



# Study on Governance Challenges for Education in Fragile Situations

## Study Synthesis Report

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## Foreword and Acknowledgements

The European Commission study management team, Brussels, consisted of representatives from the Social and Human Development and Migration Unit of DG, EuropeAid. The Study Reference Group consisted of representatives from the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, Education and Training Foundation, DFID, GTZ, CIDA, IIEP UNESCO, World Bank, Ulster University and the European Commission.

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The purpose of this report is to bring together some of the key findings, lessons learned and conclusions from the eight country study reports in order to contribute to future thinking regarding education aid planning, programming, implementation and monitoring in fragile situations. In this context, it is hoped that readers will find the Synthesis Report a useful contribution to ongoing debates in this field.

The lead authors of the various country study reports were: Mike Ratcliffe (Team Leader) for Aceh, Cambodia, Lebanon and Somalia; Chris Perry for Liberia and Southern Sudan and Erika Boak for DRC and Haiti. Harvey Smith contributed extensively to the DRC and Haiti reports, alongside Mark Todd for Lebanon and Somalia. The lead authors for this Synthesis Report were Mike Ratcliffe and Chris Perry. The Study and consultancy team has been managed by Euro-Trends.

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## Case Study Countries

Aceh, Indonesia



Cambodia



DRC



Haiti



Lebanon



Liberia



Somalia



Sudan



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## Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

Acronym/Term	Description
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme
ANAPECO	Congo's National Parent and Student Association
BOS	School Block Grant
BRR	Bureau of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CEC	Community Education Committees
COHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
COPA	Parent Associations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
EFA	Education for All
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ESP	Education Sector Plan
FACPEL	Free and Compulsory Primary Education in Liberia
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
GEMAP	Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
iPRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
LNGO	Local Non Governmental Organisation
MoEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MoEYS	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
PAP	Priority Action Programme
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFM	Public Financial Management
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSM	Public Service Management
SMoE	State Ministry of Education
SPSP	Sector Policy Support Programme
TA	Technical Assistance
TC	Technical Cooperation
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

## Executive Summary

The overall purpose of the Study was to better understand key governance challenges facing education in different fragile situations, and highlight implications and make recommendations for external support to the education sector. The case studies - Aceh (Indonesia), Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Somalia and Southern Sudan were selected to provide a range of fragility and post-fragility contexts. The conceptual framework, methodology and activities for the Study are detailed in Section 1 and the specific methodology for the synthesis report in Annex 1. The evidence and findings are based on eight country governance assessments, which are summarised in the country profiles in Annexes 2 - 9 and available as full reports. The Study incorporated field visits to six countries, while the case studies on Lebanon and Somalia were conducted through desk research and distance consultations. The work is part of the broader research agenda established by the working group on 'Education and Fragility' – under the auspices of the 'Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies' (INEE).

**Fragility and Resilience Assessments.** The eight case studies generated useful information on sector performance and fragility/resilience features and trends, which is further detailed in Section 2. Overall, a fair degree of correlation was found between the peaks and troughs of security and political instability, and access to education services. Continued disparities in access to basic education services were evident in conflicted or unstable parts of individual countries. The Study found that limited information was available on post-basic education services and quality/governance indicators, despite the fact that governments and non-state actors often accord high priority to maintaining assessment/examination systems (e.g. Somaliland, DRC Eastern Congo).

A number of 'enabling factors' were identified as contributing to education sector resilience, in terms of maintaining some level of basic service delivery: i) the high value accorded by communities and families to school attendance, ii) early restoration of some form of teaching service, frequently community paid, iii) public/private partnerships, and iv) where feasible, a sustained role by government in continuing to finance education. In all the countries studied, sector governance capacity was found to adapt through a diversification of providers, clients/learners and organisational/management/financing arrangements. These adaptations were often found to contribute to the 'resilience' and 'early recovery' of the education system. However, adaptations had the potential to become 'hindering factors' in later stages of sector development, unless governance related actions were addressed at an early stage.

**Analysing and Addressing Governance in Education.** The broader macro and sector governance challenges, including the role of state and non-state actors, are explored in Section 3. The governance challenges in the different case studies vary; however, in Section 3 critical issues in relation to seven broad criteria of assessment (sector policy/strategy, budget, sector coordination, institutional setting and capacity, performance monitoring systems, macro economic framework and Public Finance Management (PFM) are identified.

Across the case studies, to some extent independent of their fragility status, a number of common sector governance challenges became evident. Education standards setting and broad based stakeholder participation in performance monitoring is underdeveloped. There is a need to accord greater attention to adopting more 'results oriented' expenditure frameworks, as well as providing more targeted support for those parts of the PFM system that impact on the education sector. Strengthening sector performance oversight and independent watchdog agencies (e.g. parliamentary select committees, audit agencies, NGO monitoring groups) could also be accorded higher priority in such situations.

Where private sector provision is extensive, including for higher education, a major challenge is the establishment of regulatory and organisational arrangements to assure the learners/clients of these services minimum quality and value for money. In a number of cases, as the frequency of block grants to schools (BOs) expand, more work is required on institutional arrangements that ensure mutual accountability between governments, school managers and school committees for the results and use of these funds. These common challenges in fragile situations are frequently questions of degree, with many of these sector governance issues outstanding in countries that are perceived as less or no longer 'fragile' (e.g. Aceh, Cambodia).

In order to meet these sector governance challenges, key 'enabling factors' need to be identified and addressed. Broadening the 'inclusiveness' of sector policy-making and expenditure allocation, decision making was identified as critical, especially in countries where patrimonial governance (e.g. clans, faith-based organisations) is prevalent. Encouragingly, there are signs that in situations of on-going fragility or recent emergence from fragility, these challenges are gradually moving higher up on the country and donor sector development agendas, as part of mutual accountability for results and improved aid effectiveness.

A number of governance actions can ensure that the positive legacies and responses to fragile situations are potentially transformational and enabling a transition. These are especially: (i) early preparation of medium-term sector plans, (ii) a comprehensive and inclusive education reconstruction programme that overcomes previous educational grievances, (iii) early building of state organisational capacity to regulate public-private-community education partnerships, (iv) early embedding of alternative or accelerated learning strategies and programmes within formal systems to avoid perpetuating over-age entry, and (v) early restoration of state-run teacher payroll, merit-driven teacher recruitment and teacher training systems.

'Crowding in' of community financing of education during fragile situations was identified as a potentially transformational opportunity if linked to: (i) incorporating community and donor contributions into early preparation of sector Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), (ii) early harmonisation and regulation of sources of support for teaching service budgeting and financing, (iii) early conducting of country Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) and PFM assessments, with a focus on sector accounting/audit capacity building, and (iv) building up even rudimentary education performance and financial information systems.

A final set of lessons learned, in terms of donor support modalities were identified: (i) the need to strike a careful balance between quick wins for service delivery against longer-term sector capacity building perspectives (ii) minimising the duration of the 'emergency relief paradigm', through the



promotion of government led relief/reconstruction transition planning, (iii) assessing the most effective mix of aid modalities in specific country contexts, recognising the importance of advancing the legitimacy and authority of state education services, and (iv) promoting government led education aid effectiveness groups to inform donor priorities. An overarching conclusion is that is important to ensure that whatever donor modalities are adopted, they enable progressive country leadership of sector governance and accountability arrangements.

**Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations.** A detailed summary of key issues, conclusions and recommendations is provided in Section 4. With regard to programme planning and design considerations, the Study concludes that an increased focus on sector 'resilience', as opposed to the often more negatively received language of 'fragility' constitutes an important shift and an opportunity for promoting a forward and longer-term sector planning perspective. A related conclusion is that early sector governance analysis (including the EC sector governance methodology/tools used in this Study) is a powerful tool and entry point for identifying key issues which can influence the sector's development and for identifying potentially transformational governance actions and processes.

There is evidence that greater attention is already being placed on 'sector governance' at an early stage of the recovery/reconstruction process, as exemplified by early sector policy/reform plans, PERs and PFM assessments in some of the countries studied. The willingness of country policy makers and donors to use often rudimentary financial systems to channel school block grants (BOS) constitutes an opportunity for state capacity building.

Though not exclusive to fragile situations, insufficient attention was found to be paid to senior secondary, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), higher education, teacher management development and basic literacy. The Study identifies this as a missed opportunity – considering that the potential reach of the sector could be much greater. In particular, support for education staff career and employment pathways has the potential to build public confidence, expanding livelihood opportunities for young adult populations and sustain momentum on key areas of public sector reform.

The Study concludes that especially during early recovery/reconstruction periods donor support has a tendency to target more accessible and stable locations, focus almost exclusively on basic education access and is frequently maintained off-budget. This carries the risk of policy incoherence, overstressing country coordination capacity and creating an inward looking sector ministry. As a result, the opportunity to focus on a small number of manageable priority programmes, to begin to develop on-budget expenditure frameworks and better align policy priorities and resources are frequently missed.

Following from these conclusions, the Study's first set of recommendations are for development partners to work with governments to: (i) look at ways to better embed sector governance assessment, methodology and tools into country assistance programming and design, (ii) focus on a smaller number of harmonised priority programmes, including tailor-made strategies for under-served areas with specified results and on-budget programme financing, (iii) look beyond the delivery of primary education, and prioritise skills development linked to livelihood recovery and system/career pathways, (iv) consider providing early support for the payment of teacher salaries,

whilst maintaining short term community contributions and a longer-term perspective for a state paid service, (v) accord higher priority to developing 'teaching service development plans', including remuneration policy, management and payroll systems, and (vi) promote and build state capacity to adopt an enabling role for public-private-community partnerships.

For programme implementation, monitoring and learning, the Study concludes that development partners should further support NGOs and CBOs to help facilitate capacity building of externally oriented information and communication systems and national education oversight arrangements, amongst others through parliamentary select committees and civil society organisations. Strengthening the voice, capacity and accountability of these actors, including in their role as watchdog coalitions, is needed.

There is a growing body of experience and knowledge of using a mix of strategies and aid instruments (e.g. Technical Assistance (TA), project support, pooled funds, budget support) in post-fragile situations, including for the education sector. There are also a number of credible and rigorous analytical frameworks for assessing sector governance challenges. It is less clear to which extent this knowledge/experience is being applied by governments and donors systematically in country contexts. This type of knowledge tends to be retained within aid agencies and its dissemination amongst key national policy makers and planners is underdeveloped.

In fragile situations, very little is known about the relationship between sector governance and performance outcomes, especially with regard to improving the quality of education service delivery. Targeted donor project support in fragile and conflict-affected, under-served areas may be an effective short term measure, but it cannot substitute for longer term equity based policy, finance and governance reforms. There may be an opportunity to use non-project modalities to promote dialogue on these issues, especially if informed by provincial/district disaggregated performance information and state/non-state actor monitoring and accountability mechanisms.

The Study's second set of recommendations are for development partners to work with governments to: (i) support NGOs and CBOs to help facilitate capacity building of externally oriented information and communication systems and national education oversight arrangements, (ii) set up and support inclusive state/non-state actor coordination mechanisms to formulate medium to longer-term plans, with key transitional milestones, enabling governance indicators and monitoring mechanisms, linked to long-term pledging of support from donors, (iii) look at ways to make school block grants more policy and results conditional, alongside a well regulated school governance/management capacity development plan, (iv) emphasise prioritisation of a sustainable education census and information systems, including provincial/district disaggregated performance data, (v) promote early and donor harmonised medium term public expenditure planning and PFM assessments, with timely support for sector budget planning, accounting and audit capacity building.

# 1. Introduction: Objectives and Methodology

## 1.1 Objectives and Purpose

The overall objective of the Study is to enhance understanding of the key governance challenges facing education in different fragile situations and of how these challenges impact on broader sector fragility, resilience and stability in the delivery of education services. Taking account of different fragile situations, the Study aims to highlight the implications for planning, management and implementation of support to the education sector. In doing so, it is acknowledged that addressing 'sector governance' has the potential to contribute to better and more sustainable results in state formation/building.<sup>1</sup> An overarching goal of the Study is to better understand the key macro economic and sectoral governance features that enable or hinder the transition through emergency relief/early recovery, reconstruction and more sustainable sector development.

The conceptual framework and operational methodology for the Study draws on an extensive methodological and country literature review,<sup>2</sup> as summarised in Annex 1. This literature review highlighted four main methodological approaches consisting of: (i) broader country governance and state building assessments<sup>3</sup> (ii) use of sector governance assessments, including an analysis of state capacity and willingness,<sup>4 5</sup> (iii) use of analytical tools to assess appropriate aid instruments in fragile situations,<sup>6</sup> and (iv) post disaster/emergency tools and methodologies.<sup>7</sup> The main conceptual framework and methodological approach of this Study focused on sector governance assessments, although in operational terms it was often a hybrid of the four main approaches. The overall Study methodology, including the way the results of the governance assessment have been synthesised, is detailed in Annex 1.

The OECD fragile states characterisation (arrested development, deteriorating situation, post-conflict/recovery, early recovery) was adopted to guide the selection of eight country case studies, as detailed in the 'Terms of Reference' and agreed by the Study reference group. In practice, sector fragility and resilience were conceptualised as two faces of the same coin. The main criterion for assessing sector resilience/fragility was the (lack of) 'capacity' of the system to maintain service delivery and what were the primary governance features maintaining or otherwise education services. The second criterion was assessing the 'willingness' of the state and non-state actors, through analysing a range of political, security and economic/administrative features. In this way, the Study methodology adopted allowed convergence between sector governance analysis and sector capacity development assessment (i.e. organisational capacity as measured through sector outputs, outcomes and impact).

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<sup>1</sup> European Commission, 2008. Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations, P.9.

<sup>2</sup> Euro-Trends, 2009. Study Phase 1 Report, which sets out the proposed conceptual framework and operational methodology and reporting for the study, covering a review of over 200 documents.

<sup>3</sup> OECD, 2007. Fragile States Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.

<sup>4</sup> European Commission, 2008. Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations.

<sup>5</sup> EFA FTI, 2008. Guidelines for Capacity Development in the Education Sector : EFA FTI Progressive Framework

<sup>6</sup> DfID, 2005. Aid Instruments in Fragile States (N. Leader and P. Colenso).

<sup>7</sup> INEE, 2009. Rapid Response Programming for Education Needs in Emergencies.

A key finding of the literature review that was applied during the Study, was the importance of making a distinction between more systemic fragility (frequently related to governance factors) and more immediate post-emergency/disaster fragility. In order to link shorter-term fragile situations with planning for a medium to long term sector development trajectory, many donors adopt the 'capacity and willingness' framework. In Study process terms, the focus on lessons learned and on contextual factors that contribute to sector resilience enabled better country cooperation during the Study,<sup>8</sup> and helped to overcome resistance to being defined as 'fragile'.

Key analytical outputs of the Study include insights into: (i) the extent to which particular governance structures contribute to a sector successfully delivering education services at different stages of transition, (ii) the extent to which governance conditions support or hinder this kind of development transition in education, (iii) how external factors, especially political ones, drive or inhibit improved service delivery, and (iv) how external and education sector governance factors can be mutually re-enforcing and enable a more conducive environment for sector reform and improvement.

The Study recognises that in these complex and difficult contexts, governance challenges take time to be addressed. As a result, the Study has been designed to more systematically analyse the key factors that influence sector performance and results. This Study also intends to contribute to the ongoing debate about how donors can best assist education development in fragile situations. The Study draws on country reports from Aceh (Indonesia), Cambodia, DRC, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Somalia and Southern Sudan.

## 1.2 Overall Methodology and Activities

The overall conceptual framework for the Study has a number of key features consisting of:

- § [Characterisations of fragile states](#), using the current OECD classification of deteriorating, arrested development, post-conflict/reconstruction, and early recovery.
- § [Education Sector capacity assessments](#), focusing on the interrelationships between institutional and structural factors, organisational settings, and capacity and organisational responsiveness to internal and external demands and clients.<sup>9</sup>
- § [Education Sector governance mappings and assessments](#), looking at the overall country context, mapping the role, importance and interests of key actors and stakeholders and governance/ accountability relations between them.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> EC Study management team, EC country delegations and the consultancy team communicated with country authorities and the country education donor working groups to this effect, ahead of country visits.

<sup>9</sup> EC, 2005. Tools and Methods Series : Institutional and Capacity Assessment.

<sup>10</sup> Drawing on conceptual frameworks and analytical approaches detailed in EC Reference Document on Analyzing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations, November 2008.

The overall Study methodology, analytical instruments and activities consisted of:

- § [Historical sector performance and resiliency assessments](#), with analytical activities including: i) historical sector performance trend analyses against a number of agreed indicators, ii) correlation analyses with key historic fragility/stabilisation milestones and events and iii) selective analyses of disaggregated geographical performance data.<sup>11</sup>
- § [Assembly of country education sector fragility/resilience profiles](#), with analytical activities including: i) assessments of positive and negative factors contributing to fragility and stabilization prospects, including security, economic and social aspects, ii) assessments of the role of the state and other providers, in terms of coverage of service delivery, iii) assessments of willingness and capacity of national and local authorities and community groups to provide education services and iv) overall assessments of the status and trajectory of country fragility against OECD definitions.<sup>12</sup>
- § [Education sector governance assessments](#), incorporating: i) mappings/overviews of the overall country governance contexts and its implications for education, ii) stakeholder analyses of the key state and non-state actors, iii) existence of sector policies and strategies, sector expenditure framework and PFM systems, institutional arrangements, performance monitoring systems, v) mappings of key actors, including the powers and interests and potential drivers of change for non-state actors, core public agencies, oversight agencies and other service providers and vi) the extent and effectiveness of governance mechanisms covering participation, inclusiveness, accountability and transparency.<sup>13</sup>
- § [Mappings and analyses of local non-state/community actor initiatives](#), consisting of: i) mapping of the range, types, diversity and scale of local initiatives, ii) assessment of the origin of the initiative, both demand and supply side, in a fragile context, iii) the extent to which the design and implementation of these local initiatives enable or hinder improvement in participation, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability within the sector and iv) the extent to which these initiatives enable or hinder longer-term system capacity building, system resilience and social compacts between state, citizens and providers.<sup>14</sup>
- § [Mappings and analyses of donor supported activities](#), consisting of: i) mappings of the range, types, diversity and scale of donor supported activities, ii) assessments of the alignment between activities and modalities, in terms of promoting state/government capacity building while expanding services, iii) the extent to which the design and implementation of these donor activities enable or hinder improved participation, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability within the sector and iv) the extent to which

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<sup>11</sup> Primary sources of trend data were the UNESCO Statistical Information Service, Education Policy and Data Centre, World Bank country development briefs and country education ministries.

<sup>12</sup> A primary tool for this analysis was the EFA FTI Fragile States Progressive Framework Guidelines, 2008.

<sup>13</sup> C. Berry et al, 2004. Approaches to Improving Social Services in Difficult Environments was a primary analytical tool.

<sup>14</sup> EC, 2007. Mapping of Donors, Actors, Financial Instruments and Assessment Tools in Situations of Fragility.

these initiatives are likely to enable or hinder longer-term system capacity building, system resilience and social compacts between state, citizens and providers.<sup>15</sup>

- § **Analyses of lessons learned and good practice case studies**, incorporating: i) the extent to which there was well coordinated stakeholder involvement in programme design and its implementation, ii) the extent to which the design took account of state building considerations, especially in education and related agencies, iii) the extent to which potential state building capacity was at least not undermined, iv) the extent to which inclusivity of service provision and better quality were enhanced, v) the extent to which key governance principles were being advanced as part of implementation and vi) in the case of donor support, the extent to which aid effectiveness principles are being advanced.<sup>16</sup>

This analytical approach, set out in the approved Study conceptual framework and methodology and common country analysis and reporting formats and content, formed the basis of the findings in the eight individual country case study reports. The main activities conducted as part of country case study preparation consisted of: i) desk study analyses of historical sector performance trends, ii) desk study analyses and documentation research of fragility/stability milestones, iii) desk studies and documentation research of resilience factors, iv) detailed reviews of key country governance and sector governance documentation, including education strategy papers, public expenditure and financial accountability assessments and country governance assessments and v) follow-up field or teleconference interviews with key political, donor agency, government, community informants. Field visits were conducted for Aceh, Cambodia, DRC, Haiti, Liberia and Southern Sudan, with the case studies in Lebanon and Somalia conducted by distance studies/interviews.

The country reports have been further synthesised to produce individual country profiles covering: i) the chronology of key governance and sector events, ii) an overall education fragility assessment, iii) a summary sector governance assessment and outlook, iv) a sector resilience and performance assessment, v) an assessment of education sector governance progress, challenges and opportunities/risks and vi) current development assistance profiles. These country profiles are based on a systematic analysis of country case study reports and documentation which allows careful country comparisons. The comparative country analysis in this synthesis report is based on an application of the EC sector governance assessment dimensions, which are presented in Annexes 2 – 9, including the selected country bibliography of analytical reports that formed the basis for the country profile assessment.

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<sup>15</sup> OECD, 2005. Paris Declaration Principles for Aid Effectiveness provided a broad analytical framework.

<sup>16</sup> OECD, 2008. Round Table Findings on Aid Effectiveness in Situations of Fragility and Conflict.

## 2 Fragility and Resilience Assessments

### 2.1 Factors that influence the Fragility and Resilience of Education Systems


The key findings of the fragility and resilience analyses are presented below. The findings are based on a combination of a chronology of key security, political, economic and education sector governance events and a review of sector performance trends in each case study country. The sector performance and related sector resilience analyses have primarily focused on access/participation indicators, especially for primary and secondary education. Longitudinal information on service quality and equity indicators were found to be quite limited in the case study countries.

**Aceh, Indonesia**<sup>17</sup> (see Annex 2): Recent history in Aceh can be best characterized by three phases. Firstly, there was a conflict period over 1979/2001. During this time, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was founded, after which a conflict emerged between this movement and the national authorities. In 1989/1991 a military zone was established and eventually a humanitarian pause (2000/2001). The consequences for the education sector fragility were: disruption of schooling due to the destruction of schools, assault of teachers by GAM combatants, schools being used as military camps, difficulties for village leaders in mobilizing community support when faced with GAM/military conflicts of interest, and inability of parents to pay school and university fees, especially for post-basic education provision.

Secondly, the region knew a conflict affected reconstruction period over 2001/2004, when there was a breakdown of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in 2003 and the introduction of martial law. The impact on the education sector included an estimated 500 schools destroyed and around 900 schools temporarily closing. Besides there was a continued prevalence of high levels of poverty due, in part, to the disruption of key aspects of the economy and the out migration of a large number of better educated professionals and university staff.

The third phase, from 2005/2009 can be understood as a post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction and recovery phase, when tens of thousands of people were lost, family housing was destroyed and over 500,000 people were displaced. The livelihoods for tens of thousands of households were destroyed and many more families were pushed into poverty. The immediate impact on education was the destruction of over 2500 schools, thousands of teachers being displaced from their place of work, and difficulties in assimilating ex-combatants back into the work force and community after the 2005 Helsinki Peace Accord.

Figure 1: 2008 Gross Enrolment Rates, Aceh and Indonesia




<sup>17</sup> See EC, 2009. Aceh, Indonesia Country Report, which is a companion volume to this report.



A key factor for maintaining comparatively strong participation rates during the prolonged hostilities until 2003 has been the continued national government support for schools, a paid teaching service, the special autonomy law in 2001 (allowing retention of oil and gas revenues) and the timely decentralisation policies at the start of the millennium. Even at that time, participation in more conflict affected areas of Aceh was still around provincial averages. The post-tsunami reconstruction effort and the maintenance of comparatively high participation rates was strongly enabled by an authoritative government led reconstruction agency, extensive donor support using government systems and the political and security dividend associated with the 2005 peace accord and an elected and legitimate provincial governorship established in 2007 (see figure 1).

The primary factors in enabling the transition from sector reconstruction to more sustainable development have been: i) the continuation of decentralisation policies, including elected local parliaments, ii) predictable medium-term education financing through specific revenue/expenditure allocations for education at national and provincial levels, iii) specific delegated authority and expenditure allocations for education to district local governments, including for the

Figure 2: Projected Education Resources, Aceh



teaching force (see figure 2), and iv) formulation of a specific sector plan for reconstruction/sustainable development transition in 2007, led by the office of the governor, with very inclusive participation from political, community and government stakeholders.

Aceh is in the early stages of sustainable development, having recovered quickly from short-term post-tsunami emergency relief/reconstruction. The overall sector development trajectory is judged to be strongly upwards, facilitated by a stabilised security and political environment, with a focus on autonomy building and predictable sector financing. Pockets of fragility, mainly related to service delivery capacity, are primarily economic/poverty related rather than political or security issues.

**Cambodia<sup>18</sup>** (see Annex 3): The main source of fragility in Cambodia has been the political upheaval and genocide during the Khmer Rouge period in the 1970s and a continued, though diminishing, Khmer Rouge presence until the late nineties. Recent history in Cambodia can be best characterized by three phases.

Firstly, an early recovery/restoration period over 1979/1991 when there were continued security governance concerns due to both Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese presence, uncertain legitimacy of the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, and underdeveloped economic governance, with state revenues being spent mainly on defence/security. The highly fragile state that the education sector was left in after the Khmer Rouge period, improved significantly over these

<sup>18</sup> See EC, 2009. Cambodia Country Report, which is a companion volume to this report.



years. Pupil enrolment rose from zero to 1.6 million, a nationwide system of schools was created and the teaching service was restored, including through voluntary service and an extensive programme of accelerated learning.

Secondly, a sector reconstruction period over 1991/1999 included sources of continued fragility in the context of political instability within the coalition government and continued low level security instability from

remnants of Khmer Rouge. Public expenditure for education was limited, and there was very limited support of under-served provinces from external programmes, due to security concerns. Despite these factors, school enrolment grew to around 2.5 million during this period, a state paid teaching service was established and public examinations were re-established. A key policy contributing to this, was increasing compulsory schooling to 12 years, up from 11 in 1996 (see figure 3). The education sector was further strengthened by sustained education ministry leadership and project support from the international community.

Thirdly, there has been a subsequent reconstruction/development transition period over 2000/2009. The sources of political and security instability diminished significantly over this period, with the reconciliation with the Khmer Rouge, a transition from an unsettled political coalition to a single party government in 2007 and gradual improvement in economic and administrative governance, including through elected commune councils. There has been extensive restructuring of education provision, with enrolment rates growing at all levels, including an expanded private higher education sector. Sector governance developments have included government-led education sector development frameworks and the formulation of a sector MTEF, abolition of enrolment fees and the introduction of BOSs school block grants, a rising share of government expenditure for education, and improved government, donor and NGO accountability processes.

The primary factors in enabling the transition from sector reconstruction to more sustainable development were: i) growing political commitment to education, including increased public expenditure shares (see figure 4), ii) increased state revenue generation and more robust fiscal and PFM systems, with education as a lead ministry for reforms, iii) formulation of a results oriented education strategic plan, with significant stakeholder involvement and strong government/donor endorsement and iv) more results oriented and participatory sector performance monitoring and more client oriented budget planning and internal audit.

Figure 3: Enrolment Patterns 1980-2009, Cambodia





Figure 4: Education Expenditure Patterns, Cambodia



Cambodia is in the very late stages of reconstruction/sustainable development transition, with a development trajectory which is gradually upwards. This trajectory has been facilitated by increased political authority, strongly improving education finance predictability and more results oriented sector planning. Pockets of fragility, especially in border areas, are mainly related to service delivery capacity and driven by factors related to ethnicity, cultural and poverty.

[Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>19</sup>](#) (see Annex 4): Historically, DRC has suffered extensive political instability and civil war since its independence, although a transitional government was elected and a constitution approved by voters in 2006. Conflict continued over 2006/2009, with security and political fragility contributing to a death rate of around 0.5 million per year since 2004, due to disease or famine. The reach of the conflict is very broad, with an estimated three-quarters of the population reporting themselves as conflict-affected.

The past two decades have been characterised by a gradual and now almost complete removal of the state from the financing of the education sector. The trend has been one of overall deterioration with only some pockets of good practice with an increase in the supply of education and localised quality improvements due to targeted international or local support. These led to an increase in enrolment in all types of schools in both primary and secondary levels between 1986 and 2007. The growth in nearly all types of schools was more marked between 2001-2006 than between 1986-2001, in part due to the reduction of fragility in the country, which was a result of the formal end of the chronic crisis in 2003. The average increase in enrolments in primary schools during that time was 38%, while in the same period there was an increase of 74% and 88% in enrolments in private primary and private secondary schools respectively.

Currently, the main drivers of education sector fragility can be summarised as: i) inadequate education coverage in the East was caused by instability, ii) a high proportion of the national budget spent on security, placing the education financing burden on parents, iii) high dependence on private financing creates harmful incentives resulting in continued exclusion and marginalization, iv) a large and unwieldy education civil service together with a complex and bureaucratic decentralised structure and iv) ongoing violence in the East and border areas and lack of security capacity constrains national stabilisation and development.

The ongoing conflict over the period 1980-2003 significantly reduced school participation rates, with a degree of resilience in urban areas due to an active network of faith based education organisations. There were extensive provincial disparities, especially in border areas where the national government was not considered legitimate or authoritative and public education services broke down.

Since 2003, participation rates have grown very significantly, although the eastern conflict affected provinces remain underserved. Key resilience factors have been: i) steps taken to better regulate and aid a growing private sector by the government, including grants to schools and teachers, ii) the implementation of a number of education strategies, including for the reduction of school fees, through an independent and authoritative education strategy commission, iii) a high and growing level of political commitment to education, for example leading to a number of legal compacts with

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
<sup>19</sup> See EC, 2009. DRC Country Report, which is a companion volume to this report.

the private sector, and iv) greater attention to sector governance reforms, including for PFM and teaching service regulation.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction, with a strong upwards development trajectory, albeit from a low baseline. This trajectory has been facilitated by a degree of security and political stabilisation, growing political commitment to education sector development and increased education sector resources. Pockets of fragile service delivery capacity remain in conflict affected areas, alongside elements of institutional fragility related to public private partnership policy in education and its regulation.

Haiti<sup>20</sup> (see Annex 5): Haiti achieved independence from France in 1825, the country knew a period of US occupation over 1915/1934, which was followed by the Duvalier dictatorship until 1986. Further political instability was prevalent until very recently with continued street protests and rebellion, which has significantly undermined economic development. Haiti's location makes it particularly hurricane-prone, especially in highly populated coastal areas in the north (e.g. Gonaïves and Port-de-Paix), with extensive hurricane damage to homes and social infrastructure in recent years. Deforestation has also contributed to severe flooding, once again, disrupting households and schooling.

Figure 5: Share of Enrolment in Non-State Primary Schools, Haiti



During the fragility experienced the last decade, anecdotal evidence suggests a drop in enrolment in urban centres affected by violence between 2004 and 2007. Public and non-public education provision in slums such as Cité Soleil (the biggest slum in Port-au-Prince) has suffered due to banditry and armed gangs, while education in rural areas in the north and south has been affected by natural disasters. A large number of children in slum areas are not in school, with many never having enrolled. The main barrier to children's access in both urban and rural areas is poverty. An additional factor affecting education performance in public schools, particularly in rural areas, is the regular occurrence of teacher demonstrations and strikes, due to the non-payment of salaries. As a result, a key feature in maintaining primary education service delivery has been the growing share of non-state provision (see figure 5).


This complex mix of factors has contributed to significant regional disparities in enrolment and attendance in primary and secondary education. At primary level, enrolment rates range between 30-40% in central and northern regions to an estimated 70% in the metropolitan area. The urban/rural access gap is around 20-30%. The pattern is similar at secondary level, and a mixture of poverty related, security related (especially in the northern cities) and environmental related factors (e.g. schools destroyed by hurricanes) all contribute to system fragility.

Despite the period of sustained political instability and recurring hurricanes from 1990-2003, primary school enrolments continued to grow (see figure 6). The key resilience factors were: i) a

<sup>20</sup> See EC, 2009. Haiti Country Report, which is a companion volume to this report.

robust private sector including faith based and for profit organisations, ii) a willingness of parents to forego other household expenses in favour of education, partly supported by the Haitian Diaspora, and iii) non-regulation of age of entry to schooling, including extensive accelerated learning and non-formal education provision. Nevertheless, a legacy remained of extensive access disparities between better off urban areas and poor urban slums and hurricane prone and poorer rural and coastal areas.

Figure 6: Elementary Education NER, 1990-2003, Haiti



Since 2003 the efforts to sustain a period of sector reconstruction have begun to focus on more institutional and organisational issues, in particular: i) establishing an initial legal framework for education through a presidential education commission and interim framework for collaboration, ii) formulation of a government led and reasonably inclusive national Education For All (EFA) strategy, iii) better alignment between education reform and broader national development policy and iv) significant external assistance for education, focussing on both service delivery and improved organisational capacity to regulate the extensive public-private partnership.

Haiti is in the process of recurring post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction, with encouraging recovery from hurricane effects. The development trajectory is judged to be only slowly moving upwards, due to recurring political and security uncertainties and varying degrees of political commitment to education. Pockets of weak service delivery capacity are evident, especially in the poorer urban and rural areas and hurricane prone coastal areas, alongside significant institutional fragility related to apparent unwillingness to regulate a growing private sector in education.


Lebanon<sup>21</sup> (see Annex 6): The two main periods in Lebanon's recent history are best characterised as i) a post-civil war recovery and reconstruction period, though still conflict-affected over 1975/2006; and ii) a second recovery and reconstruction period, over 2006/2009. Key drivers of fragility have included the continued security instability, especially on the Israel and Syria borders; the large influx of Palestinian refugees; and the 2005/2006 hostilities which resulted in 30,000 jobs being lost, the destruction of 100,000 houses and an estimated overall damage of around USD 730 million. A further source of fragility was the introduction of 'confessionalism', through which political and economic governance decision making has become based on a complex mix of political and religious allegiances and networks.

Over the period 1975/2006, further sources of education sector fragility included i) continued disruption of schooling as the reconstruction of the school infrastructure and teaching service was comparatively slow; ii) delays in public financing of education due to parliamentary/administrative delays; iii) the absence of a well-defined education policy and legislative/regulatory and financing frameworks, particularly in relation to the tensions between confessionalism based provision and management of communal based private provision; and iv) continuation of an uncertain state role in refugee camp education provision.

<sup>21</sup> See EC, 2009. Lebanon Country Report, which is a companion volume to this report.

Over the period 2006/2009, key features contributing to education system fragility included: i) the military conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, leading to the disruption of schooling, extensive damage to school buildings and internal displacement of students and teachers; ii) disruption of economy and income generating opportunities, with the education sector being especially sensitive in a predominantly fee-paying environment; and iii) also as a result of the downturn in the economy, volatile public expenditure planning for education and spending volumes (see figure 7).


Figure 7: Public Expenditure Shares on Education, Lebanon



As a result, significant disparities in the share of public provision and reach for education across regions/governates remain. A key feature is that the poorer northern and southern areas of Lebanon rely more heavily on public schooling in contrast to a better-off Beirut, where the private provision constitutes an indicative 70% of enrolment. Despite the prolonged political and security instability over 1975-2005, participation in all levels of education continued to expand. The main source of resilience was the continued willingness of communal groups to run and pay for schooling through a very extensive private and private/grant aided system, supported by extensive levels of remittances from the Lebanese Diaspora.

Particularly from the year 2000, other sources of resilience have included: i) a better definition of the role of the state in education provision and financing, including of the teaching service, ii) gradual consolidation of education policy and planning and monitoring functions within a single central education ministry, as opposed to previous sub-sectoral education administrations, particularly over 2000/2005, iii) formulation of an initial EFA policy and plan and specific TVET legislation in 2005 and 2000 respectively and iv) gradually putting in place administrative and staffing systems for running the education ministry.

Figure 8: Enrolment Patterns, 1999-2007, Lebanon



Since 2005, several other factors have begun to contribute towards more sustainable development, even though participation rates appear to have stagnated, (see figure 8). These are: i) maintenance of the robust public-private partnership in education, with education expenditures estimated at around 8-9% of GDP (around 2.5%-2.6% from public expenditure), ii) the continued willingness of households and the Diaspora to devote high shares of remittances for education, iii) greater integration of education reforms into broader public administration and civil service policy and planning and financing reforms, iv) significant stakeholder participation in education policy and strategy formulation and v) improved coordination of external

assistance for education, including sector reform implementation and a greater focus on the Palestinian camp refugee education programme.


Lebanon is in the later stages of recurring post-conflict reconstruction, with encouraging recovery from recent regional conflicts. The overall development trajectory is assessed to move slightly downwards due to limited political commitment to education and unpredictable and regressive education financing policy. Albeit from a comparatively high baseline, pockets of fragile service delivery are evident, especially in the northern and southern governates, alongside confessionism related institutional/ organisational fragility, sector internal inefficiencies and ineffective enabling of the private sector in education.

**Liberia<sup>22</sup>** (see Annex 7): The roots of the civil war in Liberia and of fragility in its education sector can be traced back to policies of inequitable resource allocation and government supported development between American settlers located in coastal regions and indigenous peoples in the hinterlands. These inequalities were clearly evident in access to education opportunities before President Tubman's "Unification and Integration" policy was launched in the 1950's. The main factor which has contributed to fragility within the education sector is the same as for the country as the whole: poor governance. Education has been a means by which certain groups dominated Liberian society and sustained their domination, including through long-standing historic inequalities between American settlers and indigenous peoples, and latterly along ethnic lines.

In reviewing the historical perspectives of education in Liberia, a number of key factors have contributed to education sector fragility, including: i) during conflict years, education was not generally seen as a priority for many families, compared to the higher security of their children at home, ii) displacement of teachers and education managers during conflict years, iii) a persistent inequitable provision of education services between coastal areas and hinterland, iv) a lack of resources and political leadership to implement and enforce free education policy and v) competition for limited resources between overage youth and children of correct school age.

Government education policies introduced in the 1950's began to start addressing the historic inequities in provision between the coastal areas and hinterland (see figure 9). Even though the government adopted a policy of self-help for rural areas and prioritisation of expenditure in coastal areas over the 70's, primary enrolments in the rural areas still grew from 50% to around 80% due to a strong community response and support from the international community.

Figure 9: 2007/08 Junior Secondary NER & GER, By County, Liberia



<sup>22</sup> See EC, 2009. Liberia Country Report, which is a companion volume to this report.



Despite the devastating impact of the civil war on the education system over 1989-2003, during relative periods of peace there were extensive efforts to rebuild, again led by communities with international support. As a result, the number of classrooms and enrolment doubled after presidential elections in the late 90s. Enrolment levels have quickly recovered since the end of the civil war and generations of young people denied access during the war have flooded back.

Key factors in enabling resilience of the sector during times of crisis or conflict and in supporting restoration include: i) strong community-driven initiatives over 1989-2003 during periods of relative peace (e.g. community schools grew from a total of 54 to 1,370 over 1989-2007), ii) early recognition and implementation (1997/1998) by the government of accelerated learning programmes (ALPs) as part of ex-combatant demobilization and reintegration, iii) the introduction of a free and compulsory education policy in 2001 by the transitional government, a nationwide back to school campaign in 2003 and an introduction of government financed block grants in 2006 and iv) a growing commitment to education and its financing by government, including priority policy frameworks introduced in 2007.

Liberia is in an early stage of post-conflict reconstruction, with the overall development trajectory being strongly upwards, albeit from a comparatively low baseline. Political and security environments are stabilising, with a growing political commitment to education and its financing. Pockets of fragile service delivery remain evident, particularly in rural inland areas, which have been historically neglected by successive governments. Despite recent efforts, the education institutional/organisational environment and capacity remains fragile, but the overall outlook is judged to be promising.

[Somalia](#)<sup>23</sup> (see Annex 8): Somalia's recent history can be divided into two main periods: i) a conflict-affected deterioration phase, 1970/2000 and ii) a still conflict-affected early recovery phase, 2000/2009. The key sources of fragility over the 1970/2000 period were the lack of authority of the overall Somali government, resulting in the overthrow of the Barre Government by opposing clans and subsequent warfare in 1990 and in the continued territorial disputes between the three regions of Somalia (South-Central, Puntland and Somaliland).

Over this 30 year period, the sources of sector fragility included i) the destruction of much of the school infrastructure and the teaching service, including growing internal displacement and refugee camps; ii) a breakdown of public administration, especially in South Central, with an absence of state revenues for education nationwide; iii) migration of more experienced education managers, planners, teachers and university staff; iv) unwillingness of parents to send their children to school in the more insecure parts of the country, including in hostile urban areas; v) growing inability of parents to pay school fees, with young men taking up employment as part of clan militias; and vi) absence of a strategic response for education provision for nomadic populations and IDPs/refugees.

The key sources of fragility over the 2000/2009 period have been the continued uncertain legitimacy and authority of the transitional federal government (TFG), the continued hostilities, especially in South Central region and a slow progress on building up public administrations, even in Puntland and Somaliland, resulting in only limited state resources for education.


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<sup>23</sup> See EC, 2009. Somalia Country Report, which is a companion volume to this report.

Over this latter period, the sources of sector fragility have included i) severe district inequities in provision within regions, due to a combination of variable state provision, limited non-formal education opportunities and limited attention to nomadic and IDP specific strategies; ii) variable attention to ensuring inclusive clan participation in benefits of expanding education opportunities; iii) insufficient attention to language of instruction issues, including English, Somali and Arabic, as a means of promoting social cohesion and inclusiveness; and vii) limited post-primary education and skills training opportunities and employment, especially for younger militia members.

Despite the very extensive security and political instability over the period 1970-2000, participation rates continued to increase, albeit from low baselines, especially in Puntland and Somaliland (see figure 10). Key aspects of resilience have included: i) the establishment of authoritative parliaments and public administrations in these two regions, ii) the set up of community education committees (CECs), frequently under the patronage of individual clans and Islamic organisations, iii) willingness of better-off parents to pay fees for primary education in safer locations, iv) community and donor mobilisation of funds to restore schools and pay teachers, especially post-1996 and v) growing levels of remittances from the Somali diaspora.

Figure 10: Primary Enrolment, by Region: 1980/2007, Somalia



Since 2000, although overall net enrolment rates remained low by international standards, participation rates in primary and secondary education have expanded, even in the conflict affected South Central region. Initiatives in Puntland and Somaliland are designed to gradually move towards more sustainable development through: i) increased legitimacy and authority of education policy and legislation, through clan inclusive zonal parliaments, ii) growing attention and donor technical support for strengthening public revenue and financial management systems, including allocations for education, iii) growing community education council commitment and management capacity, including revenue mobilisation to contribute to school operations and teachers' salaries, iv) better defined education sector plans and targets and embryonic financing strategies and v) increased and better coordinated donor support mobilisation for maintaining and increasing primary education provision, although this is less the case for sector governance, capacity development and post-primary education provision.


Somalia is in an early stage of post-conflict reconstruction in Puntland and Somaliland, with a situation of arrested development, possibly deteriorating in the South Central region. Nevertheless, the development trajectory is slightly upwards, albeit from an extremely low baseline. Service delivery capacity remains very weak, especially in rural and nomadic areas. Despite significant progress in Puntland and Somaliland, the political commitment to education and its financing also remains highly fragile. The non-legitimacy of the TFG and uncertain international status of the three regions is the most serious source of fragility.



**Southern Sudan**<sup>24</sup> (see Annex 9): The drivers of education sector fragility and poor sector performance in Southern Sudan are not just related to decades of civil war and conflict, but have their roots in colonial rule as well. Education policies under the colonial administration differed between the Muslim north and the Christian south. These policies resulted in a widening socio-economic gap and inherent fragility in the education sector in the south, given that education needs could not be met through the limited numbers of government and missionary schools.

The situation was exacerbated by the policies of the northern based government in the years after independence, focused on: i) using the education system to create a unified Sudan with Arab-Islamism as the binding force, ii) seizure of missionary schools in the south and replacement of English with Arabic as the language of instruction and ii) massive under-investment in education in the south and an overall inequitable allocation of resources (see figure 11).

Figure 11: Selected Shares of Government Spending, Southern Sudan



The relative peace in Sudan between 1972 and 1983, following the peace agreement which granted self-government to southern Sudan, did little to address inequities between the regions. Over this inter-war period, the primary GER was only 12% in the south compared to 40% in the north and only 10% and 8% of primary schools and teachers in the country were based in the south (compared to a population share of 28%).

Comparing education indicators at the height of the war years in 1999/2000 with pre-war figures (1980/1981) shows a surprising increase in access to education in south Sudan (for example, primary enrolment more than doubled from 143,000 to 319,000). This improvement occurred during a period when there were limited government resources for education and a complete absence of policy guidance and central authority (see figure 12).

Figure 12: Selected Regional Comparative Development Indicators

Indicator	Southern Sudan	Darfur	Khartoum and Northern Areas	National
Chronic Hunger (% of population)	13.5%	12%	9%	11.3%
Under 5 Mortality (per 1,000 births)	134	110	104	117
% Children receiving 5 yrs of Primary Education	<50%	93%	95%	90%
Adult Literacy	15%	38%	56%	36%

A number of factors contributed to this resilience, including: i) large humanitarian assistance compared with the previous war, including in response to regional famine, as a result of intense and wide spread international pressure, ii) establishing a UN/NGO consortium known as Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) which allowed international assistance to be mobilised towards, inter alia, education in the south and iii) with support under OLS, communities mobilized to open their own primary schools.

<sup>24</sup> See EC, 2009. Somalia Country Report, which is a companion volume to this report.

Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, a number of developments within the sector are beginning to contribute to increased resilience, including: i) the establishment of State Ministries of Education (SMoEs) and County education offices has contributed to more effective coordination within the sector, ii) the adoption of a new GoSS Aid Strategy is contributing to improved alignment and harmonization of development partner support, iii) a focus on priority budget sectors, of which education is one, is supporting joint GoSS and donor medium-term planning and budgeting and iv) increased availability of reliable and comprehensive data is supporting improved targeting of education resources.

Southern Sudan can be characterised as being in a very early stage of post-conflict reconstruction. If the security and political and macro-economic outlook remains positive, the overall sector development trajectory is slightly upwards, but coming from a very low baseline. Service delivery capacity remains high fragile, especially in more remote and nomadic areas. The political commitment to education and its financing is positive, though still fragile compared to security and defence. A substantive role for the government is undermined by extensive localised conflicts over resources, ethnic loyalties and patronage.

## 2.2 Sector Resilience: Hindering and Enabling Factors

**Broad Features of Sector Performance and Resilience:** Sector resilience is assessed through trends in sector performance, especially related to basic education access and participation rates. The status for the eight countries and regions studied is shown in figures 13 and 14 below. Figure 14 assesses the extent of performance disparities and trends in areas in each country which were extensively conflict affected or continue to be so. The country case study reports highlight the specific factors which have enabled or hindered sector resilience as measured through maintaining or improving sector performance indicators.

Figure 13: Overall Sector Performance (Access/Participation)

Sub-sector	Aceh	Cambodia	DRC	Haiti	Lebanon	Liberia	Somalia	Southern Sudan
Primary	ì	è	ì	ì	è	è	ì	ì
Secondary	ì	ì	ì	ì	è	è	ì	ì
Tertiary	ì	ì	ì	ì	ì	ì	ì	ì
High:		Medium:		Low:				
Upward Trend:	ì	Neutral Trend:	è	Downward Trend:	î			

In all countries, participation rates correlate fairly strongly with the peaks and troughs of governance changes, especially in relation to security and political fragility or stability. There is generally an upward trend for primary, secondary and tertiary education access indicators in the early stages of recovery and reconstruction. This begins to allow a pathway of increased education opportunities beyond primary education. However, as the transition towards sector reconstruction and more sustainable development proceeds, it does appear that primary education participation tends to level off (e.g. in Cambodia, Lebanon and Liberia). This seems to be due to a mixture of reasons, including the gradual reduction in overage students, under investment in facilities and decreases in demand as birth rates begin to level off.

Another finding is that, even when participation rates in primary education become comparatively high, the growth in secondary education, skills training and tertiary education is comparatively slow. This is often because of insufficient attention to secondary and tertiary education during the post-conflict reconstruction phase, when both government and donor support focuses mainly on the primary level. Without opportunities for clients and learners (e.g. ex-combatants, under-skilled and under-employed youth) to progress to secondary and tertiary education, there is a potential risk that frustration will lead to recurring political and security instability. This is a particularly sensitive issue because a lack of access to secondary and tertiary education, as an avenue to paid employment, is frequently a historical source of sector fragility (e.g. in Southern Sudan, Liberia and Somalia).

Figure 14: Fragile Area Performance Parity

Sub-sector	Aceh	Cambodia	DRC	Haiti	Lebanon	Liberia	Somalia	Southern Sudan
Primary	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↓	↑	↑
Secondary	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Tertiary	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
High:	Medium:		Low:					
Upward Trend:	↑	Neutral Trend:	↓	Downward Trend:	↑			

In most of the countries and regions studied, the service capacity gaps in more fragile areas (e.g. eastern provinces in DRC, coastal areas in Haiti and the hinterland of Liberia) seem to prevail. It appears to take a prolonged period of post-conflict reconstruction before these severely conflict-affected areas will be equally well served, as was also demonstrated in Cambodia and Aceh.

There appears to be a number of reasons for this phenomenon, including: i) difficulties in restoring services due to destroyed road and education infrastructures, ii) historical lack of robust education administration, iii) very scattered demand in some areas (e.g. Somalia and Southern Sudan), iv) limited interest to fee paying private providers in more rural or fragile areas and v) a tendency of donor/NGO support to initially focus on safer areas. The overall message is that affirmative action in favour of these severely conflict-affected areas is necessary. This can help to provide a sense of a nationwide and equitable peace dividend in the sector.

**Assessment of Enabling and Hindering Factors:** Drawing on the country reports, it was assessed whether three macro economic dimensions and three sectoral dimensions were either strongly enabling, enabling, hindering or strongly hindering. These findings are summarised in figures 15 and 16 below, with the rationale for the assessment set out in the relevant country Annexes 2 - 9.


The number of factors that enable sector resilience, as opposed to being a hindrance, appears to increase when countries are further on the transition from recovery to reconstruction and development (e.g. Aceh and Cambodia). In the countries recently emerging from fragility, enabling factors appear to be more related to those that maintain education service delivery capacity. In these countries, the more macro economic factors are still judged to be hindering or strongly hindering (e.g. Haiti, Liberia and Somalia).

There is frequently little linkage between post fragility sectoral development and broader poverty reduction, peace and political institution building strategy. Even in cases where a broader post-conflict reconstruction strategy has been prepared (e.g. the joint needs assessment in Somalia and IPRSP and PRSP in Liberia), alignment between sectoral development and the broader country

strategy appears to be limited. This constitutes an opportunity missed to use education service restoration as part of peace building efforts.

Sector resilience is frequently enabled by a mix of sources of leadership for sector recovery and reconstruction. Key enabling factors include i) a sustained role of the state in financing education in conflict affected areas (e.g. Aceh), ii) very visible leadership of education system restoration (e.g. from the restored state in Cambodia; from rebel leadership in DRC; from faith-based organisations in


Figure 15: Macro Economic Enabling/Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience



Haiti; and from political groups in Lebanon), and iii) traditional existence of a public-private partnership in education, less affected by deteriorating security and political governance (e.g. in Haiti and DRC). The Diaspora play an important role in helping to maintain and support education provision (e.g. in Lebanon, Somalia and Haiti). Once again, the overall picture of enabling or hindering sector resilience appears to be very country specific.

Improving security governance is a necessary condition for system resilience and/or restoration. However, it does not appear to be a sufficient condition. For example in Aceh and Cambodia, improving political governance through the respective 2007 and 1992 Peace Accords, enabled accelerated post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. The same applies in Southern Sudan and Liberia, with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreements. This is also the case in Somalia, where the three different security and political governance situations in Somaliland (stable), Puntland (comparatively stable) and South Central (unstable) are broadly reflected in the status of education service provision and participation.

Figure 16: Sectoral Enabling/Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience



A common finding across the eight countries and regions studied is that the most important enabling factor for maintaining or restoring education service delivery is a high community value accorded to education participation. This and other factors appear to result in various country adaptations of education sector governance. These sector governance adaptations are best characterised as i) a diversity of sources of financing, ii) a diversity in the range of education service providers, iii) a greater age range and diversity of learners and types of client, and iv) a broad range of sector organisational and management arrangements. The extent of diversity appears to diminish as countries shift from early recovery to sector reconstruction and development.

For example, during periods of fragility there are a variety of financing sources, with communities usually bearing the largest burden. This is evident when parents/households (e.g. in Haiti, DRC and Lebanon) are prepared to pay school fees that frequently constitute a significant proportion of household income. Similarly, communities contribute significantly to the rapid restoration or maintenance of some form of teaching service. These contributions frequently include supplementing government teacher salaries, paying for volunteer teachers and the repair or construction of school infrastructure. Many of the countries studied are facing the challenge of re-establishing state financing of the teaching service and school operational costs during post fragility transition.

Education service delivery is enabled by countries taking the opportunity to crowd in various forms of community or non-state providers. In several instances (e.g. in DRC, Haiti, Liberia and Lebanon), any gaps are filled by non-state providers, especially by faith-based organisations. In countries with a longer historical tradition of public provision (e.g. Cambodia, Aceh and Somalia), the gap in provision is filled by more community based organisations (e.g. school/parent committees). A common challenge is to better regulate these public-private-community partnerships during the sector recovery phase. Another common challenge is to avoid crowding out of these service providers as the role of the state grows during sector reconstruction and development phases.

Another sector governance adaptation during and immediately after fragile situations is a diversity of learners and clients. For example, during early recovery/reconstruction it was found that there is a prevalence of a broad range of, often over-age, students in schools. Positive features of this response are the opportunities for students denied education to return to school and the opportunity for ex-combatants (e.g. in Liberia, Sudan and DRC) to acquire education and skills. Frequently, this takes place through a combination of over-age students in formal schools (e.g. in Cambodia and Liberia) and expansion of non-formal literacy and education programmes. While this provides short-term benefits, it presents a challenge at later stages of sector reconstruction. One challenge is to ensure that the organisation and curriculum of the education system becomes more school-age disaggregated. A second challenge is to adjust sector capacity as over-aged children are phased out.

During fragile situations, management arrangements are adapted to include very localised and community-based management systems. This frequently brings limitations in terms of institutional arrangements (e.g. lack of legislation/regulation) and uncertain organisational and individual capacities to run schools. For example, expansion of private/community providers during a crisis can result in clients/learners not getting value for money, unless the quality of these providers' services is well managed and well regulated. In the case study countries, the existence of such legislation and regulatory arrangement is frequently limited. It is also notable that in some cases, existing legislation/regulation has not been implemented (e.g. in Haiti) and/or came only later in the education reconstruction period (e.g. in Cambodia).

An important operational finding and lesson to be learned is that many of the above phenomena that contribute to sector resilience during fragile situations and that enable early recovery have the potential to become negative legacies and hindering factors for later stages of sector development. For example, an effective balance needs to be struck between 'quick wins' and 'targeted initiatives'

to restore basic education services and longer-term perspectives on system capacity building. If the emergency relief and reconstruction mentality is predominant for too long, parallel service delivery systems (e.g. through NGOs) become entrenched. This can quickly become counter-productive and capacity draining for planning longer-term state-run education service building. The challenge is to set out a clear pathway for transforming CBOs, local NGOs and international organisations, from being agents of service delivery to becoming participants in sector planning, oversight and advocacy.

A related lesson learned is that short-term capacity building or gap filling measures, mainly related to speeding up service delivery, can leave longer-term negative legacies. Any necessary short-term measures need to be linked to a longer-term perspective which addresses institutional reform (e.g. regulation and systems) and organisational incentives to change. For example, there is a tendency to keep external assistance off budget, especially during relief/early reconstruction. This can in itself result in longer-term PFM capacity draining and, as such, constitute a missed opportunity for building up commitment to strengthening sector PFM capabilities.

A lesson learned is that putting in place sustainable teacher management and financing systems is critical for the transition from fragility to resilience and system sustainability. While under qualified volunteer teachers can help restore the system, this cadre can quickly become a less positive asset, unless regular in-service teacher education and restored pre-service teacher education measures are put in place. Another lesson is that there is a potential conflict of interest for education administrators and teachers when formal remuneration replaces informal arrangements (e.g. in DRC, Haiti and Cambodia). In many of the countries and regions there has been insufficient education administration and teaching service succession planning for teachers recruited during fragile situations.

In conclusion, a very important lesson learned is that a number of key governance actions can help to transform the positive legacies of fragile situations into positive factors in sector reconstruction and development. These 'transformational governance actions', especially related to institutional and organisational arrangements for more sustainable sector financing, service provision and management/accountability arrangements, have the potential to create a virtuous circle during development transition. However, these key 'transformational governance actions' need to be better understood, in order to select appropriate governance development priorities in specific country contexts. Equally, selecting and addressing related challenges in a comprehensive and not piece-meal way, during the early stages of sector recovery, is critical. Currently, sector governance planning and development unfortunately tends to be left to later stages of sector reconstruction and development.

Another lesson learned is that the correlation between political, security and even sector governance and education access, quality and equity is not fully understood. One reason is that historical data on education quality and equity indicators is not regularly collected during periods of country fragility. This Study has contributed in a preliminary way but this area of analysis needs to be further developed. For example, most of the block grant schemes are non-conditional and access related financing mechanisms have a limited focus on sector quality and equity results and outcomes. Similarly, little is known about the impact of these various block grant arrangements on school organisation and/or beneficiary group (e.g. school committees) accountability.



## 3 Analysing and Addressing Governance in Education

### 3.1 Sector Governance Assessment

Governance challenges in the education sector in the eight country cases studies were examined against the 7 criteria of assessment defined within the EC's Sector Policy Support Programme Guidelines (SPSP).<sup>25</sup> These are: i) sector policy/strategy processes, ii) budget and expenditure management processes, iii) sector coordination and management processes, iv) institutional setting and capacity, v) performance monitoring systems, vi) macro-economic frameworks and vii) PFM processes. Reference to the 'country profiles' held in Annexes 2-9 provides a more detailed explanation of the different governance features which were assessed in each case study.

#### Sector Policy/Strategy:

The four governance features assessed were:

- Transparency of policy making processes
- Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes
- Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes
- Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes

Throughout the case studies, it was possible to examine some of the particular experiences, challenges and opportunities with regard to strategy/policy development in the education sector. The degree of stakeholder inclusiveness and transparency of the strategic planning process has been quite variable across the eight cases examined. However, in most instances, the roles for the civil service ministry, community stakeholders and parents, appears to have been largely for validation of the strategy, rather than for defining policy prioritisation or decision making. Overall, in most of the Study countries, robust governance mechanisms for sector policy formulation, even in the least fragile cases, are significantly underdeveloped. In a few cases, the legitimacy and authority of education strategies have been strongly enhanced through greater engagement and approval of parliamentary authorities and finance ministries (e.g. in Aceh, Southern Sudan and Somaliland).

Early formulation of an interim operational plan for the sector is increasingly recognised as an important first step towards longer term policy/strategy development. For example, it took almost 15 years post-early conflict in Aceh and Cambodia before a sector plan was formulated (see box 1). In the other Study countries, the timeframe has been much shorter, especially in Liberia and Southern Sudan where sector plans have been formulated within five years following the formal conflict resolution processes. A key factor in enabling a robust realistic sector plan is the availability of education baseline statistics. In Southern Sudan, Puntland and Somaliland recent efforts have been made to obtain education statistics and to set up education management information systems, which have significantly enabled sector plan and policy formulation.

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<sup>25</sup> Support to Sector Programmes. Covering the three financing modalities: Sector Budget Support, Pool Funding and EC project procedures. ([http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Support-to--Sector-Programmes\\_short\\_27072007\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Support-to--Sector-Programmes_short_27072007_en.pdf))

To be effective, any education plan needs legitimacy and authority. In Haiti, Lebanon and DRC, several efforts have been made over the past 20 years; however, these appear to not have been very effective because key stakeholders (e.g. private sector foundations) were not sufficiently involved in the formulation process.

Visible and robust national leadership of plan formulation, as opposed to 'donor driven' processes, is a crucial element of an authoritative sector plan, particularly in terms of attracting domestic and external financing. Good examples are the Aceh strategic planning process and Somaliland, where donors have successfully engaged with the national parliament in formulating sector legislation, strategy and budgeting processes.

**Box 1: Aceh Education Strategic Plan Process, 2007**

Recognising the need to accelerate transition from post-tsunami reconstruction, the provincial Governor instituted a task force, managed by Provincial Education Council. Ten task forces were established with formal mandates from the Governor to formulate new Aceh education sector priorities. These groups were broadly based, including representatives from Governor's Office, Finance and Planning Departments, MONE and MORA technical staff, university rectors and professors, school principals and the private sector.

Nevertheless, it is recognised that putting in place appropriate governance arrangements for sector policy/strategy development should be carefully sequenced to avoid delays in service

delivery improvements. Equally, medium term policy/strategy development needs to take place in parallel with simple, realistic and affordable operational plans designed to 'get things moving'. There is a growing tendency in sector strategies to set 'service standards' (e.g. minimum service standards in Indonesia) during early recovery/transition phases. In doing so, it has to be recognised that the results chain between service standards and inputs mix is fairly complex. When a standard setting approach is adopted, such standards need to be as realistic, enforceable and affordable, as when using more traditional approach of access and quality targets.

### Budget and Expenditure Management:

The four governance features assessed were:

- Donor accountability mechanisms
- Timeliness of donor pledging
- Inclusiveness of budgetary processes
- Budget influence on policy making

In most countries and regions studied, governance processes for ensuring that there are strong links between budget and policy are largely underdeveloped. Inclusiveness of the budget process is often restricted to education and finance ministry consultations with little involvement of other stakeholders (e.g. private providers, sub-national level government, parents' associations and diaspora) in budget prioritisation.

The timeliness and accountability of donor support within the budget process is frequently disappointing. It appears to be more effective when donors constitute a significant source of finance (e.g. in Cambodia and Southern Sudan) and when joint sector coordination groups have been setup early and are properly supported.



The tendency of donors to keep support 'off budget' in early recovery/reconstruction often undermines mutual accountability processes and reduces government's incentives to press for more timely donor programming and reporting calendars. A large percentage of external assistance for education is 'off budget' in Somalia, DRC, Haiti and Liberia, which undermines the transparency and realism of overall medium-term sector expenditure frameworks and annual sector budget plans. In Liberia, a particular constraint is that the conditions of the HIPC debt relief programme demand an annual cash-based budget process. This was found to have, to some extent, undermined incentives to move towards multi-year budgeting.

Progress with putting in place the necessary governance arrangements for effective and sustainable education financing, from a range of sources, has been variable. In the case of Aceh and Cambodia, regulatory arrangements for predictable government financing are broadly in place. In Liberia and Southern Sudan, where governments are financing school block grants and teacher salaries respectively, regulatory and accountability mechanisms are still embryonic. In the case of DRC, Haiti and Lebanon, extensive private sector financing is insufficiently reflected in sector expenditure frameworks. In Somaliland, engagement of parliamentary groups, the finance ministry and the education ministry enables a more inclusive sector budget planning processes.

Nevertheless, the key 'transformational governance actions' and challenges for any emerging budget process during early recovery/reconstruction is to ensure that all sources of financing from the state, communities, non-state actors, donors and the diaspora are incorporated into a single medium-term and annual sector financing plan and budget. A good example of this approach is the Cambodia and Aceh education sector financing strategy and plans, developed through coordinated government/donor sector working groups. The Southern Sudan 'budget sector working groups' constitute an important opportunity to embed a strongly authoritative and inclusive budgeting approach, in parallel to the approval of new PFM legislation which has been submitted to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly.

### Sector Coordination and Management:

The four governance features assessed were:

- Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders
- Extent of donor influence on sector coordination arrangements
- Extent of networking with other key ministries
- Centred/decentralised coordination arrangements

Across the countries studied, 'inclusiveness' of sector coordination appears to be highest in Cambodia and Southern Sudan, and lowest in Haiti and Lebanon. The existence of coherent education decentralisation policies and plans broadly correlates with greater involvement of local education authorities in sector coordination. Sector coordination and networking arrangements with other key ministries are limited in most of the Study countries. As indicated earlier, donor influence on sector coordination arrangements correlates fairly strongly with their proportion of education financing/support. An important observation is that in those countries where the role of the private sector is extensive or predominant (e.g. in Haiti, DRC and Lebanon) this does not appear to result in a seat at the sector coordination table.

A number of challenges are evident for improved sector coordination/management in fragile situations. Firstly, in the context of political instability or insecurity and frequently under-developed economic governance, there is little incentive for cross-ministry and other stakeholder communication (e.g. in Somalia and DRC). In some cases, even with political will, the private sector is difficult for the government to 'organise' (e.g. in Haiti). Another potential constraint was defined as the 'relief mentality' of national and international NGOs, for whom sector coordination is sometimes perceived to be at the cost of supporting urgent service delivery needs.

In more decentralised contexts, local/regional sector coordination capacity is critical. In the countries studied, there was little evidence of donor involvement in supporting a link between national, regional and local government sector coordination. However, a potentially promising example is Indonesia, where the government/donor education sector working group has been supporting provincial level sector coordination capacity improvement in Aceh, Papua and West Papua provinces, though not nationwide.

The country studies have highlighted initiatives such as 'school block grants' in Aceh, Cambodia and Liberia, national school fee reduction policy in DRC and education grants to teachers (for their children) in Lebanon. A common challenge, as yet insufficiently addressed, is the development of information/communication strategies. Such strategies would help to better alert parents and other community stakeholders of revised policies, regulations compliance and mutual accountability arrangements using a range of technologies, including radio/television outlets and dissemination of information leaflets and posters (see box 2).

#### Box 2: Evidence of the Importance of Demand-Side Approaches, Cambodia

In 2002, MoEYS abolished the start of year registration fees (amounting to US\$ 0.5 per annum) for primary and junior secondary schools. Parents were informed that school operational budgets would ensure that schools had sufficient running costs. A parallel nationwide information campaign reminded parents that there was no need to pay this traditional fee. The impact of the programme was immediate, with primary and junior secondary enrolment rising by around 25% over one year.

### Institutional Setting and Capacity:

The three governance features assessed were:

- Extent to which sector organisations are internally client oriented
- Extent to which sector organisations are externally client oriented
- Extent to which sector organisations are influenced by external actors

The overall finding is that in the countries studied, sector organisations tend to be internally client oriented. In other words, internal central education ministry concerns become the predominant consideration. As a result, mechanisms to better inform other stakeholder groups to understand their education rights and responsibilities (e.g. parents) do not appear to be a priority.

There are a number of good examples of NGOs and CBOs helping to set up such mechanisms with external stakeholders and acting as a bridge with government. However, it is notable that, in study countries where NGO/CBO roles are significant (e.g. in Somalia and DRC) their efforts have tended to

focus on filling gaps in service delivery, as opposed to setting up externally oriented information systems. A key 'transformation governance action' and challenge will be to develop pathways for a transition of NGOs/CBOs from service delivery to a more external oversight/watchdog role, or alternatively to better delineate and support NGOs/CBOs to fulfil these different functions.

A number of important system capacity development issues arose from country studies, especially related to: i) ALPs for ex-combatants, internally displaced peoples and young people denied access to education during periods of conflict, ii) alternative strategies to restore school infrastructure and iii) regulating public private partnerships, especially where private capacity is significant. Progress on addressing governance issues related to these system development and implementation capacity issues has been variable.

For example, in Somalia, DRC, Liberia and Southern Sudan, ALPs are extensive and they address the needs of various target groups. Progress has been impressive in developing system capacity to implement these programmes, frequently with extensive donor support. While ALPs constitute an education access opportunity, a number of sector governance issues appear not to be sufficiently addressed. A key governance challenge is to better mainstream ALPs into medium term sector reconstruction plans and avoid the establishment of ALPs which substitute the need for formal education provision. An interesting example is Somaliland, where efforts to build in mainstreaming and sustainability are part of a separate and specific alternative education program design and implementation plan (see box 3).

**Box 3: Alternative Education : Alpha Ujuvi, DRC and Somaliland, Somalia**

DRC : The Alpha Ujuvi Collective, a local education and protection foundation, was founded in 2002. Initially it provided technical support to the existing government-run catch-up classes (cours de rattrapage) for children whose education had been disrupted by the conflict. Later on, Alpha Ujuvi developed a formal curriculum for an ALP in collaboration with the Provincial Inspectors and UNICEF, targeting children who have never been to school. The Programme is designed so that children can sit the TENAFEP at the end. Alpha Ujuvi also supports Literacy Centers in the Kivus which particularly target the many illiterate adults in the provinces. Such grassroots initiatives have contributed to building the resilience of the education system where the Ministry has lacked resources as well as capacity to intervene in the conflict-affected East.

Somaliland : In 40 sites across 3 regions of Somaliland, Save the Children has been addressing the very low enrolment rates in formal primary education by piloting five different modes of delivery of alternative approaches. These offer a number of advantages over 'formal' schools: attendance is initially free, although after the first year the communities make a progressively greater contribution to the costs; they are closer to the communities and in the case of the mobile schools the school moves with the population; teaching takes place at a time which suits the community; teachers mostly come from the community; there is a condensed curriculum; the methodology is more active and stimulating. The proportion of girls enrolled in the sites is higher than in the formal schools. The projects have built the capacity of Regional Education Officers (REOs) and some Ministry staff and there is clearly now a commitment to address the issue of children out of school, especially in nomadic communities, as part of efforts to achieve EFA.

Restoring school infrastructure has been a key feature of relief efforts in post-tsunami Aceh, post conflict reconstruction efforts in Cambodia, Liberia and Southern Sudan and post-hurricane Haiti. The speed and efficiency with which school infrastructure programmes have been implemented has depended on the design and construction approach, the capacity of local construction companies, the capacity of government and implementers to manage the different phases of the process and the different contracting modalities available. In many countries, the opportunity to build on a tradition of community based approaches has been marginalised, replaced by costly and often much

slower private contractor approaches. There is strong evidence of 'political impetus' whereby provision of costly concrete schools becomes linked to the legitimatisation of political leaders and demand for peace dividend, even when more cost effective models would expand access more quickly.

A general finding is that a balance needs to be struck between the 'quick wins' of community-based approaches, using local materials, which can create additional school places quickly and cheaply, and measures to assure high quality and longer-lasting school facilities with lower annual maintenance costs. The challenge is to ensure that an assessment of implementation approaches as well as cost-benefit analysis are included in the choice of modalities, incorporating not just the cost-effectiveness and sustainability of alternative approaches, but also the implications and impact on school/community governance and capacity building opportunities.

Many of the country studies highlight the importance of community and private sector organisations as part of the sector's resilience and capacity, both during and after conflict. Particular examples are community education councils in Somalia and faith based and for-profit organisations in DRC, Haiti and Lebanon. There is an opportunity to maintain this diversity as part of 'national capacity', to avoid a tendency for replacement by public provision when fragility recedes and the importance of government's roles increases. Measures to optimise this capacity have been broadly disappointing, due to: i) unwillingness or limited capacity to effectively regulate these organisations, ii) a tendency of governments to create public-private competition rather than partnerships and iii) insufficiently developed financing strategies to ensure that where alternatives are not available, poorer families also have access to fee paying private providers.

#### Performance Monitoring Systems:

The four governance features assessed were:

- Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)
- Availability of sector results framework
- Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms
- Availability of sector performance data

The availability of sector performance data and, as a result, its use for enabling greater government/donor accountability is very variable across the eight countries and regions studied. Notably, it is accorded comparatively significant attention in Lebanon and Southern Sudan, although this does not always appear to result in more inclusive sector performance monitoring systems.

Results oriented sector monitoring frameworks are variable, being the least developed in DRC, Haiti and Liberia. According early priority to setting up and supporting robust education management information systems (EMIS) has occurred in Aceh, Cambodia, Liberia, Southern Sudan and Somaliland. This does appear to broadly correlate with a more inclusive engagement in both sector planning and budgeting, including a stronger donor involvement. In addition, in Southern Sudan, Somaliland and Liberia, donor support for a nationwide EMIS has also enabled the formulation of a preliminary sector strategy (see box 4). Taking EMIS development to the next level, in terms of ensuring that sector performance data enable the identification of indicators, the setting of targets

and a more fully integrated 'performance monitoring system' for accountability, is not well evidenced in most of the country studies.

**Box 4: Establishing a Functioning Education Management Information System (EMIS) in Liberia**

The Ministry of Education, with support from donors, embarked on the first post-war education census in 2005/06. This data has never been formally published due to ongoing data quality issues which the MoE is still attempting to resolve. Learning from the 2005/06 experience the Ministry conducted a second post-war census in 2007/08, the results of which were published, widely distributed and which are now being extensively used.

The EMIS 2007/08 was a highly collaborative effort, led by the Ministry and included: i) donor funding for equipment and materials procurement and provision of incentives to enumerators and data entry staff, ii) the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS) assisted with questionnaire design and preliminary analysis of data, iii) the National Information Management Centre (NIMAC) led the development of the EMIS database, iv) Monrovia Consolidated School System (MCSS) pilot tested the questionnaire and v) United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) assisted by airlifting staff and instruments/questionnaires used for the census to various hard-to-reach areas around the country.

In the formulation of the Aceh education strategic plan, early analysis and dissemination of district disaggregated access and quality performance indicators was used extensively to raise engagement with local government and local parliamentary groups. It also helped to inform the planning and implementation of the performance related block grant system. Similarly, the gradual improvement of EMIS in Cambodia from the late eighties fostered initial dialogue between government, donors and NGOs and provided the basis for an

annual government education sector performance report from 1999. This has since been central to the government/NGO/donor dialogue during the annual joint sector performance review process.

**Macro-Economic Framework:** The linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning appears weakest in the most fragile countries. The relative prioritisation of education for government financing appears to be more influenced by political considerations than fiscal ones. One frequent consequence of this (e.g. in Somalia and Southern Sudan) is a focus on security governance and defence spending at the cost of much needed increases in social sector spending. For example in Southern Sudan, spending on the rule of law and security sectors amounts to around 40% of public expenditure, roughly eight times that for education.

In a number of cases, the fact that development partners advocated for a 'public expenditure review' (PER) (e.g. as in DRC, Haiti, Lebanon) has strengthened dialogue and actions which better link macro economics with sector expenditure planning. This can help to promote the formulation of a medium-term expenditure framework, with sectoral disaggregation and spending priorities. Efforts to put private education financing and donor education sector support 'on budget', as part of sector MTEF formulation has been largely underdeveloped in the case study countries. An unforeseen consequence of this is that it may allow governments to accord priority use of national revenues to other sectors (e.g. in Somalia and Liberia). Nevertheless, the challenge in fragile situations will be to ensure that any MTEF type framework is comparatively simple, understandable and realistic within the medium-term fiscal outlook. Similarly, the priority in fragile situations is to ensure coherence between policy priorities, operational plans and budgets.

A related issue is that in the countries studied, there is frequently a balancing act, sometimes a tension, between emerging economic recovery and growth strategies. This may include balancing

enabling growth of the private sector with increased social sector/education spending (e.g. Lebanon, Somalia and Cambodia). For example, in Cambodia, economic growth and private sector development was accorded high priority throughout the nineties. Increased education spending since 2000 is directly linked to improved private sector tax revenue collection. The political and development dynamics of these decisions in fragile situations is not fully understood and worth more analysis and research.

**Public Financial Management:** An overall finding is that robust PFM systems are better developed in those countries further on the development transition towards sustainable development (e.g. Aceh, Cambodia and, Lebanon). In the remainder, the urgency of improving service delivery capacity appears to often take priority over PFM system development. There is a strong argument for moving PFM system development further along the early reconstruction/development agenda, including a greater focus on internal and external audit development. This may need to be done selectively to avoid overstretching of the system capacity, through an initial focus on improving teacher remuneration and management policies. Teacher pay frequently constitutes one-half to two-thirds

**Box 5: Implementing a New Education Payroll System, Southern Sudan**

The MoEST began a teacher payroll management reform programme in March 2008 with a country wide teacher head count. The head count was implemented with support from the MoFEP managed Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF) and was the first step towards establishing an accurate and effective teacher payroll management system.

Armed with the results of the head count, the Ministry has been able to clean the payroll and from mid 2009 all states have begun using the system. The implementation of the system has focused on a number of capacity development initiatives, including: a) developing a cadre of skilled analysts within the MoEST payroll unit, b) training of payroll managers within SMOEs by MoEST payroll unit staff and c) provision of ICT equipment to support the new system.

The new system is already beginning to pay dividends. It has been determined that the conditional grants used to fund the salaries budget should be funding 24,000 teachers as opposed to the currently budgeted for 33,000. It is anticipated that the identification of these 9,000 largely unclassified staff members will support rationalisation of the payroll and allow full payment of salaries to verified teachers.

of spending on public servant salaries. This is the selective approach being adopted in the Southern Sudan and DRC through the mechanisation of teacher payment systems (see box 5).

A potentially useful interim strategy, adopted in Liberia and Southern Sudan is the initial outsourcing of some PFM functions. However, there is a risk that if these interim strategies are prolonged, the impetus for setting national systems

could be undermined. For example, in Southern Sudan, a recent evaluation of contracting out suggests that the benefits have been uncertain and greater attention needs to be paid to improving government capacity to procure and manage contracting services, alongside a clear exit strategy.<sup>26</sup>

Overall progress in building robust macro and sectoral PFM and civil service reform has been mainly disappointing and more encouraging only in those countries further down the sector development transition. In Aceh and Cambodia, a robust PFM legislative and regulatory framework is in place, and being advanced in Lebanon. In Haiti and DRC, recent PERs and PEFAs have helped provide a PFM/PSM roadmap, but government commitment to its implementation is uncertain. In the remaining countries, other incentives for accelerating PFM reforms exist – through HIPC triggers in

<sup>26</sup> F. Davis, 2009. Contracting out Government Functions and Services in Southern Sudan.



Liberia, public expenditure approvals in Somalia and accessing alternative forms of aid in Southern Sudan – though yet to be fully acted upon.

Overall, only limited progress has been made on integrating sector reforms and targets into broader PFM and PSM reform initiatives, with PFM and PSM targets (e.g. for remuneration/pensions of teachers) often omitted from sector results frameworks. A notable exception is Cambodia where the Ministry of Education is acting as a lead ministry in implementing PFM and PSM reforms. Another example of emerging good practice is harmonised donor support in Somalia, especially in Puntland and Somaliland, for strengthening both central finance and education ministries in macro and sectoral budget planning and cost analysis. The growing prevalence of school block grants potentially provides a useful avenue for linking accountability and PFM reforms, but essential accountability mechanisms and regulatory frameworks are underdeveloped.

In most of the countries studied, significant progress has been made in more predictable government financing of the teaching service. In the case of Aceh, Cambodia, DRC, Liberia and Southern Sudan and Somalia, governments are paying for the majority of teachers, in some cases within some private schools (e.g. in DRC and Southern Sudan). However, a common feature in some post-conflict situations is for teaching service appointments to be used as part of a political settlement and patronage (e.g. in Lebanon, Southern Sudan and DRC) and as part of a social welfare/protection strategy. Frequently, this results in overstaffing and appointment of under qualified staff, unless effective checks and controls are in place.

A related issue is that the tradition of communities paying teachers during fragile situations results in a range of teacher salary top-ups being retained even after governments begin to pay salaries (e.g. in DRC, Cambodia and Somalia). A key 'transformational governance action' and challenge is to set admission standards for the teaching service and restore or set up appropriate teacher development

#### Box 6: Strengthening Capacity of Teacher Training (SCOTT), Somalia

The SCOTT programme has addressed an immediate need across all three zones: the training of the largely untrained cadre of primary teachers. It has done so by utilising existing structures (the education departments of the universities) and using school holiday periods for in-service training, and has achieved considerable success in terms of putting teacher education issues firmly on the Ministries' agenda. There have been serious implementation problems, mostly a result of an over-optimistic assumption of the services that could be provided by the universities which were themselves in an early stage of development. But all partners have persevered and the foundations of a fully comprehensive teacher development programme can be visualized.

programs. These need to be part of an overall regulatory and quality assurance process for the teaching service. A good example of restoring teacher development programs is Somalia, despite difficult circumstances (see box 6).

In general, sector specific strategies in support of broader government PFM and PSM are not well understood and frequently considered too late to be part of an

early recovery strategy. Equally, incorporating specific and sequenced PFM and PSM targets and indicators in the sector strategies of the countries studied is limited. A challenge will be to develop an approach that can stimulate and provide incentives for building the capacity of government PFM system through 'learning by doing'.



## 3.2 Sector Actors and Stakeholders

### Role and Importance of Selected Actors and Interest Groups:

The Actors assessed were:

- Development partners
- Community providers
- Local government
- National government

The Interest Groups assessed were:

- Diaspora
- Citizens (students/parents)
- Frontline providers
- Public-private partnerships

The mapping of sector actors and stakeholders for each country was done against a number of indicators within 4 dimensions, consisting of: i) the role and importance of selected actors, ii) the role and importance of selected interest groups, iii) the nature of education governance mechanisms (e.g. hierarchical, patrimonial) and iv) an assessment of accountability relations and mechanisms.

The role and importance of selected actors, especially with regard to education service delivery, appears, in general, more diverse in those countries which are at earlier stages of transition into more sustainable sector development and currently more fragile. For example, in Liberia, Southern Sudan and Somalia, frontline community providers (e.g. community education councils in Somalia) are equally, if not more important, than government in terms of service delivery capacity. In the case of DRC, Haiti and Lebanon, this diversity is maintained through a flourishing and influential private sector.

In the more Francophone countries, there has been a stronger tradition of community/private provision and fee paying. This means that historically the role of the government/state has been less dominant. In the case of Aceh and Cambodia, which have had a strong tradition of public provision, the reconstruction/development transition effort has essentially focused on restoring the role and importance of government.

The role and importance of various interest groups broadly mirrors this analysis. For example, in countries with traditionally extensive public provision, the role and importance of private providers, the Diaspora and citizens/student groups are limited (e.g. in Aceh and Cambodia). Interestingly, in these two countries, this is beginning to change with the rapid growth of private run TVET and higher education organisations. On the contrary, the role and importance of private providers and the Diaspora in Haiti, DRC, Lebanon and Somalia is very significant, especially through remittances paying for school fees. While the interests of the Diaspora and private sector converge, the actual importance of the Diaspora appears to be limited, almost always indirectly or directly delegating its influence to in-country private education foundations.

Although the actual interests of citizens/students is very strong (e.g. attending good schools), their importance appears to be limited due to the absence of mechanisms and organisations to effectively resonate their interests. A notable exception is DRC which has well organised bodies (e.g. ANAPECO, COPA), although the strength of their voice is still questionable. Similarly, apart from the DRC and Haiti, where teachers unions are both powerful and influential, mainly in terms of remuneration and conditions of service, the role and importance of teachers' bodies appears limited in the countries studied.

While the role and importance of national government in all countries studied is either extensive or significant, the importance of local governments is more variable. Local government is very influential in Aceh and Southern Sudan, much less so in the remaining Study countries. A key factor in enabling a strong voice for local government is a well defined decentralisation policy, linked to robust fiscal and revenue generation and transfer mechanisms. In DRC and Haiti, decentralisation policies are embryonic, but national government commitment to an implementation timetable is uncertain. Delegated authority to manage the teaching service only exists in the case of Aceh and Southern Sudan.

An assessment of the progress made by countries with macro economic governance was made against four dimensions consisting of: i) various actors, authority and accountability mechanisms, ii) building government capacity (e.g. PFM and PSM), iii) the shifting role of NGOs and CBOs from delivery to planning, oversight and advocacy and iv) donor support and strengthening government capacity and accountability.

As highlighted above, generally the early recovery/ reconstruction phase provides an opportunity to broaden the role of the state (as opposed to government) by engaging with a range of non-state actors. In order to progress this opportunity, a coherent governance framework is required. Overall, across the eight countries, progress has been rather disappointing. In Aceh, the authority and legitimacy of provincial and district governments in holding other actors to account has been progressed, less so in Cambodia where the elected commune councils are underutilised.

According to the case study reports, there has been some promising progress in Haiti and DRC to better coordinate and regulate the government-private sector relationship, but the uncertain authority of the government is a constraint. In the other countries, government coordination of relief/recovery efforts through formal mechanisms (e.g. the Paris 3 government/donor coordination process in Lebanon) has helped progress government legitimacy and authority. However, patrimonial traditions constitute a constraint on government exercising authority, especially in Somalia and Southern Sudan. The least progress appears to have been made, in all study countries, in putting in place robust mechanisms for mutual accountability for education services.

In most countries, there has been encouraging progress in both education NGO and CBO groupings in establishing formal organisations and associations. For example, in Haiti and DRC and Lebanon private education foundations are becoming more self regulatory. In Somalia, Southern Sudan and Liberia, NGO groups are becoming better organised, though still mainly for coordinating service delivery capacity building and working with community groups. In Cambodia, there has been a formal NGO education partnership for many years, with a mandate to engage in sector reform consultations with donors and government. However, as highlighted earlier, only little progress appears to have been made in transforming these NGO/CBO responsibilities into a greater focus on sector planning, oversight and advocacy roles. This constitutes a missed opportunity, given the limited oversight capacity (e.g. parliament, external audit) in many of the countries, with the exception of Aceh and Lebanon.

## Education Sector Governance/ Accountability Mechanisms:

The Education Governance Mechanisms assessed were:

- Governance by hierarchy
- Patrimonial governance
- Market governance
- Voluntary network governance

The Accountability Relations and Mechanisms assessed were:

- Capacity for governance and accountability
- Accountability set-up and responsibility
- Responsiveness of governance
- Information about and clarity of governance

The nature of the education sector governance across the eight countries studied is variable. In all eight countries, there is at least a significant degree of hierarchical governance, mainly through powerful national or local governments. In the case of Aceh, the source is a growing central/local government compact. For Cambodia, Southern Sudan and Liberia, this is reinforced through a strong government/donor compact.

Patrimonial and, to some degree voluntary network governance is more apparent in Somalia, Southern Sudan and Liberia through political, ethnic and clan based loyalties. In the case of Lebanon, the patrimony derives from 'confessionalism', which formalizes power sharing across political and religious dimensions. In Haiti, DRC and Lebanon, the strong influence of faith based institutions, often set up as education foundations with extensive political and service delivery reach, reinforce a combination of patrimonial/voluntary governance. A number of the country reports (e.g. Somalia, Lebanon and Haiti) highlight the significant tensions between these various sources of governance.

The degree of tension between these various sources of governance appears to be influenced by the clarity of the rules of the game. A reported tension between government and patrimonial loyalties appears to correlate with a lack of clarity and information over the rules of the game and lack of

### 7: Regulating Education Market Governance, Haiti

The absence of clear or worthwhile benefits from being accredited encourages non-public providers to ignore government education regulations and accreditation standards. The fact that only a minority of non-public elementary and secondary schools are accredited by the education ministry (MENFP) means it is impossible to enforce and maintain standards across all schools, which has a negative impact on non-public providers' accountability to children and parents and to the Ministry. Recent legislation providing for the creation of a new school accreditation agency (ONAPE) is a potentially step forward.

clear regulations and government organisational compliance capacity. Market governance, through the private sector providers, is also extensive in a number of the Study countries (e.g. in DRC, Lebanon and Haiti). The primary challenge is to

establish a regulatory framework that provides sufficient incentives for private providers to engage. A related challenge is to establish organisational arrangements and capacity within the education ministries, to ensure regulatory compliance and quality assurance. Efforts in this direction are being made in Haiti with generally disappointing results (see box 7).

Even when appropriate sector legislation and regulations are issued, a common feature is underdeveloped systems to inform stakeholders of the implications and compliance measures. In some instances (e.g. in Aceh and Cambodia) legislative and regulatory arrangements have come comparatively late in the development transition, relying heavily on operational guidelines. The

legacy is that of a 'high degree of discretion' in complying with such guidelines, which have traditionally lacked legitimacy and authority. In the case of Southern Sudan, which has attempted to introduce legislation relatively early in the development cycle, the constraint appears to be primarily one of over reliance on legislation, despite substantial delays in enactment and state education ministry capacity to ensure compliance.

A common feature in all countries, apart from Aceh, appears to be limited progress in putting in place appropriate accountability arrangements and governance capacity. Internal and external audit regulations in the education sector are generally underdeveloped. Similarly, the role of parliamentary select committees, where they exist as an independent watchdog or with an oversight function, is underdeveloped. Similarly, organisational capacity for internal/external audit within government is a work in progress in most of the Study countries, apart from Aceh, Cambodia and Lebanon.

A growing feature in many of the countries is the introduction of various forms of school block grants managed by school principals (e.g. through priority action program in Cambodia, BOS in Aceh, FACPEL in Liberia and national school fees policy in DRC). To a large extent, an opportunity has been missed to use such initiatives as a vehicle for more results oriented accountability between various levels of government and between frontline providers and school committees, due to poor defined regulations and information on financing formula and on school level results oriented mutual accountability mechanisms.

Donor agencies are important actors in many of the Study countries. Currently, there is a diverse mix of aid instruments and modalities being used in the Study countries, including technical assistance, project support and various forms of pooled or trust funds (e.g. multi-donor trust funds, EFA FTI). There are pooled fund arrangements in Aceh (post-tsunami reconstruction), Cambodia (as part of Education For All FTI support) and sectoral multi-donor trust funds in Haiti, Liberia and, particularly, Southern Sudan. The diversity of aid modalities/instruments and aid harmonisation arrangements (e.g. pooled funds) present a number of challenges in terms of coordination, implementation strategy and ensuring support for sector governance and accountability development. In the case of pooled funding arrangements, one challenge is to ensure that support programs are coordinated, prioritised and aligned with country education strategic priorities. A second challenge is to set up

**Box 8: Ensuring Local Governance of the Post-Tsunami Reconstruction Effort, Aceh**

The national and Aceh government set up a reconstruction and rehabilitation agency (BRR), with minister level leadership and located in Banda Aceh. Key findings of recent evaluations highlight the following : i) the use of a BRR one-stop shop for project approval over a short time frame provided an incentive for donors/NGOs to use government systems rather than parallel ones; ii) the multi donor trust fund (MDTF) provided an effective mechanism for integrating donor support into the BRR led process; and iii) the prompt action to formulate an Aceh ESP, involving participation of BRR staff helped facilitate the transition from education emergency relief/rehabilitation/construction into more sustainable sector development.

pooled funding in such a way that country governance and accountability systems are supported and enabled, ensuring legitimacy and authority of country decision making and accountability for fund use. A promising example is the Aceh post-tsunami multi-

donor trust fund, with minister-level leadership and program approval authority, using a 'one-stop shop' for project approval that encouraged the use of government systems (see box 8). A related challenge is to ensure that country governments and donors are mutually accountable for results

through joint program monitoring reviews. A key consideration is the location of the organisation and management of the pooled funding arrangement, preferably within or under the umbrella of a specific government organisation, in order to signal government accountability.

In the Study countries, there frequently is a proliferation of various forms of project support. The challenge is to ensure that these projects are aligned with an agreed set of country priority programs and results, alongside building up country system capacity to select, screen and govern the program. An important measure to help mitigate such risk is to ensure that these projects (either discreet ones or through MDTFs) are on budget, with designated education ministry program managers required to report on results. Promising examples are the governance and management arrangements for the Cambodia EFA FTI support.

In all of the Study countries, there is an extensive range of technical assistance for both program implementation, planning and country system capacity development. A particular challenge is to put in place mechanisms that ensure effective country governance and accountability for the performance of technical assistance through setting clear and monitorable outcomes/outputs and through ensuring that sector managers are responsible for both selection and performance monitoring. Otherwise, there is a risk that technical assistance will assume line sector ministry responsibilities and potentially undermine sector ministry governance/accountability arrangements.

Encouragingly, in all the countries studied, donor support is giving significant priority to strengthening government capacity for greater accountability, especially through macro and sectoral PFM reforms. For example, in Aceh, Cambodia, Liberia and Lebanon, there is extensive TA support at both central agency and sector agency levels. Nevertheless, a common challenge is to ensure that donor support focuses on building up government capacity, at both national and sub-national levels, rather than providing gap filling TA or allowing contracting to continue for too long, because these short-term capacity building benefits carry the risk of becoming capacity draining in the long-term. Once again, it is critical that sector governance capacity and accountability targets are formally built into both national and sectoral development plans which currently they are not. There are encouraging signs of improved harmonisation of donor support in these areas (e.g. the PFM reform in Cambodia, GEMAP in Liberia), frequently initiated through PERs and PEFAs. The extent to which these initiatives are government led or donor driven is variable.

## 4 Conclusions and Recommendations

### 4.1 Main Issues and Conclusions

**Programme Planning and Design Considerations.** Recognition of the importance of analysing and addressing governance challenges in sector operations in fragile situations is comparatively recent. Little is known about the correlation, if any, between sector governance dimensions and access, quality and equity of education services. It needs to be better understood how the positive governance legacies of education sector resilience in fragile situations can be optimised to enable the effective transition and transformation from early recovery to more sustainable sector development. The Study concludes that an increased focus on sector 'resilience', as opposed to the often more negatively received language of 'fragility', constitutes an important shift and an opportunity for promoting a forward and longer-term sector planning perspective.

Important transformational governance actions, where identified, need to be supported earlier rather than later during a period of recovery/reconstruction transition. The experience of using sector assessment and governance tools during this Study has allowed further thinking of how best to use such tools, at the same time illustrating that they do have the potential to be powerful entry points for promoting education sector dialogue, planning and development.

In most of the countries studied, education services are maintained despite periods of relative fragility, due to the generally high community value and sustained demand for education. This and other factors result in various adaptations of sector governance. These adaptations include a diversity of sources of education financing (with communities assuming the largest burden initially), a range of state/non-state and private providers, a diversity of learners and clients (e.g. ex-combatants, overage students) and a diversity of localised, community-based and state-run management arrangements.

Identification and selection of priority interventions focused on sector governance during a phase of early recovery can optimise opportunities and mitigate potentially negative legacies and risks as reconstruction/development paths evolve. In most of the case studies, short term perspectives focusing on overcoming hindering factors to service delivery is often the priority for both country policy makers and donors during periods of fragility. The opportunity to adopt a medium to longer-term perspective on sector development, focusing on how to use existing enabling factors, is frequently missed.

During a period of recovery or relative stability, there is often a significant increase in the number of projects in direct support of service delivery, yet with fairly short implementation frameworks. This phenomenon often results in the overloading of already burdened national coordination systems, the loss of policy and strategy coherence and fragmentation of effort and potential impact. Projects are often maintained off budget, and therefore fail to enable government to develop more coherent expenditure frameworks. The Study uncovered some important initiatives in terms of contracting out core public services through non-state actors during early recovery (e.g. in Liberia and Southern Sudan). These initiatives carry risks of delaying public sector capacity improvements, unless well



defined strategies for engagement with both central and decentralised levels of governance are defined during the design phase and are implemented fully. National policy makers and development partners should focus more on a limited number of priority programmes, including tailor-made strategies in under-served and under-performing provinces/districts.

In a number of the Study countries, there are examples of rudimentary education sector planning processes during an early recovery phase. Nevertheless, in the countries studied, sector plans tend to focus on addressing service access and delivery disparities, with insufficient attention paid to sequenced governance and financing reform indicators and targets. Equally, more attention could be paid to making sector planning processes more stakeholder inclusive and providing incentives for such stakeholder involvement.

External assistance for education in fragile states tends to focus on restoring access and to some degree, quality of primary and basic education. Especially, but not exclusively, in fragile situations, greater attention needs to be paid to developing priority programmes for all groups that have 'missed out', in particular, for young adult populations on whom social and economic pressures fall following a period of fragility. Priority should be given to developing strategic interventions which support basic literacy and vocational skills strongly linked to improved livelihoods, as well as secondary level and specific higher education initiatives which foster the development of education staff career pathways (teacher training, education management and civil administration).

Non-state actors, especially community groups, are critical in financing, maintaining and restoring the teaching service and enabling equitable access to education services during a fragile situation. If and when state capacity recovers and state financing for education and in particular for teacher remuneration becomes available, there is often the difficult and complex period of transition in terms of management and accountability for education services. In certain circumstances, development partners should accord greater priority to the need to provide early support to government for the payment of teacher salaries, linked to at least short term measures that maintain community contributions, within a long term perspective of transformation to a state paid service. During this period, setting up human resource information and education payroll systems should also be further prioritised. There is the potential that the positive legacies linked to volunteerism/community contribution/ownership in education are lost, as well as the opportunity for broader mutual accountability for results oriented education management. Attention must be paid to avoid these outcomes when designing interventions in this area.

During periods of fragility, a key source of education sector resilience is the capacity of faith-based, patrimonial and voluntary community based organisations and networks to maintain education service delivery. The involvement of these organisations in sector reform planning and financing appears insufficiently prioritised, often resulting in the loss of important organisational capacities and resources in the sector. The same situation frequently applies to the for-profit private sector.

The relationship between state, community and private providers tends to be unregulated during periods of fragility and for a significant time during post-fragility phases. In the absence of a clear public-private-community provider partnership policy and a specific education ministry organisational location for ensuring policy compliance, there is a risk that the positive legacies and capacity of community providers and their initiatives will be crowded out. In addition, any country



sector plan and sector financing framework would be more legitimate and authoritative if these groups were more strongly engaged in sector planning and budgeting processes.

**Programme Implementation, Monitoring and Learning Considerations.** Sector ministries tend to be more internally client oriented during fragile situations and for significant periods afterwards. This orientation is largely due to a focus on maintaining or restoring education service delivery. The engagement of donors also tends to focus primarily on service delivery and can further exacerbate this internal client orientation. This constitutes a missed opportunity, especially in decentralised contexts where there is the potential to use sector results to engage with external clients and different levels of governance (e.g. local parliaments, community groups). NGOs and CBOs could be well placed to enable externally oriented information and communication systems, although this requires clear regulatory frameworks and openness of government to work with non-state actors.

External accountability mechanisms for education sector performance are also largely underdeveloped in fragile situations and need to be accorded greater attention in early sector planning. Strengthening voice and accountability mechanisms for civil society could be potentially transformative and accelerate progress within state and nation building efforts. Encouraging NGOs and CBOs to move beyond service delivery towards a watchdog/oversight function at the community level is critical, in parallel to the early delineation of specific NGO/CBO roles and functions.

Emphasis on 'sector resilience', through assessing country capacity and willingness, and through education service delivery and governance capacity indicators, has the potential to deepen and make more constructive the country/donor policy and programming engagement. During an early recovery phase, development partners should set up and support inclusive state/non-state actor coordination mechanisms to formulate medium to longer-term plans, with key transitional milestones, enabling governance indicators and monitoring mechanisms, linked to long-term pledging of support from donors.

The Study examined different experiences with the early implementation of 'school block grants'. Block grants tend to be non-conditional, focused on offsetting parental contributions that are frequently an access barrier for the poor. Putting in place results monitoring systems, regulatory frameworks and school management development programmes, related to grant implementation, are clear challenges and tend to lag behind grant introduction. The opportunity to make these block grants more results oriented and conditional, for both access and quality improvement is often missed and as a result the impact of block grants and/or conditional cash transfers on enabling or sustaining school/community governance is unfortunately little understood.

The Study found that insufficient attention has been paid to the quality and relevance of education and on the other side, disparities at sub-sectoral and sub-national levels. Both elements can be a major source of political and security attention. The development of national capacity for education census and management information systems, however rudimentary, appear to have powerful interventions, providing the potential for disparities to be more openly discussed, understood and consensus reached on how different actors can respond.

There is a growing body of experience and knowledge of using a mix of aid instruments (e.g. pooled funds, budget support, MDTFs) in a variety of (post-)fragile situations, including for education. There

are a number of credible and rigorous analytical frameworks for assessing sector governance issues. It is less clear to which extent this knowledge/experience is being applied systematically by governments and donors in specific country contexts. In particular, the dissemination of such knowledge amongst key national policy makers and planners is underdeveloped and tends to be retained within aid agencies.

Conducting a review of PFM systems and formulating macro and sector medium-term expenditure framework are potentially useful entry points for policy dialogue. Lessons could be learned from DRC and Liberia where government and development partners have embarked on PFM reforms with potentially positive results for education sector development.

## 4.2 Summary of Main Recommendations

With regard to improved programme planning and design, the main Study recommendations would be:

i)	Development partners should consider how sector governance assessments and tools could be better embedded in country assistance program planning and design processes, alongside country policy makers, in order to gain a better understanding of the link between governance and access, quality and equity improvements.
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ii)	National policy makers and development partners should focus more on a limited number of education priority programmes, including tailor-made strategies in under-served and under-performing provinces/districts.
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iii)	In fragile situations, national policy makers and development partners should look beyond the delivery of primary education, and prioritise skills development linked to livelihood recovery, and system/career pathways.
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iv)	Development partners should accord greater priority to providing early support to government for the payment of teacher salaries (where feasible), linked to at least short term measures that maintain community contributions, within a long term perspective of transformation to a state paid service.
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v)	Development partners should accord higher priority to support for the formulation of a long-term teaching service development plan, paying particular attention to setting up teacher human resource information and payroll systems, with involvement of teachers unions or professional associations in the process.
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vi)	Development partners should promote and build state capacity to adopt an enabling role for public-private-community partnerships, especially building sector organisations capacity to regulate, plan, monitor and quality assure this partnership.
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With regard to programme implementation, monitoring and learning, the main Study recommendations would be:

i)	Development partners should accord greater priority in fragile situations to support for NGOs and CBOs to help facilitate capacity building of externally oriented information and communication systems and national education oversight arrangements, including through parliamentary select committees and civil society education watchdog coalitions.
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ii)	During an early recovery phase, development partners should set up and support inclusive state/non-state actor coordination mechanisms to formulate medium to longer-term plans, with key transitional milestones, enabling governance indicators and monitoring mechanisms, linked to long-term pledging of support from donors.
iii)	In contexts of fragility, development partners should re-emphasise the importance of ensuring the link between school block grants or cash transfers to targets on access/quality/equity, alongside the development of regulations and school capacity development plans.
iv)	The coverage and disaggregation of education sector performance indicators through early support in the reconstruction phase for education census and management information systems should be broadened.
v)	Development partners, through policy dialogue, should promote early action by central government agencies setting out medium-term sector strategy, planning and PFM parameters, including preliminary sectoral PERs. An early priority should be building sector expenditure planning, accounting and audit capabilities, especially for teaching service management.

## Annex 1: Overall Study and Country Profile Methodology

**Comprehensive Literature Review.** The overall Study conceptual framework, methodology and activities is based on an extensive literature research reviews covering i) historical perspectives and indicators of sector performance and resilience/fragility of service delivery and political, economic and administrative will, ii) fragile states typologies and categories, iii) education and state building strategies, iv) analysing and promoting education sector governance in fragile states, v) use of aid instruments in fragile states, and vi) analytical work on specific issues. The main research documents, tools and methodologies informing the Study are at the end of this Annex.

These profiles are based on comprehensive documentation reviews and analysis set out in the country reports, as illustrated in the bibliographies at the end of Annexes 2 - 9 of this synthesis report. The methodology and sources of information/analysis are summarised for each of the country profile components below.

**Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events.** The sources of this chronology included i) information from key country informants, ii) country political, security and economic/administrative governance assessments conducted by international agencies, iii) reviews of a series of EFA mid and end of decade assessment reports, and iv) analysis of a range of education sector situation analyses, strategic plans and sector performance reviews.

**Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessments.** These assessments were characterised as i) just beginning, where there is an initial recognition that a particular issue needs to be addressed, ii) limited, where an initial action plan has been prepared but implementation has yet to start, iii) significant, where progress on implementing a particular action plan is under way but not yet comprehensive and organisational arrangements and mandates are only embryonic, and iv) extensive, where the action plan is being implemented comprehensively, including existence of specific organisations with mandates, authority and resources.

- A. **Assessment of Sector Policy/Strategy.** Based on the processes adopted at country levels, to formulate an education policy/strategy framework, including assessment of the inclusiveness of stakeholder representation and the subsequent degree of legitimacy and authority of the policies and strategies. The main sources of information were country Education Strategic Plans, EFA Action Plans and EFA Mid and End of Decade Assessments. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.
- B. **Budget and Expenditure Management.** Based on processes and outcomes adopted at country levels, to ensure alignment and harmonisation and timeliness between stated education policy and strategic priorities and public resource allocations, alongside mutual accountability arrangements. The main sources of information were country Public Expenditure Reviews, Fiduciary Assessments and Paris Declaration Aid Effectiveness Monitoring reports. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.
- C. **Sector Coordination and Management.** Based on an assessment of the extent of coordination and information sharing within and beyond government ministries, especially education, finance and planning ministries and in-country government led education donor working groups. The main sources of information were Annual Sector Performance Reviews, Public Expenditure Reviews and EFA Global Monitoring reports. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.

- D. **Institutional Setting and Capacity.** Based on an assessment of the extent to which sector institutional arrangements (e.g. policies, legislation, regulation) and sector organisational arrangements are internally or externally client oriented or influences, including the role of parliaments and independent watchdogs. The main sources of information were country discussions with key informants, country Governance Assessments and country Public Expenditure and Fiduciary Assessments. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.
- E. **Performance Monitoring Systems.** Based on an assessment of availability of sector performance data and sector results frameworks and targets and the extent to which such information is used for performance assessment and mutual accountability. The main sources of information were country Sector Performance Reviews, EFA Monitoring Reports and Aid Effectiveness reviews. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.
- F. **Macroeconomic Framework.** Based on an assessment of the trends in education, public expenditure and GDP share, existence of sector MTEFs and macro/sector policy alignment. The main sources of information were country Education Strategic and Financing Plans, Public Expenditure and Fiduciary Assessment reviews and analysis of recent public expenditure trends from UNESCO and World Bank sources. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.
- G. **Public Financial Management.** Based on an assessment of the transparency and effectiveness of country PFM and audit systems and organisations. The main sources of information were Public Expenditure and Fiduciary Assessment reviews and Public Expenditure Tracking studies. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.

**Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders, Interest Groups, Education Governance Mechanisms and Accountability Relations.** These assessments were characterised as i) limited, where only predominantly informal arrangements exist for stakeholder involvement in sector policy and implementation, ii) significant, where formal arrangements are in place for stakeholder involvement but authority and implementation is only partial, and iii) extensive, where formal organisational arrangements are in place, with a degree of authority and operations of these organisations is fairly comprehensive.

The sources of information in making these assessments are country Governance Assessments, country Public Expenditure and Fiduciary Assessments, country Education Strategic Plan and MTEF assessments, country EFA reports, country Aid Effectiveness reviews and country reports on the role of diaspora. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.

**Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance.** These assessments were characterised by i) having high, medium or low sector performance indicators, and ii) the overall trend of these indicators. The main sources of information were country Education Sector Performance reviews, EFA FTI Global and Country Monitoring reports, analysis of UNESCO statistical information handbooks, EPDC information sources and updated country education information systems reports. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile and in Chapter 4 of this report.

**Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience.** These assessments were characterised by i) strongly enabling, where selected factors were contributing to both education service delivery capacity and country willingness for sustained sector development transition, ii) enabling, where selected factors were contributing to either/or capacity and willingness or only partially for both, iii) hindering, where selected factors were strongly undermining either/or capacity and willingness or weakly hindering both, iv) strongly hindering, where selected factors were undermining both capacity and willingness for sector development transition.

The sources of information were country Education Strategic Plans, EFA FTI Monitoring reports, country Governance Assessments, Public Expenditure Reviews and country Aid Effectiveness reviews. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.

**Progress Made in Addressing Governance Challenges and Strengthening Resilience.** These assessments were characterised as i) just beginning, where there is an initial recognition that a particular issue needs to be addressed, ii) limited, where an initial legislative, regulatory and organisational action plan has been prepared but implementation has yet to start, iii) significant, where progress on implementing a particular action plan is under way but not yet comprehensive regulatory and organisational arrangements and mandates are only embryonic, and iv) extensive, where the action plan is being implemented comprehensively, including existence of specific legislative and regulatory frameworks and organisations with mandates, authority and resources. The sources of information were country Education Strategic Plans, EFA FTI Monitoring reports, country Governance Assessments, Public Expenditure Reviews and country Aid Effectiveness reviews. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.

**Assessment of External Assistance Modalities.** These assessments were characterised as none, limited, significant or extensive, depending on the proportion of external assistance using particular types of external assistance modalities, typified in the country profiles. The main sources of information were analyses done during country visits, education ministry aid information databases, country Education Donor Working Group reports, country EFA FTI reports and country Aid Effectiveness reports. The rationale and justification for the assessment is detailed in each country profile.

**Visual Presentation of Comparative Country Profiles.** In order to present accessible and visual comparative country findings, the various governance dimensions assessed were weighted and aggregated in the form of bar charts, with the size of the weightings visually represented as defined in the main text. While not designed to constitute a specific quantitative weighting, the visual presentations are designed to demonstrate the country progress made from a baseline of just beginning/limited.

Clearly, in those countries which have progressed most in the transition towards more sustainable development and represent a longer time period since political/security fragility or instability (e.g. Aceh, Cambodia), compared to those still experiencing significant political/security fragility (e.g. Somalia, DRC), one would expect higher weightings on most of the macro and governance dimensions assessed. This appears to be the case as the visual representation illustrate. Nevertheless, this visual approach does help to highlight specific sector governance gaps even in those countries that have emerged longer from periods of fragility/instability.



# Selected Literature Review for Study Conceptual Framework and Methodology Design

## 1. Fragile States Typologies/Categories

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USAID (2006), Education and Fragility Assessment Tools

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## 2. Education and State Building Strategies

Barakat et al (2008), Desk Study : Education and Fragility, B. Barakat, Z. Karpinska, J. Paulson

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Manor, J. (2007), Aid That Works: Successful Development in Fragile States

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OECD (2008), Round Table 7: Aid Effectiveness in Situations of Fragility and Conflict: Summary of Outcomes

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
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## Annex 2: Aceh, Indonesia Country Profile

This country profile summarizes the key sector governance findings of the country report, drawing on the overall Study methodology at Chapter 1 and specific EC and other donor sector governance analytical tools.

### 1. Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events

The chronology below maps critical security, events which have strongly influenced the and sector development transitions, as



political and sector governance relationship between fragility status highlighted in Chapter 2 of the Synthesis Report.

### 2. Overall Fragility Assessment

recovery from post-tsunami – reconstruction/ development

### 3. Country Education Sector Governance Assessment and Outlook

The analysis below assesses the status of key macro and sector governance features and analyses the relationship between various actors/stakeholders and their influence on sector governance. This has then been used to inform the further governance analysis carried out in Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 1: Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessment

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
<b>A. Sector Policy/Strategy</b>		
Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes		Significant linkage between central, provincial and district education authorities in formulation of provincial ESP 2007-2011.
Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes		Extensive engagement of provincial/district parliaments in ESP planning and review, with strong finance/planning ministry involvement.
Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes		Significant involvement of universities, school parent committees and advisory councils in ESP formulation/approval.
Transparency of policy making processes		Significant open public debates on ESP, including dissemination province wide and public discussions in parliament.
<b>B. Budget and Expenditure Management</b>		
Budget influence on policy making		Limited influence with budgeting tending to be program rather than policy/results driven.
Inclusiveness of budgetary processes		Limited involvement of community stakeholders, mainly government/parliament.
Timeliness of donor pledging		Improved alignment between national/provincial ESPs and the timing of donor programming calendars and commitments.
Donor accountability mechanisms		Limited due to the absence of a formal joint GoI/donor review process and monitoring of donor programme results.
<b>C. Sector Coordination and Management</b>		
Centre/decentralized coordination arrangements		Clearly defined in GoI decentralization policy, with specific Aceh political and fiscal autonomy law and regulations.
Extent of networking with other key ministries		Limited consultation with civil service or planning ministries, mainly with finance/budget authorities.
Extent of donor influence on sector coordination arrangements		Limited but improving with joint Aceh education sector working group, which monitors ESP progress.
Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders		Significant with regulations in place for provincial and district education performance reports presented to local parliaments and in media.
<b>D. Institutional Setting and Capacity</b>		
Extent to which sector organizations are influenced by external actors		Significantly influenced by new political parties and elected parliamentary officials and by central Jakarta Ministry of Home Affairs.

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale		
Extent to which sector organizations are externally client oriented		Significantly influenced by sense of accountability to local parliaments and district authorities through circulation of performance reports.		
Extent to which sector organizations are internally client oriented		Extensive influence, especially related to horse trading on annual education budget allocations between programme departments.		
E. Performance Monitoring System				
Availability of sector performance data		Significant coverage across access, quality and management, including annually disaggregated district performance data.		
Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms		Limited but improving as parliaments increasingly demand comparative district level data as part of arguing for additional education revenues.		
Availability of sector results framework		Significant, with ESP results framework 2007-11, although some results information processes (e.g. teacher deployment) need improvement.		
Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)		Limited to mainly sector organization and donors with limited participation of parliament or parents or watchdogs (e.g. NGOs) in process.		
F. Macro-Economic Framework				
Linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning		Significant with Aceh autonomy law dedicating 30% of oil/gas revenues for education, which is strongly adhered to.		
Availability of medium term sector resource envelopes		Limited, although the Aceh ESP has a sector MTEF, still mainly done through an annual budget process.		
Alignment between macro and sectoral development policy		Significant with strong alignment between national/provincial development plans and Aceh ESP with increased focus on secondary/higher education.		
Relative prioritization of government financing of education		Extensive, with national policy of 20% share of public expenditure for education, upheld in constitutional court and Aceh province/districts adhere to this.		
G. Public Financial Management				
Transparency of PFM systems		Significant, with annual and other regular education programme financial reports submitted to parliament and central MoF.		
Effectiveness of budget control mechanisms		Significant with well defined financial regulations for spending eligibilities and compliance/monitoring arrangements.		
Effectiveness of internal audit systems		Extensive, with education programmes internally audited by central MoNE inspectorate general and provincial/district audit agencies.		
Effectiveness of external audit and watchdogs		Significant for external audit, by GoI and independent donor auditors, watchdogs (e.g. NGOs) less well developed.		
Extensive:	Significant:	Limited:	Beginning:	

Table 2: Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders and Interest Groups

Actor/Interest Group	Role and Importance	Extent of Interests	Extent of Power & Resources	Extent of Linkages	Extent of Incentives	Rationale
National Government						Dominant provider, variable linkage to other interest groups.
Local Government						Reliant on central/provincial financing, technical accountability.
Community Providers						Limited provider, apart from community based ECE.
Public-private partnerships						Private university staff have extensive political influence.
Frontline providers						Schools have limited authority and influence, mainly accountability.
Citizens (students/parents)						Parliamentary influence, not vocal over quality issues.
Diaspora						Influence limited to previous political interests, now waning.
Development partners						Mainly influencing political governance, not sectoral.
Extensive:		Significant:		Limited:		

The assessment in Tables 3 and 4 below is designed to synthesize governance and accountability relations and mechanisms and illustrate the way they impinge on education sector development. This assessment is also incorporated into Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 3: Assessment of Education Governance Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Governance by hierarchy		Limited delegated authority, even within the government service.
Patrimonial governance		Political allegiance partly influences staff selection and sector priorities.
Market governance		Only higher education is market responsive, less so in public schools.

Voluntary network governance		Extensive informal influence of Islamic organizations on schooling.			
Extensive:		Significant:		Limited:	

Table 4: Assessment of Accountability Relations and Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale	
Information about and clarity of governance		Extensive sector legislative/regulatory framework, alongside decentralization.	
Responsiveness of governance		Limited discretion in deviating from regulatory framework, resulting in some rigidity.	
Accountability set-up and responsibility		Significant parliamentary oversight arrangements, less so independent watchdog.	
Capacity for governance and accountability		Parliamentary education select committees have limited capacity or resources.	
Extensive:	Significant:	Limited:	Beginning:

#### 4. Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance

Tables 5 and 6 below summarize the trajectory of education performance, including fragility impact and summarize what are key enabling or hindering factors on maintaining or strengthening sector resilience. This analysis provides the basis for Chapter 4 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 5: Education Sector Performance and Resilience Trends

Sub Sector	Overall Performance	Regional Performance Parity	Gender Performance Parity	Fragile Area Performance Parity	Rationale
Primary	ì	è	è	ì	Limited district disparities in access/quality, previous conflict areas meet Aceh average.
Secondary	ì	è	è	ì	Limited district disparities in access/quality, previous conflict areas meet Aceh average.
Tertiary	ì	è	è	ì	Mainly urban/rural and poverty factors rather than post-conflict effect.
High:		Medium:		Low:	
Upward Trend:	ì	Neutral Trend:	è	Downward Trend:	î

Table 6: Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience

Table of Enabling and Hindering factors of Investing Sector Resilience							
Dimension/Indicator	Assessment		Rationale				
Security, political and economic/administrative governance			Cease of hostilities, elected provincial governor, elected parliaments, clear fiscal outlook under special autonomy law and proven civil service are all enabling factors.				
Education financing and state revenues			Predictable education financing from central, provincial and district revenues provide a strong enabling environment, with robust fiscal regulation on sector support.				
Education providers (state, non-state and public-private partnerships)			Robust government providers of schooling, although greater involvement communities in early childhood education and private sector higher education is needed.				
Education participation			Strong engagement of government, donors and parliamentary groups in policy making, less so for oversight/watchdog agencies and school/parent committees.				
Restoration or maintenance of teaching service			New legislation on teacher remuneration and minimum qualifications is strongly enabling, although budget implications are worrying.				
Restoration of the role of the state			Autonomy law provides legitimacy and authority to the provincial government and education authorities, reinforced by assured education sector financing levels.				
Strongly Enabling:		Enabling:		Hindering:		Strongly Hindering:	

#### 5. Assessment of Sector Governance Challenges

Tables 7 and 8 below provide an overview of the various aspects of sector governance challenges and prospects for sector resilience, including the role of donor agencies. This analysis is incorporated in Chapter 5 of the Synthesis Report. The assessment summarizes the extent to which progress in addressing sector governance challenges has been made and identifies related opportunities and risks.

Table 7: Progress Made in Addressing Governance Challenges and Strengthening Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Opportunities and Risks
<b>A. Macro Governance Issues</b>		
Various actors, authority and accountability mechanisms		Growing authority and legitimacy of provincial government constitutes an opportunity. Risk of underdeveloped stakeholder participation in accountability mechanisms.
Building government capacity (e.g. PFM and PSM)		Strong legislative and regulatory framework for PFM and PSM, including teaching service is opportunity. Risk of underdeveloped financial reporting capacity.
Role of NGOs and CBOs from delivery to planning, oversight and advocacy		Parliamentary arrangements constitute an opportunity to improve oversight. Limited NGO, CBO or watchdog role in oversight/advocacy undermines broad accountability.
Donor support and strengthening government capacity and accountability		Recent donor PFM capacity building TA constitutes an opportunity. Risk is lack of support at district levels, where capacity/accountability is less developed.
<b>B. Sectoral Governance Issues</b>		
Move from emergency relief to sector reconstruction/development		Legitimacy and authority of Reconstruction Agency (BRR) has been opportunity to quickly return to reconstruction/development path.
Early formulation of an education strategic plan		Current ESP 2007-11 framework provided opportunity for broad stakeholder involvement and results monitoring. Risk is lack of strategies to deal with district disparities.
Strengthening education system capacity (e.g. overage students)		Post-tsunami school reconstruction has been opportunity to expand and build back better. Potential risk of limited transition to university for rural students.
Financing systems		The predictable resource envelope is incentive for medium-term planning. Serious risk that high level of assured resources will lead to inefficiency and high cost base.
Sustainable teacher management		New teachers' law and regulations provide opportunity to upgrade and properly remunerate teachers. Significant risk is non-sustainability and inequitable deployment.
Restoring institutions: social inclusion and information/communication		Demographic patterns provide opportunity to use schools for ECE, especially in underserved rural areas. Risk is that poverty factors may still undermine inclusion.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> <div>Beginning:</div> </div>		

Table 8: Assessment of External Assistance Modalities

Modality	Assessment		
Debt Relief			
General budget support		Extensive:	
Sector budget support			
Off budget project support		Significant:	
On budget project support			
Multi donor trust funds/pooled funds		Limited:	
NGO grant financing			
Capacity development TA		None:	

Aceh benefits indirectly from general and sector budget support provided to central government, much of the targeted aid to Aceh remains off budget. There is a growing focus on strengthening provincial and district education sector planning/management capacity. Much of the post-tsunami relief aid, delivered MTDF and NGO grant mechanisms has now been disbursed with BRR closing down in early mid-2009.

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


## Annex 3: Cambodia Country Profile

This country profile summarizes the key sector governance findings of the country report, drawing on the overall Study methodology at Chapter 1 and specific EC and other donor sector governance analytical tools.

### 1. Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events

The chronology below maps critical security, political and sector governance events which have strongly influenced the relationship between fragility status and sector development transitions, as highlighted in Chapter 2 of the Synthesis Report.



### 2. Overall Fragility Assessment

Late stage of transition from reconstruction to more sustainable sector development, with little evidence of late conflict prone areas showing service disparities.

### 3. Country Education Sector Governance Assessment and Outlook

The analysis below assesses the status of key macro and sector governance features and analyses the relationship between various actors/stakeholders and their influence on sector governance. This has then been used to inform the further governance analysis carried out in Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 1: Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessment

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
<b>A. Sector Policy/Strategy</b>		
Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes		Significant communication and consultation between central, provincial and district education authorities over policy.
Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes		Extensive voice for finance and planning ministries in both sector expenditure planning and alignment with broader development policy.
Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes		Effectiveness is increasingly robust but broader stakeholder participation, including districts and schools/parents in decision making is needed.
Transparency of policy making processes		Comparatively opaque with most major decisions made inside central education ministry and other central agencies. Limited process for parliamentary approval.
<b>B. Budget and Expenditure Management</b>		
Budget influence on policy making		Extensive, through use of overall MTEF and sector MTEF, for which education has been a lead ministry for several years.
Inclusiveness of budgetary processes		Limited external influence on budget priorities outside of education/finance ministries, with no consultation with communities on budget priorities.
Timeliness of donor pledging		Has improved significantly in the past 5 years through a regular ESP review and adjustment process and robust ministry led ESWG.
Donor accountability mechanisms		Extensive accountability through a very results oriented education sector performance review process, with a discreet donor report to education ministry.
<b>C. Sector Coordination and Management</b>		

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Centre/decentralized coordination arrangements		Significant coordination with province/district education authorities through the annual education congress, now incorporated as part of annual performance review.
Extent of networking with other key ministries		Extensive formal and informal networking with finance, interior, civil service, planning ministries.
Extent of donor influence on sector coordination arrangements		Extensive donor influence through provision of donor coordination adviser and technical support for the annual performance review process.
Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders		Extensive information sharing through a well developed EMIS and dedicated education information department which focuses on dissemination to communities.
<b>D. Institutional Setting and Capacity</b>		
Extent to which sector organizations are influenced by external actors		Significant influence by Council of Ministers and finance ministry and donors, less so at community levels where commune council role is evolving.
Extent to which sector organizations are externally client oriented		Extensively focusing on making sure that parents/communities are informed of new policy/programme initiatives and higher education QA unit to inform fee payers.
Extent to which sector organizations are internally client oriented		Extensive internal orientation, especially related to the medium-term and annual budgeting process and internal information sharing.
<b>E. Performance Monitoring System</b>		
Availability of sector performance data		Availability of comprehensive and multi-year data sets which are being used to inform decision making and support policy informing and operational research.
Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms		Significant improvement through submission of performance reports to government, donors and especially finance ministry, less so with National Assembly.
Availability of sector results framework		Extensive multi-year outcomes, results and policy oriented indicators and targets within strategic plan and basis for annual joint performance review.
Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)		Performance review largely restricted to education ministry, donors and NGOs, although the use of the education congress should broaden stakeholder range.
<b>F. Macro-Economic Framework</b>		
Linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning		Increasingly robust through the PFM reform program, where the education sector budget allocation is now much more realistic against fiscal outlook.
Availability of medium term sector resource envelopes		Significant improvement in predictability of resource envelopes, having overcome the previous cash management and cash flow constraints.
Alignment between macro and sectoral development policy		Strong alignment through well focused sector working groups, including MoEYS and donors, as part of five year national development plan process.
Relative prioritization of government financing of education		High prioritization as demonstrated by public expenditure share more than doubling to over 18% in the last 6-7 years.
<b>G. Public Financial Management</b>		
Transparency of PFM systems		Significant improvement in transparency of budget allocations between ministries and also improved frequency and quality of programme finance reports.
Effectiveness of budget control mechanisms		Significant improvement, both in terms of budget approval, but also budget execution, due largely due to improved capacity in central and sector agencies.
Effectiveness of internal audit systems		Quite robust financial supervision and control systems within finance ministry, aligned to new internal audit department within MoEYS.
Effectiveness of external audit and watchdogs		Supreme audit agency established a few years ago, but progress has been slow, with continued reliance on donor financed independent audits.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> <div>Beginning:</div> </div>		

Table 2: Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders and Interest Groups

Actor/Interest Group	Role and Importance	Extent of Interests	Extent of Power & Resources	Extent of Linkages	Extent of Incentives	Rationale
National Government						Dominant provider with both sectoral and political interests.
Local Government						Limited role due to slow progress on decentralization policy.
Community Providers						Limited provider role and little overall influence.
Public-private partnerships						Limited provider role and little overall influence, apart from HE.
Frontline providers						Growing school authority for block grant decision making.
Citizens (students/parents)						Limited influence apart from commune council elections.
Diaspora						Little or no evident active Diaspora.
Development partners						Extensive influence on policy/strategy discussions and financing.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> </div>						

The assessment in Tables 3 and 4 below is designed to synthesize governance and accountability relations and mechanisms and illustrate the way they impinge on education sector development. This assessment is also incorporated into Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 3: Assessment of Education Governance Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Governance by hierarchy		High levels of centralized power, legitimized by constitution.
Patrimonial governance		Significant decision making through political allegiances and historical loyalties.
Market governance		Only higher education is market responsive, less so in public schools.
Voluntary network governance		Little or no influence, apart from school community level relations.
Extensive:		Significant: Limited:

Table 4: Assessment of Accountability Relations and Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Rating	Rationale
Information about and clarity of governance		Extensive sector legislative/regulatory framework, limited decentralization.
Responsiveness of governance		Limited discretion in deviating from regulatory framework, resulting in some rigidity.
Accountability set-up and responsibility		Underdeveloped parliamentary oversight and watchdog arrangements.
Capacity for governance and accountability		Significant sector level capacity, less so at the political level.
Extensive:		Significant: Limited: Beginning:

#### 4. Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance

Tables 5 and 6 below summarize the trajectory of education performance, including fragility impact and summarize what are key enabling or hindering factors on maintaining or strengthening sector resilience. This analysis provides the basis for Chapter 4 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 5: Education Sector Performance and Resilience Trends

Sub Sector	Overall Performance	Regional Performance Parity	Gender Performance Parity	Fragile Area Performance Parity	Rationale
Primary	è	ì	è	ì	Limited disparities, but enrolment stagnation due to high repetition.
Secondary	ì	ì	ì	ì	Sustained enrolment growth with leveling out of disparities.
Tertiary	ì	ì	ì	ì	Sustained private sector enrolment growth, with urban/rural disparities.
High:		Medium:		Low:	
Upward Trend:	ì	Neutral Trend:	è	Downward Trend:	î

Table 6: Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Security, political and economic/administrative governance		Sustained political and security stability, extensive state revenue generation and election of single party government has enabled a stronger sense of legitimacy and authority.
Education financing and state revenues		Sustained political commitment to education, demonstrated through sustained public expenditure increases has raised public confidence in government as main provider.
Education providers (state, non-state and public-private partnerships)		Transformation from community based provision to government provision over the last 10 years has been an enabling factor, although PPP in HE/TVET is priority.
Education participation		Limited stakeholder participation in sector decision making is a potential constraint on resilience if the fiscal outlook becomes more uncertain.
Restoration or maintenance of teaching service		Sustained increases, though still low, in teacher remuneration has raised morale and motivation, but equitable deployment to rural/remote areas is problematic.
Restoration of the role of the state		Historical tradition of dominant role for the state has been restored during the recovery, reconstruction and development transitions.

Strongly Enabling:		Enabling:		Hindering:		Strongly Hindering:	
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## 5. Assessment of Sector Governance Challenges

Tables 7 and 8 below provide an overview of the various aspects of sector governance challenges and prospects for sector resilience, including the role of donor agencies. This analysis is incorporated in Chapter 5 of the Synthesis Report. The assessment summarizes the extent to which progress in addressing sector governance challenges has been made and identifies related opportunities and risks.

Table 7: Progress Made in Addressing Governance Challenges and Strengthening Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Opportunities and Risks
A. Macro Governance Issues		
Various actors, authority and accountability mechanisms		Elected commune councils with education role constitutes opportunity to broaden actors and accountabilities, risk that hierarchical tradition will be a constraint.
Building government capacity (e.g. PFM and PSM)		Robust PFM reform with MoEYS as a lead ministry constitutes continuing opportunity which is being grasped, risk that PBB is insufficiently results oriented.
Role of NGOs and CBOs from delivery to planning, oversight and advocacy		The setting up of the NGO education partnership and participation in ESWG is opportunity. Risk is resistance to changing to oversight and watchdog role.
Donor support and strengthening government capacity and accountability		Extensive progress through harmonized donor PFM support is opportunity, risk is slow progress and insufficient focus on parliamentary oversight and external audit.
B. Sectoral Governance Issues		
Move from emergency relief to sector reconstruction/development		Opportunity to accelerate sustained sector development. Potential risk that effort, especially post-primary will be insufficiently broad based and rural.
Early formulation of an education strategic plan		Opportunity to focus on post-basic education provision in the next ESP, risk that donor support will be insufficiently responsive to changing priorities.
Strengthening education system capacity (e.g. overage students)		Increased government resources, especially for secondary education is an opportunity to expand capacity, risk is uncertainty on how to enable PPP in HE with high demand.
Financing systems		Greater financial predictability is opportunity for long-term sector planning. Risk is that senior secondary and higher education financing policy is unclear.
Sustainable teacher management		Improving teacher remuneration and payroll mechanisms are an opportunity, risk remains of uncertainty over best incentives for rural/remote deployment.
Restoring institutions: social inclusion and information/communication		Significant gains in social inclusion for primary and secondary schooling constitutes opportunity for more inclusive post-secondary. Risk is uncertain financing policy.
Extensive:	Significant:	Limited:
		Beginning:

Table 8: Assessment of External Assistance Modalities

Modality	Assessment		
Debt Relief			
General budget support		Extensive:	
Sector budget support			
Off budget project support		Significant:	
On budget project support			
Multi donor trust funds/pooled funds		Limited:	
NGO grant financing			
Capacity development TA		None:	

Cambodia benefits from a wide range of aid modalities, including general and sector budget support, alongside an EFA FTI pooled fund, on budget project support and sustained levels of strategic planning and capacity development TA.

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
## Annex 4: DRC Country Profile

This country profile summarizes the key sector governance findings of the country report, drawing on the overall Study methodology at Chapter 1 and specific EC and other donor sector governance analytical tools.

### 1. Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events

The chronology below maps critical security, events which have strongly influenced the status and sector development Chapter 2 of the

political and sector governance relationship between fragility transitions, as highlighted in Synthesis Report.



### 2. Overall Fragility Assessment

Early stages of recovery to reconstruction transition, with instability in eastern provinces resulting in continued sector fragility (e.g. in Kivu province).

### 3. Country Education Sector Governance Assessment and Outlook

The analysis below assesses the status of key macro and sector governance features and analyses the relationship between various actors/stakeholders and their influence on sector governance. This has then been used to inform the further governance analysis carried out in Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 1: Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessment

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
<b>A. Sector Policy/Strategy</b>		
Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes		Increased stakeholder participation through consultation between government and the National Parent and Student Association and the Union of Congolese Teachers.
Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes		Limited communication with provincial/municipal administrations and education authorities due to limited progress on decentralization.
Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes		Non-government organizations are increasingly involved, but mainly in a consultative role rather than proactive policy development one.
Transparency of policy making processes		Increased parliamentary and cabinet debates on education as a priority, but dissemination of decision making criteria is uneven.
<b>B. Budget and Expenditure Management</b>		
Budget influence on policy making		PRSP is forming basis for education as priority, with public expenditure share increasing from 6% to 9% over 2006/08, alignment with priorities less well defined.
Inclusiveness of budgetary processes		Limited participation of stakeholders, mainly restricted to education/finance ministry discussions, with uneven involvement of key private sector and teacher organizations.
Timeliness of donor pledging		Extensive dialogue on PRSP and 2009 education round table is providing a better basis for donor programming priorities and calendars.
Donor accountability mechanisms		Growing accountability for individual support programme results. Less well defined in terms of overall sectoral performance, due to limited performance data.
<b>C. Sector Coordination and Management</b>		
Centre/decentralized coordination arrangements		Decentralization reform in 2006 constitution forms a potential basis, but limited action on the ground so far, in part due to difficult communication with regions.





Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Extent of networking with other key ministries		PRSP has initiated some networking, but absence of coherent education strategy makes it difficult to effectively network with finance/civil service.
Extent of donor influence on sector coordination arrangements		Extensive level of donor resources helps exert significant influence, alongside promotion of education round table and MEPSP programme coordination unit.
Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders		Growing willingness for information sharing, but undermined by lack of performance data and under-developed EMIS.
<b>D. Institutional Setting and Capacity</b>		
Extent to which sector organizations are influenced by external actors		Some influence of parliament and Finance Ministry, through the PRSP and independent Education Strategy Commission.
Extent to which sector organizations are externally client oriented		Partially influenced by concerns of faith based organizations, parents and teachers bodies, but mechanisms are under-developed.
Extent to which sector organizations are internally client oriented		Some internal influence over individual education programme allocations within MEPSP departments, but limited coordination with higher education ministry.
<b>E. Performance Monitoring System</b>		
Availability of sector performance data		Donor supported initiatives have produced some education data sets, but no institutionalized EMIS exists are there are concerns over quality of available data.
Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms		There is limited capacity and systems within the central education ministry and other government organizations to effectively use available data for decision making.
Availability of sector results framework		There is some evidence of indicators and targets having been developed for individual programmes, but not for overall sector plans.
Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)		No formal annual joint performance monitoring systems are yet in place, though the education section of PER and donor round table offer a starting point.
<b>F. Macro-Economic Framework</b>		
Linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning		Significant strides since 2002, including legal framework and regulations for annual budget process, including well defined public expenditure procedures.
Availability of medium term sector resource envelopes		Education Ministry is not allocated sector envelop, which makes credible budget planning and strategy development problematic.
Alignment between macro and sectoral development policy		Regular commitment through PRSP that education is priority, especially EFA, but reflection in education budget commitments uneven.
Relative prioritization of government financing of education		Prioritization appears to vary with peaks and troughs in education share and overall budgeting tends to be historical.
<b>G. Public Financial Management</b>		
Transparency of PFM systems		Significant strides over past 6-7 years with regular production of budget execution and treasury operations reports, although quality of information uncertain.
Effectiveness of budget control mechanisms		Significant discrepancies and delays in budget allocation/execution, especially for items involving procurement and also cash management problems.
Effectiveness of internal audit systems		Recent tracking studies suggest that internal financial controls, especially for teachers salaries, is a major challenge and efforts are only just beginning.
Effectiveness of external audit and watchdogs		Within government, external audit does not appear to be a priority, but parents committees are making efforts to monitor use of school fees.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:  Beginning: 		

Table 2: Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders and Interest Groups

Actor/Interest Group	Role and Importance	Extent of Interests	Extent of Power & Resources	Extent of Linkages	Extent of Incentives	Rationale
National Government						Marginal provider, mainly enabling of private sector provision.
Local Government						Little authority or capacity, even for school supervision.
Community Providers						Limited provider, apart from education/protection foundation.
Public-private partnerships						Main provider through faith based organizations.
Frontline providers						Teachers' unions influential, mainly over personnel incentives.
Citizens (students/parents)						Parent/student associations organized, limited resources.
Diaspora						Significant provider of household resources for education.
Development partners						Provide large proportion of development resources.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited: 						



The assessment in Tables 3 and 4 below is designed to synthesize governance and accountability relations and mechanisms and illustrate the way they impinge on education sector development. This assessment is also incorporated into Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 3: Assessment of Education Governance Mechanisms








Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Governance by hierarchy		Limited delegated authority, even within the government service.
Patrimonial governance		Regional and tribal influences on some education provision.
Market governance		Very influential through extensive private sector and faith based organizations.
Voluntary network governance		Some efforts to mobilize, but lack resources and points of influence.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited: 		

Table 4: Assessment of Accountability Relations and Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Rating	Rationale
Information about and clarity of governance		Some education regulations published, but compliance arrangement unclear.
Responsiveness of governance		Responses tend to be arbitrary, especially for use of salaries/school fees.
Accountability set-up and responsibility		Very little capacity to undertake watchdog role at any level of system.
Capacity for governance and accountability		School supervision system barely functioning and under-resourced.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:  Beginning: 		

#### 4. Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance

Tables 5 and 6 below summarize the trajectory of education performance, including fragility impact and summarize what are key enabling or hindering factors on maintaining or strengthening sector resilience. This analysis provides the basis for Chapter 4 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 5: Education Sector Performance and Resilience Trends











Sub Sector	Overall Performance	Regional Performance Parity	Gender Performance Parity	Fragile Area Performance Parity	Rationale
Primary	î	î	è	î	High urban/rural disparities, with growing disparity in conflict areas.
Secondary	î	î	è	î	High urban/rural disparities, with growing disparity in conflict areas.
Tertiary	î	î	è	î	High urban/rural disparities, with growing disparity in conflict areas.
High:  Medium:  Low: 					
Upward Trend:  Neutral Trend:  Downward Trend: 					

Table 6: Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Security, political and economic/administrative governance		Political, security and economic outlook improving and beginning to enable embryonic planning, although eastern provinces still conflict affected.
Education financing and state revenues		Improvements in revenue and growth are improving revenue base, but sector budget planning capacity still problematic.
Education providers (state, non-state and public-private partnerships)		Government aid to private schools is enabling public-private partnership but regulatory issues are a problem.
Education participation		Lack of mechanisms for effective stakeholder consultation, with a sense of competition with the powerful faith based sector is a constraint.
Restoration or maintenance of teaching service		Some effort to pay for both public and aided private school teachers is a start, but poor implementation and low salaries are a hindrance on motivated teachers.
Restoration of the role of the state		Efforts being made to restore public system and increase public expenditure to enable restoration of state role, but education ministry capacity to do so limited.
Strongly Enabling:  Enabling:  Hindering:  Strongly Hindering: 		

## 5. Assessment of Sector Governance Challenges

Tables 7 and 8 below provide an overview of the various aspects of sector governance challenges and prospects for sector resilience, including the role of donor agencies. This analysis is incorporated in Chapter 5 of the Synthesis Report. The assessment summarizes the extent to which progress in addressing sector governance challenges has been made and identifies related opportunities and risks.

Table 7: Progress Made in Addressing Governance Challenges and Strengthening Resilience









Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Opportunities and Risks
<b>A. Macro Governance Issues</b>		
Various actors, authority and accountability mechanisms		The efforts to better coordinate education providers constitutes an opportunity for mutual accountability. The risk is a lack of clear regulation and public/private competition.
Building government capacity (e.g. PFM and PSM)		The opportunity is to translate improving macro budget planning into similar sectoral efforts. The risk is limited sector ministry capacity to grasp these opportunities.
Role of NGOs and CBOs from delivery to planning, oversight and advocacy		The setting up of various NGO education organizations is an opportunity to build up oversight/advocacy, although urban focus and lack of resources is a major risk.
Donor support and strengthening government capacity and accountability		The joint framework agreed through PRSP and PER is an opportunity to focus on governance capacity building. Risk of variable technical capacity within government.
<b>B. Sectoral Governance Issues</b>		
Move from emergency relief to sector reconstruction/development		Opportunity is to consolidate the reconstruction effort, especially in more unstable areas. Risk is that absence of sector plan/targets and governance framework is a constraint.
Early formulation of an education strategic plan		Opportunity to build on existing education strategic planning processes. There is a risk that unless all key stakeholders are involved, any plan may lack legitimacy.
Strengthening education system capacity (e.g. overage students)		Opportunity to build on a range of ALP initiatives, especially in conflict areas and IDP camps. Risk that these will overstretch capacity and delay formal education expansion.
Financing systems		Opportunity to use increased state revenues for expanded education provision. Risk is that high share of funds will be urban focused and limited non-salary spending levels.
Sustainable teacher management		Opportunity to build efforts to provide public funds for public/private school teachers, risk is that the payroll system remains dysfunctional and salaries too low.
Restoring institutions: social inclusion and information/communication		Opportunity is to use significant donor resources to help improve social inclusion and information systems, risk is lack of sustainable regulatory framework and compliance.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:  Beginning: 		

Table 8: Assessment of External Assistance Modalities

Modality	Assessment		
Debt Relief			
General budget support		Extensive:	
Education Sector budget support			
Off budget project support		Significant:	
On budget project support			
Multi donor trust funds/pooled funds		Limited:	
NGO grant financing			
Capacity development TA		None:	

DRC mainly benefits from various forms of grant support, which are mainly off budget, with a substantial amount through direct grants to UN agencies and NGOs working at grassroots levels. Harmonization and alignment of aid remains limited, although there is a greater focus on TA support for policy development, planning and organizational reform.

The primary sources of information and analysis for these country profiles is in the country report, derived from the country bibliography below.

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
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## Annex 5: Haiti Country Profile

This country profile summarizes the key sector governance findings of the country report, drawing on the overall Study methodology at Chapter 1 and specific EC and other donor sector governance analytical tools.

### 1. Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events

The chronology below maps critical security, political and sector governance events which have strongly influenced the relationship between fragility status and sector development transitions, as highlighted in Chapter 2 of the Synthesis Report.



### Overall Fragility Assessment

In transition from recovery to reconstruction with elements of arrested development in more conflict or more disaster prone areas, especially in urban slums and northern coastal areas respectively.

### 3. Country Education Sector Governance Assessment and Outlook

The analysis below assesses the status of key macro and sector governance features and analyses the relationship between various actors/stakeholders and their influence on sector governance. This has then been used to inform the further governance analysis carried out in Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 1: Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessment

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
<b>A. Sector Policy/Strategy</b>		
Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes		Dominant role for central education Ministry with limited involvement of provincial and municipal education authorities.
Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes		Some voice for private education provider coalitions and civil society, but mainly review role, not policy making.
Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes		Some role of civil society in PNEF process, less so for community organizations and school parent committees. NGOs mainly involved in validation, not development.
Transparency of policy making processes		PNEF yet to be reviewed due to political instability and uneven capacity within government and other stakeholders.
<b>B. Budget and Expenditure Management</b>		
Budget influence on policy making		Lack of results orientation in PNEF makes it difficult to align with budget priorities.
Inclusiveness of budgetary processes		Budgeting based on historical trends, with little attention paid to contributions from private sector little participation from sub-national education offices.
Timeliness of donor pledging		PNEF planning has been significantly undermined in the past by uncertain levels of donor support which are sensitive to political changes.
Donor accountability mechanisms		Absence of joint review process or education round table limits donor accountability to GoH/Education Ministry.
<b>C. Sector Coordination and Management</b>		
Centre/decentralized coordination arrangements		ONAPE (Public Private Partnership Agency) legislation in place, but yet to be implemented.

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Extent of networking with other key ministries		Limited consultation with civil service or planning ministries, mainly with finance/budget authorities.
Extent of donor influence on sector coordination arrangements		Interim Framework for Collaboration (CFI) seen to be overly donor led with little government ownership, though possible foundation for strengthened arrangements.
Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders		Very little information sharing due to underdeveloped education census and EMIS arrangements though recognized as a priority.
<b>D. Institutional Setting and Capacity</b>		
Extent to which sector organizations are influenced by external actors		Heavily influenced by faith based education providers who constitute more than 90% of primary schools and mobilize most of the financing in the sector.
Extent to which sector organizations are externally client oriented		Limited sense of accountability to parents/communities by MENFP, more short route accountability between private providers and parents.
Extent to which sector organizations are internally client oriented		Extensive influence, between MENFP programme departments and with finance ministry.
<b>E. Performance Monitoring System</b>		
Availability of sector performance data		There is a lack of any systematic school census exercises and no comprehensive nationwide EMIS, though private education foundations have some data.
Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms		There are no formal national performance monitoring systems in place mainly due to the lack of EMIS data.
Availability of sector results framework		There are targets in the PNEF and EFA Plan, but information systems for monitoring are at best embryonic.
Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)		Performance monitoring takes place within the better established non-state providers such as CEEC and FEPH, but not within government.
<b>F. Macro-Economic Framework</b>		
Linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning		Beginnings of macro economic reform, driven by recent Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) reviews by World Bank.
Availability of medium term sector resource envelopes		There is not yet a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework for education and GDP shares vary over time.
Alignment between macro and sectoral development policy		Some alignment between PRSP and PNEF in policy terms and development objectives, but there is little alignment between PNEF and annual budget processes.
Relative prioritization of government financing of education		Social sector expenditure shares have increased by 30% since 2005, but from a very low baseline of 2% GDP, compared to 12% GDP from private sector.
<b>G. Public Financial Management</b>		
Transparency of PFM systems		Introduction of automated FMIS across government departments is beginning to improve transparency.
Effectiveness of budget control mechanisms		Some efforts being made, but all ministries suffer from limited capacity to control cash flow and related budgeting, including education.
Effectiveness of internal audit systems		Some progress in internal audit arrangements over the last few years, but audit of private providers by government not taking place.
Effectiveness of external audit and watchdogs		Undermined by the very limited capacity of the supreme audit institution (CSCCA), though legal framework in place.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:  Beginning: 		

Table 2: Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders and Interest Groups

Actor/Interest Group	Role and Importance	Extent of Interests	Extent of Power & Resources	Extent of Linkages	Extent of Incentives	Rationale
National Government						Limited provider and power due to dominance of private sector.
Local Government						Even more limited influence, due to strong centralized approach.
Community Providers						Limited influence due to substitution by private sector & Diaspora.
Public-private partnerships						Highly influential, both politically and educationally.
Frontline providers						Limited power, but fee paying means schools have some influence.
Citizens (students/parents)						Strong incentive for attendance, limited power/access to networks.
Diaspora						Highly important though remittances, not well organized.

Development partners						Significant influence on MENFP, less so with private sector.
Extensive:		Significant:		Limited:		

The assessment in Tables 3 and 4 below is designed to synthesize governance and accountability relations and mechanisms and illustrate the way they impinge on education sector development. This assessment is also incorporated into Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 3: Assessment of Education Governance Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale				
Governance by hierarchy		Limited delegated authority to sub-national authorities, non hierarchical private sector.				
Patrimonial governance		Patronage applies across both public and private sector, including politics and religion.				
Market governance		Dominated by supply/demand, with private sector mainly responsive.				
Voluntary network governance		Poor urban slums demonstrate a degree of cooperative volunteerism.				
Extensive:		Significant:		Limited:		

Table 4: Assessment of Accountability Relations and Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Information about and clarity of governance		Absence of regulatory/quality assurance framework for public/private schools.
Responsiveness of governance		Resistance to setting up independent education regulatory agency.
Accountability set-up and responsibility		Limited existence/capacity of parliamentary oversight and watchdog bodies.
Capacity for governance and accountability		Unevenness in resources being available for audit and watchdog bodies.
Extensive:	Significant:	Limited:
		Beginning:

#### 4. Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance

Tables 5 and 6 below summarize the trajectory of education performance, including fragility impact and summarize what are key enabling or hindering factors on maintaining or strengthening sector resilience. This analysis provides the basis for Chapter 4 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 5: Education Sector Performance and Resilience Trends

Sub Sector	Overall Performance	Regional Performance Parity	Gender Performance Parity	Fragile Area Performance Parity	Rationale
Primary	î	è	è	î	Overall enrolment growth, but much lower access in slum and hurricane areas.
Secondary	î	è	è	î	Overall enrolment growth, but much lower access in slum and hurricane areas.
Tertiary	î	è	è	î	High demand in urban areas, less provision in slum, rural and hurricane areas.
High:		Medium:		Low:	
Upward Trend:	î	Neutral Trend:	è	Downward Trend:	î

Table 6: Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Security, political and economic/administrative governance		Uncertain security and political situation, though some economic stabilization, natural disasters continually undermine reconstruction effort.
Education financing and state revenues		Reconstruction hindered by lack of public investment and over reliance on private sector initiatives and remittances.
Education providers (state, non-state and public-private partnerships)		The dominant private sector strongly enables resilience with continued growth in private school enrolment share during every period of instability.
Education participation		Lack of any coherent arrangement for stakeholder participation in sector planning or monitoring is a serious constraint on resilience.
Restoration or maintenance of teaching service		The majority of teachers are not accredited, salary scales are not regulated, no

		payroll system and evidence of discontent and low morale amongst some teachers.					
Restoration of the role of the state		The dominant private sector, through fee paying and remittances, undermines will to restore the role of the state, alongside MENFP capacity constraints.					
Strongly Enabling:		Enabling:		Hindering:		Strongly Hindering:	

## 5. Assessment of Sector Governance Challenges

Tables 7 and 8 below provide an overview of the various aspects of sector governance challenges and prospects for sector resilience, including the role of donor agencies. This analysis is incorporated in Chapter 5 of the Synthesis Report. The assessment summarizes the extent to which progress in addressing sector governance challenges has been made and identifies related opportunities and risks.

Table 7: Progress Made in Addressing Governance Challenges and Strengthening Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Opportunities and Risks	
A. Macro Governance Issues			
Various actors, authority and accountability mechanisms		Opportunity to strengthen accountability mechanisms for private providers, serious risk that government/education Ministry has limited will and capacity.	
Building government capacity (e.g. PFM and PSM)		Opportunity to build on recent progress and implement PER recommendations within the sector, risk of limited education Ministry capacity to do so.	
Role of NGOs and CBOs from delivery to planning, oversight and advocacy		Opportunity to build on some embryonic NGOs and CBOs for watchdog role, but risk that NGOs and CBOs will focus on selective service delivery only.	
Donor support and strengthening government capacity and accountability		Opportunity to build on various PFM action plans through donor support. Risk that government ministries are unwilling to be held accountable for sector results.	
B. Sectoral Governance Issues			
Move from emergency relief to sector reconstruction/development		Opportunity to build on recent recovery from hurricane damage through school restoration. Risk that natural disasters and political instability may recur and disrupt.	
Early formulation of an education strategic plan		Opportunity to build on EFA Plan and NPEF formulated in the late 90's, risk that current inertia for change and lack of budget alignment will continue delays.	
Strengthening education system capacity (e.g. overage students)		Opportunity to build on robust private sector capacity, risk that reliance on fees and remittances will reinforce current inequitable access for the poorest.	
Financing systems		Opportunity to begin to regulate private contributions and reflect them in a sector MTEF, risk that current situation will be retained and role of government undermined.	
Sustainable teacher management		Opportunity to promote regulation of teacher salaries across public and private schools, risk of lack of will to do so and consequent teacher dissatisfaction and low morale.	
Restoring institutions: social inclusion and information/communication		Opportunity to adopt legislation/regulations related to role of education ministry and regulatory agency. Failure to do so carries risk of continued social exclusion.	
Extensive:	Significant:	Limited:	Beginning:

Table 8: Assessment of External Assistance Modalities

Modality	Assessment		
Debt Relief			
General budget support		Extensive:	
Sector budget support			
Off budget project support		Significant:	
On budget project support			
Multi donor trust funds/pooled funds		Limited:	
NGO grant financing			
Capacity development TA		None:	



Haiti benefits from an IMF/World Bank Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility to central government, but virtually all of sector aid is reportedly off budget, with a significant amount channelled through NGO grants. Support from the EFA FTI Catalytic Fund is anticipated in the near future and is expected to be recorded on the government budget. The primary sources of information and analysis for these country profiles is in the country report, derived from the country bibliography below.

## Selected Bibliography : Haiti


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## Annex 6: Lebanon Country Profile

This country profile summarizes the key sector governance findings of the country report, drawing on the overall Study methodology at Chapter 1 and specific EC and other donor sector governance analytical tools.

### 1. Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events

The chronology below maps critical security, political and sector governance events which have strongly influenced the relationship between fragility status and sector development transitions, as highlighted in Chapter 2 of the Synthesis Report.



### 2. Overall Fragility Assessment

Mid way stage of recovery to reconstruction transition, temporarily disrupted by 2006 hostilities, with continued access/quality disparities in more conflict prone areas in north and south.

### 3. Country Education Sector Governance Assessment and Outlook

The analysis below assesses the status of key macro and sector governance features and analyses the relationship between various actors/stakeholders and their influence on sector governance. This has then been used to inform the further governance analysis carried out in Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 1: Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessment

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
<b>A. Sector Policy/Strategy</b>		
Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes		Increased stakeholder participation between government, faith based organizations and professional associations in preparation of EFA plan & strategy documents over 2005/06
Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes		Limited involvement of finance ministry and governate authorities in sector level policy decision making.
Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes		Extensive inclusiveness in policy processes, but effectiveness undermined by confessionalism related loyalties and interests.
Transparency of policy making processes		Tends to be an opaque process where education ministry consults privately with perceived insiders (e.g. private sector, faith based groups).
<b>B. Budget and Expenditure Management</b>		
Budget influence on policy making		Limited alignment between policy priorities and budgets, with spending priorities driven by group interests (e.g. teachers).
Inclusiveness of budgetary processes		Limited participation of stakeholders, mainly restricted to education/finance ministry discussions, with uneven involvement of key private sector and teacher organizations.
Timeliness of donor pledging		EFA Plan and strategy offer potential opportunity, but underdeveloped sector working groups mean that potential mechanisms for formal pledging are just beginning.
Donor accountability mechanisms		Limited focus on results framework means that any accountability is restricted to individual donor programmes, rather than at the sector level.
<b>C. Sector Coordination and Management</b>		
Centre/decentralized coordination arrangements		Limited progress on decentralization means that coordination is highly centralized between education ministry and interest groups.

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Extent of networking with other key ministries		EFA/ESP and annual budget process means some networking with finance ministry, less so with important civil service reforms.
Extent of donor influence on sector coordination Arrangements		Only just beginning, largely through the Paris 3 post-conflict recovery programme, little progress at the sector reconstruction level, with no ESWG.
Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders		EMIS is available and operational within education ministry, but its use as part of information sharing with stakeholders is limited.
<b>D. Institutional Setting and Capacity</b>		
Extent to which sector organizations are influenced by external actors		Significant influence by political and religious groups, particularly related to staff appointments and funding priorities.
Extent to which sector organizations are externally client oriented		Not significantly external client oriented, due in part to the fact that faith based organizations as providers assume the interfacing role with communities.
Extent to which sector organizations are internally client oriented		Significantly influenced by internal education ministry considerations, especially related to programme budget allocations.
<b>E. Performance Monitoring System</b>		
Availability of sector performance data		Significant performance data available, including regional disaggregated data, although its use for decision making appears more limited.
Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms		Very little use of data for accountability purposes, either between education/finance ministries or centre/governate and parliaments.
Availability of sector results framework		EFA plan and strategy have indicative results framework, but its use for operational planning or budgeting appears limited.
Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)		No formal annual joint performance monitoring systems are yet in place, though the donor community is advocating strongly for these.
<b>F. Macro-Economic Framework</b>		
Linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning		Linkage between fiscal and sectoral planning appears to have weakened, due in part to serious fiscal uncertainties in recent years.
Availability of medium term sector resource envelopes		Education Ministry is not formally allocated a medium-term resource envelope for planning purposes, although the recent PER advocates for one.
Alignment between macro and sectoral development policy		Alignment appeared strong during post-conflict reconstruction period, but alignment of EFA and macro development policy is less clear.
Relative prioritization of government financing of education		Decline from 12% of public expenditure to 10% over the past 5 years, due in part to post-conflict reconstruction costs.
<b>G. Public Financial Management</b>		
Transparency of PFM systems		Significant progress with MoF publishing annual financial reports and budget projections on websites.
Effectiveness of budget control mechanisms		Significant progress in improving budget execution and containing overspending, although sector budget financial reports need improving.
Effectiveness of internal audit systems		Extensive coverage of internal audit of public expenditure programmes, although status specifically within education sector less clear.
Effectiveness of external audit and watchdogs		Extensive coverage of external audit through national agencies, although role of independent watchdogs on public spending unclear.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> <div>Beginning:</div> </div>		

Table 2: Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders and Interest Groups

Actor/Interest Group	Role and Importance	Extent of Interests	Extent of Power & Resources	Extent of Linkages	Extent of Incentives	Rationale
National Government						Some legitimate power, but less so as a provider of services.
Local Government						Limited role and marginalized by strong private sector.
Community Providers						Limited provider, apart from community based ECE.
Public-private partnerships						Extensive influence through politics, religion and resources.
Frontline providers						Schools have limited authority and influence, mainly accountability.
Citizens (students/parents)						Citizens have limited authority and influence, mainly accountability.
Diaspora						Strong financial influence, but limited organizational power.
Development partners						Appears limited in the absence of well organized coordination.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> </div>						

The assessment in Tables 3 and 4 below is designed to synthesize governance and accountability relations and mechanisms and illustrate the way they impinge on education sector development. This assessment is also incorporated into Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 3: Assessment of Education Governance Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Governance by hierarchy		Limited delegated authority to governates, even within the government service.
Patrimonial governance		Confessionalism determines many governance decisions, including staffing.
Market governance		Strong competition amongst private education providers at all levels.
Voluntary network governance		Extensive informal influence through faith based and religious groups.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:		

Table 4: Assessment of Accountability Relations and Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Information about and clarity of governance		Sector regulatory framework in place and groups are well informed.
Responsiveness of governance		Limited discretion in deviating from regulatory framework, resulting in some rigidity.
Accountability set-up and responsibility		Limited oversight arrangements within parliament, audit agencies exist.
Capacity for governance and accountability		Education ministry capacity for school supervision and quality assurance limited.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:  Beginning:		

#### 4. Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance

Tables 5 and 6 below summarize the trajectory of education performance, including fragility impact and summarize what are key enabling or hindering factors on maintaining or strengthening sector resilience. This analysis provides the basis for Chapter 4 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 5: Education Sector Performance and Resilience Trends

Sub Sector	Overall Performance	Regional Performance Parity	Gender Performance Parity	Fragile Area Performance Parity	Rationale
Primary	è	î	è	î	Stagnant enrolment due to conflict issues, but also repetition and drop out.
Secondary	è	î	è	î	Stagnant enrolment due to conflict issues, but also repetition and drop out.
Tertiary	î	î	è	î	Private sector driven growth, but very urban focused and benefits better off.
High:  Medium:  Low:					
Upward Trend:  Neutral Trend:  Downward Trend:					

Table 6: Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Security, political and economic/administrative governance		Continued political uncertainty and high fiscal deficits hinder steps towards greater sector resilience and development.
Education financing and state revenues		Over reliance on non-government spending allows government to spend on other priorities, hindering a sustainable financing plan.
Education providers (state, non-state and public-private partnerships)		Non-state and PPP arrangements enable reconstruction in times of turbulence and help mobilize community support for education.
Education participation		Diverse range of providers help mobilize participation of government, faith based, politically based and community based organizations.
Restoration or maintenance of teaching service		Early restoration of teaching service through combination of paid salaries, but also children's education grants, costs are becoming unsustainable.
Restoration of the role of the state		Role of the state in terms of policy development and monitoring being hindered by only partial authority and limited capacity.
Strongly Enabling:  Enabling:  Hindering:  Strongly Hindering:		

## 5. Assessment of Sector Governance Challenges

Tables 7 and 8 below provide an overview of the various aspects of sector governance challenges and prospects for sector resilience, including the role of donor agencies. This analysis is incorporated in Chapter 5 of the Synthesis Report. The assessment summarizes the extent to which progress in addressing sector governance challenges has been made and identifies related opportunities and risks.

Table 7: Progress Made in Addressing Governance Challenges and Strengthening Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Opportunities and Risks
<b>A. Macro Governance Issues</b>		
Various actors, authority and accountability mechanisms		Authority of government during post-conflict phase constituted an opportunity for accelerated reconstruction, risk that limited stakeholder participation will be undermining.
Building government capacity (e.g. PFM and PSM)		Regulatory frameworks for PFM constitute opportunity for greater results orientation, risk that this will not be translated down to the sector level.
Role of NGOs and CBOs from delivery to planning, oversight and advocacy		Opportunity to build on NGO/CBO cooperation to sustain service delivery, risk that government will lack capacity to regulate PPP effectively. .
Donor support and strengthening government capacity and accountability		Recent PER provides opportunity for harmonized support against common action plan, sector level capacity for results monitoring/accountability is a risk.
<b>B. Sectoral Governance Issues</b>		
Move from emergency relief to sector reconstruction/development		Legitimacy of joint government/donor Paris 3 process was opportunity to move to reconstruction quickly, risk that progress will not be sustained.
Early formulation of an education strategic plan		Opportunity to build EFA Plan and education vision/mission. Risk that all stakeholders will not get behind its implementation.
Strengthening education system capacity (e.g. overage students)		Opportunity to optimize system capacity through measures to reduce repetition and drop out, associated risk that if not achieved, system will be overstretched and inefficient.
Financing systems		Opportunity to build on robust public private partnership, risk that unless government regulate PPP, parental confidence in quality and value for money will be undermined.
Sustainable teacher management		Opportunity to rationalize current teacher remuneration system to allow more pro-poor targeting of teacher education grants. Risk of limited sustainability if not done.
Restoring institutions: social inclusion and information/communication		Opportunity to use pro-poor education reform in PER as a basis for policy dialogue, including for refugee education. Risk that if not done, exclusion will increase.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> <div>Beginning:</div> </div>		

Table 8: Assessment of External Assistance Modalities

Modality	Assessment		
Debt Relief			
General budget support		Extensive:	
Sector budget support			
Off budget project support		Significant:	
On budget project support			
Multi donor trust funds/pooled funds		Limited:	
NGO grant financing			
Capacity development TA		None:	

Lebanon has been a limited beneficiary of external assistance for education, apart from during the post-conflict recovery period. There are signs that the EFA plan and education strategy are helping to mobilize increased levels of assistance from a range of sources.

The primary sources of information and analysis for these country profiles is in the country report, derived from the country bibliography below.

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


## Annex 7: Liberia Country Profile

This country profile summarizes the key sector governance findings of the country report, drawing on the overall Study methodology at Chapter 1 and specific EC and other donor sector governance analytical tools.

### 1. Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events

The chronology below maps critical security, political and sector governance events which have strongly influenced the relationship between development transitions, as highlighted in Chapter 2 of the Report.



### Assessment

The education sector in Liberia can be best characterized as being in a post-conflict/reconstruction stage which will rapidly enter recovery/restoration, provided the anticipated ESP proves to be an effective sector-wide development framework, that aid effectiveness in the sector improves and additional resources for education are mobilized quickly.

### 3. Country Education Sector Governance Assessment and Outlook

The analysis below assesses the status of key macro and sector governance features and analyses the relationship between various actors/stakeholders and their influence on sector governance. This has then been used to inform the further governance analysis carried out in Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 1: Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessment

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
<b>A. Sector Policy/Strategy</b>		
Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes		Early attempts at sector policy largely donor led, subsequent efforts mainly by central ministry, current ESP in development will incorporate broad stakeholder appraisal.
Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes		Capacity of sub-national education authorities limited and only just restored, reliant on central ministry instruction and guidance.
Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes		Limited engagement in sector policy processes by other government agencies, despite ministry of education efforts with ministry engagement limited to senior staff.
Transparency of policy making processes		Current ESP formulation process guided by education law, PRSP and other regulatory frameworks and will incorporate review and appraisal process.
<b>B. Budget and Expenditure Management</b>		
Budget influence on policy making		Early attempts at sector policy independent of assessments of budget availability, currently program orientated, historic and limited by government budget constraints.
Inclusiveness of budgetary processes		Limited participation of stakeholders mainly restricted to education/finance ministry and donor representation with pressure to prioritize formal primary education.
Timeliness of donor pledging		Very little donor harmonization, some examples of extensive predictable off budget assistance and examples of serious delays more aligned donor support.
Donor accountability mechanisms		No joint annual review process, though ESP appraisal constitutes opportunity. Sector coordination facilitates focus on narrow individual donor concerns and not accountability.
<b>C. Sector Coordination and Management</b>		
Centre/decentralized coordination arrangements		Relationship between centre/sub-national authorities largely characterized by issuing or instructions and ad-hoc guidance with little systematic coordination.
Extent of networking with other key ministries		Limited to finance ministry through budget processes and limited strategic linkages (e.g. youth development) despite requirements to do so within PRSP.
Extent of donor influence on sector coordination		There are a number of donor coordination arrangements (some internal only),

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
arrangements		including an emerging ESG approach and joint steering committee as part of EPF.
Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders		Growing capacity with EMIS now functioning well, though limited analysis and dissemination of sector performance with consultation mainly internally focused.
<b>D. Institutional Setting and Capacity</b>		
Extent to which sector organizations are influenced by external actors		Evidence of political influence in education policy decisions, political settlement approaches to staffing of ministry influence decision making.
Extent to which sector organizations are externally client oriented		Client orientation of sector organizations still limited, though beginning to change, especially as a result of new ESP formulation process.
Extent to which sector organizations are internally client oriented		Dominance of central ministry staff in guiding work of sub-national education authorities results in a high degree of internal client orientation.
<b>E. Performance Monitoring System</b>		
Availability of sector performance data		EMIS now well established with support from various sources, though with only one year of published data needs time to bed in. Being used extensively to develop ESP.
Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms		Little evidence of results oriented reporting to parliament or other agencies and limited to internal progress reporting, not yet sufficiently linked to EMIS.
Availability of sector results framework		L-PERP first planning document to include results oriented indicators and targets, though limited in sub-sector scope. New ESP anticipated to be more comprehensive.
Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)		No joint sector performance review processes in place, but recent joint L-PERP performance assessment constitutes a good foundation on which to build.
<b>F. Macro-Economic Framework</b>		
Linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning		Cash based budgeting requirement as part of HIPC arrangements provides relatively predictable, though constrained, sector expenditure planning.
Availability of medium term sector resource envelopes		Annual cash based budgeting approaches have not involved significant medium-term planning, but plans for MTEF will shortly provide envelopes.
Alignment between macro and sectoral development policy		PRSP incorporates sector policies and strategies, including inter-ministry cooperation. Sector frameworks not yet sufficiently aligned with full range of PRSP education policies.
Relative prioritization of government financing of education		Education share stagnant at around 7%-8% of government spending, though volumes increasing.
<b>G. Public Financial Management</b>		
Transparency of PFM systems		Good progress under GEMAP, draft PFM, procurement and anti-corruption legislation submitted or enacted. Weak scores under 2007 PEFA, but strong progress since.
Effectiveness of budget control mechanisms		Budget execution often diverges significantly from plans. Delays in implementing legislation and line ministry capacity constraints remain problematic.
Effectiveness of internal audit systems		PFM act anticipated to address internal audit structural and functional alignment, but as yet still remains underdeveloped.
Effectiveness of external audit and watchdogs		External audit function is weak and legislative capacity to perform oversight role is insufficient.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> <div>Beginning:</div> </div>		

Table 2: Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders and Interest Groups

Actor/Interest Group	Role and Importance	Extent of Interests	Extent of Power & Resources	Extent of Linkages	Extent of Incentives	Rationale
National Government						Significant influence from policy making and resource allocation.
Local Government						Reliant on central government, starting to forge community links
Community Providers						Strong historic legacy of community initiatives supported by NGOs.
Public-private partnerships						Faith based groups are 20% of provision with strong networks.
Frontline providers						Limited voice, but strong interests in community relationships.
Citizens (students/parents)						Strong demand for education, but limited resources.
Diaspora						Limited direct influence, but returnees may grow in influence.
Development partners						Significant investors and extensive influence all levels.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> </div>						

The assessment in Tables 3 and 4 below is designed to synthesize governance and accountability relations and mechanisms and illustrate the way they impinge on education sector development. This assessment is also incorporated into Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 3: Assessment of Education Governance Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Governance by hierarchy		Very centralized approach to education sector management and decision making.
Patrimonial governance		Current politicization of ministry consequence of post-conflict political settlements.
Market governance		Some competition between private providers, limited to urban areas..
Voluntary network governance		Significant, as a legacy of absence of state provision, but may be starting to wane.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:		

Table 4: Assessment of Accountability Relations and Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Information about and clarity of governance		Some sector legislation, emerging government wide legislation, limited communication.
Responsiveness of governance		Sub-national authorities highly dependent on central ministry for guidance.
Accountability set-up and responsibility		Sub-national parliaments oriented towards central government, not civil society.
Capacity for governance and accountability		Limited internal and external audit and parliamentary oversight capacity.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:  Beginning:		

#### 4. Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance

Tables 5 and 6 below summarize the trajectory of education performance, including fragility impact and summarize what are key enabling or hindering factors on maintaining or strengthening sector resilience. This analysis provides the basis for Chapter 4 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 5: Education Sector Performance and Resilience Trends

Sub Sector	Overall Performance	Regional Performance Parity	Gender Performance Parity	Fragile Area Performance Parity	Rationale
Primary	è	ì	ì	è	Strong enrolment growth now stagnating, regional disparities related to age profiles only.
Secondary	è	î	ì	î	Continued enrolment growth, though significant disparities between urban/coastal/rural.
Tertiary	î	î	ì	î	Increasing demand, but facilities mainly located in Monrovia.
High:  Medium:  Low:					
Upward Trend:  Neutral Trend:  Downward Trend:					

Table 6: Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Security, political and economic/administrative governance		Some progress on administrative/economic governance through GEMAP, internal stability still reliant on UNMIL and conflict stopped, not resolved.
Education financing and state revenues		Cash based budgeting a constraint on government financing of education, largely off-budget and unpredictable donor financing not sufficiently enabling.
Education providers (state, non-state and public-private partnerships)		Growing share public provision is enabling resilience, but better coordination with non-state actors is critical.
Education participation		Strong value accorded by Government and communities to education, though lack of ministry of education policy alignment with PRSP needs addressing urgently.
Restoration or maintenance of teaching service		Remuneration of teachers becoming more predictable but legacy of under qualified teachers remains a serious concern.
Restoration of the role of the state		Good progress in establishing policy development role of central ministry, but a lack of capacity and incentives at sub-national level remains a concern.
Strongly Enabling:  Enabling:  Hindering:  Strongly Hindering:		

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## 5. Assessment of Sector Governance Challenges

Tables 7 and 8 below provide an overview of the various aspects of sector governance challenges and prospects for sector resilience, including the role of donor agencies. This analysis is incorporated in Chapter 5 of the Synthesis Report. The assessment summarizes the extent to which progress in addressing sector governance challenges has been made and identifies related opportunities and risks.

Table 7: Progress Made in Addressing Governance Challenges and Strengthening Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Opportunities and Risks
<b>A. Macro Governance Issues</b>		
Various actors, authority and accountability mechanisms		Opportunity to build on peace dividends to strengthen legitimacy, risk associated with interests represented by local officials (who are centrally appointed).
Building government capacity (e.g. PFM and PSM)		Opportunity provided by HIPC completion triggers to focus strongly on governance reforms, risk of continued use of external interim processes and not national systems.
Role of NGOs and CBOs from delivery to planning, oversight and advocacy		Opportunity for well organized NGO/CBO arrangements to be transformed into advocacy and watchdog role but serious risk of resistance.
Donor support and strengthening government capacity and accountability		Opportunity to build on GEMAP process and move towards more aligned forms of support on HIPC completion, capacity gap filling TA continuing too long is a risk.
<b>B. Sectoral Governance Issues</b>		
Move from emergency relief to sector reconstruction/development		Appraisal and adoption of ESP constitutes major opportunity, risk if external assistance continues to be insufficiently aligned or harmonized.
Early formulation of an education strategic plan		Opportunity to build on L-PERP processes and adopt ESP under development quickly. Risk that insufficient inter-ministry cooperation fails to address key thematic issues.
Strengthening education system capacity (e.g. overage students)		Opportunity to realign ALP programs within a sector wide approach and avoid undermining formal approaches. Risk of underinvestment in infrastructure.
Financing systems		Opportunity to use PFM reforms and HIPC completion triggers to enable results oriented budgeting, risk of insufficient investment in ministry capacity and systems development.
Sustainable teacher management		Opportunity to engage with broader PSM reforms to support teacher development and rationalization, risk than lack of decentralized management undermines implementation.
Restoring institutions: social inclusion and information/communication		Opportunity to respond more effectively to PRSP role for education in peace building, risk that client orientation in the sector does not support civil society voice initiatives.

Extensive:

Significant:

Limited:

Beginning:

Table 8: Assessment of External Assistance Modalities

Modality	Assessment		
Debt Relief			
General budget support		Extensive:	
Sector budget support			
Off budget project support		Significant:	
On budget project support			
Multi donor trust funds/pooled funds		Limited:	
NGO grant financing			
Capacity development TA		None:	

Liberia benefits from a diverse range of aid support and modalities, except for sector budget support. Harmonization is improving, but alignment with sector priorities and systems needs addressing, especially focusing on capacity building targets and strategies through strategic TA.

The primary sources of information and analysis for these country profiles is in the country report, derived from the country bibliography below.

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
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## Annex 8: Somalia Country Profile

This country profile summarizes the key sector governance findings of the country report, drawing on the overall Study methodology at Chapter 1 and specific EC and other donor sector governance analytical tools.

### 1. Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events

The chronology below maps critical security, political and sector governance events which have strongly influenced the relationship between fragility status and sector development transitions, as highlighted in Chapter 2 of the Synthesis Report.



### Overall Fragility Assessment

Overall, Somalia is at a mid way stage in the transition from recovery to reconstruction, predominantly in Somaliland and Puntland, with South Central best characterized as arrested development.

### 3. Country Education Sector Governance Assessment and Outlook

The analysis below assesses the status of key macro/sector governance features and analyses the relationship between various actors/stakeholders and their influence on sector governance. This has then been used to inform the further governance analysis carried out in Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 1: Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessment

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
<b>A. Sector Policy/Strategy</b>		
Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes		Some stakeholder participation through education summits and reviews, but still predominantly government, not community stakeholders.
Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes		Limited participation of external actors, apart from finance ministry, although parliaments are starting to engage.
Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes		These education summits and policy development exercises have improved inclusiveness, but role in decision making of non-state actors is limited.
Transparency of policy making processes		Improved dissemination of sector review findings and education summits, but breadth of public awareness is uneven, especially in rural areas.
<b>B. Budget and Expenditure Management</b>		
Budget influence on policy making		Absence of PRSP and unpredictable fiscal outlooks make it very difficult to use planned budgets as an influence on policy making.
Inclusiveness of budgetary processes		Budget process largely restricted to education/finance ministries with formal parliamentary approval, role of donors in this process appears embryonic.
Timeliness of donor pledging		Puntland/Somaliland education strategies are becoming an incentive for timelier donor pledging, but budget capture processes need early strengthening.
Donor accountability mechanisms		Limited accountability emerging through joint review processes, but mainly at programme rather than sector level, with limited role for ESC.
<b>C. Sector Coordination and Management</b>		
Centre/decentralized coordination arrangements		Limited legitimacy for TFG means that each of three regions is autonomous, although coordination within regions limited, in part due to uncertain decentralization policies.
Extent of networking with other key ministries		Limited to some coordination with finance ministry, less so for civil service issues. Limited networking with defense/security ministries on ex-combatant education.








Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Extent of donor influence on sector coordination arrangements		Extensive donor drive in moving forward on sector coordination and review processes, with external assistance constituting 5-10 times government expenditure.
Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders		Annual education census provides entry point, but information sharing is limited to regional education ministries and donors.
<b>D. Institutional Setting and Capacity</b>		
Extent to which sector organizations are influenced by external actors		Some influence of regional parliaments and Finance Ministries, with extensive influence and patronage through regional clans, though declining in some urban areas.
Extent to which sector organizations are externally client oriented		Partially influenced by concerns of provide providers, less so from only embryonic CBOs, parents and teachers bodies.
Extent to which sector organizations are internally client oriented		Significant internal influences related to horses trading over individual programme budgets and accessing donor resources.
<b>E. Performance Monitoring System</b>		
Availability of sector performance data		Donor supported annual education census has produced useful data sets, but its use in policy/strategy formulation appears very limited.
Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms		New education sector performance review process in Puntland and Somaliland provides entry point, but lack of results focus makes accountability problematic.
Availability of sector results framework		The various education strategies have indicative targets, but use of these frameworks for expenditure planning or monitoring appears limited.
Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)		Representation is largely restricted to government bodies and the international community as opposed to non-state actors.
<b>F. Macro-Economic Framework</b>		
Linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning		Fiscal/revenue planning capacity is only embryonic and impinges little on sector expenditure planning which is minimal anyway.
Availability of medium term sector resource envelopes		Uncertain revenues mean little incentive for education/finance ministry coordination on sector MTEFs with little progress being made.
Alignment between macro and sectoral development policy		Recent joint needs assessment (JNA) and reconstruction strategy provides entry point, but still at an early stage.
Relative prioritization of government financing of education		Education share of public spending is only around 5%, with continuous priority being given to security/defence, relying on donor/private sources for education finance.
<b>G. Public Financial Management</b>		
Transparency of PFM systems		PFM action plans proposed by the JNA in 2007/08 still under review and commitment uncertain.
Effectiveness of budget control mechanisms		Limited budget control with constant reallocation of any revenues, to security as situation demands.
Effectiveness of internal audit systems		No clear function for audit within education ministry organizational structure and does not appear to be a priority due, in part, to low public expenditure.
Effectiveness of external audit and watchdogs		Very limited oversight/audit role by regional parliaments, but independent watchdogs nonexistent.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:  Beginning: 		

Table 2: Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders and Interest Groups

Actor/Interest Group	Role and Importance	Extent of Interests	Extent of Power & Resources	Extent of Linkages	Extent of Incentives	Rationale
National Government						TFG has little or no legitimacy within regional governments.
Local Government						Parliament and clans exert predominant influence.
Community Providers						Main providers with incentive of donor/NGO direct grants.
Public-private partnerships						Private university officials have extensive influence.
Frontline providers						Main accountability is between provider and parents.
Citizens (students/parents)						Very little influence apart from election of parliaments.
Diaspora						Important role in school fee paying, little organized influence.
Development partners						Highly important as main financier, but ESC coordination uneven.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited: 						



The assessment in Tables 3 and 4 below is designed to synthesize governance and accountability relations and mechanisms and illustrate the way they impinge on education sector development. This assessment is also incorporated into Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 3: Assessment of Education Governance Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Governance by hierarchy		Limited delegated authority to districts, even in PL and SL.
Patrimonial governance		Dominant factor is clan allegiance in most forms of decisions making.
Market governance		Only higher education is market responsive, less so in public schools.
Voluntary network governance		Extensive influence through community education councils and groups.
Extensive:		Significant:
		Limited:

Table 4: Assessment of Accountability Relations and Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Information about and clarity of governance		Limited legislative and regulatory framework, with little information sharing.
Responsiveness of governance		High levels of discretion, even for regulations that do exist.
Accountability set-up and responsibility		Accountability largely limited to an embryonic oversight role from parliament.
Capacity for governance and accountability		Very small education ministries and lack of resources mean limited capacity.
Extensive:		Significant:
		Limited:
		Beginning:

#### 4. Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance

Tables 5 and 6 below summarize the trajectory of education performance, including fragility impact and summarize what are key enabling or hindering factors on maintaining or strengthening sector resilience. This analysis provides the basis for Chapter 4 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 5: Education Sector Performance and Resilience Trends

Sub Sector	Overall Performance	Regional Performance Parity	Gender Performance Parity	Fragile Area Performance Parity	Rationale
Primary	î	î	è	î	Strong enrolment growth, with poverty factors as influential as security concerns.
Secondary	î	î	è	î	Strong enrolment growth, with poverty factors as influential as security concerns.
Tertiary	î	î	è	î	Strong enrolment growth, with poverty factors as influential as security concerns.
High:		Medium:		Low:	
Upward Trend:	î	Neutral Trend:	è	Downward Trend:	î

Table 6: Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Security, political and economic/administrative governance		Lack of authority of TFG highly problematic and limited economic/administrative governance hinders systematic education sector development.
Education financing and state revenues		Lack of public spending priority for education is major hindrance, with sustained risk that private and donor resources will allow for continued substitution.
Education providers (state, non-state and public-private partnerships)		Demonstrable ability and willingness of CECs to operate with little government support is enabling factor, even if political/economic situation deteriorates again.
Education participation		Frontline provider, parent and student relationships are source of resilience and engender sense of community level participation/mutual accountability.
Restoration or maintenance of teaching service		Limited effort in PL and SL to institute paid teaching service, but with limited progress due to top ups from schools and no teacher conditions of service.
Restoration of the role of the state		Limited political commitment to strengthen government provision, with heavy reliance on community and donor initiatives.
Strongly Enabling:		Enabling:
		Hindering:
		Strongly Hindering:

## 5. Assessment of Sector Governance Challenges

Tables 7 and 8 below provide an overview of the various aspects of sector governance challenges and prospects for sector resilience, including the role of donor agencies. This analysis is incorporated in Chapter 5 of the Synthesis Report. The assessment summarizes the extent to which progress in addressing sector governance challenges has been made and identifies related opportunities and risks.

Table 7: Progress Made in Addressing Governance Challenges and Strengthening Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Opportunities and Risks
<b>A. Macro Governance Issues</b>		
Various actors, authority and accountability mechanisms		Uncertain legitimacy and authority of TFG and three regions constitutes a continued risk, although parliamentary authority could be built on as an oversight function.
Building government capacity (e.g. PFM and PSM)		Opportunity to begin to use even small government expenditures as an entry point to sector PFM capacity building, key risk is very small education ministries.
Role of NGOs and CBOs from delivery to planning, oversight and advocacy		Continued opportunity for community level governance building through service delivery/planning with NGOs. Risk is marginalization of government role.
Donor support and strengthening government capacity and accountability		Limited focus of donor support to date on macro or sectoral governance capacity building and accountability mechanisms.
<b>B. Sectoral Governance Issues</b>		
Move from emergency relief to sector reconstruction/development		Sector plans and reviews in PL and SL constitute significant progress, while in SC, continued hostilities mean arrested development.
Early formulation of an education strategic plan		Current ESPs in PL and SL constitute an opportunity for more results oriented monitoring; risk is limited interest or capacity to do so.
Strengthening education system capacity (e.g. overage students)		Opportunity is to begin to mainstream NGO run NFE/ALP programmes within overall ESPs, risk is that these programmes will remain parallel to education system.
Financing systems		Opportunity is to begin to put community/donor education resources on budget as part of sector MTEF, serious risk of donors continuing to substitute for public expenditure.
Sustainable teacher management		Opportunity to build on embryonic partly paid teaching service in PL and SL, serious risk that school top-ups for teachers will mean state avoids considering realistic salaries.
Restoring institutions: social inclusion and information/communication		NGO/CBO initiatives have helped social inclusion and some information sharing. Risk is that this over reliance will delay demand for restoring government institutions.
<div> <div>Extensive:</div> <div>Significant:</div> <div>Limited:</div> <div>Beginning:</div> </div>		

Table 8: Assessment of External Assistance Modalities

Modality	Assessment		
Debt Relief			
General budget support		Extensive:	
Sector budget support			
Off budget project support		Significant:	
On budget project support			
Multi donor trust funds/pooled funds		Limited:	
NGO grant financing			
Capacity development TA		None:	

Somalia relies heavily on external assistance which is roughly 10 times the expenditure per capita by regional governments. The assistance is primarily delivered through direct grants to NGOs and other contractors, with the former working mainly at the grassroots level. In the past few years, at least in Puntland and Somaliland, policy/planning TA has been provided.

The primary sources of information and analysis for these country profiles is in the country report, derived from the country bibliography below.

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
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## Annex 9: Southern Sudan Country Profile

This country profile summarizes the key sector governance findings of the country report, drawing on the overall Study methodology at Chapter 1 and specific EC and other donor sector governance analytical tools.

### 1. Chronology of Key Governance and Sector Events

The chronology below maps critical security, political and sector governance events which have strongly influenced the relationship between fragility status and sector development transitions, as highlighted in Chapter 2 of the Synthesis Report.



### 2. Overall Fragility Assessment

The education sector in Southern Sudan can be characterized as being in a post-conflict/reconstruction stage with the potential to move towards arrested development depending on the governments' ability to address budget constraints and security issues.

### 3. Country Education Sector Governance Assessment and Outlook

The analysis below assesses the status of key macro and sector governance features and analyses the relationship between various actors/stakeholders and their influence on sector governance. This has then been used to inform the further governance analysis carried out in Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 1: Macro and Sectoral Governance Assessment

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
<b>A. Sector Policy/Strategy</b>		
Voice of sector actors in national level policy processes		Limited stakeholder participation due to limited existence of sector organizations, though strong inter-agency engagement through Budget Sector Working Group (BSWG).
Voice of sector-external actors in sector level policy processes		Good programming participation and voice for sub-national authorities and development partners through various coordination fora, including availability of guidelines.
Inclusiveness and effectiveness of sector policy processes		Consultative processes are limited validation and review with limited formal engagement in policy decision making.
Transparency of policy making processes		Existence of education laws which guide sector policy development with good communication and reporting to parliament and through coordination forums.
<b>B. Budget and Expenditure Management</b>		
Budget influence on policy making		Education one of a number of priority Budget Sector Working Groups established as part of CPA implementation, helps formulate sector resource envelopes, but no MTEF.
Inclusiveness of budgetary processes		Limited participation of stakeholders mainly restricted to education/finance ministry and donor representation on BSWG, with uneven involvement of other stakeholders.
Timeliness of donor pledging		Harmonized donor support through MTDF supports predictability, supported by aid effectiveness monitoring by Joint Donor Office, undermined by disbursement issues.
Donor accountability mechanisms		Significant donor programming accountability through annual joint MTDF progress reviews, less so for accountability for sector performance.
<b>C. Sector Coordination and Management</b>		
Centre/decentralized coordination arrangements		Federal nature of country governance arrangements, clear allocation of policy and management roles between levels and strong coordination forums.
Extent of networking with other key ministries		Limited to finance ministry through budget processes, limited strategic linkages (e.g. youth development) but with strong links to defence (training of ex-combatants).
Extent of donor influence on sector coordination		Strong influence through harmonized MTDF arrangements, participation in BSWG

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale	
arrangements		and Education reconstruction Development Forum (ERDF).	
Extent of information sharing and consultation processes with various stakeholders		Growing capacity with EMIS now functioning well, parliamentary committee reporting and dissemination through various forums, including to communities.	
D. Institutional Setting and Capacity			
Extent to which sector organizations are influenced by external actors		Evidence of political influence in education policy decisions, growing parliamentary oversight and involvement of defence ministry related to soldier education strategies	
Extent to which sector organizations are externally client oriented		State Ministries of Education (SMoE) have a high degree of external client orientation, including growing linkages with NGOs and CBOs. Less so for Federal Ministry (FMoE).	
Extent to which sector organizations are internally client oriented		Federal Ministry strongly focused on supporting capacity development of SMOEs, including provision of policy guidance and operational support.	
E. Performance Monitoring System			
Availability of sector performance data		EMIS now well established inside FMoE with donor support with several years of increasingly reliable data. New payroll system supporting teacher management.	
Extent to which performance data supports accountability mechanisms		Internal and parliamentary reporting processes exist and utilize sector information systems, though more focused on progress than outcome monitoring.	
Availability of sector results framework		Significant availability of performance indicators and targets within ESP, Budget Plans and various trust funds, but not sufficiently focused on outcomes.	
Inclusiveness of performance monitoring processes (including donors)		Formal annual joint sector performance review not yet in place, but regular performance reviews linked to MTDF and BSWG well established.	
F. Macro-Economic Framework			
Linkage between fiscal policy and sector expenditure planning		PFM legislation and regulations developed but not approved, interim arrangements through BSWG in place, though effective at linking fiscal policy and expenditure.	
Availability of medium term sector resource envelopes		Medium-term (3 year) indicative envelopes provided through BSWG process, though predictability is low and final allocations often vary.	
Alignment between macro and sectoral development policy		CPA provides a roadmap of socio economic development towards independence referendum in 2011. ESP and sector plans broadly consistent with CPA provisions.	
Relative prioritization of government financing of education		Security and defense concerns dominate public spending priorities, though strong government commitment towards expanding education spending volumes.	
G. Public Financial Management			
Transparency of PFM systems		PRM systems being developed from scratch. New legislation and regulations awaiting approval. Using old and inefficient Northern Government system as interim.	
Effectiveness of budget control mechanisms		Budget execution often diverges significantly from plans. Overspending on salaries due to a lack of management controls a serious concern.	
Effectiveness of internal audit systems		Some internal audit functions exist within the FMoE which are organizational separate from financial management functions, but are only beginning to develop their role.	
Effectiveness of external audit and watchdogs		Limited capacity for external audit exists inside government and these functions, along with procurement, have been outsourced to private providers (e.g. PWC).	
Extensive:	Significant:	Limited:	Beginning:

Table 2: Assessment of Sector Actors, Stakeholders and Interest Groups

Actor/Interest Group	Role and Importance	Extent of Interests	Extent of Power & Resources	Extent of Linkages	Extent of Incentives	Rationale
National Government						Significant influence from policy making and resource allocation.
Local Government						Extensive influence through control of salaries and CS linkages.
Community Providers						Strong historic legacy of community initiatives supported by NGOs.
Public-private partnerships						Faith based groups are 10% of provision with strong networks.
Frontline providers						SMCs well established and have received NGO/CBO support.
Citizens (students/parents)						Organized locally but with limited access to national institutions.
Diaspora						Limited direct influence and no specific organization.
Development partners						Significant investors and extensive influence all levels.
Extensive:		Significant:		Limited:		

The assessment in Tables 3 and 4 below is designed to synthesize governance and accountability relations and mechanisms and illustrate the way they impinge on education sector development. This assessment is also incorporated into Chapter 3 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 3: Assessment of Education Governance Mechanisms








Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Governance by hierarchy		Federal nature constitutes strong formal relationships between administrative levels.
Patrimonial governance		Significant political party and tribal based issues influence decision making.
Market governance		Limited influence with mainly supply side approaches to education provision.
Voluntary network governance		Significant, as a legacy of absence of state provision, but may be starting to wane.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited: 		

Table 4: Assessment of Accountability Relations and Mechanisms

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Information about and clarity of governance		Extensive sector legislative/regulatory framework, alongside decentralization.
Responsiveness of governance		Federal discretion with regards to regulatory framework, including curriculum.
Accountability set-up and responsibility		Limited sub-national parliamentary oversight capacity and no formal watchdog bodies.
Capacity for governance and accountability		Parliamentary education select committees have limited capacity or resources.
Extensive:  Significant:  Limited:  Beginning: 		

#### 4. Country Education Sector Resilience and Performance

Tables 5 and 6 below summarize the trajectory of education performance, including fragility impact and summarize what are key enabling or hindering factors on maintaining or strengthening sector resilience. This analysis provides the basis for Chapter 4 of the Synthesis Report.

Table 5: Education Sector Performance and Resilience Trends







Sub Sector	Overall Performance	Regional Performance Parity	Gender Performance Parity	Fragile Area Performance Parity	Rationale
Primary	↑	↔	↔	↑	GER only around 66% in 2006 and fragility still impacts on access.
Secondary	↑	↑	↑	↑	GER of 34% (above regional average), but expansion is urban based.
Tertiary	↑	↑	↑	↑	Extensive GER growth, but heavily reliant on neighboring country provision.
High:  Medium:  Low: 					
Upward Trend:  Neutral Trend:  Downward Trend: 					

Table 6: Enabling and Hindering Factors Affecting Sector Resilience

Dimension/Indicator	Assessment	Rationale
Security, political and economic/administrative governance		Some progress on administrative/economic governance, but internal instability remains a risk, as does uncertainties over the north-south security situation.
Education financing and state revenues		Declining oil revenues and increased spending on defence and security mean that unpredictable education financing is a hindering factor.
Education providers (state, non-state and public-private partnerships)		Growing public provision is enabling resilience, but better coordination with non-state actors is critical.
Education participation		Strong value accorded by Government and communities to education, especially as part of nation building approaches, is enabling greater participation in education affairs.
Restoration or maintenance of teaching service		Strong focus on establishing a teaching service as part of early peace dividends and political settlement, rationalization underway through strengthened payroll processes.
Restoration of the role of the state		Establishment of the state through GoSS, including political settlements, strong focus on nation and state building and development of previously non-existent





The primary sources of information and analysis for these country profiles is in the country report, derived from the country bibliography below.

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