A framework for mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning

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Produced by IIED's climate change group

The Climate Change Group works with partners to help secure fair and equitable solutions to climate change by combining appropriate support for adaptation by the poor in low- and middle-income countries, with ambitious and practical mitigation targets.

The work of the Climate Change Group focuses on achieving the following objectives:

- Supporting public planning processes in delivering climate resilient development outcomes for the poorest.

- Supporting climate change negotiators from poor and vulnerable countries for equitable, balanced and multilateral solutions to climate change.

- Building capacity to act on the implications of changing ecology and economics for equitable and climate resilient development in the drylands.

Past and present levels of greenhouse gas emissions have locked unavoidable climate change effects into the climate system for decades to come. Countries with climate-vulnerable and poor people need to find ways to achieve climate-resilient societies and economies while addressing both current increased climatic variability and future climate change.

This paper is the result of collaboration and shared learning by government development planners from countries across Africa and Asia. It presents the concepts of climate resilience mainstreaming and provides a practical instrument for government planners to think through the integration of climate-resilient responses into policy.

Contents

Summary

Past and present levels of greenhouse gas emissions have locked unavoidable climate change effects into the climate system for decades to come. Countries with climate-vulnerable and poor people need to find ways to achieve climate-resilient societies and economies while addressing current increased climatic variability and future climate change.

Government development planners from various countries in Asia and Africa have recognised this need. Between November 2011 and April 2013, they came together in a series of meetings and workshops to share their experiences in dealing with climate change and address the challenges climate change poses to social and economic development. During the process, they drew not only on their knowledge of climate change and experience of development planning practice, but also on what they have learnt about mainstreaming other cross-sectoral issues such as HIV/AIDS, gender and environmental change.

This paper, a result of that collaboration, aims to identify progress and share countries' learning. The development planners have applied their expertise and judgement to collate, systematise and reflect upon their experiences to date in their own countries, where they are addressing climate change through their planning processes.

Participants developed the climate mainstreaming building blocks framework outlined in this paper as a practical diagnostic for government officials to assess and plan the integration of climate resilience into their planning processes. During the workshops they identified a strong need for mainstreaming and streamlining climate resilience into development planning objectives, processes and systems.

Emerging trends within each building block indicate that countries are increasingly mainstreaming their integration efforts within existing development planning priorities and capacities. The building block framework helps governments to do this in a country-driven process that evolves from and is embedded in, existing development planning systems, capacity and priorities.

1

Introduction

The impacts of climate change are likely to undermine planned development outcomes in a number of countries, posing significant challenges to the resilience of livelihoods and ecosystems. Of course, development planning responses play an important role in addressing these challenges; as such, mainstreaming climate resilience into these responses is fast emerging as a major policy agenda.

Government planners have practice, knowledge and experience at their disposal: development planning practice; knowledge of climate change; and in some cases experience of mainstreaming other cross-sectoral issues such as HIV/AIDS, gender and environmental change. Annex 1 and Box 1 summarise the key lessons from mainstreaming practice in other development areas.

When it comes to mainstreaming climate change, officials aim to integrate aspects of adaptation and/or mitigation-oriented responses to climate change into development planning.

The content of this paper was developed by members of the Government Group Network for Climate Change Mainstreaming over a series of workshops. The paper draws on country case studies[1] of climate mainstreaming in The Gambia, Kenya, Bangladesh and Cambodia and elsewhere.

After analysing the case studies and issues arising, this paper advocates for the need to move towards approaches that integrate climate resilience into development planning. We advocate a shift away from externally imposed priorities and capacity to developing approaches that evolve from – and are embedded in – existing development planning systems, capacity and priorities.

For this to happen, planners need to focus on how to support the process of integrating climate resilience into development planning responses. This might be through developing bespoke monitoring and evaluation frameworks that start from the basis of existing capacity – for example, a country's millennium development goal monitoring and evaluation framework – and adapting it to address the challenges of mainstreaming climate change into planning.

Mainstreaming climate resilience needs to be a strategic, country-led approach. It needs to integrate climate resilience into development planning in efficient and effective ways. It must enable development planners to rationalise what **could be done** with what **needs to be done** and what **feasibly can be done** within the structures, resources and capacity available. Of course, this will change and develop over time as the mainstreaming process continues.

The government planners reflected, systematised and shared their learning and experiences from their own countries to create the climate resilience mainstreaming building block (CRMBB) framework, with key building blocks that trigger and shape a country's internal planning processes from the starting point of existing priorities and capacity. It aims to be a practical diagnostic instrument for assessing and planning for public sector development planners to identify and examine effective and efficient ways to mainstream climate resilience into development planning in streamlined ways.

This paper opens with a description of the process through which the authors collated their experiences and systematised their ideas on climate mainstreaming. There follows a discussion of the key dimensions of climate mainstreaming in terms of policy responses and approaches taken. We then present the CRMBB

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[1] For more information visit www.iied.org/supporting-public-policy-delivers-climate-resilient-development

BOX 1. KEY LESSONS FROM OTHER AREAS

A review of literature on mainstreaming in other areas – such as gender, HIV/AIDS and environmental change provides us with some key lessons that we can translate into mainstreaming climate resilience. We have summarised these here. For more in-depth analysis, see Annex 1:

1. Mainstreaming is not a new strategy

a) Despite extensive use of the term 'mainstreaming' there is not a clear understanding of the concept.

b) To simplify matters, we should think of mainstreaming in terms of principles, systems, framework tools and discrete tools and techniques (Mackay and Bilton 2003).

c) There is no blueprint approach to mainstreaming: tools and approaches need to respond to the specific country context and issue(s) of concern (IIED and UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) nd).

2. Typology of mainstreaming strategies

a) The three main approaches to mainstreaming are: **integrationist**, based on 'adding on' an issue to current development plans and policies without questioning and addressing inherent social inequalities and state interests; **agenda setting**, which is more consultative and allows the recognition of marginalised voices; and **transformative**, which aims to 'transform...the existing development agenda' (Jahan 1995). The latter is needed to address and overcome existing power differences and interests (Daly 2005) and ultimately lead to an empowerment of diverse actors (Verloo 2005).

b) Mainstreaming should aim to transform the organisational culture of governments and public bodies and to improve the quality of public policy and of governance itself (Mackay and Bilton 2003).

3. Entry point and enabling factors

a) The 'entry points' are often key points in mainstream policy and planning cycles, particularly those concerning safeguards, prioritisation and investment choices (IIED and UNEP WCMC nd).

b) It is important to differentiate between institutional (upstream) and operational (downstream) mainstreaming approaches, which will influence the choice of entry points.

c) Mainstreaming is an iterative process which does not necessarily follow a set of sequential steps (IIED and UNEP WCMC nd). While strategic political will decisions on mainstreaming are taken at the top, implementation design decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level of public authority, closest to the population concerned. There is a need to balance top-down and bottom-up processes; and flexibility and adaptive management are key requirements.

4. Achievements and shortcomings

a) Despite many successes in awareness raising, capacity building and institutional and policy development, mainstreaming efforts often fail to achieve their goals and objectives.

b) Leadership has not consistently supported the implementation of gender mainstreaming policy, resulting in 'policy evaporation'. Mainstreaming requires change. Organisational culture must break with old ways of thinking and acting, and accept and act on new concepts. (African Development Bank 2012, Norad 2006).

c) Additional constraints identified include: lack of data, information, skills and institutional capacity to work on environment-development links; lack of successful models; and lack of political will for change.

d) For most developing countries, mainstreaming both responds to – and is challenged by – competition with many other policy priorities in the face of limited resources (IIED and UNEP WCMC nd).

framework and emerging trends within the building blocks from the case countries. The paper concludes by discussing how the key trends within the building blocks reflect streamlined efforts to integrate climate resilience into development planning.

This paper shares experiences across countries to give lessons wider benefits, and to help avoid future mistakes and pitfalls. It should also be noted that the framework is more descriptive than prescriptive, and is likely to evolve as further experience is gained.

2

A process of experiential learning

The key concepts and building block framework for mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning are the result of facilitated reflection, systematisation and sharing of experiential learning among government officials from various countries in Africa and Asia during a series of workshops and meetings over an 18-month period:

- **November 2011,** Dhaka, Bangladesh: training workshop on mainstreaming climate change into development planning, facilitated by the International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD). The building blocks and diagnostic questions (see Table 1) were the outcome of this workshop.

- **April 2012**, Hanoi, Vietnam: write-shop to draft the framework and prepare in-depth country case studies describing the status of each building block across six countries.

- **October 2012**, Dar es Salam, Tanzania: training workshop on mainstreaming climate change into development planning, facilitated by ICCCAD.

- **December 2012**, Qatar, Doha: Participants presented and discussed the CRMBB framework at the Least Developed Countries (LDC) side event on mainstreaming climate change at the UNFCCC Conference of Parties.

- **April 2013,** Dhaka, Bangladesh: Participants reviewed and presented the framework at CBA 7, the community-based adaptation to climate change conference.

Participants – from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Kenya, Tanzania, The Gambia, Rwanda, Zanzibar, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda and Morocco – included officials from central ministries such as planning and finance; line ministries such as agriculture and environment; and local government staff. The new framework is based upon a systematisation of experiential learning by these participants, members of the government official group for mainstreaming. In other words, it is a practical tool, rather than a theoretical, academic framework.

This process of learning from experience also drew on a review of policy and guidance documents and key mainstreaming literature, which are listed in the references at the end of the document. The review outlined the key dimensions of mainstreaming climate change into development planning and the broad approaches to mainstreaming that are being promoted by policy and guidance documents.

In-depth country case studies describing the status of each building block across six countries were prepared in the Hanoi write-shop; country reports are available for The Gambia, Kenya, Bangladesh and Cambodia.[2] An analysis of the emerging trends within each building block is presented in Part 5; further details of political will, information services and policy, financial and institutional frameworks for case study countries are found in Annex 2.

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[2] These are available online from: http://pubs.iied.org Bangladesh http://pubs.iied.org/10045IIED.html; Cambodia http://pubs.iied.org/10047IIED.html; The Gambia http://pubs.iied.org/10046IIED.html and Kenya http://pubs.iied.org/10044IIED.html

3

Mainstreaming concepts, dimensions and approaches

3.1   The concepts

Various stakeholders advocate mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning,[3] broadly referring to processes for integrating climate change considerations into development planning *objectives* – such as national development plans – and *processes* such as annual planning cycles and public finance management systems.

Climate mainstreaming is seen as a rational policy response; however, the *way* in which it is achieved is crucial to its technical and institutional sustainability. Workshop participants discussed the fact that where mainstreaming is perceived as an agenda promoted by agencies outside of the country and associated with exogenous expectations for planning, disbursement and monitoring systems, it is liable to turn into a 'tick the box' process of compliance. Capacity-building exercises are followed by design actions that then lag while waiting for outside approval and funding. In these situations, existing capacity and knowledge of unique context and priorities within government agencies is largely ignored. Indeed, in some cases, the supposed lack of capacity is treated as the problem to be solved.

To have real impact, mainstreaming must have a greater sense of ownership by government staff. A different approach is therefore called for: one that would do what mainstreaming is supposed to do. The response to climate change must be built into the government's most

vital institutions and policies, using existing capacity and priorities to integrate climate resilience into existing decision-making processes.

In many countries, governments are already investing in processes that are country-driven, using their existing priorities and capacities as the starting point and their planning expertise as the engine. Country officials are determining how climate change issues are relevant to their plans and deciding what actions to take, using their country's own systems, capacities and priorities. Mainstreaming in this way is more pragmatic, context-specific and simple than constructing a planning programme to development partner specifications. It targets change strategically and operates with national resources.

This emphasis on a country-driven process is not new – for example, the UNFCCC decision on national adaptation plans states that adaptation planning should be a "continuous, progressive, iterative and country-driven process" (UNFCCC 2012). The CRMBB framework provides a diagnostic tool to enable countries to drive the process.

As Box 1 and Annex 1 both show, different approaches have been used for integrating cross-cutting themes and issues, with varying degrees of success. The theoretical basis for mainstreaming is weak and in many cases the structural constraints have been either ignored or underestimated. Climate change represents a different

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[3] See, for example, USAID (2009) p.47; Klein *et al.* (2007); OECD (2009); UNDP-UNEP (2011); Lebel, L. *et al.* (2012).

challenge for mainstreaming due to it being a 'wicked problem' – whereby high levels of uncertainty (around timing and severity of effects and ways to address them) and high stakes (likely losses and costs) coincide. Climate change is also different because we know that there will be escalation of effects on development plans and achievements over time. There is therefore the need to decide when and how to act, balancing knowable costs of investments now with less well known costs of inactivity. Climate change is therefore a relatively complex policy problem.

3.2   The dimensions

To become truly embedded, climate resilience needs to be integrated into three key dimensions of the development planning system: development policy objectives, spatial planning scales and temporal planning scales. Box 2 explains these dimensions in more detail.

3.3   The approaches

There are a number of entry points for mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning. This applies equally for policy and guidance documents at national and international levels. In this paper we have identified three broad types of policy responses to mainstreaming climate resilience into development

planning and their different entry points, which we discuss in this section.

3.3.1   The climate-proofing approach

The climate-proofing approach aims to protect development interventions that have been planned in isolation of the climate change context by increasing capacity to cope with – and recover from – the impacts of existing climate variability. Climate resilience is integrated at a later stage of design to minimise the impacts of climate change on the intervention.

The entry point for integration under this policy response is often via project-based interventions. This approach is viewed as a valid entry point for mainstreaming climate resilience in countries that prefer to use a project-based approach to development planning. In such cases, climate proofing achieves the objective of streamlining the integration of climate change into existing country priorities and capacity. An example of this approach is highlighted in USAID guidance (USAID 2009), which aims to integrate climate resilience into the design of its country assistance development portfolio.

3.3.2   The climate-first approach

The climate-first approach largely addresses incremental changes in existing climate-related risks, by increasing a society's capacity to cope with extremes and variability, thus preparing them for, and enabling

BOX 2. DIMENSIONS FOR MAINSTREAMING CLIMATE RESILIENCE

Development policy objectives: Because climate change challenges development, climate resilience must be integrated into development policy objectives. Climate change impacts – increased temperatures, rising sea-levels, unstable and more extreme rainfall patterns – can impede development and threaten the effectiveness and sustainability of development investments. At the same time, people's capacity to adapt to these impacts depends on their access to economic, ecological and social resources, and infrastructure and governance. Hence, development planning must be climate resilient while also building climate resilience.

Spatial planning scales: The cross-scale impacts of climate change demand better integration of local and national policy responses. The impacts of climate change will be felt first and foremost by local people, groups and enterprises. National adaptation planning must therefore be informed by, and supportive of, local adaptation planning, which focuses on location-specific needs and so better reflects local realities and contexts. Local adaptive planning can be more agile than national planning and can make seasonal adjustments, thus enabling better responses. National planning can enable adaptation by providing the necessary infrastructure, public services and resources.

Temporal planning scales: The changing impacts of climate change over time demand the integration of adaptation into short-, medium- and long-term development planning cycles, such as annual, five- and ten-year plans and mid-term expenditure frameworks. Development planners need to take the right decision at the right time. Existing stand-alone, project-based approaches to adaptation planning largely fail to incorporate iterative planning as a means to respond to the different timescales of climate change impacts. Programmatic approaches that are linked to development planning cycles are required.

them to accommodate, increased variability and more frequent and severe extremes.

The entry point for integration under this policy response is often stand-alone climate change policies and strategies. The climate-first approach often results in identifying and implementing pilot climate-resilient strategies or projects, with effective pilots subsequently being scaled up and/or integrated into existing development programmes, sectoral and national plans at a later stage. It is used in countries that wish to test approaches to climate resilience before investing significant resources in integrating them into regular development planning, or by governments who find it easier to address climate change as a stand-alone issue either to highlight its importance and/or to manage the political economy of global climate finance.

Examples of this approach are highlighted in initial National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) and Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) guidance documents, which allow LDCs to identify priority activities and projects that responded to their urgent and immediate climate adaptation needs. The United Nations Development Programme-United Nations Environment Programme (UNDP-UNEP)'s Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) has also developed guidance to help officials mainstream climate change adaptation into national development planning as part of broader poverty/environment mainstreaming efforts (see Box 3).

3.3.3 The development-first approach

The development-first approach has climate resilience as an integral part of the development planning process from the start. Policymakers focus on making development planning processes resilient to climate change, so they can deliver climate-resilient developmental outcomes. The entry point for integration is often a national, local or sectoral development planning framework. This approach is used in countries that wish to mainstream climate resilience from a development planning systems approach. It is in this approach that medium to long-term opportunities for mainstreaming really lie.

BOX 3. UNDP-UNEP GUIDANCE ON CLIMATE MAINSTREAMING

UNDP-UNEP's PEI guidance aims to mainstream climate change adaptation into national development planning as part of broader poverty environment mainstreaming efforts. It recommends using a framework of three components, each involving a set of activities or modules for which a range of tactics, methodologies and tools can be used:

1. **Finding the entry points and making the case** is concerned with setting the stage for mainstreaming. This entails understanding the linkages between climate change and national development priorities, as well as understanding governmental, institutional and political contexts and needs, in order to define pro-poor adaptation outcomes on which to focus. From this vantage point, the mainstreaming team can identify entry points into development planning and make the case for mainstreaming climate change adaptation.

2. **Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into policy processes** focuses on integrating adaptation issues into an ongoing policy process, such as a national development plan or sector strategy. These efforts are based on country-specific evidence, including impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessments, socio-economic analysis and demonstration projects.

3. **Meeting the implementation challenge** aims to ensure that climate change adaptation is mainstreamed into budgeting and financing, implementation and monitoring, and that mainstreaming is established as standard practice.

(UNDP-UNEP 2011)

3.4 Mainstreaming in action: adopting a more strategic approach

Mainstreaming at a country level means moving
towards the strategic integration of climate resilience
into development planning. This kind of country-wide
programmatic approach necessitates looking at national
budgets, development and investment plans as well as
institutional arrangements.

A number of countries involved in this project have
already evolved from articulating climate resilience as a
set of stand-alone projects within NAPA documents to
articulating climate resilience as an integral part of their
national and sectoral development objectives. Countries
that have adopted this approach include:

- **Ethiopia** and **Rwanda**, in their national climate-resilient growth strategies

- **Nepal**, in its agriculture development perspective plan

- **India** in its national five-year development strategy

- **Kenya**, where planners' interest in mainstreaming
climate resilience into development planning rises

from need to design adaptation and resilience
interventions to enable people to escape poverty
despite climate change.

A number of governments are also taking programmatic
approaches to integrating climate-resilient priorities
into annual and medium-term policies and budgetary
instruments.

- **Bangladesh** and **Indonesia** have both formulated
national climate change strategies that cluster sets of
adaptation needs and/or identify long-term adaptation
programmes with sets of concrete activities.

If used as a reference point, such comprehensive
strategies have the potential to ensure coherence
across policy objectives. However, such strategies
also require looking at national budgets together with
development and investment plans, to ensure adequate
funding is in place.

- Both **Bangladesh** and **Indonesia** have set up a trust
fund model as a mechanism to finance their national
strategies. The trust fund model has the potential to
strategically integrate diverse sources of funding,
ensuring coordination between funders and sector-
based institutions. It can also enable on-budget
disbursement of climate funds, thereby supporting the
integration of climate resilience into country budgetary
processes (Huq and Kaur 2009).

- In terms of institutional policy instruments, **Nepal** has
adopted a national framework for local adaptation
plans for action (LAPA). The LAPA framework
articulates the institutional architecture for integrated
climate-resilient development planning across local
and national spheres (Government of Nepal 2011).

Global climate programmes are also supporting
the strategic integration of climate resilience into
development planning. For example, climate finance
disbursement mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol
Adaptation Fund and the PPCR have included
programmatic approaches to planning and financing
the design and implementation of climate change
strategies (Huq and Kaur 2009). This approach brings
multiple projects and planning processes under a single
policy framework, achieving strategic integration across
climate change and development policy objectives.
These can then be funded by a variety of financial
instruments – including individual project support,
common funds and budget support (Evans *et al*, 2006)
– thereby mainstreaming climate resilience into short-,
medium- and long-term budgetary instruments.

4

A framework to streamline mainstreaming

Given the complexity of the policy problems around how to address climate change – due in part the widely divergent levels of climate vulnerability of populations, sectors and development strategies – it was agreed that it would be useful to systematise and share the ways that different developing country governments are addressing climate mainstreaming. This was thought necessary because no over-arching approach would best fit all circumstances and also because different governments were already using different ways to mainstream with some success. This experiential

learning-based approach led to the identification of the mainstreaming building blocks and the elaboration of the framework described here.

During their meetings, the government planners assessed the key factors that support mainstreaming in government planning contexts. They reflected, systematised and shared their learning and experiences to develop the CRMBB framework, a practical instrument to help planners think through and enact the integration of climate-resilient responses into

Figure 1. Building blocks for climate mainstreaming

policy according to national capacities and domestic understanding of the prevailing circumstances.

In Part 3 we discussed how climate resilience needs to be integrated into three key dimensions of the development planning system – policy objectives, spatial and temporal planning scales – and that countries are already adopting a range of policy responses to mainstream climate resilience into development planning. The building blocks set out in this framework are supportive of these key dimensions and approaches to mainstreaming.

Figure 1 illustrates the three main building blocks identified in the framework that will aid the mainstreaming of climate resilience into development planning. Although the group discussions did not initially envisage these blocks as being sequential, it later became apparent that having an enabling environment is a primary requirement for effective mainstreaming, making it the fundamental building block. Once a country has achieved an enabling environment, it can proceed with either a systems or project-based approach to climate resilience.

In countries that take a systems approach to planning, the policy and planning building block plays a key role in mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning; while for countries that take a project-based approach, integrating climate resilience into the programme or project planning cycle is key.

The diagnostic assessment questions identified in Table 1 were the outcome of the first workshop in

Table 1. Building blocks framework assessment questions

BUILDING BLOCKS	ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS
Enabling environment	Political will: • Whose political will is it (eg politicians; technocrats; donor partners)? • What is political will responsive to (eg UNFCCC; parliamentary debate)? Information services: • What sources of information are available to support decision making? • Is there a national system for generating climate information? (A system may include institutions and/or tools for generating and managing communication information services – eg monitoring and evaluation frameworks.) • Is there information to help planners deal with uncertainty? • Is there information on costs and benefits? (Planners and decision makers will not only need climate information, but wider data on the costs and benefits of action or inaction, etc)
Policy and planning	Policy framework: • How is climate change reflected in policy (eg in policy and strategy documents, action plans, legislation)? • Has climate change been integrated into any planning cycles? Which one(s)? Institutional arrangements: • Have institutional arrangements been put in place to mainstream climate change into development planning? • Have existing institutional arrangements been mapped out to enable effective division of responsibility within the decision-making process? • Have institutional arrangements been made sustainable? How? Financial framework: • How have climate change interventions have been costed and integrated into national development priorities and budgets? • Is there a resource mobilisation strategy in place to develop and implement stated climate-resilient policy objectives? • How does the management of climate funds support the articulation and implementation of integrated climate-resilient development objectives?
Programmes and projects	• How do projects or programmes climate-proof existing development? • How could projects and programmes potentially be integrated into national, local or sectoral development programmes? • How do projects or programmes have the potential to deliver climate resilience at scale?

Dhaka in November 2011. These questions will help planners to assess and characterise their country's climate mainstreaming status, to then integrate climate resilience into development planning while addressing the specific challenges posed by climate change. These include: uncertainty; the costs and benefits of action falling to different parties or time horizons; the different types of resilience in different sectors; and tackling extreme weather events and slow onset changes.

4.1 Building Block 1: An enabling environment

This cross-cutting building block is relevant to any development planning approach adopted by government planners. It refers to an environment that enables or supports climate mainstreaming. As discussed above, an enabling environment is a primary requirement for ensuring the effective and sustainable integration of climate resilience into development planning processes. Once there is an enabling environment, it is possible to proceed to building blocks 2 and 3 – policy and planning, projects and programmes. In the context of government planning, there are two key sub-components of an enabling environment:

4.1.1 Political will

Political will plays an important role in driving the mainstreaming agenda, in terms of identifying the integration of climate resilience as a policy objective and converting objectives into action. Politicians, technocrats, donor partners, private sector and civil society are key drivers of political will in government planning contexts. It should be noted that political will in the context of climate change is reflected in different countries in different ways – through legislation; components of national development policies; policies, strategies and action plans; or climate objectives within sectoral policies and programmes.

4.1.2 Information services

Information services provide for the knowledge needs of decision-makers – or for those who advise them. They need access to climate science and often have to make decisions on the basis of uncertainty. Information services therefore play an important role in driving the climate mainstreaming agenda by providing evidence of the effects and impacts of climate change, which can trigger iterative policy responses. Information sources – inventories and data sets – and information systems – tools, methods and institutional arrangements for generating information – both play a key role in generating, managing and communicating the information needed for mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning.

4.2 Building Block 2: Policy and planning

This building block is relevant for countries that address climate-resilient planning from a systems perspective, as it pertains to the systems, tools and processes that drive the development planning process. A policy depicts a government's objectives, which are then implemented through planning instruments. Policy, institutional arrangements and financial frameworks are the three key sub- components of a planning 'system' – in other words, they are smaller building blocks within a larger one. It is important that climate resilience is integrated into each of them.

4.2.1 Policy frameworks

Policy frameworks reflect policy objectives and the way in which these will be implemented. The following aspects of policy frameworks have been identified as key in supporting the mainstreaming of climate resilience into development planning:

- *Policy documentation*: To be effectively mainstreamed into development planning, climate resilience must be integrated into:

  a. **policy documents** which articulate development planning objectives

  b. **strategy** and **action plans**, which outline how the policy objectives will be implemented

  c. in some cases **legislation**, which provides a legal mandate for the implementation of policy objectives.

- *The policy cycle*: Development planning is guided by annual, medium- and long-term policy cycles. Integrating climate resilience into these cycles ensures sustainability and the ability to deal with the immediate, medium- and long-term impacts of climate change. Entry points for integrating climate resilience into the development planning policy cycle include:

  a. annual, medium- and long-term **sectoral** and **development plans**

  b. annual and medium-term **expenditure** and **budgetary frameworks**.

4.2.2 Institutional arrangements

Institutional arrangements can direct the mainstreaming agenda. These reflect the extent to which government rules, regulations and organisations can support the coordinated integration of climate resilience into development planning at different spatial and temporal scales.

4.2.3 Financial frameworks

Financial frameworks help integrate climate resilience into development planning, once the objectives have been articulated through policy and institutions. Integrating climate resilience into annual and medium-term expenditure and budgetary frameworks indicates the sustained implementation of climate-resilient policy objectives over time. Similarly, resource mobilisation strategies that cater to the scale of required resources over time play a key role in integrating climate resilience into development planning prioritisation and implementation cycles. The effective management of climate funds, with strong country ownership and on-budget disbursement capacity, is also an indicator of integrated climate-resilient development. In this light, the CRMBB framework assesses:

- the extent to which climate change interventions have been resourced and integrated into national development priorities and budgets

- whether a resource mobilisation strategy is in place to develop and implement stated climate-resilient policy objectives

- whether the management of climate funds supports the articulation and implementation of integrated climate-resilient development objectives.

4.3 Building Block 3: Projects and programmes

In a coherent framework where climate change is well integrated into national and sectoral planning processes, projects remain the way in which policies, strategies and action plans are translated into concrete actions. This building block is therefore more applicable to countries that take a project-based approach to development planning and use it as an entry point to climate mainstreaming. Such an approach can allow climate resilience to be integrated in existing development planning initiatives through climate-proofing. As articulated in the PPCR, project-based entry points can also be used to scale-up and leverage climate-resilient investment, building on other ongoing initiatives (PCCR, 2011).

5

Emerging trends within the mainstreaming building blocks

Having outlined the CRMBB framework in Part 4, we now reflect upon the emerging trends within the first two building blocks for mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning – an enabling environment and policy and planning. We explore the framework's empirical use by drawing on six country case studies – from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Kenya, The Gambia and Rwanda – prepared by the government planners who attended the meetings described in Part 2. For more detail on the individual country cases, see Annex 2.

5.1   An enabling environment

5.1.1   Political will

All the case study countries reported an increase in political will, driven by technocrats and politicians, to mainstream climate resilience into development planning. Technocratic drivers include technical experts, department heads and secretaries from various ministries. Political drivers include members of parliament, ministers and in a number of cases, heads of state.

• In **Bangladesh**, ministers and ministry secretaries established a cabinet review committee under the leadership of the prime minister to review and steer BCCSAP, the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. An all-party parliamentary group steers the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund. The minister of environment has been made a state minister, thereby enhancing his ministry's role in coordinating climate-resilient planning. Trends in the diversity and profile of actors engaging with climate change on a national level are indicative of an environment that is more conducive to streamlining climate change aspects within existing county priorities and development planning capacity.

In most countries the political will of technocrats and politicians is responsive to international and national climate change agendas.

• In **Bangladesh**, climate resilience is reflected in the ruling party's election manifesto, which has driven the mainstreaming of climate resilience into national development plans.

• in **Kenya**, the prime minister allocates an hour in Parliament every week to answer climate change-related queries; this trend indicates that climate integration is and will be responsive to democratic processes representing country-driven priorities.

In a number of countries development partners play a key role in influencing the mainstreaming process. However, it should be noted that bilateral and multilateral funds can result in deviations away from the streamlined integration of climate resilience towards project-based initiatives where objectives are not set by governments. Other serious challenges to mainstreaming climate resilience can include different levels of will or power, as well as clashes with other sectors. For example, political will can be lacking at sub-national levels, if there are few incentives for district and municipal authorities to engage with mainstreaming initiatives. Or there could be political will at the sub-national level, but the decision-making or funding power could all rest at a higher level. Also, plans and policies must be mainstreamed into decisions and investments across the board: to avoid a clash between different priorities in different sectoral line ministries. For example, there could be a great climate policy with the necessary political will behind it, but another part of development planning in another sector can at the same time be increasing vulnerability or lock-in to a fossil fuel future. Here the problem lies not so much in developing plans and policies, but in mainstreaming these into decisions and investments. Some countries are responding to these challenges through institutional arrangements (see 4.2.2).

5.1.2   Information services

Across the case study countries, evolving trends around the provision of climate-relevant information services suggest a shift towards the streamlined integration of climate resilience into development planning. Information sources have evolved from relying on *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC) reports, to data collated in NAPA and national communications to the UNFCCC, to more detailed climate-specific research, often carried out by external entities, to nationally collected data. A number of countries use their national meteorological agencies to produce climate information and have integrated climate change data into their country and sectoral data collection systems. They have also started to develop tools and guidance documents for supporting the information needs of policymakers.

- In 2011, the government of **Laos** established a Department for National Disaster Management and Climate Change to assess climate impacts and identify priority actions.

- In **Kenya**, the Ministry of Planning has adapted the Millennium Institute's Threshold 21 (T21) model to support scenario-based, climate-resilient development planning, which supports the costing of climate-resilient interventions and their integration into national and sectoral priorities and budgets.

- In **Bangladesh**, the General Economics Division, Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning is developing a monitoring and evaluation system to design and evaluate climate change adaptation projects.

- In **Cambodia**, the national climate change technical team has developed methods to assess the current and future impact of climate change on sector productivity.

As a result of the development of information systems, information sources are evolving from the analogue approach which reviews historic and current observations and experiences to assess the future impacts of climate change towards scenario-based sources, which rely on statistical modelling or forecasting to assess the impact of climate change on sector productivity. This will support integration across temporal planning scales. Information systems allow planners to integrate climate responses into existing development planning systems.

Although the provision of climate-related information services is progressing, there are gaps in terms of the quality, coordination and analysis of the information, and in its dissemination and communication. Decision-makers often lack information on criteria for prioritising climate-resilient responses; this includes information on the economic losses incurred by climate change. Monitoring and evaluation frameworks that support periodic reviews and feedback loops-based learning are yet to be developed and applied.[4]

5.2   Policy and planning

5.2.1   Policy frameworks

In a number of countries, climate-resilient objectives are reflected in national and sectoral policy documents and in strategy and action plans. This trend is indicative of how countries are streamlining climate change responses within existing development policy vehicles. Climate-resilience objectives are reflected, to a lesser extent, in legislative and regulatory frameworks.

- In **Kenya**, a climate change bill was presented to parliament in 2012 but failed to get presidential endorsement. The government prepared a national climate change response strategy and published a national climate change action plan in March 2013 to implement this strategy.

- In **The Gambia**, the Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE 2012–2013) identifies the need to develop a low carbon development strategy and to mainstream climate

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[4] Tracking Adaptation and Measuring Development (TAMD) is piloting approaches to monitoring and evaluation climate change interventions to support feedback and learning within the planning process (Brooks et al, 2011).

change into national development frameworks. A climate change action plan has been developed and costed for integration into PAGE.

- In **Bangladesh**, the government has moved beyond articulating climate-resilient development as a policy objective by developing a strategy and action plan and adopting legislation for the establishment of the Bangladesh Climate Resilience Trust Fund.

- In **Laos**, the Climate Change Strategy (2010) has been integrated into the 7th Social and Economic Development Plan (2011).

Policy frameworks have shifted away from sets of project-based climate initiatives (NAPA) to more programmatic planning. In some countries there has been a shift towards seeing climate change a programme of work, with climate change policy frameworks and climate-resilient national development policies and strategies. These wider-reaching climate change programmes are then integrated into larger development programmes.

- Climate change as a policy objective was first articulated in the NAPA documents in **Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos** and **The Gambia.** All four countries then developed national climate change strategies that have subsequently been integrated into national and sectoral development plans either as policy objectives or as investment portfolios.

Climate resilience is being reflected to a lesser extent across temporal planning cycles. Countries are yet to integrate climate change into annual, medium- and long-term planning cycles, including annual and medium-term expenditure and budgetary framework. Tools like the T21 model in Kenya and the monitoring and evaluation framework in Bangladesh are promising steps towards the integration of climate resilience into temporal planning cycles.

5.2.2 Institutional arrangements at national level

Institutional arrangements have evolved from being ad-hoc to permanent. Climate change planning in a number of countries was initially driven by ad hoc institutional arrangements – such as technical working groups and steering committees – to develop and coordinate climate change documents like the NAPA. In recent years, such arrangements have become institutionalised, allowing for a more programmatic approach.

- In **Laos**, the government has established a Department of National Disaster Management and Climate Change which is responsible for assessing climate change impacts and identifying priority response measures. Such institutionalisation indicates a shift away from relying on regional data and ad hoc technical advice, towards a more sustainable and

mainstream approach to generating and analysing evidence.

- In **Cambodia**, the government established a Climate Change Office under the Ministry of Environment in 2003; it was upgraded to a Climate Change Department in 2010.

There are many institutional drivers of mainstreaming, and these vary from country to country.

- In **Laos**, **Cambodia** and **The Gambia**, natural resource ministries – environment, fisheries and water – play a lead role in driving and coordinating the mainstreaming agenda.

- In **The Gambia**, the Ministry of Environment and Forests and the Department of Water have driven the climate resilience mainstreaming process by seeking and coordinating the participation of relevant ministries and parliamentary committees.

- In **Kenya** and **Bangladesh**, the environment ministries are focal points for climate change planning. Planning ministries and line ministries, however, also play key roles in mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning.

- In **Bangladesh**, the Planning Commission is integrating climate resilience into national development planning.

- In **Kenya**, the Rural Planning Directorate under the Ministry of Planning is responsible for mainstreaming climate change into development plans, including the medium-term plan 2013–2017 and plans for the newly constituted counties. The directorate has developed mainstreaming guidelines for county development officers to follow when preparing county development plans. The Ministry of Development for Northern Kenya and other Arid Areas and the National Drought Management Agency are both responsible for building climate resilience in drought-prone and semi-arid areas of the country (80 per cent of land mass).

It should also be noted that, although this multiplicity of institutional drivers within each country is an indicator of political will and dedicated capacity across a range of actors, the division of responsibility with clear leadership and coordination arrangements still needs to be articulated.

The case study countries show that the types of institutional arrangements being used for climate change planning are evolving, and include: technical, steering and coordinating committees; secretariats providing support to various climate change committees; climate change units and departments that have been set up in sectoral and national ministries.

- In **Bangladesh**, the Climate Change Cell, established in 2005 under the Ministry of Environment, coordinates focal points located in other ministries.

- In **Kenya**, the Ministry of Finance's Carbon Finance Unit is responsible for climate financing. This signals that Kenya wants to take a coordinated approach to accessing and prioritising climate finance as a core part of its finance strategy, both domestic and international.

- In **The Gambia**, the government has decentralised arrangements for climate change planning, and we see the emergence of institutional arrangements for integration at national, regional, sub-national and community levels:

  - national-level policy and technical oversight is provided by the Ministry of Fisheries and Water Resources; technical functions are executed by the national climate change committee

  - regional policy and technical oversight is provided by the Regional Coordinating Committee

  - technical coordination at sub-national level is carried out by the climate change committee chaired by the state governor

  - community-level institutions are responsible for the actual implementation and management of climate change projects.

5.2.3 Financial frameworks

Countries have initiated the process of costing climate-resilient activities and integrating these costs into national and sectoral development plans. For example:

- **Bangladesh** and **Cambodia** have carried out a climate change public expenditure and an institutional review (CPEIR) exercise to explore how to integrate climate change issues into expenditure decision making and responsive fiscal policies.

- **The Gambia** has costed its national climate change action plan and integrated the same into its three-year development plan.

- **Bangladesh** has costed its climate change strategy and action plan that guides investments by the climate change trust funds.

- **Rwanda** has relied on budgetary analysis and financing gaps methodology to determine indicative climate-relevant costs.

- The T21 model, prepared by **Kenya**, is likely to support the costing and integration of climate change interventions into national development priorities and budgets.

In terms of resource mobilisation, most countries rely on international resources to meet the scale of investment required for climate-resilient development. There are a few exceptions:

- **Bangladesh** has also drawn on national development budget to finance the implementation of projects under the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF).

- **Rwanda**'s national climate and environment fund (FONERWA) has developed a phased approach to resource mobilisation:

  - short term: targeting multilateral and bilateral sources for resource mobilisation, with a government commitment to contribute some of its own money into the fund

  - medium term: targeting multilateral and bilateral funds alongside private sector investments via co-financing instruments

  - long term: targeting multilateral sources, including concessional lending.

  The fund will put in place management structures and instruments to mobilise private sector investments.

Resource mobilisation strategies like those implemented by Rwanda, targeting different sources of funding and aiming to generate resources for different time frames, are indicative of a sustainable approach to dealing with the impacts of climate change.

The six case study countries show different approaches to resource management.

- Some countries, such as **Bangladesh**, **Cambodia** and **Rwanda**, have established dedicated funds for the management of climate change finances. These 'basket funds' have been designed to ensure the prioritisation and targeting of climate funds for the development and implementation of climate change activities that are coherent with national policy.

- **Rwanda**'s, Ministry of Natural Resources (MINIRENA) has been accredited as the National Implementing Entity (NIE) to directly access climate finance from the Adaptation Fund.

- In **Cambodia**, the Climate Change Trust Fund is co-managed by the Ministry of Environment and UNDP, and will be aligned with national budgeting system in the future.

- In **Bangladesh**, the All-Party Parliamentary Committee steers the BCCTF; the Ministry of Environment and the World Bank co-manage the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund.

Although the information from these country studies gives some indication of how climate change is being mainstreamed and the utility of the CRMBB framework, more work still needs to be done on the subject. An evolution toward country-led institutional arrangements would support a more sustainable integration of climate resilience into development planning. Furthermore,

Table 2. Findings from climate mainstreaming experiences

BUILDING BLOCK	EMERGING TRENDS
Enabling environment	
Political will	• increased diversity and profile of protagonists • driven by technocrats and politicians • responsive to international and national climate change agendas • lacking at sub-national levels in countries with few incentives for district and municipal authorities to engage with mainstreaming initiatives.
Information services	• diverse sources and systems being used • shifts toward streamlined integration of climate resilience into development planning • sources evolved from external reports to integrating climate change to in-country data collection systems • sources also evolving from status reviews based on historic and current observations to scenarios based on modelling or forecasting.
Policy and planning processes	
Policy cycles, strategies and action plans	• climate objectives framed within wider policy objectives • integrating climate into planning cycles
Institutional arrangements	• systems evolved from ad hoc to institutionalised arrangements • different driving institutions, varying across countries • types of arrangements and function include committees, cells and units • emergent spatial arrangements, with sub-national agencies addressing climate and attempting to coordinate across administrative scales.
Financial frameworks	• most countries have relied on international resources to meet the scale of investment required for climate-resilient development • some countries have allocated finance from domestic sources • tools to link costing to planning – T21, CPEIR etc.
Resources, projects and programmes	• movement from a project-based to a programmatic approach • bilateral and multilateral funds can result in deviations away from integrating climate resilience in a streamlined manner towards project-based initiatives where objectives are not set by governments.

countries recognise that a number of gaps remain to be filled to ensure effective mainstreaming of climate resilience. These include:

• putting in place adequate financial management, accounting and reporting systems

• increasing the use of medium-term expenditure and budgetary frameworks and sector plans as vehicles for streamlining the integration process

• developing national evaluative frameworks for assessing developmental effectiveness of climate investments

• developing guidelines for the formulation of climate change response plans and budgetary allocation for use by ministries, development agencies and the private sector.

Table 2 above summarises the emerging trends from our country studies of their experiences of mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning.

6

Conclusions

This paper advocates the need to move to an approach to mainstreaming that integrates climate resilience into development planning in country-driven ways. Climate mainstreaming needs to emphasise the streamlining of integration efforts with existing development planning priorities and capacity to ensure they are effective and efficient. Development planners should be able to use climate mainstreaming framework set out in this paper to rationalise what could be done with what needs to be done, and what feasibly can be done.

The key dimensions that climate resilience mainstreaming efforts should address include integration between policy objectives and between temporal and spatial planning scales. The paper highlights that three broad policy responses are being applied by countries to address these dimensions: climate-proofing, climate-first and development-first approaches to mainstreaming. These respectively seek to protect existing and business-as-usual development interventions from climate change effects, overcome incremental climate change effects on development and address climate change from the perspective of developmental outcomes.

The building blocks framework set out in this paper helps to assess and plan mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning. Based on shared experiential learning between government planners from Asia and Africa, this framework gives planners three building blocks to help them effectively mainstream climate resilience in government-led development planning processes:

- an enabling environment – a cross-cutting building block that is relevant to any development planning approach adopted by government planners, covering political will and information services

- policy and planning – relevant for countries that address climate-resilient planning from a systems

perspective; identifies policy frameworks, financial frameworks and institutional arrangements as key systems within which climate resilience should be integrated

- projects and programmes – more applicable in countries that take a project-based approach to development planning.

Emerging trends within each building block indicate that countries are increasingly mainstreaming their integration efforts within existing development planning priorities and capacities. Climate resilience is increasingly reflected within national and sectoral development plans, indicating a trend towards integration between policy objectives, as climate-resilient priorities are streamlined with development priorities.

Initiatives aimed at responding to climate change are increasingly being streamlined with existing development planning capacity, and countries are adapting existing development planning instruments and institutional arrangements to address the need to integrate climate resilience into development planning.

The building blocks framework provides practical guidance for public sector development planners who want to identify and assess their capacity to mainstream climate resilience into development planning. The framework will continue to evolve as we learn more about how to address the effects of climate change on the climate-vulnerable poor through development planning and implementation.

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Annex 1. Mainstreaming – a review of the literature

Mainstreaming is not a new strategy

Mainstreaming is a concept that has been adopted across different sectors. Gender equality has been the primary focus of mainstreaming in theory and practice, but other issues – including the environment, sustainable development, HIV/AIDS and disability – have also been a focus of mainstreaming strategies. All these mainstreaming experiences in developed and developing countries can provide important lessons for future mainstreaming activities.

One important finding confirmed in a range of mainstreaming reviews is the lack of a clear understanding of the concept itself. There is widespread misunderstanding and confusion over the meaning of the term mainstreaming and its related concepts. Mackay and Bilton (2003) suggest that "*Mainstreaming is a term which is increasingly used, but is less well understood.*" Important shortcomings in terms of knowledge, awareness and methodology have been pointed out by various authors (Mackay and Bilton 2003, Squires 2005, Daly 2005, Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2009).

A useful explanation is provided by Mackay and Bilton (2003) who suggest to think of mainstreaming in terms of principles, systems, framework tools and discrete tools and techniques: "*Mainstreaming is supported by* **principles** *which set out commitment to, and conceptions of, equality, and* **systems** *consisting of strategies, policies, structures, mechanisms and tools through which these principles can be put into practice.*

Tools *are diverse and can be used separately or as part of a* **framework** *or package. Mainstreaming is an* **active process** *combining these elements.*"

A review by IIED and UNEP WCMC (nd) points out that mainstreaming tools and approaches need to respond to the specific country context and issue(s) of concern and there is no blueprint approach.

Mackay and Bilton (2003) define *mainstreaming* as a social justice-led approach to policymaking in which equal opportunities principles, strategies and practices are integrated into the everyday work of government and other public bodies. Despite the wide range of definitions available, three key characteristics of mainstreaming are highlighted in many of them: that it is a deliberate process; that there are multiple routes and/or outputs that can be targeted (for example, policies, plans and legislation) and that mainstreaming should take place across multiple levels of government as well as across central government (IIED UNEP WCMC, nd).

Typology of mainstreaming strategies

An important contribution resulting from the different mainstreaming reviews is the differentiation between the three different approaches to mainstreaming (Squires 2005). These are:

- **integrationist approach**, based on 'adding on' an issue to current development plans and policies (such as women in development) without questioning and addressing the inherent social inequalities and state interests

Table 3

MAINSTREAMING MODEL	INTEGRATIONIST	AGENDA-SETTING	TRANSFORMATIVE
Actors	experts	identity groups	political citizens
Aims	neutral policymaking	recognising marginalised voices	denaturalising and thereby politicising policy norms
Processes	bureaucratic	consultative – non-governmental organisations and social movements	deliberative
Indicators	policy instruments	policies of presence	cultural transformation
Strengths	effective integration	recognises group perspectives	sensitive to diversity
Weaknesses	rhetorical entrapment	reification – treating a concept as an object, eg 'women only'	complexity, lack of specificity

- **agenda setting approach**, promoted by Jahan (1995)and others, which is more consultative in nature and allows the recognition of marginalised voices

- **transformative approach**, probably the most radical form of mainstreaming, which aims to 'transform... the existing development agenda' (Jahan 1995).

Squires (2005) presents a good overview of these different mainstreaming strategies (see Table 3 above).

Sweetman (2012) engages with the typology above by pointing out that gender mainstreaming needs to move from the integrationist approach to a more agenda-setting one in order to effectively address women's rights. Transformation starts from a gender analysis of inequalities between women and men, which understands gender relations as intersecting with relations of race and class, to create context-specific locations of inequality (Porter and Sweetman 2007).

Daly (2005) points to the tensions between the goals of integrating gender into the mainstream compared to changing and transforming the mainstream, which is a very important comment to keep in mind.

Overall, there seems to be an agreement that transformative approaches to mainstreaming are needed to address and overcome existing power differences and interests (Daly 2005) and ultimately lead to an empowerment of diverse actors (Verloo 2005). Mainstreaming should aim to transform the organisational cultures of governments and public bodies and to improve the quality of public policy and of governance itself (Mackay and 2003).

Entry point and enabling factors

The 'entry points' are often key points in mainstream policy and planning cycles, particularly those concerning safeguards, prioritisation and investment choices (IIED and UNEP WCMC, nd). It is important to differentiate between institutional (upstream) and operational (downstream) mainstreaming approaches, which in turn will influence the choice of entry points. Furthermore, the review of experience shows that mainstreaming is an iterative process which does not necessarily follow a set of sequential steps (IIED and UNEP WCMC, nd). While strategic political will decisions on mainstreaming are taken at the top, implementation design decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level of public authority, closest to the population concerned. Top-down and bottom-up processes need to be balanced; and flexibility and adaptive management are key requirements.

One of the most well known environmental mainstreaming programmes is the UNDP-UNEP PEI, which identifies three levels of intervention for successful mainstreaming of climate change adaptation (UNDP-UNEP PEI 2011):

1. Making development efforts consciously aimed at reducing vulnerability, thus strengthening the base for adaptation and increasing the overall resilience of the country and population.

2. Ensuring that climate change is considered in the decision making of relevant government agencies so that (mainstream) policy measures catering to climate change are developed.

3. Targeting specific adaptation issues that the first two levels have not tackled; identifying enduring implementation challenges associated with information and indicators, financing and budgeting, institutional and capacity needs at national, sub-national and sector levels.

Success factors have been identified across the different mainstreaming experiences. IIED and UNEP WCMC (nd) emphasise leadership, reciprocity, effective communication, local ownership and building on existing plans and processes as important principles to adopt. An evaluation of UNDP's gender mainstreaming identifies the following success factors (UNDP 2006):

- strong commitment and leadership from management

- a clear and proactive strategy and policy for gender mainstreaming

- qualified senior gender expertise to advise on gender mainstreaming in the country programme

- awareness of gender mainstreaming as a collective organisational responsibility

- systematic training on gender mainstreaming concepts, tools and thematic issues

- dedicated financial resources for gender mainstreaming.

Dalal-Clayton and Bass (2009) summarise the major drivers of mainstreaming as:

- increasing stakeholder awareness and demands

- national legislation and regulations

- values of progressive organisations

- donor conditions and initiatives.

Other drivers include:

- visible 'real' issues or relevance

- a link between development/poverty reduction and environment

- requirements of clients

- EU accession and approximation process

- membership of international business groups (that embrace biodiversity mainstreaming)

- a desire to address rising poverty and inequality

- a need to protect ecosystems and stem environmental degradation.

However, it is important to remember that these entry points and enabling factors are to a large extent context-specific and an analysis and assessment of the particular situation will be required for each new situation.

Achievements and shortcomings

Despite many successes in terms of awareness raising, capacity building and institutional and policy development, it is noticeable and somewhat concerning that the majority of the reviews and evaluations of mainstreaming experiences revealed important shortcomings in terms of achieving their mainstreaming goals and objectives.

The general conclusion one can draw from a systematisation of existing gender mainstreaming reviews is that, despite decades of gender mainstreaming, the inequalities between men and women in society have not yet been overcome and there are still many barriers to women achieving greater participation and accountability in global and national governance.

A recent evaluation of 20 years of experience in gender mainstreaming (Risby and Todd 2011) concluded that "gender equality is not yet integrated into the mainstream operations and organizational culture of development organizations". Some reviews even state that mainstreaming efforts have had a negative effect on women's representation and left women's movements disempowered and fragmented (IIED and UNEP WCMC nd, Mannell 2012). Reasons for these shortcomings are manifold. An analysis of the Council of Europe on Gender Mainstreaming showed a limited impact due to a lack of clear goal-setting and choice of tools to develop coherent gender mainstreaming strategies (Verloo 2005). This confirms a lack of clear concepts and strategies.

Another important shortcoming identified in the mainstreaming theory is the understanding of the relationship between state and society. The fact is that gender inequality is embedded in social structures and eradicating them would require societal change. Mainstreaming policies alone are not sufficient to stimulate this change; therefore gender mainstreaming needs to address the question of how change in governance translates into societal change (Daly 2005).

Furthermore, it is crucial to take into account the separation between economic and social policies (including gender inequality). Economic policies are currently not gender neutral (Perrons 2005), which leads to the conclusion that mainstreaming strategies are constrained by the market economy. This emphasises the importance of transformative gender mainstreaming, which can question the current status quo and stimulate a change in the wider policy environment.

This issue has also been brought up by Lehtonen (2008) who reviewed the mainstreaming of sustainable

development issues within the economist community in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), identifying a lack of political capital needed to reform the OECD organisational discourse based on conventional economic theory. He concluded that the failed sustainable development experiment in the economic surveys clearly demonstrates the influence that political context and power structures have on learning. Another related shortcoming, highlighted in the review of the OECD study and number of other studies (eg Liberatore 1997), is the issue of how much to 'give in' to the dominant economic discourse is an attempt to gain credibility without 'diluting' the environmental or gender concerns.

This was also identified by IIED and UNEP WCMC (nd), who identified the prevailing development paradigm, which treats environment as an institutional and economic 'externality', and the lack of political will as key constraints for effective mainstreaming.

A recent review of drylands mainstreaming highlighted that in many cases dryland issues had been subsumed into broader environmental issues rather than being given any particular emphasis (IIED and UNEP WCMC nd). This is confirmed by other reviews, such as Mackay and Bilton (2003), who found that mainstreaming is a strategy that can, without care, degenerate into tokenism – where public commitment is given in principle, but little is achieved in practice.

Similarly, another review of gender mainstreaming by the African Development Bank (2012), drawing on a comprehensive study conducted by Norad (2006) concludes that leadership has not consistently supported the implementation of gender mainstreaming policy, resulting in what has been widely described as 'policy evaporation'. Mainstreaming requires change; organisational culture must break with old ways of thinking and acting, and accept and act on new concepts.

Other constraints identified in existing literature include:

• a lack of data, information, skills and institutional capacity to work on environment-development links

• the lack of successful models

• the lack of political will for change.

In addition, for most developing countries, mainstreaming both responds to – and is challenged by – competition with many other policy priorities in the face of limited resources (IIED and UNEP WCMC nd). These constraints resonate well with constraints identified elsewhere (UNDP 2006).

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Annex 2. Details from individual country studies

POLITICAL WILL	
Bangladesh	• driven by technocrats and politicians – parliamentarians and prime minister • responsive to national and international demands
Cambodia	• driven by technocrats – technical officers, secretaries and under-secretaries from key ministries – and politicians – prime minister
Laos	• driven by politicians – deputy prime minister and ministers from key ministries • responsive to international climate change negotiations
Kenya	• driven by politicians – ministers and prime minister – and technocrats • responsive to national and international demands
The Gambia	• driven by technocrats from: Ministry of Environment and Forest; Department of Water Resources; National Disaster Management Agency; National Environment Agency • politicians involved through cabinet approval process and councils such as the Disaster Management Council and the National Environmental Council – both of which are headed by the vice president
Rwanda	• driven by cross-section of stakeholders including FONERWA managing committee members; government representatives at central and district levels – permanent secretaries and Ministry of Local Government officials; civil society, private sector and development partners. • technical committee made up of director generals from key environment and climate change-related sectors as well as development partners
INFORMATION SERVICES	
Bangladesh	• **sources**: IPCC reports and climate change documents (NAPA); strong data on disasters collected by Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (climate discourse embedded within disaster response in Bangladesh); sector-specific data collected by line ministries; climate change information generated by the Bangladesh Meteorological Department; research-based climate change evidence collected by external agencies • data sources are based on past and current observations; scenarios and projections are lacking • **systems**: Ministry of Planning is currently developing a monitoring and evaluation framework focusing on adaptation; others – eg PCCR – are developing project-based monitoring and evaluation systems ; a monitoring and evaluation framework for designing and evaluating adaptation projects is also under development

Cambodia	• **sources**: climate change documents from NAPA, national communications; current and historic climatic data is generated by the Department of Meteorology • National Climate Change Technical Team is responsible for collecting climate change data; • National Institute of Statistics maintains the national statistics database, supported by the Commune Database – a valuable source of information for monitoring changes in community level vulnerability • **tools**: analogue and modelling tools used to assess the future impacts of climate change; focus is on impact and vulnerability assessments. • national framework for monitoring and evaluation climate change is being developed under the Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan
Laos	• **sources**: findings from regional climate change studies; national communications to UNFCCC; national climate change strategy; NAPA • information is general and relies on historic trends • **systems**: Department for National Disaster Management and Climate Change is responsible for assessing climate change impacts and identifying priority actions
Kenya	• **sources**: meteorological data collected by the Kenya Meteorological Department; other data produced by various ministries. • data sources are based on past and current observations and scenarios • **systems**: T21 model developed as a tool for supporting scenario-based development planning; mainstreaming guidelines prepared by the Ministry of Planning for use by district development officers when preparing climate-resilient county development plans
The Gambia	• **sources**: climate change documents – National Communications, NAPA, NAMA – sectoral data collected by line departments • **systems**: loose institutional network of independent research networks and focal government agencies responsible for assessing global change; Global Change Research Institute established in 2001 under Department of Water Resources. • **tools**: under development to assess adaptation costs and benefits
Rwanda	• **systems**: information management is prioritised under FONERWA, guided by annual strategic issue paper, which identifies the yearly priorities of budget agencies in line with the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy; submissions by relevant line ministries as part of their budget submission process to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Bangladesh	• NAPA (2005); election manifesto; Bangladesh climate change strategy and action plan (2009) Climate Change Trust Fund Policy (2009) and Act (2010); perspective plan; five-year plan; annual development plan
Cambodia	• NAPA (2006); Ministry of Environment leading the development of the Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan, with nine line ministries shaping it by developing sectoral climate change strategic plans, a process which is aligned with the national development planning process • entry points for mainstreaming climate change into sub-national planning scales have been identified via the Strategic Framework for Decentralisation and Deconcentration under the National Programme for Sub-National Democratic Development • principal policy focus is post-disaster relief via the Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction2008–2013; climate change has not been integrated into the annual, three- and five-year development planning cycle
Laos	• NAPA (2009); National Climate Change Strategy and Plan (2010); 7th Social and Economic Development Plan (2011)
Kenya	• National Climate Change Response Strategy (2010); National Climate Change Action Plan; climate resilience integrated into national-level medium-term plans (2013–17) and county development plans (2012–17); Energy Act 2006 and Kenya Forest Policy specifically provide for carbon finance activities; private members bill on climate change being debated in parliament; efforts to integrate climate change into long-term policy framework through Vision 2030; Kenyan constitution (2010) advocates a rights-based approach to adaptation.

The Gambia	• NAPA (2007); NAMA; climate change action plan; National Communications (2003, 2012); national climate change and low carbon strategy; climate change integrated into the medium-term National Agricultural Investment Plan (2011–2015) and the three-year national development plan (PAGE 2012–2015); climate change action plan prepared as a strategy to implement PAGE
Rwanda	• environment and climate change finance is channelled, programmed, disbursed and monitored through FONERWA, a basket fund operated and organised by the FONERWA law approved by parliament

FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK

Bangladesh	• resource mobilisation strategy relies on national and international sources: annual development budget allocated by Ministry of Planning; non-development budget allocated by Ministry of Finance; PPCR • BCCTF is operated by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) and funded by a block government budgetary allocation of US$300m over three years (2009–12) • BCCRF is resourced by bilateral and multilateral grant contributors and operated by MoEF • disbursement: all funds support the implementation of BCCSAP and therefore a programmatic action plan • BCCRF has two funding windows, managed by a government-designated microfinance institution: 90 per cent goes to an 'on-budget' window, allocated to public sector projects; ten per cent is allocated to the 'off-budget' window for civil society and private sector projects • the majority of BCCTF funds will be allocated to the public sector, with 34 per cent of total funds kept in a fixed deposit investment to support emergencies • projects below 250,000,000 BDT (US$3,150) are approved by the MoEF as fast-track projects; those above that value need approval from the planning commission
Cambodia	• climate change activities have been costed, but not yet integrated into national budget • CPEIR exercise conducted to assess the increase in climate-sensitive expenditure • resource mobilisation strategy relies mainly on international sources – EU, Danida, Sida currently funding climate change • government planning to allocate budget for Climate Change Trust Fund, established to manage and disburse climate finance and currently co-managed by Ministry of Environment and UNDP; it will be aligned with national budgeting system in the future, and could serve as the basis for a national climate fund • current disbursement is project-based • climate change financing framework being formulated to guide resource mobilisation and management strategy, supported by Cambodia Climate Change Alliance and UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Centre.
Laos	• resource mobilisation strategy relies on international sources • national implementing entity being established to facilitate direct access and management of climate finance
Kenya	• national climate change response strategy costed • T21 model used to integrate climate change costs into development planning in the budget envelopes of key ministries – energy, environment, water, agriculture, roads and forestry • in 2012, international sources accounted for over 90 per cent of climate finance (62 per cent as loans, 38 per cent as grants) • existing national and local funds will be used for the management and disbursement of funds – the Constituency Development Funds have been used for climate change-related activities; the National Drought Contingency Fund for early drought response; and the Drought and Disaster Contingency Fund for rapid response
The Gambia	• climate change action plan costed and integrated into national three-year plan, PAGE • resource mobilisation strategy relies on international sources (official development assistance and foreign direct investment); currently, the government official group for mainstreaming provides funding for environmental, climate and disaster risk reduction-related work through the national budget • climate funds to be disbursed via national budget

Rwanda	• costing exercise carried out; resource gaps assessed via a financial needs assessment exercise to identify investment areas taking innovative financing tools into consideration; decision taken to pool domestic and external resources:
	– *domestic*: environmental fines and fees; Environmental Investigation Agency fees; forestry and water fund; other environmental revenue; seed financing from line ministries
	– *external*: donor contributions; international environment and climate change funds; target private sector investment by demonstrating financially competitive ventures (giving 10–15 per cent returns)
	• FONERWA has the potential to be converted to a 'venture capital' fund in the long term; a phased approach to resource mobilisation will allow the fund to establish a track record
	• disbursement decisions guided by national priorities reflected in sector investment plans; earmarking of resources by development partners not recommended as expenditure is intended to support a demand-based fund (responsive to project/programme proposals reflected in SIP)
	• publically oriented funds will be channelled through the Ministry of Natural Resources (MINIRENA) and Rwanda Environmental Management Agency (REMA) using existing government procedures
	• private sector disbursement will be channelled through the Rwanda Development Bank using its existing procedures
	• FONERWA funds can be accessed by line ministries; government agencies; districts; civil society organisations including academic institutions; and the private sector
	• at least 20 per cent of total FONERWA resources will be earmarked for the private sector; at least ten per cent for the districts
	• disbursement instruments include: in-kind support; short-term performance-based grants; medium-term loans and guarantees; long-term investment and equity finance

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Bangladesh	• MoEF lead institution, responsible for coordinating climate change activities across ministries; Department of Environment's Climate Change Cell (2004) coordinates focal points located in other ministries; MoEF's Climate Change Unit acts as Secretariat to BCCTF; the National Steering Committee and All Parliamentary Committee on Climate Change steers the BCCRF; the cabinet review committee was established to review BCCSAP
	• the Ministry of Planning's Planning Commission is responsible for integrating climate resilience into national development planning
Cambodia	• the Ministry of Environment (MoE) is the climate change focal point; its Climate Change Department (previously the Climate Change Office from 2003–10) is the technical unit for coordinating climate change activities
	• the National Climate Change Committee (2006) is an inter-ministerial policy-making body, chaired by the prime minister, led by the environment minister; vice chairs include secretaries of three key ministries; other ministries are represented by under-secretaries; agencies are represented by deputy general secretaries
	• the MoE's National Climate Change Technical Team is responsible for providing technical advice on climate change; it is made up of technical staff from all the line ministries represented in the National Climate Change Committee
	• a climate change unit in each ministry is responsible for preparing sector-specific climate change strategic plans
Laos	• the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (2011) is the national focal point for climate change, responsible for coordinating other ministries
	• other responsible bodies include the National Steering Committee on Climate Change (2008); the Department for National Disaster Management and Climate Change (2011); the National Climate Change Office (2008); and eight technical climate change working groups

Kenya	• prior to recent elections, the National Climate Change Committee chaired by and under the office of the prime minister, coordinated climate change planning • the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (MENR) leads climate change planning; the Climate Change Secretariat, under MENR, coordinates the development of the National Climate Change Action Plan to operationalise the national climate change response strategy; • other responsible bodies include: National Climate Change Activities Coordination Committee, a multi-sectoral/stakeholder technical committee responsible for the technical coordination of climate change activities; National Environmental Management Authority, responsible for Clean Development Mechanism; Kenya Meteorological Department, responsible for research, prediction and dissemination of climate change information; Kenya Forest Service, under the Ministry of Forest and Wildlife, responsible for REDD +, the nationally led United Nations collaborative initiative on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; Carbon Finance Unit, under the Ministry of Finance, responsible for climate change financing; the Planning Division, under the Ministry of Planning, responsible for mainstreaming climate change into development plans; the Ministry of Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Areas, along with the National Drought Management Agency, both responsible for building resilience in drought prone and semi-arid lands.
The Gambia	• decentralised arrangements are in place, with national-level policy and technical oversight by the Ministry of Environment, Parks and Wildlife and the Ministry of Fisheries and Water Resources and technical functions by the National Climate Change Committee • regional policy and technical oversight by Regional Coordinating Committee, with technical coordination carried out by the regional Climate Change Committee chaired by the governors in each region • community-level institutions are responsible for the implementation and management of climate change projects • The National Environmental Council and Disaster Management Council are responsible for cross-sector policy coordination

Rwanda	• MINIRENA is responsible for FONERWA oversight; in 2012 MINIRENA was also accredited as the national implementing entity for the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund
	• the FONERWA fund management team is housed in REMA; the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning is responsible for fund planning, coordinating and budgetary oversight
	• FONERWA institutional architecture includes:
	  − managing committee − responsible for all funding decisions including defining project selection criteria
	  − technical committee − responsible for informing the management committee
	  − secretariat − responsible for implementation oversight
	• in the medium and long term, the government expects the institutional arrangements to evolve into hybrid arrangements with the fund management team, working with domestic and international financial institutions − such as the Rwanda Development Bank and other bilateral and multilateral banks − to offer more complicated financial instruments, including low interest or concessional loans, to the private sector.

Acronyms

BCCSAP	Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
BCCTF	Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund
CDKN	Climate and Development Knowledge Network
CoP	Conference of Parties
CRMBB	climate resilience mainstreaming building block
CPEIR	climate change public expenditure and institutional review
FONERWA	Rwanda National Climate and Environment Fund
LDC	Least Developed Countries
ICCCAD	International Centre for Climate Change and Development
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LAPA	local adaptation plans for action
MENR	Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (Kenya)
MINIRENA	Ministry of Natural Resources (Rwanda)
MoE	Ministry of Environment
MoEF	Ministry of Environment and Forestry
NAP	national adaptation plans
NAPA	national adaptation programmes of action
NIE	national implementing entity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAGE	Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment
PEI	UNDP-UNEP's Poverty-Environment Initiative
PPCR	Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
REMA	Rwanda Environmental Management Agency
T21	Threshold 21 (Millennium Institute)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WCMC	World Conservation Monitoring Centre

Past and present levels of greenhouse gas emissions have locked unavoidable climate change effects into the climate system for decades to come. Countries with climate-vulnerable and poor people need to find ways to achieve climate-resilient societies and economies while addressing both current increased climatic variability and future climate change.

This paper is the result of collaboration and shared learning by government development planners from countries across Africa and Asia. It presents the concepts of climate resilience mainstreaming and provides a practical instrument for government planners to think through the integration of climate-resilient responses into policy.

IIED is a policy and action research organisation. We promote sustainable development to improve livelihoods and protect the environments on which these livelihoods are built. We specialise in linking local priorities to global challenges. IIED is based in London and works in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and the Pacific, with some of the world's most vulnerable people. We work with them to strengthen their voice in the decision-making arenas that affect them – from village councils to international conventions.

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