



CASH & VOUCHER ASSISTANCE

WITHIN SOCIAL PROTECTION PREPAREDNESS

IN CENTRAL AMERICA,
MEXICO, AND
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC



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THE CALP NETWORK BRINGS TOGETHER ORGANIZATIONS TO STRENGTHEN POLICY, PRACTICE AND RESEARCH RELATED TO CASH AND VOUCHER ASSISTANCE (CVA).

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADESS	Social Subsidy Administration (Dominican Republic)	ILO	International Labour Organization
BHA	Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (United States)	INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
BZS	Belize dollar	IOM	International Organization for Migration
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership (Now CALP Network)	IPI	<i>Inclusión Población Infantil</i> (Dominican Republic)
CENISS	National Center for Social Sector Information (Honduras)	KYC	Know Your Customer
CEPAL	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
CEPREDENAC	Center for Coordination for the Prevention of Disasters in Central America and the Dominican Republic (Regional Americas)	MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning
COMAR	Refugee Assistance Commission (Mexico)	MXN	Mexican pesos
CONRED	National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction (Guatemala)	MIDES	Social Development Ministry (Guatemala)
COPECO	Permanent Commission for Contingencies (Honduras)	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
CRC	Costa Rican <i>Colones</i>	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
CVA	Cash and Voucher Assistance	NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
CWG	Cash Working Group	OCHA	Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
DR	Dominican Republic	PET	<i>Programa de Empleo Temporal</i> (Mexico)
DRM	Disaster Risk Management	PETi	<i>Programa de Empleo Temporal Inmediato</i> (Mexico)
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction	RAS	Social Supply Network (Dominican Republic)
EWS	Early Warning Systems	RED-LAC	Risk, Emergency and Disaster Group for Latin America and the Caribbean
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	RUP	Single Participant Registry
FSU	Single Socioeconomic Form (Honduras)	SEDESOL	Secretary of Social Development (Mexico)
FSU-SE	Streamlined Single Socioeconomic Form (Honduras)	SENPRENDE	Small Business and Entrepreneurship Administration (Honduras)
FSP	Financial Service Provider	SICA	Central American Integration System
GoG	Government of Guatemala	SINAGER	Honduras Risk Management System National Law (Honduras)
GoH	Government of Honduras	SIUBEN	Single Beneficiary System (Dominican Republic)
GoSV	Government of El Salvador	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
GoG	Government of Guatemala	SP	Social Protection
HNL	Honduran <i>lempira</i>	SRSP	Shock-Responsive Social Protection
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent	WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There are a range of options for integrating social protection programming linked to humanitarian cash and voucher assistance (CVA). This continuum moves from governments taking the lead in developing social protection systems that can respond to large-scale shocks (shock responsive social protection systems) to humanitarians driving the process (described as linking humanitarian CVA with social protection). Consequently, preparedness should include the reinforcement of shock responsiveness in social protection systems and of how humanitarian and social protection systems may be linked for a more effective, efficient, and equitable response.

The inclusion of CVA – whether via social protection, humanitarian response, or a blend of the two - in preparedness work in LAC is only beginning to gain traction. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) governments have long used CVA successfully in various social protection programs. However, CVA for humanitarian response at scale is much more recent in the region.

The region is highly vulnerable to multiple and cyclic hazards such as droughts and hurricanes, which are increasingly causing displacement and poverty. One factor that inhibits using CVA in disaster response is that traditionally disaster management response in LAC favored in-kind assistance by default; this limited further investment in preparedness to use CVA in emergency situations.

The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has proved a driver of change through a greater focus on CVA as a main tool to address increasing poverty and vulnerability. Governments in the region have begun to strengthen emergency preparedness using humanitarian CVA and through links to existing social protection programs. These new practices and learning can offer a sort of a road map in preparing to respond to other complex crises with humanitarian CVA connected to existing national social protection systems.

This study maps and analyzes programs starting from 2016 in which humanitarian CVA was linked to, or built on, national social protection programs, primarily for preparedness in a disaster but also for direct response to disasters, throughout Central America, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. The study draws on an analytical framework of five key “building blocks” of social protection systems to help unpack the main parameters for work on preparedness: i) Stakeholders and Institutions; ii) Data, and Information Systems; iii) CVA Design; iv) Delivery Systems; and v) Coordinating and Financing. Companion in depth case studies from the Dominican Republic and Honduras complement the study. climate change is looming ever-larger as the major humanitarian issue for the years ahead.



FINDINGS

Many governments in the region are interested in using and are innovating with CVA in humanitarian response and social protection: The study finds that recent pilots using humanitarian CVA in government-led social protection programs offer valuable learning; the COVID-19 pandemic proved an opportunity to pilot the use of the CVA in new ways and drew on the expertise of different actors. Many governments in LAC have demonstrated an openness to experiment with the use of humanitarian CVA (El Salvador), engage non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations (UN) to use existing programs (Dominican Republic), seek out technical support (Honduras), and learn from Cash Working Groups (CWGs) to design new programming (Guatemala). In Mexico and the other Central American countries featured in this study, strong foundations in social protection programming allow the relatively easy use of humanitarian CVA. Governments were able to adapt targeting mechanisms, streamline databases, expand vendor systems, and evolve accountability and transparency mechanisms—elements which have enhanced national social protection programming overall. Some of this flexibility was possible partly because partners who worked with governments had funding which could be deployed in support. However, there is an obvious role for donors—humanitarian and development—in funding and investing in preparedness as an anticipatory action through both humanitarian CVA, linking humanitarian CVA with social protection programs and/or systems and through making existing social protection systems more shock responsive.

National policy and regulatory frameworks limit options for CVA preparedness for emergencies: One of the biggest obstacles in the region are regulatory frameworks; existing laws actually limit options for governments in the region to employ CVA in emergencies in a sustained manner. However, there are some successful examples: in the Dominican Republic, the President was able to take advantage of flexible laws to immediately deploy additional humanitarian CVA when a shock occurred. Even with more flexible regulatory frameworks, governments need to make formal agreements that are agile and not tied to one type of crisis or timeframe, for example, through a Memoranda of Understanding as was the case in Honduras. A lack of coordinating institutions is a further major challenge. Common across the countries of study is the need for at least one national ministry with the authority to plan for and use humanitarian CVA in preparing for shocks within national social protection programs.

Coordination roles, responsibilities, and reach among government ministries and humanitarian and civil society organizations should be planned in the preparedness phase: In each context, the study found uneven or absent national humanitarian CVA and social protection coordination mechanisms. In some cases, CWGs have taken strides to try to improve this gap, such as in Guatemala where there is a sub-working group on the topic. In the Dominican Republic, the government's role in the roundtable on social protection provides another promising example of coordination on the topic. Coordination between different government ministries, humanitarian agencies and, potentially, local civil society, should fit the context and be organized in advance. This coordination should include clarity on which agency is responsible for which people of concern so that vulnerable populations not covered by national mandates, such as migrants, refugees, and stateless people, receive support through the appropriately mandated partner—whether government, international agencies, or civil society. Better coordination and acknowledgement of agency mandates will facilitate preparedness across governmental agencies and humanitarian stakeholders, including donors, and other local actors. Such regular and predictable coordination will allow actors to harmonize and consolidate responses ahead of a crisis. Critical topics to unpack in coordination include identification of capacity gaps, the use of relevant response mechanisms, and delivery mechanisms.

Clear messaging and effective communication channels and feedback mechanisms for affected communities and recipients are essential: The need to create and use strong information and data management platforms for clear messaging to recipients is another emerging thread in the study. Stakeholders consulted for this study strongly indicated that they face barriers in joint data sharing, in particular between governments and humanitarian agencies. This is an especially sensitive issue for those organizations working with the undocumented and/or in mixed migration settings, where the humanitarian mandate goes hand in hand with both protecting and serving the most vulnerable populations. The UN and NGOs are often held to General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) or other agency-level data protection policies, which prohibit sharing. Recipient identification by

NGOs and the UN programming may be different from that used in national social protection programming, which can contribute to duplication of recipients, exclusion errors, or confusion by the population. However, such obstacles can be overcome if data protection protocols can be clearly outlined in accompanying agreements and these agreements are written so that they anticipate and allow for crisis response. For true preparedness, data management platforms will need to be adaptive and flexible. Examples include a single social and economic registry and increasing linkages and interoperability between different databases.

International NGOs and UN agencies should collaborate to share their expertise and strengthen government capacities: Capacity-building and training in partnership with NGOs, CWGs, and the UN, should continue to be provided to ministries, agencies, and civil society engaged in social protection to develop technical and institutional knowledge. NGOs and the UN have growing capacity to deliver humanitarian CVA in LAC. They are in a good position to support governments to build their capacity through technical accompaniment and financial support to ensure more flexible humanitarian CVA delivery, including through better targeting, and identification mechanisms. This technical support will require engagement with donors to help secure funding for sustained support and building capacities especially with governments at national and regional levels and with locally based NGOs.

Regional bodies such as CEPREDENAC have a critical role to play: Building on the nascent capacity in LAC, many opportunities exist for strengthening the links between humanitarian and social protection CVA, reforming existing social protection to use humanitarian CVA in LAC or, ultimately, to become more shock responsive social protection systems. Various preparedness measures are already underway, from an Emergency Subsidy and Emergency Preparedness Plan in the Dominican Republic to legal mandates for transparency and accountability accompaniment to CVA in social protection in Honduras. To continue strengthening preparedness measures, national governments will need to i) overcome continued challenges, such as reaching stateless and undocumented individuals, ii) build trust with NGOs coordinating national messaging related to humanitarian CVA alongside CVA in long term social protection, and iii) continue to harmonize national CVA delivery and targeting mechanisms with civil society approaches. This requires a deeper level of relationship-building between various key CVA and social protection stakeholders. There is existing sub-regional/national capacity and experience that can provide a basis for a preparedness framework; for example, rapid response mechanisms that integrate humanitarian CVA within their existing social protection systems or a regional mechanism to support national CVA delivery and transparency. An entity like the Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America (CEPREDENAC) has the potential to generate regional buy-in for linking UN, NGOs, and civil society for humanitarian CVA social protection preparedness.

CONCLUSION

Climatic, socioeconomic, and epidemiological shocks will continue to impact the emergency response landscape in LAC and this study shows national social protection systems are increasingly equipped to respond. However, strengthening shock responsiveness, not least through further inclusion of humanitarian CVA within national systems and programs to prepare for inevitable shocks could provide more flexibility, effective and adaptive responses in complex contexts, ensuring support to the most vulnerable populations. The emergency situation posed by COVID-19 highlights relevant experiences that can be learned from and built upon from Central America, Mexico, and Dominican Republic. These experiences can likely show the way forward to the region overall and the world.

01

INTRODUCTION



Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is a region well known for pioneering national government-led social protection (SP) programs. International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and the United Nations (UN) have also recently invested heavily in Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA)¹ in the region, both to meet development goals and to respond to humanitarian response. These include unexpected shocks such as COVID-19, as well as more frequent and/or predictable shocks such as hurricanes, earthquakes, droughts and floods, or socioeconomic shocks such as rapid-onset migration and forced displacement.

Yet, since Shock-Responsive Social Protection (SRSP), and linking Social Protection (SP) and humanitarian CVA programs, and as combining these approaches in emergency preparedness are still new throughout LAC; only a handful of governments have explicitly considered linking humanitarian CVA to SP in their emergency preparedness. Many still focus primarily on responses based on the provision of in-kind goods. Even fewer have actively linked SP with INGO- and UN-led humanitarian CVA efforts in thinking ahead for emergency response. ‘whereas globally, humanitarian response has seen a major shift towards the use of CVA. CVA is used in both humanitarian and SP systems precisely because it is more efficient and more effective. The similarity in the administrative and delivery systems of humanitarian CVA and national social protection systems based on the use of CVA has proved an entry point for attempts to link the two for a faster, more adequate, and more comprehensive response.

As Rodolfo Beazley aptly noted in 2019, “social protection systems are increasingly used in emergency response in LAC ... [but] to date, systems and programs have been mostly used ‘as they were’ or only slightly adapted after the shocks. Planning and preparedness of the social protection system has been limited.”²

While recent research (Beazley 2016, 2017a, 2019 and Barca 2019) details efforts to link SP to CVA in the region, there is a notable lack of research on the use of humanitarian CVA in, or on linking SP to national emergency preparedness efforts. The COVID-19 pandemic has offered an opportunity to fill this gap. COVID-19 has contributed to a surge of CVA and SP programs in LAC—an emergency that, as one key informant noted, “no government in the region was prepared for.” Analyzing lessons learned from COVID-19 and other recent shocks in LAC may contribute to more effective preparedness planning, especially when exploring better ways to bring in humanitarian CVA or link it with SP.

This report explores how humanitarian CVA is used in SP programs to contribute to disaster preparedness in Mexico, Central America, and the Dominican Republic (DR), later narrowing in on two case studies for further analysis of preparedness in CVA-linked SP (*Bono Único* in Honduras and *Inclusión Población Infantil* (IPI) in the DR). It maps CVA, and SP preparedness, focusing on where humanitarian CVA has been used in SP. It then highlights barriers, enablers, challenges, and opportunities for linking CVA to SP through a preparedness lens.

This report should prove useful to government staff in social developments agencies, humanitarian technical advisors, and implementing partners in municipalities and localities—particularly those working within NGOs and the UN.

¹ In this study, humanitarian CVA refers to humanitarian assistance that is provided separately from or integrated into the national programs and systems. Many national social protection systems will have social assistance programs that are cash- or voucher-based.

² Beazley, Rodolfo, Ana Solórzano, and Valentina Barca. *Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management. 2019.

I.1 METHODOLOGY

This study relies on five key “building blocks” to conceptualize where initiatives related to preparedness would be in a CVA program linking SP or humanitarian assistance program. These building blocks draw on the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) Preparedness Framework, internal documents prepared by the CALP Network Consultant Gabrielle Smith, and recent research on shock-responsive social protection (SRSP) by two research initiatives: SPACE (Social Protection Approaches to COVID-19 Expert Advice) and TRANSFORM. These “building blocks” include.

- 1 **STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS:** contingency planning, policy frameworks, institutional capacities, governance, and coordination.
- 2 **DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS:** on disaster and vulnerability analysis, SP systems, other civil and government registries, other targeting systems, data-sharing agreements.
- 3 **CVA PROGRAM DESIGN:** design of targeting, modalities, transfers, inclusion of vulnerable groups, linkages between CVA and SP.³
- 4 **DELIVERY SYSTEMS:** registration, enrollment, payment, communications and accountability, disaster-proofing of delivery systems, monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEAL).
- 5 **COORDINATING AND FINANCING:** disaster risk financing, pooled funds, pre-positioning, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) in place for expansions.

TABLE I: BUILDING BLOCKS COMPONENTS’ SUMMARY

BUILDING BLOCKS	COMPONENTS
 <p>STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Policy and regulatory frameworks ii Governance and coordination iii Institutional capacities
 <p>DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Social protection data and information systems including beneficiary registries; social registries and data protection ii Other civil registries iii Data on disaster/shock vulnerability including disaster vulnerability mapping, early warning systems and trigger indicators for early action
 <p>CVA DESIGN</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Targeting design (e.g., coverage; criteria; methodology) ii Modality design including restrictions and conditions iii Transfer design (e.g., value, frequency, duration, exit)
 <p>DELIVERY SYSTEMS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Registration ii Enrolment iii Payment delivery iv Communication, complaints and feedback and accountability v Monitoring and evaluation
 <p>COORDINATION AND FINANCING</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Guidance on government financing and SP ii Disaster risk financing

³ CVA design includes all of the elements of CVA (delivery, targeting, etc.). This report uses “CVA Program Design,” instead of “Cash Transfer Programming Design” that is used at IASC Framework for Preparedness, to be consistent with CaLP Glossary and standard practice in CVA research.

For a more detailed discussion of this methodological approach, please see Appendix 1.

This study also reviewed existing literature on SP and CVA in LAC since 2016 and conducted in-depth key informant interviews with approximately 30 stakeholders; some of which were focus group discussions from government SP and disaster management ministries, the UN, and INGOs.

The research was carried out in two phases:

- PHASE 1** focused on regional mapping of institutions, selection of case studies, and development of a topical outline, as well as initial key informants;⁴
- PHASE 2** focused on conducting in-depth research on the selected case studies, case study specific key informants, and preparation of the final report and case studies.

The selection of the two case studies was carried out in consultation with CALP and the study Steering Committee.⁵ The criteria for selection of the case studies included: use of the SP system, diversity of humanitarian organizations connected to the program (including UN and INGOs), clarity of institutional linkages, aid recipient selection and targeting type, population coverage, availability of MEAL documents, and use or development of preparedness elements. The main respondents came from UN, INGO, and national governments, all of which are key stakeholders in linking CVA with SP programs in LAC.

1.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Some limitations of the study need to be considered here.

- The lack of literature on this emerging topic meant that most of the more current data used in this study comes from key informant interviews and from the most up-to-date COVID-19 monitoring. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean's (CEPAL for its acronym in Spanish) SP tracker also served as a useful resource, but as one of the few comprehensive SP archives, was potentially over-consulted for this study.
- It was beyond the scope of this study to examine in detail each element of the preparedness building blocks for each of the SP programs that were mapped. Rather, the focus has been on the most relevant ones in each example.
- This study excludes certain programs, primarily if they were too small-scale or had limited information publicly available. Therefore, it should be considered a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, mapping exercise.
- There is a slight gap in the number of respondents from government or regional disaster and social development ministries. There is an even greater gap in representation from local NGOs respondents, since these were not identified in the initial mapping of initiatives/key stakeholders. The role of local NGOs should be more carefully considered in any future studies, since it is likely that they would constitute a significant body of stakeholders.

⁴ Some of the resources used as part of the literature review for this study are internal documents from key informants and their organizations, which are not cited here for privacy reasons.

⁵ The Steering Committee was composed of members of WFP, UNICEF, GOAL International, Catholic Relief Services, Action Against Hunger, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and World Vision International.

02

REGIONAL CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES: **A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW**



As noted in the Introduction, the literature on preparedness for linking humanitarian CVA to CVA programs with SP is limited compared to the comprehensive literature on SP and social cash transfers. A wide-ranging review of academic articles, reports, policy memoranda, regional and national contingency plans, blogs, and evaluations resulted in only a handful that specifically referenced examples within preparedness of linking humanitarian CVA to SP programming or systems.

Various resources in the existing literature highlight efforts to link national SRSP, INGO, and UN initiatives in LAC. These include widely referenced research by Rodolfo Beazley and Valentina Barca, published by Oxford Policy Management (Barca and Beazley 2019.; Barca, Hebbbar, and Malik 2019.; Beazley, Solórzano, and Barca 2019; Beazley, Solórzano, and Sossouvi 2016), as well as a recent SP-focused RED-LAC and R4V study on integrating CVA in national SP systems (2021). Another LAC regional study, based on a survey to CVA stakeholders, highlighted that in many countries, the use of CVA with SP was already in process and was featuring strongly in the COVID-19 response, while in an even greater number of cases, there was an awareness of the potential offered by such an approach.⁶

There is also an increasing amount of literature on how to strengthen national SP systems with large social assistance programs based on CVA (Innovations for Poverty Action 2015; McClain 2018). Similarly, preparedness and contingency planning for linking CVA with existing SP is also a common theme in the literature, especially as related to COVID-19 (see Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO)), and United Nations Habitat 2020; CEPREDENAC and SICA 2020; IOM 2018; SICA 2020). Yet much of this literature fails to discuss the potential relationship between national SP programming and humanitarian CVA in preparedness planning, nor does it focus on making existing SP more sensitive and responsive to large-scale covariate shocks. This omission may be because much of this literature is out of date.

Beazley's work on SRSP in LAC (Beazley 2016, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2019), comes the closest to filling these gaps. These studies outline the regional context and challenges for linking and developing stronger SRSP in government systems. They also detail a regionally specific theoretical framework for understanding SRSP in LAC. Beazley (2017a) also identifies preparedness challenges in the region, particularly related to the design of targeting mechanisms,⁷ delivery systems, coordination mechanisms, and data management. While each of these categories is critical for preparedness, Beazley's analysis focuses on SP in general, without reference to humanitarian response. As Beazley also notes, his analysis largely excludes SP used for natural disasters, as opposed to economic shocks, due to the limited number of experiences of linking and preparedness for climatic shocks at the time of his research.⁸

This study contributes a new, preparedness-specific lens to the existing literature on SRSP, rooted in linking humanitarian CVA and the systems that support this to national CVA SP programming and policies for preparedness. The aim is to help strengthen the use of humanitarian CVA and in linking humanitarian CVA to national SP systems in Central America, Mexico, and the DR.

⁶ R4V. *Cash and Voucher Assistance in Response to COVID-19*. May. 2020.

⁷ As Beazley notes, geographic targeting, and particularly tied to rural areas, excluding urban catchment zones; targeted only to areas where supply of delivery mechanisms can meet demand for cash transfers; categorical targeting that excludes disaster-impacted households outside of these categories; emergence of single registries, such as SIUBEN's Index of Vulnerability to Climate Shocks in the DR.

⁸ Beazley, Rodolfo. *Are Social Protection Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean Shock-Responsive?* International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. 2017a.



03

REGIONAL MAPPING: PREPAREDNESS THAT LINKS HUMANITARIAN CVA AND NATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION CVA



The following section maps select examples of humanitarian CVA linked to SP initiatives in preparedness LAC since 2016. As previously noted, this is not an exhaustive mapping, but serves as a representative sample of impactful CVA-linked SP programs and their corresponding preparedness plans, as appropriate. This section begins with a discussion of Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala) and then moves to other Central American countries, before concluding with a discussion of the DR and Mexico. Each case will be analyzed following the preparedness “building blocks” that will help to understand progress and challenges in consolidating CVA within SP programs for preparedness.

A SUMMARY OF CVA WITHIN SOCIAL PROTECTION PREPAREDNESS BEST PRACTICES



BUILDING BLOCK



RELEVANT EXPERIENCE



3.1 CENTRAL AMERICA: NORTHERN TRIANGLE

3.1.1 EL SALVADOR

El Salvador has some experience of linking humanitarian CVA to SP in response to both COVID-19 and natural disasters. The most successful example of preparedness through humanitarian CVA in El Salvador is the World Food Programme's (WFP) collaboration with the Government of El Salvador (GoSV) on drought response. This response was designed to be linked to the social protection system, specifically to the poverty eradication strategy that was already being implemented in several municipalities. It aimed to "reduce the impact on food insecurity in poor households in municipalities with the highest percentage of extremely poor households."⁹



CVA PROGRAM DESIGN

The GoSV worked with WFP in 2018 to establish common regional response standards for droughts with the goal of reducing food insecurity.¹⁰ These actions included standardizing CVA transfer amounts by department. To do so, WFP collaborated with the civil protection ministries to determine the areas most impacted by drought, standardize targeting criteria, establish mechanisms to deliver transfers through the national bank, and link social registries across government ministries (also part of data and information systems reform).¹¹ Integrating these lists into a single platform, or Single Participant Registry (RUP), helped standardize response through humanitarian CVA and support monitoring efforts. This resulted in approximately 15,815 households receiving a one-time transfer of USD120 per household, targeted at the female head of household if possible. The transfers were delivered using the same institutions and agreements in existence for the payment of other government programs. The cash transfer itself was delivered physically, as opposed to electronically.¹² Since building stronger systems that can be shock responsive or able to link with humanitarian support is critical, WFP also supported capacity-building for GoSV staff, including training on how to establish contracts with implementing partners and how to conduct feasibility and market assessments. However, this program also illuminated continuing challenges in linking humanitarian CVA to SP for emergency preparedness in El Salvador, as described below.



STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS

Key informants for El Salvador noted some general institutional challenges to linking humanitarian CVA and SP CVA towards the goal of having a national SP system that was able to respond to large scale shocks as a key element in preparedness. Key informants suggested that SP operational guides and manuals had not been developed, and that legal reforms to ensure that SP ministries had a mandate for emergency response had not been ratified. Key informants

⁹ RED-LAC and R4V. *Vinculando Las Transferencias Monetarias Con Los Sistemas de Protección Social En Latinoamérica y El Caribe*. 2021.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

also expressed concerns about the lack of legal norms that would permit the UN, INGOs, and the government to formally collaborate for shock response. Creating this mandate would require legal modifications, as well as advocacy to institutionalize them into civil protection laws.¹³ Political and bureaucratic roadblocks deepened these challenges. As one key informant noted, having an overarching ministry to coordinate trans-municipal responses would be helpful to avoid duplication and centralize CVA decisions. This was especially true of WFP’s experience working with the GoSV on drought response.



COORDINATION AND FINANCING

In analyzing the drought response program, one key informant noted that the lack of a designated emergency budget within the government SP ministry restricted horizontal expansion of SP¹⁴ to eligible populations living in municipalities already targeted by the program, but who had been excluded from initial recipient identification. Standardizing emergency response and SRSP tools across ministries presented another difficulty. WFP concluded that, despite initial coordination with the GoSV, the drought program had concluded with each actor working in silos. Greater collaboration and coordination would be needed to avoid this in the future and to limit duplicating CVA efforts. Key informants suggested that greater alignment with the GoSV could strengthen preparedness for the next climate shock.



DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS & DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Within the WFP humanitarian drought response program, outdated recipient information and weak electronic payment, or “e-payment” mechanisms, also contributed to slower CVA delivery. The weakness of e-payment mechanisms meant that CVA had to be delivered physically, in-hand, through the national bank. A follow-up case study suggested that electronic delivery mechanisms would be necessary for more agile emergency response in the future.¹⁵ Therefore, improving delivery and data management modalities would help to strengthen future integration of humanitarian support into helping to build shock responsive preparedness focused on the SP system in El Salvador.

BOX 1: GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR’S HUMANITARIAN CVA PREPARING THE POPULATION FOR COVID-19

Despite institutional and operational challenges in terms of preparedness for humanitarian CVA within SP programs, including lack of dedicated budget, actors in El Salvador have shown themselves to be proactive respondents to crisis integrating humanitarian CVA within their public policies when responding to COVID-19.

On 12 March 2020, El Salvador was

one of the first countries to close its borders even with no cases of COVID-19 yet detected. The GoSV shortly after provided a cash transfer of USD 300 for 1.5 million people, mainly those working in the informal sector.

The government also took other innovative approaches, in targeting the ‘newly poor’, in freezing three-months’ worth of payments of

utility bills and loan instalments for the whole population and, more traditionally, distributing 2.7 million food baskets to needy households. While the program was not without its criticisms related to targeting, verification, and accountability, it is an example of early action using existing systems in the face of shocks where CVA was used by a government.

¹³ Beazley, Rodolfo. *Study on Shock Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean - El Salvador Case Study*. Security Research Hub Reports, January 1, 2018b.

¹⁴ A horizontal expansion is when new recipients are added to an existing SP program. CaLP. Working with *Cash-based Safety Nets in Humanitarian Contexts: Guidance note for humanitarian practitioners*. 2016.

¹⁵ RED-LAC and R4V. *Vinculando Las Transferencias Monetarias Con Los Sistemas de Protección Social En Latinoamérica y El Caribe*. 2021.



SALVADORAN RED CROSS SUPPORTS FAMILIES FROM COMMUNITIES WITH THE HUMANITARIAN CASH TRANSFER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AMIDST COVID19. © CRUZ ROJA SALVADOREÑA

**TABLE 2:
EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - EL SALVADOR**

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p><i>COMUNIDADES SOLIDARIAS</i> (Formerly Red Solidaria) 2005 - PRESENT GoSV</p>	<p>Non-contributory Conditional Cash Transfer in addition to infrastructure support, complementary livelihoods activities such as microcredit and training, and municipal government strengthening.¹⁶</p>	<p>RUP acted as a key preparedness measure for streamlining data management and other information systems, which could be updated and maintained in a central database for deployment in future emergencies.</p>
<p>COVID-19 SUPPORT 2020 GoSV</p>	<p>The GoSV established a COVID-19 contingency plan—critical for stakeholder and institutional preparedness. A once-off cash transfer of USD 300 was sent to households working in the informal sector and who consumed less than 250 kilowatt hours of energy each month.¹⁷</p>	<p>Contingency planning, including CVA.</p>
<p>WFP DROUGHT RESPONSE 2018 WFP and GoSV</p>	<p>Approximately 15,815 households in 38 drought-affected areas received a one-time transfer of USD 120 per household, targeted to the female head of household where possible.</p> <p>Delivery was via the same “institutions and agreements” for the payment of other government programs.</p> <p>The CVA itself was delivered physically, as opposed to electronically.</p>	<p>The GoSV worked with WFP to established common regional response standards for drought to reduce food insecurity.¹ Actions included standardizing transfer values; identification of high impact areas with civil protection ministries; standardization of targeting criteria; streamlining delivery mechanisms via the national bank; and linking social registries across government ministries with the aim of integrating all lists into a unified registry and improve monitoring through capacity building with the GoSV.</p>

16 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.
17 World Food Programme. *Coronavirus COVID-19 Cases in Latin American and Caribbean Countries*, 2021

3.1.2 HONDURAS

Honduras has a limited history of delivering emergency SP programs. Since 2014, Honduras operated the non-contributory SP program *Bono Vida Mejor*, which features a Conditional Cash Transfer that targets households in extreme poverty. However, in recent years, humanitarian support from INGOs and the UN in Honduras has increasingly included CVA. Following Hurricanes Eta and Iota, humanitarian actors in Honduras began to consider how to expand humanitarian CVA across the country. However, it is only since the COVID-19 pandemic that actors in Honduras have invested heavily in deploying humanitarian CVA in partnership with national social development and disaster-risk management ministries and agencies (the National Social Sector Information Center- CENISS- and the Permanent Commission for Contingency Planning -COPECO), INGOs, and the UN. The CWG in Honduras has also assisted these efforts. Thus, the main SP program utilizing humanitarian CVA has been *Bono Único*, a one-off transfer to independent workers who were unemployed or otherwise lacked social security during the global pandemic.¹⁸



STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS

There has also been considerable focus on strengthening institutions and policy relevant for linking social protection and humanitarian response in Honduras. The GoH has also engaged with humanitarian and development actors in capacity-building and legal and institutional reform outside of *Bono Único*. This has included collaborating with the Red Cross, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and UNICEF. For example, the GoH has (through COPECO and CENISS) worked with the Red Cross to explore the establishment of emergency planning committees. NRC has also worked with COPECO, primarily to identify humanitarian CVA recipients with shelter needs and has only recently begun to work on internal displacement issues. NRC is working to construct a government protocol for Internally Displaced People, though it is unclear the extent to which NRC has collaborated directly with COPECO on this effort. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is supporting the GoH to build and strengthen capacity in government SP ministries such as CENISS, with particular focus on excluded vulnerable populations, such as returnees and migrants. UNICEF is also working in parallel with INGOs to provide CVA for child and adolescent migrant returnees.

In addition, the GoH is working to build synergy on information management internally and update the SINAGER Law¹⁹ to include SP actors and other important humanitarian CVA stakeholders to further streamline communication, coordination, and transparency for linking humanitarian CVA to SP programs and systems.²⁰ COPECO has taken the lead in laying the foundations for the coordination of recipient identification mechanisms and targeting, working alongside external stakeholders.

Notwithstanding these successes, attempts to link humanitarian CVA with national SP systems also presents notable challenges in Honduras. In the view of many INGOs, the GoH prefers in-kind assistance during emergencies. The GoH also has concerns regarding market fluctuations. Lastly, there is a perceived donor and government reticence to fund emergency preparation for unpredictable future events. Further, despite the enhanced transparency demonstrated in *Bono Único*, institutional trust and governance continue to pose a challenge. Although not exclusive to SP systems, this has resulted in some hesitancy on the part of certain INGOs to collaborate with government, due to concerns about neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Such sentiment may be rooted in different targeting priorities,

¹⁸ *Honduras Case Study: Bono Único—Deepening preparedness in Social Protection programs using Cash and Voucher Assistance for future emergency assistance*, a companion to this study offers extensive details on preparedness elements as related to the CVA and SP “building blocks” in *Bono Único*.

¹⁹ Ley del Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos (Decreto No. 151)

²⁰ COPECO and the Government of Honduras. *Response Plan (Contingency Plan) Ahead of Possible Risk Scenarios*. National Level. May 31, 2021.

funding sources, accountability, and politics. This may be also be linked to the fact that different SP initiatives come from distinct funding sources and, if the GoH receives a contribution from a new donor, it often announces and sets up a new program. This overlapping programming can cause confusion and frustration for recipients who may not understand the limits of their program eligibility, or which programs are active, and which concluded. Such confusion can pose challenges to deepening transparency, both with potential external partners and Honduran citizens.



COORDINATION AND FINANCING

INGOs and the UN are working to support preparedness for integrating humanitarian CVA within SP in Honduras. For example, NRC is working on CVA as a safety net intervention in public schools, offering electronic vouchers for school supplies to households with school-age children, as part of a larger safety net effort aimed at supporting undocumented or otherwise vulnerable groups.

UNICEF has also prepared for future emergencies by strengthening trust and coordination with the GoH. One result of this continued relationship-building has been a new unconditional cash transfer for returned migrants of up to 7,248 *lempiras* (HNL) per household (USD 300). Targeting and identification will happen alongside CENISS, which is collecting data on returned migrants, with Action Against Hunger acting as the implementing partner. UNICEF hopes to reach 1,700 households in 2021, paving the way for the inclusion of these households in the national SP system.

GoH decree in April 2020, PCM 035-2020, mandated that *Bono Único*—which offered a one-time voucher payment to eligible citizens—should include accountability and transparency mechanisms. In response to a tender, GOAL Honduras took charge of MEAL support and United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) technical accompaniment.²¹ This included accompaniment in recipient identification, MEAL, targeting methodology, and transfer delivery through a “strategic committee” tasked with determining the feasibility for humanitarian CVA in Honduras.²² The GoH signed MOUs with each external actor and included addenda as new program requirements emerged.²³ Both external actors worked closely with the Honduran SP ministry,²⁴ CENISS,²⁵ as well as with the National Service for Entrepreneurship and Small Businesses (SENPRENDE).²⁶ GOAL and UNDP also consulted with the national disaster management agency, COPECO. Targeting and accountability took place in parallel, along with the development of new CVA delivery and registration models. Coordinating with GOAL and UNDP through *Bono Único* engendered deeper GoH interest in preparedness for future natural, epidemiological, and socioeconomic shocks.



CVA PROGRAM DESIGN

In Honduras, the principal challenges to humanitarian CVA program design in SP relate to equity and inclusion. Key informants noted that SP programs that deliver humanitarian CVA in Honduras struggle to target all vulnerable populations, in large part due to financial constraints, contributing to possible exclusion errors and duplication of GoH SP and external CVA programs. This generates challenges both for institutional preparedness, as well as equitable humanitarian CVA designs.

21 GOAL. *Informe de Monitoreo, Veeduría, y Transparencia: Proyecto de Asistencia a Los Trabajadores Independientes o de Cuenta Propia AFILIADOS O NO AFILIADOS a Un Colegio Profesional y/o Gremial y, Aquellos Que Se Consideren Que Se Han Visto Afectados Por Las Medidas de Contención Social Del Virus COVID-19*. July. 2021.

22 Ibid.

23 CENISS website. Accessed December 10, 2021.

24 One key informant noted that this was a lost opportunity for the humanitarian community in Honduras, as greater interest amongst other INGOs and stakeholders in offering support to the GoH could have deepened collaboration between the GoH and external CWGs, the humanitarian community, etc.

25 COPECO also leads an information management roundtable in Honduras with OCHA.

26 Executive Order *PCM-032-2020*, Government of Honduras. March 2020.



HONDURAS.
NEIGHBORHOOD FLOODED
BY THE ETA AND IOTA STORMS
© NRC/CHRISTIAN JEPSEN

UNICEF is supporting GoH recipient identification mechanisms, to better define the most vulnerable target groups to receive CVA through the SP system. This work is occurring both at the municipal level and, to some extent, with CENISS. UNICEF is conducting research alongside CENISS on gaps in SP coverage (including of *Bono Vida Mejor*), working on a migrant integration support strategy, and helping to align existing humanitarian CVA programs to national SP identification mechanisms. This work continues to happen largely in parallel with GoH actors—though it does include plans to share aid recipient data and registries, as appropriate, and collaboratively develop data protection plans.²⁷



DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

In a nice example of national government drawing on the expertise of humanitarian and development actors, as part of GOAL and UNDP's collaboration with the GoH on *Bono Único*, UNDP worked with SENPRENDE and the Secretary of Labor and Social Security to develop a multidimensional vulnerability index, connected to the existing data management mechanisms in Honduras the RUP and Single Socioeconomic Form (FSU). The GoH also developed a more streamlined online version of the FSU (FSU-SE) for its self-registration system, which it piloted and rapidly adopted in the face of restricted mobility during the COVID-19 national lockdown. Along with the *Bono Único* call centers, use of the RUP and FSU-SE through online self-registration is a critical aid to data and information systems preparedness, as data gleaned from *Bono Único* can be reused for future large scale shock responses.

²⁷ Executive Order [PCM-032-2020](#), Government of Honduras, March 2020.

Table 3 outlines mapped SP programs in Honduras utilizing CVA, as well as any preparedness measures, they have included.

**TABLE 3:
EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - HONDURAS**

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<i>BONO VIDA MEJOR</i> 2014 - PRESENT GoH	<p>Conditional Cash Transfer in a SP program focused on creating opportunities for education, health, and nutrition for households “in extreme poverty.”²⁸</p> <p>It aims to coordinate with other social programs for employment and income. The program transfers HNL 10,000 (USD 413) per year, provides bonuses for health and nutrition, and includes complementary programming: Community School Committees (i.e., citizen participation groups including teachers, health, religious, and indigenous leaders, parents, and water board members), household support services (<i>Guías de Familias</i>) and education, nutrition, health, and basic allowance bonuses.</p>	None identified.
<i>BONO POR EMERGENCIA A DAMNIFICADOS ETA E IOTA</i> 2020 GoH	Unconditional and non-contributory humanitarian CVA program targeted at 60,000 households affected by Hurricanes Eta and Iota. A once-off, e-voucher of HNL 5,000 (USD 200) to individuals identified as severely affected by the hurricanes by COPECO assessments. ²⁹	COPECO post-hurricane needs assessment, inclusion of CVA assessment and targeting identification tools, were linked with other SP programs in-country (i.e., same system and delivery platforms as existing GoH SP programs, including <i>Bono Único</i> .)
<i>BONO ÚNICO</i> 2020 - 2021 ³⁰ GoH, GOAL & UNDP	<p>Unconditional and non-contributory COVID-19 CVA program targeting ‘newly poor’ workers, especially independent workers, who were impacted by the pandemic.</p> <p>This program provided a one-time payment of HNL 2,000 (USD 83) via an e-transfer; it was unclear if the card could be reused.</p> <p>The program excluded public employees and pensioners, who receive support through other SP programs.</p> <p>Complementary programming included delivery of masks, hand sanitizer, and other hygiene products as well as support in paying debts and refinancing businesses for those impacted by COVID-19.³¹</p>	<p>GoH decree at the start of the pandemic mandating a MEAL element managed by a learning partner (GOAL). UNDP provided technical support additional.</p> <p>GOAL is now leading various efforts to build capacity to deliver and prepare for the use of humanitarian CVA in future emergencies, via trainings, technical assistance and accompaniment, support on writing legislation, norms, and decrees with COPECO, support in establishing a universal decree and adapting CENISS’ and COPECO’s mandates to allow for CVA, establishing data sharing and delivery channels, etc.</p>


28 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

29 CENISS and Government of Honduras. *Operación No Están Solos*. n.d.

30 Please see *Honduras Case Study: Bono Único—Deepening preparedness in Social Protection programs using Cash and Voucher Assistance for future emergency assistance*, a companion to this study, for more detail.

31 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.; GOAL. (2021).

3.1.3 GUATEMALA



Climate shocks are common in Guatemala. Hurricanes Eta and Iota affected 1.5 million people in the country, destroying the property and livelihoods of thousands of Guatemalans during the 2020 hurricane season.³² Primary actors in Guatemala have made some initial strides toward including CVA in emergency response. However, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Guatemala's CWG not made extensive progress on integrating humanitarian CVA systems with SP systems,³³ and government validation has been sought for the clarification of internal CVA frameworks even though SP programs that use CVA have been present in Guatemala since 2008. This could generate challenges for preparedness in the face of future shocks.



STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS

The primary barrier to deeper collaboration lies in complex regulations and legal roadblocks that frame the mandates of Government of Guatemala (GoG) ministries. Actors in Guatemala, including Action Against Hunger, the Guatemala CWG, WFP, Catholic Relief Services, the Nutrition Cluster, and RED-LAC, provided technical support to local government actors, the *Ministerio de Desarrollo Social* (the Social Development Ministry, or MIDES), and *Bono Familia* through encouraging MIDES to participate in a CWG and request technical assistance for humanitarian CVA implementation. However, the GoG staff, as in other countries in Central America, are largely untrained in legal frameworks for inter-institutional coordination. A GOAL survey of GoG staff showed that only 52 percent of them were aware of the legal frameworks, while only 66 percent had knowledge of disaster risk management.³⁴ These knowledge gaps also exist in MIDES, although a more encouraging 76 percent of GoG staff were aware of their roles and capacities with regard to emergency response.³⁵ MIDES manages all SP in Guatemala, but crucially, does not have a humanitarian (emergency) mandate. CONRED, the disaster management ministry, manages emergencies. Incorporating emergency response into the mandate of MIDES would require a presidential decree, and to sustain such efforts, there would need to be legislative change. As a result, the consolidation of humanitarian CVA within SP to strengthen emergency preparedness presents a regulatory challenge.

To fill these legal and regulatory gaps, the abovementioned humanitarian actors' support in the response to Hurricanes Eta and Iota included expanding technical support and capacity-building to MIDES. The support included implementing financial literacy training and complementary nutrition initiatives in SP programs, as well as MEAL support to ensure that humanitarian CVA met the GoG's financial and nutritional goals. This represents an important coordination effort, as well as improved humanitarian CVA design.



CVA PROGRAM DESIGN

Following the emergency response to Hurricanes Eta and Iota offered by *Bono Familia*, MIDES was able to capitalize on lessons learned from the training provided and interactions with the CWG. These interactions allowed MIDES to use "the information presented to elaborate and publish the information capsules in the national media" regarding health,

³² Guatemala's *CONRED Civil Protection Agency*.

³³ The CWG recently added a working group on reactive SP.

³⁴ GOAL internal documents (not cited).

³⁵ *Ibid.*

nutrition, and humanitarian CVA awareness.³⁶ Ultimately, 2,151 households in 17 communities received transfers provided by humanitarian agencies through *Bono Familia* with support from local governments and Urban and Rural Community Development Councils. In delivering this humanitarian CVA, MIDES and municipalities overcame barriers posed by the lack of public services, limited local promotion of this humanitarian CVA (despite MIDES' national information packets), or awareness of aid recipients' rights. Other challenges were coordinating the inter-institutional cooperation, and the restricted access to aid recipients in some hard-to-reach localities.

Beginning in 2012 with the national *Bono Social*—the country's flagship SP program—MIDES and UNICEF collaborated on a new targeting system using household electrical consumption to identify socioeconomically vulnerable groups. UNICEF prepared for this partnership by working to build the GoG's CVA capacities as part of its global preparedness strategy by improvements to the GoG's MEAL systems, information, and data management.



COORDINATION AND FINANCING

GOAL recently played a role in integrating humanitarian CVA into SP systems in Guatemala as, in addition to supporting *Bono Familia* through actors in RED-LAC, GOAL supported Guatemala's *Bono Social* by working closely with MIDES on capacity-building for emergency response. This also involved including CONRED in training and professional development. The collaboration resulted in GOAL developing a curriculum of training consisting of various concept notes for preparedness on topics including, but not limited to: integrated risk management, training on the fundamentals of CVA and its implementation in emergencies, pre-crisis market analysis and rapid market analysis, and other technical topics related to standardizing CVA modalities.³⁷ According to GOAL's diagnostic studies and surveys of MIDES, the key areas for stronger preparedness and capacity-building for humanitarian CVA are: legal and normative frameworks for disaster response within SP (a stakeholders and institutions preparedness measure), ex-ante and ex-post coordination mechanisms, CVA implementation modalities, and shock-responsive risk analysis related to delivery systems preparedness.³⁸

UNICEF has also made notable steps toward coordinating with the GoG through humanitarian CVA preparedness measures. UNICEF established MOUs and contracts with implementing partners to support the implementation of *Bono Familia*. Further, UNICEF supported MIDES in digitizing administrative processes for rapid, remote implementation. Payments were then sent to recipients through Banrural, Guatemala's rural development bank, important delivery systems and CVA design preparedness measures, respectively. UNICEF prepared for this partnership by working to build GoG CVA capacities as part of its global preparedness strategy, such as through improving the GoG's MEAL systems, information, and data management, etc. These efforts may have encouraged MIDES to reach out to Guatemala's CWG to request educational materials related to CVA (e.g., materials for radio spots, toolkits, implementation guides) ahead of the roll-out of *Bono Familia*. Through these and other preparedness mechanisms, MIDES was able to reach 2.6 million Guatemalans with *Bono Familia* in "record time," as framed by a key informant.



DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

There is still progress to be made on data and information systems preparedness for humanitarian CVA in Guatemala. INGOs contacted for this study commented that they do not currently have data-sharing agreements with MIDES. Yet despite this gap in data systems preparedness, GoG and humanitarian stakeholders in Guatemala are taking initial steps toward greater integration of programs in other preparedness "building block" areas and using CVA for emergency preparedness. This is likely to support further integration of CVA in Guatemala SP programs in the future.

³⁶ RED-LAC. *Response Plan (Contingency Plan) Ahead of Possible Risk Scenarios 2021, National Level*. COPECO and the Government of Honduras, May 31, 2021.

³⁷ GOAL internal documents (not cited).

³⁸ Ibid.

Table 4 outlines mapped SP programs in Guatemala utilizing CVA, as well as any preparedness measures they have included:

**TABLE 4:
EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - GUATEMALA**

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
BONO SOCIAL 2012–PRESENT GoG	<p><i>Bono Social</i> targets households facing poverty or extreme poverty with CVA to improving health, nutrition, and child education. It includes four sub-interventions for health, education, disasters, and support for infants and young children.</p> <p>Education interventions consists of a 500 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 64) monthly transfer to the mother of children aged 6–15 attending school.</p> <p>Health interventions use the same transfer value paid monthly to the mother for attending checkups for children aged 0–6, and for pregnant and breastfeeding women.</p> <p>Support, via bank transfer, for up to six months for those who live in a declared zone of public emergency.</p> <p>Infant support comes with 500 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 64) monthly for children with chronic malnutrition aged 0–24 months, living in poverty or extreme poverty.³⁹</p>	<p>Various elements of linking and preparedness-building led by organizations such as GOAL, RED-LAC members, WFP, Action Against Hunger, Catholic Relief Services, and UNICEF.</p> <p>These elements include capacity-building and training, technical accompaniment of government actors in MIDES, accompaniment in mandate and normative reform, support for MEAL and MEAL capacity-building; market analysis and risk management training, among others.</p>
BONO FAMILIA 2020–2021 GoG	<p>A COVID-19 response through an SP program that targeted households with low levels of electricity consumption, or were dependent, unemployed, or vulnerable due to housing conditions, age, gender, etc.</p>	<p>Various elements including capacity-building, information management, support for and capacity-building for MEAL; technical assistance with digitization and data management, recipient sensitization and rights training, communications and marketing materials, and connecting with Guatemala’s CWG, among others.</p>
VOLCÁN DE FUEGO RESPONSE 2018–2019 GoG and humanitarian actors (i.e., WFP etc.)	<p>The <i>Volcán de Fuego</i> humanitarian response came after the eruption of a volcano of the same name in central Guatemala in 2018.⁴⁰</p> <p>The general humanitarian response included humanitarian CVA, delivered to 1,218 households with funds from the Emergency Appeal and other donors.⁴¹</p>	<p>The WFP noted that it began a UN joint action to conduct a “comprehensive assessment of current national [social protection] programs” in 2018.⁴²</p>

39 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

40 UNDP. *Volcán de Fuego: Inside the Emergency Response*. Medium (blog), September 10, 2018.

41 International Federation of the Red Cross. *Guatemala: Volcanic Eruption Final Report DREF N° MDRGT013*. May, 2020.

42 Ibid.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p>PROGRAMA BECA SOCIAL 2018 - PRESENT GoG (MIDES)</p>	<p>In the immediate aftermath of the eruption, the GoG also delivered a transfer of 3,500 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 452) to 300 households impacted by the event, namely those who lost their homes. These transfers lasted for ten months. A second transfer of 1,000 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 129) supported households who did not lose their homes, over the course of three months.⁴³</p> <p>This included unconditional transfers delivered by WFP for 90 days after the eruption, which reached 10,000 people in the affected population.⁴⁴</p> <p>CVA continued from other humanitarian actors into 2019.</p> <p>This program supports “access, continuity, and permanence in formal education, training in the formal labor market”⁴⁶ by focusing on middle and higher education, vocational and employment training programs for adolescents, youth, and adults from both rural and urban municipalities, who live in conditions of poverty.</p> <p>Operated by MIDES, targeting occurs through a means test. CVA is conditional, provided through bank transfers and delivered either monthly or annually.⁴⁷ Values of each transfer differ on type and recipient.</p>	<p>WFP provided workshops and “graduation” in SP and resilience training for government staff the same year, though it remains unclear if this was tied to <i>Volcán de Fuego</i> in any way.</p> <p>The emergency did, however, inspire policy reforms for emergency preparedness in the GoG though unrelated to CVA.⁴⁵</p> <p>However, there were no measures to integrate CVA within SP for preparedness in the GoG’s immediate CVA response.</p> <p>None identified.</p>
<p>BECA PRIMER EMPLEO 2013 - 2018⁴⁸ GoG (MIDES)</p>	<p>This program supports adolescents and youth aged 16–25 in the formal labor market through temporary apprenticeships. It includes training for up to 60 hours and an internship.</p> <p>Successful completion of the program results in a once-off MIDES transfer of 2,000 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 258) and “the employer will make a payment equivalent to 40% of the current minimum wage plus an incentive bonus of 250 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 32).”⁴⁹</p>	<p>None identified.</p>
<p>VIDA⁵⁰ 2017 - PRESENT GOG (MIDES)</p>	<p>This Conditional Cash Transfer targets adolescent girls who are mothers and/or pregnant, and survivors of Sexual Gender-Based Violence whose “cases have been prosecuted.”⁵¹</p> <p>It provides CVA for those women who attend health checks during and after the pregnancy and is targeted categorically through People’s National Registry.</p> <p>This program is managed and funded by MIDES.⁵²</p>	<p>None identified.</p>

43 Government of Guatemala. *Familias Damnificadas Por Erupción Del Volcán de Fuego Comenzarán a Recibir Bono de Ayuda Del Gobierno*. ReliefWeb. August. 2018.

44 World Food Programme. *Guatemala Annual Country Report 2018: Country Strategic Plan 2018–2021*. 2018.

45 The World Bank. *Strengthening Guatemala’s Disaster Risk Management Capacities*. PreventionWeb, UNDRR. May. 2019.

46 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

3.2 OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES: PANAMA, COSTA RICA, BELIZE, AND NICARAGUA



Outside of the Northern Triangle, examples of preparedness and/or humanitarian CVA and SP coordination were limited, but still relevant, especially from the governmental perspective. Commonalities include:

- Most government-led initiatives do not link to humanitarian stakeholders
- Primary objectives are to fight extreme poverty and/or socioeconomically excluded groups
- Programs usually feature Conditional Cash Transfers

Although humanitarian CVA and SP consolidated programs are minimal in those countries, it has been identified that there is room for additional capacity-building and technical support for CVA in SP from INGO and the UN in countries like Panama or Nicaragua.

It is worth mentioning the case of Panama, SP programming is limited, only covering a quarter of the necessities listed in the standard government basic food basket. Humanitarian actors are not engaging with the national SP program, and humanitarian actors have a limited role in linking humanitarian CVA to SP. Panama is considered a middle-income country by most donors, however, there are serious national inequalities, especially along the rural–urban divide and in indigenous communities.

In Nicaragua, there were no active government-led SP programs using CVA identified for this study. In large part, according to key informants, this is due to regulatory systems and legal blocks in place at the time of writing. The government did run the *Red de Protección Social* program between 2000 and 2006 that provided Conditional Cash Transfer to households in extreme poverty.⁵³ A similar program, called *Bono Productivo*, was focused on in-kind transfers of food and livestock. The government does have inter-ministerial coordination committees. Beazley notes, that “the *Sistema Nacional para la Prevención Mitigación y Atención de Desastres*, the body in charge of prevention, mitigation, and response to disasters, is led by the Presidency and integrated across every line ministry... has committees at every level, from national to local, in order to improve vertical coordination.”⁵⁴ However, while important to emergency preparedness generally, this system does not include humanitarian CVA in an SP program, nor does it correspond to any specific SP program, placing it outside the scope of this study.

53 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

54 Beazley, Rodolfo. *Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Oxford Policy Management, 2017b..

Table 5 outlines mapped SP programs in Panama, Belize, and Costa Rica that utilize CVA, as well as any preparedness measures, they have included.

**TABLE 5: EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE
- PANAMA, BELIZE, AND COSTA RICA**

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
PANAMA GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA		
<i>PLAN PANAMA SOLIDARIO</i> 2020 - PRESENT	<p>In response to COVID-19, the government provided vouchers to approximately 1 million recipients experiencing poverty or vulnerability including but not limited to informal and unemployed workers.</p> <p>This program was also linked to electricity bills, providing subsidies of 30–50% depending on consumption level, and included additional support on a limited basis for individuals in medical quarantine or recovery.⁵⁵</p>	None identified.
<i>BONOS FAMILIARES PARA LA COMPRA DE ALIMENTOS</i> 2005 - PRESENT	<p>This program was a Conditional Cash Transfer funded by the Government of Panama, implemented by the Ministry of Social Development. It operates primarily in rural, often indigenous, areas as part of the <i>Red de Oportunidades</i> SP (see below).</p> <p>The program targets households with minors, elderly or disabled members that are living in extreme poverty. It uses geographical targeting (e.g., localities with extreme poverty levels and chronic malnutrition) and proxy means tests based on the national Social Vulnerability Survey as a selection instrument.</p>	None identified.
<i>RED DE OPORTUNIDADES</i> 2006 - PRESENT	<p>The flagship Conditional Cash Transfer in Panama, this program aims to reduce extreme poverty both by supporting households and improving “the local supply of social services.”⁵⁶</p> <p>This program relies in part on geographical targeting using the index of extreme poverty incidence.</p> <p>It offers a “household support component,” which “allows the exchange of information on the status of the aid recipient households and on compliance with the conditionalities.”⁵⁷</p>	None identified.

55 World Food Programme. *Coronavirus COVID-19 Cases in Latin American and Caribbean Countries*, 2021

56 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

57 Ibid.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p><i>BONO SOLIDARIO AND VALE PANAMA</i></p>	<p>A once-off transfer is sent to the mother via bank accounts or “mobile post offices” operated through COTEL (Directorate of Posts and Telegraphs). Timing of the transfer has fluctuated over time from bimonthly to quarterly.⁵⁸</p> <p>The program supports 1.2 million people monthly through their identity card. The transfer offering USD 80 to support vulnerable households. <i>Vale Panama</i> mirrors this program in difficult-to-access areas, offering an unconditional, one-time, voucher valued at USD 30–50 to 400 households.⁵⁹</p>	<p>None identified.</p>
COSTA RICA GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA		
<p><i>CRECEMOS 2019 - PRESENT</i></p>	<p>This program is a Conditional Cash Transfer is aimed at promoting early and primary education for children in households facing poverty or extreme poverty.</p> <p>The CVA is monthly to the recipient’s bank account in the amount of Costa Rican <i>Colones</i> (CRC) 18,000 (USD 28), if the student remains in school.⁶⁰</p>	<p>The program links The Mixed Institute of Social Support to the Ministry of Public Education within the government.</p>
<p><i>AVANCEMOS 2006 - PRESENT</i></p>	<p>This program is similar to <i>Creceemos</i>, but targets households with children aged 12–25 who are “struggling to keep their children in the educational system due to economic reasons.”⁶¹</p> <p>The transfers are conditioned on 80% on-time attendance and deposited to bank accounts.⁶²</p> <p>The transfers are CRC 30,000 (USD 47) for students in grades 7–9 and CRC 40,000 (USD 64) to students in grades 10–12 of education.</p>	<p>None identified.</p>
<p><i>BONO PROTEGER 2020</i></p>	<p>This program provided a temporary cash transfer to cover basic needs of households affected who lost employment and/or income due to COVID-19 restrictions and their impact.</p> <p>Transfer values varies: CRC 62,500 (USD 98) during three months for people with less than 50% reduction of working hours and CRC 125,000 (USD 196) with full employment suspension or more than 50% reduction of working hours.</p>	<p>The source for households’ socioeconomic information is the national single registry and information database.</p>

58 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.; Amarante, Verónica, and Martin Brun. *Cash Transfers in Latin America*: WIDER Working Paper 2016/136. UN University, November, 2016.

59 Ibid.

60 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

HEAVY RAINS, FLOODS, AND LANDSLIDES HAVE AFFECTED MORE THAN 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE IN ALL CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, FROM PANAMA TO BELIZE. IN COSTA RICA, FLOODS HIT 60 COMMUNITIES ON THE PACIFIC COAST, OF WHICH 27 REMAIN ISOLATED.
© COSTA RICAN RED CROSS




PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
	<p>This once-off cash transfer is complementing both the National Labor and Social Security program and Mixed Institute of Social Support program.</p>	<p>A regulatory framework that allows specific actions and resource mobilization to both fight against COVID-19 effects⁶³ and protect the most vulnerable population in an emergency.⁶⁴</p>

BELIZE GOVERNMENT OF BELIZE

<p>BUILDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION (BOOST)</p>	<p>BOOST is a Conditional Cash Transfer to poor households; conditionalities include minimum school attendance of 85 percent, immunization of children under 5 and pre-natal checkups for pregnant women).⁶⁵</p> <p>It is targeted at children aged 5–18 and pregnant women.</p> <p>The monthly transfer is based on the student’s grade in school; the range is Belize dollar (BZS) 44 to BZS 82 (USD 22- 40).⁶⁶</p>	<p>Partnerships with credit unions to deliver payments.⁶⁷</p> <p>The project shares data through a national registry of “information on applicants or aid recipients of safety net programs that can be used to support resilience objectives.”⁶⁸</p> <p>This program also used horizontal expansion in light of COVID-19 to include people receiving food assistance who were not otherwise part of the BOOST program as of April 2020.⁶⁹</p>
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63 This was established through the national decree *Artículo 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 42227-MP-5*, established on the 16th of March 2020.
64 This was established through the *National Emergency and Risk Prevention Law # 8483* from the 22nd of November 2005. 65 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. Building Resilience through Social Protection. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.
65 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. *Building Resilience through Social Protection*. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.
66 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.
67 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. *Building Resilience through Social Protection*. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.
68 Ibid.
69 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

3.3 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC



Actors in the DR have significant experiences of CVA within national SP systems and continue to focus on the preparedness for CVA in emergency response. Currently, there is no CWG in the DR but rather a recently established adaptive SP roundtable.⁷⁰ There have been numerous examples of INGOs, the UN, and national SP ministries collaborating to strengthen preparedness for climatic shocks. The DR has long provided an example of a government-led SP program in LAC through its flagship *Supérate* program (formerly *ProSoli*). At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of the Dominican Republic (GoDR), with UNICEF support, also moved to establish a one-time vertical expansion of *Supérate* (*ProSoli*), called *Inclusión Población Infantil* (IPI), through the pandemic-focused program *Quédate en Casa* (“Stay at Home”).⁷¹ In addition, WFP also worked with the Social Subsidy Administration of the Dominican Republic (ADESS) to apply the Market Functionality Index⁷² in July 2020 and support a national market analysis of its network of vendors, the Social Supply Network (RAS for its acronym in Spanish), in August 2020, as well as leading the national adaptive SP roundtable.



DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Within its own SP programs, the GoDR promotes preparedness by ensuring interoperability of data and information systems, such as integrating the *Sistema Único de Beneficiarios* (SIUBEN) with other relevant government ministries delivering humanitarian CVA.⁷³ In *Quédate en Casa*, the use of SIUBEN and the National Quality of Life Index allowed for interoperability of data management and information systems, as well as streamlining the approach to data protection. Additionally, UNICEF supported the GoDR to create a call center “help desk” to provide real-time preparedness support and also provided monitoring and legal assistance. Lastly, UNICEF helped to feed a new central database for current aid recipients, which also included those near the cutoff for aid, thus creating a list of potential recipients previously not covered by SIUBEN’s registries; this reserve list would be available for additional horizontal emergency expansions.



DELIVERY SYSTEMS

In part due to the strength of existing data management preparedness through SIUBEN, the GoDR was, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, able to rapidly deliver transfers through PIN codes with national identification cards. This replaced the previous use of e-vouchers transferred to prepaid debit cards, which were no longer viable given mobility and public health restrictions surrounding COVID-19. Recipients who already had prepaid debit cards from *Supérate* were able to continue using them. The use of IDs was not without issue, however, due to potential exclusion issues. Various vertical and horizontal expansions⁷⁴ of *Supérate* during this time, as well as joint data management, allowed the GoDR to nearly double their CVA coverage, while also nearly doubling transfer amounts through “top-ups,” with the support of organizations such as UNICEF.

⁷⁰ Beazley, Rodolfo. *Protección Social Reactiva Frente a Emergencias: La Respuesta de República Dominicana a La Pandemia COVID-19*. WFP. September, 2020.

⁷¹ See also *Dominican Republic Case Study: Inclusión Población Infantil—Using humanitarian cash and voucher assistance within existing Social Protection programs to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic* a companion to this study; it offers extensive details on preparedness elements as related to the CVA and SP “building blocks” in IPI.

⁷² More information about the Market Functionality Index can be found on the WFP website.

⁷³ UNHCR. *Presentación acciones llevadas a cabo por el ACNUR en el marco de la coordinación del Grupo PS*. Internal presentation. November 18, 2020.

⁷⁴ A Vertical expansion is an increase the benefit value or duration of an existing SP program. A horizontal expansion is when new recipients are added to an existing SP program. CaLP. *Working with Cash-based Safety Nets in Humanitarian Contexts: Guidance note for humanitarian practitioners*. CaLP, 2016

Quédate en Casa showed that the use of the RAS also posed a challenge for delivery systems within the DR. IPI reflected these challenges. Firstly, key informants agreed that the use of e-vouchers instead of cash transfers was perhaps too restrictive since it denied people the ability to buy other products that may have been of equal or greater value to them during the emergency period. Further, even though recipients needed to present an ID while using their voucher, fraud within the RAS could still occur. This was mainly due to the lack of a point of sale system where a teller scans the goods acquired with the vouchers; new recipients from the expanded program did not have PIN codes or another way to control their funds, so shop owners could transact their funds without them knowing it. However, challenges with RAS aside, IPI was able to successfully leverage SIUBEN and existing SP delivery platforms to quickly expand coverage. This is due, in part, to trust and coordination between the GoDR and humanitarian CVA stakeholders, as discussed below.



COORDINATION AND FINANCING

An adaptive SP roundtable, led by WFP and composed of UNICEF, UNDP, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IOM, GOAL, the World Bank, and government ministries such as SIUBEN and ADESS, also helped to consolidate humanitarian responses to COVID-19 and build capacity across government, the UN, and INGOs. This roundtable functioned as a CWG in the absence of a formal national group. It also served as a mechanism for information sharing, alignment, and coordination and was a space in which stakeholders could build capacity, reflect on gaps in delivery and data management systems, consider exclusion errors, and strengthen inter-institutional trust.



CVA PROGRAM DESIGN

UNICEF has supported the GoDR with technical and financial support for *Quédate en Casa* and *ProSoli/Supérate*. Working directly through government platforms (i.e., RAS and the GoDR's bank) and using SIUBEN and ADESS registries, UNICEF advocated that the *Supérate* program be expanded to include households with children with disabilities in IPI. This included UNICEF funding for a new central database for the identification and registration of potential recipients (i.e., households with children with disabilities) at the "cutoff" for aid previously excluded from existing lists (itself an important data management preparedness measure). The coordination between ADESS and UNICEF made this possible.

UNICEF also funded operational innovations, such as the previously mentioned call center "help desk" that provided real-time support to preparedness, monitoring, and SP teams in the GoDR. UNICEF also provided legal accompaniment, MEAL support, and capacity-building and implemented the "help desk" while also offering additional technical support such as establishing contracts and MOUs between the GoDR, humanitarian stakeholders, and financial service providers (FSPs). These innovations also required the alignment of UNICEF programming with that of the GoDR, so that the transfers were delivered at a standard value and predictable frequency.

As part of IPI, UNICEF worked with SIUBEN to update identification questions to ensure that vulnerability and eligibility of households with children with disabilities was adequately captured. UNICEF provided the GoDR with a policy guidance note detailing how to work with households containing children with disabilities, as well as research on how much additional spending and resources would be required to serve these households with CVA and medical supplies. This data and guidance were important because neither the GoDR registries nor targeting schemes had previously taken the needs of children with disabilities into account.



STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS

IPI allowed both UNICEF and the GoDR to build capacity and strengthen institutions for future emergency preparedness. To increase internal preparedness, the UNICEF HQ required training and review of its internal Emergency Preparedness Platform for its own staff, using an online form for country offices to complete before program implementation along with workshops to improve and strengthen staff capacity. This prepared UNICEF staff in-country to offer optimal government technical support.

Table 6 outlines mapped SP programs in the DR utilizing CVA, as well as any preparedness measures, they have included.

**TABLE 6:
EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - THE DR**

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<i>SUPÉRATE</i> (FORMERLY <i>PROSOLI</i>) PRESENT GoDR (ADESS)	<p>Administered by ADESS and coordinated by the Office of the President of the Republic, this program is the flagship SP program in the DR.</p> <p>It provides e-vouchers that can be used at a network of vendors and supermarkets for a restricted list of goods, as well as educational and social support, facilitated access to public services, and “targeted subsidies” to households in conditions of extreme poverty, to promote empowerment, income generation, employment, entrepreneurship, etc.⁷⁵</p>	<p><i>Inclusión Población Infantil</i> was a horizontal expansion of <i>Supérate</i>, operated by the GoDR with UNICEF support, that sent with disabled children.⁷⁶</p> <p>Other measures included vertical and horizontal expansions in the face of COVID-19, design adjustments to increase and speed up CVA deliveries, changes to make conditionalities more flexible in the face of COVID-19, and vertical “top-ups” to double the amount of the transfer.⁷⁷</p>
<i>QUÉDATE EN CASA</i> (COVID-19 Adaptation, FASE, and <i>Pa Ti</i>) 2020 - PRESENT GoDR (ADESS, SIUBEN, Cabinet Social Policy Coordination, etc.)	<p>Operated by Cabinet Social Policy Coordination the program targets via vulnerability and poverty in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p> <p>It reaches 811,000 households through prepaid debit card. The transfer originally was a monthly payment of Dominican pesos 5,000 (USD 88) for basic needs and food.</p> <p>The transfer value decreased with each monthly transfer so as to reach more households.⁷⁸ Another 690,000 vulnerable households were supported by SIUBEN.⁷⁹</p>	<p>UNICEF and WFP capacity-building, training, and technical support for implementation, program design (notably, of expansions) and MEAL during and after the program.</p> <p>Coordination with SIUBEN and ADESS for CVA delivery and data management.</p>

75 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

76 For more information on this program integration and preparedness, please see the Dominican Republic Case Study, a companion to this study

77 World Food Programme. *Coronavirus COVID-19 Cases in Latin American and Caribbean Countries*, 2021

78 *The “Stay at Home” Subsidy for March Is Ready*, Govt. Says. Dominican Today, April 1, 2021.

79 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.



PLAN STAFF MEMBERS VISIT COMMUNITY IN AZUA PROVINCE TO DISTRIBUTE VOUCHERS © PLAN INTERNATIONAL / FRAN AFONSO

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p>CIVIL SOCIETY COVID-19 RESPONSE 2020 - 2021 Humanitarian actors (UNHCR, IOM, etc.)</p>	<p>UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM) with the Embassy of Haiti and organizations such as FUNCOVER, <i>Casa de Caribe</i>, <i>Diaspora Venezolana</i>, provided parallel programming to <i>Supérate</i>.</p> <p>It was aimed at people with refugee status, Venezuelan nationality, and Haitian migrants. These groups are typically excluded by national SP programs and do not have documentation required to access government SP.</p> <p>The cash transfer is delivered via PIN number and Banco Hispano Americano.</p>	<p>Parallel programming with <i>Supérate</i>.</p>
<p>WORLD VISION WITH ARCHDIOCESE OF SANTO DOMINGO COVID-19 RESPONSE 2020 - 2021</p>	<p>The program targeted areas not covered by the government with the parish <i>Comunidad Venezolana del Gran Santo Domingo</i>.</p> <p>The CVA was aimed at supporting lactating mothers and those with minors children, offering food kits with vouchers and/or paid at their local supplier (95 percent). Five percent of the program is the direct transfer of food to households (non-cash or voucher component).⁸⁰</p>	<p>None identified.</p>

80 UNHCR. *Presentación acciones llevadas a cabo por el ACNUR en el marco de la coordinación del Grupo PS*. Internal presentation. November 18, 2020. This program is an example of a program with CVA that complemented an ongoing SP one.

3.4 MEXICO

Historically, Mexico has served as a SP leader in the LAC region, most notably with its flagship programs *Oportunidades*, *Progresa*, and *Prospera*. Yet, despite non-CVA based preparedness efforts in *Prospera* and the *Programa de Empleo Temporal* (PET), there has been markedly limited integration of humanitarian CVA and SP in Mexico. Further, as of 2020, researchers could not identify any COVID-19 “offsetting” SP in Mexico, independent of existing SP or through any expansion of existing SP programs. However, there are strong examples of humanitarian preparedness efforts in the Mexican CVA context.



DELIVERY SYSTEMS

UNHCR’s efforts in Mexico offer one such strong example of humanitarian CVA preparedness. UNHCR does not have a CVA program in Mexico tied to national SP; it does operate various programs with CVA for migrants. These programs provide prepaid cards that can be used in stores or to withdraw funds in automatic teller machines. UNHCR maintains pre-agreements with FSPs and relies on Mexico’s CWG, which they lead, to help harmonize cash-based responses across humanitarian INGOs and the UN in Mexico. The CWG has a joint tender with one FSP, so that CVA contracts and delivery mechanisms are streamlined for all INGO and UN programs affiliated with the CWG in the country. When necessary, the CWG puts out joint tenders for new FSPs, maps and assesses the applicants, and decides which to hire. As one key informant noted, Mexican banks rarely respond to the tender, perhaps in part because they are not interested in UNHCR’s primary populations of interest—undocumented, and often unbanked or unbankable migrants and asylum seekers.



CVA PROGRAM DESIGN

In Mexico, UNHCR’s programs primarily aim to target migrants, stateless people, and asylum seekers with humanitarian CVA; these groups lack documentation and are therefore excluded from national SP programs. UNHCR noted that this exclusion reflects one of the major roadblocks to the effective consolidation of UN and INGO CVA and national SP programs in Mexico as the primary humanitarian challenge in country stems from migration. National SP programs are unable to serve undocumented migrants because these populations fall outside of their mandates. Although Mexico has historically set the gold standard for the integration of CVA in SP, Mexican SP is not legally equipped to support asylum seekers. This presents a challenge and underscores a gap in government mandates on humanitarian CVA for this community.

Opportunities to deepen collaboration with the Government of Mexico, advocate for legislative reform related to SP access for migrants and build on the relationship between UNHCR and the Mexican Refugee Assistance Commission (COMAR) may be a first step to expanding humanitarian CVA in SP for this vulnerable group. Further, INGOs and the UN in Mexico might invest more energy into the CWG, which some key informants noted was “suffering” due to inconsistent and infrequent participation from its members. These efforts may support Mexico in bridging the gap between its historical SP record and its current inability to use CVA in SP to support migrants.



STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS

Building preparedness to use humanitarian CVA in SP when responding to the migration emergency in Mexico also faces political challenges at home and abroad. Changing border laws in the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic, and challenges with Mexican border regulations impact the extent to which migrants can access CVA, whether or not it is offered via SP channels. For instance, UNHCR witnessed the closing of many public and privately run migrant shelters on Mexico's southern border where Central American migrants often enter the country. These closures impeded UNHCR's work, in conjunction with COMAR, which depended on access to shelter and housing, to update targeting data and identify recipients. Loss of access to migrant shelters represents an institutional challenge and creates a gap in coordinating data and information systems. In response, UNHCR provided vertical "top-ups" to transfers. Additionally, UNHCR offered complementary programming to migrants already included in their registries—support for jobseekers and additional cash transfers to keep children in school or connected to the internet. Yet horizontal expansion and updating registries with newly arrived migrants was nearly impossible due to this lack of shared data management and access constraints.

Further, legal and policy reforms in Mexico now limit UNHCR to only supporting migrants with refugee status. This drastically reduces UNHCR's potential population of interest and restricts migrants' eligibility for CVA. UNHCR is also only able to offer one month's worth of CVA to refugees who do not intend to seek regularization in Mexico. Banks have also changed policies to reflect new laws and regulations in both the U.S. and in Mexico and have begun to ask migrants for passports in order to send remittances or receive humanitarian aid. Yet many asylum seekers lack passports or other documentation. UNHCR key informants noted the need for urgent legislative reform and collaboration with banks to create products intended for migrants to keep these CVA delivery channels open.

However, these challenges do not mean that Mexico has not made some gains in stakeholder and institutional preparedness with humanitarian CVA, especially with respect to greater shock responsiveness within an SP system for natural disasters. The PET and *Programa de Empleo Temporal Inmediato* (PETi) which ended in 2019, offered one such example. PETi offered a contingency financing mechanism for PET—a worker-focused program in which workers living within a vulnerable geographic area can earn cash transfers when their work has been disrupted by a natural disaster or socioeconomic crisis. PETi is an example of a program that was able to modify systems and procedures for a post-disaster context and thereby facilitate the rapid and agile deployment of disaster financing within an existing SP program.



DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Lack of data sharing poses a challenge for recipient targeting and identification in Mexico. While UNHCR conducts post-distribution monitoring, spot checks, and market assessments, they do not share this information with the COMAR or other Government of Mexico ministries. This is in part due to the sensitivity of their recipients' data. Though UNHCR works with COMAR on data management in registration, this does not mean that COMAR and UNHCR share joint registries of incoming migrants. In fact, migrants must register twice upon their arrival in Mexico, once with UNHCR and once with COMAR, to be eligible for UNHCR support. COMAR supports UNHCR insofar as it shares whether someone has, or has not, completed this essential step. This leads to nearly daily contact between UNHCR and COMAR, but no contact related to data capacity-building around humanitarian CVA or disaster preparedness. This lack of data sharing poses an issue for both parties, as it makes it more difficult to analyze and compare migration patterns in Mexico to prepare for future humanitarian emergencies related to refugees and asylum seekers.



COORDINATION AND FINANCING

PETi was an emergency response and contingency financing mechanism for PET.⁸¹ At least 20 percent of PET’s budget is dedicated to low-to-medium impact disasters. All funds in SEDESOL’s budget, now called *Secretaria del Bienestar*, can be deployed for more “severe” disaster response via PETi; additional funds are available via the Mexican Fund for Natural Disasters.⁸² According to the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, PETi operates within PET but has modified systems and procedures for a post-disaster context.⁸³ In this regard, PETi presents an example of greater shock responsiveness of national SP programs to facilitate rapid deployment disaster financing, but deeper inter-institutional collaboration with INGOs or the UN on humanitarian CVA in SP was not evident.

Table 7 outlines mapped SP programs in Mexico that utilize CVA, as well as any preparedness measures they have included.

**TABLE 7:
EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - MEXICO**

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
UNHCR AND IOM SUPPORT TO MIGRANTS UNHCR and IOM	<p>Multiple programs operated by UNHCR, IOM, and other INGOs supported migrants and refugees during the COVID-19 pandemic and prior to the start of the pandemic.</p> <p>Both UNHCR and IOM provided humanitarian CVA for migrants; it is sometimes with complementary case management and support in accessing SP and government services (e.g., accompaniment to receive necessary social security and identification documents, training on rights to access to public services, etc.).⁸⁴</p> <p>UNHCR’s CVA is up to four months covering the majority of basic needs. The transfer value is based on the approximate amount of time needed for immigration authorities to resolve asylum requests, after which, migrants can seek formal employment in Mexico.</p> <p>UNHCR provides up to four complementary health payments to migrants whose health needs are not completely met by the national health system at which point they can also be referred to the National Refugee Agency. This is a complementary, rather than parallel, system.</p>	<p>Some pre-positioning of financing mechanisms for migrant support, linking to government safety net programs and networks of safe houses and shelters in limited data sharing.</p> <p>UNHCR Mexico is also linking migrant and refugee support to SP in its Strategic Planning for CVA, which includes efforts toward durable solutions.⁸⁵</p>

81 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. *Building Resilience through Social Protection*. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 UNHCR. *Americas COVID-19 Response Update #4*. April. 2020.

85 Ibid.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p><i>JÓVENES CON PROSPERA</i> 2003 - 2019 Government of Mexico (Secretary of Social Development) (SEDESOL)</p>	<p>Cash transfers to encourage students to complete their high school education before age 22 and within four years.</p> <p>This CVA of up to 4,890 Mexican pesos (MXN) (USD 233) was deposited into a savings account when the student completes their studies; students earn more money through a point system that accumulates over the course of their education. This program is managed by SEDESOL.⁸⁶</p>	<p>None identified.</p>
<p><i>PROGRESA- OPORTUNIDADES- PROGRESA ENDED 2019</i> Government of Mexico, Various</p>	<p><i>Prospera</i> was the successor of two flagship non-contributory Mexican SP programs—<i>Oportunidades</i> and <i>Prospera</i>.</p> <p>It began in 2014 as a Conditional Cash Transfer intended to support vulnerable households’ “graduation” out of poverty through a cash transfer, and complementary health, education, and livelihoods programs.⁸⁷</p> <p>The Mexican Government invested heavily in <i>Prospera</i>, which reached up to 6 million households and 131 million people. CVA was conditioned on health checkups, school attendance, and other conditionalities, and households were targeted using a proxy means testing and geography.</p> <p>CVA is provided bi- monthly or every three months, with a maximum of 2,945 MXN (USD 140) to households with high-school scholarship holders, and 1,825 MXN (USD 88) for those without, as well as 370 MXN (US 18) per additional elderly person in the household.⁸⁸</p> <p><i>Prospera</i> offered opportunities to link with many other government-led SP programs for housing, health, education, and livelihoods, which were typically not CVA.</p>	<p>During the <i>Progres</i>a/<i>Oportunidades</i> phase various elements of horizontal expansion were reported including combining CVA with the <i>Programa Apoyo Alimentario</i> and a “child cash bonus”, which expanded aid recipient lists as well as added complementary and aligned programming. It also included vertical expansion, in increasing “monthly payments to the poorest by 24%.”⁸⁹</p> <p>The program invested in preparedness measures insofar as connecting more aid recipients—particularly women—to formal financial systems, delivering a “savings promotion, life insurance, and access to a credit line.”⁹⁰ In doing so, it increased financial literacy.</p>
<p><i>PROGRAMA DE EMPLEO TEMPORAL (PET)</i> 2000 - 2019 Government of Mexico</p>	<p>This program is a worker-focused one; workers can earn cash transfers when their work has been disrupted by a natural disaster or socioeconomic crisis and they live within a vulnerable geographic area.</p>	<p>PET, as of 2003, included an emergency response and “contingency financing mechanism” as a “sub-component” which was called PETi.⁹¹</p>

86 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

87 Ibid.

88 Masino, Serena, and Miguel Niño-Zarazúa. *Improving Financial Inclusion through the Delivery of Cash Transfer Programmes: The Case of Mexico’s Progres*a-*Oportunidades-Prospera* Programme. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 56(1), 151–168. 2018.

89 Beazley, Rodolfo. *Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management, 2017b; Bastagli, Francesca. *Responding to a Crisis: The Design and Delivery of Social Protection*. ODI Briefing, 2014.

90 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

91 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. *Building Resilience through Social Protection*. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
	<p>This program employs workers and offers CVA in areas of infrastructure, health improvement, “heritage preservation,” conservation and rural road management, ecosystem conservation, civic education, food assistance and food bank support, climate mitigation, and other projects.⁹²</p>	<p>At least 20% of the PET program’s budget is dedicated to low to medium impact disasters. PETi is an example of modifying systems and procedures for a post-disaster context.</p>

92 Ibid.

LILIANA LÓPEZ AND HER FAMILY
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04

MAIN DISCUSSION



The following sections analyze barriers, challenges, opportunities, and enablers to humanitarian CVA in SP and in doing so, highlight key lessons learned from this mapping exercise.

4.1 BARRIERS

MAIN BARRIERS TO BUILDING PREPAREDNESS FOR CVA IN SP IN LAC INCLUDE:

- +** **Limited governmental investment in preparedness, especially for humanitarian CVA.** Governments globally may find it difficult to allocate resources to preparing for future crises, as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has shown. Despite knowing that natural disasters like hurricanes and floods will occur, it is still difficult to know where and when these will happen and precisely what their impact will be. Legal preparedness is part of this challenge. As one informant noted, “if there is political will, there will always be [the associated] laws, financing, etc.” management ministries and agencies in LAC, with a more traditional organizational structure and culture, may favor in-kind assistance by default, limiting further investment in preparedness that brings in humanitarian CVA.
- +** **Low-level capacity to accurately forecast predictable emergencies.** Despite an increase in institutional investment in forecasting, e.g., in new technologies, capacity needs to be further reinforced. The fact that this has not yet happened is perhaps owing to challenges to accurate forecasting (including to climate-related shocks), as well as lack of interest and donor investment in forecasting and funding anticipatory actions (i.e., funding geospatial data and satellites, lack of prepositioned disaster funding, etc.). Forecasting predictable emergencies needs to be reflected in national response plans, in which humanitarian CVA should be integrated as a modality of response.
- +** **Uneven or absent humanitarian CVA/SP coordination mechanisms at national levels.** Humanitarian CVA and SP coordination was found to be unique in each context and so to present different challenges to stakeholders. One coordination challenge is related to a technical understanding of humanitarian CVA; few contexts had an active and highly functioning CWG. At the same time, a CWG may not be the best solution for coordination and may even undermine sustainability if capacity is not ultimately transferred to national actors. CWGs may also face challenges when trying to link humanitarian CVA and SP programs, as CWGs are not formally integrated into the humanitarian infrastructure and/or lack connections to national systems.¹⁰⁰ The next level of coordination challenges is that, despite reinforcing linkages between CVA and SP, there is a lack of broader coordination between SP, civil protection, and disaster risk management ministries and agencies at the national level with respect to national SP or humanitarian CVA integration in national response plans.
- +** **Despite some good examples, there is a general lack of coordination in data management between agencies.** The lack of proper data-sharing procedures and aligned data protection mechanisms results in a disconnect between national, INGO, and UN identification and targeting mechanisms. This disconnect can contribute to possible exclusion errors or duplication in recipient registries when assessments and registries are not coordinated.
- +** **Frequent political, technical, and bureaucratic turnover impede long-term agreements between governments and other actors.** While turnover of personnel is normal in both governments and humanitarian agencies, sometimes it can create difficulties in signing bilateral MOUs for long-term projects with national SP ministries as incoming ministers may not share the agendas of their predecessors. Thus, large-scale turnover in national entities, such as government, after elections, for example, may also derail previously positive progress. Turnover can create additional preparedness work when seeking to integrate humanitarian CVA with SP, especially when an incoming government seeks to adapt SP to put in place their own humanitarian CVA-related policies, or a change in personnel means that government actors lack technical expertise and institutional knowledge.
- +** **Insufficient transparency, accountability, and monitoring policies.** Fraud and data insecurity may occur when both humanitarian CVA and SP systems lack strong MEAL support. This is especially relevant for digital hacking or other digital breaches that in some cases are risks that pose a barrier to preparedness.

4.2 ENABLERS

MAIN ENABLERS TO BUILDING PREPAREDNESS FOR CVA IN SP IN CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO, AND THE DR INCLUDE:

- +** **Government reforms opening possibilities for the integration or use of humanitarian CVA in national SP systems or for greater levels of shock responsiveness in general in national SP systems.** Preparedness can be facilitated by government legislation including constitutional reform, if needed. Mandates, decrees, and norms will allow SP ministries to use CVA in emergencies and access disaster-risk financing. Mandates and decrees build institutional sustainability, whereas exceptional or ad hoc emergency decrees rarely last beyond a disaster. Developing an Emergency Subsidy that can be automatically triggered at the onset of an emergency (see DR for examples) is one helpful legislative strategy for future preparedness. Governments have achieved this by, for example, updating data protection laws, and using e-delivery mechanisms that track recipient data. It was noted that COVID-19 fostered these processes by reforming laws to provide CVA in emergencies, also funded by UN agencies or INGOs, creating cash grants in record time.
- +** **Creation and use of strong information and data management platforms.** Various countries have experiences with updating data management systems, including adapting reliable, equitable, and up-to-date data protection, targeting, and identification mechanisms.
- +** **Clear messaging to recipients.** Rapid deployment of national communication and messaging regarding eligibility and aid recipient rights in humanitarian CVA in emergencies is critical to build trust in the citizenry.⁹³
- +** **Taking a multipronged approach to preparedness.** As multiple key informants noted, linking, or integrating humanitarian CVA in SP relies on certain key elements. Strong and agile internal data management systems are critical, in addition to post-distribution monitoring and MEAL capacities, adequate risk analysis, capable technical staff (or technical accompaniment), and safe, equitable, and sustainable CVA delivery and targeting systems, including contingency plans for recipients without documentation. Internal data management systems must be interoperable with payment systems to allow better synchronization with humanitarian stakeholders databases and payment systems.
- +** **Existence of contracts, MOUs, and rapid deployment pre-agreements with INGOs and the UN for linking in emergency response.** This may include training for capacity-building ahead of disasters, or technical accompaniment to national SP staff. It may also include the establishment of joint contracts between SP, INGO, and UN actors to share FSPs, banks, and cash delivery mechanisms that streamline humanitarian or social protection CVA delivery and reduce duplication.
- +** **Existence and use of Emergency Preparedness Protocols/Plans.** These plans are flexible tools that enables technical staff to receive humanitarian CVA training ahead of disasters. It also helps SP, INGO, and UN staff to collaborate to determine targeting criteria, MEAL approaches, joint contracts with service providers and voucher vendor networks, and contingency plans ahead of an emergency. The Emergency Preparedness Plans can also serve as a platform for establishing shared data protection, price, accountability, and legal protocols.

⁹³ In the DR, this helped the president to explain Supérate's expansions and new government CVA/SP policies correctly and convincingly on national television just two days before the country shut down for COVID-19 and the new policy rolled out.

4.3 NEXT STEPS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Understanding challenges and opportunities for future humanitarian CVA preparedness in SP can help national, INGO, and UN stakeholders in LAC determine next steps and potential roadblocks for deepening national CVA ahead of emergencies.

MAIN CHALLENGES TO BUILDING PREPAREDNESS FOR HUMANITARIAN CVA IN SP IN LAC INCLUDE:

- ⊕ **Building trust and transparency with NGOs to collaborate with governments.** This can be difficult due to historic tensions between certain NGOs and national governments—especially given civil society commitments to the Humanitarian Principles and the importance of their remaining impartial and independent. One INGO key informant noted that it would be possible to collaborate with governments only if they “demonstrated more transparency” and included civil society at the beginning of CVA and SP planning processes. Another suggested that government turnover gave rise to too much instability to “do [partnership] well.” Some INGO key informants expressed an interest in continuing to work closely with municipal government actors instead of national governments. Working with local partners, such as the Red Cross National Societies, is one way to build this humanitarian–development partnership.
- ⊕ **Use of technology and access to identification.** It is a challenge to continually update data and identify potential recipients in a context of frequent cell phone number turnover, the digital divide, and migration in aid recipient populations, as well as other possible exclusion factors. The common reliance on electricity bills to determine eligibility, may exclude the poorest or most remote groups as they may not have access to or consume electricity. Further, it may be difficult to update and manage this data quickly and reliably for geographically remote populations that are difficult to reach (i.e., due to mobility restrictions during COVID-19 lockdowns, rainy seasons, etc.). Reaching individuals who are stateless (see DR) or cannot use SP programs because they are migrants (see Mexico, Honduras) is another critical challenge.
- ⊕ **Messaging to populations.** Messaging includes coordinating national SP and humanitarian messaging related to humanitarian CVA, to manage recipient expectations about, for example, “top-ups” in emergencies, or targeting disparities, such as why one disaster-affected municipality may receive cash while another does not (see DR). This challenge is particularly evident with respect to efforts to pre-position aid to municipalities that are expected to be more vulnerable to certain climatic shocks. Clear messaging can help to avoid exclusion errors, perceptions of political bias, and duplication of CVA efforts in implementation and targeting.

MAIN OPPORTUNITIES TO BUILDING PREPAREDNESS FOR HUMANITARIAN CVA IN SP IN LAC PRIMARILY INCLUDE:

- ⊕ **Building on nascent capacity in the region.** Leveraging government capacity-building, training, and coordination activities for the linking of humanitarian CVA to SP programming, especially in terms of preparedness, can better support historically excluded populations, such as individuals without documentation, stateless people, migrants, Afro-Latinos, returnees, indigenous communities, women, and the LGBTQ+ community. Local NGOs and local INGO and UN offices can also play a key role in promoting local management of inclusive SP through technical accompaniment in monitoring, data collection, and targeting. Further, the Center for Coordination for the Prevention of Disasters in Central America and the Dominican Republic (CEPREDENAC) should continue to encourage in-depth discussions amongst governments and generate regional buy-in for collaboration with humanitarian actors and for humanitarian CVA-SP preparedness. Key



GERMAN ADALID MEJIA
ISA FATHER OF 2 AND
AN ENTREPRENEUR
WHO BENEFITED FROM
CASH ASSISTANCE FROM
GOAL'S HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSE TO NORTH
ATLANTIC MAJOR STORM.
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informants expressed concerns that, without CEPRENEDAC's involvement, there would not be enough political will to use humanitarian CVA in SP. Key informants suggest that to date, CEPRENEDAC has done a good job of accompanying specific disasters but could be more active in establishing regional mechanisms to support national CVA delivery and transparency.

- + Deepening and expanding humanitarian CVA coordination.** Most of the countries of focus in this report have matured in their focus on humanitarian CVA coordination greatly in the past year, especially in light of COVID-19 humanitarian CVA in SP responses. The ongoing pandemic presents an opportunity for greater use of cash modalities for preparedness. A critical next step is to expand CWGs and host more conferences and roundtables with governments to explore joint project financing and establish a CVA dialogue. In some contexts where CWGs may not be appropriate, a more effective approach involves opening up existing roundtable or coordination spaces in which the particularities of humanitarian CVA can be better understood by the different actors in the response.
- + Increasing use of digital humanitarian CVA delivery, targeting, and MEAL.** This includes updating and investing in e-transfer mechanisms and online data management and registration platforms, as well as supporting stronger data protection laws. The DR has, for example, made strides to this effect by piloting QR codes and chip-based plastic debit cards for increased aid recipient security upon cashing out or redeeming CVA.
- + Development and harmonization of tools to coordinate, prepare, and align government, UN, and INGO humanitarian CVA responses in the area of linking social protection and humanitarian CVA or in terms of SRSP.** Various tools exist or are in progress, yet each organization's tools, whether those of UNICEF, WFP, FAO, or World Bank HQs, have a slightly different focus. According to some key informants, "there is a desire to move assessments forward at the country level in a coordinated and collective way ... [but there is a need to make] efforts to align tools before there are too many tools and a need to delete some. But who will adapt to whose?" COVID-19 provides an opportunity to reflect on this question and act. Updating government databases—especially single unified registries—to include updated lists of not only current aid recipients, but possible future aid recipients who are "on the border" of eligibility for CVA. The DR, via SIUBEN, offers one example.
- + Involve donors more closely in preparedness processes.** Involving donors can demonstrate the connection between preparedness, humanitarian response, and international development. Donor engagement might well lead to investment in preparedness measures typically related to development, such as health promotion and financial literacy training. Working with local partners, such as the Red Cross National Societies, is one way to build this humanitarian–development partnership. Such advocacy can also be couched within commitments to CVA in the Grand Bargain and other international agreements. One key informant also suggested that bringing on international donors—whether the UN or governmental, such as BHA—may spark cultural changes in disaster management agencies, which sometimes have a more traditional structure based in civil protection, and support further the move from in-kind assistance toward including humanitarian CVA in SP response.

05 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

As one key informant noted, the current COVID-19 moment is an “excellent moment for [government] advocacy for the inclusion of SP actors in emergency response and preparedness.” Such inclusion could benefit broader humanitarian CVA engagement to prepare for and respond to a wide range of shocks, including natural disasters. Indeed, new Disaster Risk Management laws and emergency preparedness laws, as well as increased interest in preparedness considering the COVID-19 pandemic, have encouraged linking processes; examples are currently underway in Guatemala, the DR, and in Honduras. Across LAC, national SP ministries, CEPREDENAC, the UN, and INGOs have demonstrated their active interest in preparing for future emergencies by integrating humanitarian CVA into existing national SP. This mutual interest across actors opens the door for capacity-building and collaboration across each of the five “building blocks.” While the academic and gray literature on the integration of CVA within national SP in LAC is limited, despite extensive literature on the benefits of CVA in SP, this study demonstrates that it is not for lack of preparedness actions in the region.

In fact, preparedness actions abound across the region. The DR is leading the way on humanitarian CVA design via its Emergency Preparedness Plan and Emergency Subsidy; this could transform the rapid deployment of CVA through a national system during climatic shocks in the country. In Honduras there are steps toward legal reform of key national stakeholders and institutions that would allow its SP agency to have an emergency mandate. Guatemala has embraced government capacity-building and UN technical accompaniment, while El Salvador, the DR, and other countries have made strides toward improved data management through Single Participant Registries.

Governments, INGOs, and the UN across the region are also streamlining CVA targeting and delivery mechanisms. Humanitarian stakeholders in countries without strong humanitarian CVA–SP integration, such as UNHCR in Mexico, are identifying targeting gaps that will develop a more nuanced understanding of equity and inclusion in recipient identification. Across LAC, COVID-19, and recent shocks such as Hurricanes Eta and Iota and the *Volcán de Fuego* have sparked new interest in the possibilities for scaling and sustaining CVA through national SP. Preparing to do so is the logical next step.

Bringing the two systems closer together offers the opportunity to build transparency and strengthen inclusion and equity in recipient identification. It also opens the door for deeper conversations about transitioning from in-kind and voucher support to cash transfers (or a combination of modalities), delivered through secure mechanisms such as prepaid debit cards or digitally, in the face of rapid-onset shocks. Communication and relationship-building between national SP ministries, INGOs, and the UN remains at the heart of collaboration and coordination for disaster preparedness using humanitarian CVA. Regional disaster management bodies such as CEPREDENAC are well poised to advocate for deeper preparedness with national SP and disaster management ministries and meet national CWGs where they are to support high-level collaboration, communication, and preparedness planning. As one key informant noted, “the less capacity in the SP system, the more reason to collaborate with... UN, INGO [entities].”

Climate, social, and epidemiological shocks will continue to be a fixture of the emergency response landscape in LAC. Factors such as extensive coastlines, warming temperatures, political turnover and social unrest, migration, extreme poverty, and frequent drought make LAC a vulnerable region. Yet just as LAC governments piloted CVA in SP with pioneering programs such as Mexico’s *Progresas/Oportunidades/Prospera*, growing interest in preparedness focused on CVA in SP has positioned LAC to lead the way in making their national social protection systems truly shock-responsive. This study is a first step in mapping the landscape towards this goal.

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APPENDICES



APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS

I.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Because integrating humanitarian cash and voucher assistance (CVA) and social protection (SP) is a developing field, this research approach drew on emerging existing examples of relevant linking and preparedness, despite otherwise generally rich experiences of government-led SP in Mexico, Central America, and the Dominican Republic (DR). The methodology draws primarily on shock-responsive social protection (SRSP) frameworks elaborated by SPACE and TRANSFORM, as well as the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Preparedness Framework commonly used for preparedness actions in the humanitarian community. It takes UNICEF’s SP framework¹ as a broad “jumping off” point for conceptualizing where social assistance sits in the larger conversation about SP and SRSP.

Drawing on the IASC Framework, a key foundation for the study was to use the idea of preparedness “building blocks” to link humanitarian CVA and SRSP² including:

BUILDING BLOCK	COMPONENTS
<p>01 STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Contingency Planning (including developing evidence base for learning from past humanitarian CVA, analyzing the maturity of existing SP systems and availability for piggybacking etc., development and strengthening of SRSP vs. SP for chronic poverty). ii Policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks (including preparedness procedures, framework agreements with financial service providers (FSP)s, memorandum of understanding (MOU)s with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors, identification requirements and documentation, etc.). iii Governance and coordination (i.e., standby partnership agreements, coordination with Cash Working Group). iv Organizational capacity (i.e., adherence to and knowledge of humanitarian principles, training, political will). v Roles of the most relevant institutions (especially governmental and of the State) and understanding of how they function, including but not limited to: Disaster Risk Reduction and SP institutions and sub ministries, and development and early recovery actors (where necessary, as in United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Honduras or the World Bank in Central America) when these actors play a role in social protection or disaster preparation.

1 UNICEF. *Programme Guidance: Strengthening Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems*. UNICEF, 2019.

2 Drawing on S Smith, Gabrielle. *Five Practical Insights on Linking Humanitarian Assistance and Social Protection*. CaLP, October 2020.; Barca, Valentina, and Rodolfo Beazley. *Building on Government Systems for Shock Preparedness and Response*. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, January 2019; Holmes, Rebecca. *Grand Bargain Workshop: Linking Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection*, BASIC (Better Assistance in Crises) Programme. DAI Europe, 2019; TRANSFORM. *Shock Responsive Social Protection—Manual for Leadership and Transformation Curriculum on Building and Managing Social Protection Floors in Africa*. TRANSFORM, 2020; World Bank Sourcebook (forthcoming), European Union. *Social Protection Across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus*, n.d.

BUILDING BLOCK	COMPONENTS
<p>02 DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Data on disaster and shock vulnerability analysis (i.e., disaster vulnerability mapping, early warning systems, trigger indicators for early action, synchronizing government schemes with NGO mechanisms). ii Social protection data and information systems (including aid recipient registries, social registries, management information systems (MIS), data protection schemes, as well as data protection schemes for FSPs, contracts, etc.). iii Other civil, government registries. iv Other forms of targeting systems management and data management typical of preparedness mechanisms (i.e., Standard Operating Procedures, linkages with disaster risk management stakeholders and national disaster management ministries, ability and protocols in place to waive system requirements in facing an emergency etc.). v Data-sharing agreements pre-established between government and humanitarian CVA, SP actors.
<p>03 CVA PROGRAM DESIGN</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Targeting design (i.e., coverage, criteria, methodology, market assessments, vulnerability assessments, proxy means testing when necessary, categorical targeting when necessary). ii Modality design (including restrictions and conditions). iii Transfer design (i.e., value, frequency, duration, exit, preparedness for cash “plus” and coordination with district and community-level leaders, protection-oriented parallel programming or use of secondary services such as mobile money, case management). iv Inclusion of most-vulnerable groups considerations (i.e., gender, mobility, ability and disability, youth and adolescents, indigenous peoples, etc.). v Linkages between humanitarian CVA and SRSP (or preparedness for such linkages).
<p>04 DELIVERY SYSTEMS</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Registration. ii Enrollment and early access to enrollment (i.e., through Early Warning System to onboard new households for potential horizontal expansions). iii Payment delivery (CVA delivery mechanism and FSP selection, capacity-building for FSPs to work with humanitarian actors, etc.). iv Communication, accountability, recipient complaints and feedback mechanism (including coordination with banks and other FSPs to deliver humanitarian funds in timely manner and equitably, e-payment or agent over-the-counter systems in place for urban and rural communities). v Delivery systems and physical infrastructure disaster-proofed. vi monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) (Including risk analysis and continuous risk monitoring, other preparedness feedback mechanisms).
<p>05 COORDINATING AND FINANCING</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i Disaster risk financing (DRF). ii Pooled funds (Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance- (OCHA) managed, such as Country-based Pooled Funds (CBPF) and Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funds and other rapid humanitarian funding for quick-onset emergencies). iii Pre-positioning funding and risk-layering of funding (i.e., forecast-based financing, early action). iv Strong national response strategy and inter-institutional MOUs in place for financing horizontal expansions, etc.

I.2 RESEARCH PHASES AND TOOLS

This study also reviewed existing literature on SP and CVA in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) since 2016 and conducted in-depth key informant interviews with approximately 30 stakeholders from government and disaster management agencies, UN agencies, and INGOs. It focuses on stakeholders previously identified by CALP Network and the project-specific Steering Committee,³ as well as those recommended by respondents and CALP Network partners through the “snowballing” research technique. The final analysis and interview selection process considered gender, protection, equity, and cultural norms in the context of the core humanitarian principles

The research was carried out in two phases:

- PHASE 1** focused on regional mapping of institutions, selection of case studies, and development of a topical outline, as well as initial key informants;⁴
- PHASE 2** focused on conducting in-depth research on the selected case studies, case study specific key informants, and preparation of the final report and case studies.

The selection of the two case studies was carried out in consultation with CALP and the study Steering Committee. The criteria for selection of the case studies included: use of the SP system, diversity of humanitarian organizations connected to the program (including UN and INGOs), clarity of institutional linkages, aid recipient selection and targeting type, population coverage, availability of MEAL documents, and use or development of preparedness elements.

The main respondents came from UN, INGO, and national governments, all of which are key stakeholders in integrating CVA with SP programs in LAC. There is a slight gap in the number of respondents from government or regional disaster and social development ministries. There is an even greater gap in representation from local NGOs respondents, since these were not identified in the initial mapping of initiatives/key stakeholders. The role of local NGOs should be more carefully considered in any future studies, since it is likely that they would constitute a significant body of stakeholders.

The lack of literature on this emerging topic meant that most of the more current data used in this study comes from key informant interviews and from the most up-to-date COVID-19 monitoring. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s (CEPAL for its acronym in Spanish) SP tracker also served as a useful resource, but as one of the few comprehensive SP archives, was potentially over-consulted for this study.

³ The Steering Committee was composed of members of WFP, UNICEF, GOAL International, Catholic Relief Services, Action Against Hunger, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and World Vision International.

⁴ Some of the resources used as part of the literature review for this study are internal documents from key informants and their organizations, which are not cited here for privacy reasons.

APPENDIX 2: MAPPING OF INITIATIVES

EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - EL SALVADOR

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p><i>COMUNIDADES SOLIDARIAS</i> (Formerly Red Solidaria) 2005 - PRESENT Government of El Salvador (GoSV)</p>	<p>Non-contributory Conditional Cash Transfer in addition to infrastructure support, complementary livelihoods activities such as microcredit and training, and municipal government strengthening.⁵</p> <p>As of 2009, <i>Comunidades Solidarias</i>, which was formerly a rural program, expanded to urban areas. It targets households with children under age 21, who fall under the “extremely poor” income category, covering 100 rural municipalities and 412 “precarious urban settlements” in 25 municipalities.</p> <p>Targeting takes place through a proxy means test aligned to the Unique Registry of Participants (RUP). As of 2017, participant households can also access community accompaniment activities, education bonuses, health bonuses, and temporary income support for youths aged 16–24 without formal employment.</p>	<p>RUP acted as a key preparedness measure for streamlining data management and other information systems, which could be updated and maintained in a central database for deployment in future emergencies.</p>
<p>COVID-19 SUPPORT 2020 GoSV</p>	<p>The GoSV established a COVID-19 contingency plan—critical for stakeholder and institutional preparedness.</p> <p>A once-off cash transfer of USD 300 was sent to households working in the informal sector and who consumed less than 250 kilowatt hours of energy each month.⁶</p> <p>This resulted in a nearly USD 450 million GoSV investment in CVA that could reach approximately 75% of the population (1.5 million households). The program used electric bills for targeting, and the Government mandated that private enterprises allow certain workers—such as pregnant women, people over age 60, and people with pre-existing health conditions—to receive a sick-leave stipend for 30 days ostensibly, to remain home from work.</p>	<p>Contingency planning, including CVA.</p>

5 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

6 World Food Programme. *Coronavirus COVID-19 Cases in Latin American and Caribbean Countries*, 2021

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p>WFP DROUGHT RESPONSE 2018 WFP and GoSV</p>	<p>Approximately 15,815 households in 38 drought-affected areas received a one-time transfer of USD 120 per household, targeted to the female head of household where possible.</p> <p>Delivery was via the same “institutions and agreements” for the payment of other government programs.</p> <p>The CVA itself was delivered physically, as opposed to electronically.</p>	<p>The GoSV worked with WFP to established common regional response standards for drought to reduce food insecurity.</p> <p>Actions included standardizing transfer values; identification of high impact areas with civil protection ministries; standardization of targeting criteria; streamlining delivery mechanisms via the national bank; and linking social registries across government ministries with the aim of integrating all lists into a unified registry and improve monitoring through capacity building with the GoSV.</p>

EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - HONDURAS

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p>BONO VIDA MEJOR 2014 - PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS (GoH)</p>	<p>Conditional Cash Transfer in a SP program focused on creating opportunities for education, health, and nutrition for households “in extreme poverty.”⁷</p> <p>It aims to coordinate with other social programs for employment and income. The program transfers HNL 10,000 (USD 413) per year, provides bonuses for health and nutrition, and includes complementary programming: Community School Committees (i.e., citizen participation groups including teachers, health, religious, and indigenous leaders, parents, and water board members), household support services (<i>Guías de Familias</i>) and education, nutrition, health, and basic allowance bonuses.</p> <p>Since the program is conditional on children being enrolled in and attending school in education centers or public schools, it links to the public school system. Funding is linked to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and World Bank. Transfers are delivered in cash or deposited in bank accounts, targeted toward women recipients. Formerly called Bono 10,000, which delivered money targeted to women to prepare them to become heads of households and household decision-makers.</p>	<p>None identified.</p>

7 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<i>BONO POR EMERGENCIA A DAMNIFICADOS ETA E IOTA 2020</i> GoH	Unconditional and non-contributory humanitarian CVA program targeted at 60,000 households affected by Hurricanes Eta and Iota. A once-off, e-voucher of HNL 5,000 (USD 200) to individuals identified as severely affected by the hurricanes by COPECO assessments. ⁸	COPECO post-hurricane needs assessment, inclusion of CVA assessment and targeting identification tools, were linked with other SP programs in-country (i.e., same system and delivery platforms as existing GoH SP programs, including <i>Bono Único</i> .)
<i>BONO ÚNICO 2020 - 2021</i> GoH, GOAL and UNDP	<p>Unconditional and non-contributory COVID-19 CVA program targeting 'newly poor' workers, especially independent workers, who were impacted by the pandemic.</p> <p>This program provided a one-time payment of HNL 2,000 (USD 83) via an e-transfer; it was unclear if the card could be reused.</p> <p>The program excluded public employees and pensioners, who receive support through other SP programs.</p> <p>Complementary programming included delivery of masks, hand sanitizer, and other hygiene products as well as support in paying debts and refinancing businesses for those impacted by COVID-19.⁹</p> <p>Used the Single Socio-economic Form (FSU) to understand participants' geographic location, household demographic and employment information, education, health, etc.</p>	<p>GoH decree at the start of the pandemic mandating a MEAL element managed by a learning partner (GOAL). UNDP provided technical support additional.</p> <p>GOAL is now leading various efforts to build capacity to deliver and prepare for the use of humanitarian CVA in future emergencies, via trainings, technical assistance and accompaniment, support on writing legislation, norms, and decrees with COPECO, support in establishing a universal decree and adapting CENISS' and COPECO's mandates to allow for CVA, establishing data sharing and delivery channels, etc.</p> <p>GOAL was able to provide recommendations for future programming to the government, which, due to strong relationship- and capacity-building, the government is now taking on across the board.¹⁰</p>

EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - GUATEMALA

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<i>BONO SOCIAL 2012 - PRESENT</i> GoG	<i>Bono Social</i> targets households facing poverty or extreme poverty with CVA to improving health, nutrition, and child education. It includes four sub-interventions for health, education, disasters, and support for infants and young children.	Various elements of linking and preparedness-building led by organizations such as GOAL, RED-LAC members, WFP, Action Against Hunger, Catholic Relief Services, and UNICEF.

8 CENISS and Government of Honduras. *Operación No Están Solos*. n.d.

9 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.; GOAL. (2021).

10 *Honduras Case Study: Bono Único—Deepening preparedness in Social Protection programs using Cash and Voucher Assistance for future emergency assistance*, a companion to this study offers extensive details on preparedness elements as related to the CVA and SP "building blocks" in Bono Único.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
	<p>Education interventions consists of a 500 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 64) monthly transfer to the mother of children aged 6–15 attending school.</p> <p>Health interventions use the same transfer value paid monthly to the mother for attending checkups for children aged 0–6, and for pregnant and breastfeeding women.</p> <p>Support, via bank transfer, for up to six months for those who live in a declared zone of public emergency. Infant support comes with 500 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 64) monthly for children with chronic malnutrition aged 0–24 months, living in poverty or extreme poverty.¹¹</p>	<p>These elements include capacity-building and training, technical accompaniment of government actors, accompaniment in mandate and normative reform, support for MEAL and MEAL capacity-building; market analysis and risk management training, among others.</p> <p>Various elements including capacity-building, information management, support for and capacity-building for MEAL; technical assistance with digitization and data management, recipient sensitization and rights training, communications and marketing materials, and connecting with Guatemala’s CWG, among others.</p>
<p>BONO FAMILIA 2020 - 2021 GoG</p>	<p>A COVID-19 response through an SP program that targeted households with low levels of electricity consumption, or were dependent, unemployed, or vulnerable due to housing conditions, age, gender, etc.</p>	<p>The WFP noted that it began</p>
<p>VOLCÁN DE FUEGO RESPONSE 2018 - 2019 GoG and humanitarian actors (i.e., WFP etc.)</p>	<p>The <i>Volcán de Fuego</i> humanitarian response came after the eruption of a volcano of the same name in central Guatemala in 2018.¹²</p> <p>The general humanitarian response included humanitarian CVA, delivered to 1,218 households with funds from the Emergency Appeal and other donors.¹³</p> <p>In the immediate aftermath of the eruption, the GoG also delivered a transfer of 3,500 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 452) to 300 households impacted by the event, namely those who lost their homes. These transfers lasted for ten months. A second transfer of 1,000 <i>quetzales</i> (USD 129) supported households who did not lose their homes, over the course of three months.¹⁴</p> <p>This included unconditional transfers delivered by WFP for 90 days after the eruption, which reached 10,000 people in the affected population.¹⁵</p>	<p>a UN joint action to conduct a “comprehensive assessment of current national [social protection] programs” in 2018.¹⁶</p> <p>WFP provided workshops and “graduation” in SP and resilience training for government staff the same year, though it remains unclear if this was tied to <i>Volcán de Fuego</i> in any way.</p> <p>The emergency did, however, inspire policy reforms for emergency preparedness in the GoG though unrelated to CVA.¹⁷</p>

11 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

12 UNDP. *Volcán de Fuego: Inside the Emergency Response*. Medium (blog), September 10, 2018.

13 International Federation of the Red Cross. *Guatemala: Volcanic Eruption Final Report DREF N° MDRGT013*. May, 2020.

14 Government of Guatemala. *Familias Damnificadas Por Erupción Del Volcán de Fuego Comenzarán a Recibir Bono de Ayuda Del Gobierno*. ReliefWeb. August, 2018.

15 World Food Programme. *Guatemala Annual Country Report 2018: Country Strategic Plan 2018–2021*. 2018

16 The World Bank. *Strengthening Guatemala’s Disaster Risk Management Capacities*. PreventionWeb, UNDRR. May, 2019.

17 Ibid.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
	<p>CVA continued from other humanitarian actors into 2019.¹⁸</p>	<p>These include “a bill of law, submitted to Congress in January 2019, to strengthen the legal disaster risk management framework, and the adoption of a roadmap to strengthen institutional capacities for volcanic risk reduction and resilience, following lessons learned from the eruption of <i>Volcán de Fuego</i> in 2018. Also, a Disaster Risk Financing Strategy was approved in 2018 to strengthen the country’s fiscal resilience and its capacity to respond to disaster risks.”¹⁹</p> <p>However, there were no measures to integrate CVA within SP for preparedness in the GoG’s immediate CVA response.</p>
<p>PROGRAMA BECA SOCIAL 2018 - PRESENT GoG (MIDES)</p>	<p>This program supports “access, continuity, and permanence in formal education, training in the formal labor market”²⁰ by focusing on middle and higher education, vocational and employment training programs for adolescents, youth, and adults from both rural and urban municipalities, who live in conditions of poverty.</p> <p>MIDES targeting occurs through a means test. CVA is conditional, provided through bank transfers and delivered either monthly or annually.²¹ Values of each transfer differ on type and recipient.</p>	<p>None identified.</p>
<p>BECA PRIMER EMPLEO 2013 - 2018 GoG (MIDES)</p>	<p>This program supports adolescents and youth aged 16–25 in the formal labor market through temporary apprenticeships. it includes training for up to 60 hours and an internship.</p> <p>Successful completion of the program results in a once-off MIDES transfer of 2,000 quetzales (USD 258) and “the employer will make a payment equivalent to 40% of the current minimum wage plus an incentive bonus of 250 quetzales (USD 32).”²²</p>	<p>None identified.</p>

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 CEPAL. [Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe](#), n.d.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
VIDA ²³ 2017 - PRESENT GoG (MIDES)	<p>This Conditional Cash Transfer targets adolescent girls who are mothers and/or pregnant, and survivors of Sexual Gender-Based Violence whose “cases have been prosecuted.”²⁴</p> <p>It provides CVA for those women who attend health checks during and after the pregnancy and is targeted categorically through People’s National Registry. This program is managed and funded by MIDES.²⁵</p>	None identified.

EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - PANAMA, COSTA RICA, BELIZE, AND NICARAGUA

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
PANAMA GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA		
PLAN PANAMA SOLIDARIO 2020 - PRESENT	<p>In response to COVID-19, the government provided vouchers to approximately 1 million recipients experiencing poverty or vulnerability including but not limited to informal and unemployed workers.</p> <p>This program was also linked to electricity bills, providing subsidies of 30–50% depending on consumption level basis for individuals in medical quarantine or recovery.²⁶</p>	None identified.
BONOS FAMILIARES PARA LA COMPRA DE ALIMENTOS 2005 - PRESENT	<p>This program is a Conditional Cash Transfer funded by the Government of Panama, implemented by the Ministry of Social Development. It operates primarily in rural, often indigenous, areas as part of the Red de Oportunidades SP (see below).</p> <p>The program targets households with minors, elderly or disabled members that are living in extreme poverty. It uses geographical targeting (e.g., localities with extreme poverty levels and chronic malnutrition) and proxy means tests based on the national Social Vulnerability Survey as a selection instrument.</p>	None identified.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ World Food Programme. *Coronavirus COVID-19 Cases in Latin American and Caribbean Countries*, 2021

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
	<p>It also includes a food stamp and voucher component (20 vouchers that can be redeemed at a network of over 175 pre-approved markets) delivered to the mother, conditional on health checks and school attendance (for children over 6 years of age). At least one adult household member must also participate in the Ministry of Agricultural Development (MIDA) food production sessions. This program is funded by the Government of Panama with the Ministry of Social Development as implementer.²⁷</p>	None identified.
<p><i>RED DE OPORTUNIDADES</i> 2006 - PRESENT</p>	<p>The flagship Conditional Cash Transfer in Panama, this program aims to reduce extreme poverty both by supporting households and improving “the local supply of social services.”²⁸</p> <p>This program relies in part on geographical targeting using the index of extreme poverty incidence.</p> <p>It offers a “household support component,” which “allows the exchange of information on the status of the aid recipient households and on compliance with the conditionalities.”²⁹</p> <p>These conditionalities include health checkups (pregnancy and post-partum, child checkups, elderly checkups, immunizations), 85% attendance in classes for children 4–17 years old, parent participation in school training activities, etc.</p> <p>A once-off transfer is sent to the mother via bank accounts or “mobile post offices” operated through COTEL (Directorate of Posts and Telegraphs). Timing of the transfer has fluctuated over time from bimonthly to quarterly.³⁰</p>	None identified.
<p><i>BONO SOLIDARIO</i> AND <i>VALE PANAMA</i></p>	<p>The program supports 1.2 million people monthly through their identity card. The transfer offering USD 80 to support vulnerable households.</p> <p><i>Vale Panama</i> mirrors this program in difficult-to-access areas, offering an unconditional, one-time, voucher valued at USD 30–50 to 400 households in “Bocas del Toro, Chiriquí, Veraguas, Herrera, Los Santos, Coclé, Panama Oeste, Panamá [and] Colon.”³¹</p>	None identified.

27 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

28 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

29 Ibid.

30 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.; Amarante, Verónica, and Martin Brun. Cash Transfers in Latin America: WIDER Working Paper 2016/136. UN University, November. 2016.

31 Ibid.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
COSTA RICA GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA		
CRECEMOS 2019 - PRESENT	<p>This program is a Conditional Cash Transfer is aimed at promoting early and primary education for children in households facing poverty or extreme poverty.</p> <p>The Joint Institute for Social Aid (IMAS) targets program recipients through categorical and proxy means testing methods, using a proxy means testing gleaned from the national Social Information Card (FIS) and categorizing based on which students are actively enrolled in primary or pre-school.</p> <p>The CVA is monthly to the recipient's bank account in the amount of Costa Rican Colones (CRC) 18,000 (USD 28), if the student remains in school.³²</p>	<p>The program links The Mixed Institute of Social Support to the Ministry of Public Education within the government.</p>
AVANCEMOS 2006 - PRESENT	<p>This program is similar to Creceemos, but targets households with children aged 12–25 who are “struggling to keep their children in the educational system due to economic reasons.”³³</p> <p>The transfers are conditioned on 80% on-time attendance and deposited to bank accounts.³⁴</p> <p>The transfers are CRC 30,000 (USD 47) for students in grades 7–9 and CRC 40,000 (USD 64) to students in grades 10–12 of education. <i>It also includes a comprehensive health assessment for students, carried out by the Costa Rica Social Security Fund.</i></p>	<p>None identified.</p>
BONO PROTEGER 2020	<p>This program provided a temporary cash transfer to cover basic needs of households affected who lost employment and/or income due to COVID-19 restrictions and their impact.</p> <p>Transfer values varies: CRC 62,500 (USD 98) during three months for people with less than 50% reduction of working hours and CRC 125,000 (USD 196) with full employment suspension or more than 50% reduction of working hours.</p> <p>This once-off cash transfer is complementing both the National Labor and Social Security program and Mixed Institute of Social Support program.</p>	<p>The source for households' socioeconomic information is the national single registry and information database.</p> <p>A regulatory framework that allows specific actions and resource mobilization to both fight against COVID-19 effects³⁵ and protect the most vulnerable population in an emergency.³⁶</p>

32 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

33 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 This was established through the national decree *Artículo 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 42227-MP-S*, established on the 16th of March 2020.

36 This was established through the *National Emergency and Risk Prevention Law # 8488* from the 22nd of November 2005.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
BELIZE GOVERNMENT OF BELIZE		
BUILDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION (BOOST)	<p>BOOST is a Conditional Cash Transfer to poor households; conditionalities include minimum school attendance of 85 percent, immunization of children under 5 and pre-natal checkups for pregnant women).³⁷</p> <p>It is targeted at children aged 5–18 and pregnant women.</p> <p>The monthly transfer is based on the student’s grade in school; the range is Belize dollar (BZS) 44 to BZS 82 (USD 22- 40).³⁸</p> <p>It is delivered via credit union and targeted via a PMT coordinated with the Single Information System of Belize (SISB)</p>	<p>Partnerships with credit unions to deliver payments.³⁹</p> <p>The project shares data through a national registry of “information on applicants or aid recipients of safety net programs that can be used to support resilience objectives.”⁴⁰</p> <p>This program also used horizontal expansion in light of COVID-19 to include people receiving food assistance who were not otherwise part of the BOOST program as of April 2020.⁴¹</p>
NICARAGUA		
N/A	<p>Nicaragua does not have any active government-led SP programs using CVA identified by this study, in large part, according to informants, due to regulatory systems and legal blocks in place at the time of writing.</p> <p>It did have a <i>Bono Productivo</i>; this was focused on in-kind transfers of food and livestock. It also has inter-ministerial coordination committees. As Beazley (2017) notes, “the Sistema Nacional para la Prevención Mitigación y Atención de Desastres (SINAPRED), the body in charge of prevention, mitigation and response to disasters, is led by the Presidency and integrated across every line ministry SINAPRED has committees at every level, from national to local, in order to improve vertical coordination.”⁴²</p> <p>However, while important to emergency preparedness generally, this does not constitute CVA in an SP program, nor does it correspond to a specific SP program, making it outside the scope of this study.</p>	None identified.

37 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. *Building Resilience through Social Protection*. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.

38 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

39 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. *Building Resilience through Social Protection*. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.

40 Ibid

41 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

42 Beazley, Rodolfo. *Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Oxford Policy Management, 2017b.

EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
SUPÉRATE (Formerly <i>ProSoli</i>) PRESENT GoDR (ADESS)	<p>Administered by ADESS and coordinated by the Office of the President of the Republic, this program is the flagship SP program in the DR.</p> <p>It provides e-vouchers that can be used at a network of vendors and supermarkets for a restricted list of goods, as well as educational and social support, facilitated access to public services, and “targeted subsidies” to households in conditions of extreme poverty, to promote empowerment, income generation, employment, entrepreneurship, etc.⁴³</p>	<p><i>Inclusión Población Infantil</i> was a horizontal expansion of <i>Supérate</i>, operated by the GoDR with UNICEF support, that sent with disabled children.⁴⁴</p> <p>Other measures included vertical and horizontal expansions in the face of COVID-19, design adjustments to increase and speed up CVA deliveries, changes to make conditionalities more flexible in the face of COVID-19, and vertical “top-ups” to double the amount of the transfer.⁴⁵</p>
QUÉDATE EN CASA (COVID-19 Adaptation, FASE, and <i>Pa Ti</i>) 2020 - PRESENT GoDR (ADESS, SIUBEN, Cabinet Social Policy Coordination, etc.)	<p>Operated by Cabinet Social Policy Coordination the program targets via vulnerability and poverty in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p> <p>It reaches 811,000 households through prepaid debit card. The transfer originally was a monthly payment of Dominican <i>pesos</i> 5,000 (USD 88) for basic needs and food.</p> <p>The transfer value decreased with each monthly transfer so as to reach more households.⁴⁶</p> <p>Another 690,000 vulnerable households were supported by SIUBEN.⁴⁷</p> <p>FASE included private sector collaboration, offering CVA to those not covered by <i>Quédate en Casa</i> with a bank transfer through the Ministry of Work and Housing. Also operated by the Ministry of Work and Housing, <i>Pa Ti</i> covered the rest of those not included in <i>Quedate en Casa</i> or FASE.⁴⁸</p>	<p>UNICEF and WFP capacity-building, training, and technical support for implementation, program design (notably, of expansions) and MEAL during and after the program.</p> <p>Coordination with SIUBEN and ADESS for CVA delivery and data management.</p>
CIVIL SOCIETY COVID-19 RESPONSE 2020 - 2021 Humanitarian actors (UNHCR, IOM, etc.)	<p>UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM) with the Embassy of Haiti and organizations such as FUNCOVER, <i>Casa de Caribe</i>, <i>Diaspora Venezolana</i>, provided parallel programming to <i>Supérate</i>.</p>	<p>Parallel programming with <i>Supérate</i>.</p>

43 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

44 For more information on this program integration and preparedness, please see the Dominican Republic Case Study, a companion to this study

45 World Food Programme. *Coronavirus COVID-19 Cases in Latin American and Caribbean Countries*, 2021

46 *The “Stay at Home” Subsidy for March Is Ready*, Govt. Says. Dominican Today, April 1, 2021.

47 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

48 *Ibid.*

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
	<p>It was aimed at people with refugee status, Venezuelan nationality, and Haitian migrants. These groups are typically excluded by national SP programs and do not have documentation required to access government SP.</p> <p>The cash transfer is delivered via PIN number and Banco Hispano Americano.</p>	
WORLD VISION WITH ARCHDIOCESE OF SANTO DOMINGO COVID-19 RESPONSE 2020 - 2021	<p>The program targeted areas not covered by the government with the parish <i>Comunidad Venezolana del Gran Santo Domingo</i>.</p> <p>The CVA was aimed at supporting lactating mothers and those with minor children, offering food kits with vouchers and/or paid at their local supplier (95 percent). Five percent of the program is the direct transfer of food to households (non-cash or voucher component).⁴⁹</p>	None identified.

EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS USING CVA FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE - MEXICO

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
UNHCR AND IOM SUPPORT TO MIGRANTS UNHCR AND IOM	<p>Multiple programs operated by UNHCR, IOM, and other INGOs supported migrants and refugees during the COVID-19 pandemic and prior to the start of the pandemic.</p> <p>Both UNHCR and IOM provided humanitarian CVA for migrants; it is sometimes with complementary case management and support in accessing SP and government services (e.g., accompaniment to receive necessary social security and identification documents, training on rights to access to public services, etc.).⁵⁰</p> <p>UNHCR's CVA is up to four months covering the majority of basic needs. The transfer value is based on the approximate amount of time needed for immigration authorities to resolve asylum requests, after which, migrants can seek formal employment in Mexico.</p> <p>UNHCR provides up to four complementary health payments to migrants whose health needs are not completely met by the national health system at which point they can also be referred to the National Refugee Agency. This is a complementary, rather than parallel, system.</p>	<p>Some pre-positioning of financing mechanisms for migrant support, linking to government safety net programs and networks of safe houses and shelters in limited data sharing.</p> <p>UNHCR Mexico is also linking migrant and refugee support to SP in its Strategic Planning for CVA, which includes efforts toward durable solutions.⁵¹</p>

49 UNHCR. *Presentación acciones llevadas a cabo por el ACNUR en el marco de la coordinación del Grupo PS*. Internal presentation. November 18, 2020. This program is an example of a program with CVA that complemented an ongoing SP one.

50 UNHCR. *Americas COVID-19 Response Update #4*. April. 2020.
51 Ibid.

PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
<p><i>JÓVENES CON PROSPERA</i> 2003 - 2019 Government of Mexico (Secretary of Social Development) (SEDESOL)</p>	<p>Cash transfers to encourage students to complete their high school education before age 22 and within four years.</p> <p>This CVA of up to 4,890 Mexican pesos (MXN) (USD 233) was deposited into a savings account when the student completes their studies; students earn more money through a point system that accumulates over the course of their education. This program is managed by SEDESOL.⁵²</p>	<p>None identified.</p>
<p><i>PROGRESA- OPORTUNIDADES- PROGRESA ENDED 2019</i> Government of Mexico, Various</p>	<p><i>Prospera</i> was the successor of two flagship non-contributory Mexican SP programs—<i>Oportunidades</i> and <i>Progresa</i>.</p> <p>It began in 2014 as a Conditional Cash Transfer intended to support vulnerable households’ “graduation” out of poverty through a cash transfer, and complementary health, education, and livelihoods programs.⁵³</p> <p>The Mexican Government invested heavily in <i>Prospera</i>, which reached up to 6 million households and 131 million people. CVA was conditioned on health checkups, school attendance, and other conditionalities, and households were targeted using a proxy means testing and geography.</p> <p>CVA is provided bi- monthly or every three months, with a maximum of 2,945 MXN (USD 140) to households with high-school scholarship holders, and 1,825 MXN (USD 88) for those without, as well as 370 MXN (US 18) per additional elderly person in the household.⁵⁴</p> <p><i>Prospera</i> offered opportunities to link with many other government-led SP programs for housing, health, education, and livelihoods, which were typically not CVA.</p>	<p>During the <i>Progresa/ Oportunidades</i> phase various elements of horizontal expansion were reported including combining CVA with the <i>Programa Apoyo Alimentario</i> and a “child cash bonus”, which expanded aid recipient lists as well as added complementary and aligned programming.</p> <p>It also included vertical expansion, in increasing “monthly payments to the poorest by 24%.”⁵⁵</p> <p>The program invested in preparedness measures insofar as connecting more aid recipients— particularly women—to formal financial systems, delivering a “savings promotion, life insurance, and access to a credit line.”⁵⁶ In doing so, it increased financial literacy.</p>
<p><i>PROGRAMA DE EMPLEO TEMPORAL (PET)</i> 2000 - 2019 Government of Mexico</p>	<p>This program is a worker-focused one; workers can earn cash transfers when their work has been disrupted by a natural disaster or socioeconomic crisis and they live within a vulnerable geographic area.</p>	<p>PET, as of 2003, included an emergency response and “contingency financing mechanism” as a “sub-component” which was called <i>Programa de Empleo Temporal Inmediato (PETi)</i>.⁵⁸</p>

52 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

53 Ibid.

54 Masino, Serena, and Miguel Niño-Zarazúa. *Improving Financial Inclusion through the Delivery of Cash Transfer Programmes: The Case of Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera Programme*. The Journal of Development Studies, 56(1), 151–168. 2018.

55 Beazley, Rodolfo. *Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management, 2017b; Bastagli, Francesca. *Responding to a Crisis: The Design and Delivery of Social Protection*. ODI Briefing. 2014.

56 CEPAL. *Base de Datos de Programas de Protección Social No Contributiva En América Latina y El Caribe*. n.d.

58 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. *Building Resilience through Social Protection*. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.



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PROGRAM TITLE AND AGENCY(IES)	PROGRAM DESCRIPTION	PREPAREDNESS AND SP LINKING ELEMENTS
	<p>This program employs workers and offers CVA in areas of infrastructure, health improvement, “heritage preservation,” conservation and rural road management, ecosystem conservation, civic education, food assistance and food bank support, climate mitigation, and other projects.⁵⁷</p> <p>Targeting is categorical and included people in <i>Prospera</i> or those who received food assistance, as registered in the Single Registry of Beneficiaries and funded by The Ministry of Welfare, the Secretariate of the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), and the System for Transfers and Payments (STPS) (operated by SEDESOL).</p> <p>According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), transfers are made according to days worked and length of time and can be equivalent to “99 percent of the official daily minimum wage for the geographic area where the project or the emergency tasks are done”.</p>	<p>At least 20% of the PET program’s budget is dedicated to low to medium impact disasters. PETi is an example of modifying systems and procedures for a post-disaster context.</p>

57 Williams, A., F. Lamanna and N. Jones. *Building Resilience through Social Protection*. SISRI Knowledge Note No. 2. Small Island States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). 2016.



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