

# International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Working Group on Indicators

## Progress Report on Fragility Assessments and Indicators

*4 December 2012*

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# 1. Introduction

The ***New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*** was adopted at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (Republic of Korea) in December 2011. The New Deal helps to put the principles of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation into practice in fragile states and situations and has been welcomed in the Busan Outcome document.<sup>1</sup>

The New Deal includes five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs). To strengthen and promote these goals as a framework for national and international engagement, it was agreed in the New Deal to develop a set of simple and practical indicators to track progress towards the PSGs at the country and at the global level (i.e. across countries).<sup>2</sup>

In January 2012, the Steering Group of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding decided to establish a **working group on indicators** (“working group”, hereafter) to advance and co-ordinate the development of Peacebuilding and statebuilding indicators. The group comprises 15-20 International Dialogue members and is co-chaired by the DRC and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The co-chairs are supported by a core group consisting of representatives from Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, civil society, the g7+ Secretariat and two experts. The International Dialogue Secretariat provides support to the working group and the core group.

The working group was mandated to develop “country-level” indicators and a list of “shared/common” indicators. At the request of the g7+, and supported by the Steering Group meeting in June 2012, the working group adapted the process of indicator development from a “top-down” process drawing from centralised datasets to a “**bottom-up**” approach for selecting and developing indicators. This approach combined the piloting of fragility assessments and testing of the fragility spectrum – central commitments of the New Deal – with the process of selecting indicators. After the Steering Group meeting in June 2012, the working group proposed to develop the indicators for endorsement by the International Dialogue in December 2012

This report summarises progress and key outputs and outcomes from the working group. It outlines the process for developing indicators, drawing attention to the most important products generated by the working group between early 2012 and early November 2012 (section 2); highlights key issues and lessons arising from the piloting of the fragility assessments (section 3); and explains the rationale for developing indicators for the PSGs and how such indicators could be used (section 4). The central section of this report (section 5) contains a set of shared/common indicators that has emerged on the basis of consultations in the g7+ pilot countries, a g7+ experience-sharing meeting and extensive consultations with members of the International Dialogue working group. Section 6 outlines the next steps for this process.

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<sup>1</sup> The Busan Partnership is the result of an inclusive process of consultation and negotiation which aims at improving the effectiveness of development co-operation. The Busan Partnership document emphasises country-level implementation and monitoring based on the needs and contexts of developing countries. It reaffirmed the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2008), alongside new commitments agreed by a much broader set of stakeholders in Busan. See Busan Partnership document (§ 26) at: [www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/49650173.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/49650173.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> “By September 2012, a set of indicators for each goal will have been developed by fragile states and international partners, which will allow us to track progress at the global and the country levels. These indicators will combine objective measures with measures to understand the views of people on results achieved...” (New Deal, § 1). The International Dialogue Steering Group agreed to extend the process until end of 2012.

**Table 1.1. Members of the International Dialogue Working Group on Indicators**

<b>g7+</b>	<b>INCAF</b>
<b>Afghanistan</b>	Denmark
Central African Republic	European Union
Chad	Germany
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	Japan
Guinea-Bissau	United Kingdom
Liberia	United States
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	United Nations ( <b>PBSO</b> , <b>UNDP</b> , <b>DPKO</b> )
Somalia	<b>World Bank</b>
South Sudan	<b>CSO representatives</b>
<b>Timor-Leste</b>	Two representatives (rotating organisations)
<b>Core group members in bold</b>	

This progress report does not include indicators for measuring implementation of the specific commitments agreed to in the New Deal (in particular FOCUS and TRUST commitments) as the working group does not have the mandate to develop these indicators. This report also does not yet propose options for national (and international) data collection and reporting mechanisms. This will be addressed in future reports.

## 2. Fragility assessment and indicator development process

Since its creation, the working group, the core group and members of the g7+ met multiple times, most recently at a South-South experience-sharing event held in Nairobi in October 2012. Annex A provides a comprehensive overview of the process between January and December 2012. The following section highlights the key steps in the process and the support provided by the working group.

### **Development of the g7+ fragility spectrum (January-February 2012)**

The fragility spectrum is a diagnostic matrix developed by the g7+ countries during a technical meeting in Dili in January 2012<sup>3</sup>. It allows country stakeholders to identify a country's situation of fragility on a scale of 1 to 5 (1=crisis, 2, 3, 4=transitional stages, 5=resilience) using the five PSGs as an overall framework. A g7+ meeting on indicators in New York in February 2012 identified broad dimensions for each PSG drawing on the descriptive characterisation given for each PSG in Dili. The fragility spectrum's final aim is to become an innovative, self-assessment tool for fragility in a particular country context.

### **Development and agreement on analytical framework (March – June 2012)**

A critical first step for the working group was the development of an analytical framework for the fragility assessments and the indicator development. Building on the work by the g7+, the framework identifies a number of key sub-dimensions for each PSG to allow a better understanding of each PSG. This framework was developed and elaborated by the working group in Copenhagen (March 2012) and Nairobi (June 2012). Multiple meetings were required due to the technical and political complexity of the process, the need to build a common understanding what peacebuilding and statebuilding mean, and the importance to ensure g7+ ownership and leadership throughout the process. The analytical framework achieved the important task of providing a common framework for the fragility assessments and development of indicators and linking them.

### **Agreement on principles for indicator selection (March – June 2012)**

The working group established a set of principles, based on g7+ inputs, to guide the selection of common/shared indicators and country-level indicators. These principles emphasised the need for simple, relevant indicators that can be adapted to the country context, reflecting both short and longer-term progress (see Annex C). Indicators should avoid duplication with more general development indicators (e.g. MDGs). They should also reinforce national statistical capacity, and emphasise reliable and transparent data collection mechanisms.

### **Piloting the fragility assessment and spectrum (June – ongoing)**

The process of developing indicators was an integral part of the piloting of fragility assessments and testing of the fragility spectrum. Fragility assessments were conducted in DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste. Others that are expected to launch this exercise in the near future include Central African Republic and Somalia, and possibly Afghanistan and Guinea Bissau. Fragility assessments helped to identify areas for measurement and identified initial indicators to measure progress against country-specific priorities. The working group provided inputs to the development of key analytical tools, including interim guidance for conducting a fragility assessment and technical support throughout the process. The g7+ Secretariat provided a template for completing the fragility spectrum.

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<sup>3</sup> Organised by the g7+ secretariat with the financial support of World Bank Institute (WBI), 20 representatives of 11 fragile States (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Salomon Island, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor Leste) along with observers from DFID, AUSAID, ODI, WBI.

The g7+ representatives from the five pilot countries shared lessons learned from the fragility assessments at the third meeting of the working group in New York in September 2012, demonstrating progress and revealing diverse examples of how the fragility assessment can be implemented. Key lessons from the fragility assessment are captured in a separate lessons learned report and will be used by the working group to revise the guidance for conducting fragility assessments in the future.

### **Identification of draft country-level and common indicators (June – October 2012)**

At its third meeting in New York, members of the working group identified a number of common areas for measurement based on the initial g7+ country indicator lists. These common areas were then taken back to the country level and were used by the g7+ pilot countries to identify and further develop their list of indicators. A South-South exchange was held from 21-22 October 2012 in Nairobi to share experiences, assist g7+ countries in developing their list of country-level indicators and develop a proposal for common/shared indicators. The meeting brought together fragility assessment focal points, representatives from national statistics offices and civil society from eight g7+ countries. On the basis of country lists and discussions, the meeting agreed on a set of 64 common/shared indicators as basis for discussion and consultations.

Prior to the meeting in Nairobi, a guidance note on indicator development was circulated. The note distinguished indicators by type and use, outlined key data sources and collection methods and provided guidance on constructing, combining and selecting indicators. This note will be updated and made available to countries that are interested in replicating this process of identifying country-level indicators.

### **Consultations at g7+ Ministerial Retreat (13-14 November 2012) and INCAF Director Level Meeting (19-20 November 2012):**

The working group co-chairs presented progress on indicator development at both meetings. As a result of these consultations it was agreed that: *i)* pilot countries would be given until January 2013 to conduct country consultations on the indicators and *ii)* a minimum list of indicators that could feed into the post-MDG agenda discussion should be developed by March 2013.

### 3. Fragility assessment methodology

#### **Purpose and role of fragility assessments**

Fragility assessments are designed to inform and contribute to ongoing development planning processes. They are carried out by key national stakeholders to identify the causes, features and drivers of fragility and conflict and the sources of resilience within a country. The fragility assessment process and the fragility spectrum tool in particular are intended to enable constructive and forward-looking dialogue among key stakeholders, to inform the development of national strategic plans and to set realistic peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities, which address the causes and drivers of fragility and conflict.

The piloting of the fragility assessment took into consideration the unique social and political context of the respective countries. Each pilot country adopted a distinct approach to developing their fragility assessments, field-testing their spectrums, and identifying appropriate indicators, while maintaining the fundamental principles of a country-owned, country-led process that was participatory in nature. This exercise was led internally by the g7+ focal point within their institutional affiliation within government.

#### **Methodology<sup>4</sup>**

##### ***Desk review and stakeholder analysis***

The g7+ pilot countries assembled their Task Forces for the fragility assessment process in different ways. Some countries (South Sudan, Liberia, Timor Leste) created a Task Force, bringing together various ministries, and in some cases international partners, statistics offices and civil society to conduct and guide the fragility assessment. In other g7+ pilot countries (Sierra Leone, DRC), the Ministry of Finance and/or Planning piloted the exercise. Each g7+ country undertook a rigorous process of internal reflection on the main issues within each PSG. This included a desk review that helped in identifying some of the issues that had already been identified as being pertinent in reports by the government and other actors. The desk review formed the basis for further focus group discussions and key informant interviews where these were undertaken.

The stakeholder analysis was an exercise suggested within the guidance document as a useful scoping exercise aimed at generating a clear picture of the critical stakeholders in peacebuilding and statebuilding in the country. Most of the pilot countries (DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone) felt it was not necessary to carry out formal stakeholder analysis as such exercises were already undertaken for the monitoring and evaluation of the Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the MDGs. These processes helped countries identify, among other issues, those who would be critical as key informants; those who should be included in consultations; and those with whom buy-in of this process and the wider New Deal implementation would be necessary.

##### ***Country Consultations***

The consultations brought together various actors within the country. In the case of, Sierra Leone and South Sudan, this involved bringing together the stakeholders in the main city and participants from various districts. In the case of Timor-Leste, the consultations were undertaken in the capital and in two other districts, representing the Eastern and Western districts. On the other hand, in one of the pilot country (DRC), the consultations did not involve participants coming from the provinces, but was preceded by a civil society pre-assessment workshop that identify the main drivers of conflict and fragility.

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<sup>4</sup> See Annex B for an overview of the methods used in the piloting process.

Except for South Sudan and DRC, the country consultations were mainly held separately for each PSG area. In those two countries, all of the stakeholders participated in plenary sessions, and the PSG discussions happened in the breakout groups. Overall, the country consultations involved meetings around each PSG and aimed at answering the following five questions:

- What are the main drivers of conflict and fragility in the country looking at each of the PSG areas?
- What was the country like during the crisis in the respective PSG area?
- Where is the country now and what measures have been put in place to achieve progress?
- What will the country look like in the graduation into resilience?
- What measures will be required to achieve this progress?

This process was critical in building consensus on the main drivers of conflict and fragility in the country, as well as clarifying areas where there was still some effort required for improvement. The fragility report for the country was developed based on these consultations. An indication of where the country is on the fragility spectrum for each PSG and suggestions for indicator measurement areas were also identified through this exercise.

### **Validation exercise**

The next stage was to undertake a validation exercise of the results of the fragility assessment report, the fragility spectrum and the country-level indicators. Timor-Leste and South Sudan has undertaken a broad validation of the fragility spectrum, which will be followed by higher government level validation. The other countries have planned, but not yet undertaken, validation exercises. It is expected that these validation processes will be completed before the end of 2012 in each of the countries.

### **Guidance revision**

As follow up to the fragility assessment pilots, the fragility assessment guidance will be updated and validated to reflect the feedback and lessons learned from the initial piloting phase. Key issues that have been raised for further explanation and guidance include the clarifications on the fragility assessment process and terminology and the inclusion of templates and examples. More specifically the guidance revision will:

- *Demonstrate how emerging dimensions of the fragility spectrum will be incorporated in the analytic framework.* In some countries, such as Sierra Leone and Timor Leste, new dimensions appeared in that were not identified in the analytic framework.
- *Clarify the analytical framework and terminology, while maintaining a “light touch”, so as not to be overly prescriptive.* Some of the sub-dimensions and their relevant questions in the analytic framework were difficult to apprehend and will be simplified.
- *Provide guidance on addressing overlap and interaction between different PSGs.* A number of key dimensions are emerging as cross-cutting issues throughout the assessment. These are key to understanding the current situation and challenges that remain.

## 4. The role and use of indicators in monitoring peacebuilding and statebuilding


*Indicators are signposts of change; a means for determining the status quo and progress towards the intended goal. They indicate trends and allow for tracking of progress towards intended results.*

It was agreed in the New Deal that the PSGs should be used to measure progress in peacebuilding and statebuilding at the national and the international level, and that two kinds of indicators (Figure 4.2) should thus be developed:

First, **country-level indicators** can be developed and applied by individual states to determine the current situation and measure progress towards country-specific priorities. These indicators will reflect local historical and contextual priorities while also being organised according to the 5 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs). These more flexible country-level indicators will allow for measurement of changes within specific countries and are not necessarily comparable across countries. It was agreed that the working group would develop a **menu of indicators** as a practical tool to support g7+ countries and development partners in the identification of relevant country-level indicators.


Second, **shared/common indicators**, with broad acceptance by members of the International Dialogue, track progress across all g7+ countries implementing the New Deal. These common indicators should include data that accurately and transparently measures different aspects of each of the 5 PSGs -- collected reliably and regularly by countries or trustworthy third party sources, including non-governmental entities. The common indicators would allow for comparison across countries to highlight real and relative progress.

Figure 4.1. NEW DEAL USE OF INDICATORS





**Figure 4.2. Overlap of indicator categories: country-level indicators, menu of indicators and common indicators**



## Application of indicators

Each of these categories of indicators has potentially different sources and applications. “Shared/common” indicators can be used internationally and nationally, while “country-level” indicators will only be applied nationally.

Specifically, **country-level indicators** could:

- inform future fragility assessments and fragility spectrums to understand the current situation and provide a baseline for measurement;
- inform national development planning processes and priority setting in national plans and compacts by assisting national and international actors in understanding key challenges;
- measure progress on priorities agreed in national plans or compacts (e.g. as part of a PRSP M&E system) and communicate effectively with citizens and other constituencies on progress; and
- inform results measurement and M&E of national and/or partner-supported programmes.

Specifically, **shared/common indicators** could be used to:

- help in assessing the effectiveness of strategies, approaches and programmes across countries;
- measure peacebuilding and statebuilding progress and allow national and international actors to communicate results (e.g. in the post-MDG framework);
- assist international partners in the allocation of resources;
- support the international community to establish benchmarks (e.g. by the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission); and
- facilitate wider sharing of tools for and experiences in measurement, and more interoperable data sets.

A key expectation is that shared/common indicators will also inform the post-2015 development agenda, including through Secretary-General's High-level Panel of Eminent Personson the Post 2015 Development Agenda, consultative processes, civil society and other deliberations (see Box 4.1).

#### **Box 4.1 Post-2015 Process**

The successor framework to the Millennium Development Goals for the post-2015 period will be developed through an inclusive, consultative process, which consists of two phases and a number of processes. The first phase will be until September 2013, when the President of the UN General Assembly will convene a Special Event. This event will most likely determine the process for the second phase until the end of 2015, when the post-2015 framework has to be decided.

The following processes are ongoing:

- The **UN system Task Team** produced a report to the Secretary-General in June 2012 ([www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam\\_undf/index.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/index.shtml)).
- The Secretary-General's **High-level Panel** of Eminent Persons on the Post 2015 Development Agenda will have four meetings in London, Liberia, Indonesia and New York and deliver a report to the Secretary-General in May 2013.
- The UN is supporting **national consultations** in 50 to 100 countries.
- The UN is leading 11 **thematic global consultations**, including one on conflict and fragility (co-led by UNDP, PBSO, UNICEF and UNISDR) with regional consultations in Indonesia (October 2012), in Liberia (probably in early December) and Latin America and a global consultation in February 2013 in Finland.
- The national and thematic consultations will produce **synthesis reports** by March 2013 as an input to the High-Level Panel and other reports and processes.
- Civil society is actively contributing, including through a website ([www.worldwewant2015](http://www.worldwewant2015))
- The UN General Assembly is establishing an **Open Working Group** to develop Sustainable Development Goals as a follow up to Rio+20, which will feed into the post-2015 discussions. The aim is to report by September 2013.
- Other processes, including those related to migration and development, population and development, disaster risk reduction, information society, women and financing for development, will also feed into the final inter-government discussions.

## 5. Indicator overview

PSG 1: LEGITIMATE POLITICS	Data collection method	Type of indicator	Proposed by	Notes
<b>Dimension 1.1: Political Settlement</b>				
<b>i. Diversity in representation (by gender, region and social groups) in key-decision making bodies (legislature, government, military, judiciary)</b> <i>Inclusion within the institutions that are the arenas of power and decision making is considered critical for building confidence in these institutions. It is assumed that diversity in representation during political bargaining should be producing better results for the good of all citizens. Intra-group elite capture can undermine effective articulation of interests of those who are marginalised.</i>	Administrative Data	Objective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Liberia, DRC, Timor-Leste, South Sudan, Sierra Leone	
<b>ii. Perception of representation (and its effectiveness) in government</b> <i>The perception indicator here will be used to capture these concerns where they exist providing further triangulation on the extent of satisfaction with representativeness and the results from that. This is also a good proxy measure for general perception of exclusion.</i>	Perception Survey	Subjective / Outcome / Fast-changing	Group Discussion	
<b>iii. % of provisions of the political settlement (eg. peace agreement, power-sharing agreement) that are honoured and implemented</b> <i>In cases where a peace agreement or political settlement of whichever kind has been agreed by the various parties, discontent and political conflict arises where there is a feeling that parts of the agreement are being reneged upon or being dishonoured and ignored. Progress in the implementation of the agreement package therefore provides an important indicator on level of commitment in the peace process and the evolution of a partnership between the parties.</i>	Administrative data, expert review, document review	Objective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Liberia, DRC, South Sudan	
<b>Dimension 1.2: Political Processes and Institutions</b>				
<b>i. Participation in elections and political processes by region, gender and social groups</b> <i>Participation in the electoral process is being used as a measure of confidence by citizens in the political system's ability to deliver inclusivity and effective representation. This indicator also speaks to the civic engagement of the general public and their participation in determining the social contract.</i>	Administrative data, Perception survey	Objective & Subjective / Outcome / Slow changing	Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone	Election registration and participation is captured during every election. At early stages of fragility this is a useful indicator, but may become less relevant as the country progresses.
<b>ii. Level of satisfaction with the quality of the election process and the possibility to participate in the political process</b> <i>This indicator captures the perceptions of the public concerning the environment for political participation. Do citizens feel that there is an equal playing field for all? Does their voting effort deliver free fair and democratic results? This indicator combined with the previous indicator captures the degree of confidence in the electoral institutions and whether citizens feel they can have a say in key decisions that affect their vital interests.</i>	Perception Survey	Subjective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Liberia, DRC, Timor-Leste, South Sudan, Sierra Leone	
<b>Dimension 1.3: Societal Relationships</b>				
<b>i. Number of intergroup disputes resolved by various dialogue and/or mediation mechanisms (including traditional mechanisms)</b> <i>This indicator captures the mechanisms that exist for local dispute resolution and the effectiveness of these mechanisms. It indicates the extent of societal coping mechanisms and the resilience that exists within the society in this regard.</i>	Expert review	Objective / Output / Slow-changing	Liberia, DRC, Timor-Leste, South Sudan	Possible evolving target: Increasing early in fragility spectrum as mechanisms become capable of resolving disputes, decreasing as # of disputes decreases
<b>ii. Level of trust among people and between formerly conflicting groups</b> <i>This indicator reflects the general degree of confidence that people have in others, social capital and trust between peoples. Bridging capital is reflected by intergroup trust and relationships.</i>	Perception Survey	Subjective / Outcome / Fast-changing	Sierra Leone, South Sudan	Gallup and Afrobarometer both have questions on trust within society.

PSG 2: SECURITY	Data collection method	Type of indicator	Proposed by	Notes
<b>Dimension 2.1: Security Conditions</b>				
<b>i. Violent deaths per 100,000 population (including homicides, mob violence, violence against civilians)</b>	Administrative data (police, health), document review (media sources), incident reporting	Objective / Outcome / Fast-changing	Liberia, Timor-Leste, South Sudan, Sierra Leone	
<i>The incidence of direct conflict deaths and (intentional) homicidal violence can be assessed from multiple data sets in a range of fragile and conflict-affected countries, including most g7+ members. Conflict violence events are available from 1991-2010 with various data collection institutions. Homicidal violence is available for 1995-2010 from UNODC and the Global Burden of Injuries database of the WHO</i>				
<b>ii. Major and minor assaults per 100,000 population</b>	Administrative data (police), incident reporting	Objective / Outcome / Fast-changing	Liberia, Timor-Leste, South Sudan, Sierra Leone	
<i>The change in the number of recorded assaults (major and minor) is available since 2006 for many fragile and conflict-affected countries, including g7+ members. The specific indicator measures reported/recorded violent assaults and can serve as a proxy for other forms of non-lethal victimization. Moreover, data can be disaggregated according to sex and location. The indicator indirectly serves as an index of confidence of citizens in reporting of serious violent crime in 86 countries.</i>				
<b>iii. Incidence of rape and sexual violence</b>	Administrative data (Police and health services), perception surveys, document review (civil society/NGOs)	Objective / Outcome / Fast-changing	Sierra Leone, DRC, Liberia	Possible evolving target: As awareness and trust in police increases, incident reporting may go up, suggesting that the target is actual reporting of previously unreported incidence; however overall target is decreasing.
<i>Reporting on sexual assault/violence is increasingly common throughout the world. Varying definitions of "rape", different rates of reporting, variation in prosecution and conviction create also generates statistical disparities. While comparative statistics are limited, recent WHO-led assessments found that between 15-71 per cent of all women reported experiencing physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime. There are a number of data sources for this indicator. UNODC collects data on sexual violence, including rape against adults and children.</i>				
<b>iv. Incidence of cross-border violence</b>	Administrative data and incident reporting	Objective / Outcome / Fast-changing	Timor-Leste, DRC, Sierra Leone	
<i>This indicator measures the number/frequency of individual incidences of cross-border violence between (i) state entities and armed groups, (ii) between armed groups, and (iii) between state entities/armed groups and civilians. It can be measured using incident reports of associated deaths and injuries generated by independent monitoring bodies and can divide specific events into "attacks", "clashes" or other designations. It will be important that a strict coding system is adopted/adhered to in order to allow for comparable reporting over time and across space.</i>				
<b>v. Internal displacement (# of IDPs, by conflict)</b>	Administrative data Document review (humanitarian sources - ICRC, UNHCR)	Objective / Outcome / Fast-changing	DRC	
<i>Internal displacement refers to "forced" population movement from a resident's original home to another (temporary) location which occurs during periods of armed conflict and or generalized political violence. The incidence of population displacement is measured in aggregate terms on a monthly and annualized basis. Data is available on the number of displaced, number of relocated and number of returned families, households and individuals.</i>				
<b>vi. Perception of security conditions (by region, gender, social groups)</b>	Perception survey	Subjective / Outcome / Fast-changing	Group discussion	
<i>The best way to measure the subjective dimensions of security is to ask people how safe they feel to walk alone in the evening. A widely accepted question is "do you feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where you live?" and is available for virtually all of the g7+ members. The indicator can be disaggregated by sex, minority status, religious affiliation, socio-economic profile and by geographic area. According to Gallup it is based on telephone/face-to-face interviews with approximately 1,000 adults in 102 countries. There are a number of data sources for this indicator. Gallup and Barometers conduct routine perception surveys of perceptions of safety and security.</i>				

<b>Dimension 2.2: Capacity and Accountability</b>				
<b>i.a. Ratio of prosecutions of police misconduct over the total number of cases identified by an independent commission/citizen reporting mechanisms</b>	Administrative data, Document review (independent oversight commissions), incident reporting	Objective / Output / Slow-changing	DRC, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone	This indicator is not widely collected by existing international organizations. There are currently no international datasets or data collection procedures across candidate countries
<i>This indicator would combine two separate indicators into a single ratio. It would require an annual number of prosecutions of police misconduct divided by the annual number of reported cases of police misconduct by an independent body. This measure would presumably assess the relative extent of impunity of misconduct among police and the effectiveness of oversight functions of the policing and justice sectors.</i>				
<b>-or-</b>				
<b>i.b. Capacity to monitor, investigate and prosecute police misconduct (three indicators)</b>	Perception survey	Subjective / Output/ Slow-changing	DRC, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone	This indicator is not widely collected by existing international organizations. There are currently no international datasets or data collection procedures across candidate countries
<i>The extent to which public authorities are able and willing to act on claims of misconduct are an important marker of accountable, responsive and effective security provision. It is possible to combine two indicators – both from the UN Rule of Law Indicators manual – to assess responses to misconduct: (i) “To what extent do you agree that people are usually able to trigger an investigation of alleged misconduct by the police?” (Q15) and (ii) “To what extent do you agree that alleged incidents of police corruption or misconduct are seriously investigated and, when required by law, prosecuted?” (Q17). This could also be supplemented with a review of documents to determine whether existing laws allow for formal independent investigations of serious incidents of alleged police misconduct.</i>				
<b>Dimension 2.3 Performance and Responsiveness</b>				
<b>i. i. Level of confidence in police/security (%; disaggregated by gender, region, social group)</b>	Perception survey	Subjective / outcome / fast or slow-changing	Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, South Sudan	There are a number of datasets featuring this indicator. Gallup and Barometers conduct routine perception surveys of public confidence in police.
<i>There are a number of ways in which confidence in security personnel can be measured by perception surveys. One specific question that is frequently asked is: “In the city or area where you live, do you have confidence in the local police force?” and is available for most 7+ countries since 2005. The indicator can provide insight into overall satisfaction with policing performance. It may also offer insight into why some citizens resort to informal and/or non-legally authorized alternatives for meeting basic security needs. Variations of this indicator are available also from Gallup as well as the Afro, Arab, Asian and Latin barometers.</i>				
<b>ii. Average response time to distress call and/or response rate to distress calls</b>	Administrative data, perception surveys	Subjective or Objective / outcome / fast or slow-changing	Liberia, DRC, South Sudan	May be difficult to identify denominators (“legitimate” distress calls). There are no known datasets for this indicator.
<i>The measurement of responsive policing may be possible by examining the average time that security entities respond to calls for assistance. This indicator would assess the average units of time that it takes between the point of call and the arrival of the (public) police service and would require access to well organized and coded data. Alternately, it could be measured as part of a question in polling or perception survey.</i>				
<b>iii. Perception of corruption of security forces</b>	Perception surveys	Subjective / outcome / fast or slow-changing	South Sudan, Timor-Leste	There are potentially datasets for this indicator. Gallup and Barometers conduct routine perception surveys of perceived corruption in the police and military forces.
<i>The measurement of the legitimacy of security forces can be imputed by the extent to which citizens trust them and/or feel they are corrupt. The measurement of perceived corruption would require setting up either a binary or scale based question asking whether specific security actors are considered “corrupt” and, if so, the extent of corruption on an ordinal scale.</i>				



PSG 3: JUSTICE		Data collection method	Type of indicator	Proposed by	Notes
Dimension 3.1: Justice Conditions					
i. % trust in customary justice system, % trust in formal justice system		Perception surveys	Subjective / Outcome / Slow-changing	South Sudan, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone	
<i>The extent to which citizens are confident that a nation´s justice system – including both providers with legal authority and those without – is considered fair is an indication of whether courts are considered effective and performing to an acceptable standard. The specific question "In this country do you have confidence in the judicial system and the courts?" is a performance proxy and has been tested by Gallup since 2006 in more than 100 countries.</i>					
ii. Ratio of lawyers to total cases		Administrative data (Ministry of Justice)	Objective / output / Slow changing	Liberia, Sierra Leone	May be evolving depending on changing trust in and use of formal justice system. Timor-Leste had suggested ratio of public defenders to total population by district.
<i>The number and distribution of lawyers in a given setting can provide an indication of the extent to which there is capacity for administering justice. Determining the range and spread in relation to the total caseload of pending and ongoing cases can also highlight whether cases are being dealt with expeditiously. There is no international categorization system tracking the distribution of lawyers relative to cases and of course more precision would be required to determine (a) what kinds of lawyers might be included and (b) the nature of "cases" and whether only certain types are addressed. There are no known international datasets measuring this indicator. Data would most likely need to be retrieved nationally both from public sources and national and local bar associations.</i>					
Dimension 3.2: Capacity and Accountability of Justice Institutions					
i. Ratio of public officials tried and convicted to reported cases		Administrative data, expert review	Objective / Output / Slow changing	Sierra Leone, DRC, South Sudan, Liberia	There are no known international datasets measuring this indicator.
<i>This indicator would combine two separate indicators into a single ratio. It would require an annual number of prosecutions of judicial personnel ("public officials") misconduct divided by the annual number of reported cases of judicial personnel misconduct by an independent body. This measure would presumably assess the relative extent of impunity of misconduct among judicial officials and the effectiveness of oversight functions of the policing and justice sectors.</i>					
ii. % of overall budget allocated to justice sector and actual expenditures on justice as % of total government expenditure		Administrative data	Objective / Input / Slow changing	DRC, Timor-Leste, Liberia	It would require a careful determination of what is included as "justice sector".
<i>The extent of spending on the justice sector would require aggregating a wide array of judicial budget line items and dividing it by the total budget. It would be a proxy for assessing the capacity of the justice sector [since the actual expenditures included to reflect independence of justice system and possible disconnect between planning and implementation.</i>					
iii. % of population who perceive they have affordable access to justice system (by region, gender, income, identity)		Perception survey	Subjective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Timor-Leste, DRC, Liberia and group discussion	
<i>This indicator would seek to determine the extent of the population (according to their geographic, income, gender, and identity profile) that has access to basic justice. The indicator would need to clarify what is meant by "access" and "justice system" since it will allow differentiation between customary and formal systems.</i>					
iii. Number of judges per 100,000 population		Administrative data (Ministry of justice)	Objective / Input / Slow-changing	Group discussion	
<i>The ratio of judges to 100,000 population is a common metric to assess the extent of judicial coverage. It may not be possible to infer the quality or nature of their activities, but it does indicate the distribution and can be disaggregated at the subnational level. UNODC and other international organs routinely collect information on the distribution of judges in multiple settings.</i>					

Dimension 3.3: Performance and Responsiveness of Justice Institutions				
<b>i. Perception of overall performance of the justice system</b>				
<i>The assessment of the overall performance of the justice system can be measured on a scale or ranking device through a perception survey. Another way of measuring the overall satisfaction of citizens with the justice system is to compare the formal and customary systems. For example, some Barometer surveys could indirectly measure the "trust" that citizens have in traditional courts/customary systems of justice as compared to formal ones.</i>	Perception survey	Subjective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Timor-Leste, South Sudan	
<b>ii. % population with awareness of legal and human rights</b>				
<i>The extent to which citizens are aware of their basic rights can reflect their capacities to seek redress and actively engage in political, social and economic life. It is a precondition to effective participation in civic life. The indicator could be measured using a perception or polling survey.</i>	Perception survey	Subjective / Output / Slow-changing	Liberia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and group discussion	Any indicator assessing the proportion of population awareness would require ensuring a definition for "legal and human rights" and assessing knowledge either in a binary or scaled manner.
PSG 4: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS	Data collection method	Type of indicator	Proposed by	Notes
Dimension 4.1: Productive Resources and Prospects for Growth				
<b>i. % of population with access to useable and serviceable primary and feeder roads and affordable electricity (multiple indicators)</b>				
<i>This indicator measures the percentage of the population that has access to affordable and adequate infrastructure, primarily roads and electricity. Infrastructure is a core foundation for economic development.</i>	Administrative data, satellite imagery, household survey data	Objective / Output / Slow-changing	Liberia, Timor-Leste, DRC	
<b>ii. Income inequality among regions (gini coefficient)</b>				
<i>The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Inequality and social exclusion is a key stress point in FCS, but is often context-specific by gender, ethnicity, region. While the overall Gini coefficient by individuals or households cannot capture these context-specific nuances, the Gini among regions could provide a useful proxy indicator of the level and direction of change—whether inequality is increasing or decreasing.</i>	Administrative data, household survey data, document review	Objective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Timor-Leste	
<b>iii. Level of economic diversification by productive sector</b>				
<i>This indicator measures the level of diversification of a country's economy. It indicates the extent to which employment, revenues and economic output depend on agriculture, natural resources, public sector employment, industry, etc. It can highlight dependencies on certain sectors and expose vulnerabilities to economic shocks.</i>	Administrative data, expert assessment data	Objective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Group discussion	
Dimension 4.2: Jobs, Livelihoods and Private Sector Development				
<b>i. Level of employment (by youth, gender, region)</b>				
<i>Employment is a key indicator for measuring participation in the economy and access to income. Unemployment and underemployment are key stress factors for FCS, particularly where there are significant employment differentials among identity groups. Generating employment is critical for broad based post-conflict recovery. In order to mitigate and address economic grievances, it is important to monitor the extent to which particular groups are included in the benefits of the recovery.</i>	Administrative data, household survey data	Objective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone	
<b>ii. Number of new registered businesses and SMEs</b>				
<i>This indicator measures the level of registration of new businesses and small and medium enterprises as a measure of private sector development and growth. The indicator does not cover regulations but reflects more of a proxy for the broader business environment.</i>	Administrative data, expert assessment data, document review (doing business report)	Objective / Output / Slow-changing	Sierra Leone	

<b>iii. Share of food in household expenditure</b>				
<i>There is a strong empirical link between the share of food in household expenditure and income. This indicator reflects household vulnerability to changes in food prices or incomes. Hunger and malnutrition are the number one risk to good health worldwide and impose a severe economic burden on developing and conflict-affected countries. Food insecurity can also increase the risk of conflict.</i>	Administrative data, household survey data, perception surveys	Objective / Output / Slow-changing	Group discussion	
<b>Dimension 4.3: Natural Resource Management</b>				
<b>i. Ratio of local/foreign employment in natural resource sector</b>				
<i>This indicator measures the extent to which the natural resource sector has created local jobs compared to foreign ones.</i>	Administrative data, expert assessment data, document review	Objective / Output / Slow-changing	Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste	
<b>ii. Existence and quality of regulatory framework for natural resource management</b>				
<i>This indicator measures the existence and quality of regulatory frameworks to manage natural resources. The legal and regulatory framework refers to the laws, regulations and institutions that delineate roles and responsibilities in the extractive sector and provide assurances of integrity in relevant categories.</i>	Administrative data, expert review	Subjective (quality aspect) & objective components / output / slow-changing	Group discussion	
<b>iii. Perception of participation in and benefits from natural resources</b>				
<i>This indicator measures the perception of participation in the benefits deriving from natural resources within a country/region/community. Lack or a perceived lack of adequate distribution of access to employment, government revenues and income generated from natural resources can be a key driver of conflict.</i>	Perception surveys	Subjective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Group discussion	
<b>iv. Ratio of natural resource production in country to total revenues to government</b>				
<i>This indicator measures the extent to which a government's total revenue depends on income generated through natural resource production or exports.</i>	Administrative data, expert assessment data	Objective / Output / Slow-changing	Group discussion	
<b>PSG5: REVENUES AND SERVICES</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>	<b>Type of indicator</b>	<b>Proposed by</b>	<b>Notes</b>
<b>Dimension 5.1: Revenues</b>				
<b>i. State control/monopoly over tax, customs and fee collection</b>				
<i>This concerns the ability of the state to a) monopolise tax and customs collection in relation to other competing sources of state authority and b) extend tax and customs services over the full territory of the state. These factors enhance state resilience because they reduce the prospects of non-state actors financing rebellions and/or challenging state authority and legitimacy in the delivery of social services. They can be measured through administrative data about the extent of which the state has a functioning tax and customs office presence at all major trading points and in all major urban areas cities in the country but also through expert analysis using a scale to determine alternative sources of tax authority (warlord payments, protection rackets). Monopoly over customs collection could be calculated by drawing on data from national income accounts and trade statistics.</i>	Administrative data, expert assessment	Objective / Output / Slow-changing	Liberia, Somalia	Monopolisation of tax collection may reflect state resilience more than levels of tax collection per se.
<b>ii. Tax revenue as share of total revenues</b>				
<i>This indicator measures the ability of the state to generate official tax payments as a source of development finance and service delivery.</i>	Administrative data	Objective / Output / Slow changing	Sierra Leone, DRC, Liberia	
<b>iii. Tax effort</b>				
<i>Tax effort is a measure of how well the state is doing in terms of tax collection relative to what could be reasonably expected given its economic potential. It is calculated as the ratio of actual tax revenue to potential tax revenue based on the state's level of economic development and openness to trade and the relative importance of agriculture in domestic production. This indicator could be calculated based on a formula developed by organisations such as the IMF.</i>	Independent Audit	Subjective / Output / Slow-changing	Group discussion	
<b>iv. Perception of tax collection and fairness</b>				
<i>Citizens' perceptions and attitudes of taxes (taxes, tax administration and tax evasion) shed light on issues of state legitimacy and the perceived ability of the state to convert tax revenues into</i>	Perception survey	Subjective / Outcome / Slow-changing	Liberia	



effective expenditures.				
<b>v. Capacity of tax administration</b>				
<i>Tax administration capacity could be measured through the IMF (RAFIT) and World Bank (IAMTAX) which both have two similar and far reaching diagnostic and benchmarking tools on general administrative capacity which are being rolled out across almost all developing countries in 2012.</i>	Administrative data/ Expert review	Subjective / Output / Slow-changing	Timor-Leste	
<b>Dimension 5.2: Public Administration</b>				
<b>i. Quality of public financial management and internal oversight mechanisms</b>				
<i>The quality of public financial management is a good indicator for the overall capacity and accountability in the civil service. A set of indicators capturing the quality of the public expenditure system could draw on the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) methodology and focus on i) timeliness of the government payment systems, ii) medium and long-run fiscal and budget planning capacity, iii) effective internal audit procedures, and iv) effectiveness of payroll controls. PEFA indicators are based on scores determined on an agreed framework.</i>	Administrative data/ Expert review	Objective / Output / Slow changing	Liberia	As part of the monitoring framework for the Busan Outcome Document, the Global Partnership is developing an indicator to measure the "quality of public financial management".
<b>ii. Budget execution rate in line ministries at central and subnational level</b>				
<i>This indicator would be a proxy for the general capacity within the civil service. It is likely that budget execution rates are low if core administrative capacities such as project management, procurement and public financial management within the civil service are weak.</i>	Administrative data	Objective / Output / Slow changing	Group discussion	
<b>iii. Number of public officials sanctioned for corruption and bribery</b>				
<i>This measure would assess the existence and the effectiveness of accountability and oversight mechanisms to sanction misconduct by public officials, through providing information on the number of cases initiated against public sector personnel - as well as administrative and legal sanctions applied, acquittals and cases withdrawn. Information on the length of time to bring cases to conclusion would also be a useful indicator for determining the institutional effectiveness in handling corruption cases</i>	Administrative data (Internal controller, civil service commissions, prosecutor, anti- corruption commissions), document reviews	Objective / Output / Fast changing	Liberia, Timor- Leste	Also see indicator 3.2.i.
<b>iv. Perception of corruption and bribery necessary to obtain a service</b>				
<i>Indicator of changes in citizens' perceptions and experiences of corruption and bribery. Provides a good indication of the change in petty corruption over time. Disaggregation by sex and region can provide a more precise picture of citizens' perceptions'.</i>	Perception survey	Subjective / Outcome / Slow- changing	Sierra Leone, Liberia	
<b>Dimension 5.3: Service Delivery</b>				
<b>i. Existence of service delivery quality standards in government agencies</b>				
<i>This indicator would assess whether government plays an oversight/regulatory role in regard to service delivery. Service delivery by non-state actors without any role for the state can create competing or parallel structures and undermine state legitimacy. From a statebuilding perspective it is important for the state to have a prominent role in setting the overall legal and policy framework and co-ordinating delivery even if the state is not the direct provider.</i>	Administrative reporting, expert review, document review	Objective / Output / Slow changing	DRC	
<b>ii. Social spending as share of total spending</b>				
<i>Can serve as a general indicator of the extent to which the government is committed to improving the living conditions of the population. Indicator can also be used to determine whether countries reap a peace dividend after the end of violent conflicts, i.e. whether governments reduce military expenditures and reallocate the savings toward improving socio-economic conditions.</i>	Administrative data	Objective / Output / Slow changing	DRC, Sierra Leone	
<b>iii. Distribution of services: Ratio of health personnel to 10,000 population (by region); Ratio of teachers per 100 students (by region)</b>				
<i>Research has shown that horizontal socio-economic inequalities are an important risk factor for conflict. This indicator would assess the distribution of services by region using health and education as examples. Regional inequality measures of each ratio (or of outcome measures such as children underweight or mortality) could be added.</i>	Administrative data	Objective / Output / Slow changing	Timor-Leste, DRC, Sierra Leone	

<b>iv. Access to service delivery for marginalized and vulnerable groups</b>				
	<i>Research has shown that horizontal socio-economic inequalities are an important risk factor for conflict. Inequality measures (by region, gender, income or identity group) of underweight children, child mortality or other health or education outcomes could be used as a social service delivery outcome.</i>	Administrative data	Objective / Outcome / Slow changing	Group discussion
<b>v. Public satisfaction with service delivery</b>				
	<i>To measure satisfaction with the delivery of key basic services such as education and healthcare by level of government, gender, regions and groups. Satisfaction of users of these services, are important determinants of the trust that citizens have in governments and the level of well-being within a country.</i>	Perception survey (Citizen evaluation/ scorecard)	Subjective / Outcome / Fast changing	Sierra Leone, DRC  Possibly UN data as well

## 6. Proposed next steps

The following next steps are envisaged:

<b>Nov 2012- Jan2013</b>	<b><i>Consultations on menu of indicators and shared indicators</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pilot countries consult and validate country-level indicators and decide how to use them in national level monitoring and planning processes. Consultation feedback should be submitted to the International Dialogue Secretariat by 18 January 2013.</li> <li>- Other groups of stakeholders (INCAF, UN, CSOs, experts, etc.) provide feedback from consultations on the proposed list of common/shared indicators by 11 January 2013.</li> </ul>
<b>17-18 December 2012</b>	<b><i>Discussion and feedback at Steering Group Meeting in Juba</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- presentation of feedback from consultations, revised shared indicators and menu of indicators</li> <li>- feedback and guidance from the Steering Group on next steps</li> </ul>
<b>4-6 February (TBC)</b>	<b><i>Meeting of working group on indicators</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- presentation and discussion of feedback from consultations</li> <li>- development of a revised list of 25-30 shared/common indicators,</li> <li>- agreement on a minimum list of 5-10 common PSG indicators that can feed into the post-2015 development agenda</li> <li>- discussion of options for collecting and compiling data for the identified indicators.</li> </ul>
<b>By March</b>	<b><i>Contribution of PSG indicators into post-2015 development agenda discussions</i></b>	An International Dialogue contribution on the post-2015 development agenda together with a list of 5-10 common PSG indicators is fed into ongoing consultations and the High-Level Panel by March 2013.
<b>By end of January</b>	<b><i>Revision of guidance on the fragility assessment and development of the fragility spectrum.</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- revised guidance on use of fragility assessment and fragility spectrum</li> <li>- elaborated fragility spectrum</li> </ul>
<b>First half of 2013 (TBC)</b>	<b><i>Endorsement of indicators at global International Dialogue Meeting</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- endorsement of menu of indicators and shared indicators by International Dialogue members</li> <li>- presentation of guidance on measurement</li> <li>- launch of roll out and data collection process</li> </ul>
<b>After endorsement</b>	<b><i>Roll out of indicators</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- proposal for roll out of indicators, capacity development, preparation of guidance and training</li> <li>- agreement on modalities for a roll out of the indicators between 2013-2015.</li> </ul>

## Annex A: Timeline (January – November 2012)

Timeline	Milestones	Deliverables
<b>January 2012</b>	<b><i>g7+ meeting (Dili)</i></b>	- development of initial fragility spectrum
<b>20-22 February 2012</b>	<b><i>g7+ meeting on indicators (New York)</i></b>	- development of g7+ policy on indicators - development of g7+ long list of indicators - identification of PSG dimensions
<b>23-24 March 2012</b>	<b><i>First meeting of the working group (Copenhagen)</i></b>	- agreement on work programme and ways of working - discussion on parameters for indicator selection - development of analytical framework for fragility spectrum and menu of indicators
<b>April 2012</b>	<b><i>Circulation of first drafts to working group members for comment by 20 April</i></b>	- updated work programme and timeline circulated - draft parameters for indicator selection circulated - draft analytical framework circulated
<b>19-21 April 2012</b>	<b><i>g7+ meeting (New York) and margin meeting at the World Bank spring meetings (Washington D.C.)</i></b>	- progress update for g7+ members and presentation of fragility spectrum
<b>11 May 2012</b>	<b><i>INCAF Task Team Meeting (Paris)</i></b>	- progress update for INCAF members
<b>14-15 May 2012</b>	<b><i>Working Group Co-Chairs/Core Group Meeting</i></b>	- discussion on purpose of framework and links with fragility spectrum and PSG indicators - review of analytical framework (including dimensions, sub-dimensions and key questions) - discussion on parameters guiding indicator selection on the basis of g7+ indicator policy and comments received. - update of timeline
<b>22 May 2012</b>	<b><i>Progress update for International Dialogue members</i></b>	- progress update, including revised work programme and timeline
<b>25 May 2012</b>	<b><i>Progress update and documents for Nairobi meeting circulated to working group members</i></b>	Circulation of room documents for Nairobi working group meeting: - work programme and timeline - analytical framework - menu of indicators - concept note on road testing - parameters for indicator selection
<b>23-27 May 2012</b>	<b><i>g7+ Working Group Co-chair mission to Timor-Leste</i></b>	- progress update - discussion on purpose of framework and links with fragility spectrum, and PSG indicators - review of analytical framework (including dimensions, sub-dimensions and key questions) - review of format and descriptions of the draft fragility spectrum and discussion on process for finalising fragility spectrum and TA requirements - review indicator mapping
<b>24-25 May 2012</b>	<b><i>CSO Meeting on indicators (Mombasa, Kenya)</i></b>	- progress update for African CSOs
<b>6-7 June 2012</b>	<b><i>Second meeting of the working group (Nairobi)</i></b>	- discussion on draft analytical framework and parameters for indicator selection; - discussion on concept note for piloting,
<b>8 June 2012</b>	<b><i>International Dialogue Steering Group meeting (Nairobi)</i></b>	- progress update and presentation of interim results - discussion on options for next steps and timeline - agreement to extend deadline for preparation of indicators until end of 2012
<b>27 June 2012</b>	<b><i>Working Group Co-Chairs/Core Group meeting (Paris)</i></b>	- preparation of proposal for new process and agreement on revisions to analytical framework and concept note for piloting
<b>10 July 2012</b>	<b><i>Deadline for Steering Group members to comment on revised process proposal</i></b>	- agreement on new process put forward by the core group

<b>1 July – 31 August 2012</b>	<b><i>Piloting fragility assessment and identifying indicators at country level</i></b>	- country-level piloting of fragility assessment and identification of indicators or areas for measurement (using analytical framework)
<b>10-11 September 2012</b>	<b><i>Working Group Co-Chairs/Core Group meeting in Paris</i></b>	- discussion of preliminary results, indicators and lessons from g7+ fragility assessments - preparation for third working group meeting - revision of process and timeline
<b>26 September 2012</b>	<b><i>High-level side event g7+ with support of partners at United Nations General Assembly</i></b>	
<b>27-28 September 2012</b>	<b><i>Third Meeting of the working group in New York</i></b>	- presentation of results and lessons from country-level piloting by g7+ of the fragility assessments - discussion of compilation of country indicators and identification of preliminary common areas for measurement across countries - agreement on revisions for fragility assessment guidance and glossary - agreement on consultation strategy and next steps for indicator development
<b>By 19 October 2012</b>	<b><i>Consultation and refinement of indicators at country level (in five pilot countries)</i></b>	- country-level consultations/discussion and technical review on draft indicators emerging from fragility assessments - identification of indicators for preliminary common areas of measurement (identified by the working group)
<b>22-23 October 2012</b>	<b><i>South-south knowledge-sharing meeting on peacebuilding and statebuilding indicators in Nairobi</i></b>	- presentation of revised indicator lists by country, informed by other g7+ country focal points and statistics experts - preparation of shared indicator list by g7+ participants on basis of country indicators - agreement on next steps and needs for each country in process
<b>By early November 2012</b>	<b><i>Progress update and list of shared indicators for g7+ and INCAF meetings circulated</i></b>	- circulation of progress report and list of shared indicators as basis for consultation with key stakeholders.
<b>13-14 November 2012</b>	<b><i>g7+ Ministerial meeting in Haiti</i></b>	- presentation by g7+ countries on process of fragility assessment pilots and lessons learned - presentation of draft shared indicators based on g7+ country inputs - presentation of suggested next steps for indicator process - discussion and feedback by g7+ Ministers
<b>19-20 November 2012</b>	<b><i>INCAF Director Level Meeting</i></b>	- presentation of feedback from g7+ Ministers on indicator work - presentation of draft shared indicators based on g7+ country inputs - presentation of suggested next steps for indicator process - discussion and feedback by INCAF Directors

## Annex B: Methods for piloting fragility assessments and developing indicators

The following matrix summarises some key parameters of the fragility assessment and indicator development process across the five countries where pilots were pursued. Not all countries addressed all parameters, nor is this necessarily the expectation of the assessment process. Even so, most g7+ countries share a common set of minimum activities. It is important to note that the sequencing of parameters varies across countries. The order of activities in the matrix is suggestive rather than definitive. As noted above, certain countries pursued activities (e.g. consultations at the beginning with multi-stakeholder assessment at the end as in Timor-Leste) while others followed a different ordering of activities (e.g. multi-stakeholder consultation at the beginning as in Sierra Leone). The decision on how assessments were undertaken was determined by country task teams themselves.

Country piloting of Fragility Assessment and Indicator development	Sierra Leone	Timor-Leste	Liberia	South Sudan	DRC
<b>CO-ORDINATING STRUCTURE</b>					
Has a taskforce been established	x	x	x	x	going on
If yes, is this the same as the New Deal taskforce	x	?	x	x	x
Is there overlap in membership between taskforces	x	?		x	x
Task force includes government ministries/departments (list number)	x (1 MoF)	x (1 MoF/3depart)	x (5 Peacebuilding office of MoPEA MoJ)	x (10 members)	
Task force includes representatives of the statistical department	x	x		x	
Task force includes civil society representation (list number)	x	x	x(15 members)	x	
Task force includes development partners (list)	x (UNDP)	x (UN, Australia)	x (USAID, SIDA, UNMIL)	x (multi-donors)	
PSG co-ordinating focal points established	x	x	x		x
PSG specific working groups established			x		x
Were foreign technical assistants/observers involved	X		x	x	x
<b>PROCESS</b>					
Pre-assessment consultations to review fragility assessment (list number)	x (1)	x (3)	x (Taskforce reviewed drafts of the fragility assessment and worked with lead drafter to provide necessary documents for	x (1)	x (Civil society workshop)

			desk review		
Conflict/peace drivers (root causes) identified	x	x	x	ongoing	x
Use of ID working group analytical framework and/or guidance	x	x (modified)	x	x	x
Desk review undertaken for fragility assessment	x	x	x		ongoing
Key informant interviews conducted with stakeholders	x	x	x	planned	ongoing
Focus group discussions conducted with government stakeholders	x	x	ongoing	x	x
Focus group consultations with civil society stakeholders	x	x	x	x	x
Focus group consultations with development partners	x meeting was held with donors		planned	planned	x
Consultations at sub-national level	x	x	planned	x	
Validation workshop to review assessment (number/days)	planned	x (150/5)	planned	x	planned
Validation process to review indicators	planned	planned	planned	planned	planned
Statistical office review of indicators	x	planned	planned	x	planned
Reflections on a strategy for next steps	x	planned	planned	x	x
<b>ANALYTICAL OUTPUTS</b>					
Feedback exclusively to development partners	x	x	planned	x	planned
Stakeholder analysis/mapping	incomplete	x	planned		
Background analysis of each PSG	x	?	ongoing	planned	planned
Fragility assessment narrative report	x	x (Tetum)	ongoing	x (draft form)	x (draft)
Fragility spectrum completed (number of phases)	x (5)	x (5)	ongoing	x (5)	x (5)
Country specific menu of indicators	x	x	ongoing	x	x
Lessons learnt report produced	x	ongoing	planned	x	x
Linkages made with development planning processes (“one vision, one plan”)	x (Agenda for Prosperity/PRSP)		x (PRSP); National Visioning exercise; national reconciliation exercise	x ((SSDP SSDI, PBP, etc.) Planned	x (PRSP, Executive, PM, UN PB plan)

## Annex C: Criteria for selection of indicators

1. Indicators should avoid duplicating Millennium Development Goals and other measures of more general development, focusing instead on indicators that reflect how sectoral efforts interact with drivers of conflict and fragility and contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding. Indicators should be measured at least annually, when possible/appropriate.
2. Indicators should be selected based on, or aim to be backed by, baseline data collection capabilities.
3. Indicators should reinforce statistical capacity in countries undertaking fragility assessments. National statistical offices should lead and co-ordinate the data collection process and should be the primary source of data, where possible. Indicators will be drawn from civil society, academic, private sector and UN/international agencies only when the national statistics offices cannot collect the data.
4. Indicator data collection methods and mechanisms should be reliable and transparent.
5. Indicators should be simple, relevant and practical. They should be easy to communicate and should measure real and broad progress in the PSG area, and in the everyday lives of people.
6. Indicators should be adaptable to norms and traditions of the country and able to be localised to the country context.
7. Indicators should be balanced to demonstrate changes in both government capacity and performance (e.g. a mix of input/output and outcome/impact indicators).
8. Indicators should be balanced to also capture population views of progress.
9. Indicators should be as much as possible disaggregated by gender, region and identity group.
10. Indicators should reflect short-term progress as well as longer-term institutional reform, consistent with the concept of the fragility spectrum

In addition to the above, selection of a *smaller sub-set of shared/common indicators* were expected to be guided by the following additional criteria:

1. Shared indicators should be able to adequately indicate overall progress in a particular PSG. Together the share indicators should be able to tell a representative story about the status and progress of PSGs within a country
2. Shared indicators should be appropriate/relevant to all g7+ countries at all stages of fragility and be comparable across countries.
3. Shared indicators should be limited in number.
4. Where local capacity to monitor shared indicators differ by country context, mixed data collection efforts drawing on other sources will be used to create comparable indicators.



## Annex D: Proposed format for menu of indicator

The table below provides a sample template for the menu of indicators. The menu of indicators provide the same format for each of the PSGs.

PSG 1: LEGITIMATE POLITICS						
Dimension 1.1: Political Settlement						
Indicator area	Indicator	Description	Frequency of reporting	Data Indicator collection method	Data Source	Type of indicator
Degree of inclusiveness of the political settlement (inclusion of political actors, excluded groups)	<i>This column will list the proposed indicator for each area</i>	<i>This column will include the description of each indicator</i>	<i>This column will provide the regularity of data collection / reporting</i>	<i>This column will specify the type(s) of data collection methods:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• administrative data</li> <li>• household survey data</li> <li>• public perception data</li> <li>• expert assessment data</li> <li>• incident reporting data</li> <li>• document reviews.</li> </ul>	<i>This column will specify where the data will be gathered from (e.g. International or national data source)</i>	<i>This column will classify each indicator type according to three categories:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• objective or subjective</li> <li>• a measure of output, outcome or impact</li> <li>• slow changing or fast changing</li> </ul>
Acceptance of political settlement, e.g. levels of political stability, % of territory affected by conflict						
Dimension 1.2: POLITICAL PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS						
Participation of stakeholders and people in policy formulation process (inclusive, meaningful)						

Integrity of electoral process (free, fair, peaceful)						
Ability of accountability institutions (parliament, media) to provide checks on the executive						
Public perception of the inclusion of different parts of society in public institutions						
<b>Dimension 1.3: Societal relationships</b>						
Enabling environment for civil society						
Trusted grievance and dispute resolution mechanisms						
Public perception of the inclusion of different parts of society in public institutions						