson for any future capacity development effort. The main goal of the program was to contribute to global sustainable development by modernizing the national capacities and institutions involved with official development assistance in the CEE countries, through sharing Canadian expertise with them.

Coordinating and organizing such a complex and multi-faceted program required special administrative arrangements, which are discussed in detail in the case study on the ODACE program in Hungary in Annex 1. One issue however is worth discussing here. CIDA is an organization that prides itself in providing assistance which is highly tailored to the needs of its partners. As the ODACE project included eight partners, CIDA had to be very flexible in order to take national differences into account and to avoid being 'prescriptive.' CIDA managed to accomplish this through a series of discussions with the national governments, and also by providing experts who were placed for longer periods of time in the national capitals and thus had the opportunity to get to know the local issues and challenges. These experts were mostly CIDA professionals and not external consultants, which most likely increased their acceptance.

The ODACE program had two main components. The first phase involved extensive capacity development assistance in the form of institutional and policy planning assistance (including drafting national institutional development plans and country strategies), specialized training sessions, study tours, internships, awareness raising activities etc. Much of the training was highly hands-on, and focused on exposing the local stakeholders to how CIDA works. The program was instrumental in the creation and initial support of national NGDO platforms and involving the academia as well. This phase ended in mid-2005. The second phase involved trilateral programming in order to operationalize the new capacities, along with monitoring, evaluation and other assistance. Trilateral programming essentially meant funding programs in third countries on a matching basis by CIDA and the emerging CEE donor (see section 6.5 for more details on this approach). This represented a form of action learning both for the MFAs and the NGOs, and also aimed to help the CEE partners to develop transparent, objective project selection criteria and processes.

Trilateral programming had different implementation modalities in the different countries. In Hungary for example CIDA contributed to the MFA's grant tenders for NGOs. In Slovakia CIDA contributed to the UNDP-Slovak Trust Fund. While some countries received several rounds of trilateral funding (Slovakia received this form of assistance for four years, Hungary for three), others only received it for a single year (such as Poland, although the country made up for the delay in terms of the number of projects eventually funded). The trilateral phase did not start at all with Slovenia, as CIDA decided to exclude the country from it, the reasons for this exclusion being unclear, but are apparently unrelated to the level of readiness of the country. Also, the

level of Slovenia's participation in the capacity building phase was also rather low, with the country being little more than an 'active observer.' Estonia only benefited from a single trilateral project, which was mainly due to the slowness of developing the legal background in the country. CIDA did not engage in any formal capacity building in Romania or Bulgaria, due to the fact that its entire European program had ended in 2008, with the end of the ODACE program. Although CIDA would have been willing to engage with these new donors as well, it could only have done so on a cost-recovery basis, which understandably reduced any demand for CIDA involvement.

The ODACE program is presented in detail in a case study through the context of Hungary in Annex 1.

### **5.1.2. ADA's Regional Partnership Program, 2005-2007**

The Austrian Development Agency (ADA) also took part in assisting the capacity building of its neighbors, which have become new donors. Due to the fact that Austria itself is a relatively young donor as well, there are some clear similarities between Austria and the new member states, so expertise from ADA could have been a significant contribution to capacity building among the CEE donors. Despite this fact, much of the assistance provided in this field by Austria was not systematic and was relatively low profile. The only higher profile program funded by ADA was the Regional Partnership Program (RPP), which was a form of trilateral programming, and focused mainly on giving access to funds for NGOs from four of the new member states (all neighbors of Austria: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) in order to allow them to gain practical experience in project implementation. Besides the practical experience, there was also the idea of motivating cooperation between NGOs from the old and the new member states to share know-how, learn from each other and perhaps build partnerships for the future. This interaction between new member states and established Austrian NGOs provided opportunities for learning-by-doing.

The scope of the program was to bring together NGOs from Austria and the new member states, so that they can apply for funds from the RPP for joint project implementation. The size of the projects was intentionally limited in scale in order to allow smaller NGOs to participate as well. The RPP had a total funding from ADA of EUR 400 000, to which new member states also contributed (20%) and the winning NGOs also had to provide 10% co-financing. The appraisal of the proposals was carried out by a committee consisting of representatives of the CEE MFAs, ADA, the NGO platforms of the five participating countries and one representative from TRIALOG, a European Commission (EC) funded CEE NGO capacity building program. All together 47 joint NGO projects were approved. The RPP also included a series of seminars for NGOs in order to boost their capacities.

### **5.1.3. USAID's Emerging Donors Initiative, 2006-2009**

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded Emerging Donors Initiative (EDI) was started in 2006, when USAID commissioned an extensive report on the foreign aid activities of five of the new EU Member States (the Czech Republic, Hungary,



Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). USAID decided to support ODA capacity building in these new member states due to the fact that they share common attributes in the following areas:

- the new donor countries all possess experience on the transition process which they are prepared to share as part of their development assistance efforts;
- all of the new donors have important partnerships (thanks to the efforts of other bi- and multilateral organizations) with established NGOs that play a key role in the delivery of their development assistance efforts;
- all emerging donor countries are open to learn new methods for aid delivery, therefore the involvement of USAID could be crucial in shaping how ODA in the CEE countries will evolve.

The interest of USAID in supporting CEE countries to improve their ODA efforts lies in the following three points:

- sustaining US investment in democratic reforms in Eastern Europe is a primary objective of US foreign policy directed towards Europe, and CEE countries possess the capabilities to contribute to these efforts in Eastern Europe;
- as it takes time for the emerging donors to take advantage of EU funding and since the projects of USAID are being phased out in the region, it becomes more crucial to forge new partnerships;
- the transition expertise of the CEE countries would allow USAID to create trilateral / joint programs when trying to assist the reform processes in the Balkans.

The Emerging Donors Initiative started off as providing capacity development assistance to the Visegrád countries plus Slovenia in the form of workshops, aimed to provide training in issues like project design and management. In 2009, upon the request of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia workshops were held in their respective capitals as well in order to explain the methodology and criteria USAID uses to provide development assistance in recipient countries. In the course of the program, USAID ended up providing in-depth technical assistance to these three countries. It recommended that each country identify its own niche in development cooperation through which they can be differentiated from other CEE and well established donors. They also advised to start building support within the government and among the wider public for the development assistance programs. USAID proposed that the respective governments identify inter-ministerial roles and responsibilities to avoid overlapping activities. In addition, USAID offered a possibility for the staff of the emerging donors to take up internship positions at USAID offices for a limited period of time in order to obtain hands-on knowledge on how USAID conducts program and project management.

The USAID Emerging Donors Initiative is presented in more detail in a case study in Annex 5.

#### **5.1.4. JICA, 2006-2008**

The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), mindful to its commitment in helping CEE countries (mainly Hungary and Poland) in the transition process, provided both financial and technical assistance for many issues throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s.

The areas of cooperation were in the fields of assisting the democratization process and aiding the transition to market economy as well as cooperating with the international community. However, since most CEE countries became members of the EU in 2004, JICA decided to phase out aid to the region within two years, and provide only assistance for new EU member states to support their goal of becoming donors. Capacity development support for the CEE countries was not systematic and took place between 2006 and 2008. JICA provided support in two different ways. It supported the establishment of a volunteer organization in Poland in 2007 through the provision of know-how on the operation and management on Japanese overseas cooperation volunteer activities. The workers of the Polish volunteer organization were provided seminars, discussions, exchanges of opinions and on-site knowledge. In addition to the direct support received by Poland, JICA also provided an opportunity in 2008 for development cooperation officials from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland to visit the training center of JICA, in order to study the organization's structure and exchange experience with senior officials.

#### **5.1.5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2006-2007**

The capacity development program of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands ran between September 2006 and October 2007, with the title of 'Strengthening the Implementing Capacity for Official Development Assistance (ODA) of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs', and was a part of the larger Matra Flex Program. The Matra Flex Program was designed to strengthen the connections between governmental actors of the Netherlands and those of the new EU Member States as well as the candidate countries. Thus it came as a natural idea to include the strengthening of the activities of the Hungarian government for reaching its ODA commitment goal of 0.17% of the GNI by 2010, in accordance with the rules and methodologies of the UN, the OECD DAC and the European Union. The other CEE countries participating in the Matra Flex Program did not request such assistance from the Netherlands. The program mainly targeted Hungary's aid implementing agency at the time, HUN-IDA. The issues which were included in the capacity building of Hungarian development assistance were the following:

- training was provided on the ODA policy of the Netherlands, in particular on the methodology of how the Netherlands selects its partner countries and sectors for assistance;
- cooperation with other donors (such as the EC, other EU member states, multilateral organizations etc.);
- assistance with meeting the targets of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (co-ordination, harmonization, partnerships, sector-wide approach, etc.);
- consultation on the Netherlands' development assistance activities in countries which represent targets of ODA for Hungary as well;
- consultation on effective ODA delivery mechanisms;
- consultation on ODA implementation (how to select projects, implementation by NGOs vs. direct implementation, project monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, etc.);
- government strategy on communicating information on development cooperation; best practices for awareness raising targeted at different groups, including policy-makers;
- reporting statistics to the OECD DAC;

- exploring the possibilities for trilateral programs between Hungary and the Netherlands in development cooperation in the Western Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

During the program, Hungarian and Dutch officials took part in four study trips and training sessions. In addition to these activities, since Hungary took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) of the Netherlands in Baghlan Province of Afghanistan, a training of Hungarian officials in the practical issues related to involvement in Afghanistan took place in the fall of 2006.

#### **5.1.6. The Foreign Ministry of Finland's 'twinning light' project in Hungary, 2007**

In 2006, Directorate-General Enlargement of the European Commission offered a 'twinning-light' grant from the EU Transition Facility to help strengthen the administration of Hungarian international development co-operation (the MFA and HUN-IDA, but sessions were also open to other stakeholders), which was awarded to the Foreign Ministry of Finland. The project's value was EUR 230 000 and it lasted for six months starting in January 2007.

The project included eight thematic workshops, each followed by expert days, mentoring, individual on-the-job trainings, the preparation of tailor-made templates, manuals, guidelines and other documentations. The workshops were delivered by more than 300 visits of Finnish experts to Budapest. Each workshop was approximately 2.5-3 days long, as was followed by hands-on mentoring lasting 3-5 days each. The workshops were the following:

- Development policy, management of development co-operation, country and sector strategies, followed by expert mentoring.
- Project cycle management, followed by mentoring, which included issues like preparing log frames, project design, etc.
- Financial management and reporting, including issues like contract management, management systems, progress and technical reporting and monitoring.
- Procurement, including issues on legal frameworks and the discussion of OECD requirements on harmonization and untying aid, as well as the overview of EU guidelines.
- Tendering practices and participation in competitive bidding of the EU (EDF) and the international financial institutions (IFIs).
- Civil society relations and development communication, including issues like web-based tools, development education and presentation skills. This workshop also specifically targeted NGOs as well and provided advice for them in policy formulation, advocacy and funding.
- ODA reporting and ODA statistics, with an emphasis on the requirements and directives of the OECD DAC. The workshop also discussed technical issues on the usage of database software and the OECD creditor reporting system (CRS).
- Quality control, systems, evaluation, budgeting and auditing, including the overview of OECD/EU evaluation guidelines and standards.

During workshops, the trainers also provided written training materials. The project included other components besides the workshops, including an expert mission for advisory services on law and regulatory framework issues. This mission focused on the overview of relevant international public and private law (including the EU *acquis*), as well as drafting bilateral ODA agreements.

The project also allowed study visits (short internships) for 4 Hungarian MFA staff members to Helsinki, to study issues related to the topics of the workshops in the practice of the Finnish MFA. After the completion of the project, a further staff member of the Hungarian MFA took part in an internship at Finland's embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, where she gained experience in work on the field and local donor coordination.

The project was the first time that the MFA of Finland took part in a twinning project.

#### **5.1.7. Sida's Partnership Program, 2009- (still ongoing as of April 2012)**

The Partnership Program of the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) was launched in 2008 based on the request of the Swedish Government. The implementation of the program started in 2009 and is still ongoing. The rationale behind this exercise was that Sweden possessed the know-how and the specificities on how to create an effective and efficient development assistance policy, but the country needed the transition experience of the new EU member states, and also their regional expertise in implementing projects in Eastern European and Western Balkan countries, as this was perceived to be lacking at Sida. The Partnership Program also aimed to promote contacts between the parties involved, thus establishing a base for longer term programs. It is also relevant to mention that capacity development for the new EU member states was not the primary objective of this program, rather it was a bi-product; the main goal was to make use of the transition reform expertise of the CEE countries in Sida's cooperation in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. An additional reason why Sweden adopted the approach of providing opportunities to work as partners in relevant projects instead of 'simple' capacity development assistance is because Sida's experience in the CEE region led to the realization that the most important thing CEE ministries or institutions need is long term institutional connections. This approach was perceived to be more effective than different short term consultancies or training sessions.

The program focused on three themes, all of them aimed at practical cooperation. The first theme was enhanced impact assessment; the second one was to provide new content to the EU's Eastern Partnership Program in terms of institution building, taking into account that the new EU Member States have a longer history in dealing with the EU's Eastern neighbors. The third theme was to increase the intensity of cooperation with the new EU Member States within the framework of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). Attached to these themes, demand based training was also provided by Sida.

It should be noted that the Partnership Program was not created to be a funding mechanism, rather to provide more opportunities for common projects between Sida and the new EU Member States, taking into account the traditional goals of Swedish development cooperation

(democracy and human rights, environment and climate change issues, gender equality and the role of women in development) and the regional expertise that the new member states have in the Eastern Neighborhood.

The program provided the CEE partners a number of workshops and seminars, both in terms of training and also to discuss possibilities for co-operation. Based on these discussions, it was mainly Estonia, Poland and Slovenia which seemed open to trilateral cooperation with Sida. Some actual projects have already started, with Poland working together with Sida in the Ukraine, Estonia cooperating in a food safety project in Georgia, and Slovenia in a waste management project in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Sida's Partnership Program is presented in more detail in a case study in Annex 4.

#### **5.1.8. Other bilateral forms of involvement in capacity development projects**

There is some limited information that other established bilateral donors have also provided capacity development assistance to the CEE donors, most notably the Department for International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. However, these efforts were not systematic or highly formalized, most of them were relatively small projects involving the organization of a single *ad hoc* workshop or some limited staff exchange, and the contacted donor agencies were unable to provide detailed information. For example, during Hungary's EU presidency in the first half of 2011, DfID provided a resident expert to the Hungarian MFA, in order to assist in policy issues where Hungary had little expertise (such as policy coherence for development or issues related to Africa).

The contacts with bilateral agencies that have provided capacity development have in some cases transformed into working relations between donors. The Czech Republic for example now has a joint project together with ADA in Moldova, and building such cooperation is an explicit goal of Sida's Partnership Program as well. One may argue that some bilateral agencies now perceive the CEE donors to have graduated from capacity development assistance, and now place an emphasis on normal working relations, including trilateral programming and joint implementation instead.

### **5.2. Capacity development by multilateral donor agencies**

#### **5.2.1 The UNDP's Emerging Donors Initiative, 2003- (still ongoing as of April 2012)**

Besides CIDA's ODACE program, the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Emerging Donors Initiative (EDI) was (is) the most important and most comprehensive capacity development program among the CEE donors. The UNDP has been supporting emerging donors since the late 1990s, but the formal EDI program only began in 2003, launched by the UNDP's Regional Centre in Bratislava (UNDP RBEC), with an initial seed funding of USD 300 000 and the aim to raise additional CEE government funding in the form of cost sharing (the UNDP had already been experimenting with cost sharing for a while in Latin-America, and it

seemed a good possibility for the CEE countries as well, as UNDP's core resources available to the EU accession countries was shrinking).

Through the program, the UNDP has helped strengthen 'national capacities for development co-operation, prepare development cooperation frameworks, and establish ODA delivery mechanisms' (UNDP 2006). In 2003, the UNDP started the program with the EU-8 countries. The EDI program had two main components: 1) support for the development of national capacities for development cooperation, in the form of policy advice, staff training, and public awareness raising; and 2) assistance in establishing development cooperation transfer mechanisms which conform to international standards in terms of transparency, accountability, and programmatic soundness. In this later component, the UNDP promoted the creation of UNDP Trust Funds with the CEE partners, which basically meant that the UNDP provided a set of rules and assistance for programming the resources of the partner. These Trust Funds were mainly open to tenders from national NGOs. During the period between 2003 and 2005, the EDI mobilized approximately a total of USD 12 million, most of it contributions from the emerging donors themselves. The program was led by UNDP RBEC, but if the given partner country had a separate UNDP office, then it had the main responsibility in program management and implementation.

The first component of the EDI program included a 'bit of everything'. As, paradoxically, MFAs seemed to have the least knowledge on ODA due to high staff turnover, the main emphasis was on their capacity building. Capacity building included policy work, strategy formulation, the study of comparative advantages, several training sessions, assistance to NGDO platforms, awareness raising, and curriculum development for universities. The UNDP attempted to capitalize on the comparative advantages (such as their transition experience) of the new members, and instead of providing ready-made solutions to them, tried to assist the emergence of a unique Central European face of donorship, which conformed to international standards. This was further reinforced by the fact that the UNDP was especially keen in promoting 'East-East' cooperation, i.e. assistance from the CEE new member to Southeast European and CIS countries.

In the second component, the UNDP signed Trust Fund agreements with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and later Romania. The Slovakian Trust Fund was the largest, financed with 2.4 million USD in 2003 and 2.8 million USD in 2004, and enjoyed additional contributions from CIDA and ADA. The Trust Fund was executed by the UNDP, with strategic guidance and project approval by the Slovak MFA. Administrative issues were managed by the Administrative and Contracting Unit (ACU), a 'joint venture' of the MFA and the UNDP, which later evolved into the Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation. The Hungarian Trust Fund was considerably smaller (USD 1 million for 2004-2006) and had the goals of supporting Hungary's priority countries, with the bulk of the funds going to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. The Hungarian MFA was adamant in having overall control over the funds, and thus the UNDP's actual role was much smaller than in the case of Slovakia or the Czech Republic. Overall guidance and project selection was provided by the Hungarian MFA, and implementation done by HUN-IDA. The Czech Trust Fund already began operations in 2000, and had raised 1 million USD between 2000 and 2003. It had an emphasis on linking up Czech experts and NGOs with ongoing UNDP projects in third countries, and the UNDP considers this approach the best

practice among the Trust Funds. The Romanian Trust Fund had a rather different philosophy, as it involved the transfer of Romanian funds to UNDP offices in Romania's priority partner countries, in order to contribute to ongoing UNDP projects. The Romanian government also used the Trust Fund to finance the activities of local NGOs. See the case study on the implementation of the EDI program in Romania in Annex 3 for more details. The total amount of resources mobilized by all the Trust Funds since 2004 is about USD 22 million.

The UNDP had high hopes about involving other, more established donors into these Trust Funds in order to increase the total amount of resources. This was only achieved in the case of Slovakia, where CIDA decided to channel its funds available for trilateral programming into the UNDP Trust Fund, and also ADA contributed some small resources. It must also be noted that as the UNDP was the one to formulate tendering, contracting, monitoring etc., processes for the Trust Funds, their implementation was fully transparent, fully open and fully competitive. But, they were only open to national NGOs and companies, and thus they represented a form of tied aid, which was justified with the necessity of building national capacities.

There were large differences in implementing the EDI project on a country-by-country basis. As mentioned, Trust Fund agreements were only signed with the four countries above. Estonia decided relatively early on in the project to stop working with the UNDP, as they regarded themselves as a donor which does not require any more capacity development assistance. The UNDP's focus was very highly skewed towards awareness raising instead of government capacity building in the case of Poland and the Baltic countries. Related to this is the issue of coordination with CIDA. As the EDI program ran more or less parallel with CIDA's ODACE program, close cooperation was required between the two agencies on the national level. This factor led to a further source of diversity in how the EDI program was actually implemented in different CEE countries, because while in one country CIDA would have carried out a task (such as financing an opinion poll), in another it would have been the UNDP, even though there was no formal division of labor between the two. CIDA's program was also much stronger budget-wise, and no national government co-financing was necessary. All this required extremely close cooperation between the two agencies in order to avoid any duplications, and also a large level of flexibility.

While UNDP capacity development efforts have been finished in the new member states that joined the EU in 2004, the UNDP is still active in this field in Romania, as well as in accession countries like Croatia and Turkey and other new donors like Russia. As the UNDP is currently repositioning its approach towards middle-income countries and is seeking to act as a facilitator and knowledge sharing center instead of a funding organization, the EDI program is well suited to be a part of this strategy.

While presenting the UNDP's EDI program with all the different variations among the countries where it was implemented is clearly beyond the scope of this report, the annex does include two detailed case studies, one from the first phase of the program (Lithuania, 2003-2005) and one from the second (Romania, 2007-, where UNDP involvement is still ongoing). Another ongoing capacity development effort of the UNDP, financed by the EC and aimed at awareness raising not only in the CEE countries, but in the entire EU, are the Kapuscinski Lectures, described in more detail in section 6.7.

One final initiative of the UNDP that should be mentioned is that in Poland it has been supporting east-east and south-south knowledge sharing activities since 2009, between Poland and its priority partner countries. In 2011, with the adoption of the new Polish five-year Development Cooperation Act, east-east, south-south and triangular cooperation activities have become a key element of Polish ODA. There is now a clear mechanism for sectoral ministries to get involved into development cooperation abroad, in coordination with the MFA. Respectively, UNDP is scaling up its support to triangular knowledge sharing from Poland. The focus in 2012-2013 is on facilitating Polish assistance to Afghanistan, Egypt, Georgia, Ukraine, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, etc.

### **5.2.2. The European Commission**

As mentioned previously, accession to the EU was the main driving force for re-creating the international development policies of the New Member States (NMSs). The European Commission (EC) realized that there is a need to smooth the transition of the new members from donors to recipients and decided to offer its own capacity development program. Some capacity development had already happened before 2004: the EC provided assistance early on through its Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument (TAIEX) managed by the Directorate-General Enlargement. This instrument provides short term technical assistance and advice on the transposition of EU legislation into the national legislation of beneficiary countries and on the subsequent administration, implementation and enforcement of such legislation. For example, in 2003 in the framework of TAIEX's Parliamentary program, the EC brought together MPs from all 13 accession and candidate countries, and provided them with information on development policy (TAIEX 2004). The European Commission ran also 'twinning programmes' between public administrations of Member States and the acceding countries of the time to reinforce expertise and knowledge in public administrations.

Since September 2004, the European Commission launched a series of Capacity Building Schemes to support the CEE countries in building their ODA policies. After the accession of the NMSs, the EC's approach can be divided into two rather distinct phases: the first phase, lasting from 2004 to 2009, focused mainly on training and raising awareness, involving different stakeholders. The second phase focuses on operationalizing these capacities through joint actions. The first phase itself can be divided into several different capacity building schemes:

- Capacity Building Schemes I & II (2004-2007). These schemes were based on a demand driven tailor-made approach to provide training and technical assistance to NMSs, mainly to government officials and NGOs. Training concentrated on issues like: the EU's development policy, how to engage NGOs and the wider public in development cooperation, monitoring and evaluation, tendering procedures, etc. In part II, this was expanded to include more tailor-made advice per country concerning key strategic development policy and implementation issues, and also Bulgaria and Romania were invited to participate.
- Capacity Building Scheme III (2008). The launch was based on questionnaires distributed to the EU12 countries. This scheme intended to build on the results already achieved. Specific objectives included technical and operational training, assistance on the OECD/ DAC's ODA reporting system and how to prepare for DAC membership, new



trends in development cooperation such as the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action as well as the EU Code of Conduct and communication issues. These objectives were delivered through targeted seminars and direct support and advice provided on request.

- Capacity Building Scheme IV (2009): As the needs and requests by the NMSs got more and more diverse and specific, it was felt that the NMSs would benefit from more assistance on an individual basis to provide more in-depth knowledge. As a consequence, the *EU12 floater* was offered for providing flexible short-term assistance and services within a time period of 6-8 months. The EU12 floater experts assisted the NMSs in planning, for example, events in the Member States. Other activities were specifically developed to make good use of the availability of expert resources, such as awareness raising and training exercises for national stakeholders in Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Romania, and Malta.

There are some perceptions that these human resource development exercises were not as effective as they could have been. The program proved difficult to implement due to the fact that organizational structures in the CEE countries were still in their infancies. Staff numbers were low and stretched thin, which often led to staff members not showing up on training sessions to which they had registered to. Even though the program was meant to be demand driven, the CEE MFAs seemed to have difficulty in formulating what they actually needed, and seemed to 'go for everything'. Also, coordination with the UNDP and CIDA, the two other major providers of capacity development assistance was missing, and thus efforts seem to have been duplicated to some extent.

Building on these lessons, in the second phase of the program the EC attempted to move towards more hands-on approaches instead of training and seminars. Recently, the EC has been focusing on involving the CEE countries in joint actions, with the goal of improving their planning, programming and project implementation capacities in practice, and also allowing them to make use of their transition experience. Following consultations with all EU12 Member States, Moldova was selected as a partner country for these joint actions, as it was a priority country for most of the new donors. A team of consultants selected by the European Commission led the process. Necessary implementation steps included the identification of a sector for the pilot programming, establishment of a lead donorship arrangement, joint identification and formulation of projects. Extensive consultations were held with the EU Delegation in Moldova and the State Chancellery of the Government of Moldova in May 2011, and the Moldovan Council of Ministers selected regional development and decentralization as the subject for cooperation. All EU12 countries were then invited to nominate a participant for a Working Group set up to discuss matters in further detail and coordinate accordingly. The participating countries in this working group were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. In addition, Germany and Sweden were also invited to participate because they were active in this specific sector. The EU Delegation, UNDP and USAID also participated actively as did the Moldovan Government and key NGOs. The team of consultants took over the role of lead donor and undertook analytical research on the country situation to determine the Government of Moldova's priorities towards the sector and to identify options for support. Following this identification process, a matrix of interest in the projects identified was established following consultations with the EU12. This was later

accompanied by specific financing decisions of the Member States involved to implement the following projects:

- Development of the regional statistics capacity of the National Bureau of Statistics;
- Twinning of Regional Development Agencies: support to updating regional development strategies;
- Civil society development;
- Local Public Finance Management reform.

A further recent initiative was the creation of the European Transition Compendium (ETC) in 2010, which aims to collect and categorize the existing transition experience of the new members, which could be used in development cooperation. Although one may question to what extent this project could be classified as a capacity building exercise, its relevance and potential for helping the development of the CEE emerging donors is clear. The ETC is basically a database, a collection of 'who knows what' in the CEE countries in the field of transition experience. The ETC lists and briefly details specific knowledge and best practices that various (state and non-state) actors possess under six headings: democracy, human rights and institutional reforms; economic reforms; human development; agriculture, land issues and environment; regional and local development; and the management of external aid (European Commission 2010). The main goal of the database is 'to assist in the implementation of some of the EU's commitments on aid effectiveness, in particular concerning the identification of each country's comparative advantages, improved coordination and division of labor among Member States' (European Commission 2010: 5). The database's relevance for capacity building lies in the fact that it allows the new members to identify national stakeholders possessing transition experience, and thus plan and implement development projects involving these stakeholders. The creation of the initial database was coordinated by the EC, and each NMS had to provide a list of known transition expertise in their country. The database was first published as a single document, but since 2011 it is available on-line ([www.eutransition.eu](http://www.eutransition.eu)). The EC has stressed that in order for the database to be truly useful, it must be kept up-to-date and used as much as possible in the programming cycles of bilateral development policies .

The EC has also been offering capacity support on Development Cooperation to the NMSs when their EU Council Presidency comes up. Experienced experts are engaged for an approximate period of 8 months to advise the New Member States on Development Cooperation issues and assist them with preparations during their Presidency term, either directly in the Headquarters and/or in Brussels.<sup>1</sup>

Last but not least, the EC also provided financing for other donors to carry out capacity building projects, for example the Kapuscinski Lectures organized by the UNDP, or the support to Finland's capacity development program in Hungary (section 5.1.6). When requested, the EC provided experts to give presentations at national workshops and conferences. The EC is also a main financial contributor to TRIALOG, a project that since the year 2000 has aimed to strengthen civil society and raise awareness on development issues in the enlarged EU. The

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<sup>1</sup> Countries that benefitted from this capacity support so far are: Slovenia (January-June 2008), Czech Republic (January-June 2009), Hungary (January-June 2011), Poland (July-December 2011) and now Cyprus (July-December 2012).

main tools of the TRIALOG project include an information system, assistance in grant proposals, periodic workshops and training, as well as policy work.

### **5.2.3. The Council of Europe North-South Centre's Programs for Strengthening Global Education in the Visegrád countries, 2004-2005 and 2009-2011**

The goal of the Council of Europe (CoE) North-South Centre's approach was to support the emerging development policies in the Visegrád countries by strengthening development education in these countries, in order to allow citizens to have more informed views of development issues and their countries' role in them. In order to achieve this goal, the Centre implemented two programs, one between 2004 and 2005, supported by the Dutch MFA, and a second one between 2009 and 2011, in cooperation with the EC. Both programs foresaw strengthening 'the quality and scope of provision of global development education.'

The approaches used in the first program included the organization of national seminars in order to introduce the concepts of global and development education (GE/DE) and to stimulate dialogues between key stakeholders. The program provided seed funding to start development education projects, with a value of EUR 35 000 per country, which was used to finance NGO development education projects and was managed by the national foreign ministries or development cooperation agencies. The four countries were involved in the framework of the European Peer Review process of Global Education, which also allowed experts from the V4 countries to take part in other national reviews. Specific training sessions were also carried out on global education in the four countries, and their involvement in the Global Education Weeks was encouraged.

The second program involved the organization of a series of national and regional seminars in the EU-12 countries between 2009 and 2011, with the goal of promoting the creation and implementation of national GE/DE strategies and bringing together stakeholders to discuss the main challenges.

The North-South Centre's involvement in CEE new donor capacity building is presented in more detail in Annex 6.

### **5.2.4. The OECD DAC**

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is not a funding organization, thus its resources for providing capacity development assistance are limited. The OECD DAC therefore did not have a formal capacity development program towards the CEE new donors, but it did assist them with a series of *ad hoc* efforts, mainly through providing expert advice on the reporting of ODA statistics. Many other donors have also provided assistance in this regard; in fact almost all capacity development programs included a component on statistics and DAC reporting (CIDA being the most important).

While it is not strictly capacity development, but the Special Peer Reviews that the DAC has carried out on CEE donors do have important capacity building effects. These reviews basically

evaluate the development policies of the OECD's non-DAC members, and formulate specific advice on how the countries can bring their practices closer to DAC principles and international best practices, with the view of increasing the effectiveness of their foreign aid. While the DAC does not provide assistance in implementing the recommendations of these special reviews, the fact that it points out the strengths and weaknesses in CEE development policies can provide an impetus for further reform.

So far, the DAC has carried out special reviews for the Czech Republic (2007), Poland (2010), Slovakia (2011) and Slovenia (2012). The Hungarian MFA has mainly cited cost concerns for not having invited the OECD yet to carry out such a review.

## **6. Main approaches and tools used in the capacity development programs**

The capacity building programs aimed at helping the new CEE donors to shape their international development policies described above made use of a number of different approaches and tools to transfer knowledge and expertise. This section reviews these methods, focusing on their actual contents, and draws conclusions on which of them can still be relevant for future capacity development exercises. These conclusions are synthesized in section eight.

### **6.1. Technical assistance in developing policies, legal issues and institutions**

Arguably the most important contribution of the early capacity development programs (such as CIDA's or the UNDP's program) was to provide assistance in setting up the institutional infrastructures, strategies, and the legal and policy frameworks within the new donors. This assistance mainly took the form of classical technical assistance, i.e. experts arriving from the established donor agencies (or commissioned by them) to the new donors and helping them identify the issues, and jointly coming up with the best possible solutions. The UNDP for example was instrumental in setting up the Czech Development Centre in 2002 which later evolved into the Czech Development Agency.

Such technical assistance and experience sharing mainly focused on the following:

- drafting institutional development plans, detailing desired institutional structures, planned staffing needs and working procedures;
- creating a wider strategic framework for ODA, as well as drafting country assistance strategies;
- helping the formalization of processes and aid delivery mechanisms, such as programming, project cycle management, contracting, tendering, monitoring and evaluation through the preparation of manuals and guidelines;
- mapping the national legal context and proposing changes in order to make ODA policy easier.

Technical assistance in reforming policies, strategies, the legal context and institutions may still be required today. In some CEE donors (such as Hungary) for example there is still no single development agency, rather development cooperation activities are spread among several ministries, which makes implementing a coherent development strategy difficult and leads to the fragmentation of resources. Technical assistance aimed at drafting legislation may also still be required: among others, Hungary and Romania have not yet created a law on development cooperation, and have other gaps in legislation that, for example, make contracting with NGOs difficult. Regulations on contracting with and providing national budgetary resources to foreign actors (such as NGOs in the partner countries) is also missing in some CEE countries and makes the implementation of locally owned development projects difficult.

## **6.2. Formal training**

Formal (classroom-based) training played a varying role in the capacity development programs analyzed. Many of the capacity development programs seem to have preferred more hands-on training, involving learning by doing. Also, it seems to have been more common in the early stages of capacity development programs, and was later gradually substituted by more practical approaches, which required more intensive involvement from CEE ministry staff and other stakeholders, such as mentoring and internships.

In 2002-2003, ministry staff in most cases had no prior expertise in development cooperation, and if they did, it was from the highly different context of the pre-1989 period. Enhancing the skill base of staff was seen as essential. According to the UNDP, 'staff working on development cooperation issues may not be fully familiar with important OECD DAC or EU rules and procedures, or with substantive development matters' (UNDP 2003). Formal training was therefore seen as essential in order to start building up the skill base necessary for effective ODA policies. The main areas where such staff training was delivered included:

- the principles of international development cooperation and how the official development assistance system works, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and issues on aid effectiveness;
- project cycle management, including project generation, project appraisal and implementation;
- performance based monitoring and evaluation;
- financial management, contracting, tendering, procurement;
- statistical reporting to the OECD DAC.

While formal training mostly targeted MFA staff, other stakeholders, mainly NGOs, also received formal training on similar issues, but also on issues of specific interest to them, such as grant proposal preparation, logical framework analysis, specific issues to consider when applying for grants from specific international organizations (like the EU), fund raising and development education.

Formal training was often followed up with more hands-on methods. In the framework of CIDA's ODACE program for example, Saint Mary's University was contracted to organize workshops for

CEE ministry staff on project monitoring and evaluation, and later also provided assistance in carrying out in-country monitoring missions. A similar approach was used by Finnish MFA in Hungary, when each formal training session was followed by a few days of hands-on mentoring activities. This is seen as a good practice, since the trainers are able to help in implementing and operationalizing the knowledge.

While not necessarily formal training, many of the capacity development programs included the organization of larger conferences and networking events. While these are useful in exposing the participants to many different practices, their effect on building capacities is most likely low.

As mentioned, formal training could have a role in the CEE countries today, as staff turnover is high in MFAs and the ministries usually have no provisions to train development staff. However, it may not be feasible to organize formal training sessions due to the low number of staff in each country, and also the impact of such training sessions was perceived to be low by some experts interviewed, if not followed up by more hands-on approaches. Therefore, methods like mentoring should be given a larger role as opposed to formal training. The development of an e-learning repository of the necessary knowledge for development experts could also be an option.

### **6.3. Study visits, internships and mentoring**

Many possibilities exist for more hands-on training, and these seem to have been favored more by donor agencies than formal training. Short term study visits to other donors have played an important role during some of the capacity development projects, in order to expose MFA staff and others to how development cooperation is done in other countries. An important emerging lesson here for the future is that the differences between the CEE country and the donor visited should not be too large, because it could make it difficult for the visitor to draw lessons that could be implemented at home. In other words, the relevance of the study trip is an issue to take into consideration when planning such activities. A good example in this case was when the UNDP organized a study visit for Lithuanian development stakeholders to the Czech Republic, a country which was, to a large extent, in a similar situation as Lithuania, but on the other hand also had a more advanced international development policy. Study visits to Canada were common in the CIDA's ODACE program as well, exposing the CEE development practitioners, policy makers and also politicians (MPs) to the Canadian way of doing development cooperation, but it is unclear how much of this experience was actually relevant.

Longer term internships were perhaps slightly less common, as having to make do without a staff member for several months can put a large strain on the development departments of the CEE MFAs and implementing agencies, being understaffed as they are. According to a development expert interviewed, many CEE MFAs seem unwilling to invest in the development of staff if it poses some form of costs they must bear (including the time away from the job). While spending longer periods of time at the headquarters of an establish donor, or in the field at an embassy can be a formative experience for any CEE staff member, there is also the question of how much the experience gained actually contributes to improving capacities at home. To what extent can the former intern use the skills gained, and can he or she share them with other colleagues? Also, what if the former intern is rotated away from development

cooperation? A strikingly negative, and most likely not unique example was when the Foreign Ministry of Finland provided an internship opportunity for a development staff member from the Hungarian MFA at the Finnish embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Shortly after her return to Budapest, the former intern was moved to the consular department and appointed to the Hungarian consulate in Helsinki. To avoid such situations, CIDA for example emphasized that after their return former interns should stay in contact and to some extent work together with their former superiors / mentors. Based on these considerations, longer term internships are only recommended for future projects if there is an explicit request for it from the CEE partners, and also if there is a possibility to monitor how the expertise gained is used afterwards.

Mentoring is basically a reverse internship, where an experienced senior expert from an established donor spends a longer period of time at a CEE MFA or other government agency. Mentors can help at specific tasks, such as designing calls for proposals, or can provide policy and strategic support. Mentoring can also be linked to formal training. Mentoring can definitely be a useful tool in the future, but it must be made sure that the mentor has the exact type of expertise that is required by the CEE donor, and also appropriate measures must be taken that the mentor is accepted and the advice given by him/her is actually made use. Mentoring should also contribute to building longer term relations between the CEE country and the donor.

#### **6.4. Mobilizing resources for bilateral ODA**

Quite a few of the capacity development programs have attempted to increase CEE bilateral ODA, either by providing a framework for the government's bilateral expenditures and getting a commitment on a certain amount of national resources (the UNDP Trust Funds), or by contributing to bilateral development projects on a cost sharing basis (trilateral programming in the framework of the CIDA ODACE program or ADA's Regional Partnership Program). These represent a form of 'action learning', where the goal is to operationalize the capacities in the CEE emerging donors and 'finalize' their transition to fully-fledged donors.

The UNDP has supported the creation of Trust Funds with the new donors as an interim solution while these donors gain sufficient experience in their bilateral development policy. Some details of these Trust Funds have already been presented in section 5.2.1. The general characteristic of these funds is that the national governments provide the resources, which are then programmed using a set of procedural rules and administrative arrangements agreed with the UNDP. As discussed, the actual implementation of the UNDP Trust Funds differed significantly between the CEE countries, and many CEE countries decided to opt out of this possibility. The UNDP has prepared a thorough analysis of the largest Trust Fund, the one with Slovakia, for more details see UNDP – SlovakAid (2008).

CIDA's trilateral programming has been presented in section 5.1.1, and more details can be found in Annex 1. In total, 124 projects were approved in the framework of the ODACE program with seven of the emerging donors:

- 14 with the Czech Republic
- 1 with Estonia
- 14 with Hungary
- 20 with Poland

- 25 with Latvia
- 19 with Lithuania
- 31 with Slovakia

This approach proved rather successful in mobilizing resources. Trilateral projects are also an excellent form of donor coordination and have the potential to significantly contribute to reaching the goals of the Rome-Paris-Accra-Busan aid effectiveness process. By combining the expertise of the established and the new donors, such projects could increase donor coordination and decrease the administrative burdens of recipients. Trilateral programming could be extended into true trilateral implementation (joint implementation), thus allowing for greater learning effects for the CEE donors. Therefore, making increased use of trilateral programming and joint implementation could be an important part of any future capacity development project. However, as the case study on Sida in Annex 4 shows, only a few of the CEE donors seem to be open to engaging in further trilateral programming. The reasons for this can be both a lack of resources due to the crisis and the fact that the CEE donors seem to prefer supply-driven bilateral projects and may not be ready to compromise on their activities with another donor.

## **6.5. Engaging development stakeholders**

Almost all programs described placed a large emphasis on engaging and developing non-state development stakeholders. As mentioned, the ODACE program was instrumental in helping the creation of the national NGO platforms in the Visegrád countries. It provided opportunities for NGO personnel for study trips, both to Canada and also to developing partner countries to visit specific projects. Training sessions on writing grant applications (both in general and also to international organizations like the UN or the EU), fundraising, advocacy and numerous workshops simply involving them and seeking their inputs all helped their development. It was implicitly communicated towards the MFAs of the new donors that NGOs should not only be regarded as project implementers, but they should also be involved in shaping international development policy. Besides the programs described, the CEE NGOs have also been constantly assisted in capacity building by organizations like CONCORD (the federation of European NGO platforms) and TRIALOG (an EC-funded project which aims to assist CEE NGOs) through training and specialized seminars and workshops (these projects are not covered by this report as they do not target the official sector at all).

Raising awareness and also increasing the capacities of private for-profit companies was also addressed in some capacity development projects, most notably the UNDP's EDI program. The aim was to engage these companies in development cooperation and make them active participants in UN, EU or World Bank financed tenders and contracts. These efforts mostly involved the organization of training courses and seminars for companies on writing proposals for international procurement tenders with titles like 'Doing Business with the UN'. However, it has proved difficult in most cases to reach companies that are not regularly active in development cooperation. Also, there seems to be a high level of consensus that these corporate training projects were not particularly effective. Still, the issue of private company capacities is highly relevant for most MFAs today. As the CEE countries have become donors in recent years to the European Development Fund (EDF) and the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), governments are increasingly concerned about the fact that



this money is 'lost' to their economies. While this may not be the correct way of looking at the issue, there is a perception among the CEE governments that without strong national private companies, it will be companies from other countries who will be winning procurement tenders financed by these funds.

Efforts at raising awareness among politicians and members of parliament were rather limited. CIDA for example organized a study tour for them to Canada, and there was a handful of conferences and workshops to which politicians were also invited, with small impact. In most CEE countries (Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania in particular) however, development cooperation is still very far from being embedded in daily politics and thus has little support and also low visibility. Engaging politicians and perhaps encouraging some MPs to specialize in development policy issues could be an important component of future capacity building efforts.

## **6.6. Awareness raising and development education**

Many capacity building programs in the emerging donors (especially the activities of the CoE North-South Centre and the UNDP) have made emphasized awareness raising and development education, with the goal of allowing the new member states to reach out to their citizens, explain to them why the country is engaging in international development cooperation, and to gain public support for this activity. This is seen as a crucial element in creating public support for development cooperation. These activities have either targeted national educational curricula (the CoE in particular) with the aim of mainstreaming development issues, organizing high profile campaigns and events or involving other actors, such as NGOs, the academia or journalists.

Examples of development education and awareness raising projects within the capacity development programs are manifold. "In 2004, UNDP Poland and the Polish MFA jointly launched a public campaign called 'Millennium Development Goals: time to help others!'. This was the first UN-driven campaign in Central Europe in support of the MDGs" (Harmer and Cotterell 2005). In Hungary, the UNDP financed the organization of a series of public seminars called 'UN-Academy' in 2004 and 2005, implemented by HUN-IDA and the Hungarian UN Society. Throughout the years, CIDA provided important contributions to the annual Summer School of Development Assistance at Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic. The UNDP and Sida have also supported the Romanian Development Camps, which are more training and networking events for professionals, but also have development education aspects.

An important flagship initiative aimed at awareness raising are the Kapuscinski Development Lectures, organized by the UNDP, in collaboration with a number of universities and think tanks and funded by the EC. In the framework of this program, development experts from around the world deliver public lectures on development in European Union countries, mainly at university venues. The first round of the lectures in 2009 focused exclusively on awareness raising in the new member states, while the 2010 round was pan-European. The ongoing 2011-2012 round concentrates on only 8-10 countries, including both new and old member states, selected by the EC. Previous rounds have included such high profile development experts as Paul Collier, Simon Maxwell, François Bourguignon, Kemal Dervis and Carol Lancaster, as well as public

figures and politicians like Jerzy Buzek, Andris Piebalgs and UNDP goodwill ambassador Crown Prince Haakon of Norway.

Another tool used to raise awareness was to reach out to journalists and train them on development issues, so that in the future they could act as multipliers. Specific tools included initiating formal cooperation with national journalist unions and organizing workshops and study trips for journalists. Another approach used development NGOs as multipliers and trained them in the necessary methods to deliver such projects. In fact, the most significant activity of development NGOs in the CEE countries today is awareness raising, as evidenced by the fact that most of their EC grant applications are for such projects. Both CIDA and the UNDP played an important role in engaging the academia in development education. The goal was to convince universities to mainstream development issues into their curricula, but also to start special development related programs, such as MA programs in development studies or development economics. The specific methods included involving senior professors from universities in meetings and organizing workshops for academics interested in development issues, as well as study tours to foreign universities with established development studies programs.

It is extremely difficult to gauge the effectiveness of these awareness raising initiatives. Opinion surveys carried out on the national level are rather *ad hoc* and do not permit comparison over time. Both CIDA and the UNDP financed initial public opinion surveys in some of the CEE countries (most notably Poland, Lithuania and Romania), but these were not followed up over time. The surveys of Eurobarometer, which are carried out rather regularly on the other hand do not ask the right questions, as they try to measure opinions towards development cooperation in general and European development cooperation, but not attitudes towards national policies. It is likely however, that not much has changed. The media hardly ever covers developing country issues. With the support of UNDP, a competition for the best article on development cooperation was organized in Lithuania, but it received little attention from journalists. It is also difficult to reach out to 'new' people: awareness raising events like public lectures or festivals organized by NGOs often only reach the 'usual' audience, people who are already aware of development issues. The results of attempting to involve academia have been limited as well, although there are some encouraging signs. So far, third world perspectives are not really integrated into higher education in the CEE countries. While a few individual programs and courses exist, development studies are not really a subject taught in CEE. The first university department devoted to development studies in the CEE countries was established in 2007 in the Czech Republic at Palacký University at Olomouc, offering both bachelor and master level degrees in development studies. Tischner European University, a small private institution in Poland offers a specialized non-degree course in Peace and Development studies. Corvinus University of Budapest in Hungary has developed a textbook on development cooperation and also offers a wide range of courses on development and developing countries, without any dedicated program however. In Romania, four universities have started master-level programs on development cooperation. It is clear however, that further capacity development in involving CEE academia would be highly desirable.

Raising awareness is however likely a long term process and the limited impact of efforts so far should not lead to conclusions regarding the futility of such projects. Capacity building in

awareness raising should play a role in future capacity development programs in the new donors, but it must be innovative compared to earlier ones in order to reach a wider audience. While it is clear that some parts of the societies in the CEE countries will not be interested in the issue in the foreseeable future, other parts, especially the young intellectuals should be targeted and convinced. New tools, like social networking websites can be useful here. The academia could serve as a platform, although rigidities in CEE academia can make involving them difficult.

## **6.7. Mapping existing expertise**

An important problem related to stakeholder capacities in the new CEE donors is that it can be difficult to find the people and organizations with the right kind of expertise needed for the implementation of specific development projects. The European Union is pushing its member states to focus more on their 'comparative advantages' in development cooperation in order to create a better division of labor, thus, finding the right national expertise is even more crucial.

Solving this 'who knows what' information problem was only addressed in a limited fashion in capacity development projects so far. The UNDP's emerging donor project in Lithuania and Romania for example financed the creation of databases on national expertise that could be used in development cooperation. There is a clear need for such a database in Hungary and Poland as well. As mentioned, the EC has attempted to address this issue, with a focus on transition experience, through the creation of the ECT database. It is however not clear to what extent these databases are kept up to date and how they are actually used or implemented in practice by the MFAs or other line-ministries. Therefore, there is clearly room here for further assistance.

## **7. Some issues related to impact**

As mentioned, this report aims to map and describe the contents of the main capacity building activities in the CEE countries and does not aim to provide a thorough impact evaluation of these projects. Almost no formal evaluations at all have been carried out on any of the individual capacity development programs. CIDA's ODACE program had a mid-term review, but no final evaluation, and also the UNDP's efforts were evaluated in the case of Lithuania, which however mainly concentrates on describing outputs, and has very little to say about actual impacts. However, while researching for this report, some tentative general conclusions on the overall impact of these capacity development programs have emerged.

As with any other evaluation exercise, it is almost impossible to construct a counter-factual situation. It is very difficult to conceive how CEE development policies would look like today without all the capacity development programs. It is also highly difficult to exclude outside influences. While the ODA policies in the region have gone through rapid development and expansion in the early 2000's, in the last five years, many of them seem to have stagnated, mainly in terms of financial resources devoted to development cooperation, but in many cases also in terms of quality. This could lead to the conclusion that after the large regional capacity development programs (mainly the CIDA and UNDP programs) have ended, the CEE countries

felt less pressure to continue scaling up their ODA programs. However, determining such causality is problematic, as the end of major capacity development programs more or less coincided with the eruption of the global economic crisis, which put severe strains on the government budgets of the new members as well.

Despite these problems, some issues on impact seem to be absolutely clear. It is more or less the case that governments and national MFAs, lacking much of the experience and knowledge required for 'modern' international development cooperation, could not have done it alone, and outside assistance was therefore definitely required. The governmental and non-governmental institutional structures set up during the capacity development programs are in many cases still working to this day, or new institutional structures have evolved based on them. The procedures and transfer mechanisms put in place were also important in ensuring transparency. Development staff at CEE MFAs have learned to 'talk the talk' of international development cooperation, and they are getting more and more confident. NGO platforms, which have been created in the frameworks of these programs now play important roles in national development policies, and seem to be especially vocal in terms of their 'watchdog role' on government policies. NGOs have also become increasingly better at raising funds through international grant tenders, and many of them have built up substantial networks in the partner countries. Development studies as an academic discipline definitely emerged in the region due to the capacity development programs. These examples show that many of the effects of the capacity development programs are actually sustainable, and the programs were successful in 'planting the seeds.'

Also, capacity development projects were successful in mobilizing funding for bilateral development cooperation in the short to medium run, although these effects were not sustainable. CIDA greatly contributed to increasing the available funds through the cost-sharing arrangement, and a major success of the UNDP was to persuade the CEE donors (at least some of them) to fund themselves and make use of UNDP expertise in the process.

Most projects funded either through CIDA's or ADA's trilateral programming or the UNDP Trust Funds were relatively small, and it is likely that they had no large impact on the development of the partner countries. Their impact therefore should mainly be measured in terms of their contributions to the strengthening of CEE development stakeholders. As mentioned, there are clear signs that NGOs in the CEE countries, while still coping with many capacity problems, have become more professional in the past ten years. The for-profit private sector however is still rather weak, and has proved difficult to reach through the capacity development programs.

Ultimately however, the impacts of any capacity development assistance (future programs included) depend on the willingness of the governments to actually make use of the knowledge and expertise that is transferred to them. Policy documents, strategies, institutional development plans, or specific recommendations from outside experts have little use if there is no will to implement them. MFAs and other government officials have often pointed towards national legal barriers to explain why they are slow in implementing certain practices and why they refrain from others, but such barriers could be overcome if there were a true will. While such willingness may depend on available financial and human resources, it may also be related to the mentalities within the MFAs or the level of political attention to development cooperation.

One CEE ODA expert interviewed emphasized that any future capacity development project is likely to have little impact due to the apathy and lack of willingness to go forward that seems to be prevalent towards ODA in many (though not all) of the CEE MFAs and governments. An example of mentalities within the MFAs is shown well by the fact that while many established donors seem to be open to trilateral programming and joint implementation, and make explicit use of CEE expertise (such as Sida or ADA), there is much less willingness on the CEE side, as such efforts would mean compromising in national priorities.

Ten years ago, when ODA was a new issue, and there was clear external pressure to do something in the policy area due to the EU accession process, governments were more likely to heed external advice than they are today, when almost all such pressure has disappeared. National willingness is the only factor that can serve as a driving force today, and in the case of most CEE countries it is missing.

The six case studies in the annex provide more details on the impact of those specific programs.

## **8. Needs for further capacity development and potential areas for established donor involvement**

This section first sums up the areas where the CEE donors may need capacity development, then it reviews some of the best practices that have emerged from such programs so far and should most likely be built into any future exercise.

### **8.1. Areas where capacity development assistance may be required**

CEE ODA policies are still in their infancy and there are many pressing issues where capacity development would be needed. While the CEE MFA and implementing agency officials interviewed stated that any sort of assistance would be welcome, there are some areas where the need is especially apparent. These are listed and briefly described below, in no particular order. The list does not attempt to provide a full list of capacity development needs in the emerging donors, rather it aims to present the most important issues.

#### *Transparency*

Previous capacity development programs have assisted the creation of transparent and accountable processes among the CEE donors. Disclosure of information however is still a problem for some of them: Hungary, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Latvia rank among the last in Publish What You Fund's (2011) Aid Transparency Index. Estonia and the Czech Republic are ranked rather high, while the others are in the lower-mid field. NGDOs and their national platforms are highly active in lobbying the government to provide better access to data related to its activities and what it funds. Technical and perhaps financial assistance to improve access to data (such as helping the development of on-line, searchable project databases) could provide incentives for governments to publish more and better quality data.

### *Evaluation of projects and country assistance*

Most experts interviewed mentioned impact evaluation as an issue where further capacity development is needed. So far, only the Czech Republic and to some extent Slovakia have put ample emphasis on evaluating their development activities, but feedback and learning from the results is problematic even here. Other CEE countries neglect evaluation almost totally, and at best they only carry out financial monitoring of their development activities. A part of the explanation is the lack of knowledge on evaluation methodology, and in more general, a lack of understanding of the importance of evaluation and learning from results. In the case of Hungary for example, the culture of evaluation is almost totally missing from the entire government sector, not only the MFA. Many MFAs think of evaluation as a threat to their activities and fear that any negative conclusions of such exercises will have a negative impact on their future budgets. While capacity development projects so far have already provided training in evaluation methodologies, their effects are hardly visible. Any such training must go together with attempts to form government attitudes towards the topic, and maybe also provide some positive incentives for the government. Clearly, creating a culture of evaluation is a long term process.

### *Communicating results*

Related to both transparency and evaluation, MFAs could be provided both financial and technical assistance to raise the profile of their activities through communication. While negative issues (such as corruption related to development activities) usually do reach the press, successful projects are not considered to be news by the media. Most MFAs and implementing agencies have no communication strategies, and often no dedicated staff members either. While some of the capacity development programs so far have attempted to help in this, any strategies formulated were mostly not put into practice. Better communication of results would have a definite effect on development awareness. Any capacity development project aiming to help in this issue must therefore assist not only in the identification of exactly what to communicate and through what channels, it should also assist in implementation.

### *Program-based approach*

Several development experts interviewed have mentioned the need for the CEE countries to gradually move from stand-alone projects to a program-based approach. Again, the Czech Republic is already experimenting with programs, while the others are not. One can of course argue that at their current levels of development, project-based approaches are more suitable for the CEE countries, especially taking into consideration their resources. However, attempts should be made to gradually shift their focus towards a program-based thinking, which would also involve a more strategic approach to partner countries and multi-year financial planning. A realistic goal would be to convince and assist the CEE countries in developing a pilot program towards one of their priority countries, which would later be evaluated as well, in order to give the CEE countries 'a feel' of how programs work as opposed to projects. Such pilot programs could take on a trilateral or joint implementation aspect and involve other donors as well. Sida's Partnership Program is an excellent initiative in this regard.

### *Institutional development*

The current institutional structures are far from effective, and the CEE countries should be encouraged to explore possibilities for other arrangements. Hungary, Poland, Romania and most of the Baltic countries for example have not moved towards the implementing agency model and have highly fragmented structures. Such assistance must be exploratory, as the low amount of bilateral resources may not justify the creation of a separate agency. Other, more advanced CEE donors on the other hand are interested in expanding the role of their aid implementing agencies by increasing their presence in the field. Opening branch offices at embassies in priority partner countries is a possibility, thus advice could be welcome on how to set up such offices. Consultations and knowledge sharing with donors who have established field presence would be useful, in issues like the division of labor between headquarters and the branch offices, and engagement in donor coordination efforts in the field. In case of any institutional reforms, the given CEE MFA should work together with the donor in working out institutional reform needs and draft a new institutional development plan.

#### *Trilateral programming and joint implementation*

As mentioned previously, some established donors would be keen to engage with the CEE donors in trilateral programming and joint implementation activities, but so far not many have actually happened (specific examples include a joint border management program, implemented together by CIDA and Poland, the Czech Republic's cooperation with ADA in Moldova, or the projects started within Sida's Partnership Program). Established donors could make use of CEE expertise in their projects, or work as a facilitators and attempt to involve other donors as well in the framework of a larger coordinated program. This would provide much needed experience for the CEE countries on working together with other donors in the field. They can also get to know the methods used by more established donors in practice, and perhaps later on build these into their own procedures. Such trilateral cooperation can take several forms, and even more limited cooperation, focusing only on joint evaluation for example, could be of value. Any such effort would be a visible contribution to the global aid effectiveness agenda as well. These initiatives would also have the potential to create long term connections and partnerships with other donors, something that is valued among the CEE countries. Many of the experts interviewed argued that such co-operation would have a much higher added value in terms of capacity building than organizing trainings and workshops. However, as the Sida case study in Annex 4 reveals, there are also some significant obstacles to such cooperation that need to be overcome, requiring a certain degree of flexibility both from the established donor and the CEE partner.

#### *Strategic planning*

Related to program-based assistance and institutional structures is the question of country assistance strategies (CAS). Many of the CEE countries do not have operational CASs, which makes much of their assistance donor-driven and *ad hoc*. The impact of such efforts is most likely however low. As the case study on the CIDA ODACE program's implementation in Hungary (Annex 1) shows, assistance in formulating CASs so far may not have been totally successful. In terms of drafting CASs, training could be necessary on how to formulate such strategies, including issues like engaging the partner country and making sure that the strategy reflects its needs and is aligned with locally owned development / poverty reduction strategies. Besides training, mentoring and hands-on consultancy is required to help the process of creating and negotiating these plans, as well as putting them into practice and following up how

they are implemented. The importance of the evaluation of the CASs cannot be over-emphasized.

### *Staff training*

While there is a clear need to continuously train staff from the MFAs, other line ministries and implementing agencies (section 4), experience has shown that organizing *ad hoc* training workshops often has little impact (see the case study on USAID's program in Annex 5). Therefore it is not recommended for any new capacity development program to place a large emphasis on formal training and workshops, but rather on activities which involve learning-by-doing. Still, new staff members in the CEE countries would need some form of formal training. An idea to solve this problem could be the creation of an e-learning repository, with online courses on the main topics of interest for (new) development staff, including development theory, the global development system, project cycle management, etc. This repository could be opened to all MFAs and other interested government organizations, which could then use it to provide training according to their own needs with little costs. Opening the e-learning courses for national NGDO platforms can also be considered.

### *Strengthening and involving other stakeholders*

All non-state development stakeholders in the CEE countries could make use of further capacity development assistance, but not necessarily in the form of training sessions, but rather more hands-on approaches. While NGOs have come a long way in the past decade, it does not mean that they are anywhere close to being comparable with large Western NGOs. Assistance could be needed in issues like fund raising, volunteering, effective campaigning, etc. The activities of many NGOs are concentrated on awareness raising and development education, so providing them possibilities for more fieldwork would also be welcome (through joint implementation for example). The academia could be encouraged and assisted not only in teaching development studies, but also engaged more in development cooperation as a provider of expertise. Perhaps the most severe problem so far in terms of stakeholders has been reaching out to private companies. The for-profit companies need to be convinced about the merits of taking part in the 'aid business', and also need assistance in meeting some of the criteria for doing so. Awareness raising among them should be much more targeted than previously. While it is a difficult issue and raises many questions, established donor agencies may consider providing some temporary form of positive discrimination for private companies from the CEE region in its procurement tenders. CEE NGOs have lobbied the EC successfully for such positive discrimination, and have been able to secure some earmarked funds, mainly for domestic awareness raising activities. But the CEE countries have so far not been successful in getting special treatment in terms of the EDF, to which they are also new contributors. While any wider awareness raising projects, aimed at the general public would also be welcome, as elaborated previously, these need to be innovative in order to reach a wider audience, or specific groups like young intellectuals. They could make increased use of social media and other relatively new web-based approaches.

## **8.2. Emerging lessons and best practices to take into consideration**

There are some lessons which have emerged from the capacity development programs so far and can be useful for any future project.



### *Differences in country needs*

While the contexts of the CEE new donors were already rather different ten years ago, many of these differences have increased even more since then, and today the CEE donors are a rather heterogeneous groups. On the one hand we have relatively advanced new donors like the Czech Republic and Slovenia, where there is a clear political commitment to become a visible and effective donor, coupled with a focused organizational structure, an emphasis on increasing bilateral aid and high transparency. On the other hand we have countries where the policy area is suffering from a lack of strategic direction and is in decline due to a decrease of financial resources (Hungary, Poland). There are also countries where ODA policies are very new and much needs to be done (Bulgaria), and to this group we can also add some of the accession countries like Croatia. Estonia and Slovenia seem to have been much less active in accepting capacity development assistance than the other countries have. Both CIDA and the UNDP attempted to take national differences into account and tailor their programs to the exact local needs, even if this led to large administrative burdens, and this is definitely the practice that the new providers of capacity development assistance should adapt as well. The actual contents of any new capacity development program on the country level must be closely coordinated with the partners. For example, any donor providing capacity development assistance in the future could offer the CEE countries a sort of 'menu' of the capacity building assistance it can provide, and the countries can 'a la carte' choose which components are most suited to their needs. While this may be difficult to manage with 10+ countries, it can ensure that any assistance provided is relevant in the given country contexts. Flexibility on part of the donor is therefore a key factor.

### *Whole of country approach*

New capacity development programs should attempt to involve all development stakeholders within the country and offer something to everyone in order to increase the acceptance and 'legitimacy.' An ideal approach is to separate a program into specific components targeting different stakeholders, but also make sure that the approach is integrated.

### *Ensure that the experience transferred is implemented / not lost*

An important lesson from previous programs is that the expertise transferred was often not implemented, or was outright lost due to the trained staff members being rotated into new jobs. Any new program must take this into consideration and develop some way to address it. One solution could be legal, i.e. officially agree with MFAs or other stakeholders that given staff members will remain on the job for the foreseeable future. Another approach could involve creating positive incentives for the CEE partners, in order to make them truly interested in implementation, such as making implementation a pre-condition for other assistance involving a larger financial commitment.

### *Try to bring about a change in mentality and generate political will*

Last, but not least, securing political commitment to move forward in international development cooperation is necessary. This is related to the question of actually implementing the knowledge transferred mentioned above, but it also relates to the wider phenomenon of what plans the government has with ODA and what importance it attaches to it. Credible commitments can be

difficult to achieve, but as elaborated in section seven, the impact of any capacity development project hinges on it.

An important issue here is financial resources. CEE governments may be more ready to provide commitments if there is an actual transfer of funds, for example to support trilateral projects, or any other clear material benefits, and not 'only' knowledge and experience. CIDA's ODACE program has proved that mobilizing massive resources was a key factor in gaining the attention of government officials. Transferring funds however to the CEE countries can prove to be a challenge for most donor agencies, because as members of the EU they do not qualify for ODA.

## **9. Conclusions**

This report has attempted to map the main capacity development programs and projects that have been carried out among the CEE new donors between 2001 and 2011, describe their contents and approaches, and based on this mapping, provide recommendations for future capacity development assistance.

Based on this mapping exercise, the report has identified the most important donors, and has provided an extensive description and overview of these programs, with a special focus on the approaches and tools they have used. The report has provided several recommendations for the contents of any such exercise, mainly in the issues of transparency, impact evaluation, communication, program-based delivery mechanisms, institutional development, trilateral programming, strategic planning and involving other stakeholders. The report also identified a number of best practices which have emerged through the capacity development programs so far, and should be mainstreamed into future programs.

The main importance however of any new larger scale capacity development program may lie in the fact that it could re-invigorate the discourse on ODA in the CEE countries, and build the political will needed in many of these countries to go forward with these policies. It could also bring new, determined and talented people into development cooperation. Thus, the importance of future capacity development goes beyond any direct impacts it may have.

## Annex 1. Case study of the CIDA's ODACE program in Hungary

Basic data	
Title of the program	Official Development Assistance in Central Europe (ODACE)
Financed and implemented by	Canadian International Development Agency
Financial contribution	CAD 15 million (approximately USD 12 million) for the entire program, the exact share of Hungary is unclear
Duration	2001-2008

### 1. Rational for selecting this program as a detailed case study

The Canadian International Development Agency's ODACE program was – besides the UNDP's Emerging Donors Initiative – the largest and most high profile capacity building program in the CEE countries. It was able to draw on massive funding, and did not require governments to share costs, as did the UNDP. It was decided to present this program through the case of Hungary in order to allow better scope and depth to the case study. However, as the phases and components in the program were much the same in all CEE countries, much of what is said here is true for the other participants as well. Of course, actual implementation and performance did vary between countries due to differences in country contexts, and thus some tentative remarks and conclusions will also be included for the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic countries.

### 2. Background

As most other CEE countries, Hungary also had a relatively extensive foreign assistance policy during the Communist regime. This aid program was rather extensive, and at some points during the early 1980s resources spent on development cooperation reached 0.7 percent of the country's national income. The program did not make a difference between development and military aid, and had a significant military dimension, which, according to various estimates reached 30-40 percent of total aid (HUN-IDA 2004). It was almost exclusively state organs that carried out the programs, with the International Technical and Scientific Cooperation Office (TESCO) being the main implementing agency.

Due to the country's huge government debt and the economic hardships caused by the transition process, Hungary terminated its international development policy in 1989, and turned from being a donor country into a recipient of foreign aid. During the 1990s, there was no active

bilateral development cooperation, only smaller ad hoc contributions to multilateral development organizations, support for ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries (which became a foreign policy priority of successive Hungarian governments), a limited number of scholarships to students from developing countries, and a small budget for humanitarian aid (Fodor 2003).

As with other CEE countries, it was also the accession to the EU which prompted the re-creation of international development policy in Hungary. Before the ODACE project began, the following milestones characterized Hungary's development cooperation policy:

- In July 2001, the government accepted a concept note detailing the main principles and contents of Hungary's development cooperation policy.
- The amount of resources spent on ODA (and OA) were EUR 29 million in 2001, approximately 0.048% of the country's GNI.
- In early 2002, TESCO (now a privatized company) created a subsidiary with the name of HUN-IDA, which would later be contracted by the MFA to serve as Hungary's aid implementing agency between 2004 and 2009.
- The department responsible for international development cooperation was created within the MFA in November 2002.

### **3. Planning the program and program management**

CIDA had been active in Hungary since 1989 and had financed a multitude of different development projects. With the EU accession however, Hungary (and all other CEE countries) graduated from being eligible for CIDA funds. The ODACE program was one of the tools used by CIDA to ease this graduation process, as it allowed Canadian assistance and financing for these countries until 2008. While unofficial contacts and some forms of cooperation between CIDA and the Hungarian MFA had been ongoing since 2001, it was in December 2002 that the MFA and CIDA signed a memorandum of understanding about the ODACE program, which represented its official launch.

Concerning the organizational structure implemented by CIDA, the program was assigned to a highly experienced project manager, who had worked with the CEE countries previously and was stationed at CIDA headquarters in Ottawa. CIDA also established a regional ODACE office in Bratislava, mainly to act as a coordinator in the field. As the program was extremely complex and administratively intensive due to the fact that it involved at first four, later eight countries and the large number of individual contracts, CIDA also contracted a coordinating agency, and devolved much of the responsibility for implementing the program to it. This agency was the Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE), a non-profit organization. 'CBIE is responsible for supporting program management in the delivery of all capacity building components of ODACE. In addition, CBIE is responsible for the identification, recruitment and mobilization of experts, partners and participants both in Canada and in CEE countries, for all contractual arrangements with experts and CEE country organizations, for organizing internships and study tours, roundtables and committee meetings abroad, liaising with MFAs and other partners in all program countries, financial management, logistical support, monitoring, evaluation and reporting for over 300 sub-program initiatives' (CBIE 2007). The

Canadian field manager at the Bratislava ODACE office worked with the coordinating agency and was responsible for identifying the necessary expertise required, preparing strategic plans, organizing short term consultancies and also acting as a technical advisor. The CIDA field manager essentially reported to CBIE, and CBIE reported to the project manager in Ottawa.

This arrangement assured flexibility and made sure that the program was driven by the needs of the individual partner countries rather than CIDA's perceptions of what would be needed. CBIE, being a membership-based organization which's membership includes the most prominent Canadian universities, was well placed to react to any potential requirements for training or capacity building expertise, as it had a large pool of experts to draw upon.

The Canadian embassies in the CEE partners also played important roles in the program, as they provided policy support and facilitated entry and access for CIDA experts.

#### **4. Goals and objectives of the program**

The main goal of the program was to contribute to sustainable development by modernizing the national capacities and institutions involved with official development assistance in Hungary, in harmony with the concept paper on international development cooperation approved by the government in 2001. The program aimed to target all development stakeholders involved in the planning, management and delivery of aid to recipient countries. The way the program aimed to achieve these goals was by sharing experience on how CIDA operates its own development programs worldwide, and adapting these practices to the specific contexts of the CEE countries.

#### **5. A description of the activities in the project and the outputs**

The ODACE program was divided into two rather clear and separate phases. The first phase, which began in 2003 and lasted until May 2005, was the actual capacity building phase. The second phase, from 2005 until March 2008, focused on operationalizing the new capacities through trilateral programming.

##### **5.1. Phase 1, 2003-2005**

Phase 1 consisted of four components, each aimed at building the capacities of specific development stakeholders.

- 1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and government units responsible for establishing ODA policies, structures and protocols.
- 2. The non-governmental sector, including the creation and support of a national NGDO platform.
- 3. Academic institutions, in order to develop programs and courses on international development cooperation.
- 4. The private sector, in order to promote their participation in development cooperation projects.

### **5.1.1. The MFA and other government units**

#### *Institutional development plan*

The key element in the government component of the first phase was the creation of an institutional development plan (IDP). The IDP was to serve as the main tool that would allow Hungary and CIDA to identify the specific areas where capacity development is required and provide a medium term vision on Hungary's development cooperation. The IDP would allow Hungary to set its institutional development goals, and CIDA would contribute to them accordingly. The IDP was to be developed by the MFA, and ideally the process should have involved a wide range of consultations. The implementation of the plan was the responsibility of the MFA as well, although other stakeholders and CIDA played a supporting role. Content wise, CIDA formulated rather clear requirements on what it would like to see in the IDP: a factual presentation of Hungary's current development cooperation, an elaboration of strategic choices and objectives (in terms of ODA commitments, management issues, delivery mechanisms, systems, and stakeholders) and an action plan detailing the implementation of the IDP (including details on budget, responsibilities, due dates and risk management).

Therefore, the IDP should have a key role and serve as a master plan throughout the entire ODACE program, but it could also provide a platform for coordinating capacity development projects from other donors.

The draft of the Hungarian IDP was prepared with the help of a senior Canadian consultant, and presented in late 2002. It conformed to CIDA's requirements and the general guidelines and provided an 'honest diagnosis' of the strengths and weaknesses of Hungary's development cooperation. It also described the main strategic objectives and goals realistically. In implementing the IDP, specific assistance was provided on how to organize work within the MFA and the implementing agency. A Canadian consultant drafted detailed for example guidelines on how HUN-IDA should be strengthened to be able to function as a real implementing agency. The guide focused mainly on what staff positions are required at HUN-IDA, including detailed job descriptions of these positions. It also formulated proposals on how to divide tasks between the MFA and HUN-IDA.

#### *Study tour for members of parliament*

CIDA organized a study tour for members of parliament from the CEE partners in 2004. The goal of this three and a half day long tour was to expose the MPs to the role parliamentarians have in ODA policy making, with a special emphasis on multi-year budgetary planning. Meetings were organized with Canadian MPs (opposition included), senior CIDA officials, and recognized critics of ODA. Two Hungarian MPs took part in the tour, one of them a member of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, the other from the Budgetary and Financial Committee. MPs from the Czech Republic and the three Baltic countries also took part on the tour.

### *Study tour for representatives of the ministry of finance and other line ministries*

The goal of this study tour was to familiarize senior representatives of the ministry of finance and other line ministries with the role the Canadian counterparts of these ministries play in Canada's international development cooperation policy. The study tour involved a three and a half day stay in Ottawa, where the participants not only met with staff from Canadian line ministries, but also with CIDA staff responsible in liaising with the ministries. The tour was organized in 2004, for officials from the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.

### *Study tours and internships for representatives of the MFA*

Representatives of the MFA and the implementing agency (HUN-IDA) also had opportunities to take part in study visits and internships to Canada. However, CIDA recognized that as the number of staff at the new development department of the Hungarian MFA was rather low, the prolonged absence of even one person could cause troubles.

Internships were assignments of 3-6 month in Canada, primarily at CIDA, but also involving any other Canadian organization involved in development cooperation. The goal was to enhance the interns understanding of, commitments and capabilities to deliver international development projects, and upon his/her return home share this experience with colleagues. CIDA provided each country with an internship possibility of one person year, which they could divide up as they see fit. CIDA funded 80% of the costs of the internship, and the sending country the remaining 20%, which basically meant the airfare and normal salary of the participants. CIDA provided a supervisor for each intern, whose task was also to follow up the intern's activities after he/she had returned home. The home organization had to provide a solid commitment that upon returning home, the intern remains involved with international development cooperation for at least one year.

### *Assistance in drafting country strategy papers*

CIDA aimed to provide assistance in drafting regulations and strategies. While one might question the relevance of creating country strategy papers with the low amounts of bilateral assistance provided by the CEE countries to any single recipient, the ODACE project still emphasized their importance. Hungary had named Serbia, Vietnam, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Palestinian Authority as 'program' countries and requested assistance in drafting country strategies for them. CIDA provided assistance for this by granting the hands-on services of a Canadian expert experienced in drafting such strategic documents. A special emphasis was placed on how to identify partner country demands, how to ensure ownership and building support for the eventual strategies.

### *Guidance in legislation drafting*

The goal was to provide guidance in drafting any necessary legislation needed to establish the ODA program and delivery mechanisms. The method was similar as with country strategies,

CIDA aimed to provide hands-on consultancy expertise. Hungary received such assistance in the second quarter of 2004, although the exact issues addressed during it are unclear.

### *Training*

Formal training was requested from CIDA by the Hungarian MFA in issues like project cycle management (preparing terms of reference, public procurement, project selection, monitoring and evaluation), OECD DAC reporting and statistics. The main training event of the ODACE program in Hungary took place in September 2004: a two day workshop was organized in Budapest for MFA officials, staff from other ministries, MPs and representatives of NGOs. Other formal training events were less high profile and mainly concentrated on MFA and HUN-IDA staff.

### *Communications and polling strategies*

CIDA also provided expertise to the Hungarian MFA in creating a communications strategy.

#### **5.1.2. Building NGDO capacities**

During the study trips for the MFA officials, it became clear to them that CIDA relies heavily on NGOs in the implementation of its programs. MFAs in the CEE countries however had only very limited relationships with NGOs, not to mention experience in working with them.

A key and arguably most successful aspect of the ODACE program was supporting the creation of national NGDO platforms in the V4 countries. CIDA hired a Canadian NGO expert, who had existing ties with NGOs in the CEE countries. The expert was placed in the ODACE office in Bratislava, and was the main coordinator in developing the national platforms.

NGDOs in Hungary (led by the larger, faith-based ones active mainly in domestic relief issues besides their international activities, the most important one being Hungarian Interchurch Aid) already started having regular consultations from September 2002. It was recognized early on that in order to have their voices heard in Hungary's emerging ODA policy, they must act together. CIDA supported this consultation and networking process by providing expertise. Consensus among the NGDOs was reached in issues like drafting a code of ethics, formulating the main principles and the modes of operation for the platform, and a representative strategy for the sector. The platform itself was established in mid-2003, with 12 members and 5 observers. It received the name of Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid (HAND). The MFA accepted HAND as a partner.

Since its founding however HAND has been constantly struggling with capacity issues. CIDA provided support to setting up HAND's office, which included financing costs (CIDA provided CAD 35 000 to HAND in 2004) and participation in the selection of HAND's coordinator. CIDA worked together with HAND to identify the most pressing needs of the platform, and provided expertise in the form of short-term consultancies in, among others, creating a business plan, a communications strategy, and strategic ODA documents. CIDA also gradually transferred some



of the management responsibilities of its NGDO training and study visit capacity building activities to HAND during 2004.

Training for NGOs provided in the framework of the ODACE program included both formal training and learning by doing, the latter implying internships and study visits. Formal training was mainly organized on demand from the national NGDO coalitions. It was therefore HAND's responsibility to identify the training needs of its members and communicate it towards CIDA. Training therefore was very much flexible and demand driven. Main topics where NGDOs required training was in fundraising, EU project proposal writing, building public awareness, project cycle management, peace and conflict issues and cross-cultural awareness (HAND 2004). The goal of CIDA was to deliver these training sessions with local experts as much as possible.

Concerning the more hands-on learning by doing training, CIDA provided 2 to 4 week long internships and study visits to approximately 60 NGDO staff members from the CEE countries covered by the ODACE program. Some of these visits meant exposing Hungarian NGO workers to development projects in developing countries, i.e. CIDA paid their volunteering costs. For example, in 2003 two volunteers had an opportunity to work for a month in Mozambique on an AIDS relief project, another person worked in Kenya on microfinancing issues. Other study visits aimed to familiarize more senior NGDO staff with the role Canadian NGDOs have in development cooperation policy making. For example, one of the board members of HAND spent two weeks in Canada, meeting with CIDA officials and representatives of Canadian NGDOs.

Capacity building and international networking activities of the CEE NGDOs was also supported by various international workshops. One of the most important of these was a two day seminar for national NGDO platforms organized in Vienna in cooperation with TRIALOG. During this workshop the representatives of the platforms got to know the challenges others face and discussed opportunities on how to engage the EU in NGDO platform financing and future collaboration between the platforms of the new member states. Other workshops included the ODACE Workshop on Peace Building (Warsaw, 2004) or the ODACE Workshop Beyond Humanitarian Aid (Budapest, 2004). The ODACE program also provided travel financing to NGDO representatives wishing to take part in workshops or other activities abroad not organized within the framework of the program.

### ***5.1.3. Academic institutions***

The ODACE program placed an emphasis on introducing international development studies as a field of study in CEE higher education. A Canadian professor visited all eight countries in the program in order to expose them to how Canadian universities carry out international development studies. A report written by this professor described the contents and typical curricula of such programs and examined possibilities for implementing them.

A study visit of 15 CEE academics (mainly on the senior, professor and associate professor level) was organized to Canadian universities offering international development studies. The goal was to allow these academics to familiarize themselves with undergraduate and graduate

level development studies curricula and course material, and also expose them to Canada's experiences in developing and delivering these materials. The tour also had the objective of facilitating potential future exchanges of teaching staff and also the attendance of Canadian presenters at appropriate summer schools.

#### **5.1.4. Private sector**

This final component of the ODACE program's first phase aimed at developing strategies to increase the involvement of private sectors actors in development cooperation. Perhaps this component had the least emphasis devote to it. It resulted in a strategic document for the MFA, written by a Canadian consultant, on potential methods and channels to involve private businesses into ODA implementation.

The report identified three main needs of the Hungarian private sector: access to information, guidance and advice, and operational programs to support their needs. Several possibilities were elaborated on how the MFA could react to these needs. A small group of dynamic companies was identified which had already been involved in projects funded by the IFIs. The document proposed that these should be the ones the MFA started to work with and later expand the scope to other companies as well.

Based on Canadian experiences, the strategic document recommended some potential models used by CIDA, which could be adapted to the Hungarian context: the directive model, the responsive programming model, and the core funding model. However, it also emphasized the fact that the government must first start to raise awareness among the private sector and provide a better flow of information.

#### **5.2. Phase 2, 2004-2008**

During the second phase of the ODACE program, the focus of the program shifted from explicit capacity building towards putting the new capacities to work in practice. The aim of this phase was to enhance the abilities of national MFAs to deliver successful international development projects. This took the form of trilateral cooperation, in other words, CIDA provided co-financing to specific development projects. The form for this in the case of Hungary was that CIDA contributed 50% of the costs to selected international development projects of NGOs which had been selected in competitive process. This co-financing allowed a significant increase of the MFAs bilateral NGO grant budget between 2005 and 2007.

The phase began with the signature of an administrative arrangement agreement between CIDA and Hungary, which defined the working relationship and the legal and contractual requirements. CIDA provided detailed guidance through developing a project cycle manual, which detailed issues like project planning, proposal submission, transfer of funds, narrative and financial reporting, and monitoring and evaluation. CIDA also emphasized that the Hungarian MFA and HUN-IDA are at the center of the process and carry all responsibility. CIDA was to be directly involved in monitoring and evaluation. It was hoped that the unique comparative advantages of the CEE donors (such as their experience from the transition process) and the

financial resources of CIDA could lead to a new model of donor coordination, which could later be replicated elsewhere. The process therefore was the following:

- 1) The MFA issued the call for proposals, which was formulated together with the help of an expert from CIDA.
- 2) HUN-IDA evaluated the proposals, but CIDA also received copies and had them independently evaluated as well.
- 3) A joint meeting between CIDA, HUN-IDA and the MFA discussed which of the projects CIDA would contribute to. CIDA's criteria were rather loose, as they agreed to any sound project which did not contradict Canada's own support strategy towards the recipient country.
- 4) The final decision was formally made by the MFA, and HUN-IDA signed the contracts with the beneficiaries. CIDA transferred the contribution directly to the MFA, thus the NGOs which were awarded grant contracts did not have to enter into separate contractual relations with CIDA.
- 5) CIDA retained rights for oversight, monitoring and evaluation.

This process illustrated that while the main goal of CIDA was to allow the CEE partner to put its capacities into practice as much as possible, it also aimed to help formulate a transparent and competitive NGO grant support scheme.

The Hungarian calls for proposals allowed only NGOs to participate and had two restrictions on the projects: the country of implementation must be a priority country of Hungarian ODA and the sector must also be in harmony with Hungary's (stated) priority sectors. There was one exception to this, as the call also allowed awareness raising activities in Hungary. The value of a proposed project should not have exceeded HUF 20 million (roughly USD 100 000), although each NGO was allowed to submit two proposals. The projects were supposed to be short-term projects, and implemented within the same year as the grant was awarded. Details on selection criteria were rather vague ('[t]he MFA will evaluate the professional content of the projects'), so one may argue that despite CIDA's assistance, the call was not perfect. On the other hand, this vagueness may be deliberate in order to allow the widest possible range of projects.

In total, CIDA co-funded 14 projects in three rounds. In 2005 CIDA provided HUF 71 million (around USD 355 000) for seven projects, and in 2006 HUF 42 million (USD 210 000) as co-financing. In 2006 it co-supported a larger project in Afghanistan by Hungarian Interchurch Aid, as well as 5 smaller ones in Serbia, Mongolia, the Ukraine and Vietnam. In 2007 there was only one CIDA co-funded project in the Ukraine, and as 2007 was the final year of trilateral programming, CIDA put a large emphasis on following up the projects, and conducted several on-site M&E missions together with HUN-IDA in Mongolia, Serbia, Ukraine, Cambodia and Vietnam.

## **6. Outcomes, impact and lessons learnt**

Almost all stakeholders would acknowledge that the ODACE program played an important role in supporting the re-creation of Hungary's international development cooperation policy. It was

instrumental in exposing the MFA and the government to how development cooperation is done in an advanced established donor. CIDA did not carry out any formal end-of-project evaluation, but CIDA representatives interviewed agreed that the program was 'by and large' productive and successful, and it managed to establish good relations with the new donors. It is regarded as an important 'flagship' program within CIDA to this day. It also provided CIDA with expertise in emerging donor capacity building, knowledge it is yet to make further use of.

The program provided numerous international networking opportunities for local development stakeholders and attempted to foster a culture of cooperation. The significance of the creation of the NGDO platform could hardly be exaggerated. Trilateral programming was also definitely successful in creating more transparent, open project mechanisms, although in the past years due to severe austerity measures, such grant support to NGO-implemented development projects has all but ceased in Hungary. Though the trilateral projects should be evaluated mainly from the perspective of how they helped Hungarian NGOs gain international expertise and build their networks abroad, it should be mentioned that this approach was highly donor driven and the actual needs of the recipient countries were not discussed in advance.

The main problem during the implementation of the ODACE project, as expressed by CIDA staff in official documents, was that they had expected Hungary's development policy to develop at a much faster pace. Much of the delays in the project were related to the fact that the Hungarian institutional structure was in organizational stages, even in 2004, without clear mandates. Thus, any decision was slow, and this had a considerable effect on the implementation of the IDP, on which the entire program hinged.

HUN-IDA only received implementing agency status from the MFA in 2004, which hindered progress in the project as there was no clear implementing agency until then. Many components of the capacity development program were delayed due to this. Even when mandated, HUN-IDA was not granted all the responsibilities of a classic implementing agency, as the MFA retained all issues related to policy formulation and even final decision making in programming issues. HUN-IDA's responsibilities were limited to administering the projects, formal contracting and monitoring, which can be explained by the fact that HUN-IDA was, in essence, a privately owned company and not a government agency.

While starting with the formulation of an IDP to serve as a master plan for all the actual capacity development components was a good approach (and could be considered in any future, large scale and complex capacity development program), many issues within it have not been acted upon or followed up and are outstanding problems to this day. Even though national ownership of the IDP seemed to be ensured, it was not enough to maintain political commitment, or was it enough to take all potential external constraints into consideration.

While support was given within the framework of the program to drafting country strategies and legislation, the actual outputs of these processes were not visible. Hungary has no law on international development cooperation to this day, and the first country strategies were published only in 2008, several years after the support was given to draft them. It is not clear whether these published country strategies have any relation to the ones supposedly drafted with the help of Canadian expertise.

The NGO support component was successful in creating the NGDO platform with a balanced presidium, and the new platform was able to engage in discussions with the MFA. It also prepared and distributed its first position papers. However, discord was also often present within the platform, which made formulating common positions slow and difficult. Still, the number of platform members has steadily increased, HAND has become an acknowledged partner of the MFA, and has been successful in securing funding for its activities. Also, due to the trilateral programming phase, many NGOs were able to gain international expertise, and their project proposals definitely got better and better during the subsequent funding rounds. Many NGOs, especially environmental ones were difficult to reach and convince to take part in the internships and study visits, citing lack of time as the main reason. A key challenge in engaging the for-profit private sector was that the small size of development budgets did not seem attractive to them.

Concerning challenges and difficulties in the implementation of the entire ODACE program in the V4+B3 countries and Slovenia, the following issues emerged:

- While the flexibility and demand driven nature of the program was definitely a huge asset, it often proved difficult for the management and the implementing agency (CBIE) to flexibly manage the demands of eight different countries.
- The eight different contexts (legal, cultural, differing levels of political support etc) also made issues more difficult, as one solution that was tailored to the needs of one country was not always easy to adapt in another.
- Often an important constraint was the small size of the national ODA programs. These small programs did not allow the creation of large enough institutions that could effectively manage problems like high staff turnover.
- There was little flexibility from CIDA's side in the demarcation of the two phases of the program. Due to differences in the speed of evolution between the countries, it was clear that some of them would have needed/welcomed further capacity development assistance, even when CIDA had moved on to the trilateral phase.
- The program's end in early 2008 was rather arbitrary, as there were still funds remaining in the budget and most partner countries would have welcomed further rounds of trilateral funding.

Concerning the future, there is a clear willingness within CIDA to engage in further emerging donor capacity building (including new donors beyond the CEE region as well), and make use of the expertise they have gained through the ODACE project. However, as CIDA's core resources towards middle income countries are shrinking and its Europe-program has been closed down, it has proved difficult for the agency to engage in any such activity.

## Annex 2. Case study of the UNDP's capacity development program in Lithuania

Basic data	
Title of the program	Strengthening National Capacity of Lithuania as an Emerging Donor (as part of the UNDP's Emerging Donors Initiative)
Financed and implemented by	UNDP Lithuania, with thematic expertise and overall guidance from the UNDP Regional Centre in Bratislava
Financial contribution	cca. USD 200 000 from the UNDP, but also mobilized a significant amount of government and private sector resources
Duration	Originally 2003-2005, but extended to 2006

### 1. Rational for selecting this program as a detailed case study

This program was selected for a detailed case study due to the fact that it represents the UNDP Emerging Donor Initiative's complex and multifaceted approach to new donor capacity building rather well. The UNDP used a wide range of tools and approaches in Lithuania and also strived to involve all development stakeholders as much as possible. However, there were also some differences compared to other new member state donors, the most notable among these was that Lithuania did not enter the a Trust Fund agreement with the UNDP as other countries, most notably the Czech Republic, Hungary or Slovakia did.

### 2. Background

As opposed to many other CEE countries, Lithuania had rather limited experience in international development cooperation prior to the early 2000s. The country was part of the Soviet Union before 1990, and the only relation with development assistance was provided by the limited number of Lithuanian experts working in Soviet development cooperation. After independence Lithuania became a recipient of foreign assistance and was the last of the three Baltic countries to graduate from recipient status.

Lithuania started to create its international development policy in 2001, in preparation for the country's EU accession in 2004. This preparation included:

- In 2001, the government set up a separate budget line for ODA.
- The government approved a strategic document entitled 'Lithuanian Development Assistance Policy for 2003-2005'.
- A new division (Division of Development Assistance) within the Department of Multilateral Relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created, which was to serve

as the organizational background of the new policy. At first, three diplomats were assigned to this new division.

- The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was already active in Lithuania and has supported this process through the ODACE program, thus any new capacity development program had to take CIDA's activities into account.
- The Lithuanian society's opinion and perceptions on global development issues was largely unknown.
- There was only a handful of Lithuanian NGOs involved in international development cooperation and they had no formal coalition or platform.
- In 2002, Lithuania's ODA was a mere 0,022% of its GNI, much of it multilateral contributions to international organizations, mainly the UN-family.

### **3. Planning the program and program management**

In-line with the UNDP's regional Emerging Donors Initiative, UNDP Lithuania, together with the Lithuanian MFA, took an important strategic decision in 2002 to support Lithuania in strengthening its institutions and capacities as an emerging donor.

While planning the program, UNDP Lithuania more or less relied on the tools that were used by the UNDP in other countries as well. However, extensive consultations were carried out with the MFA and all other stakeholders in order to tailor the approach to the specific needs of Lithuania. The most important partners in this process were senior level decision makers from the MFA: the ministry secretary in charge of development cooperation, the head of the multilateral affairs departments, and the head of the development cooperation departments. NGOs were mainly consulted during the implementation process, this however proved rather difficult as at the time there was no formal platform of development NGOs in Lithuania (although CIDA was instrumental in setting up a working group of NGOs). Due to this, it was difficult to find a partner who could speak for the entire NGDO sector (in fact, the NGDO platform was only formally registered much later, in 2008).

It is a question how much the tailoring of the program to the needs of the Lithuanian stakeholders actually worked out, as the components used in the program are strikingly similar as in the UNDP programs carried out in other CEE new donors. Still, some differences are visible, such as the creation of a database of Lithuanian experts who can potentially take part in implementing international development projects (described below, this component was later used in Romania as well). The consultancy process also revealed that a detailed needs assessment was required before actual program activities began. UNDP Lithuania contracted an independent international consultant to carry out this assessment.

As mentioned, CIDA had also been active in new donor capacity building in Lithuania, however UNDP Lithuania did not enter into any formal partnership with CIDA. There were a few explorative meetings that were aimed to summarize CIDA's capacity building efforts and to build upon that. The fact that the two programs were more or less coordinated is shown for example by the fact that the UNDP put a small emphasis on formal training, especially for the civil

society, as these training needs had already been covered by CIDA. This is seen as a good example of inter-agency coordination.

#### **4. Goals and objectives of the program**

The overarching objective of the program was to build national capacities in Lithuania to allow the country to carry out its own development cooperation activities. Specifically, national capacities needed development in the following areas:

- the design and implementation of development cooperation projects;
- identifying and codifying available national expertise, on the government and NGO level;
- building a strong constituency for development assistance through awareness raising and communication efforts;
- laying the foundation for the eventual establishment of an institutional mechanism to manage development cooperation activities (i.e. planning a UNDP-Lithuania Trust Fund).

The intended direct beneficiaries of the program included government agencies, public and private institutions, NGO's, media organizations, academic and training bodies

#### **5. A description of the activities in the project and the outputs**

During implementation, the program was divided into four interrelated components, loosely based on the four goals above, with components 1 and 2 representing the bulk of the program:

- component 1: Building national capacities to carry out development cooperation activities;
- component 2: Increase awareness and develop public support for development cooperation;
- component 3: Establishing a knowledge bank of Lithuanian expertise;
- component 4: Establishing a National Institutional Mechanism to manage international development cooperation.

##### ***5.1. Building national capacities to carry out development cooperation activities***

The first component of the program focused on building capacities among the main national development stakeholders. It was characterized by a broad approach and targeted government officials (not restricted to the MFA, but other line ministry staff as well), NGOs, the academia, private companies and media organizations.

##### ***a, Government officials***



Work on this component began with an identification mission which was aimed at analyzing the current situation in Lithuanian development cooperation, with a strong focus on government officials. The mission revealed the main issues in which government officials needed specific training and capacity development. Based on this, a set of training modules was developed, focusing on two key topics: the basics and main principles of official development assistance and project cycle management. These modules were delivered on a two day workshop in February 2005, where participants included not only officials from the Lithuanian MFA, but also officials from other line-ministries, members of parliament, NGO representatives, individual development experts, and also representatives of the academia. This two day workshop was the only instance of formal training for government officials throughout the project.

However, further capacity building for ministry staff was carried out, but mostly through experience exchange visits depending on the actual needs and interests of the staff members, and also the availability of UNDP partners to host such visits. The locations for such visits were selected based on their potential to contribute to the design of the Lithuanian ODA architecture. Lithuanian officials took part in an 'Emerging Donors Study Tour' to Prague and Bratislava in October 2004, with the aim of being exposed to presentations and discussions on Czech and Slovak ODA, including development cooperation strategy, mechanisms and instruments, bilateral and multilateral ODA, target countries and their selection, as well as future plans. This study visit also had an important role in presenting the Czech and Slovak UNDP Trust Funds to the Lithuanian officials and thus illustrate the role the UNDP can play in mobilizing resources for development assistance and creating interim institutional solutions. The officials also got to know the Czech Development Centre as a potential model for organizing an aid implementing agency. This study tour is seen as a good practice, because by exposing officials to the practice of similar, but perhaps slightly more advanced new donors, they could draw much more relevant conclusions for their own development cooperation policy than they could from visiting any established donor.

#### ***b, NGOs***

Capacity building among Lithuanian NGOs was not a priority in the program, as CIDA's ODACE program had already targeted the voluntary sector in 2004-2005 with training sessions and providing study tour opportunities. The workshop mentioned in the previous section however was open to participants from NGOs. It is possible that there was another reason for putting a relatively lower emphasis on building national NGO capacities: the fact that there was no formal Lithuanian development NGO platform would have made reaching these organizations difficult. However, many NGOs were included in various consultations, which may have contributed to increasing their capacities.

#### ***c, Academia***

The goal of developing capacities in Lithuanian higher education was to facilitate the creation of specialized interdisciplinary courses on development studies at Lithuanian universities, and also gradually mainstream these topics into general curricula. First a policy-level meeting was

organized with the rectors of the Lithuanian universities in September 2004, which was followed by a two day workshop in November for interested academics who could potentially elaborate such a course. This workshop was organized in cooperation with the German Development Cooperation Centre of Bonn University. Three follow-up facilitation meetings were also organized in late 2004 and early 2005. Vilnius University's library was provided with material on development cooperation (books, films and case studies) for students to use as reference material.

#### ***d, Private companies***

The program placed a large emphasis on increasing the capacities of Lithuanian private companies, mainly to boost their knowledge on possibilities for engaging with the EU, the World Bank and the UN in implementing development projects. During the project, three one day training sessions were organized in April 2006 in three Lithuanian cities (Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipeda). However, one of the sessions was cancelled due to the insufficient number of participants. Also, the one day time slots allocated for the training proved to be too short and did not allow full coverage of the planned material.

#### ***e, Media organizations***

In October 2004 a meeting was held with the chief and foreign news editors at the most important Lithuanian newspapers and national television. During this meeting, MFA officials presented the country's development cooperation policy, including the main priorities and implications. In December 2004 the MFA signed an agreement with the Union of Journalists on promoting the support of journalists and increasing their engagement in awareness raising activities.

### ***5.2. Increase awareness and develop public support for development cooperation***

While the first component targeted specific development stakeholders, the second was aimed towards increasing the awareness of the general public on global development issues, and also Lithuania's role and responsibility as a new donor. The first step in this component was to organize an opinion poll to gauge the attitudes of Lithuanians on international development issues. No similar poll had been carried out in the country previously. The poll was organized in September 2004 on a representative sample of the Lithuanian population, and it revealed that awareness on development issues was very low. It also showed that only a very small share of the population knew about their country turning from being a recipient of external assistance to being a donor.

The awareness raising campaign which followed was entitled 'Time to Help Others'. It was rather comprehensive and focused on the following activities:

- A study tour was organized for 15 Lithuanian journalists to Georgia in April 2005, in order to increase their understanding of specific development issues faced by a country in transition. The also met with several high ranking Georgian politicians.

- Four national television and radio stations aired programs related to development cooperation and the activities of the UN in mid-2005.
- The UNDP prepared a work plan for the MFA on the organization of future public awareness raising campaigns.
- A competition was organized in early 2005 for the 'best article on development cooperation'. However this initiative at first failed to attract attention, as the volume of articles submitted was well below initial expectations. Thus, the deadline for submissions was extended to fall 2005, and additional efforts were made to increase awareness among journalists about it.
- Well known and respected Lithuanian personalities were named national advocates (or goodwill ambassadors) for the campaign.
- In mid-2006 a large outdoor concert was organized, which was broadcasted live on national television and thus managed to achieve a high audience.
- Other initiatives included a public walk entitled 'Walk the World', actions targeting young people (such as an essay competition and discussions at schools), a concert by the Lithuanian Symphonic Orchestra, and the production of campaign materials such as brochures.

In order to assess the effects of the ongoing public information campaign, a second opinion poll was carried out in November 2005, which showed that despite all the concerted activities, awareness remained rather low and pointed towards the necessity of sustained awareness raising efforts.

### ***5.3. Establishing a knowledge bank of Lithuanian expertise***

The idea behind this component was that in order to involve as many Lithuanian experts in international development cooperation as possible, these experts and their specific expertise must first be identified. Creating a database of experts would therefore help the MFA in identifying the issues in which Lithuania can offer expertise to its partner countries. In early 2005 a concept paper was prepared by Lithuanian experts on the database and the database itself was presented to the MFA in early 2006.

Simultaneously, this component also attempted to gather information on the need for Lithuanian expertise in partner countries. The database on Lithuanian experts helped in fostering 'east-east' cooperation, and the UNDP was able to involve Lithuanian experts in implementing its projects in Eastern countries.

### ***5.4. Establishing a National Institutional Mechanism to manage international development cooperation***

The final component of the project aimed at drafting the terms of reference for a national institutional mechanism to manage international development resources. The idea was to create a UNDP-Lithuania Trust fund to serve as an interim mechanism for bilateral aid delivery, until

Lithuania's capacities are fully developed. As in other countries, the Trust Fund would have been meant to lay down the rules and processes for ensuring transparency and accountability in programming Lithuanian assistance.

The study tour organized for government officials to the Czech Republic and Slovakia included in Component 1 had an important role in informing the decision makers on how such an arrangement can work. The UNDP prepared a concept paper in late 2004 entitled 'Managing International Technical Cooperation in Lithuania: Proposals for Institutional Arrangements'. It recommended that the Trust Fund mainly focus on small scale projects in countries not in the immediate neighborhood of Lithuania, especially Mauritania (in-line with the EU's focus on Africa), Afghanistan and Georgia. The Trust Fund would be managed and programmed by the MFA, with guidance from the UNDP. The draft terms of reference for the Trust Fund were presented to the MFA in early 2006.

## **6. Outcomes, impact and lessons learnt**

After having described the content and outputs of the UNDP's EDI program in Lithuania, some tentative remarks on the outcomes and impact will be made. In general the program was evaluated by the Lithuanian MFA and the UNDP as successful, especially in raising the profile of development cooperation within the country. The assistance granted to Lithuania was perceived as timely and relevant. The fact that the program offered something to all development stakeholders and also involved them in planning and implementation ensured national ownership.

In the years since the end of the project, Lithuania has been attempting to create a unique 'brand' for itself in development cooperation (see for example the MFAs development website, [www.orangeprojects.lt](http://www.orangeprojects.lt)), and has increased its spending on development cooperation considerably, peaking at EUR 34.5 million and 0.11% of the country's GNI in 2008. Lithuania seems to have clear strategy in development cooperation, focusing on just a limited set of partners and placing democracy promotion to the center. While the emergence of this rather clear vision on Lithuania's role and the increase in funding may be difficult to attribute to the UNDP project, there is clear evidence that the country has come a long way in the past ten years.

The following conclusions on the impacts of the various elements of the program can be made:

- The media campaign provided unprecedented coverage for the UNDP, for international development issues and Lithuania as a new donor as well. The media campaign combined a multitude of different approaches and tools, and was able to reach a wide audience this way.
- Development issues have been streamlined into the curricula of three Lithuanian Universities (Vilnius University, Vilnius Technical University and Vytautas Magnus University). No dedicated university program however has been started.
- The creation of the Lithuanian expert's database was definitely an important idea in the program. While its immediate impact may not be easy to identify, years later, when the European Commission started to create a similar database for all CEE new member states, focusing on their transition experience (the European Transition Compendium),

the existing Lithuanian database could have served as an input to this and thus explain why Lithuania was so over-represented in the published document version of the ECT.

- Concerning the UNDP-Lithuania Trust Fund, while the draft terms of reference were created, the Fund itself was never put into practice. The MFA decided to skip this interim possibility and they set up the Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Department within the MFA as the centre for ODA project implementation. There were discussions about trilateral programming together with the Sida, as they were particularly interested in using Lithuanian expertise in the Eastern countries undergoing transition, but as the Trust Fund was never operationalized, such joint programming was not applied either. In this aspect the Lithuanian UNDP program is in stark contrast with many of the other CEE countries, where the Trust Fund approach was important in operationalizing the new capacities.

There were some difficulties during the project implementation, which provided important 'lessons learnt' for UNDP Lithuania. These should be kept in mind, as it is possible that similar issues may arise in case of future capacity development programs. The main difficulties were the following:

- Due to high staff turnover, the perceptions and official standpoints of the MFA changed often, which resulted in continuously changing ideas about the program's activities. This proved difficult to accommodate.
- Partly related to the high staff turnover, there was no single focal point for the program within the MFA, which slowed down implementation.
- As mentioned, the absence of a formal NGDO coalition made involving the voluntary sector much more difficult.

While the UNDP program was instrumental in the emergence of Lithuania as a donor, it is clear that there are several challenges that Lithuania is still facing in terms of ODA volumes and quality, donor coordination and also constituency building. More specifically, Lithuania may need further capacity building in the following issues:

- Promoting a greater public accountability and transparency of ODA resources. This includes fostering a culture of evaluation and learning from results.
- Better communication of results and thus building a constituency for ODA by showing what impact Lithuanian development cooperation has in alleviating poverty and promoting democracy.
- The capacities of NGDOs need to be strengthened considerably, in order for them to be able to enter into partnerships/consortia with similar voluntary organizations from established donor countries and thus compete more effectively for grant financing or project implementation possibilities from the EU, the UN or the World Bank.

UNDP's Lithuania Office does not plan any further capacity development projects in the issue, although the Regional Centre in Bratislava does continue to facilitate cooperation between established donors and the new member state donors.

## Annex 3. Case study of the UNDP's capacity development programs in Romania

Basic data	
Title of the program	Strengthening National Institutional and Educational Capacity to Carry out ODA programs/projects (SNIECODA) as part of the UNDP's Emerging Donors Initiative  + other smaller projects
Financed and implemented by	Government of Romania and UNDP Romania, with thematic expertise and guidance from the UNDP Regional Centre in Bratislava
Financial contribution	cca. USD 190 000 from the UNDP, USD 1 300 000 from the Government of Romania for SNIECODA. An additional EUR 1 400 000 was transferred to UNDP country offices in Serbia, Georgia and Moldova, financed by the Government of Romania
Duration	December 2007 – December 2009, with actual project work starting in early 2008. Some of the smaller projects still ongoing.

### 1. Rational for selecting this program as a detailed case study

UNDP's capacity building activity in Romania was selected for a detailed case study due to the fact that it complements the previous UNDP case study (on Lithuania) rather well. While many of the components in the Lithuanian and Romanian case seem rather similar, the Romanian government decided to partner with the UNDP and channel much of its bilateral assistance through the UNDP, which was in part due to the conviction in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that this would allow for more effective Romanian assistance, but also using the UNDP allowed avoiding some legal problems which made it difficult for the Romanian MFA to channel resources directly to domestic stakeholders like NGOs. Besides the SNIECODA program, the UNDP also took part in several other capacity building projects in Romania, which will also be presented briefly.

### 2. Background

Romania had one of the largest 'international cooperation' budgets during the Communist period, and due to its relative independence and 'free-rider' position in foreign affairs from the Soviet Union, it enjoyed a rather large autonomy in setting its priorities towards the developing world. Romania was highly active in the developing world, maintaining a rather large number of embassies and providing many experts and scholarships to developing countries.

As with other CEE countries, Romania also suspended these policies with the transformation process and became a recipient of aid. The re-emergence of Romanian development cooperation was a slow process, which could partly be explained by the fact that the country joined the EU only in 2007, and thus international pressure to become a donor of foreign assistance was also slower to build up. In 2002 for example, when the CEE accession countries joining in 2004 were well on their ways in formulating international development assistance policies, Romania still had no systematic policy.

The Romanian government set up an Office for Development Cooperation in 2003, and in 2004 an inter-ministerial working group was set up to define the future objectives and strategies, and also to take stock of existing Romanian programs that could classify as development cooperation (Oprea 2012). The MFA began close cooperation in terms of capacity building with the European Commission in setting up the necessary ODA structures. In 2006 the government adopted a National Strategy on International Development Cooperation, which detailed the goals of Romanian development cooperation and also the partner countries and thematic priorities. An Action Plan was added to the strategy to assist its implementation. The legal background of Romanian development cooperation was also formulated in 2006 and 2007 and includes Law no. 404/2006 on financing the development cooperation policy, and Government Decision (GD) no. 747/2007, which regulates specific ODA actions.

After extensive consultations going back to 2005, 34 Romanian development NGOs (most of them already involved in consultations with the MFA and TRIALOG) created FOND, the platform of Romanian NGOs engaged in development activities, in late 2006.

2007 was considered as the first year in which Romania truly began its development cooperation activities. In 2007, the MFA's total ODA budget was 4 675 000 EUR, and this entire budget was allocated through multilateral channels. Total ODA (including the ODA budgets of other line ministries and any other expenditures that can be classified as ODA) in 2007 was around 80 million EUR, which made up 0.07% of Romania's GNI.

### **3. Planning the program and program management**

As the UNDP had previously assisted the other CEE countries in establishing their mechanisms and institutions in ODA delivery, it was only natural that the organization should help the countries that joined the EU in 2007 as well. While Bulgaria's development cooperation policy remains relatively low profile and the government has so far not put large efforts into building up this policy, Romania has engaged actively with the UNDP.

UNDP Romania relied on similar tools as in other countries where the Emerging Donors Initiative was put into practice. Extensive consultations were carried out with the MFA and other stakeholders in order to gauge the exact needs of the country, and the MFA was engaged on a day-to-day basis not only in planning the capacity development program, but also in implementation. According to the UNDP, the program was tailored to the needs of Romania as much as possible and was thus able to achieve maximum local ownership.

As other donors were much less active in providing capacity development assistance to Romania than in other CEE countries, UNDP did not really have to work together with other

donors. A notable exception was the Swedish Sida, which provided training to officials in the Romanian MFA and also contributed to the Romanian Development Camps (see Annex 4 for more details). CIDA on the other hand did not officially extend its ODACE program to Romania, although informal consultations and some limited assistance did happen. This also meant that the large amount of resources that CIDA was able to mobilize for the ODACE program were missing in the case of Romania.

#### **4. Goals and objectives of the program**

The overall goal of the program was to contribute to the transformation of Romania from a recipient of external assistance to a donor country by building the national capacities for development cooperation and the provision of ODA and humanitarian aid. There was a clear need to strengthen the administrative capacity at the central and local levels to develop, implement and monitor policies and programs, ensuring transparency, accountability and participation.

The intended direct beneficiaries of the program included government agencies, public and private institutions, development NGOs and their national platform, media organizations, academic and training bodies (universities).

#### **5. A description of the activities and the outputs of the program**

The SNIECODA program had three main components:

- Component 1: Building institutional capacities to carry out development cooperation activities in partner countries, as defined by the National ODA Strategy accepted by the government in 2006.
- Component 2: Raise awareness at the national level on global development issues and Romanian ODA.
- Component 3: A contribution of earmarked amounts from the Romanian government to UNDP country offices in the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Serbia, as well as Quick Impact Initiatives.

##### **5.1. Component 1 – Capacity building**

The capacity building component within the UNDP's EDI program in Romania was much the same as what the UNDP had carried out in other emerging donors (see for example the case study on Lithuania). Thus, the program attempted to reach out to all major stakeholders, including non-governmental actors that could play an important role in implementing development cooperation projects and shaping policy. Due to this similarity with other UNDP programs, this case study will focus more on issues that make the Romanian case special.

Concerning government capacity building, the UNDP was highly active in providing support for planning the institutional structure, rules and regulations, management and other processes of development cooperation. This activity resulted in an operational manual for the MFA, which



included a thorough description of how the cycle of development projects should be managed, how the ministry should prepare calls for proposals, select projects for implementation etc. The staffing needs and relevant arrangements of the MFA were also mapped and assessed.

Training of the development stakeholders mainly happened through a large annual event, called the Romanian Development Camp. The first such camp, entitled 'Developing ourselves to help develop others', was organized in September 2008, and was open to all stakeholders, including politicians, representatives of the MFA and other line-ministries, development staff from other countries, NGOs, the media, academics and the European Commission. In total, 80 representatives took part in the event. According to the description on the MFAs development cooperation website, 'the Romanian Development Camp is a multifaceted event: it is a space for training, for exchange of knowledge and best practices; it is a forum of dialogue and networking, ensuring the sustainable interaction between national stakeholders, as well as between the national and international counterparts.' The first camp's objective was to increase general knowledge among the stakeholders on ODA. It provided opportunities for the stakeholders to familiarize themselves with the concepts, tools and framework of development. The event included training on issues like 'Global policy frameworks for development cooperation', 'EU Development Policy', aid effectiveness, policy coherence and bilateral ODA delivery etc. Case studies of other donors were also important in sharing best practices.

Since then, the Development Camp has become an annual training and networking event, the forth installment was organized in mid-2011. The main characteristics of these events are that besides the plenary sessions, they provide separate workshops for all stakeholders where they can discuss the issues that are of most concern to them. The third Development Camp in 2010 was opened by the EU's Commissioner for Development, Andris Priebeļs, who emphasized the role Romania could play in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The events also provided large media exposure for the topic.

As in other emerging donors in the region, the UNDP initiated a discourse with Romanian universities on the possibilities of starting master-level education programs in development studies. Five universities were engaged in these discussions: the University of Bucharest, the Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University in Iaşi and the West University of Timișoara. Academics from these universities benefitted from training in drafting master-level curriculums and also took part in study visits to the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. The latter was an important source of experience, as Palacký University in Olomouc was the first institution of higher education in the CEE countries to offer development studies programs (both on the bachelor and master-level) in 2003.

The program assisted curriculum development by providing grants. A major success of the UNDP program was that the planned masters programs were actually officially launched at four of the universities mentioned above (all but the Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies) in June 2010. The first students are expected to graduate in mid-2012, and thus mapping their experience and future job market prospects and performance would be an important follow up and would hold potential lessons for other CEE countries which have so far not implemented full-fledged programs on development studies.

A database of specialists and experts working in development cooperation was also created in the framework of this component, in order to better mobilize Romanian expertise in implementing future development projects. The database is available at the MFA's development website at <http://experto.aod.ro/>.

## **5.2. Component 2 – Awareness raising**

This component began with a public opinion survey, carried out in 2009 on a representative sample of 1 119 people. This survey aimed to reveal public attitudes towards development issues, and was the first of its kind in Romania. According to the results, '41% of respondents considered that Romania should provide development assistance to developing states, and 56% agreed that Romania, as an EU member state, should contribute to the community budget which finances external aid projects and programs of the EU' (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010). It also revealed that most people have no or just very little understanding of the concept of official development assistance, and many perceive Romania as a recipient of external assistance and not a donor. Many people also associated development cooperation with helping Sub-Saharan Africa, and thought that if Romania gives external assistance, it should target this assistance towards the continent. Giving assistance to countries like Georgia seems to have surprised many respondents, as it was perceived to be a country similar to Romania in levels of development.

Following the opinion poll, The UNDP helped the MFA in designing a communication strategy. The main activity in the awareness raising campaign was to provide grants to five large NGOs (all members of the FOND platform) to carry out awareness raising activities on a regional basis, between December 2008 and April 2009. The five large cities where the campaigns were carried out included Bucharest, Timișoara, Constanta, Iași and Cluj. These local campaigns included organizing events, distributing information material and placing articles in local newspapers. The five contracted NGOs (selected in an open call for proposals) each carried out separate activities, but these activities were coordinated in order to avoid overlaps. The Bucharest campaign was to some extent a national-level campaign, as it included spots and documentaries in national television and reached out to national newspapers as well. One journalist at a national newspaper was contracted to write weekly op-eds on global development issues for one year. A weekly talk show was also aired on national television, which invited academics, ministry officials, NGO representatives, UNDP staff etc. to discuss development issues and Romania's participation in development cooperation. A dedicated development website ([www.aod.ro](http://www.aod.ro)) was also created for the MFA. The results of the awareness raising campaign were presented at a roundtable held at the MFA in April 2009. The event was attended by high level politicians, NGOs, and the mass-media.

A second survey to gauge any changes in Romanian attitudes towards development cooperation has so far not been carried out, but the UNDP does feel that it would be necessary post-2012, in order to assess the effects of the media campaign and other activities.

## **5.3. Component 3 – Contributions to UNDP programs**

In the third component of the SNIECODA project, the Romanian government decided to contribute earmarked resources to UNDP country offices in the priority countries of Romanian development cooperation: the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Serbia. This approach is quite unusual in a sense that donors often prefer visibility and want to 'plant their flag' on their own development projects. It is also unusual because through this solution, Romania effectively gave the programming of its resources to the respective UNDP country offices, and thus learning-through-doing effects became much smaller than in the more traditional UNDP Trust Fund approach, as used in the case of Slovakia or Hungary for example.

The question thus arises why Romania choose this solution, even though it led to lower visibility and less possibilities for learning. The rationale for the option Romania choose is rather straightforward, and one may even argue that Romania did the right thing as a small emerging, yet globally responsible donor. The decision was made after the 2008 Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, in which Romania had also participated. One of the issues in the global aid effectiveness debate is the problem that the proliferation of donors and projects puts huge administrative burdens on recipient countries and has an adverse effect on the local ownership of development projects. These small standalone projects often have little impact. Romanian officials, influenced by the 'spirit of Accra' decided that the small resources that Romania can devote to development cooperation should not place any extra burden on the recipients, but should rather contribute to locally owned and locally driven larger programs and projects. Therefore, the Romanian MFA decided that instead of spending their ODA resources in a bilateral way, they would choose the multilateral channel in order to ensure sustainability and impact. Instead of spending time and resources on identifying new bilateral projects, Romanian officials decided to contribute to already running UNDP projects in the priority partner countries of Romania. This approach portrays Romania as a globally responsible donor, even though it only allowed limited operationalization of the new capacities developed through the SNIECODA program.

The specific UNDP projects to which Romania contributed funds as a donor were the following:

- UNDP Georgia
  - *Kakheti Regional Development*, which aimed to promote sustainable forms of human development in the region and contribute to poverty reduction (2006-2010).
  - *Economic Development in the Adjara Autonomous Republic*, which aimed to contribute to poverty reduction by promoting sustainable development through a combination of economic development tools, such as business information centre, business incubator, long-term development strategy and vocational training (2008-2009).
  - *Support to Civil Society Development*, aimed at promoting civil society development in Georgia through establishing partnerships with the Romanian civil society (2010-2012).

- UNDP Moldova
  - *Better Opportunities for Youth and Women*, which attempted to create better possibilities and jobs for vulnerable social groups, especially young graduates from boarding schools and women, by identify existing job vacancies and providing vocational trainings (2004-2011).
  - *Chisinau Municipality Development*: assist local public authorities of the Chisinau Municipality in the process of strengthening their institutional and financial management capacities (2008-2011).
  - *Building Institutional Capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration*, allowing the Ministry to better achieve its European Integration goals and commitments (2008-2012).
- UNDP Serbia
  - *Partnership for Revitalization of Rural Areas*: share the experience of new EU member States with Serbian municipalities regarding preparations for development and implementation of rural development policies (2010-2012).
  - *Strengthening of Rural Social Capital and Networks*, which supports Serbia's economic development by contributing to the development of rural social capital in 5 target municipalities in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (2008-2009).
  - *War Crimes Trials and Notions of Justice*, which aimed at allowing better outreach and communication of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and explain decisions of the Tribunal to the public in the post-Yugoslavian countries (2008).

Romanian officials took part in the steering committees of the UNDP programs mentioned above through the Romanian embassies in the three partner countries, but they were not engaged in day-to-day decision making and implementation activities. This did allow some learning to take place, as the Romanian officials became engaged in the donor coordination activities in the three partner countries. While the Romanian government seems ready to continue its contributions to UNDP-implemented projects, it is also clear that Romania would like to increase the visibility of its activities as well and thus rely more on bilateral project implementation in the future.

#### **5.4. Other UNDP projects in Romania**

The UNDP also took part (and takes part to this day) in several smaller projects aimed to build capacities in Romanian development cooperation. These are the following:

- *Support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop its capacity in implementing ODA projects 2 (2010-2012, total allocated resources EUR 110 000)*  
Activities within the framework of this project include the organization of two specialized training programs on post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, targeted at civilian and

military actors from ministries and NGOs, and are also open to international participants. Both courses are five days each, and the goal is to increase Romania's development expertise in post-conflict contexts. A second element in the project is about organizing training to diplomats from the Caucasus and Central Asian regions. This three-month training, implemented by the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, offers a transfer of knowledge to diplomats from the respective countries, but also aims to widen the regional contacts of the Romanian MFA. The third element of the project includes a one week training program offered to senior government staff from Moldova, also delivered by the Romanian Diplomatic Institute. This transfer of know-how in international relations and diplomacy aims to improve the capacity of Moldovan diplomats engaging with the European Union to boost their performance. The project was implemented by the MFA, with UNDP providing implementation support services such as contracting consultants and organizing the events.

- *Support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop its capacity in the field of Crises Prevention and Recovery in view of setting up the institutional framework that will ensure the sustainability of efforts in the field (2010, total allocated resources EUR 50 000)*

This project includes the organization of a single 5-day training program targeting practitioners in the field of post-conflict recovery, as well as civilian and military recovery and reconstruction. Lecturers included Romanian and non-Romanian experts, and the training was open to both Romanian and foreign nationals, with a view of bringing together civilian and military practitioners from different countries.

- *Capacity development of the Romanian NGOs for implementing ODA projects and programs (2010, total allocated resources EUR 100 000)*

In the framework of this project, support was provided to the Romanian NGO platform FOND to organize two events. The first was the 3<sup>rd</sup> edition of the Romanian Development Camp, which brings together all development stakeholders in order to increase their capacities and also provide them with a forum for debates, networking opportunities and possibilities to share experiences. The second event was the Romania/Moldova NGO Forum, with the view of strengthening cooperation between the voluntary sectors of the two countries, especially considering Moldova's role as one of the main partner countries of Romania. This project was an important step for FOND, as UNDP judged the platform's capacities to be sound enough to act as the project implementer, and argued that implementing this project would contribute further to the platform's capacities in terms of administrative and technical expertise. To make sure that cash shortages of FOND do not hinder project implementation, UNDP provided advance cash transfers.

- *Capacity development of the Romanian NGOs for implementing ODA projects and programs 2 (2011, total allocated resources EUR 190 000)*

This project was a direct continuation of the UNDP's previous Romanian NGO support project. It provided support to Romanian NGO's for organizing four events which brought together Romanian NGOs and their counterparts from Romania's most important partner countries, as well as all important domestic development stakeholders. The project involved the organization of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Romania/Moldova NGO Forum and the Romania/Georgia

NGO Forum, both events aiming at bringing the NGOs of the respective countries closer to each other and also solidifying Romania's role as a donor. The third event was the Black Sea NGO Forum, the goal of which was to strengthen the advocacy capacity of NGOs in the region and allow them to have greater influence on development strategies for the region. The final element of the program was support to the organization of the 4<sup>th</sup> edition of the Romanian Development Camp. As with the previous NGO support project, this one was also implemented by FOND.

- *Support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop its capacity in implementing ODA projects 3 (2011, total allocated resources EUR 295 550)*

This program supported several smaller training and workshop events, organized by various government agencies. The components were the following:

- (1) Training specialist from Central Asia on protection and sustainable use of water resources in trans-boundary areas, delivered by the Ministry of Environment and Forests.
- (2) Training specialists from Eastern Europe, the Caucasus region and Central Asia on drinking water supply, sewerage, urban waste water treatment and integrated water management, also organized by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. This project included a study visit to some Romanian cities which have recently modernized their water infrastructure.
- (3) Modernizing the practices of the Carabineer Troops from the Republic of Moldova in order and public safety management, delivered by the General Inspectorate of Romanian Gendarmerie
- (4) National Foresight Exercise of Moldova, which aimed at developing a long term strategic vision for public policies in the research and innovation sector. The project was delivered by the Science Academy of Moldova and the Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Development and Innovation, from Romania.
- (5) Workshop on Democratic Transformations, which aimed at providing capacity development assistance to the Romanian Permanent Electoral Authority, NGOs and the MFA in order to allow them to share experiences with partner countries in organizing democratic elections after a regime change. Participants also came from countries experiencing recent political transitions like Egypt and Tunisia.

The UNDP acted as an intermediary in the projects above, as funding in most cases came from official Romanian sources. One reason for these smaller projects were legal constraints, as the Romanian government could not transfer funds directly to domestic stakeholders like NGOs, and thus decided to use the UNDP framework for this. During the implementation of these smaller projects, new gaps were discovered in the capacities of the MFA, and thus UNDP engagement in capacity building is foreseen post-2012 as well.

## **6. Outcomes, impact and lessons learnt**

The UNDP's involvement in building Romania's capacities as an emerging donor is seen as essential in mobilizing support and resources. The fact that the Romanian government could channel resources through the UNDP to involve domestic stakeholders in development cooperation and thus overcome legal barriers cannot be over-exaggerated.

An important issue in the UNDP's Romanian capacity development program was the economic crisis: the program itself almost coincided with the global crisis itself, which hit Romania rather hard. Due to difficulties in financing the budget deficit, Romania had to turn to the IMF in 2009, and enter a stand-by agreement. It is understandable that under these circumstances the government could not devote the needed attention to development cooperation, and had to cut back on some of its previous aspirations. The crisis thus led to a slower development of the country's international development cooperation policy than previously expected. Ambitions concerning the future of Romania's development policy should not be too high until the crisis ends. These financial problems can in part explain why delays were so frequent during the SNIECODA program's implementation. For example, the operational manual for project management, drafted within the framework of the program, was very slow to be approved by the MFA, and thus implementation was also a slow process, and can only be said to be completed by early 2012. While Romania is on track in setting up the necessary management structures and arrangements, it is very slow in doing these.

However, the UNDP emphasizes that it is not only the money that Romania can devote to development cooperation that counts, but also Romania's transition experience, which has recently been well received in places like Egypt and Tunisia, especially on the issue of organizing democratic elections. Still, the relatively low amounts of financial resources provided by Romania are also welcome: Georgia's government for example has greatly acknowledged Romanian support through the UNDP, arguing that Romanian funds were able to create an important contribution to the success of the UNDP's efforts.

The UNDP's capacity building activities in Romania's development cooperation policy are still ongoing. Romania still has much to do in terms of institution building for example. There is no implementation agency at the moment, and the MFA is mainly staffed by diplomats, who have a high turnover rate. Thus, the institutional viability of the ODA unit within the MFA can be questioned, and Romania may need assistance in creating an institutional structure which also includes technical staff and development professionals. This however is also a condition of Romania being able to scale up its resources devoted to ODA.

## Annex 4. Case study of the Sida's Partnership Program in Central and Eastern Europe

Basic data	
Title of the program	Partnership Program in Central and Eastern Europe
Financed and implemented by	Swedish International Development Agency (Sida)
Financial contribution	Between 2009-2011: 4 million Swedish Crowns (approximately USD 600 000); Since 2011: 1 million Swedish Crowns (approximately USD 150 000)
Duration	2009 – (still ongoing)

### 1. Rational for selecting this program as a detailed case study

The Swedish International Development Agency's Partnership Program is among the more recent capacity building programs in the Central and Eastern European new donors. The reason for choosing this program was that instead of traditional capacity building, where one side provides knowledge actively and the other side is a more or less passive receiver, this program emphasized capacity building through working together. Thus Sweden's expertise in aid effectiveness, increasing aid quantities, programming and allocation, as well as the transition expertise of the new EU member states could be used in tandem for mutually beneficial goals, with the focus of implementing assistance in a trilateral approach in partner countries. It must be mentioned that even though capacity development was an essential part of this program, the main goal was to utilize the experience of the new EU member states in Swedish development assistance to Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

### 2. Background

Sweden had clearly realized that much of its interests towards the Eastern neighbors of the EU coincided with those of the new EU member states. These interests include creating stable democracies in the region, the promotion of economic prosperity, solving problems related to organized crime, etc. Therefore, Sweden was looking for CEE partners to promote these interests with. A major step in formulating this partnership was when the foreign ministers of Sweden and Poland jointly initiated the creation of the EU's Eastern Partnership Program in May 2008 in the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council. This aimed to create a multilateral framework for cooperation between the EU and the countries of the EU's Eastern neighborhood to promote political dialogue, but also provide additional financing for these countries. The fact that Sweden and Poland presented the idea for this program together, and it



was supported by all the other CEE countries as well, proved that Sweden can cooperate well with the new members on the policy level.

Sweden's Partnership Program aimed, to some extent, to transfer this cooperation to the practical level. The decision was undertaken to start the program by the Swedish Government in December 2008, and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) was tasked with implementation. The major reason why the program was established was related to the goal of the Swedish Government to increase the participation of new EU member states in development cooperation. The idea was that these new donors could work as partners of Swedish development cooperation in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. By 2008-2009 much of the ODA programs of the CEE new donors had already matured to some extent and some level of experience in development cooperation had been gathered. Sida judged that this experience would now allow the CEE countries to work together with other donors.

Sida's ultimate goal of 'simple' poverty alleviation was placed one step back and laying the foundations of the institutional development became a priority along with the values attached to it. The rationale behind this exercise was that Sweden possessed the know-how and the specificities on how to create effective and efficient development assistance programs, but the country needed the experience the new EU member states have gained during their transition processes, and also their regional expertise in Eastern European and the Western Balkans. Sweden felt that it lacked this expertise. The idea therefore was that cooperation with the new donors would be beneficial for both sides, as the capacities of the new donors would develop, and Sweden would be able to increase the effectiveness of its development programs by channeling CEE expertise into them.

### **3. Planning the program and program management**

The Partnership Program endeavored to promote contacts between the parties involved in Eastern European development assistance, thus establishing a base for long term program and not only project cooperation. It is also relevant to stress that capacity development for new EU member states was not the primary objective of this project, rather it was a necessary bi-product; the main goal was to contact the personnel who were part of the various reform efforts in the CEE countries and to ask for their assistance in development cooperation in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. An additional reason why Sweden adopted the approach of not only providing capacity development assistance in a traditional sense, but instead offering possibilities for working together as partners, is that Sida, through its past experience in cooperation with the CEE region, came to the conclusion that the most important thing CEE ministries or other government institutions need is long term institutional connections and networks with the corresponding ministries and agencies of the established donors, as well as with private consultancies.

The direct partners in Sida's Partnership Program were the new EU member states of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Malta and Cyprus were left out as direct partners even though they were new member states, however they did not possess unique knowledge on the transition process, therefore Sida

decided not to involve them in this project. The 10 CEE countries were to receive direct capacity development assistance and were asked to partner with Sida in its projects and program for Eastern Europe and Western Balkans. The potential indirect partners (recipients) of development assistance (and not capacity building) Sida had in mind when creating the Partnership Program were Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and the Ukraine. All of these countries already had bilateral programs with Sweden for development cooperation, mainly in the fields of reforming their economies and politics.

The new CEE EU member states were all given the option of participating in the Partnership Program, but Sida did not actively try to convince these countries that they should do so. Sida provided information through the Swedish embassies about the Partnership Program and the funds and opportunities that it could provide for the CEE countries, but if a country did not respond to initial invitations, future cooperation with them through the program was not pursued or forced. It is important to mention that after 2011 the Partnership Program somewhat shifted its focus, with the countries participating in the European Union's Eastern Partnership beginning to receive a larger emphasis due to the belief that through the Eastern Partnership it would be easier to realize the goals of the Partnership Program as well, given the existing infrastructure set up by the EU.

Before rolling out the Partnership Program, Sida contracted a consultancy to map the existing action plans and international development strategies of the new EU member states. The consultants found that funding possibilities for development cooperation in CEE member states were low and fiscal problems due to the global economic crisis have weakened resolve in furthering development cooperation. In addition to budgets being cut, the number of staff dealing with development assistance had become significantly lower and MFAs were also plagued with the problem of high turnover and new placements. Another quite understandable issue arose: the general population in the new member states was opposed (at least according to this mapping report undertaken by Sida's consultants), to their governments increasing development assistance to foreign countries, since they believed that problems related to poverty and low income levels should be fixed within their own countries first. This opposition could make the appropriation of new funds to international development cooperation much more difficult and also hinder the implementation of the Partnership Program (Sida 2009a). The consultants also reported that even though most new EU member states already channeled much of their development assistance to the countries in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, cooperation and long term planning could be considered rare and most projects have a one-year duration. Assistance in most cases was tied to procurement from the new donors. In addition to this, new EU member states listed a large number of priority sectors and change the sectors they support on a yearly basis.

#### **4. Goals and objectives of the program**

Based on the commissioned report detailed above, Sida managed to align its efforts for cooperation with the CEE partner countries and thus the following goals for the Partnership Program were set (Sida 2012):

- 'identifying concrete cooperation areas and sectors in the partner countries;
- developing methods for common work on analysis and strategies;
- developing methods for common program activities and project activities.'

Sida planned four main possibilities to implement the Partnership Program (Sida 2009a, 2009b):

1. Extended appraisal / assessment processes in-country, inviting recent EU Member States to join the process.
  - Several new EU member states have shown a willingness to facilitate a closer working relationship between their own relevant development assistance authorities and that of Sida, in order to learn the best practices and organizational structures associated with this well established donor organization.
  - It would also allow finding the areas where new member states can contribute forthwith and provide them with a firsthand opportunity for learning Sida's methods.
  - It could contribute to establishing contacts between the relevant actors and also long term cooperation between Sida and the emerging donors, based on comparative advantages.
2. Finding ways of facilitating the EU Eastern Partnership Comprehensive Institution Building Program.
  - Since most of the indirect target countries of Sida's Partnership Program are already involved in some way or other with the Eastern Partnership program, this came as a natural idea. Working towards achieving the goals of the Eastern Partnership would also allow new EU member states to achieve better standards for development cooperation; allow Sida the usage of transition experience; use the smaller funds of new EU member states in tandem with those of Sida and the appropriated budget of the Eastern Partnership.
3. Increasing cooperation with recent EU Member States within the frames of the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA);
4. Provide demand driven training to assist the implementation of the previous three possibilities.

It was highly stressed by Sida that the goals of the program are in line with international aid effectiveness principles, as they contribute to better coordination among donors, a departure from national aid priorities, increased use of actors that have comparative advantages in certain issues, the reduction in the number of donors a partner country must face and increased predictability.

## **5. A description of the activities and the outputs of the program**

The Partnership Program can be divided into two topic areas: the first one was actual capacity development provided through a number of conferences, training sessions etc., whereas the second area was joint implementation, that is Sida and a new EU member state working together on a common project in a targeted country.

### **5.1. Capacity development**

#### *Partnership Program Workshop in Kiev, 2009*

The first major training session within the framework of the Partnership Program took place in Kiev in 2009. The session brought together all relevant new EU member states apart from the Czech Republic and Lithuania. The goal of the workshop was to create possibilities for development cooperation within the Ukraine and also to assess the possibilities of the EU Eastern Partnership Comprehensive Institution Building program. Topics discussed included:

- the political situation and its significance for development assistance;
- engaging civil society in the context of EU-integration;
- relations with the EU and its importance for development assistance;
- the Eastern partnership and comprehensive institution building;
- the economic situation and its significance for development assistance.

#### *Romanian Foreign Ministry, 2009*

A full day training session was organized at the Romanian Foreign Ministry in 2009 where the goal was to discuss how a modern system of development assistance can be created and how to involve the line-ministries in an efficient organizational structure which avoids overlaps, yet allows each ministry to realize their comparative advantages. Additional topics that were discussed during the workshop were the issues on how to appropriate budgets for development assistance programs; how to be accountable towards the source of the budget; how to monitor projects during the implementation stage and how to evaluate them after they have been finished; what the partner selection criteria of Sida are; and what the major advantages of demand driven development assistance programs are, as opposed to supply or donor driven ones. During the session officials from Sida not only used the examples of Sweden and other Nordic countries, but used examples from other organizations providing development assistance to show the major differences between how certain projects are implemented.

#### *Romanian development camp, 2009*

The Romanian Development Camps have been presented in Annex 3, so here only Sida's contribution is detailed. During the 2009 Romanian Development Camp, participating NGOs, state agencies, international organizations, non-Romanian embassies and ministry officials were exposed to the Swedish way of thinking on development cooperation, which primarily departs from the needs of the partner country and provides assistance in those sectors where the partners actually need it. Sida also provided access to handbooks and assessment templates on Swedish development assistance. Presentations were also given on the subject of how certain development projects should be conceived, what amount of money should be appropriated, and what specific sector should be chosen for cooperation. Furthermore, training

was provided in the field of project monitoring and evaluation, and explained that this kind of activity is not only a requirement towards state agencies, but NGOs also have to be accountable. Additional discussions were held on the topics of how to create broad, popular support for national ODA commitments; what are the bases under which recovery after a crisis can be achieved and maintained with special emphasis on Afghanistan; what are the comparative advantages of Romania as a donor and what role could Romania play in Central Asia in terms of development assistance.

#### *Workshop in Brussels, 2010*

A further important capacity building event was held in April 2010. The workshop was hosted by the University of Sussex, the University of Aston and University Leiden and organized by Sida in Brussels on the contents of the EU's Eastern Partnership after the Lisbon Treaty. The participants included ODA administrators of the new EU Member States (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania) and various Sida and Swedish MFA officials. The goal of the seminar was to bring together experts of the EU's Eastern Partnership Program and representatives of the new EU member states and find possible ways of cooperation within the Sida Partnership Program. Topics discussed were the Ukrainian elections in 2010 and its effects, the role of free trade in modernizing the economies of the Eastern Partnership countries, and the role of EU financial assistance in accelerating the region's approximation to the EU through the Eastern Partnership's Comprehensive Institution Building Programme. Last, but not least the role of Sida in Eastern European countries was also discussed.

#### *The Sida Partnership Forum in Härnösand, Sweden, 2010*

The Sida Partnership Forum was an already existing training program in development assistance, organized in Härnösand, Sweden. Cost free participation in this training program was offered for all relevant CEE countries. Funding was provided by Sida for participation, including accommodation, board and travel for interested parties. This training was open for anyone who represented ministries, or relevant NGOs, state agencies, consultancies etc. from the CEE countries. Representatives from Poland, Romania, Estonia and Latvia participated in the Forum. The major goal of sessions was to both offer relevant courses (such as results-based management, humanitarian assistance, or general global development cooperation issues) and up-to date knowledge for the participants, and also to place them in the relevant networks. An additional positive aspect for providing the training session in Härnösand as opposed to for instance Stockholm was that being located in a remote place did not provide any distractions for the participants of the training sessions. One participant supposedly remarked that '*he had not met a single person outside the training complex during his time there.*'

#### *Estonian School of Diplomacy, 2011-2012*

The Estonian School of Diplomacy received half of the budget allocated for the years 2011-2012 of the Partnership Program, that is approximately half a million Swedish Crowns per year. According to Sida the reason why the Estonian School of Diplomacy received such a high-profile status was that it is one of the major schools of diplomacy in the Central and Eastern European region where issues related to reform cooperation and development assistance in the framework of the Eastern Partnership were taught. The Estonian School of Diplomacy also

focuses on providing training for senior and mid-level civil servants, therefore it came as a natural selection for the Partnership Program to support the training activities held there.

#### *Joint meeting in Riga, 2010*

A meeting was held in Riga, Latvia where representatives from all three Baltic states were present to discuss possibilities on mutual cooperation areas for future trilateral programming. Once the participating countries agreed on their common areas for cooperation, they made an agreement that in the future they shall be looking into possible future cooperation within the Ukraine and Georgia.

#### *Workshop with Slovakia, 2010*

The goal of this meeting was to identify the areas where Slovakia and Sweden can work together on common projects. After the meeting the participants realized that there was interest in working together in Moldova in the energy sector. At the time of the meeting one of the goals of Slovakia was to place a Slovak official in the Swedish embassy in Chisinau, Moldova to further this cooperation as Slovakia did not have an embassy in the country.

Sida also created a website for the program, in order to establish a simple and effective way to keep all stakeholders up-to-date about the upcoming events and activities. The webpage also included memos and overviews of past activities and training sessions.

### **5.2. Joint / trilateral programming**

Besides the capacity development and training events detailed above, it was also the goal of Sida to partner with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe through joint programming. Ideally, the projects under this trilateral programming should fall into the thematic priority areas of Swedish bilateral development cooperation:

- democracy and human rights;
- environment and climate;
- gender equality and the role of women in development.

In order to launch this phase, first Sida had to investigate where there was already existing interest among the new EU member states to work in partner countries through joint / trilateral programming. Much of the training workshops and events described in the previous section already aimed at identifying such possibilities. The initial response rate was low from CEE countries, which Sida attributed to the fact that at the time of the launch of the Partnership Program there were severe budgetary issues in all these countries due to the financial crisis. Also, Sida formulated a number of criteria which had to be met in order to form partnerships, mainly related to procurement rules and certain standards set forth by the OECD DAC. Another issue that came up was that the new member states were rather focused on ensuring their own visibility and preferred to use standalone projects. Sida on the other hand preferred sector wide approaches and wanted to avoid small projects, both for administrative reasons and increased aid effectiveness. Since many of the new EU member states were not entirely aware of these processes, additional hands-on training had to be provided: for instance, when the Sida team in Kiev was approached for support by the Ministry of Finance of the Ukraine, Sida decided to try

and include the Polish MFA as well, but they found that the ministry had capacity problems which made cooperation difficult.

Due to these difficulties, the launching of trilateral programming took much more time than Sida had originally anticipated. Still, a limited number of trilateral projects are already under way, and several others are being discussed with the CEE MFAs. These projects involve a varying degree of CEE involvement. Some of the more higher profile collaborations include the following:

- Slovenia took part in a waste management awareness raising project in cooperation with Sida in Bosnia Herzegovina.
- Estonian experts were involved in a food safety project in Georgia, aimed to strengthen the capacities of the Georgia National Food Agency.
- Polish experts are taking part in a project in the Ukraine, aimed to increase municipal investments in district heating.

Future cooperation with Slovakia in Moldova in the energy sector is a possibility. Discussions have also been underway with Hungary on a public administration reform project in Serbia, without any specific results.

## **6. Outcomes, impact and lessons learnt**

Based on the information available on the website of the Sida Partnership Program, the agency expected a number of results from the program, although most of them were worded in rather vague terms and are difficult to actually measure (Sida 2012):

- increased knowledge of EU Member States' overall management of development cooperation;
- increased dialogue on, and knowledge of international work on aid effectiveness (e.g. the Paris Agenda and the EU Code of Conduct);
- strengthened ownership among the partner countries through increased implementation of the above principles;
- increased dialogue with Member States in strategy processes and programming;
- increased cooperation with relevant Member States in influencing the EC instruments ENPI and IPA;
- identified contractual forms that suit possible new cooperation formats, including EU twinning;
- identified areas of common interest and activities within the frame of the EU Eastern Partnership.

According to Sida, the capacity building goal of the Partnership Program was achieved, although Sida did not use specific indicators to measure the results and impacts of the program, therefore strict identification of the results may be difficult. Nevertheless by providing seminars, trainings and conferences in a number of different CEE countries as well as in Sweden, the goal of awareness raising and exposure to the different type of working system Sida was using as

opposed to that of CEE aid agencies was achieved, even though the direct impact may be hard to measure. Sida also gained expertise on how the CEE countries work in their ODA policies, and has been able to identify possibilities for working together. Since the program is still running, official evaluation about the effects of the capacity development component may only be carried out at a later date.

Sida did not formulate any expectations for actual trilateral cooperation or joint programming, the expected outcomes listed above only talk about identifying such possibilities. The limited number of joint projects launched showed that there are difficulties in engaging the CEE countries in trilateral cooperation, which can be traced back to four main reasons.

First, a factor that had a large effect on the actual implementation and impact of the Partnership Program is related to the timing of its launch, which came at a time when many of the new CEE donors were downgrading their ODA policies due to the global economic recession. This was unfortunate, but also unforeseeable. Decreasing ODA spending was an understandable reaction on the part of the CEE countries, since the respective budget deficits of these countries started to spiral out of control and the annual rate of economic growth was also slowing down, in many cases leading to outright recession.

Second, the CEE emerging donor countries were facing an additional problem that had to be countered by Sida: the fact that their ODA programs were relatively new creations and therefore it may have been somewhat premature to think about them as countries which can act as long term partners for Swedish development assistance. This is mainly because project assessment methods, criteria for selecting partners, and criteria for selecting sectors for assistance in the CEE countries have proved to be less developed than hoped for by Sida, despite the fact that these new donors have already received recent capacity development assistance from various other bi- and multilateral organizations.

Third, Sida realized it was facing a different approach to development cooperation in the CEE countries, which was difficult to reconcile with its own approach and preferences. Whereas Sida supported a demand-driven approach based on the needs of the partner countries, this thinking proved to be new to the CEE partners in some cases. The new EU member states were working in a number of different ways in ODA, but mainly through financing national NGOs which then implemented their own project ideas in the recipient countries. Line-ministries and their own partners seemed to work rather independently from the MFAs. All this seemed to happen in a highly *ad hoc* fashion. Sweden's approach was rather different: it started by collecting the needs of the governments and civil societies in the respective partner countries, and then formulated country development plans according to the local possibilities and wishes, and not according to the supply of Swedish expertise and development ideas.

Forth, cooperation on trilateral projects was also made difficult by the fact that decisions to engage in such activity were made at different levels in the CEE countries and in Sweden. Sweden uses a highly decentralized model, meaning that it is common that decisions on development assistance are made at the Swedish embassies in the partner countries. In the



case of CEE countries however, almost all decisions on development assistance are made within the respective capitals. Thus the decision making process of the new donor countries took much longer as opposed to that of Sida, therefore there was additional processing time involved before the actual launch of common projects.

Despite these problems it seems that Sida did manage to find three partners in Estonia, Slovakia and Poland for future trilateral cooperation, who could perhaps evolve into 'like-minded' donors in the future. As mentioned, a limited number of trilateral projects have already been launched, some are in the planning phase, but many of them never moved beyond initial discussions.

Important lessons for future CEE capacity building programs emerge from Sida's efforts. Even after all the large scale capacity development programs that have addressed the region, there still seem to be many problems in the CEE countries, including a lack of knowledge on the modern ways of planning and implementing long term development projects and programs, or on how to cooperate with other donors. The emphasis on short term (one year long), supply driven projects from the side of the CEE countries is a major problem that inhibits longer term cooperation and visible long term impacts. Sida also perceived a lack of willingness on the part of some CEE countries to participate in trilateral programming, as it meant that they must give up their supply driven approach and adapt to recipient country needs and priorities, as advocated by Sida. MFAs in the CEE countries may find it difficult to locate the necessary expertise needed to take part in demand driven development cooperation, and perhaps had a feeling that such projects may benefit Sweden more than it would themselves.

These problems must not lead to the conclusion that trilateral / joint programming should not be pursued in future capacity development programs. On the contrary, it represents one of the best possibilities for the CEE donors to gain practical experience from other donors while doing development cooperation. But, a large degree of flexibility may be required on the part of the established donor to be able to address CEE country concerns and accommodate the differences between their approaches to providing assistance. This can be achieved if the donor and the CEE partner explore together the wide range of possibilities for trilateral cooperation (joint financing, joint implementation, joint evaluation, etc.) and find the one that suits both of their interests.

## Annex 5. Case study of the USAID's Emerging Donors Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe

Basic data	
Title of the program	Emerging Donors Initiative
Financed and implemented by	United States Agency for International Development, Regional Service Centre in Budapest
Financial contribution	150 000 USD
Duration	2006-2009

### 1. Rational for selecting this program as a detailed case study

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded Emerging Donors Initiative was the capacity development program through which the United States aimed to provide assistance to the new emerging donor countries of Central and Eastern Europe. While the size and extent of the program is rather limited, there are several reasons which justify describing it in detail. The main reason for choosing this project as a detailed case study was that the USA is the largest bilateral donor in the world, possibly involved in the biggest number of countries as well, therefore leaving out their capacity development project to the emerging donors in the CEE countries would provide an incomplete picture. In addition to this, since USAID is one of the oldest bilateral development agencies, with 50 years of experience and currently approximately 100 missions in foreign countries, they definitely have a large pool of experience to share in how to train the personnel of aid agencies and also how to formulate and implement ODA policies, which can be highly relevant for the CEE countries. The Emerging Donors Initiative is also a highly comprehensive program, as not only did it provide capacity development assistance to the CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004, but also to Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia as well.

### 2. Background

USAID has been involved in aiding the transition in the CEE countries since 1989, and moved into the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union in 1992, with the goal of helping them become free, prosperous, market-oriented democracies. The CEE new EU member states have of course graduated from USAID assistance, and currently the agency runs programs in 15 countries in Eastern Europe. When quoting its successes in the region, USAID states that 'our 11 graduates are among the strongest supporters of U.S. global objectives and are moving from being aid recipients to becoming aid providers.'

Before the launch of the Emerging Donor Initiative, USAID had already financed some smaller, uncoordinated projects in the new members, which have aspects that make them qualify as new donor capacity building. One of these, for example, was the Hungarian-American Partnership Initiative, a training program aimed at collecting Hungarian transition expertise and sharing this expertise with other countries still in the process of transition. Between 2000 and 2005 (starting even before Hungary emerged as a new donor), approximately 600 experts travelled to Hungary in order to learn from the country's successful transition to a market economy and a democratic society.

The USAID's Emerging Donors Initiative was started in 2006, after the agency had more or less finished its larger-scale projects in the new EU member states.

### **3. Planning the program and program management**

USAID commissioned an extensive report on the foreign aid activities of five of the new EU Member States (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). USAID's reason for supporting the capacity building projects of these five CEE member states is based on the fact that they share common attributes in the following areas, which increases the possibility of productive engagement:

- the new donor countries all possess experience on the transition process which they are prepared to share as part of their development assistance efforts;
- all of the new emerging donors already have important partnerships (thanks to the efforts of other bi- and multilateral organizations) with established NGOs, which play a key role in the delivery of their development assistance policies;
- all emerging donor countries are open to learn new methods for aid delivery, therefore the involvement of USAID can be crucial in shaping how ODA in the CEE countries will turn out in the following years;
- they have expressed interest in consultation with the U.S. on foreign policy issues and also foreign assistance.

The interest of USAID in supporting CEE countries to improve their ODA efforts is based on the following three premises:

- Sustaining US investment in democratic reforms in Eastern Europe is a primary objective of US foreign policy directed towards Europe, and the CEE countries possess the capabilities of maintaining these achievements and assisting further transfers towards Eastern Europe. Thus US development legacy can be maintained.
- Since it takes time for the new emerging donors to take advantage of EU funding and also the projects of USAID are being phased out, it becomes more crucial to forge new partnerships while there is still chance.
- As mentioned previously, the transition expertise of the CEE countries would allow USAID to create trilateral programs when trying to assist in the reform process in the Balkans.

In other words, the goal of the Emerging Donors Initiative was to share the experience of USAID in providing development assistance, and also to give the CEE countries an opportunity to get

involved in a working partnership with USAID in providing development assistance in other parts of the world. It is important to mention that USAID did not try to force its own views on the CEE countries, but just to provide them with information on the ways USAID works and some of the reasons why they believe these methods are effective. Afterwards, it would be up to the individual decision makers in the respective CEE capitals to decide whether to take the American viewpoint in foreign assistance into consideration or not.

Even though the Emerging Donors Initiative started off as providing capacity development assistance to the Visegrád countries plus Slovenia, in 2009, upon the request of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, workshops were organized in their respective capitals, which explained the methodology and criteria based on which USAID provides development assistance in its partner countries. Therefore, despite the initial goal of providing information for only five of the new EU member states, the program was extended to the latest rounds of EU accession countries, which also have the obligations of becoming donors of foreign aid. Bulgaria and Romania have graduated from being USAID recipient countries in 2008 and Croatia in 2010.

There seem to have been competing views within USAID on what the actual contents of the capacity development program should be (USAID 2008). One approach advocated sharing lessons in foreign assistance delivery and assisting the design and development of an institutional structure which ensures that the new donors adhere to international practices. The other approach went beyond this, and also suggested that USAID explore possibilities for planning, financing and implementing projects jointly with the new donors. Based on what was realized from the program, one can assume that the first approach seems to have been the dominant one.

#### **4. Goals and objectives of the program**

Besides the reasons for its interests in engaging the new donors mentioned above, USAID has not formulated specific goals at the launch of the project. In a more general context (USAID 2008), USAID has stated that it seeks to engage emerging donors to develop their capacities to provide foreign assistance, develop collaborative efforts, and coordinate aid provision. The agency seems to have been interested in providing formal training through specific courses and workshops and see later on what kind of effects these have had on CEE development strategies and practices. Later, it would decide on how to move forward. The program seemed to have a lower degree of formality than one would expect.

#### **5. A description of the activities and the outputs of the program**

Capacity development assistance was provided in two rounds within the program. The first round was held in 2007 when representatives of the Visegrád countries and Slovenia were provided training in the form of workshops. In the second round (2009), capacity development workshops were held in Bulgaria, Romania (representing the newest EU member states) and Croatia (a candidate country at the time).

This case study will mainly focus on the capacity building workshops held in the newest EU member states as well as in Croatia, due to the fact that these countries, especially Bulgaria and Croatia have received less capacity development assistance as compared to the eight member states that joined the EU in 2004. Also, USAID seems to have put a larger emphasis on Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia than it did on building the capacities of the other new members. Capacity development efforts with the four Visegrád countries plus Slovenia are only discussed briefly.

The first part of the capacity development efforts, directed towards the five new EU members that joined in 2004 were not highly extensive, and basically consisted of two seminars / workshops:

- Training and Orientation program hosted at the USAID Budapest Regional Service Center (RSC) for junior officers May 2007;
- Emerging Donors Symposium hosted at the RSC for senior representatives in November 2007.

It was not possible to find out exact details about the contents of these two training sessions.

The second part of the program, focusing on Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, included the organization of three workshops. These three workshops focused introducing USAID's best practices on the following issues: basics of strategic planning; project design and implementation including the ways and means of procurement; project monitoring and evaluation, and general program oversight. Since these countries also provide ODA through multilateral channels because of their membership (or future membership) in the EU and the UN, a further topic in these courses included the discussion of the major distinctions between multilateral and bilateral ODA and the respective advantages and disadvantages of each channel. In addition, the courses also elaborated on which systems and practices to use to guarantee collaborative, transparent and accountable bilateral ODA.

The three workshops, organized between February and April 2009, covered more or less the same general courses and topics, however these were tailored to the needs of the new donors to some extent. Bulgaria asked that the workshop include more details on how USAID evolved over time and on the legal foundations of foreign aid planning and management. Croatia requested information on civil-military relations in post-conflict and conflict zones and how to formulate a plan which will enable a donor country to provide long term development assistance once peace has been established in a war torn area. Romania was interested in learning more on public-private partnerships. From the special subjects these countries have requested one may also hypothesize that their respective future development assistance programs will attempt to focus on these issues (e.g. post-conflict rehabilitation can be an important comparative advantage of Croatian development cooperation). In the following the major outcomes of these workshops are described, followed by some details on USAID's recommendations after the workshops for the individual countries.

During the time of the workshops, all three countries were facing the similar problem of addressing organizational and management issues. All countries have been providing ODA through multilateral channels and some bilateral channels which they have inherited from the past. The respective MFAs have been tasked with leading the ODA programs, the Ministries of Finance with budgeting for it and other individual Ministries were responsible for the funding of specific projects. This structure inadvertently is not the easiest to manage with no prior experience, therefore unfortunately some intra-agency conflicts are bound to occur. A closely related problem is inter-agency coordination. Even though it was the job of the MFA to coordinate ODA related activities, in two of the countries at the time only one person and in the third four people were charged with coordinating ODA, that is getting information on the uses of funds and also establish common policies and procedures for ODA management. All countries have created inter-ministerial working groups which include representatives from line-ministries involved with ODA. In Bulgaria and Croatia at the time unfortunately the staff members sitting on the meetings of this working group were constantly changing, therefore it seemed that it would be difficult to put together a group which would be able to build synergies. In Romania this did not seem to be a problem, indeed they were also coordinating their activities well with the donor agencies like the UNDP and Sida.

An additional task to deal with was training a core number of personnel who despite inter-agency brain drain and postings to new missions / projects, would be able to represent development expertise within their organizations. Also, it was of utmost importance to establish clear and uniform procedures which can guide future projects. On the other hand, USAID recommended that each country should identify its own niche in development cooperation through which they can be differentiated from other CEE and also well established donor agencies. Also a relevant finding was that governmental staff in all the three countries have to be more exposed to the planning of development and the techniques of implementing the resulting programs. USAID also urged the respective countries to develop multi-year programs and attach multi-year financial commitments to them.

The last major issue that was discussed at these workshops was that of communication. USAID suggested that communication channels should be established within the government as well as with the citizens. The role of this would be that on the one hand the citizens of the country could understand why their country is involved in providing ODA to developing countries and also to build support for the different programs within the government. Representatives of the respective countries indicated that when communicating with the citizens, ODA issues should be put forward in a way which emphasizes the benefits that it brings to the donor country and its citizens.

#### *Workshop in Sofia, Bulgaria, February 2009*

The following recommendations were given to the Bulgarian participants during and after the workshop:

- Develop a focused set of objectives which are based on Bulgaria's comparative advantages and also suitable for the amount of funds invested into ODA. The first thing that should be decided when establishing the development assistance program of

Bulgaria should be which partners and which sectors to focus on when providing bilateral aid.

- When deciding on projects and sectors for support, consideration should be given to the long terms benefits these may have on the lives of Bulgarian citizens. For instance, given Bulgaria's historical and cultural connection with Macedonia, how would supporting the growth and stability of Macedonia benefit Bulgaria?
- Accountability and transparency before and after the implementation of development projects should also be a key issue. Effectiveness and providing assistance with clearly defined outcomes should always be underlying factors of the ODA programs. In addition to this monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems should be created. Knowledge management should be given an emphasis so the country can learn from its practice. Also, there should be a clear and visible connection between budgets and results, that is projects and partners who are performing well should receive additional support as opposed to those who are clearly not.
- Creating a training strategy for the establishment of a cadre of development professionals within the MFA is also be given priority. Not only staff of the MFA should be trained in these practices, but long serving and key personnel in other ministries as well, since they are also involved in providing development assistance in their own separate fields of knowledge.
- Organizational roles and responsibilities should be defined to ensure that when an intra-ministry group meets, it is always the same delegates or their permanent deputies from each line ministry taking part, so that continuity and a sense of ownership from the various ministries is established.

#### *Workshop in Zagreb, Croatia; March 2009*

The following recommendations were given to the Croatian participants during and after the workshop:

- Similar recommendations have been formulated in the case of Croatia as in Bulgaria in the sense that the MFA should focus on finding the comparative advantages in terms of country capabilities and development objectives when formulating a development assistance plan. The strategic objectives should also focus and concentrate on the sectors which can produce efficient outcomes in terms of bilateral aid.
- A Management Information System based on the ODA database should be created in order to identify future opportunities.
- Taken into consideration the experiences of other new emerging donors, accountability and a focus on results should be placed into the planning system.
- Create a training strategy for a core cadre of development personnel.
- Define organizational roles and responsibilities.
- Create a strategy for engaging the NGO community in the development of the country's ODA program. The problem with NGO participation in Croatian development assistance are that:
  - There is a lack of assured funding, which makes it difficult for NGOs to provide development assistance over a number of years. Thus even though a project

might have promising outputs from the start, if the funding is cut then the money spent might have no effect whatsoever in the long run.

- The timing of calls for proposals is unpredictable and often comes late in the calendar year, with requirements that the money awarded be spent within the year. This can make implementation difficult, not to mention planning projects with meaningful impact.
- Donors suppose that after a certain internationally financed, NGO-implemented project has expired, the Croatian government would take over the funding to ensure sustainability. Unfortunately the government did not plan to do so.
- Donors usually provide less funding for NGOs than requested, and the NGO must also present a certain percentage of co-funding. Therefore even though an NGO has been awarded a grant, project implementation may still be difficult.
- There is no possibility to reimburse the costs of project proposal writing for NGOs. This can be problematic even if the NGO wins the contract, however if they do not win it can be seriously damaging.

#### *Workshop in Bucharest, Romania; April 2009*

The following recommendations were given to the Romanian participants during and after the workshop:

- Romania has received considerable support in establishing its ODA program, through Sida and UNDP, therefore according to USAID officials they were much more prepared in taking and implementing the suggestions given to them at the workshop.
- Because of the assistance of UNDP and Sida, the MFA was already on its way to identify a set of objectives which were based on the comparative advantages of the country. USAID suggested that the chosen objectives should be in line with reasonable expectations, that is the government institutions of Romania should possess the required manpower and financial means of seeing through these goals.
- An idea was also formulated whether it would be feasible to create a common development platform among CEE emerging donors to provide resources in a more efficient way. This is certainly an interesting idea and if Romania would be able to promote this idea, it would surely enhance their visibility as an emerging donor country.
- Also as in other countries it was suggested that all ministries should be made aware of the importance of participating in ODA programs and what kind of benefits it would give them in the future. Convening an inter-ministerial committee to enhance internal communication would be a good idea.
- As with the other workshops, it was mentioned here as well that it is imperative to create a training strategy for a core cadre of development personnel.
- As in Croatia, the question of NGO participation was discussed at length:
  - NGOs at the meeting indicated that they find it difficult to replace staff after a project has been implemented and this provides no job security for trained personnel and little opportunity for the same people to work again on similar projects.
  - Inadequate and random governmental processes result in extra work for NGOs, which may deepen the already existing mistrust between the parties.



- NGOs do not see it as their goal to implement Romanian foreign policy interests abroad, but to provide social services where it is needed. This also creates a tension in NGO-governmental relations.
- The final conclusion of the workshop was that it is imperative to integrate accountability and a focus on results from the early stages of development assistance projects and programs.

## **6. Outcomes, impact and lessons learnt**

As the Emerging Donor Initiative was to some extent an informal program of USAID, there has been no evaluation about its impact. It is clear that USAID filled a gap in providing tailor-made advice and training to Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, as some of the major bilateral donors which were active in the other CEE countries (most notably CIDA) did not really engage with these countries.

On the other hand, these training sessions could have provided an ideal platform for future work between USAID and the new donors. This however did not happen so far. At the highest levels of USAID there is a desire to continue this program and build on the results thus far, but due to the decreased financial and staff resources in USAID, the United States Congress might judge that such programs are 'luxury.' If one looks at the current priorities of U.S. foreign policy, it is clear that issues like providing capacity development assistance to emerging donors are not a priority area. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in implementing President Obama's foreign policy, has brought the activities of USAID much closer to foreign policy goals, thus USAID has become much less independent in choosing the programs it pursues.

Looking at the lessons learnt, USAID stated that if they embarked once again on the route of such a program, they would take a slightly different approach. They would not put such a large emphasis on formal workshops for instance, but would endeavor to provide other forms of assistance over a longer period of time. The rationale behind this is that this way they would be able to plant the seed of an idea, follow up how it unfolds and provide help regularly when it is required in the implementing it. This would allow for a much more flexible approach but would also be able to maximize the benefits of USAID assistance and at the same time train the professionals of the CEE emerging donors in a much more hands-on fashion. This could take the form of USAID hiring a consultant for a certain period of time who could assist the new donors for instance in project planning, evaluation, ensuring transparency or direct implementation as well.

To summarize the case study, USAID managed to deliver the planned outputs (workshops), but they are not sure that focusing exclusively on training and workshops was the best possible approach. They felt that all Central and Eastern European countries they have come into contact with were receptive to their ideas and the changes and reforms they suggested in project evaluation and implementation. They also found that most of the development assistance programs they have come into contact with face more or less similar problems: low budgets, lack of trained personnel, no constituency for ODA, and finding the comparative advantages on which they may be able to base their future foreign assistance program on.

## Annex 6. Case Study of the Council of Europe's Programs for Strengthening Global Development Education

Basic data	
Title of the program	Strengthening Global Development Education
Financed and implemented by	Financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and implemented by the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe (2004-2005)  Joint program between the European Commission and the North-South Centre (2009-2011)
Financial contribution	415 000 EUR (2004-2005)
Duration	Two separate programs: 2004-2005 and 2009-2011

### 1. Rational for selecting this project as a detailed case study

The main reason for discussing this program at length is that it is highly different than the other capacity development programs carried out among the CEE donors. For one, this program attempted to provide capacity development assistance in a special area only: improving the level and quality of global and development education in the new member states. While this is not development assistance in a strict sense, it is closely related to it as global and development education are important tools for building a constituency for ODA in the long term by informing 'citizens of the global dimensions of local, European and global development issues' (Council of Europe 2005). On the other hand, this program did not aim to strengthen the capacities of traditional development stakeholders like MFAs, but it rather used them and national aid implementing agencies as partners in order to reach other actors, such as ministries of education as well as development and education NGOs, youth organizations, etc. who all play an important role in forming national education curriculums.

### 2. Background

The initiation of the program was prompted by the EU accession of the CEE countries and their need to create international development policies. While the CEE countries have created the necessary ODA structures and have received much outside assistance in this, they did not address the question of development education. In fact, global and development education (GE/DE) was more or less missing in most of the CEE countries: there were no binding national strategies in the majority of the countries, and there was a lack of coherence in GE/DE

approaches and activities. There was also lack of awareness on the importance of the topic and support from the general public was missing. The lack of financial resources was also cited as a factor which impeded GE/DE.

The first capacity building program of the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, between 2004 and 2005 concentrated on the Visegrád countries and provided assistance in formulating encompassing structures and national strategies for GE/DE. In the second program, between 2009 and 2011, GE/DE national and regional seminars took place in all the EU-12 countries. These seminars aimed to follow up on the original goals of the first GE/DE program, furthermore to produce national and sub-regional reports on GE/DE. With the help of these reports European institutions would be able to identify new projects and implementation mechanisms in supporting national and European actors in GE/DE. The main reason however why the second program was launched lies mainly in two factors: first, in the 2004-2005 program only the Visegrád countries received GE/DE capacity development assistance thus there was additional inclination to include all new EU-member states. Second, despite the aims and goals of the first program, a binding national strategy was still missing in GE/DE in many of the target countries and also a lack of coherence had been identified in GE/DE related areas.

As the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe is not such a widely known organization, a few words on its activities may be in order. It was created in 1990, and is supervised by the Council of Europe's Directorate General for Education, Culture and Heritage, Youth and Sport. The activities of the Centre focus on three major issues: assisting capacity building in global education, providing training and capacity building for youth and youth organizations in order to facilitate their participation in development policies, and assisting the elaboration of strategies to promote intercultural dialogue between Europe and its neighboring regions. The North-South Centre is not a funding organization, but rather represents a repository of knowledge on these issues.

### **3. Planning the program and program management**

As mentioned, the program originally targeted the four Visegrád countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, with the aim of strengthening GE/DE. The planning of the original program consisted of a series of meetings with key stakeholders between September and December 2004. At these meetings, the goal was to map the existing capacities of the four countries in GE/DE and to formulate the plans for the implementation of the program in areas where assistance was perceived to be most needed. Thus this mapping part consisted of both desk research, in which the aim was to identify the needs and key actors in the V4 countries; and also consultations with national coordinators and core partners such as the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Education, NGDO platforms, leading NGDOs and civil society organizations. An important goal was to prepare the national workshops and plan their programs in accordance with the key local stakeholders. It was also agreed in the planning phase that each national program will contain the same elements, although various national differences would be taken into account. These core common elements were the following: national seminars, national action plan processes, seed funding initiatives to support GE/DE projects and the inclusion of the Visegrád countries in the European Peer Review process of Global Education.

The planning of the second program, running between 2009 and 2011, included a similar broad consultation process. First, national seminars were held in the new EU member states between 2009 and 2010. The second part of the program, in 2010-2011 focused on sub-regional seminars, where the regional characteristics of GE/DE education could be compared and contrasted to each other. A sub-regional seminar for the three Baltic States was held in April 2010, followed by one for the Visegrád countries in March 2011 and one for the Central and South Eastern European and Mediterranean countries in October 2011.

#### **4. Goals and objectives of the program**

The goal of the program was to increase and strengthen the quality and focus of global and development education in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia which was later extended to all new EU member states. The Council of Europe aimed to contribute to building public awareness and support for international development assistance by promoting GE/DE. According to the final report of the 2004-2005 program, this was to be achieved through the following targets (Council of Europe 2005):

- provide assistance to the education of development assistance in the Visegrád countries;
- encourage an exchange of ideas among the parliaments, governments, regional authorities and NGOs on global education in development assistance;
- raise public awareness on issues connected to global interdependence, development assistance and solidarity through global education;
- carry out national consultations with key stakeholders, who have been identified earlier on;
- the creation of national systems designed to support, fund and coordinate the evaluation of global education in the Visegrád countries;
- and last but not least to create a network of stakeholders who are willing to contribute to the project and who may also be inclined to take part in other projects connected to development assistance in the future.

The 2009-2011 program had the following targets:

- exchange and discuss different perspectives on GE/DE and also attain a more thorough understanding of the concept;
- identify common regional/sub-regional problems (if there are any) based on findings from the national seminars, and also exchange best practices with GE/DE experts on the national and regional level;
- provide the facilities for the creation of joint action plans both on a regional and on a sub-regional level;
- promote GE/DE as an integral part of education within the region;
- provide recommendations for the advancement of GE/DE among the new EU-member states.

## **5. A description of the activities and the outputs of the program**

As mentioned, the GE/DE capacity building efforts of the North-South Centre can be divided into two distinctive programs. These programs not only differ in their timing and number of involved partners, but also included different activities. The second program clearly endeavored to build upon some of the findings and results from the first one, and to formulate some recommendations for the upcoming pan-European summit on Global Education.

### **5.1. First program, 2004-2005**

In the first program a series of national seminars with similar contents were held in the Visegrád countries to provide assistance in GE/DE to the respective countries. In these workshops ministry officials, NGO representatives and members of parliament were present. The outcomes and recommendations of these seminars can be summarized in the following:

- A common understanding has been developed on development education, taking into account the specificities of the respective countries.
- The participants of the various national seminars have agreed that before an action plan can be created, an extensive mapping process has to be conducted in order to be aware of the special requirements of the countries and also any existing best practices.
- Participants at the various national seminars have agreed on holding consultations on how to introduce development education into tertiary education as well as into the non-formal education sector.
- All the Visegrád countries indicated that the question of how funding can be provided for GE/DE in the long run can be crucial.
- The Visegrád countries have also agreed upon creating a network of professionals through which coordination and cooperation for development assistance projects can be furthered.

A second component in this first program was that the Council of Europe established a seed funding mechanism of 35 000 EUR per country, from which specific small scale GE/DE projects could be financed. These funds were administered and coordinated by the aid implementing agencies of the countries. The development of the mechanism was informed by good practice from elsewhere in Europe, in particular through the involvement in GENE (the European Network of Funding Agencies for Global and Development Education).

In *Slovakia* the MFA contributed an additional 50 000 EUR to the seed fund and from this a financial mechanism for global education was established at the Administrative and Contracting Unit (ACU) of the UNDP-Slovak Trust Fund; staff at the ACU and the MFA were trained in development education; evaluation expertise and best practices on funding have also been provided. In addition, representatives from Slovakia participated in GENE meetings, which enabled them to share experiences and look for funding advice, strategies and models for GE/DE.

In the *Czech Republic* the Development Centre of the Institute of International Relations administered the seed fund. The MFA also contributed a further 38 500 EUR. Three projects

were supported in relation to environmental sustainability with a global dimension; two on development education; one on sustainable development; one on Fair Trade and one on the Millennium Development Goals. MFA and implementing agency capacities were increased as a result of the funding and the appropriate annual mechanism for global and development education has been reinforced. Participation in the GENE meetings was similar as for Slovakia and it enabled the representatives of the Czech Republic to prepare for the 2005 Brussels Conference on Development Education and Public Awareness Raising for Global Interdependence and Solidarity.

In *Hungary* the usage of the seed fund was administered by HUN-IDA. The call for proposals financed by the seed fund was the first in the area of GE/DE in Hungary. The North-South Centre provided technical assistance to HUN-IDA in developing the call. The call resulted in 14 fully funded projects and four further projects receiving 50% funding. Hungary provided some co-financing for selected projects from the UNDP-Hungary Trust Fund. The funding contributed to building capacities at HUN-IDA, and also to strengthening GE/DE financing structures.

In *Poland* however there were some differences compared to the other Visegrád countries. During the time of the program, the Polish MFA was not ready to distribute the funds provided by the North-South Centre. Due to this, an NGO, the Education for Democracy Foundation was made responsible for the implementation of the seed fund, and the MFA also contributed 25 000 EUR. Results were similar as in the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Poland also participated in the GENE meetings.

In addition to the national seminars and the establishment of the seed funds, the third component of the program was to involve the Visegrád countries in the European Peer Review Process of Global Education, facilitated by the North-South Centre. The goal of this mechanism is to review the state of GE/DE on a periodic basis in European countries, to encourage critical analysis of existing structures and processes, and to propose solutions for improvement and share best practices. The North-South Centre also aimed to increase national commitments towards GE/DE through the mechanism and sustain the momentum for reform after funding has run out. The program also provided possibilities for experts from the Visegrád countries to get involved in the preparation of peer reviews of other countries.

As the final component of the 2004-2005 program, a number of awareness raising seminars also took place in the Visegrád countries. A regional seminar was organized for public school teachers (primary and secondary) in Kosice, Slovakia. Workshops for youth organizations and youth leaders on GE/DE were organized in both Budapest and Warsaw in 2005, and participants were encouraged to spread the knowledge they had gained during these occasions. In the Czech Republic an initiative was started to raise awareness and create networks among members of the academia through a series of intensive working sessions.

## *5.2. Second program, 2009-2011*

The second part of the North-South Centre's involvement in building CEE capacities for GE/DE took place between 2009 and 2011, in the framework of a joint management agreement with the

European Commission. This second program involved a series of national and regional seminars in order to bring together different national stakeholders in GE/DE and to discuss the present situation of the issues in their countries. Promoting best practices and creating recommendations for national policy reforms were also important goals.

The kick-off for the series of national seminars was held in Budapest in March 2009, where the main challenges and perspectives for GE/DE were discussed in general, including the launching and developing of multi-stakeholder models, the development of blueprints for the forthcoming national and regional seminars, and the proposed participation in the pan-European Global Education Week. This was followed by 12 national seminars in the 10 CEE countries plus Cyprus and Malta between September 2009 and October 2010.

The results and main lessons of these national seminars were collected in an extensive report (Council of Europe 2010), which provided the following major recommendations for the new EU member states:

- Establish binding national strategies on GE/DE in the countries where they are still missing.
- Provide a common ground for national ODA strategies and national development education strategies. This way when the public is being educated on the importance of international development issues, the teachers can include information on their home countries and justify why they are providing ODA to less developed countries.
- Promote the leading role of the key stakeholders (the MFAs and the Ministries of Education) who are supposed to work in tandem in the implementation of these national strategies. Seeing that the Ministries of Education in most CEE countries are facing shrinking budgets, they may be less inclined to spend additional resources on training the teachers who are then supposed to be educating the youth on global development. Therefore any training opportunity that line ministries would be able to offer would be most welcome. Also, different teaching materials should be offered to teachers for their consideration.
- Introduce courses on development education in tertiary education. The problem here is that development education courses may be taught only in certain programs, that is mainly for future social scientists and even in these cases students may often lack the inclination to participate in these classes.
- Foster cooperation with exchange and twinning programs so that the interested parties could learn from their peers in other countries.
- A further recommendation was that a global development education training forum should be established, which could provide capacity development for trainers and teachers at regular intervals, in order to keep them up-to-date with the most important innovations in the field of development education.

The national seminars were followed by three regional seminars for the Baltics, the Visegrád countries and the South Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. The aim of the regional seminars was to bring together key stakeholders in the three sub-regions of the new EU-member states and discuss theoretical issues on GE/DE as well as debate policy and

strategy and issues related to practical knowledge for teachers and educators. Specific topics included the latest trends in GE/DE; policy perspectives on GE/DE; EU funding opportunities; various national strategies on GE/DE and providing examples of best practices.

More or less the same recommendations were formulated at these regional seminars, therefore only the new ones will be detailed:

- Because the development of a GE/DE strategy takes time, the stakeholders involved in its creation should be aware of the most up-to-date paradigms in order to allow the resulting strategy to respond to current challenges and needs. Efforts must be made to actually implement any resulting strategy.
- Find political leadership to support the efforts of promoting GE/DE.
- Support the countries within the region which have problems in adopting the GE/DE multi-stakeholder model.
- Share and circulate GE/DE related educational programs and materials within the respective regions.
- Engage in peer review within the respective countries and in the respective regions.
- Ask for the continued support of the funding of GE/DE programs. A paradox situation had been found for example in the Baltic countries: wider public understanding and support of international development initiatives could be increased through GE/DE. However, without much public interest to start with, politicians are not inclined to finance further GE/DE programs.

## **6. Outcomes, impact and lessons learnt**

The underlying logic for this program was that if society was made more aware about why it is important for their country to take part in international development assistance, then this can put a pressure on governments to increase ODA spending. The long term outcomes of these kinds of programs may be hard to measure since the key indicator of ultimate impact would be that the countries who received assistance for developing GE/DE are increasing their ODA figures. However, ODA figures are affected by a number of issues, thus it is difficult to establish any causality, and recently the global financial crisis and budget problems in most CEE countries have led to stagnating or decreasing ODA spending. Two other issues arise: (1) the program mainly attempted to sow the seeds for GE/DE and it emphasized the need for sustained efforts from national governments afterwards; (2) as GE/DE focuses on the education of the youth, building public support for ODA through it may be a long process.

The method adopted for the implementation of the program focused mostly on involving key stakeholders, providing networking opportunities, and drafting national strategies. It did not really have a learning-by-doing component, but nevertheless allowed for a peer learning process through the regional seminars and the peer review system. One of the main achievements of the program was that it enabled the creation of a dialogue between representatives of ministries, international organizations and NGOs and facilitated the creation of a multi-stakeholder working environment. Unfortunately in multi-stakeholder scenarios sometimes the actual implementation of strategies may not be satisfactory. Also, this kind of



work method requires trust and mutual respect, which can be lost if the people involved in the process change.

Some of the achievements of the two programs, at least in terms of formal curricula, are clear and visible. The report on the second program, focusing on national and regional seminars (Council of Europe 2010) mentions the following achievements and future challenges, which point to mixed results:

- In *Bulgaria*, GE/DE is included in a number of different disciplines, but the actual topics are dispersed in an unsystematic way, and are not a priority of the curriculum.
- In *Cyprus*, there is no strategy for introducing GE/DE in formal education. Nevertheless it appears in an unsystematic way in a number of subjects.
- In the *Czech Republic*, GE/DE has been implemented into the educational curriculum.
- In *Estonia*, GE/DE has not yet been identified as a priority, but there are ongoing discussions to include it in the new national curriculum.
- In *Hungary*, there is a transition in formal education, therefore it remains to be seen whether GE/DE will be given a priority status by the government, nevertheless various courses at some universities address these issues in detail.
- In *Latvia*, GE/DE topics are included in the curriculum but are not implemented due to lack of resources.
- In *Lithuania*, topics on sustainable development in secondary schools are included in the curriculum, however teachers have to be provided resources for successful implementation.
- In *Malta*, GE/DE as of yet is not included in national curricula.
- In *Poland*, GE/DE will be included in the education reform, however it will take some time to be implemented.
- In *Romania*, GE/DE has not been implemented into school curricula.
- In *Slovakia*, it is also not in the curriculum, but certain topics are implemented in extra-curricular activities.
- In *Slovenia*, it is unclear when GE/DE will be implemented as a part of the curricula.

## **Donor agencies scanned**

Agence Française de Développement (AFD)  
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)  
Austrian Development Agency (ADA)  
Belgian Development Agency (BTC)  
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)  
Council of Europe North-South Centre  
Department for International Development, UK (DfID)  
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ireland (Irish Aid)  
European Commission, DG Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid)  
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)  
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany  
Korea Development Institute (KDI)  
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)  
Luxembourg Agency for Development Cooperation (LuxDev)  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (DANIDA)  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Kingdom of Belgium  
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee  
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)  
Swiss Cooperation Office  
Swiss State Secretariat for Economic affairs (SECO)  
UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States  
UNDP Croatia  
UNDP Lithuania  
UNDP Romania  
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

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