# EU ROADMAP FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN KENYA FOR THE PERIOD 2022-2025

#### GENERAL INFORMATION

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# PART I - BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEXT AND PAST EU ENGAGEMENT

#### A. THE STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Kenya is touted as having a vibrant, dynamic, resilient and innovative civil society, that has been key in the democratic and developmental gains made by the country. The political dispensation in 2002 opened the door for improving relations between the civil society and government, as meaningful dialogue and increased mutual engagement began to take place. However, this relationship became increasingly strained from 2013, as the incoming authorities came down hard on the sector, partly in retaliation for the role of some CSOs in pushing for accountability for the 2008 post-election violence, corruption and other accountability issues. This manifested in several ways, such as attempts to amend the Public Benefits Organisations (PBO) Act 2013 and introduce retrogressive provisions, and profiling of CSOs in negative ways, with tensions sometimes raising very high, especially during politically volatile periods like elections. Perceptions around the behaviour of the regulator pointed towards mistrust, which did not improve when the mandate for oversight of NGOs was moved from the Ministry of Devolution and Planning to the Ministry of Interior and Security. Currently, the NGOs Co-ordination Board is responsible, under the Ministry of Interior, for registering, facilitating and coordinating all national and international NGOs operating in Kenya. With the appointment of a new Board and a new CEO in 2018, tensions between NGOs and the regulator were somewhat eased and civil society is more hopeful about a positive relationship with the authorities, the operationalisation of the PBO Act 2013 and a more conducive policy framework for the sector. The Board has since engaged itself in activities to re-engage with the sector through public statements, outreach forums and joint initiatives.

Kenya is set to hold general elections on 9 August 2022, which will see changes for all elected positions within the government. The Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), calling for a constitutional referendum and proposed by government, was in mid-May 2021, blocked by five High Court Kenyan judges, declaring it "irregular, illegal, and unconstitutional". In response to this, the Attorney General of Kenya and the Kenyan government filed an appeal of the court's decision, asking that the ruling be overturned. In late August 2021, the Court of Appeal upheld a large majority of the High Court ruling and outlined their interpretation of the Constitutional provisions for constitutional reform processes, which called for a much more citizendriven and consultative approach. While the outcome can be used politically, it also emphasizes the key role of civil society in consulting citizens and advocating the will of the people. Civil society are very often the guardians to ensure high levels of integrity as democratic building blocks. The situation is still evolving and there are indications that the government may move to Supreme Court, so civil society will remain vigilant to advocate for respect, protection and upholding the rule of law to ensure the will of the people is respected at all times including promoting peaceful, free and fair 2022 General Elections.

#### The Kenyan civil society landscape

Kenya boasts of one of the most active civil societies in the region, which can be classified into three broad categories. The first one relates to **community-based organisations (CBOs)**, including not-for-profit, non-governmental and non-political organisations. Examples include women groups, youth groups, neighbourhood associations, social welfare and self-help groups. Their main purpose is to represent the interests of the members and community at large. There are currently about 40,000 CBOs in Kenya. Their geographical areas of operations are limited, often at location, sub-county or county levels. The Department of Social Services registers, regulates and renews annual registrations for CBOs. However, the capacity of the department to adequately manage regulation requirements is low.

CBOs play crucial roles of building capacities of their members and communities to respond to their own development issues and improving the livelihood of communities. They mobilise and assemble community members to put pressure on the government on various development and accountability issues. CBOs have also teamed up with other not-for-profit organisations to form coalitions and pressure groups that engage with county and national government. CBOs in Kenya face a myriad of challenges. Some of the constraints that have limited the functions and exploitation of full potential of CBOs in Kenya include lack of/ inadequate organisational capacity, changing political dynamics, economic hardships, social and cultural issues. They face legal and sustainability challenges in meeting the needs of the communities they serve. They lack capacities to identify, manage and utilise the local resources for the benefit of their members and community. These constraints and limitations hinder sustainability of CBOs in Kenya, forcing the majority of them to rely on well-wishers and donor support.

The second category includes civil society organisations in the forms of **societies or associations, Trusts and Companies limited by guarantee**. The Attorney General registers and regulates these entities under the Societies act, Trust deed act and the companies act respectively. These organisations can operate countrywide and have broad objectives.

The third category includes the **non-governmental organisations (NGOs)**, registered in Kenya under the NGOs coordination Act, both national and international. There are currently about 11,000 national NGOs and 4000 international NGOs operating in Kenya. Unlike CBOs and societies, NGOs in Kenya are controlled tightly, with National Intelligence Service playing a role in their registration. That includes providing background checks of the officials prior to registration and issuance of certificate. The act requires NGOs to file annual returns at end of each financial year. A number of the NGOs pushing sensitive national agendas such as the fight against anti-corruption, promotion of free and fair elections, human rights, justice and equality among others face harassments including de-registration, freezing of bank accounts, huge charges and extra judicial killings.

The NGO Coordination Board's report documents that for the year 2018/2019, a total of 1,026 NGOs contributed a total of Ksh 34.9 billion as they implemented projects related to the government's 'Big Four' agenda. NGOs spent a total of Ksh 30.8 billion on health-related projects, Ksh 3.8 billion on food security and nutrition, Ksh 352.6 million on projects related to manufacturing and Ksh 19.6 million on housing and settlement as well as providing employment opportunities for many Kenyans.

Support to this sector is crucial. Whereas an NGO's income is generally exempt from income tax (subject to an application being made to the Kenya Revenue Authority), most local NGOs are faced with additional costs arising from Value Added Tax. Funding, lack of autonomy, government interference and corruption in the sector itself are all limiting factors curtailing NGO growth. Accordingly, the Government should provide additional tax incentives that help to attract more donor funding to the NGO sector.

NGOs engaged a total of 79,608 employees in 2018/19 (Annual NGO Sector Report). Of those employed, 70,921 were stationed in Kenya while the rest were stationed outside Kenya. There were 40,700 (51%) reported as salaried while 38,908 (49%) were hired as volunteers/interns. The 40,700 salaried employees

included 39,109 Kenyans, with 32,868 based in Kenya and 6,241 stationed in other countries. In addition, NGOs had 1,591 expatriate staff with 652 of them stationed in Kenya and 939 outside Kenya.

In 2018/19, the main sources of funds were affiliates of NGOs at 27%, followed by foreign government development agencies at 26%, and other international NGOs, foundations and trusts at 22%. Funds donated by United Nations agencies accounted for 9% of the total funding to NGOs while research and academic institutions contributed 4%. Support from individual donors and affiliates of faith-based organizations was each at 3%. NGOs engaged in income generating activities that raised four 4% of the total revenue during the year. In 2018/19, NGOs raised 88% of their funds from sources outside Kenya and 11% within the country. Funds raised from external sources amounted to Ksh 145.3 billion. Most of the funds were raised from North America at 45% followed by Europe at 35%. Funds raised from within Africa (Kenya included) accounted for 13% while funds from Asia accounted for 1% of the total raised.

The amount spent in Kenya (Ksh 133.8 Billion) is equivalent to about 4.5% of Kenya's national budget in that year, a significant contribution which cannot be ignored in national development planning. Additionally, the amounts spent outside Kenya reveal that the country is increasingly becoming a regional hub for international NGOs serving other countries in the region. Further analysis indicates that 61% of the total expenditure was spent on projects, followed by personnel emoluments at 25% (local staff being 22%, international staff 3%). Administration costs and other running costs utilized 8% and 4%, respectively, while purchase of fixed assets was at 2%.

The civil society movement in Kenya, especially NGOs, has grown from strength to strength. They continue to complement the government in meeting the needs of the citizens. They push for policy change, demand transparency and accountability and sometimes offer services in support of the government. However, they are facing internal conflicts including unhealthy completion for scarce resources, limited coordination, communication and joint actions. To some extent, national NGOs rely on international NGOs who have broader networks and capacity to mobilise, manage and sustain their operations. Unless specific packages for support are tailor-made and dedicated to national NGOs, their influence may continue to dwindle.

The new devolution governance structure in Kenya has exposed some weaknesses of CSOs in Kenya. Most of them remain based in Nairobi and major urban centres such as Mombasa and Kisumu, with a focus largely on national government. Devolution requires a change of focus to better include the 47 county governments. Hence, CSOs should consider increasing their presence at the county level and pay greater attention to governance and operations of the county governments. The operations and partnerships structures of CSOs will need to engage the two levels of governance- national level broad polices affecting the entire country and county level policies affecting respective county government residents.

#### The legal environment

The **Constitution of Kenya 2010** provides a strong foundation for the existence and operation of CSOs. From article 1 on sovereignty of the Kenyan people, article 10 on national values and principles of governance, particularly public participation, to a comprehensive Bill of Rights recognising fundamental rights including freedom of expression, the right to access of information, freedom of association and freedom of assembly, demonstration, picketing and petition. Moreover, public participation is enshrined in the Constitution as a key principle of public decision-making. Generally, the legal environment in which CSOs operate is supportive of civil society. However, the legal framework is characterised by multiple laws, which are implemented by different ministries, agencies and departments. The diverse and sometimes overlapping laws present difficulties for the government in developing harmonized, systematic and coordinated plans and approaches to civil society. To compound the problem, some of the regulatory agencies are under-resourced and find it difficult to manage their basic functions effectively.

The **Public Benefits Organisation (PBO) Act** was signed into law by the President on 13 January 2013. This act was the culmination of a process of several years of consultations with civil society (especially the NGO Council Board and a coalition of CSOs under the banner of "Civil Society Reference Group") kicked off by

the Parliament's Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2006 on NGOs. This Paper, also called the "NGO Policy", echoed the need expressed by the civil society to revise the NGO Coordination Act of 1990, in order to enforce the principles of transparency of registration procedures, independence of the regulatory body, and accountability of NGOs. Currently, there are three ways for registering civil society organisations in Kenya<sup>1</sup>. The PBO Act creates a single legal framework for registering and regulating all civil society organisations that are currently registered under the three registration entities locally or nationally to support or promote public benefit. The term "public benefit" is meant as the opposite of "mutual benefit", where individuals or organisations involved would expect a return (a profit) for their investment in time or capital. The law relies on the concept of "PBO" so as to offer a new legal framework for all NGOs registered under the NGO Coordination Act of 1990, but also for NGOs registered under other legal acts such as trusts and charitable companies<sup>2</sup> or foundations. The PBO Act meets the expectations of CSOs by<sup>3</sup>:

- Establishing an independent registration and regulatory body: the PBO Regulatory Authority, with a governing board selected through transparent procedures;
- Providing clear procedures for registration of PBOs with an explicit timeline for processing registration applications and a presumption of registration should the Authority fail to register a PBO in good time;
- Giving steps to be followed, and clear grounds for refusal to register a PBO, or for cancellation of a registration certificate;
- Providing mechanisms for public access to information on PBOs;

This Act not only strengthens the rights of CSOs and clarifies the modalities for their enforcement. It also lays out specific duties for CSOs by:

- Advancing integrity, good leadership and accountability principles for PBOs, their forums and the Regulatory Authority, in line with Chapter 6 of the Constitution;
- Creating a Federation of PBOs to replace the dysfunctional NGO Council with clear and transparent mechanisms of electing its leadership.

CSOs anticipate that PBO Act will address some of the challenges that they face under the current law. However, **the PBO Act has yet to be operationalised and implemented**. Between 2013 and 2015, there were four attempts to amend it through proposals tabled in Parliament, but civil society thwarted these plans through campaigns and litigation against the state. A PBO Task force was also put in place by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning to get public views on whether to amend the law and its recommendation was that it should be operationalised. Since 2015, CSOs have urged the government to gazette the commencement date of the PBO Act, but without success so far. Despite several court rulings, gazettment has remained "imminent" for several years now, an indication of inadequate political will.

Although the PBO Act is yet to be implemented, a number of CSOs have developed their own independent quality enhancement mechanism, through "**Viwango**" ("standards" in Swahili), an independent, standards setting and certification organisation for CSOs in Kenya. Viwango's primary role is to promote the adoption of minimum quality standards by Civil Society Organizations in Kenya.

# The involvement of civil society in domestic policies

At the national level, CSOs participation in policy processes and public policy dialogues remains mixed, despite the fact that the MTP 3 2018-2022 recognises the role of CSOs as partners in Kenya's development

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> International Environmental Law Research Center, 2000. The Operational Environment and Constraints for NGOs in Kenya: Strategies for Good Policy and Practice. IELRC Working Paper 2000 – 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A new legal framework, Societies Act, is for foundations, which will not fall under the PBO Act.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This summary of the content of the PBO Act is based on a note entitled "The Public Benefit Organization (PBO) Act 2013" and drafted by the UNDP basket fund for civil society support "Amkeni Wakenya"

agenda, and recommends a more structured engagement, along with the operationalisation of the PBO Act. Several joint working groups between the government and development partners were established to implement Kenya's development strategy, the Vision 2030 and the medium-term plans. Although civil society inclusion to these groups is not systematic, some thematic CSO networks have successfully engaged in sector working groups, such as Health and Agriculture. Individual CSOs are also successful in engaging on specific issues, but this remains the exception rather than the norm. Reasons to this limited success are varied, from weak national CSO coordination, political will from the government, capacity constraints to lack of information and access. There is a need to harmonise the multiple sector working groups, and to have effective and structured CSO participation, generally and along thematic areas, both at national and county levels. There is also a clear need to strengthen CSOs capacity to hold authorities accountable and more effectively perform their roles as actors of governance.

Youth as defined by the National Youth development policy represents over 78% of the population, which brings at the same time a demographic opportunity and a challenge. Issues such as health (sexual reproductive health especially, communicable diseases, etc.), education, unemployment, access to finance, participation in politics, ICT literacy, and crime form the pillars of most the CSOs advocating for youth rights and youth inclusion. There are quite a high number of CSOs advocating for youth rights, both at national level as well as at the county level. The lack of funding outside donor support is one of the main impediment to be able to advocate sustainably and with long lasting programmes.

At the county level, a major achievement of the 2010 Constitution has been the initiation of the devolution process which has fostered greater inclusiveness and more equal distribution of resources across the country. Nevertheless it has been hampered by poor management of resources and, in many cases, corruption. A proportion of national revenues have been devolved – although counties are split on the distribution formula: whether poverty and marginalised status (exacerbated by climate change) should be given preponderance over total population numbers, or vice versa. In terms of public participation, CSOs have registered mixed results. In some of the counties, especially those that had prior experience of working with NGOs prior to devolution, CSOs have registered good results. They have been included in decision-making organs of the county such as the County Budget and Economic Forums (CEBEFs), various technical working groups, committees and advisory entities. They provide their expertise in shaping various policies such as economic planning and budget. They disseminate the policies to citizens, collect their views and repackage them in forms of memorandums for consideration by county government. They also participate in public hearing forums. Nonetheless, they rarely receive feedback from the government as to why their views were not taken into consideration. This has demotivated the CSOs who view the public participation as a mere public relations exercise.

In theory, public institutions and public officials in Kenya are supposed to be responsive to civil society actors in their regular interaction, at least as provided for in the Constitution and enabling devolution laws. The practice is completely different: nearly 10 years into devolution, the majority of the 47 county governments hardly follow the principles of citizen participation as required under County Government Act (Section 87); do not feel duty-bound to respond to citizens' petitions and challenges (Section 89); and are yet to establish platforms for citizens' participation (Section 91). The requirements that county governments establish county communications framework to facilitate free flow of information (Section 95); and design and implement civic education on county governance processes (Section 100), are also observed in breach rather than practice. Majority of CSOs operating at county level on the other hand, remain uninformed on county governance processes, face legitimacy deficits due to their own lack of transparency, accountability, internal governance systems and procedures, and usually operate on shoestring budgets. The Roadmap will provide support to CSOs to enhance work in the areas of network building, value-based leadership and social audit, budget tracking and advocacy skills to be more effective. The inclusion of women, youth, persons with disabilities and people facing vulnerable situations will be particularly looked at.

In that context, there remains an inadequate number of established civil society organisations. Most of them register as CBOs and can rarely attract and retain good staff and funding. They lack adequate capacity to engage with county government officials, often submerged in local political rhetoric and 'used' to rubber stamp county government decisions at the detriment of county residents.

Some of the other key challenges mentioned by CSOs, which hamper their effective participation in domestic policies, are:

- Lack of an enabling policy environment at county level (i.e. some counties are still quite closed)
- Political interference at National and County level
- Limited will of government officials to engage on social accountability efforts by CSOs and to accept social audit reports
- Limited access to information, especially budgets
- Lack of mechanisms ensuring engagement with CSOs, despite the participatory guidance
- Weak feedback and tracking mechanisms on expenditure /budget implementation
- Weak capacities of county government officers
- Low capacity/understanding of CSOs
- Funding constraints including lack of long term programme funding and core funding
- CSOs felt their work was somewhat driven by donor driven priorities
- Competition amongst CSOs and fragmentation of efforts (not speaking as one voice)
- Underdevelopment of CS networks at county level

# The impact of Covid-19 pandemic

As everywhere else in the world, the Covid-19 pandemic had a significant negative impact on Kenyan civil society, not only in its ability to operate, its access to already strained financial resources, but also in terms of enabling environment. The pandemic has overstretched CSOs by the high level of demand for their services and support in the communities they serve. Most importantly, it has affected public participation negatively and reduced funding for CSOs, thus impacting on programming, staff changes and the effectiveness of CSOs' work. According to many Kenyan CSOs, the public authorities – both at national and county level – have been taking advantage of the pandemic to clamp down civil rights and fundamental freedoms further such as state-sanctioned surveillance and violence justified by efforts to implement lockdowns and curfews as part of measures to mitigate the spread of the virus. Besides prying into people's privacy, this limits the space for human rights' actors to do their work, with increasing risk and danger to their lives. Furthermore, ahead of the general elections, CSOs feel that the government may delay or frustrate financial support to civic actors to curb their capacity to raise an alternative narrative to that of the government.

Notwithstanding, opportunities for CSOs have also emerged from the Covid-19 pandemic, which has opened new opportunities to engage more collaboratively among CSOs, working across issues and bringing different partners (donors, unions, professional associations) together to promote the rights-based approach in the context of the pandemic. It has also forced the sector to be more technologically responsive and adaptive. This is particularly relevant in the context of the upcoming 2022 general elections, where civil society has the opportunity to play and active role in advocacy and oversight to ensure that the necessary legal and policy framework and systems essential to free and fair elections are put in place. Harnessing the lessons learnt from past election cycles, recommendations of Commissions of Inquiry, and lessons from other jurisdictions at this instance is critical.

# The involvement of civil society in the priority sectors of EU-Kenya cooperation

# • Natural capital and resilience

The EU will continue supporting interventions in management of natural capital and biodiversity conservation as well as resilience building of vulnerable populations, especially in climate-affected areas

already affected by the impact of climate change. CSOs have a long history of being active participants in natural resources management and building resilience of vulnerable households. The CSOs will have an opportunity to implement interventions in this sector as service providers and policy watchdogs to ensure good governance and accountability, in the conservation sector, as well as, effective management of natural resources and Accountability, especially at devolved (county) level.

For building resilience against drought in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) works closely together with local CSOs for preparedness and drought response interventions - including with pastoralist groups. CSOs have also been involved in the sphere of conservation, which was instrumental in developing the Kenyan model of conservancy, in strong coordination with the government (notably the Kenya Wildlife Service and the Kenya Forest Service). Kenyan heavy weights in this sector include NRT and WWF (both EU partners), Green Belt Movement, etc.

# • Green economy and sustainable businesses

Support to economic growth through sustainable businesses, which are responsive to environmental sustainability including preserving biodiversity, is a key EU priority. CSOs in Kenya have the capacity to support and advise micro, small, and medium size enterprises (MSMEs) to flourish, while adhering to environmentally friendly practices. CSOs can be useful service providers, however, the MSMEs need capacity building in adopting practices that are climate resilient and preserves biodiversity. There is also strong involvement of CSOs in the field of waste management/recycling, notably in slums, also in coordination with GoK and county governments.

# • Sustainable energy

CSOs are actively engaged in Kenyan's energy field and their roles are well captured in the various national energy policy and strategy documents governing the sector. CSOs are recognised as key actors in developing and promoting truly holistic solutions for sustainable and green energy solutions that aims to leave nobody behind and solutions that have focus on vulnerable groups including women and youth. Kenya's renewable energy sector has good potential for further expansion into new energy solutions like innovative bioenergy and green hydrogen. New value chains under the energy sector can be important drivers for poverty reductions and job creation, and civil society possesses an important role in being active in advocacy and in disseminating experiences (local innovation and behavioural change) to facilitate further scale up.

# • Education and skills

Civil society has a key role to play in promoting wider education access of the young population with a particular focus on women. With an education system which is constantly criticised for not adequately producing graduates with viable job prospects or with the requisite skills to respond to the demands of the job market, there is a need to increase the advocacy towards reducing the shortage of technical of vocational training institutions. As much as 92% of youth lack the requisite vocational skills to join the working force. Although this is a sector with a mainly public investment (notably at the national level), numerous Kenyan organisations are involved in education and skills projects, in particular for girls, refugees, persons with disabilities, etc. Foundations (such as the Mpesa Foundation and Equity Group Foundation) could be interesting partners in this sector.

#### • Empowering women and youth

On **Gender**, Kenya scores 81 out of 100 on the Women, Business and the Law 2020 index and ranks 109 out of the 153 countries in the Global Gender Gap Report 2020 with 0.671, significant inequalities between men and women in education attainment, health outcomes, representation in parliament, and participation in the labour market remain. Over the past decade, legislative and policy reform has established a basis for gender equality across all sectors. Implementation is more the issue and whilst there are a broad range of active CSOs working in this sector (more than 650 according to a recent mapping by

the Canadian International Development Agency), their input is fairly reactional (now focusing their work on the 2022 elections) and dependent on funding resources available. They are service providers and their work is certainly relevant for the duration of the projects but for sustainable and impactful results, their lobbying and advocacy efforts must take on a more coordinated structure. The two thirds gender rule is an example of a core constitutional provision that has not been implemented (the State must ensure that no more than two thirds of members of all elective and appointive positions are not of the same gender). The National Gender Equality Commission, which has as part of its mandate to have an oversight role of gender activities, is keen to work at county level, with CSOs and grassroots organisations. This will be explored to ensure that county gender desks are delivering their mandate.

On **Youth**, Kenyan Civil society is also particularly active and developed, including numerous CBOs, NGOs and foundations. Many of these CSOs prioritise skills development, mentorship/scholarship programmes, education and entrepreneurship, with the aim of fighting youth unemployment. Another recurring priority is to increase the political participation of youth: corruption, tribalism underrepresentation of youth in politics, and the use of youth by political actors for inciting political violence are all particular concerns for CSOs involved this field. Of note, approximately 9.3 million young people will be first time voters in the next 2022 general elections. In that context, CSOs should be further empowered as a policy watchdog of national and county policies, to hold accountable the policy makers for their implementation, and ensure youth inclusion. A higher representation of youth in decision-making fora is imperative, especially at the county level, where youth is a shared competence, but where representation and inclusion is still very far from achieved, with very mixed levels across the 47 counties.

#### • Inclusive, resilient urbanisation and transport

In informal settlements and affordable housing sector, civil society is active in collaborating with national and county governments in development of infrastructure improvements. CBOs and CSOs are active in community-led regeneration of green public spaces, water and sanitation, and the organisations play a key role in representing the interests of the communities. There is need to improve cohesion / collaboration of CSOs working in some particular areas to avoid duplication of efforts and strive for synergies and complementary interventions to the benefit of the communities.

In transport, there is a need for greater engagement of civil society in development of urban transport and mobility programs. Often CSOs are invited and get involved relatively late in implementation phases, sometimes only during resettlement discussions with project affected people. A better stakeholder engagement process could be ensured if government institutions and project partners involved and worked more closely with CSOs during project inception and design phases creating platforms where affected communities could share their concerns, needs and be an enabler for home-grown complementary initiatives.

Likewise in rural areas, CSOs can be important partners in defining holistic approaches for genuine infrastructure programmes that are beneficial to the communities and complement the infrastructural programmes by e.g. identifying and creating local anchored social economic development initiatives. CSOs play a key role in important stakeholder engagement activities and can provide oversight both in the design phase, during implementation and after project finalisation. This would benefit the achievement of objectives and results from the infrastructure programs and long-term sustainability of the programs.

#### • Democratic governance

There are several challenges facing civil society organisations in Kenya including the impact of Covid-19, the realignment of political alliances and concerted efforts to amend the Constitution through Building Bridges Initiatives (BBI) driven by the political class. Weakened civil society allies, independent constitutional bodies such as the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR), Independence Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Public Law Office, Police Oversight Authority, Gender and Equality Commission, Land Commission among others through selective appointments, failure and delay to appoint

commissioners and budget cuts. There are also threat to judicial independence, unabated corruption and skyrocketing international debts. Though the country is witnessing intense infrastructural development, these are blurred by the poor state of the economy, characterised by high levels of unemployment among the youth. These factors are likely to play a major role in 2022 General Elections with likelihood of class conflicts. CSOs must be supported in theirs demand for accountability among the politicians and strict enforcement of the rule of law by the police and judicial system.

With the national elections in 2022, Kenya's National Development Plan - the Medium-Term Plan III that is aligned with the political cycle and is likely to be replaced by a new Medium-Term Plan in 2022. These major policy documents will be followed closely, including the support accorded to them.

CSOs can also play an important role to improve the Kenya budget process. Starting with budget preparation, public consultation and engagement lacks of credulity at both national and county level. Besides, the access to budget and policy documents is rather limited. When it comes to budget implementation, while there is an overall good oversight thanks institutions such as the Controller of Budget, the Parliament Budget Office or the Office of the Accountant General, dissemination of findings to Kenyan citizens could be further improved.

# • *Conflict, peace and security*

Counties have developed county action plans for preventing and countering violent extremism. So far the implementation of these strategic guidelines remains largely unfunded and mainly declarative. CSOs have a strong role to play as policy enabler and as policy watchdog, but some of them, especially faith-based organisations, are facing severe distrust by the government and are selectively invited in fulfilling their advocacy roles. Civil society can play an important mediation role between local communities and with law enforcement agencies, to reduce tensions and contribute to enhanced social cohesion, e.g. through peace committee and resource-sharing agreements. In addition, civil society is well placed to work with youth on de-radicalisation efforts and to strengthen young people's engagement as peace-builders.

• Migration and forced displacement

Refugees and asylum seekers have faced numerous challenges over the past two years, including by COVID-19, reduced funding to support key services and the announcement by the Government to close both large refugee camp complexes, Kakuma and Dadaab. CSOs continue to play a key role to raise these issues and advocating for the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. This also includes access to legal support and supporting the new Refugee Bill.

# Civil society's access to funding

In practice, and as in many other countries, most of the CSO funding in Kenya comes from non-Kenyan sources, be they aid agencies, international organisations, international NGOs, and foreign missions. One positive aspect of Kenya's legal environment is the relatively open access for Kenyan CSOs to international funding, which can explain the tremendous level of development of Kenyan CSOs, with strong links to African, American and European civil societies.

However, the **fragile funding situation** is highlighted by many Kenyan CSOs, in part due to the usual donor preference project-based funding (as opposed to core funding), which often aims at short-term results, thus making it difficult to work on long-term and sustainable strategies. This is particularly relevant for CSOs working with/for minorities. The lack of funding and limited capacities for domestic resource mobilisation have led to increased **competition** among CSOs. In addition, the weak and **limited collaboration** with relevant Government agencies also contributes to the lack of sustainability of program efforts.

Institutional donor funding, in particular EU funding, remains especially difficult to access for CBOs, smaller organisations and social movements, which play an important role in social cohesion and organising at community level. The issue of access by grassroots organisations to donor funding came to the fore already during the previous roadmap. The complexity of project submission procedures tends to deter smaller

organisations from responding to calls for proposals. The EU is constantly reminded by CSOs to explore new options to render EU funding more flexible and accessible. A more systematic use of third-party financing features as one of these options, along with access to longer-term, unearmarked "core funding" and better information sharing on EU funding opportunities and capacity building on how to apply for EU call for proposals.

Risks of duplication and overlap amongst Members states in the resources that they give to CSOs also remains a challenge, to be addressed through better information sharing and coordination to maximise distribution of resources.

# B. LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE PAST ENGAGEMENT WITH CSOs

More than half of the EU partners present in Kenya actively support CSOs, with a few MS supporting intensively CSOs and their civic space. EU partners work with CSOs across multiple sectors -from governance (democratic and economic) and human rights, to water and sanitation, social services job creation, food security and resilience, culture, sports, education, gender equality and youth. EU partners have been supporting different civil society roles, with a special emphasis on the provision of services, watchdog roles, awareness raising and research and alternative data collection. They are therefore able to reach out to several CSOs in a wide range of sectors.

**Approaches and support modalities are mixed**, with MS working both directly with Kenyan CSOs and through INGOs (which in their turn support Kenyan CSOs). The **work with CSOs is generally threefold**:

- 1. **Support to the enabling environment and to CS capacities** (i.e. the so-called support to CSOs). This is done through a mixture of political and policy dialogue, combined with operational support.
- 2. Use of CSOs as service providers in the different cooperation sectors (i.e. the so-called CS channel), based on CSOs skills and added value. These includes crucial CS initiatives to reduce inequalities and give opportunities to the most vulnerable.
- 3. **Support to CSOs to strengthen the voice of citizens, as right-holders**, and their social accountability initiatives, vis-a-vis the duty bearers, especially at sub-county and county level,

In terms of lessons learnt, drawing from the different meetings with the EU Member States and the CSOs:

On the positive side, **resilience** stands out as the main strength of Kenyan CSOs, many of which have been on the forefront for many years supporting and giving voice to the vulnerable people while building partnerships for sustainability with other like-minded organisations and national and international institutions. This resilience has been challenged particularly during the COVID-19 period including with a more repressive approach employed by the government.

Kenyan CSOs interact with people at the **grassroots level**, this provides an excellent position to engage with different levels of government. The relationship with the national and the county level is considered good in general terms and has enabled the civil society to participate in various forums that have been organized by the national and the county government.

**Flexibility** of Kenyan civil society is also one of its key strengths. The emergency caused by Covid-19 is a good example how the civil society can adapt to a new situation, which affects not only people's health but many other sectors of life and the economy. As an example, CSOs have improved their technological skills and knowledge of alternative advocacy strategies through social media.

In terms of **transparency and accountability**, access to proper information remains challenging, and sometimes even blocked. The national and county governments control the access to information depending on how much they want to engage with CSOs resulting in a lack of a "joint voice" for CSOs.

An important weakness derives from the **loss of allies** in the political realm, and the independent offices within the government system CSOs have been working with. The fragility of these institutions through deliberate policy, administrative, and legal actions within the government has weakened the ability of CSOs

to push the agenda for reform on peace, democracy and security. For example, the failure to appoint Commissioners for KNCHR has severely impaired the operations of this important institution.

Kenyan civil society plays an important role in ensuring adequate civic space is realised in Kenya and the entire region. Efforts by CSOs in Kenya builds confidence in other CSOs across the continent. Their role in supporting the development of a conducive enabling environment is supported by the 2010 Constitution, which establishes CSOs as a key actor resulting from the public participation mandate that the Constitution requires of the executive legislator. While this has opened the space for civic engagement, CSOs have been experiencing increasing challenges to their role as watchdogs.

Kenya's civil society is also pertinent in advocacy towards legislative and policy reforms. A coordinated, constant and well-planned engagement with the government will be important to build pressure on the government and ensure compliance with regional and international principles. Civil society in Kenya provides a complimentary bridge between the government and the people to air and address grievances and further provides a means by which civic awareness is properly cascaded to the people.

In essence, CSOs' role in strengthening the civic space rests on its advocacy role for the state to implement the progressive PBO Act; enhance the capacity of the community/citizens to hold the government to account; and participate in dialogue forums with government and leaders from social movements and the private sector.

In that context, it remains extremely important to continue strengthening the sharing of information and coordination, at technical but also more senior policy level, regarding the support to CSOs in Kenya, in line with the ambitions of the Joint Strategy, in order to: (i) promote complementarities in the support and prevent the duplication of efforts and the funding of the same partners ; (ii) promote the undertaking of a number of joint actions, especially in the realm of research and policy dialogue and; (iii) discuss the modalities allowing for a greater outreach to county and sub county level. According to EU MS surveyed, today, there is insufficient overview of the EU support to CSOs, very little coordination and high risks of duplication and overlap in granting. More efforts are also required to deepen the communication and visibility of the EU support.

**Dialogue between EU partners** (EUD and EU Member States) **and CSOs needs** to become more predictable, more structured and more open to suggestions from the CSOs themselves on items for discussion. It also needs to be better aligned with the Joint Strategy Implementation-was one of the recommendation in the past.

Although meaningful participation of CSOs in domestic processes remains challenging, **the devolution process has brought new opportunities** and there are even a number of good practices. Capacity development remains paramount, particularly to deepen civil society involvement in domestic policies, especially at county level, as well as to enhance CSOs' internal governance systems with a view to reinforce the accountability and transparency of CSOs and the sector, in general. This roadmap will therefore expand its focus on civil society engagement at county level.

With limited funds available to operate on, the **youth organisations** sometimes struggle to provide the support the youth population would normally require. Pilots for entrepreneurs are generally funded through international partners or UN organisations and rarely go from pilot to scale. The lack of predictable funding for the CSOs also limit their role in supporting the young entrepreneurs with the access to information or access to capital needed.

On the roadmap implementation itself, lessons learned from previous roadmaps so far are a lack of awareness and ownership, both by external stakeholders, and internally. The process of elaborating this roadmap has been inclusive and has informed the programming exercise at the Delegation for the next seven years.

# PART II – EU STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN TO ENGAGE WITH CSOs

The first EU CSO Roadmap for Kenya of 2015 was the culmination of a process of consultations with national CSOs, grassroots CSOs and CSO experts of the EU Member States represented in Kenya. Building on the experience of the first roadmap, the second Roadmap (2019-2022) was articulated and intended to be a strategic instrument, which will complement the EU Joint Strategy 2018-2022 and provide guidance to the different areas of EU engagement with Civil Society – political and policy dialogue, development cooperation and trade – rather than an output-specific plan of action. With the forthcoming national elections in 2022, the Joint Cooperation Strategy will be renewed based on the new national policy framework. The Roadmap will also adapt to ensure that activities will complement the changing political landscape.

This Roadmap will have as its **overarching objectives** to:

- 1. Support an **enabling legal and institutional environment** for Kenyan civil society, at national and county-level;
- 2. Promote participation of Kenyan civil society in policy-making processes, at international, national and county-level, with a focus on Women and Youth;
- **3.** Strengthen the capacity of CSOs as independent actors of accountability, governance and development, in the main areas of EU-Kenya partnership;
- **4.** Initiate a **structured dialogue between the EU and Kenyan civil society,** covering main EU priority areas, and involving the EU, its member states, national and local authorities.

As a first objective, cognisant of the fact that Kenya benefits from a vibrant, multi-faceted civil society landscape, the roadmap will support an **enabling environment** by monitoring and promoting the effective implementation of the PBO Act and other relevant legislation, in line with the 2010 Constitution. The EU will also put a strong emphasis on the role of **civil society as an integral part of the Kenyan democracy**, notably by promoting and supporting its role in electoral processes, in terms of monitoring, civic education and citizen engagement, dialogue and conflict prevention. The EU will aim to improve Kenyan CSOs resilience and sustainability, notably by exploring new modalities of civil society financing using the full spectrum of financial instruments available to the EU and its Member states.

As a second objective, the roadmap will promote **participation of Kenyan civil society in policy-making processes**, both at national and county level. The process of devolution has created a strong potential for civil society participation and oversight of local governance processes and community-level engagement. The roadmap will focus in strengthening civil society's capacities to be the voice of rights-holders, in particular women, youth, persons with disabilities and other special interest groups, which remain marginalised in public participation processes. Similarly, the EU and Member states will promote the involvement of Kenyan civil society in regional and international fora and processes, notably at the level of the African Union, UN international human rights processes, and in the context of the "SDG Decade of Action".

As a third objective, the roadmap will ensure a coordinated approach to strengthening the capacities of CSOs as independent actors of development, accountability and governance in the main areas of the EU-Kenya partnership. The specific objectives of this support will be structured around the main areas of the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2021-2027, which aim to mainstream civil society's role, including social partners, in line with the EU's commitments on a rights-based approach to development. The roadmap will also support the implementation of the Gender Action Plan III (GAP III), as well as the external windows of the EU Disability Action Plan and the upcoming Youth Action Plan.

#### MIP Priority area 1: Green Transition - Environmental Sustainability & Resilience

EU and Member States will promote the role of civil society as a driving force in addressing the challenges of climate change adaptation and mitigation and harnessing the opportunities of a green transition. Through grant support, civil society will play an important role in policy development and implementation, in particular in strengthening accountability, enhancing service delivery, building community resilience, driving innovation and behavourial change. They will be key in supporting resilience building and droughts risk management interventions in ASAL areas. Furthermore, civil society will also contribute significantly to mainstreaming the empowerment of women and youth across all sectors, as well as potentially to social dialogue.

#### MIP Priority area 2: Leave no one behind - Human Development & Digital Inclusion

Civil society will play important roles as regards women and youth, people with disabilities, other minority and marginalised groups, including supporting participation in decision-making processes at national and county level, as well as promoting SRHR and gender equality. Civil society could also contribute to private sector mainstreaming for women, youth and persons with disabilities. In particular in the field of TVET, entrepreneurship and digital skills, there is potential for increased cooperation between EU and CSOs, in partnership with the government and the private sector. Increased cooperation and involvement with CSOs in infrastructure programs will be envisaged and civil society will have a role for policy development and the monitoring of the decent work agenda.

#### MIP Priority area 3: Democratic Governance, Peace & Stability

In this area, civil society will have a crucial role, in relation to democratic participation and accountability, including extending the fight against corruption. Civil society, especially at local level, may be instrumental in peacebuilding, the fight against violent extremism, human rights and outreach to vulnerable populations, as well as in the provision of basic services in relation to refugee challenges. Civil society will also be key in the realisation of the women, peace and security agenda, notably in monitoring, reporting and preventing human rights violations against women and girls in conflict. Lastly, civil society can play a decisive role by improving the participation and awareness of Kenyan citizens to the budget process and enhancing the understanding of public policy and their financing. Informed citizens can demand more accountability from politicians in terms of service delivery at national and county level.

As the EU and Member States are embarking on two major **Team Europe Initiatives** in Kenya, they will seek to integrate civil society as key stakeholders in the implementation of these initiatives.

Under the TEI on **Green Deal**, the five sub-TEIs (circular economy, green agricultural value chains, sustainable urbanisation and infrastructure, green sustainable energy solutions and biodiversity/landscape conservation), will all have significant involvement of Civil Society, in terms of service provision, accountability and policy advocacy.

Under the TEI on **Human-centred Digitalisation**, the roadmap will aim to give a major role to civil society to realise the objective of an open and inclusive digital governance in Kenya. The EU will dedicate support to civil society initiatives and innovations to promote transparency, accountability, access to justice, and the fight against corruption through digital tools. The roadmap will also support society in its efforts to monitor and contribute to the realisation of Kenya's commitments under the Open Government Partnership. Last but not least, in line with the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2021-2025, the EU and Member States will initiate actions to promote and protect democracy and human rights in the digital environment. Generally speaking, the EU will promote civil society's understanding and use of digital tools for improved civil society resilience, engagement and participation.

As a fourth and final objective, the roadmap will initiate a formalised, **structured dialogue between the EU and Kenyan civil society**, in order to ensure a coherent approach to the EU engagement with civil society, and to maintain a credible, meaningful and regular dialogue with civil society actors This dialogue will be structured around thematic working groups, covering the main areas of EU-Kenya partnership mentioned above, and involve the EU, its member states, national and local authorities. The objectives of this structured dialogue will be to allow Kenyan civil society to build their capacities and meaningfully contribute to the design and monitoring of EU's initiatives. This structured dialogue will allow a more coordinated engagement between the EU and its Member States, and promote enhanced cooperation between Kenyan and European civil societies. It will also have a specific mandate to monitor and regularly report on the realisation of this roadmap. The organisation of an annual high-level EU-Kenya civil society forum will give the opportunity of taking stock of the civil society's involvement in EU-Kenya partnership priorities and the progress achieved under this roadmap. Acknowledging Kenyan civil society's maturity, and with the aim to promote direct civil society's ownership of this dialogue, this structured dialogue will be managed directly by civil society, in a setup to be selected through a competitive procedure, inspired by other similar initiatives launched by the EU in other parts of the world.

In terms of **means and financial resources**, this roadmap will rely on the full range of instruments and implementing modalities available at EU and Member States' level, and will ensure that each instrument are mobilised in a coherent and complementary manner, taking into account the specific added values of each modality. These include:

- NDICI programme on Civil Society: support enabling environment, promote resilience and sustainability, notably by developing new modalities of support to civil society (sub-granting to grassroots CSOs, framework partnership agreements), and dedicating targeted support to youth-led initiatives, including in the areas of media, culture and sport. Indicative allocation: 12 Million EUR for 2021-2024.
- NDICI programme on Human Rights and Democracy: addressing core human rights and democracy priorities, with a focus on flexible and reactive funding, in line with the priorities set in the Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategy. Indicative allocation: 3.9 Million EUR for 2021-2024
- MIP Support Measures: promote and facilitate structured dialogue with civil society, as an overarching contribution to the realisation of the EU-Kenya partnership priorities, in particular in relation to the Team Europe Initiatives on Green Deal and Digitalisation. Indicative allocation: TBD.
- MIP Individual actions: in line with Rights-Based Approach requirements, each individual action designed under the MIP will mainstream civil society involvement ensure that CSOs are duly represented at each stage of the process and that dedicated support is foreseen to civil society as contribution to the main objectives of the action. Indicative allocations: to be decided on an individual basis.

**EU Member States' own contributions**: Through their own financial resources and allocations, Member States will also support the objectives of this roadmap, in line with their own bilateral priorities and programming requirements. Member States will also play a proactive role in the structured dialogue with CSOs. **Below are some indicative contributions highlighted by EU Member States**:

**DENMARK**: Civil society is a crucial player in Denmark's strategic framework for Kenya 2021-25. Local Kenyan organizations are responsible for delivering several of the Danish Embassy's engagements within human rights, democracy, gender, SRHR, women's rights, peace and stability. Moreover Danish NGOs – big and small – work in close partnerships with their Kenya counterparts to deliver humanitarian interventions and development projects throughout Kenya. This work directly informs the Embassy's policy dialogue which focuses on inclusion of marginalized groups and the protection of civic space.

**FINLAND**: The Embassy of Finland has a Fund for Local Cooperation, which provides small project grants to mainly Kenyan CSOs. The FLC is used to complement Finland's bilateral development cooperation programme in Kenya and the projects have to be aligned with the objectives of the programme, namely women's rights and youth empowerment. The projects are selected through an open call for proposals, that is organised every second year. The total FLC budget has varied over the years, current grant allocation committed in 2021 is 475 000 EUR to four CSOs. The funding available for the period 2022-2025 is subject to parliamentary approval in Finland. Under the country programme, the Finnish MFA has committed max 2 MEUR for a four year CSO programme on prevention and awareness raising on GBV. The CSO or consortium of CSOs is selected by an open call for proposals. Finnish CSOs have programmes and projects in collaboration with local CSOs in Kenya with funding from the Finnish MFA (in 2021 appr. 15 CSOs, MFA grants appr. 2.8 MEUR). One example is the Finnish Human Rights Foundation KIOS that supports local human rights organisations in Kenya. The budget for Finnish CSOs' programmes for 2022-2025 will be decided in late 2021.

**FRANCE:** The French embassy has been implementing a small grants programme for Kenyan CSOs for years, including capacity building and support to CSO initiatives. Over the last years, women empowerment has been the main focus. The French embassy can also support CSOs with bigger grants under the Solidarity fund of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (e.g. ongoing support to the Social Enterprise Society of Kenya or to 4 associative structures involved in the creative industry). The AFD also proposes its own grants, generally on a bigger scale (cf NRT, Kenya Red Cross Society, Green Belt Movement) and has been developing its own small grants in the field of sport and development.

**ITALY:** The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation is planning dedicated support to civil society organisations in 2022-2024 (grants awarded via Calls for Proposals, indicative allocation: € 3 million). In line with the "natural capital and resilience" EU-Kenya cooperation priority sector and the Team Europe Initiative "Green Deal", the Agency is planning to support NRT through an initiative aimed at supporting community conservancy model in Kenya to enhance an integrated and sustainable protection of biodiversity in the Amaya Triangle (Period end of 2021-2023, allocation approximately 2 million euro).

**POLAND:** The Embassy of the Republic of Poland has a small grants programme that is launched via a call for Proposal in March ever year, and that sets funding limits annually as well. There are four ongoing projects that focus on the development of fire protection, helping victims of human trafficking, creation of a sustainable environment for children and young people through music and facilitation of cancer care in Kenya and East Africa. These projects will be concluded by December 2021. In addition, the Polish Development Cooperation Plan provides for the organization of the "Polish Development Aid" competition for Polish NGOs. In 2021 the PCPM (Polish Centre for International Aid) has received funding for the extension of its project of fire brigade training for another 3 years. PCPM has been operating in the field of strengthening the capacity of fire and rescue service in Kenya for around five years.

**GERMANY:** The Kenyan Civil Society and CSOs are important partners in German development cooperation. Key factors in funding for German NGOs are long-term partnerships, the integration of local executing agencies in project planning and monitoring as "owner" of the process, and at best counterpart-contributions are requirements for government co-financing of such projects. Usually the German NGO is obliged to strengthen Kenyan CSOs' capacities, facilitating knowledge-transfer etc. Current funding in that area sums up to over 30m EUR in roughly 50 projects. In addition, some projects in bilateral development cooperation implemented by GIZ and KfW have components with grants to Kenyan CSOs. Furthermore, the German Embassy provides a Small Project Fund that directly aims at supporting local self-help initiatives or community groups who usually do not have access to other means of funding. Apart from its development cooperation, Germany also offers funding for Kenyan CSOs in areas like human rights, democracy, GBV, peace and stability."

# C. THE STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH CSOS AND HOW IT RELATES TO THE EU COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT AND AGENDA 2030/SDG

OBJECTIVES FOR THE EU ENGAGEMENT WITH CSOs	RELATED SECTOR & COMMISSION PRIORITY	RELATED SDG
1. Support an enabling legal and institutional environment for Kenyan civil society, at national and county-level	<ul> <li><u>Sectors:</u></li> <li>Democratic Governance, Peace &amp; Stability (MIP area 3)</li> <li>TEI on Human-centred Digitalisation</li> <li>Commission Priorities:</li> </ul>	SDG 16
	<ul> <li>Governance, Peace and Security, Human Development</li> <li>Alliances for science, technology and innovation, and digital</li> </ul>	
2. Promote participation of Kenyan civil society in international, national and county-level policy making processes, with a focus on Women and Youth	<ul> <li><u>Sectors:</u></li> <li>Democratic Governance, Peace &amp; Stability (MIP area 3)</li> <li>All MIP areas, as crosscutting issue</li> <li><u>Commission Priorities:</u></li> <li>Governance, Peace and Security, Human Development</li> </ul>	SDG 1, 5, 10, 13, 15, 16
	<ul> <li>Alliances for Sustainable Growth and Jobs</li> <li>Green Deal Alliances</li> <li>Migration Partnerships</li> </ul>	
3. Strengthen capacity of CSOs as independent actors of development, accountability and governance	<ul> <li><u>Sectors:</u></li> <li>All MIP areas, as crosscutting issue</li> <li><u>Commission Priorities:</u></li> <li>Green Deal alliances</li> <li>Alliances for science, technology and innovation, and digital</li> <li>Alliances for sustainable growth and jobs</li> <li>Migration partnerships</li> <li>Governance, peace and security, human development</li> </ul>	SDG 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16
4. Initiate a structured dialogue with civil society and identify the priorities for the EU-Kenya civil society partnership	<ul> <li><u>Sectors:</u> <ul> <li>All MIP areas, as crosscutting issue</li> <li>Both TEIs on Green Deal and Human-centred Digitalisation</li> </ul> </li> <li><u>Commission Priorities:</u> <ul> <li>Green Deal alliances</li> <li>Alliances for science, technology and innovation, and digital</li> <li>Alliances for sustainable growth and jobs</li> <li>Migration partnerships</li> <li>Governance, peace and security, human development</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	SDG 17

# D. THE ACTION PLAN

OBJECTIVES FOR THE EU ENGAGEMENT WITH CSOs	ACTIONS (including analysis, policy and political dialogue, operational support)	MEANS (EU programmes / instruments to implement the actions)		
1. Support an enabling legal, institutional and financial environment for Kenyan civil society, at national and county-level				
1.1. The implementation of PBO Act, and other relevant legislation, is monitored and promoted, in line with 2010 Constitution.	<ul> <li>Analysis:</li> <li>Monitoring and information sharing between EU and MS on state of play of PBO Act implementation</li> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>High-level policy dialogue on civil society enabling environment (incl. via CS Reference Group)</li> <li>Joint public statements, whenever relevant</li> <li>Dedicated space for dialogue and reflection under EU structured dialogue (cf. obj 4)</li> <li>Engage more systematically with the NGO Coordination Board</li> <li>Operational support:</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Analysis:</li> <li>Regular monitoring by PPI/OPS</li> <li>EU Cooperation and Dialogue facility</li> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>Civil Society Donors Group</li> <li>EU-Kenya dialogue facility</li> <li>EU Coordination meetings (HoCs)</li> <li>Creation of an "enabling environment" work area under the EU structured dialogue with civil society</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>NDICI Civil Society country allocation: dedicated grants on civic space</li> </ul>		
	<ul> <li>Targeted EU and MS financial support to CSOs working on improving the Kenyan civic space</li> </ul>	MS dedicated funding		
<b>1.2.</b> Civil society is supported as an integral part of the Kenyan democracy	<ul> <li>Analysis:</li> <li>Data collection, monitoring and dissemination to citizens</li> <li>Inclusion of civil society monitoring and analysis in EU electoral observation</li> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>Political and human rights dialogue</li> <li>Regular, bilateral dialogue with CSOs in context of key democratic processes</li> <li>Promote positive public awareness, trust in and recognition of the work of civil society and HRDs</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>Targeted EU and MS financial support to CSOs in the fields of civic education, citizens engagement, democracy promotion and domestic electoral observations, dialogue and conflict prevention, women and youth</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Analysis:</li> <li>Monitoring by PPI/OPS</li> <li>EU electoral observation of 2022 general elections</li> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>EU-Kenya strategic dialogue, incl. dedicated CS consultations</li> <li>Donor Group on Elections (co-chaired by EU and Germany)</li> <li>EU public support to CS and HRD-led accountability and democracy promotion work</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>Sub-granting to CSOs via Elections basket fund</li> <li>NDICI Democracy and Human Rights country allocation: dedicated grants on democracy priorities</li> <li>Instrument contributing to Stability</li> </ul>		

	<ul> <li>participation, inclusion, women's rights, child protection networks, student democracy</li> <li>Independent media support, media freedom, online spaces monitoring and combatting online hate speech and disinformation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>and Peace (IcSP): flexible grants on conflict prevention and peacebuilding</li> <li>MS dedicated funding</li> </ul>
1.3. Kenyan civil	Analysis:	Analysis:
society's resilience and sustainability are improved	<ul> <li>Improve information sharing between EU and MS on financial support to CSOs</li> <li>Conduct an EU+MS study of Kenyan CS financial sustainability, including a maturity assessment for introducing financial support to third parties/subgranting and FPAs in Kenya</li> <li>Policy Dialogue:</li> <li>Include topic of resilience and financial sustainability in relevant forums with civil society (cf. structured dialogue)</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>Initiate an EU-funded, civil society-led sub-granting facility to Kenyan CBOs, with a focus on new and youth-led initiatives at county level</li> <li>If possible, introduce Framework Partnership Agreements with selected Kenyan CSOs or consortia</li> <li>Deliver emergency support to CSOs and activities in case of worsening</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Mapping of EU+MS financial support to CSOs</li> <li>EU Cooperation and Dialogue Facility</li> <li>Policy dialogue: <ul> <li>EU Structured dialogue with civil society (part of "enabling environment" work area)</li> </ul> </li> <li>Operational support: <ul> <li>NDICI Civil society country allocation: <ul> <li>Launch and contracting of an EU sub-granting facility</li> <li>If possible, conclude at least 1 FPA for each area of the MIP</li> </ul> </li> <li>NDICI Kenya MIP Support Measures: complementary funding</li> <li>NDICI Human Rights and Democracy global instruments: emergency support to HRDs and CSOs (e.g. ProtectDefenders)</li> <li>MS dedicated funding</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	conditions	
2. Promote participation o processes, with a focus on	f Kenyan civil society in international, natio Women and Youth	onal and county-level policy making
<b>2.1.</b> The participation of	Analysis:	Analysis:
civil society in national policy making processes is improved and more inclusive	• Conduct a mapping of main actors and civil society coalitions contributing to key national policy processes	EU Cooperation and Dialogue Facility Policy dialogue:
	• Assess the application of the Rights- Based Approach principles of inclusion and participation by the Kenyan civil society sector, to support the formulation of an EU strategy	<ul> <li>EU-Kenya dialogue facility</li> <li>EU structured dialogue with civil society</li> <li>Operational support:</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>Promote "tripartite" dialogue between civil society, national authorities and EU in key areas of EU-Kenya relations</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>NDICI Civil society country allocation: capacity-building components under the subgranting facility and the structured dialogue initiative</li> </ul>

	<ul> <li>Regularly invite key CSOs to participate to sectoral working groups with GoK an DPs (SWGs, DPGs)</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>Support national civil society networks, coalitions and platforms at national level to undertake evidence-based research, monitoring and advocacy to engage with national authorities, and to increase their inclusiveness, notably in relation to special interest groups</li> <li>Promote student democracy in high</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>2.2 (Women and Youth) and 3.1 (Democratic and Economic Governance): dedicated grants to civil society</li> <li>MS dedicated funding</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>schools and higher education</li> <li>Promote new mechanisms of participation and inclusive digital governance</li> <li>Support CSOs promoting the participation of indigenous peoples in relevant governance and development processes affecting them</li> </ul>	
2.2. The participation of civil society at county level is improved, in line with the 2010 Constitution and guidelines developed in 2016 by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning and the Council of Governors	<ul> <li>Analysis:</li> <li>Deepen the understanding of challenges and opportunities to public participation to local development and policy making processes</li> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>Include civil society as an integral part of the EU policy dialogue on devolution with Ministry of Devolution, Council of Governors, regional economic blocs and individual county governments</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>Empower civil society, women, youth, persons with disabilities, through CBOs, to engage in participative mechanisms at county level and with regional economic blocs</li> <li>Strengthen capacities of counties to meaningfully engage with and mobilise local civil society in local policy and development processes, notably via the regional economic blocs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Analysis:</li> <li>Preliminary study in the framework of the future action on Devolution and local governance</li> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>SWG on Devolution</li> <li>EU dialogue with key stakeholders and regular missions in counties (systematise meetings with local CSOs when visiting counties)</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>MIP individual action on Devolution and local governance (tentatively AAP 2023)</li> <li>MIP individual actions (land governance)</li> <li>MS financial contributions</li> </ul>
<b>2.3.</b> Kenyan civil society is better involved and more visible in regional and international processes	<ul> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>Promote involvement of Kenyan CSOs in regional and international fora, in particular at the level of the African Union and UN human rights mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>Strategic partnership with UN, in particular EU dialogue with OHCHR</li> <li>Consultation of EU Delegation in preparation of relevant EU events</li> </ul>

3. Strengthen capacity of o main areas of the EU-Keny	<ul> <li>Ensure participation of Kenyan CSOs in relevant EU policy dialogue initiatives and international events</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>Support CS contributions/reporting to regional and international human rights mechanisms (UPR, UN HR treaty bodies, etc.)</li> <li>CSOs as independent actors of developmer va partnership</li> </ul>	Operational support: <ul> <li>MS dedicated support: Finland's Fund for Local Cooperation</li> </ul> nt, accountability and governance, in the
<b>3.1.</b> Civil society is empowered as a driving force in addressing the challenges of climate change and the green transition (= MIP area 1)	<ul> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>Promote the adoption and support the implementation of Kenya's National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, and Green Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan (GESIP)</li> <li>Engage with the business sector on upholding and promoting human rights and responsible business conduct</li> <li>Operational support:</li> <li>Build the capacities and support activities of CSOs delivering services and innovation in the areas of: <ul> <li>Natural capital and resilience (addressing impact of climate change, climate adaptation, environmental degradation and biodiversity loss)</li> <li>Green economy and sustainable businesses (innovation)</li> <li>Sustainable energy</li> <li>Land rights, natural resources and environmental issues, indigenous peoples' rights and corporate abuses</li> <li>Child and youth activists activity supports</li> <li>Promotion of healthy lifestyle, outdoor activities</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Policy dialogue:</li> <li>Relevant DPGs/SWG</li> <li>EU dialogue with business and trade community</li> <li>Operational support: <ul> <li>MIP individual actions under priority area 1 (Green transition)</li> <li>NDICI Human rights and democracy country allocation: targeted grants on support to HRDs in field of environmental rights and land rights</li> <li>NDICI Civil society country allocation: Targeted support to relevant youthled initiatives through EU civil society sub-granting facility</li> <li>MS dedicated support</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>3.2.</b> A more inclusive human development is promoted through civil society action, with a focus on Women and Youth	<ul> <li>Analysis:</li> <li>GAP III Gender Country Profile, including sector gender analyses of digitalisation, green transition and infrastructure</li> <li>Country analysis under upcoming EU Youth Action Plan</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Analysis:</li> <li>GAP III Gender Country Profile</li> <li>EU Youth Action Plan</li> <li>Policy Dialogue:</li> <li>SWG/DPG on Gender</li> </ul>

(- MID area 2)	Dights Dasad Approach analysis in	Ell Clobal Vouth Sounding Doord
(= MIP area 2)	<ul> <li>Rights-Based Approach analysis in programming of MIP individual actions</li> </ul>	EU Global Youth Sounding Board
	<ul> <li>Mapping of key CSOs active in the</li> </ul>	• EU support to Kenya Youth Sounding Board (UN-led)
	areas of inclusive and resilient infrastructure and urbanisation	EU structured dialogue with civil society
	Policy dialogue:	Operational support:
	• EU co-chair of the Development Partners Group and Sector Working Group on Gender	<ul> <li>MIP Individual actions on inclusive and resilient infrastructure and urbanisation</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Kenya participation in EU Youth Sounding Board (at global level)</li> </ul>	MIP/GAP III commitment on EU     flagship action on Gender
	<ul> <li>EU structured dialogue with civil society with focus on Women and Youth</li> </ul>	GAP III targets, particularly Gender     mainstreaming target
	Operational support:	• NDICI Civil society country allocation: targeted grants
	<ul> <li>Systematic inclusion of RBA principles in all MIP individual actions, incl. targeted support to CSOs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>NDICI Human rights and democracy country allocation: targeted grants</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>GAP III Country-Level Implementation Plan, incl. dedicated actions on Gender</li> </ul>	• MS financial support: Finland's Fund for Local Cooperation
	<ul> <li>Support to youth councils, platforms, associations, cooperatives, student democracy and other youth group initiatives</li> </ul>	
	• Inclusive and resilient infrastructure and urbanisation, in particular by supporting CSOs working on the rights of persons with disabilities in becoming national reference points	
	• Rights of children, notably in relation to impact of Covid-19 pandemic, promotion of early childhood care ad learning - child-centred parenting?	
<b>3.3.</b> Civil society is able	Analysis:	Analysis:
to work more effectively in democratic	Kenya conflict analysis to include	• Conflict risk analysis (due in 2022)
governance, peace and	civil society role as a focus area	• GAP III Gender Country Profile
stability (= MIP area 3)	<ul> <li>GAP III Gender Country profile, including sector profile on women, peace and security</li> </ul>	• EU Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategy 2021-2024
	<ul> <li>EU Human Rights and Democracy</li> </ul>	Policy dialogue:
	Country Strategy 2021-2024	Strategic dialogue on EU-Kenya     segurity compact
	Policy dialogue:	security compact
	• Promote the role of civil society in the EU-Kenya Security compact	EU political dialogue with NCAJ, including with Court Users Committees
	• Promote the role of civil society in the justice political dialogue	

	Operational support:	Operational support:	
	Support CSO initiatives in the areas of :	• MIP individual actions:	
	<ul> <li>the fight against corruption (monitoring, accountability, advocacy, education)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>PLEAD 2: dedicated budget to CS action on the fight against corruption, and financial</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>awareness and participation to the budget process at national and county level; strengthening of the link between public policies and financing</li> </ul>	contribution to "Amkeni Wakenya" UNDP facility on access to justice and legal aid - Dedicated budget to CS support in future MIP individual actions	
	<ul> <li>access to justice and legal aid to poor and vulnerable groups</li> <li>monitoring, documenting and addressing human rights</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>NDICI human rights and democracy country allocation: grants to CSOs on relevant EU human rights priorities</li> <li>NDICI human rights and democracy</li> </ul>	
	violations and abuses in the security sector (in particular police brutality)	global allocation: grants to Kenyan CSOs and participation of Kenyan CSOs in EU-funded global initiatives	
	<ul> <li>preventing and countering violent extremism (in particular in relation to county-level action plans on PCVE)</li> </ul>	• MS financial support: Finland's Fund for Local Cooperation	
	<ul> <li>Peace and security agenda (resilience, service delivery in borderlands areas)</li> </ul>		
	logue with between the EU and civil society per states, national and local authorities	y covering main EU priority areas, and	
4.1. A structured dialogue	Policy dialogue:	Policy dialogue:	
with civil society is launched and operational on the main areas of EU cooperation and Team Europe Initiatives	• Mobilise EU and Member states for regular interactions under a EU structured dialogue with civil society, organised around the 3 main priorities	• Until the structured dialogue is operational, regular interactions and consultations with CS in context of Dialogue facility	
	of the EU-Kenya MIP, the 2 Team Europe Initiatives, and key crosscutting	EU-Kenya strategic dialogue	
	issues (enabling environment, gender	Operational support:	
	<ul> <li>and youth)</li> <li>Involve civil society in design, implementation and monitoring of the two TEIs on Green Deal and Human- Centred Digitalisation</li> </ul>	• NDICI Civil society country allocation: targeted grant to CS-led consortium	
		<ul> <li>NDICI MIP Special measures: complementary support, where relevant</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Involve civil society in EU strategic dialogue with GoK (incl. preliminary consultations and debriefs?)</li> </ul>	MS financial contributions	
	Operational support:		
	<ul> <li>Mobilise EU financial allocation to initiate and support the design and launch of an EU structured dialogue with civil society</li> </ul>		

#### PART III- FOLLOW-UP OF THE RM

OBJECTIVES FOR EU	OUTCOME/OUTPUT INDICATORS	TARGET	BASELINE INFORMATION	SOURCES OF INFORMATION & MEANS OF VERIFICATION
ENGAGEMENT WITH CSOs			(if available)	
1. Support an enabling legal, institutional and financial environment for Kenyan civil society, at national and county-level	i.1.1. CSOs perception on the quality and applicability of the legal framework regulating CSOs i.1.2. Number of initiatives supported by the EUD and MS with a view to reviewing the legal framework regulating CSOs (supporting authorities and/or CSOs); out of these, number of initiatives adopted and implemented i.1.3. Number of CSOs supported by EU and MS in support of	i.1.1. PBO Act implementation has progressed, and increased positive perception by CSOs i.1.2. Actions dedicated to CS work on the civic space are funded, contracted and implemented by EU and MS i.1.3. Kenyan CSOs supported each year through all	i.1.1. Current stalemate with lack of GoK willingness to move forward i.1.2. 0	<ul> <li>i.1.1. <ul> <li>Laws and other regulations on civil society (i.e. laws, by-laws, decrees, etc.)</li> <li>Official Gazette</li> <li>National, regional and global studies about the EE (e.g. the CIVICUS EEI)</li> <li>CS Perception survey on EE (to be commissioned via EU structured dialogue)</li> </ul> </li> <li>i.1.2. <ul> <li>Mapping of EU+MS financial support to civil society</li> <li>EU+MS statements on EE</li> <li>EU+MS+CSOs+GoK dialogue initiatives including EE as topic of discussion</li> <li>i.1.3.</li> <li>Mapping of EU+MS financial support to CSOs on democracy and electoral matters</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
2. Promote participation of Kenyan civil society in international, national and county-level policy making processes, with a focus on Women and Youth	democratic cycle and electoral matters i.2.1. Existence in practice of invited spaces of dialogue and consultation for local/national/secto ral development plan/strategy policy discussions/laws/su b-laws i.2.2. Number of EU (EUD/MS) funded projects which promote the inclusion of CSOs in public policy formulation and/or the establishment of a more permanent dialogue i.2.3. Increased level of	means available by EU and MS i.2.1. Increased number of spaces, as reported publicly and/or through EU+MS funded actions i.2.2. Increased EU+MS support to CS participation initiatives, both at national and county level i.2.3. Increased participation of		<ul> <li>i.2.1.</li> <li>-MoU, protocols regulating public consultations</li> <li>-Public consultation reports and minutes of the meetings organised between the Government (national or local) and CSOs meetings/ of public hearings</li> <li>-EU-funded projects/programme reports</li> <li>-Reference in Media (formal and informal) to initiatives where CS is involved in public consultations/public affairs</li> <li>i.2.2.</li> <li>- Mapping of EU+MS financial support to civil society</li> <li>- EU+MS-funded projects/programmes reports</li> <li>i.2.3.</li> <li>- Public consultation reports</li> <li>-Disaggregated data from EU+MS funded projects/programmes reports</li> </ul>

	participation of women and youth in public policy discussions, at local and national level	women and youth, both in absolute (number) and relative (% of total) terms	
3. Strengthen capacity of CSOs as independent actors of development, accountability and governance, in the main areas of the EU- Kenya partnership	<ul> <li>i.3.1. Evidence of increased service delivery and participation by CSOs in key EU priority areas, sectors and Team Europe Initiatives</li> <li>i.3.2. Evidence of more systematic mainstreaming of CSOs into the EU priority areas, sectors, Team Europe Initiatives</li> <li>i.3.3. Number of CSOs receiving EU+MS support to strengthen technical and service delivery capacities, in main areas of EU-Kenya partnership</li> </ul>	i.3.1. Increased number of final beneficiaries of CSOs actions funded by EU+MS i.3.2. Increased involvement of CSOs in all relevant areas through mainstreaming i.3.3. Increased number of CSOs supported by EU+MS, and increase share of CSO funding (as % of EU+MS funding)	<ul> <li>i.3.1.</li> <li>-Mapping of EU+MS financial support to civil society</li> <li>-CSOs reports from EU+MS funded projects</li> <li>-Reference in Media (formal and informal) to initiatives where CS is involved in service delivery</li> <li>i.3.2.</li> <li>-</li> <li>i.3.3.</li> <li>-Mapping of EU+MS financial support to civil society</li> </ul>
4. Initiate a structured dialogue with between the EU and civil society covering main EU priority areas, and involving the EU, its member states, national and local authorities	i.4.1. Extent and quality of CS involvement in the dialogue process related to EU priority areas, sectors and Team Europe Initiatives	i.4.1. Number of dialogue events, and number of participating CSOs increase every year	<ul> <li>I.4.1.</li> <li>Dialogue events organised under EU- Kenya Dialogue facility</li> <li>Contracting and reporting on EU structured dialogue with civil society</li> </ul>

#### PART IV - ANNEXES & REFERENCES

#### ANNEX 1: THE PROCESS

How were MS/EU+ present in the country involved in the drafting of the RM?	MS/EU+ stakeholders were involved at all stages of the drafting. The initial process was presented to EU Development Counsellors in March. EU MS were invited to participate to online consultation meetings organised by the EUD. A "zero draft" was shared for MS comments and contributions in July 2021, along with a presentation of initial findings to Development Counsellors in July. A revised draft was shared with MS on 13 September, followed by a detailed presentation, technical discussion and guidance on expected Member States inputs. The final draft was presented and discussed with MS Political Counsellors on 6 October, with MS Development Counsellors on 14 October and with Heads of Missions on 13 October. The roadmap was completed with final MS inputs on 27 October. The roadmap was formally endorsed by Heads of Mission through a written procedure on 28 October.
What mechanisms are set up to ensure the involvement of MS/EU+	The implementation and follow-up of the roadmap will be formalised by the EU structured dialogue with civil society, to be initiated in 2022. MS will be invited to officially take part of this structured dialogue.
in the implementation and follow up of the RM?	In addition, EUD and MS will continue to regularly coordinate with each other in the context of existing sector working groups (DPGs, SWGs, etc.), as the purpose of this roadmap is not to duplicate EU+MS coordination efforts together with other development partners; Dedicated agenda points on the implementation of this roadmap will continue in the EU Development Counsellors meetings, and when relevant, in the EU Political counsellors and HoMs meeting.
	MS are also invited to signal their financial and non-financial contributions to achieve the objectives of this RM. Such financial contributions will reflect their respective areas of interest and may well complement (or co-fund) the EU actions identified in this RM.
What consultations with CSOs were organised? What type of actors were involved? What mechanisms, if any, were used to ensure the	Using the opportunity of digital tools widely available and regularly used by all stakeholders under the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU Delegation organised its formal consultations on this roadmap during 2021 through online consultation sessions, structured around the 3 main areas of the MIP and key thematic areas, all informing the programming processes (MIP, HR/Democracy Country strategy, GAP III CLIP):
inclusiveness of the process?	- MIP area 1 (Green transition), attended by 26 CSOs
	- MIP area 2 (Leave no one behind), attended by 28 CSOs
	- MIP area 3 (governance), attended by 23 CSOs
	- Human Rights and Democracy, attended by 19 CSOs
	- Youth engagement, attended by 24 youth organisations
	- Enabling environment, attended by 21 CSOs.
	For each consultation, specific CSOs were selected by the EU Delegation, on the basis of their expertise, existing relation, with the EU, and inclusiveness of specific groups (women, youth, persons with disabilities, LGBTI, minorities and indigenous groups). Clusters of CSOs were invited to ensure the broadest

	representation possible. In that process, the EU Delegation directly interacted with approximately 140 Kenyan civil society representatives.
	In addition, several online surveys extended consultations to a wider range of CS representatives, on the MIP priority areas (40 replies received), Youth engagement (58 replies received), enabling environment (8 replies received) and, more broadly, on this roadmap (160 replies received). The EU Delegation received 266 written contributions from CSOs to feed into this roadmap.
	Given the restrictions related to Covid-19 and the limited physical capacities of the EU Delegation, there was no formal physical consultation mechanism that could be reasonably organised beyond the online meetings and surveys above. It is therefore acknowledged that consultations were necessarily limited to "tech savvy" CS representatives in Kenya, although these were of course representing a much wider group of rights holders from all parts of Kenyan society. However, whenever possible, CSOs were consulted and met during EUD field visits in counties, notably in Mombasa, Lamu and Kwale counties.
What mechanisms, are set up to continue the dialogue with CSOs? What mechanisms, if any, will used to ensure the inclusiveness of the dialogue?	One of the main objectives of this RM is to Initiate a structured dialogue between the EU and civil society, covering main EU priority areas, and involving the EU, its member states, national and local authorities. The objective 4 of this RM explains more in detail what follow-up mechanisms are foreseen.
How is the RM integrated /coordinated with the JP process?	This RM directly contributes to the priorities set in the current JP strategy and aligned in the MIP. The future JP framework, to be discussed and elaborated after the 2022 General elections, will benefit from the formal dialogue structure set by this RM as a platform for engagement and consultation with civil society.
How does the RM relate to other country processes including human rights and democracy country strategies, the gender action plan, etc.?	The RM was elaborated with the intention of aligning under a single and coherent action plan all the civil society engagement elements identified in other country programming processes, notably the Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 and the two Team Europe Initiatives on Green Deal and Human-Centred Digitalisation, the Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategy, and the Gender Action Plan III Country Profile and Country-level Implementation Plan (still under preparation as of September 2021).
	The RM also identified under a single reference framework the different financial instruments and means at the disposal of the EU and its MS to support civil society, with the aim of finding complementarity and synergies between these instruments. With its objective on a structured dialogue, the RM also aims to have one joint platform and reference framework for CS to meaningfully engage on these other EU country processes.

#### ANNEX 2: REPORTS OF THE CSO CONSULTATIONS AND ONLINE SURVEY