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Independent Assessment of the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund

ECDPM, ESRF and LARES

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Key messages

This report finds that the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) supporting the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) has played a key role in building the capacity of institutions tasked with advancing CAADP at continental and regional level and in improving coordination around CAADP.

Nevertheless, it identifies important shortcomings in the way this support has translated to impact on the ground at the national level. Such shortcomings could be addressed during the ongoing design for a future MDTF.

Making the MDTF more effective requires improving the governance of the Fund and clarifying its role vis-à-vis the CAADP structures and other types of CAADP support. But also a stronger role of national stakeholders in continental CAADP, better mainstreaming of CAADP in official AU-RECs organs and stronger subsidiarity, seem to be preconditions for such MDTF improvements to work.

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List of Acronyms

ADWG	Agriculture Donor Working Group
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development
ASARECA	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa
ASDP	Agriculture Sector Development Programme
ASWG	Agricultural Sector Working Group
ATA	Agricultural Transformation Agency
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BM	Business Meeting
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CCARDESA	Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research and Development for Southern Africa
CEBEVIRHA	Economic Commission for Cattle, Meat and Fishery Resources
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CILSS	<i>Comité permanent inter-État de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel</i> Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
CMA/WCA	Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMIFAC	Central African Forests Commission
CORAF	<i>Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain pour la recherche et le développement agricoles</i> West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development
COREP	Regional Fisheries Committee for the Gulf of Guinea
CTF	Child Trust Fund
DFID	Department for International Development
DP	Development Partner
DPTT	Development Partners Task Team
DREA	Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture
EAC	East African Community
EAFF	East African Farmers Federation
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States

ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOWAP	Economic Community of West African States' Agricultural Policy
ECCOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
ESRF	Economic and Social Research Foundation
EU	European Union
FANRPAN	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARA	Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
FO	Farmers Organisation
FS SWG	Food Security Sector Working Group
G8	Group of Eight
GAFSP	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
GIZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i> German Society for International Cooperation
HSGOC	Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee
IBAR	Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JAG	Joint Action Group
JSR	Joint Sector Review
KIS	Knowledge, Information and Skills
KM	Knowledge Management
LARES	<i>Laboratoire d'Analyse Régionale et d'Expertise Sociale</i>
LI	Lead Institution
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAF	Mutual Accountability Framework
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAIP	National Agricultural Investment Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency
NSA	Non-State Actor
PC	Partnership Committee
PDDA	Programme Détailé de Développement de l'Agriculture Africaine (CAADP)
PIF	Policy and Investment Framework
PLI	Pillar Lead Institution
PNIA	<i>Programme National d'Investissement Agricole</i>
PP	Partnership Platform
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PRASAC	Regional Applied Research Centre for the Development of Agricultural Systems in Central Africa

PROPAC	<i>Plateforme Régionale des Organisations Paysannes d'Afrique Centrale</i>
RAIP	Regional Agricultural Investment Plan
REC	Regional Economic Community
RED	Rural Economic Development
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
RFO	Regional Farmers Organisation
ROPPA	<i>Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i> Network of Farmers' and Agricultural Producers' Organisations of West Africa
RTA	Regional Trade Agreements
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
TA	Technical Assistance
TAFSIP	Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

This Report is the outcome of an Independent Assessment of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), undertaken by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), the Laboratoire d'Analyse Régionale et d'Expertise Sociale (LARES) and the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF). The **Independent Assessment revolved around three broad questions:**

- Is the MDTF building the capacity of CAADP Lead Institutions supporting the implementation of CAADP?
- How far is CAADP implementation support through MDTF-sponsored institutions contributing to change in agricultural policymaking and planning in countries? What are other key perceptions of overall CAADP performance?
- Has the MDTF improved alignment and coordination in CAADP support?

The **methodology** adopted consisted of a desk-based review of relevant evidence, followed by qualitative interviews with a wide range of stakeholders at international, continental, regional and national levels. Given the complexity of the processes at stake, the multiple thematic dimensions of CAADP and the diversity of state and Non-State Actors (NSA) involved, a comprehensive assessment of the CAADP MDTF would have required more time for discussions and analysis. However, the purpose of the assignment was neither to conduct a 'fully fledged' evaluation nor a mid-term review, but rather the provision of inputs for a multi-stakeholder dialogue which is currently ongoing within CAADP processes. The time schedule of the assessment was short, to ensure its results could feed such debates on the way forward in 2014 on issues of MDTF effectiveness, in the context of upcoming reflections as part of the AU Year of Food Security.

Capacity of the Lead Institutions

The **MDTF, through the CTFs, has increased the ability of Lead Institutions** to drive the CAADP process on the international stage, at continental level and in African regions. CTFs in particular have had a major impact on beneficiary institutions' capacity. In general, more capacity has also enabled continental and regional institutions to increase their ownership of the process (though CAADP ownership at national level is a different story). MDTF support has mainly focused on hiring of staff, organisational capacity, process planning, financial management capacity, technical assistance (TA), all very important and appreciated; capacities in knowledge management, policy and strategic analysis should however receive additional attention. Further, support provided through CTFs, as opposed to support provided through the "TA window" (component 3 of the MDTF), is most effective with regard to capacity building.

Relatively **consensual options that should be explored to improve the effectiveness of the MDTF**, include:

- reduction of ad hoc TA activities (also as a share of total MDTF resources);
- increased focus on technical capacity building and more systematic planning and monitoring of it (e.g. by including indicators on Lead Institution capacity in the new CAADP Results Framework currently under development);
- stronger and more targeted institutional strengthening objectives;
- more efforts on knowledge management at all levels.

MDTF and CAADP performance at national level

CAADP's awareness-raising role cannot be overstated. It has put agriculture at centre stage for African economic growth and food security and provided an open forum for discussion on agricultural issues in Africa at continental, regional and national levels. It has also led in some countries to better inter-sectoral coordination, improved donor coordination and enhanced investments by governments, private sector and development partners. However, **progress at the national level is mixed**, with CAADP too often remaining a process with low levels of ownership and financial sustainability (this is not a "CAADP only" problem: regional and continental initiatives are often not picked up nationally). This is to a large extent dependent on national political economy dynamics (and one should not expect the MDTF to solve all national problems). On the positive side, CAADP has also often proven to be a process that opens space for NSA in the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, MDTF could have done more to equip countries and Lead Institutions with tools to move from NAIPs preparation to actual implementation, while a disconnect in terms of speed between the continental and national level processes can still be observed.

Recommendations that found a good degree of consensus are:

- more political economy analysis should be undertaken within CAADP, pre-compact and post-compact, (i.e. to make CAADP more 'politically smart'), possibly with support of a future MDTF;
- MDTF should equip countries and Lead Institutions with tools to move from NAIPs preparation to actual implementation, i.e. establishing models, tasks, systems and deliverables to sustain the CAADP momentum beyond the design of compacts and investment plans;
- supporting country-level Joint Sector Reviews should be a way for the MDTF to contribute to country-level CAADP implementation.

Donor alignment and coordination in CAADP

The MDTF has only modestly improved alignment in CAADP support. Alignment of broader CAADP support to actual investments priorities identified in national and regional investment plans remains limited. Possible causes lie with African countries/regions as well as development partners (bilateral assistance shaped by priorities put forward by Ministries of Finance or Planning, often different from NAIPs, and by development partners' own priorities). **The MDTF is recognised to have considerably increased coordination at different levels**, particularly amongst African Lead Institutions, between sectors, and among MDTF contributing Development Partners (DPs). **Coordination between MDTF-contributing DPs and non-contributing DPs was perceived as weak**, which brings serious problems of duplication of efforts and complicates implementation, with continuously changing focus on topics before results related to existing priorities materialise.

Relatively consensual measures to address such alignment and coordination challenges should include:

- strengthening inter-departmental information exchange and coherence, both within African governments/RECs as well as within development partners structures (e.g. between headquarters, regional offices and national offices; and DPs to brief many staff members on CAADP, e.g. field staff, thematic experts working on aid-for-trade, water & sanitation, etc.);
- more systematic testing of alignment to CAADP by DPs at continental, regional and national levels;
- stop the "hundred flowers bloom" approach and more transparency/systematic tracking and planning/coordination for any CAADP support activity (more regular reporting, including on CTFs),

linked to the Partnership Agreement and Results Framework under development (also by including indicators on coordination and alignment in the new Results Framework).

Key CAADP stakeholders, including Lead Institutions, are conscious of many of the shortcomings highlighted above in terms of capacity, national performance, and alignment and coordination. **Interviews and missions have revealed a high level of mobilisation to scale up what has succeeded, and address areas of concern.** In light of this, it will be crucial to use the AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security to make CAADP more result-oriented and to decentralise the process of reflection around CAADP and also the future of the MDTF.

Looking Forward

There is no obvious alternative outside the MDTF in order to support Lead Institutions and the overall CAADP process at the regional, continental and international levels. Separate CAADP-earmarked budget support to different Lead Institutions would not guarantee the same level of coordination, lesson sharing and 'cost-effectiveness' (both within and between various African and DP organisations), nor would promote a "whole-of-Africa" approach. "No-more MDTF" and "no budget support to different Lead Institutions" would make it difficult to improve CAADP's overall performance and impact. **So there is a widely-held perceived need for continuation of a CAADP multi-donor trust fund** to support the overall CAADP process and its improvements (including the ability of Lead Institutions to assist countries in implementing CAADP). Nonetheless, **a number of improvements should be made for a more effective MDTF:**

- improving MDTF governance and clarifying the role of each CTF vis-à-vis broader CAADP structures and support:
 - clarify/formalize the relation between the MDTF Partnership Committee (PC), the Development Partners Task Team (DPTT) and the Business Meeting (BM) in the Partnership Agreement : BM is the joint overarching decision-making body; below it, the DPTT is the overarching DP coordination forum and the MDTF is one of various mechanisms to support CAADP; both DPTT and MDTF should respond to decisions taken at BM;
 - clarify MDTF accountability and reporting lines, particularly "vertically" (i.e. to leaders and managers of the institutions members of the BM and the PC), including for any future TA window (which should also be capped);
 - monitor also outputs of MDTF support (that is, performance on CAADP targets and implementation progress) rather than only inputs (actual delivery of each funded activity);
 - study "pros and cons" of different options to reform the composition and procedures of the PC (like for example one permanent seat for each REC within the current PC), e.g.: creation of "an African body" to run the process and select what to fund and a donor body with a veto power over the first body's proposals; or a technical-administrative secretariat for daily management complemented by an "MDTF Board" providing a forum for oversight and advocacy towards other DPs.
- in addition to CTFs for current Lead Institutions (including for all RECs simultaneously), establishing new CTFs to support more African institutions (including continental or regional networks of NSAs and knowledge institutes) as well as priority themes (possibly through the CAADP Joint Action Groups);
- devoting larger share of support from all CTFs to urgently address demands from national stakeholders and to sustain implementation progress in-country after NAIPs are launched, while exploring the possibility of a moratorium on continent-wide CAADP sub-processes (e.g. KIS) and top-down selected thematic priorities (e.g. agribusiness strategies);

- improving CTF activities planning through more clarity of individual CTF implementation plans and better prioritization (following the example of the AUC DREA Strategic and Operational Plan 2014-2016), as well as better task-division between activities supported by different CTFs.

Considering all the issues highlighted in this Report, **the process to design any new trust fund should be deep** (including in-country consultations to strengthen national-level ownership) and take the required amount of time, ideally only after the Partnership Agreement and new Results Framework have been adopted. Informed and widely accepted improvements would not only increase the effectiveness of the MDTF, but would likely also encourage more donors to contribute to a future MDTF. Lastly, such process should also carefully examine the most suitable organisation to host a future MDTF, including African institutions such as the African Development Bank.

The overall CAADP needs to be ‘re-launched’ as a precondition for MDTF improvements to work.

This includes:

- **a stronger role of countries and national-level stakeholders** (e.g. private sector) in continental CAADP. This should take the form of AU MS funding Lead Institutions (and co-financing CTF-sponsored country-level initiatives) and engaging in CAADP at higher level (through the BM or even, possibly, through an African CAADP ‘control cabin’, similar to the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee);
- **better mainstreaming of CAADP in official AU-RECs organs;**
- agreement on a Partnership Agreement and new CAADP Results Framework that clarify and systematize the **implementation of subsidiarity** in CAADP processes and CAADP support (i.e. role and targets of each partner, including task division among the AUC, NPCA and RECs, and the added value of the MDTF vis-à-vis the rest of CAADP support). This first requires a three-dimensional institutional analysis on existing mandates, thematic task division (“who does what”) and capacities (comparative advantages on each relevant theme).

ECDPM, LARES, ESRF and their partners are committed to continue contributing to these important discussions, including by deepening any of the above ideas and proposals, which would require frank political and policy dialogue about different possible options for improving CAADP and its support.

1. Introduction

1.1. Background and methodology

1. The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) was asked to undertake an **Independent Assessment of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)**. The assessment was commissioned by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), on behalf of other MDTF contributing donors (The United States (US), The European Commission (EC), the Netherlands and Ireland). This assessment was undertaken in the framework of DFID's regular annual review of the MDTF. The Independent Assessment revolved around **three main areas of enquiry** and the following broad questions (see Annex VII for the full Terms of Reference (ToR) of the assessment):
 - Is the MDTF building the capacity of the CAADP Lead Institutions supporting the implementation of CAADP?¹
 - How far is CAADP implementation support through MDTF-sponsored institutions contributing to change in agricultural policymaking and planning in countries? What are other key perceptions of overall CAADP performance?
 - Has the MDTF improved alignment and coordination in CAADP support?
2. Considering our work and approach to supporting African policy processes conducive to sustainable and inclusive development, **ECDPM was keen to undertake this exercise**. We feel that our independence, knowledge of African institutions and donors, the trust we have gained over time, and our current role in informally facilitating knowledge transfer and frank policy dialogue around different dimensions of CAADP put us in a strong position to undertake an independent assessment of CAADP's MDTF. ECDPM committed itself to a constructive exercise in which all relevant partners were able to provide inputs (perceptions, evidence, suggestions, opinions) on what has worked well, what has proven to be ineffective, and what may need to be put up for further reflections.
3. Given the importance of gathering more rounded and inclusive views and perspectives from a broad range of relevant independent African actors, ECDPM set up a team with some of its African partners: the Laboratoire d'Analyse Régionale et d'Expertise Sociale (LARES) in Benin and the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) in Tanzania, both of which have been closely involved in CAADP processes in their respective regions.² The methodology adopted by this mixed African-European group led by ECDPM consisted of a “desk review” of relevant evidence (see Bibliography for the full list of documents consulted), followed by qualitative interviews. We interviewed a wide range of stakeholders at the international, continental, regional and national levels (see Annex VI for full list), via phone or face-to-face meetings during country missions and CAADP meetings. The stakeholders interviewed included:
 - Child Trust Fund (CTF) recipients
 - The World Bank CAADP team
 - CAADP Country teams
 - “Private Sector” stakeholders (regional and national)
 - MDTF contributing and non-contributing donors
 - Other selected national and international stakeholders

¹ In this Report, “Lead Institutions” refers to the AUC, the NPCA, and the RECs.

² The team for the Independent Assessment was composed of Francesco Rampa, Jeske van Seters, Fabien Tondel and other staff from ECDPM; Hoseana Bohela Lunogelo, ESRF (FANRPAN country node for Tanzania) and Bio Goura Soulé (LARES) in order to include specialists in CAADP processes in Eastern and Southern Africa and West and Central Africa respectively.

4. The **six countries** visited (Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Senegal and Tanzania) were **selected on the basis of the criteria below**. They were specifically chosen to help us understand the dynamics and perceptions around issues of Lead Institution capacity, national CAADP performance and donor alignment. The criteria were as follows:
 - Degree of progress in CAADP implementation at national level. The countries range from countries having no CAADP Compact as of yet (Botswana) to countries implementing their CAADP Investment Plan and considered to be “CAADP success stories”.³ (Ethiopia)
 - Ensuring wide and diverse regional coverage by selecting at least one country from each Regional Economic Community (REC) currently implementing CAADP (the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC)).
 - The presence of Lead Institutions in the country (e.g., the African Union Commission (AUC) in Ethiopia, ECCAS in Gabon, EAC in Tanzania and SADC in Botswana).
 - Countries that have, or have not, advanced in particular processes related to CAADP, which can signal success (or lack thereof) in policy reform, donor alignment and coordination, private sector involvement and capacity development: Grow Africa (e.g., Tanzania); G8 New Alliance Cooperation Framework (e.g., Ethiopia); successful application to the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) (e.g., Senegal).
5. In addition to discussions with individual interviewees, ECDPM⁴, ESRF and LARES⁵ have also made use of their experience with CAADP and African institutions in order to answer the questions outlined in the ToR to the best of their ability. In the case of ECDPM, additional insights for this Independent Assessment emerged from recent CAADP meetings we have attended (such as the Business Meeting (BM) in Abuja, Development Partners Task Team (DPTT) meetings, and the recent ReSAKSS Annual Conference in Dakar) and from our own multi-stakeholder dialogues organised in Brussels.⁶
6. This Report derives its structure from the ToR. Section 1.2 provides a quick overview of our approach, and of its limitations. Section 2 presents the MDTF’s initial theory of change and its associated expected results. Section 3 summarises the key messages from previous reviews of the MDTF. Section 4 deals with the three broad questions the team has looked into during the assignment: issues of Lead Institutions capacity (4.1), CAADP performance (and perceived results at national level) (4.2), and finally donor alignment and coordination (4.3). Section 4.4 stresses that steps have been initiated in recent months to address some of the current shortcomings of the MDTF. Finally, we found that nearly all interviewees were willing to go **beyond the three questions outlined in the ToR**, and adopt a more forward-looking view. These views are reflected in Section 5. Section 5.1 outlines the rationale

³ “Success stories” are presented on the official CAADP website: www.nepad-caadp.net/library-mapping-caadp.php.

⁴ As part of ECDPM’s overall objective of contributing to more effective Africa-Europe relations and cooperation, ECDPM’s Food Security Team undertakes practical policy-oriented research and facilitates dialogue between African and European stakeholders, with particular attention given to regional dimensions of CAADP (see www.ecdpm.org/dp128). ECDPM is not funded by the MDTF or by DFID, for its broader work on food security.

⁵ ESRF has worked on CAADP processes in countries in Eastern and Southern Africa and LARES has been closely involved in the design of the CAADP Regional Compacts in ECOWAS and ECCAS.

⁶ See for example our recent meetings on Sustainable African Agriculture and Smallholder Farming, Private investment and regional approach to nutrition security, and Sustainable Agricultural Investments and the role of emerging economies.

for a continuation of a CAADP MDTF. Section 5.2 presents arguments in favour of a reform of the MDTF's management structures and the way it relates to broader CAADP governance, which are perceived to be key in improving the MDTF's and CAADP's overall impact. Section 5.3 deals with issues of task division, institutional coherence and subsidiarity amongst Lead Institutions, which also came through as problematic during our interviews. Section 5.4 outlines ideas put forward regarding a possible future MDTF. Section 5.5 concludes with views on the hosting of a new MDTF.

7. This document does not put forth decisive recommendations, but rather suggestions based on opportunities and challenges found during the Assessment as inputs for a **fruitful dialogue on the way forward in 2014** on issues of MDTF effectiveness, in the context of upcoming reflections that will take place during the African Union (AU) Year of Food Security. Such suggestions and inputs are the results of our team's own analysis, but they mostly come from the opinions and recommendations put forward by interviewed stakeholders themselves.

1.2. Approach and limitations

8. This assessment was a challenging and complex exercise. It should be read with a number of observations in mind.
9. It is key to clarify that the outcome of our assessment is to be interpreted as inputs (early lessons, experiences, opinions, propositions) feeding in a **collective reflection about possible ways forward on issues of future orientation for the MDTF and CAADP's implementation challenges. It is based on interviews, perceptions and evidence emerging from existing literature.**⁷ **It is not a formal evaluation of the MDTF.** Most interviewees agreed that the complexities involved in assessing CAADP and its support made an exercise moving beyond measuring performance against a log-framed set of activities, targets and the linear logic of typical projects, more useful.
10. In principle, given the complexity of the processes at stake, the multiple thematic dimensions of CAADP and the diversity of state and Non-State Actors (NSAs) involved, an independent assessment of the CAADP MDTF would have required **more time for discussions and analysis.** Our exercise was somewhat constrained by a tight timeframe. However, the purpose of the assignment was not to conduct a 'full-fledged' evaluation, nor a mid-term review, but rather the provision of inputs for a multi-stakeholder dialogue that is currently on going within CAADP processes and will intensify as of January 2014. The time schedule of this assessment was short, to ensure that its results could feed into these debates.
11. As expected, one of the results of our assessment is that there is an important **variation across countries and across regions** in perceptions (and proposals for improvement) around the three areas of enquiry of this assessment. **This Report focuses on crosscutting lessons and general key messages, while simultaneously trying to accommodate such variations and local, context-specific findings.** Yet, this is only possible to a certain extent given time and size constraints. Ideally, more interviews and more space in the Report would have enabled us to describe the situation in RECs and countries to a greater extent.
12. We know from a host of studies (formal evaluations, academic literature, country case studies, donor sponsored research programmes, etc.) that politics in development processes in a particular country or sector context need to be carefully examined and need to inform reform support strategies. So in principle we would have liked to devote **more time to a political economy analysis**, for instance in

⁷ Throughout the Report, of course, "perceptions" should not be confused with "facts" or conclusive "evidence".

order to find out under what circumstances ruling elites, sector actors, and African institutions are open to effective agricultural reforms and transformation.

13. In particular, the linear thinking and theories of change **linking improved policies and planning automatically to development results has proven its impotence**. The abundance of policy assumptions and broad commitments in the CAADP arenas have not been helpful to assess what is needed to move from policy signals to implementation.⁸ When possible, one should go for more fine-grained analysis of context-specific political settlements and how these interact with vested interests and ruling elites, how formal and informal institutions interact and create political incentives, and the type of coalitions and approaches that may help overcome the obstacles to agricultural transformation.⁹
14. Another aspect that we have included, but not in-depth, relates to the broad set of donor approaches to strengthening key African institutions and the CAADP. Important questions meriting more attention relate to whether and how multiple donors can contribute to 'better' results, and whether or how these can be combined with the outcomes of the support provided through MDTF. In principle, such sort of **indirect capacity development by MDTF and interplay between MDTF and other channels** of CAADP support should be fully accounted for in an assessment of the MDTF, but the time and the scope of our exercise were limited, so our Report cannot go deeper into these pertinent areas.
15. Taking all these caveats into account, we feel that our Report sheds light in a satisfactory way on the three areas of enquiry outlined in the ToR, and hopefully beyond, also thanks to the quality of all interviews and of the existing literature.

2. CAADP MDTF theory of change and expected results

16. **The MDTF was conceived with the twin objectives** of (1) building the capacity of African institutions to lead and support the implementation of the CAADP and (2) facilitating the alignment and coordination of international donors in supporting the CAADP and agricultural development and food security in Africa more generally. The MDTF strategy emphasised the development of continental and regional institutions' capacities, the "CAADP lead institutions", which would then support the implementation of the CAADP at the country level.
17. According to the logic of the MDTF strategy, **MDTF support to the continental lead institutions, the AUC and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) /NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA)**, would allow these institutions to advocate for the CAADP across the continent and to provide technical and political support at the regional and national levels.¹⁰ In addition, **by supporting the RECs**, the MDTF would enable the regional institutions to drive country CAADP

⁸ For instance, some insightful research has been undertaken by Andrews on policy signaling and the limits of institutional reform in development. Reforms face limits when they are introduced as short term signals to make governments look better, for whatever reasons (to their constituencies, to their donors, or to certain fractions of the elite). Finding realistic solutions to make governments perform better presents a huge challenge, and usually requires donors to abandon the linear change models in favour of problem solving and iterative learning processes. [Andrews, M. 2013. *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development. Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

⁹ This is the kind of work that the Future Agricultures consortium for instance has been pioneering in its Political Economy of Agriculture in Africa programme (see <http://www.future-agricultures.org/research/policy-processes/592-political-economy-of-agricultural-policy-in-africa-peapa#.Uq8c211UT8>).

¹⁰ Various support modalities were envisaged, including political support, human resources support (training and hiring of personnel), technical support (advisory services), material support (office equipment), and financial support.

processes, providing technical support to national governments in identifying their priorities for agricultural development, formulating sound strategies, and effectively and efficiently implementing policies and programmes. The MDTF would also **enable specialised organisations to provide technical guidance** at the continental, regional and national levels in the thematic areas of the CAADP pillars.¹¹

18. For the rest, the narrative of the MDTF corresponds to that of the CAADP. According to the **theory of change of the CAADP, institutional change**—within African institutions and in the relations among them—and a more effective public sector dealing with agriculture would lead to more efficient and equitable public policies and investments. Agricultural policy-making would be more inclusive, notably with respect to smallholder farmers, and national governments would increase their expenditures in the agricultural sector. Subsequently, this would bring about **transformation in the agricultural sector**, that is, more private investment, faster agricultural productivity growth, better performing agricultural and food markets, increased access to food among vulnerable households, and more sustainable management of natural resources used in agricultural production. Ultimately, the change promoted by the CAADP would result in growth in agricultural and food production, job creation, and, more broadly, **economic growth, poverty reduction and increased food and nutrition security**.
19. The CAADP puts this logic into practice through a structured policy process involving all stakeholders, including public institutions from the continental to the local level, the private sector, the civil society, experts and development partners (DPs). This process provides for **learning** by evaluating policies and applying lessons learned at the next stage of policy-making (see Annex IV). The CAADP processes supported by the MDTF would also lead to greater transparency, particularly with respect to public expenditures in the agricultural sector. Finally, through the MDTF, the pooling and coordination of donor financial assistance would reduce transaction costs both for recipients and donors.
20. In order to reach its two main objectives, the MDTF distributes its funds through three components. The first component provides support to carry out the CAADP processes, in particular the National and Regional Roundtable processes and the continental CAADP Partnership Platform. As such, this component also supports efforts to build the capacity of the Lead Institutions driving these processes. The second component was set up to support the development, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of CAADP Pillar Programs and the institutions responsible for them. Contrary to the first two components, the third component is executed by the World Bank in order to support the Bank's management of the Trust Fund as well as to provide financial and technical assistance for specific activities related to CAADP processes.
21. The **expected results of the MDTF** were specified in the World Bank's CAADP Trust Fund Programme Document¹², which contains a rudimentary results framework. A 2010 DFID memorandum also indicates expectations concerning the MDTF using a logical framework. Key expectations are summarised as follows:
 - African institutions at the national, regional and continental levels, having access to technical, political and financial support, are able “to lead, plan, and implement” agricultural development programmes. The CAADP lead institutions have the capacity to formulate both strategic and operational plans for CAADP support activities.

¹¹ Pillar frameworks define the contours of CAADP, but there was always tension and misunderstanding around the choice of one or the other so called “Pillar Institutions”. For this reason, and as agreed in the Terms of Reference, in this Report, we consciously chose to stay away from a discussion about the wrong or right of the Pillar Institutions

¹² “A Multi-Donor Trust Fund to Support the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP)”, 2008.

- National CAADP Roundtable processes are completed in all countries engaged in the CAADP and their agricultural policies and budgets are based on the outcomes of these processes. Regional CAADP Roundtable processes are completed in all the major regions of Africa and the agricultural policies and budgets of the COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC RECs are based on the outcomes of these processes.¹³
- Four CAADP pillar framework papers are developed by the pillar lead institutions (PLI) and adopted by the AU. The PLOs provide technical and political support to the national and regional institutions implementing the CAADP during their policy planning activities, in particular for the policy reviews during roundtable processes and for the formulation of compacts and investment plans. Regional and national agricultural institutions, policies and programmes are consistent with the pillar frameworks.
- The DFID memo mentions additional objectives: The World Bank effectively manages the MDTF and the CTFs, including by providing backup to African institutions as required; in addition to enabling their recipients to lead the implementation of the CAADP, the CTFs would allow them to build their own institutional capacity, including for financial management and procurement.
- Through the implementation of the MDTF, 80 per cent of the fund's resources were supposed to be spent through the CAADP lead institutions' CTFs (including the four pillar lead organisations), and 20 per cent of it was to be devoted to the administration of the fund and for Technical Assistance (TA) provided by the World Bank.

22. The results framework of the MDTF was initially developed on the basis of the old CAADP monitoring and evaluation framework used to assess the performance of the CAADP at the continental, regional and national levels. The new CAADP Results Framework, currently still a draft, was introduced later as part of the Sustaining CAADP Momentum Initiative (see Annex V). Expectations concerning the MDTF did not necessarily take into account the contributions of **various other CAADP-related capacity building activities** sponsored by bilateral and multilateral donors. These activities could have complemented or enhanced the contributions of MDTF-sponsored capacity development initiatives.

3. Key messages from past MDTF reviews

23. This section provides an overview of key messages from past reviews of the CAADP MDTF. The donors contributing to the Trust Fund commissioned a first Mid-Term Review of the MDTF. An independent team of consultants, Kingsmill, Teshome and Tembo, carried out this review and presented their findings in November 2011. This first review (from hereon referred to as the MTR 2011) provides a comprehensive backward- and forward-looking assessment of the relevance, progress and effectiveness of the MDTF, based mainly on interviews with key stakeholders and a review of documents.

24. A second review of the CAADP was executed by the World Bank itself as part of its mandate under the CAADP MDTF Programme Document to carry out an independent Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the overall performance of the MDTF and the progress made toward the objectives stipulated in that

¹³ In the World Bank's programme document, this objective is further specified in that the MDTF will enable the development and implementation of CAADP Compacts and Investment Plans in at least 20 sub-Saharan African countries. The DFID memo mentions 15 countries and two RECs (DFID, 2010).

Programme Document. In April 2012 the World Bank thus presented a **MTR Trust Fund Status Report**, an expanded version of the status reports the World Bank provides twice a year to the MDTF stakeholders (World Bank, 2012, from hereon referred to as the World Bank Status Report). The World Bank Status Report is a summary of the implementation progress from November 2008 onwards, rather than an assessment of the Trust Fund's strengths and weaknesses. Findings of the World Bank Status Report were discussed at a stakeholder workshop in April 2012 in Johannesburg, South Africa.

25. Combined, these two reviews provide a good source of previously identified challenges and achievements regarding the MDTF's overall performance. Note that the overview below is by no means comprehensive but simply aims to offer an overview of **key messages, distilled from the 2011 MTR, the 2012 Status Report and the most recent biannual Stakeholder Status Report from October 2013**.
26. **Regarding the Programme Development Objectives**, both reviews believe the MDTF's three components have contributed to the capacity of the CAADP lead institutions and have been effective in supporting the implementation of CAADP processes across Africa. As demand for Technical Assistance (TA) in the rolling out of CAADP processes at the national level was high, the MDTF was found to be instrumental in enabling the CAADP lead institutions at the continental and sub-regional level to be responsive to the Member States' demands.
27. Whereas such support was initially provided through the Bank-executed TA funds on a demand-driven basis, the MDTF approach to financing national CAADP processes changed as CTFs were being established for the Lead Institutions at the regional and continental levels. The latter form of financing enabled the AUC, the NPCA, the Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa (CMA/WCA) and RECs to provide TA and support to national processes, as well as to develop partnerships and engage in planning, programming, policy analysis and harmonisation across different levels of CAADP governance.
28. **The MDTF funding modalities**, essentially the CTFs and the World Bank executed TA window, are deemed to have been effective in mobilising the relevant type of support to CAADP institutions and processes. However, whereas in general CTFs were considered to be highly effective instruments in providing institutional support, it was noted that oftentimes they suffer from a lack of explicit focus on capacity building in the sense that they tend to be strong on supporting processes, though rather weak when it comes to substance (MTR, 2011).
29. Additionally, as far as **capacity building** is concerned, it is often limited to the financing of temporary staff increases, raising questions regarding sustainability. As such, the 2012 Status Report concludes that, in order for CTFs to be fully effective, greater clarity and consensus is needed on the type of institutional framework that is required to provide effective and sustainable support to CAADP processes and Lead Institutions. While the TA window was initially intended as a stop-gap measure to provide responsive and flexible TA to specific activities related to CAADP, it has increasingly emerged as a key means for supporting evolutions of the CAADP framework and its lead institutions (Status Report, 2012).
30. In total, **nearly half of the MDTF support so far has been channelled through the World Bank-executed part** (Stakeholder Status Report, 2013; see table 2 in Annex III for expenditure figures per component).¹⁴ While understandable for a variety of reasons, this approach has constrained the scope

¹⁴ The share of the World Bank-executed part of the MDTF varies over time, in line with actual expenditures under the different MDTF components as well as commitments and disbursements into the fund by the contributing donors (who make the pledged resources to the MDTF available in tranches, not through lump sums, as seen in Table 1 in

for ownership and institutional capacity development, particularly since there is not any monitoring report on “World Bank-executed” TA activities. In terms of complementarity, the mix of support, through CTFs for medium-term objectives and through the TA window for flexible, short-term gap filling, was deemed adequate. The combined impact of MDTF-supported institutions and processes has contributed greatly to putting forward CAADP as the leading framework of reference for agricultural transformation in Africa (MTR, 2011).

31. **Support to the CAADP pillar framework** was initially linked to a number of Pillar Lead Institutions that were considered for CTF access in order to strengthen their capacity and technical leadership to support the development and implementation of CAADP processes in each of the four thematic CAADP Pillars. For various reasons, this approach proved problematic, and the World Bank suspended the development of CTFs for Pillars I and III.¹⁵ Instead, the MDTF has financed short-term, ad-hoc, TA for country and regional strategic planning (Status Report, 2012).
32. While discussions on a long-term structure for applied **knowledge and information support** within CAADP have taken the shape of formulating a Knowledge, Information, and Skills (KIS) support system, the absence of a comprehensive structure to implement the pillars and CAADP’s knowledge and information agenda was identified as a cause of significant frustration among stakeholders. The Status Report states that once the CAADP institutions agree on an adequate knowledge and information structure, MDTF support can contribute toward a more structural provision of technical guidance throughout CAADP processes at every level (Status Report, 2012).
33. In addition to the need for such knowledge support architecture, the 2011 MTR stressed the need for some serious analysis and reflection about how to translate technical recommendations to the practical level of political feasibility. Somewhere in the constellation of CAADP’s research and knowledge institutes, there should be scope to look into the **political economy** of agricultural reform and development in order to better match efficient technical policies with political reality and expediency (MTR 2011).
34. **At the practical level of MDTF governance**, there has been a long-time consensus on the necessity to improve and clarify the structure and functioning of the MDTF. A Partnership Committee (PC) was established in 2009 as the governing body of the MDTF. The governance mechanisms of the CAADP MDTF are institutionalised in an MDTF Operations Manual describing the composition, mandate and functioning of the PC. Despite such (revised) operational guidelines, the 2011 MTR found that the PC by then had met only three times and on a rather informal basis with irregular business practices (MTR, 2011).
35. The rotation of PC representative participants further hampered its effectiveness and expertise. In light of these experiences, the MTR-team recommended that the PC would improve its preparatory work, agenda setting and business practices. For the purpose of transparency, it was recommended to open up the PC meetings to all stakeholders by granting them observer rights. The Status Report acknowledged these shortcomings and emphasised the need for a revision of the Operations Manual to clarify the PC’s functioning modalities and strengthen its transparency (Status Report, 2012).

Annex III). According to the World Bank CAADP Team, such share stands at the beginning of 2014 at 38%, while the latest figures available to all stakeholders in the Status Report (October 2013) show the share of the World Bank-executed part at 44%

¹⁵ For Pillar II, a CTF for the Conference of Ministers of Agriculture in West and Central Africa (CMA/WCA) for the period of one year was approved as an interim measure in the absence of consensus on a long-term support structure. For pillar IV, the PLI (FARA) already enjoyed access to a separate MDTF so it was decided not to spend additional CTF funding under the CAADP MDTF (WB, 2012).

36. **Looking forward**, the 2012 Status Report concluded that, in view of on-going activities and the future agenda to sustain CAADP momentum, there is a continued need for an MDTF-like mechanism well beyond its initial closing date (June 30, 2014). As such, an MDTF II would have to be established to provide additional support to the original CTF-recipients, as well as to set up new CTFs and a new TA fund (Status Report, 2012). At the Johannesburg workshop in April 2012, however, stakeholders recommended the development of a concept note that would articulate the constraints associated with the current MDTF and explore different options for an extension of the MDTF.

4. Findings: capacity, national performance, alignment and coordination

4.1. The MDTF and capacity building of Lead Institutions

Key message: The MDTF, through the CTFs, has increased the ability of Lead Institutions to drive the CAADP process on the international stage, across the continent and in African regions. CTFs in particular have had a major impact on beneficiary institutions' capacity. Capacities in knowledge management, policy and strategic analysis should however receive additional attention. Further, support provided through CTFs, as opposed to support provided through the "TA window" (component 3 of the MDTF), is most effective with regard to capacity building. We suggest that a reduction of ad-hoc TA activities, increased focus on technical capacity building and stronger institutional strengthening objectives are relatively consensual options that should be explored for a future MDTF.

37. Generally, interviewees pointed out that continental, and to some extent regional, institutions have managed to put CAADP firmly on the international stage as the only African owned process dealing with food security and agricultural development in Africa. **MDTF support, through CTFs, has been a key enabler** of this trend. By providing a stable source of financial support, CTFs have enabled Lead Institutions to hire staff, to build up managerial capacities, and increase the results orientation of CAADP activities generally. In short, there is a strong case to be made that the MDTF, through the CTFs, has enabled African continental and regional institutions to take on a leadership role with regard to CAADP on the international stage.

38. The NPCA and the AUC's Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA) are also seen as having acquired the organisational skills needed to **coordinate a continent-wide process**. In general, stakeholders remarked that continental CAADP meetings have increased in quality, focus and relevance. Examples of this include, *inter alia*, better organised Partnership Platforms and Business Meetings, decreasing tensions amongst African institutions, decreasing tensions between African institutions and DPs, the burgeoning of thematic discussions during these meetings, and the increased engagement of RECs. Private sector involvement, despite some positive trends in the countries reviewed, remains below potential. Further, some questions remain with regard to CAADP events' sustainability and impact.

39. MDTF support has also had an impact on the **level of ownership of CAADP in continental and regional institutions**. The AUC and NEPAD are prominent examples where there is a correlation between MDTF support, ability to lead the process, and ownership. Note that MDTF support cannot generate ownership *sui generis*, but can only support it (ECOWAS is a case in point: it is perceived to have strong ownership of its regional plan, but has received very limited MDTF support to date).

Box 1 - CAADP in Senegal

Senegal launched its CAADP process in 2008, which led to the adoption of a National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) in 2010. It is one of the few African countries that have had public agricultural expenditure above the 10% threshold over the last 10 years, although some NSAs question this. Key achievements of the CAADP process mentioned most by interviewees are the inclusiveness of the process and the value of a coherent and comprehensive approach to agricultural development and food security. However, it is widely recognized that the regular replacement of Ministers of Agriculture the last decade have delayed the process. Interviewees also stressed the need to reinforce analytical capacity for policy reforms to promote agricultural transformation, potentially involving a redesign or reduction of agricultural input subsidies that currently represents a large share of public agricultural spending. According to government officials interviewed, the ECOWAS Commission has played a key role in the CAADP process in Senegal by providing technical and financial support, which it did from its own resources. The country benefitted from the MDTF through small contributions through the TA window, although interviews were only aware this came from the World Bank, not that it concerned the MDTF. In sum, considerable progress has been made in Senegal on CAADP, with an important role played by the ECOWAS Commission.

40. Similar observations can be made for the RECs, although conclusions are harder to reach, as most of them are still in the process of finalising their regional investment plans and of assisting their Member States in their own CAADP processes. **Two RECs had CTFs established during the period covered by this assessment** (COMESA and ECCAS), and two others had either just recently established one or were in the process of doing so (ECOWAS and SADC).¹⁶
41. **For those regions benefiting from a CTF**, the role of the regional secretariats in driving the process forward at regional and national level is widely acknowledged. **MDTF support to the process was crucial** to enable this role: it has allowed them to increase human capacity, and increase their capacity to manage a complex process. For example, MDTF resources made possible the designing of regional CAADP compacts in COMESA and in ECCAS (COMESA's investment plan is currently being designed while ECCAS's investment plan was adopted in September). It has also further strengthened the results orientation of both institutions. The leadership role of the RECs in these two regions in assisting their Member States with the rolling out of national CAADP process is also worth mentioning, with respondent at country level generally agreeing that the regional secretariat exercises a strong leadership role (see below). The fact that MDTF reporting takes place *vis-à-vis* institution-wide operational plans in agriculture, and not only on the activities financed by the MDTF, is in all likelihood partially responsible for this result.
42. The two regions having developed an investment plan with MDTF support are in the process of rallying DPs and Member States around regional ambitions. It is therefore too early to draw full conclusions regarding the effectiveness of MDTF support provided through the CTFs to the RECs in terms of allowing them to align DPs and Member States around **regional investment plans**.
43. Generally, the strong level of ownership at continental level, has not fully "trickled down" at the national level, where there is still in some cases a low level of sustainability of CAADP processes, a lack of clarity on how CAADP processes fit with pre-existing policies and plans, etc. (see 4.2). Most interviewees suggested that the MDTF should, in the future, focus on the type of capacity that will enable Lead Institutions to have, directly or indirectly, **more impact at country level**. This could be done by strengthening thematic expertise (see below).

¹⁶ CTFs for ECOWAS and SADC have just been operationalised, while the IGAD and EAC CTFs may follow at some point in the future.

44. Further, despite the progress witnessed in the past few years both African stakeholders and representatives of DPs expressed the view that DPs were still exercising a disproportionate influence over the CAADP agenda and process at the continental level. This observation goes hand in hand with the “ever-expanding” thematic issues covered by CAADP.¹⁷ As the CAADP agenda expands, it also requires more technical expertise and leadership from continental institutions on thematic issues. There is a view that support focused on building “**strategic capacity**” in lead institutions is now required, replacing the current institutional/technical/organisational development focus. The “sustaining CAADP momentum” exercise was cited core CAADP stakeholders as a positive step in this direction.

45. Generally, CTF recipients are perceived to have benefited to a great extent in terms of **organisational capacities** from MDTF support. The ECCAS secretariat’s agricultural department for example, has seen a dramatic increase in its human and logistical capacities: it has gone from a single staff to a full-fledged department. An interviewee concluded that “without the support provided through the MDTF, the ECCAS secretariat would have remained a mere spectator of the CAADP process”. In general, we found that stakeholders were overwhelmingly of the view that supporting lead institutions through the CTFs (essentially a form of earmarked budget support) is effective in that it allows substantial institutional strengthening in terms of manpower, management, and results-based planning, and allows for continuity. Importantly, it is also in line with CAADP principles of African ownership (a conclusion also reached by Kingsmill et al., 2011).

46. Further, at least in ECCAS, the CTF has also allowed the Secretariat to **reinforce its ties with other regional institutions**: regional farmers’ organisations (e.g. PROPAC) and specialised regional institutions. It has also allowed the secretariat to exercise a certain leadership role *vis-à-vis* its Member States, during the national processes and the drafting of the regional investment plan. The ECCAS secretariat has also been able to hire outside technical expertise (the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), IFPRI and Hub Rural) in order to increase its “technical credibility” *vis-à-vis* its Member States.

47. Views on activities undertaken through the “**TA window**” (component 3 of the MDTF) are mixed. On one hand, unsurprisingly, numerous interviewees (from DPs themselves and African stakeholders) remarked that their results in terms of capacity building are limited in that they principally rely on the hiring of consultants for short-term activities. On the other hand, others (notably the World Bank but also MDTF recipients) stressed that TA window support serves as a “pressure valve”, allowing the hiring of additional expertise and manpower when Lead Institutions face capacity constraints. According to this logic, such an arrangement allows the CAADP process to move forward at a faster pace, by reducing pressure on RECs arising from short-term demands from their Member States. There is therefore a fine balance to be struck: the absence of a TA window could have resulted in a backlog of short-term activities and assistance that Lead Institutions were not in measure to provide, even in the presence of CTFs.

48. Nevertheless, most respondents did not have a clear picture of how CTF support and activities undertaken through the TA window complement each other. This includes country CAADP focal points and RECs. This poses obvious problems in terms of coordination and accountability. Those that were aware of TA window activities concluded that the TA window’s impact on the capacity of lead institutions was uncertain. Some stakeholders were of the opinion that overly strong reliance on the TA window has a negative impact on sustainability and ownership. Many, especially in Central and West Africa, strongly criticised the way the TA window has been managed.

¹⁷ This may be also due to the limited use of the pillar frameworks at national level to guide the process from a technical point of view and the absence of institutions backing the process.

49. Further, there remains **confusion** among several national and regional actors about what are the **respective roles of AUC/NPCA and RECs in assisting CAADP national processes**: according to some interviewees AUC/NPCA sometimes undertake CAADP support activities in certain countries without informing nor involving the respective REC, especially with the NEPAD's Flagship programmes, which are sub-programmes to assist African countries in specific themes relevant to agriculture and food security, but not necessarily or exclusively under the CAADP framework and/or MDTF funding.¹⁸

50. As a general remark, a number of interviewees observed that the MDTF and CTFs were initially relatively "**open ended**" **regarding capacity building**, and did not specify what activities were going to be supported in this area. The description of capacity building activities and goals were at the time perceived to be relatively generic, staying at the level of overall institutional capacity building. Some interviewees also suggested that the World Bank Team managing the MDTF could have benefited from specialised expertise on institutional capacity building and capacity development. Including more targeted capacity building objectives in a future MDTF seems like a relatively consensual orientation to pursue.

51. The type of capacity that the MDTF has built over the past years has laid strong institutional foundations in recipient institutions. Most progress seems to have been achieved in **strengthening the "nuts and bolts" of lead institutions**: staffing, training, results-based management, process planning, financial management capacity, etc. A majority of stakeholders noted that the progress made in this domain over the past years has been impressive, and had an impact on the quality, relevance and accountability of the CAADP process overall (although it has to be stressed that these institutions are also supported by other bilateral mechanisms).

52. Yet, some interviewees remarked that too often **Lead Institutions approach the CAADP process as project facilitators** rather than as institutions giving strategic impulse and vision. We suggest that this might be due to the type of support the MDTF has sought to provide. This is not to say that the MDTF capacity building support has been inappropriate. The focus of the capacity building agenda of the MDTF has been and still is relevant. But, as CAADP moves forward, there is perhaps a need to place more emphasis on the set of skills required to go beyond process management. Kingsmill et al. (2011: 55) note in this regard that CTFs so far have focused on process support, rather than on long-term institutional capacity building.

53. This observation goes hand in hand with one clear trend amongst stakeholders consulted when asked what type of capacity they thought Lead Institutions should focus on in the future. A number of them suggested that "**strategic, policy and analytical capacities**" **were currently lacking** in a number of Lead Institutions. This idea, expressed in slightly different terms in interviews, is that CAADP will need to find a "new narrative" towards its goals (beyond the 10% of spending and 6% agricultural growth), and develop a shared vision on controversial yet crucial topics such as land ownership, the type of agricultural model it seeks to promote, openness to international markets, intellectual property rights, etc. Many of these issues touch on the regulatory framework of the agricultural sector, where there are no easy answers, and where trade-offs exist. Increasing thematic funding as suggested below could be a way to strengthen the emergence of a stronger CAADP narrative.

54. Crucially, it is these types of issues that CAADP investment plans often fail to address (with a few notable exceptions). It is also these types of issues that the expanding CAADP agenda seeks to

¹⁸ These include sub-programmes on: fertiliser; risk-management; nutrition; fisheries; gender; agribusiness; and sustainable land management (Terrafrica).

confront more openly. A number of stakeholders remarked that increased analytical capacities in Lead Institutions on these matters would greatly enhance their credibility at national (and international) levels. The new ECOWAS CTF goes in this direction, as it serves to fund technical capacity strengthening of the Directorate for Agriculture and Rural Development of the ECOWAS Commission, through the recruitment of programme officers for value chain development, fisheries and agricultural development. More frank political dialogue on these issues at all levels is also viewed as important, and Lead Institutions are strategically placed to facilitate, and in some cases lead, such dialogues.

55. Overall, more effort is needed to create an improved **knowledge management architecture** which would catalyse learning and knowledge creation, storage and usage - and in the end enable reaching CAADP objectives. In that regard, knowledge management should be considered one of the "strategic" capacities that can be further reinforced.¹⁹ In line with the discussions above, we remark that lead institutions could benefit from building strategic knowledge management capacity on the organisational level. In order to avoid CAADP becoming "many streams never connecting to one river", such capacity building trajectories should be focused and translate into a portfolio of practical knowledge management interventions. Improving monitoring and evaluations (M&E) efforts is also part of such knowledge management capacity building. Initial work on building organisational knowledge management capacity started in 2013, and should be reinforced.

56. Some stakeholders have remarked that **knowledge and information flows** can also be further enhanced. Information gaps might be more critical at the country level. Improving knowledge flows would improve the dissemination of information from thematic continental/regional workshops, which is often not optimal according to some of the national stakeholders we have talked to. Similar problems manifest themselves in the sometimes-difficult communications between continental and regional level, due to multiple languages. For example, francophone RECs signal that key CAADP documents often are not shared in French (or Spanish or Portuguese). More efforts should be dedicated to ensuring systematic and clear communication, in order to create awareness around CAADP knowledge products and initiatives (the CAADP website being cited as a good place to start).

4.2. The MDTF and CAADP performance

Key message: CAADP's awareness raising role cannot be overstated, especially on the international stage. It has put agriculture on centre stage and provided an open forum for discussion on agricultural and food security issues in Africa. However, progress at the national level is mixed, with CAADP too often remaining a process with sometimes-low levels of sustainability in the long run. On the positive side, CAADP has also often proven to be a process that opens space for NSAs in the agricultural sector. MDTF should have done more to equip countries and Lead Institutions with tools to move from National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) preparation to actual implementation.

57. CAADP has achieved a great deal in terms of raising **overall awareness about the centrality of agriculture for African economic growth and food security**, although its message could be more nuanced and context specific. As such it has an intrinsic value as the only continent-wide forum in which such issues can be addressed. In addition, there is little doubt that some of the plans developed

¹⁹ In the context of the CAADP, knowledge management refers to three main information flows. The first one concerns the management and dissemination of information and knowledge products that define the CAADP, its processes and frameworks (notably the CAADP guidance documents, the documentation of outcomes of CAADP events, CAADP meeting proceedings, the policy documents such as the Compacts and Investment Plans, etc.). These information and knowledge products generally emanate from the Lead Institutions and are disseminated to all CAADP stakeholders. The second information flow consists of CAADP's M&E system, with country-level information on the performance of CAADP and the agricultural sector flowing back to the Lead Institutions. The third flow corresponds to the peer sharing of information, among countries and among regions.

under CAADP are now in general more transparent and better owned by local stakeholders than their predecessors. In some countries it is leading to more inclusive policy-making, better inter-sectorial coordination, much improved donor coordination and complementarity in the agriculture sector, and enhanced investments by governments, private sector and DPs. Policy-making improvements induced by the CAADP, at least in some countries, have sent positive signals to private investors. Progress towards the attainment of the 10% target of public financing into agriculture is also mixed.²⁰

58. However, **CAADP remains principally a process so far, according to many observers, especially when seen from the national level or the perspective of a rural entrepreneur.**²¹ To give a few examples, most Ministers of Finance or Planning do not include CAADP in their priority budget allocations, nor in their aid-dialogues with the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), bilateral donors, etc.²² Such state of affairs could be due to various causes. It could simply be due to a lack of awareness of the CAADP where the ministry of agriculture has failed to promote it among other ministries concerned, or where the REC and the NPCA have failed to advocate the CAADP. Another explanation could be the low priority placed on agriculture in domestic politics. For instance, the slow progress of the CAADP in Botswana may partly be attributed to these factors. Moreover, general awareness about the CAADP remains very weak among farmers and investors, except in certain countries, and implementation suffers: investments in facilitation of government-led CAADP processes are still high, while financing of national investment programmes and private sector-led activities is still low.²³

59. **Currently, in many cases the main motivation for drafting CAADP investment plans remains fundraising (as appears to be the case in many countries in ECCAS, see Box 2 and 4).** As such they are useful tools to increase international (and possibly national) support to the agricultural sector (especially given that GAFSP funding is conditional on a CAADP investment plan). Many stakeholders at this point see moving from this “fundraising” dynamic to a more transformational agenda as necessary. This agenda would confront agricultural policy reforms head on. As hinted to above, Lead Institutions could provide some bits of the “narrative” around these issues, but it would require additional technical expertise.

60. This, in turn, **depends to a great extent on national leadership and local dynamics.** CAADP processes are not created in a ‘vacuum’ at the national level; they build on earlier initiatives, patterns of behaviours and are shaped by various government, donor and stakeholder interests at local level. In particular, the need for a political champion, a President or Prime Minister, to keep up the profile of agriculture among competing interests and budget allocations (e.g., Rwanda or Ethiopia are often cited as examples of CAADP having been “picked up” by local political dynamics).²⁴ This is largely dependent on the level of importance of the agricultural sector in national politics.

²⁰ Since 2003, only 11 countries have surpassed the target in any year, while only 7 countries sustained this figure of more than a year. Nevertheless, on average, public agricultural expenditures in agriculture has risen by over 7% per year across Africa (more than 12% per year in Africa’s low income countries) since 2003 – nearly doubling public agricultural expenditures since the launch of CAADP.

²¹ This is not to say that the process itself is not important; rather, that many national level and private sector actors have not seen or do not know what concrete results such process brought to the agriculture sector they operate in. As seen in other parts of this Report, most of those who lead or are directly involved in the different CAADP sub-processes believe instead that Africa’s agricultural transformation challenges not only relate to physical investment in irrigation or to crop management but also to improve systems, institutions and capacities (for M&E, lessons sharing, knowledge management, political advocacy, peer review mechanisms, etc.); and that is what the CAADP process is here to develop and support.

²² For example, RECs reportedly do not bring up CAADP Investment Plans in their EDF dialogue with the EU.

²³ Available evidence suggests that on average the CAADP NAIPs face a funding gap of 50%, with the vast majority of contributions coming from governments and DPs rather than private sector (e.g. see UNECA, 2013 and ONE, 2013)

²⁴ For example, according to most Ethiopian stakeholders, the CAADP NAIP, and its subsequent implementation (including efforts at donor coordination) are progressing due to a much earlier choice of the Ethiopian Government

Box 2 - CAADP in Gabon

Gabon's CAADP process was marked by strong involvement at ministerial level, which is seen as having greatly contributed to the unfolding of the process. The compact and investment plan are seen as important in order to raise the profile of the government's effort in agriculture amongst international partners. The planning and prioritization process undertaken with IFPRI was also the first of its kind in the country, and was marked by inclusiveness of the country's stakeholders in the sector. Some interviewees voiced complaints with regard to the provision of technical assistance by the FAO, which was contracted by the ECCAS secretariat to help countries during the technical phase. According to them, the government was not consulted on the provision of TA. Going forward, challenges include deepening ownership of the plan in the country, capacity building of the CAADP country team, and the setting up of post-compact M&E tools.

61. In several of the countries surveyed, CAADP has struggled to gain traction and become the reference framework for the agricultural sector. This leads to **duplication** of policy documents and confusion amongst stakeholders (Tanzania being a good example of this). More, and better use of political economy analysis could help CAADP become more effective and in tune with national political realities and find "traction" (the Future Agriculture Consortium's work is a good example of this type of analysis). Funding such analysis directly, and especially promising in-country processes could be a great investment. This would imply MDTF resources financing increasingly being targeted at national level activities (see Section 5 below).

Box 3 - CAADP in Tanzania

Currently at the stage of mobilising investment resources through Business Meetings, Tanzania signed its CAADP Compact in 2010 and the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) was presented in 2011. The EAC and the AUC-DREA are perceived as the main contributors to the CAADP process toward the Compact, while USAID was mentioned as the most active driver in providing financial support to the Business Meeting process. While the CAADP desk at the Ministry of Agriculture is aware of the MDTF, no funds were accessed and the procedure for applying was deemed unclear. At the time of engaging with the CAADP process, Tanzania already had a national Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) in place. Whereas many respondents stressed that CAADP was being mainstreamed through different existing and new governmental programmes, other interviewees voiced concerns regarding the relevance of CAADP/TAFSIP and its interaction with these different efforts. Despite an overall political prioritisation and increasing expenditure figures for food security, it was suggested that CAADP as such is not the main framework of reference for agricultural development.

62. The problem of "**domestication**" of **regional and continental processes is not restricted to CAADP**. Supranational initiatives on the continent in other fields regularly suffer from these problems (e.g., African Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) typically suffer from poor levels of implementation). Donors in other sectors are experimenting with ways to remedy the problem of what can sometimes be perceived as a "top down" regional and continental process that do not build on national political momentum. For examples, donors such as the UK, the EU and USAID have recently started working at both national and regional levels when addressing regional issues. CAADP and the MDTF could learn from these approaches.

63. There seems to be a **disconnect between the speed of the CAADP process at the continental level, and results and dynamics on the ground**. Some countries have just started implementing National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs), while the continental level keeps developing new sub-processes, modalities and programmes which countries have a hard time keeping up with and are not

to focus and invest in agriculture and rural development. The labelling of such national plans as "CAADP", starting in 2007, was reportedly done only for diplomatic reasons after Ethiopia fell off out of favour with the donor community following the violent aftermath to the 2005 elections..

always in line with their priorities. This can result in many initiatives that are not given time to take root at a field level before new ones are developed (KIS being cited as an example of this).²⁵

64. Nevertheless, there are instances (including some of the countries and regions visited in our country mission) where **CAADP has opened the space for civil society and private sector participation at national and regional levels**. This was frequently cited by different interviewees as one of CAADP's achievements, even in cases where the follow up on the implementation of the plans remains to be desired.

65. Interviewees noted that one should **not be over ambitious as to what MDTF support can achieve at the national level**. Awareness raising by RECs amongst their Member States takes time, resources, and patience. MDTF performance is, however, intrinsically linked to CAADP performance at the national level. In light of this, ways of better linking MDTF support to country progress should be explored (see section below). In particular, according to some stakeholders, MDTF should have done more to equip countries and Lead Institutions with **tools to move from NAIPs preparation to their actual implementation**, i.e. establishing models, tasks, systems and deliverables to sustain the CAADP momentum beyond the design of compacts and investment plans.

Box 4 - CAADP in Cameroon

Cameroon has been involved in the CAADP process since 2006, but like most other Central African countries has experienced serious delays in the process mainly due to a lack of financial resources. The process has picked up recently, partly motivated by the hope of mobilising technical and financial partners. The regional secretariat, funded under MDTF resources, has been a driving force behind the process. CAADP has allowed the country to set clear strategic targets, increase inter-departmental coordination (notably with the ministry of finance) and consultation with the private sector and NSAs. Increased capacity in planning and programming of agricultural projects was also cited as an achievement. Challenges ahead cited by interviewees included undertaking structural reforms for which Cameroon is not ready, follow up on outlined actions, and continued capacity building of all stakeholders. In short, the CAADP process in Cameroon has contributed to better agricultural planning and increased capacity, but implementation of the upcoming PNIA will be key.

66. Country-level Joint Sector Reviews (JSRs) could play an increasingly important role in bridging the gap between the architecture of the CAADP at the continental level and country-level development outcomes. JSRs are participatory mechanisms to assess the agricultural sector's performance, verify the fulfilment of state and non-state stakeholders' commitments, notably their contributions to a NAIP, and promote better agricultural and food security policies. By combining a monitoring and evaluation system, a policy planning component, a public expenditure review, and a country-level mutual accountability framework (MAF), the JSRs put in practice the key principle of mutual accountability of the CAADP. JSRs have already been implemented in Mozambique and Ghana, amongst other countries. This initiative, led by the AUC and NPCA and supported by IFPRI and the ReSAKSS, is promising and could be a way to further support country-level CAADP implementation through the MDTF. Yet, it faces challenges, given the lack of capacity among non-state stakeholders and the difficulty in guaranteeing credible, binding commitments by governments and donors.

²⁵ This does not mean of course that all CAADP new sub-processes are too fast or superfluous for the national level, e.g., Joint Sector Reviews (JSR) should help both countries implementing a NAIP and those in the process of designing it. In other cases, however, processes of recent focus, and funded by MDTF, such as the 'science and technology' or 'agribusiness' frameworks were not perceived as urgent nor crucial by national level actors, especially in countries still designing their NAIPs.

4.3. Donor alignment and coordination in CAADP

Key message: The MDTF has only modestly improved alignment in CAADP support, as actual alignment of broader CAADP support to national and regional investment plans remains limited. The MDTF is recognised to have considerably increased coordination at different levels, particularly amongst African Lead Institutions, between sectors and among DPs. Nevertheless, serious coordination challenges remain. These can be addressed by specific measures, like strengthening inter-departmental information exchange and coherence, both within African governments/RECs as well as within DPs structures (e.g. between headquarters, regional offices and national offices) and increasing systematic tracking and planning for any CAADP support activity linked to the Partnership Agreement and the new Results Framework.

67. The **MDTF**, by virtue of its key aim to support CAADP processes, is **aligned to Africa's agricultural development agenda**. Part of the MDTF, that is the CTFs executed by African Lead Institutions, are also **aligned to African systems and procedures**, not only using but also seeking to strengthen them. Generally consensus exists among interviewees on the value of such multi-annual programmatic funding to strengthen the capacity of CAADP lead institutions.
68. However, many interviewees also raise critical questions, and **generally the MDTF is considered to only modestly have improved alignment in CAADP support**.²⁶ One explaining factor is that alignment to African systems and procedures is not assured for the TA component executed by the World Bank, representing a large share of the MDTF resources as was discussed in earlier sections. More importantly, while the MDTF supports CAADP processes, the actual alignment of broader CAADP support to the regional and national investment plans remains limited.
69. Significantly, there is still a lot of **controversy on how the MDTF relates to country-level CAADP investments**. According to some DPs, implementation of CAADP at country level is what matters ultimately, but MDTF intervenes at another level and is merely for supporting the process and support structure. On the other hand, many African interviewees expressed the view that the fact that bilateral assistance for agricultural investment programmes proposed in the NAIPs so far is limited is a sign that alignment is not materialising.²⁷ Allegedly, this is due to the fact that bilateral assistance is shaped by priorities put forward by Ministries of Finance or Planning, often different from NAIPs, and by DPs' own priorities.
70. While some DPs claim that they spend bilateral aid in line with NAIPs, some of them do recognise that there is a broader need for better coordination between MDTF and other types of support, both by MDTF-contributing and non-contributing donors, to really follow through on international commitments on alignment to improve aid effectiveness. This implies that **even MDTF-contributing donors should better align to NAIPs**. Alignment appears to be sliding in the donor community and real interest is lacking due to changing political conditions of development cooperation.
71. High-level officials within DPs' structures should also facilitate alignment, including within the World Bank, which could do more to follow-through at country-level on what it promotes through MDTF, involving its senior management in each African country. This suggests that there is currently a **lack of coordination within individual DPs** on agricultural support, despite the support provided to the MDTF.

²⁶ For instance, the AUC Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture recently explained in an interview: "What we expect from different partners is to work with us in Africa and better harmonise their support, better coordinate their support and align to country-drawn and led priorities" (see ECDPM, 2013)

²⁷ This does not mean that alignment is lacking in every single country. According to some interviewees, in the CAADP "success stories" such as Rwanda or Ethiopia, alignment of bilateral assistance to NAIPs has improved.

72. At the same time, more realism and frankness from DPs at national level on how far they can align and to what, could usefully be demonstrated, while African countries could improve the utility of NAIPs by clarifying priorities, in cases of broadly formulated NAIPs that can justify almost any intervention.

73. In terms of **how the MDTF relates to regional-level CAADP support, the debate is less deep because practical cases are lacking**. ECOWAS is the only REC already implementing a Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP), but its CTF was only launched in October 2013. The design of the ECOWAS CTF is in line with the region's priorities, by providing primarily support to strengthen M&E and by recruiting staff to enhance thematic expertise. However, regardless of the existence of the much lauded ECOWAP donor working group that has increased donor coordination, it is commonly recognised that alignment of DPs interventions to the RAIP needs to be strengthened further. Other RECs like COMESA and ECCAS are longer-standing CTF recipients, using their CTF partly to develop a RAIP, but that process is still on-going, so little can be said about RAIP-alignment in those regions.

74. DFID acts as co-chair of COMESA's embryonic Regional DPs Working Group, set up in the context of the formulation of the RAIP, but -separately from the RAIP formulation process- it launched a new 'East and Southern Africa Staple Food Markets Programme' that is not housed at the COMESA Secretariat. Some African stakeholders perceive it as weak alignment. DFID explained that COMESA has been consulted throughout the programme design and that the programme addresses one of the three RAIP pillars. The programme is currently actively negotiating the details of its focus and activities with COMESA, EAC and a number of other stakeholders including how the programme will be coordinated with COMESA and EAC regional plans. Another more general question that deserves clarification, knowing that the RAIP formulation process is solely funded by DPs through the CTF, is to what extent DPs would choose to give more responsibilities and funds to RECs if its Member States were to co-finance the formulation and implementation of the regional investment plans?

75. While alignment to the NAIPs and RAIPs is a much-debated issue, more consensus exists among African stakeholders and representatives of DPs on the assessment that the **MDTF has proven to be a useful tool to strengthen coordination**. They point out that the MDTF contributed to strengthening different levels of coordination: i) coordination amongst African Lead Institutions, ii) inter-sectorial coordination, iii) coordination amongst MDTF contributing DPs, and finally iv) coordination between MDTF-contributing DPs and non-contributing DP. We take each point up in detail below.

76. **Coordination of African lead institutions and their initiatives.** The MDTF provides one umbrella for a set of CTFs covering continental and regional institutions, which facilitates coordination and communication between institutions supporting CAADP implementation. As pointed out above and below however, this coordination remains below potential due to a lack of KM capacities, and lack of clarity in the division of roles between Lead Institutions.

77. **Coordination across the different sectors affecting food security.** Initiatives related to areas such as nutrition, productivity, land management, agricultural research, etc., are starting to be better coordinated. This is, in some cases, due to the fact that some are funded by the same source, that is the MDTF.

78. **Coordination among the MDTF-contributing DPs.** By pulling together resources of different donors in a single instrument, the MDTF has facilitated coordination of a group of donors, allowing African institutions to reduce the transaction costs related to multiple funding sources and procedures. As detailed below, the reduction of transaction costs in donor support to the CAADP process and Lead Institutions is perhaps one of the most important reasons for the continuation of the CAADP MDTF.

Box 5 - CAADP in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is widely considered a “big success” in CAADP. The key achievements of CAADP in Ethiopia were i) attracting additional international support to agriculture and ii) considerably strengthening coordination in the sector, both among DPs and between DPs and Government. This led to effective coordination mechanisms and to a degree of alignment of multilateral and bilateral assistance that many stakeholders suggest should be shared with other African countries as “best practices”. Ethiopia is also possibly the best example of the centrality of national leadership and local conditions for the successful implementation of CAADP. Such good progress (including on donor harmonization) is largely due to the choice of the Ethiopian Government, well before CAADP, to focus and invest in rural development (from 2008 to 2011 almost 20% of government spending was invested in agriculture, and productivity rose each year by almost a quarter, while the CAADP Compact was signed in 2009 and the NAIP launched in 2010). According to many national stakeholders, the Prime Minister’s direct involvement as political champion made a difference, while the CAADP Lead Institutions (and the MDTF) did not play a crucial role. Possibly the major bottleneck for CAADP in Ethiopia is the scarce direct involvement of the private sector; so one of the key challenges ahead will be to ensure farmers and companies really own and contribute to the agriculture transformation agenda, also building on the significant experiences of public-private cooperation such as those promoted by the Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency.

79. **Coordination between MDTF-contributing DPs and non-contributing DPs.** The MDTF is only a small part of CAADP support and efforts are undertaken to coordinate with non-MDTF flows, like the FAO’s support of investment planning, GIZ’s capacity building of NPCA and other institutions and, more recently, the Gates Foundation’s assistance to the AUC’s DREA. The MDTF, although limited in size compared to the rest of CAADP support, contributes to activities that provide a rallying and reference point for all other flows.²⁸ In other words, if there were no NAIPs and no RAIPs, other flows would be much more scattered.

80. Regardless of efforts and improvements, for the latter type of coordination, **serious challenges remain**. Most interviewees, African stakeholders and representatives of DPs alike, say that they do not know overall amounts or any detail about overall support to CAADP, i.e. MDTF and other instruments and programmes. In current efforts to improve the CAADP process, AUC and NPCA asked the DPTT to work on tracking flows of all support to CAADP (and associate to it to indicators of results and impact) and this aim to improve tracking is reflected in the DPTT’s work plan 2013-2014.

81. Regardless of current efforts, some interviewees commented that the present approach to supporting CAADP by its many partners resembles a **“let a hundred flowers bloom” approach**. This brings serious problems of duplication of efforts by different players involved, for example in thematic support (e.g. uncoordinated efforts on agricultural risk management, climate smart agriculture, knowledge management, policy reform etc.) and it complicates implementation, with continuously changing focus on topics before follow-up on existing priorities materialise.

82. Most interviewees **did not seem to be able to point to striking lessons learnt outside the MDTF** in terms of donor practices to support CAADP, which MDTF should incorporate in the future, partly due to the fact that CAADP support has not been reviewed as such. Many still believed that coordination and “one umbrella for all CTFs” were an added value of the MDTF compared to such other bilateral practices. Without an MDTF, the risk of sliding back to a “silo” approach by Lead Institutions would be high.

²⁸ A specific example of how the MDTF has promoted the coordination of contributing and non-contributing DPs is in the Dublin Process under which mechanisms have been developed to coordinate the support of DPs (and especially that of the CGIAR system) for agricultural technology generation and adoption, including through the development of the Science Agenda for African Agriculture, and joint programming and priority setting between African research agencies and the CGIAR organisations.

83. Nonetheless, a **few specific comparative advantages of other donors outside the MDTF** emerged. GIZ for instance is said to provide good quality support to AUC-NPCA as it is well aligned to their strategic directions as a result of biennial dialogues between NPCA, AUC and GIZ staff. Another strong feature is that it combines funding of capacity building (recruit) and funding for the activities of that recruited staff, with procedures that many perceive as more flexible compared to other donors' procedures. This differs from the approach under the MDTF, which funds an expert (e.g. on knowledge management or capacity development) but often does not fund its activities. Gates Foundation was perceived by some to be "better" than some of the MDTF-donors and the World Bank since it is very neutral on policy choices and does not put forward the slightest "conditionality". Similarly, some lessons could certainly be learnt from Grow Africa on how to support platforms that regularly and effectively engage investors and producers (at the level of CEOs) in CAADP discussions.

84. In any case development partners outside the MDTF, **have not joined the MDTF for a number of reasons**, including the aspiration to pursue their own agenda, exploit their comparative advantage, ensure visibility, avoid perceived weaknesses of the MDTF and avoid being associated to certain donors involved in the MDTF. However many interviewees at national level and within some of the Lead Institutions stated that it was not clear to them why so few DPs joined the MDTF. Considering that they have a shared interest in supporting CAADP and given the MDTF's coordination role, they felt that more development partners should join a new MDTF, especially if the instrument improves. Some of the issues mentioned are detailed below.

- **Visibility.** Some comment that the World Bank has much of the visibility emanating from MDTF support, without acknowledging the role of its donors to a satisfactory extent. Promising for (future) MDTF contributors is that others have noted that the MDTF is more visible than other channels for CAADP support.
- **Transparency.** Some flag a lack of transparency of specific activities funded via the CTFs of the MDTF. Most interviewees refer to similar lack of clarity in terms of the World Bank-executed TA component of the MDTF, which does not seem to have improved alignment and coordination around CAADP. More broadly, a full overview of support to CAADP Lead Institutions, from the MDTF and beyond, is a concern still to most donors, regardless of various (unsuccessful) efforts to ensure adequate tracking in the past.
- **Target setting.** Many note that the MDTF was too open-ended in its targets to be fully effective. It focused primarily on institutional capacity building, but did not specify what type of activities or themes it was going to support.

4.4. Recent positive trends and the important Year ahead

Key message: CAADP stakeholders are conscious of the shortcomings highlighted above. Interviews and missions have revealed a high level of mobilisation to scale up what has succeeded, and address areas of concern. In light of this, it will be crucial to use the AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security to make CAADP more result-oriented and to decentralise the process of reflection around CAADP and also the future of the MDTF.

85. Many of the critical elements outlined above and some of the weaknesses of the MDTF are currently being addressed at continental level by CAADP Lead Institutions, led by the AUC and NPCA. In this sense, 2014 is an opportunity to craft consensual solutions to these problems. Further, we note that **many interviewees have highlighted positive trends in recent months**, some of which include:

- The work currently under way to produce a clear Partnership Agreement and an overall improved CAADP Results Framework which should specify each CAADP stakeholder's roles and responsibilities as well as the modalities governing relations between partners (including in the BM and within JAGs).
- The lack of senior involvement at country level is being addressed via the organisation of a series of seminars on CAADP for Permanent Secretaries.
- Lead Institutions and key partners are developing improved CTF institutional and collective CAADP MDTF Results Frameworks. This will be key to improve accountability, value for money, and effectiveness as well as to lay a strong basis for clearer synergies and complementarities among the different CTFs and more in general among all mechanisms to support CAADP.
- The fact that there are now regular AUC/NPCA/RECs joint planning meetings aiming at promoting joint learning, improving complementarity and synergies and expanding capacity.
- Informal preliminary discussions have also started on the possibility of continuing funding the MDTF or creating a new MDTF for overall CAADP support, naturally looking at some of the weaknesses of the present MDTF (such as linking the MDTF and the draft CAADP Results Framework more clearly).

86. One major process recommendation is that the **discussions on the future of MDTF (and more generally how to improve CAADP implementation) should be 'decentralised'**, including but not limited to discussions in relation to the upcoming AU Summit. They could usefully be conducted at various moments in the different regions. Limiting the discussions to side-meetings in the margin of the summit in Addis Ababa will not promote AU Member States' involvement, which is currently lacking (see 3.2 above).

87. In addition to these planned improvements, it will be important to use the international attention and focus in 2014 AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security (also UN Year of Family Farming) to effectively make progress on agriculture development and food security. This requires **enhanced cooperation rather than divisive debates** captured only by polarising discourses around large-scale industrialised against smallholder farming. Strong political leadership, multi-stakeholder proactive participation, and evidence-based dialogues should be the drivers of such international processes, not purely ideological clashes.

88. The **AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security is therefore a great opportunity in particular to make CAADP more result-oriented**, and the new Results Framework and Partnership Agreement are being developed to this effect with the objective of clarifying respective roles, commitments, and expected contributions, beyond donors, extending to CAADP Lead Institutions, African states and if possible the private sector and civil society.

5. Looking Forward

5.1. Perceived need for continuation of a CAADP multi donor trust fund, and no obvious alternative outside the MDTF

Key Message: Donors supporting CAADP outside of the MDTF do so for a variety of reasons that cannot supplement the basic aim of the MDTF. Other recent initiatives that have tried to overcome CAADP's shortcomings have had mixed results up until now, and do not benefit from the same level of ownership. No MDTF-contributing donor seems to have an exit strategy from the MDTF. There seems to be a consensus that for work to continue on improving CAADP's impact, there is still a strong rationale for having an MDTF.

89. As explained above, donors supporting CAADP outside of the MDTF mainly do so to exploit their comparative advantage in a given area, or to retain flexibility in their funding arrangements. Examples include support from the GIZ on capacity building on NPCA and other institutions, and more recently Gates support to the AUC's DREA, and the substantial work being done by other DPs such as the FAO in support of investment planning. Most interviewees **did not seem to be able to point to striking lessons learnt outside the MDTF** in terms of donor practices to support CAADP, which the MDTF could incorporate in the future.
90. In any case **DPs outside the MDTF**, according to some, **have not joined the MDTF due to:** 1) donor own agenda and visibility; 2) MDTF weaknesses and unclear governance; 3) unwillingness to be associated to DPs like the US or the World Bank (which some stakeholders saw as promoting too strongly their own agendas, including about what policies African countries should follow). However many interviewees at national level and within some of the Lead Institution also stated that it was never clear to them why so few donors joined the MDTF, and that given CAADP-support is a shared value and given its coordination-role, more DPs should join a new MDTF, especially if its mechanisms were improved.
91. Additionally, other CAADP-related initiatives that received high-level visibility such as the **G8's New Alliance** (whose underlying aim is to move faster on policy reforms compared to CAADP so far) and **Grow Africa** (which has a stronger private sector involvement focus) are not perceived to have solved some of the problems that similar CAADP and MDTF-sponsored activities have faced. Some African private sector, for example, question the G8's New Alliance and its underlying theory of change.
92. **Donors do not seem to have concrete MDTF exit strategies as of yet.** Donors are, generally, inclined to continue to support CAADP at the political level, via funding NAIPs and RAIPs, and via the World Bank and other multilaterals. Lead Institution being funded by Member States to a greater extent would encourage additional support to Lead Institutions in agriculture, given that leadership and ownership are important factors influencing funding decisions.
93. There is also some **scepticism towards the idea of providing budget support directly on a bilateral basis to Lead Institution as a possible alternative to the current arrangement.** The MDTF effectively reduces the transaction costs for Lead Institutions, who get the benefits of having access to a large amount of pooled resources from different donors without incurring the management cost, which is largely passed unto the World Bank.
94. Finally taking into account messages above on Capacity (3.1), CAADP buy-in at the national level (3.2) and Coordination (3.3) there is according to many stakeholders a clear **incentive to keep financing MDTF for the following reasons:**

- A continued need to fund the overall CAADP process and its improvements, including the ability of Lead Institutions to assist countries in implementing their NAIPs. Presently there are limited resources in CTFs for this purpose, even if countries tend to ask Lead Institutions to intervene only on some issues of regional/continental relevance.
- A continued need to maintain DP momentum on issues of food security, and to continue to work on CAADP-specific coordination of donors between headquarters, regional offices and national offices.
- Further, having one coordinated pool of resources can help avoiding two risks that tend to emerge when donors operate separately: an over concentration of resources in “donor darlings” and individual donors being too powerful in decision-making for funds-allocation (which is diluted when all DPs have to coordinate via pooled procedures).

95. As pointed out by some interviewees, the discussion on the value and continuation of the MDTF should of course crucially address the questions of “what was funded”, “what needs to be funded” and “what will be funded” by MDTF in the future. The remaining sections of this Report will also partly address the “what” questions. While many stakeholders have different responses and are open to further discussions, the Lead Institutions and the World Bank seem to be convinced of the value of a continuation of exactly the type of support that has been provided under the CAADP MDTF so far²⁹: technical, logistical and financial support; mentoring; performance monitoring; direct support to development and implementation of thematic pillar frameworks, key CAADP events as well as documents and tools (e.g. Sustaining CAADP Momentum, CAADP results frameworks, etc.) that seek to enhance the overall efficiency and impact of both CAADP and the MDTF itself.

Box 5 - CAADP and MDTF Support in Botswana

Botswana is a particular case, as its fledgling CAADP process has stalled before it even adopted a CAADP Compact. Because Botswana belongs to the SADC but not to the COMESA, so far it has not benefitted from the MDTF through a CTF. Without a CTF until now, the SADC Secretariat has been unable to provide significant support to country CAADP processes. The Government of Botswana has only received modest assistance from the NPCA, which provided a consultant for the stocktaking analysis. To move forward with the CAADP, the Ministry of Agriculture expects to receive more support from the SADC Secretariat and other institutions supporting the implementation of the CAADP. In Botswana, the agricultural sector represents a small share of the economy and it faces various challenges, notably a lack of rural infrastructure. The Government needs support to raise awareness of the CAADP among a wider range of stakeholders, to garner domestic political support for agricultural and rural development, and to build its capacity for policy planning, resources mobilisation and the implementation of policy reforms and investments. The sector also needs a greater participation of farmers organisations in the agricultural policy process.

²⁹ According to their view, such focus -on financing processes, capacity development and organizational enabling- is unique of the MDTF, and it was a deliberate decision while designing it, due to a number of reasons. Financing processes/capacity development is a long term and essentially “silent” issue and in general is not attractive for donor funding (looking for quick tangible results); so the MDTF arrangement helped to “convince” DPs to finance CAADP also on those long term objectives. Secondly, improving capacities and overall frameworks for agriculture clears the way for more efficient and effective “deployment” of investment financing in the sector- thereby enhancing ‘value-for-money’ of both those types of donor funding. Finally, systemic capacity is a critical constraint in Africa’s agricultural development, but seriously underfunded even by local governments themselves.

5.2. Improving MDTF governance and clarifying its role *vis-à-vis* broader CAADP structures and support is key to respond to new challenges

Key message: There seems to be wide-ranging dissatisfaction amongst stakeholders with regards to the MDTF's management structures and the way it relates to broader CAADP governance. The dissatisfaction seems to find its source in the ambiguity of current arrangements. Interviewees identified monitoring, communication, accountability lines and overall governance, as key areas of concern. Importantly, all this is seen to affect issues of CAADP effectiveness outlined in part 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Improving current arrangements seems to be key going forward in order for CAADP to reach its full potential.

96. During the conversations we conducted with key stakeholders on the three main questions above, a number of important points related to the MDTF governance structures and the broader institutional architecture of CAADP were voiced. It seems there is a widely felt need to improve the governance of the MDTF and to clarify its role *vis-à-vis* both the overall CAADP structures and other types of CAADP support. Many of the factors behind sub-optimal performance of the MDTF (as outlined in the previous sections) can be linked to various **weaknesses in current MDTF arrangements. Interviewees identified monitoring, communication, accountability lines and overall governance, as key areas of concern. We take each up in turn below.**

97. Currently, in line with standard World Bank procedures, the performance monitoring for the CTFs only requires Lead Institutions to report against expenditures related to CTF activities (assessing level of implementation of MDTF-related activities), not against performance on CAADP targets and implementation progress. Many have suggested that key **monitoring** questions should relate to *outputs* of MDTF support rather than only focusing on the *input* side (the delivery of each funded activity). For example, if we take the three areas of enquiry this independent assessment has addressed, monitoring should ideally revolve around questions such as "is CAADP effectively mainstreamed in overall AUC DREA plans for the future?" "has NPCA CTF contributed to some extent to improved growth and private sector development in the agricultural sector", "are the RECs CTFs activities coordinated with other types of support RECs get for agriculture?"³⁰

98. Another set of suggested improvements concern the ambiguity of the relationship between the MDTF PC, the DPTT and the BM and the prominence of the CAADP MDTF PC *vis-à-vis* other CAADP structures. While on paper MDTF governance arrangements are sound and clear, and the MDTF is only one instrument amongst others to support CAADP, according to most interviewees the reality is different.³¹ The **triangle PC-DPTT-BM** is blurred and needs improvement. While in principle the BM is considered the executive decision-making body overseeing implementation and progress of CAADP at the continental level and the DPTT is the coordinating body for all CAADP DPs, currently the **PC is taking very strategic decisions that influence all CAADP processes and all donors**, even if the PC is only a sub-group of CAADP BM stakeholders and of donors within the DPTT (see Annex II for PC Composition).³²

99. Although for some of those involved this is only an issue of perceptions (e.g. according to them the BM can certainly overturn a decision made by the PC), there is, in our view, a lack of transparency and clarity over governance arrangements underlying these observations. Many, for example, wonder

³⁰ The monitoring should of course specify that attribution to the MDTF can only be partial.

³¹ The six guiding principles on which the governance of the MDTF is based, and according to which the CAADP MDTF PC operates are: Representativeness, Transparency, Accountability, Balance of Interests, Africa Owned and Fact Based (MDTF Partnership Committee Operations Manual Version 4, October 2013)

³² The DPTT itself is also only a subset of donors contributing to agricultural development and food security in Africa.

whether the MDTF and its PC report to the BM or to the Partnership Platform (PP), or both. Not only are **accountability and reporting lines** unclear, but the reporting schedule of MDTF progress to CAADP PP, CAADP BM, and even the CAADP PC full-membership is itself also irregular. Some suggested that reporting lines should be "vertical" to be effective, i.e. reporting to higher levels hierarchy (leaders and managers of the institutions members of the PC). "Horizontal" reporting lines to "peers" within the DPTT or BM are not seen by them to lead to proper decisions and feedback which the MDTF would need for better results.

100. A recent, emerging example of **overlap between initiatives of the MDTF (and its PC) and the DPTT** is the latter's plan to improve DP coordination by tracking the flow of all aid to CAADP, dialogue/cooperation with Lead Institutions, through its different work-streams, which to some extent duplicates the key targets of MDTF (capacity building in Lead Institutions, country level support to CAADP implementation, alignment/catalysing more support to CAADP).³³ Cases of **overlap (or lack of coordination) between PC (and its lead-members) and the other BM members** often mentioned by interviewees include instances when the BM as a whole considered a given activity as of a low priority to CAADP (e.g. KIS or Dublin Science Agenda) and the PC (apparently pushed by its lead-members or certain donors) funded that process or activity anyway, or the fact that other members of the BM, even Lead Institutions such as the RECs, can access the TA Service Agency solely via NPCA (lead-member of the PC). More in general, many interviewees feel that there is never enough room for proper discussions before deliberations during the BM.

101. **Going deeper into these MDTF governance issues**, some interviewees believe these emerging tensions around a possibly 'excessive' role of the MDTF (via the work-streams and processes it approves and funds) and its PC (via the activities its lead-members promote and implement) in overall CAADP-decision-making also have to do with the actual MDTF decision-making dynamics and the composition of the PC. These are taken up below.

102. Various interviewees referred to issues to be resolved or improved in **the way MDTF arrives at decisions**. On paper, the PC, *chaired* by the AUC, is a peer review mechanism responsible for providing overall strategic guidance and monitoring the performance of the CAADP MDTF, with two support structures assisting its operations: the Fund *Administrator*, i.e. the World Bank, and the *Secretariat*, i.e. NPCA. Legally speaking the World Bank has the contract with contributing-donors hence fiduciary responsibility of MDTF.³⁴ The PC is therefore not a decision-making body³⁵ but an advisory body for the whole MDTF membership, making funding recommendations to the World Bank who executes according to its own procedures.³⁶

103. However, some stakeholders seemed to have the feeling that the AUC, NPCA and the World Bank act at times as "shadow decision makers" within the PC, taking decisions prior to PC meetings, and presenting them as a "fait accompli" to PC Members (which causes subsequent decrease in ownership of other African members and in donor oversight). According to some this has to do with **functions within the PC**: AUC-NPCA-World Bank are the Chair, the Secretariat, the Administrator and the only permanent seats coordinating the whole MDTF process, while all other PC members

³³ See the recently approved DPTT Work Plan.

³⁴ World Bank obligations as a trust holder of the MDTF are to: monitor progress, ensure compliance of grantee institutions with their governance and reporting procedures in the implementation of MDTF supported activities; and report on the MDTF achievements to the CAADP PP and other Institutions and sectoral fora. (MDTF Partnership Committee Operations Manual Version 4, October 2013)

³⁵ The CAADP MDTF PC is mandated to: providing analysis into direction of the CAADP MDTF; assessing eligible applications and making funding recommendations; reviewing the performance of previous funding decisions (MDTF Partnership Committee Operations Manual Version 4, October 2013)

³⁶ All MDTF funding decisions need to comply with World Bank fiduciary and management requirements and standards.

rotate and also have a more complex role as they need to seat in the PC not only in their capacity but also to represent their respective stakeholder-group (donors, RECs, NGOs, etc.). According to others, it has to do with the multiple roles and functions specifically of the Bank: not only is it the MDTF Administrator, it is also very influential within Lead Institutions themselves as it co-manages all their CTFs³⁷, and it runs and decides directly on a large part of MDTF (without being an African institution but a small team in Washington D.C., some complain).

104. Looking forward, opinions seem to differ on whether the **composition of the PC** should be changed to improve representation and effectiveness within the MDTF. Some believe that RECs should have one seat each, since the current rotational seat system means that REC representation starts “from scratch” every year, limiting its ability to input. Others point to the fact that RECs could improve their efforts to arrive at common positions to be presented at the PC, and that the PC should in any case be a technical advisory/management body, and that controversies over “political” representation should therefore not emerge.

105. Others would favour a totally different set-up with two separate bodies for the MDTF: an African body, with a strong role for farmers and private sector to run the process and select what to fund (once criteria are defined) and a donor body with donors having a “veto” power over the first body’s proposals (along the principles of “ownership of funds is ours, ownership of programmes is yours” that exists in the CGIAR Fund Council). Others prefer a mixed African-Development Partner set-up, but with two separate bodies: a technical-administrative secretariat for daily management (with seniority-level as it presently is in the PC), complemented by an “MDTF Board” providing a forum for oversight and advocacy towards other DPs. It could also provide a forum for interaction with political leaders, and be composed of high-level representatives from different organisational background (with, for example, seats for the private sector, NSA, and development partners not only from Headquarters but also from national Agriculture Donor Working Groups (ADWG) and regional donors).

106. Some further suggestions for improvements to be addressed in the way forward were raised by many interviewees on the **relation between MDTF and the other types of CAADP support** in the context of the continental CAADP processes. Critics emphasise that while the MDTF is by far the most visible support-tool within overall CAADP processes, it is only one programme amongst many others. As such, the CAADP BM should indicate more clearly the role and niche for MDTF activities, exactly like for any other type of CAADP support, not the other way around. Some interviewees have noted that however this would require a formalisation of the BM as a decision-making -and possibly a resource management- body (as currently it is only a platform for dialogue and cannot make binding decisions on members), which certain stakeholders may not favour for instance because it would make overall working-procedures slower, focus too much on support-allocation and probably require higher level of representation (which is often difficult to have regularly for instance).

107. Some believe that a **proper Partnership Agreement and new CAADP Results Framework currently under development should solve all the weaknesses above and clarify all support instruments to CAADP and the expected contributions by each CAADP Partner**³⁸, including PC and BM and DPTT members. According to many this is key to both improve current (funding) practices as well as to respond to new challenges for better overall CAADP implementation in the future.

³⁷ The World Bank Team, on the contrary, stresses that it has been quite assiduous in promoting ownership by the Lead Institutions of their own decisions and directions, at times even supporting related actions that were counter to the Team’s own advice.

³⁸ For instance, the AUC Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture recently explained in an interview: “First, and for the next decade, we want to pursue CAADP efforts differently. As such, we have developed a CAADP Results Framework that is comprehensive and beyond agricultural production productivity but to cover all parts of the value chain and support mechanisms that come with it. In practice, this will be the instrument that will rally all actors to pursue different efforts but are measured jointly and reported likewise” (see ECDPM, 2013)

108. This clarification, improved task-division and connection to the Results Framework should also apply to the TA window administered by the Bank, which most interviewees felt was not properly planned, was too large a share of MDTF and didn't seem clearly complementary to CTFs nor other support outside of MDTF. Some interviewees also believed that closer alignment of the MDTF to the new Results Framework would also improve monitoring of MDTF outcomes and of relations with overall CAADP. Looking forward, focusing on strategic issues rather than TA and emergency demands from African countries could also be a way of increasing MDTF funding and CAADP support in the future, including from new development actors like China, private foundations and the private sector.

109. One final interesting observation emerging from this Independent Assessment is that the **wish for clarification of MDTF role and its relation with overall CAADP Structures seemed to vary with different stakeholder groups**. Those who are not strictly involved in the MDTF-funded processes, such as national stakeholders like ADWG, Ministries of Agriculture and economic operators like FOs (i.e. those closer to the real agriculture dynamics at local level), seemed to demand more strongly those clarifications above. Many of the CAADP specialists and also contributors/beneficiaries of MDTF like Lead Institutions (i.e. those leading the CAADP process hence crafting the official CAADP narrative about CAADP-led agriculture transformation) did not, for a long time, demand those clarifications (demands which have been around for quite some time now). This has recently changed, as we explain in the following section.

5.3. Stronger role of countries in continental CAADP, better mainstreaming in official AU-RECs organs, and clearer subsidiarity as preconditions for MDTF improvements?

Key message: Going forward, three suggestions were raised during our consultations in order to improve the overall CAADP framework (hence also MDTF effectiveness): giving African countries and national stakeholders a stronger role at the continental level (including through their high level engagement); increasing the mainstreaming of CAADP in Lead Institutions and their formal organs; having a clearer task division and outlining of responsibilities amongst all African institutions in the CAADP framework.

110. As highlighted in section 4.2, while the official CAADP narrative (and CAADP-specialists) present CAADP as 'the' fully African owned Agriculture and Food Security framework, there are still many national actors and stakeholders group who do not own it. Three possible ways of remedying this emerged during our interviews: giving a stronger role to AU Member States (governments and other national level stakeholders) in the continental CAADP process, better mainstreaming of CAADP in the official AU-RECs organs, and clearer subsidiarity in CAADP implementation.

111. According to many stakeholders AU Member States are not involved in the continental CAADP process to a great extent, as exemplified by their very fragmented and irregular **participation in overall CAADP structures** such as PP, BM and often RECs preparatory processes. Most interviewees never understood the criteria (if any) for deciding on African country participation in these processes.

112. In addition, most interviewees pointed to the **lack of funding and support to CAADP by African countries themselves** as an example of the gap between the narrative of African ownership and the fact that, apparently, African countries still do not own regional and continental processes. This would include funding for Lead Institutions to coordinate and support the process. This should be possible in most countries given current growth rates, resources from the extractive sectors and increasing fiscal revenues from an emerging middle class and it is, in fact, at the core of CAADP (10% of national budget).

113. All interviewees recognised that in absence of nationally sourced funds, such as those ECOWAS had for the ECOWAP/CAADP, the MDTF is fundamental to promote CAADP and support the process at national level. Yet there is also another view that reliance on the MDTF is a kind of donor dependency, and in this sense that a new MDTF would provide the wrong incentive for long-term sustainability and full ownership of CAADP.³⁹ This issue of **donor dependency** is not restricted to CAADP, and spans across the majority of continental and regional institutions.⁴⁰

114. A related point made by many interviewees is that a stronger role of African countries in the continental CAADP process in order to make CAADP more effective and in order to gather international support would probably require **High Level engagement from AU Member States**. Lead Institutions and donors should not remain the only CAADP champions, and increased high-level attention by a minimum critical mass of national Leaders or Ministers (if not all of them) would make possible the sort of Peer Review required to incentivise further progress on CAADP implementation at country level. This would also avoid CAADP remaining “like many streams never connecting into one river” (as one eloquently put), by connecting what Lead Institution are promoting and ground dynamics towards agricultural transformation. In other words, having African AU Member States in the lead is perceived as an effective way of reducing the disconnect between CAADP at continental and national levels. This would have a “push effect” (bottom-up), rather than relying on “pull dynamics” (top-down) like it is currently the case.

115. Partly as a consequence of the so far limited role of AU Member States in the continental CAADP process, another weakness identified by key stakeholders was the lack of **mainstreaming of CAADP in the official AU-RECs organs**. In this sense CAADP remains mostly an individual project within those Lead Institution, when it should be a policy framework relevant for all departments, beyond departments of agriculture.⁴¹ As regards the AUC, so far CAADP has not been part of the normal AUC programming and budgeting process. Even in DREA, according to this view, it remained a list of activities amongst many, and DREA progress was only measured against delivery of those activities. Starting with 2014, however, this is going to change, with CAADP becoming the overall guiding principle on the agriculture, food security, rural development and environment related activities of the whole Commission, as reflected in the overall AUC Strategic Plan for 2014-2017 and the subsidiary DREA Strategic and Operational Plan 2014-2016. In any case, more broadly, many interviewees believe it would be more efficient and conducive to high level engagement by AU Member States to cover CAADP progress and decisions during all relevant AU Ministerial Committees, the entire AU Commission, the Permanent Representatives' Committee, and Pan-African Parliament meetings.

116. The same suggestion could be made for **RECs**, for instance having Ministers (including of finance) overseeing the CAADP process more directly and systematically as part of the relevant (yearly) meetings of Ministers (as it is currently the case in ECOWAS). This would also have the advantage of facilitating the harmonisation of agricultural support around the CTF, thereby avoiding the multiplication of budget lines and burdensome reporting procedures. At present some RECs have

³⁹ This would seem important for the sustainability of recent increases in staffing amongst Lead institutions that the MDTF has enabled.

⁴⁰ The “2063 Draft Document” by the AUC itself recognise: “the AUC’s Programme budget is funded by international partners to the tune of 90 percent with African countries contributing a mere 10 percent. Furthermore, collaboration between these Pan African institutions has been poor resulting in duplication and hence inefficient use of resources.” For more details on the “Agenda 2063” (an AU-led process to identify ways to ensure a positive socioeconomic transformation in Africa within the next 50 years) see <http://agenda2063.au.int>

⁴¹ In the case of the MDTF, CTF annual reports are to be provided by L.I. to the World Bank against the entire budget of the agricultural unit (including the CTF financed portion) and annual plans are also to be provided for the entire budget of the agricultural unit (not just for the CTF financed portion of the budget). But as seen in other parts of this Report, CAADP and its support are much broader than MDTF, including for the L.I.

managed to coordinate different contributions, but this should receive special attention going forward as support increases.

117. Some interviewees suggested **an African CAADP ‘control cabin’**, modelled around the NEPAD governance structures and enshrined within overall official AU organs, with some Heads of State champions, similar to the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) that provides strategic leadership for the implementation of the NEPAD Programme.⁴² Processes like Grow Africa and the G8’s New Alliance faced the problem that very high-level country and political engagement do not seem to suffice without continental “anchor” and apparently generates a level of mistrust from RECs and continental institutions. If such a cabin of command would have a function of also peer-review system (see above), some stakeholders suggested that it should not duplicate existing systems with purely a CAADP peer review.⁴³

118. In this context, finally, some private sector representatives have suggested that a clarification of overall Structures and more effective mainstreaming would also require the creation (beyond CAADP) of a sort of **“Africa Business Council”** body formally integrated in AU Structures to represent the private sector and feeding systematically private sector views into CAADP and similar broad policy frameworks (and if useful possibly receive a CTF in future).⁴⁴

119. Another element that many interviewees saw as a desirable pre-condition for a more effective CAADP (and more effective MDTF) would be to **clarify the overall subsidiarity in CAADP implementation**. Current roles and responsibilities are seen as unclear between continental, regional and national levels in the CAADP process. While the official mandates and roles are clear in principle to all those working within Lead Institutions, they suffer from a lack of clarity to many others; according to several stakeholders the reality is different and often politics also plays against solving certain overlaps between such institutions. Not only does there seem to be confusion between the respective roles of the AUC-NPCA and that of the RECs in assisting Member States with Compact/NAIP preparations, but certain thematic ‘flagship programmes’ of regional and continental institutions tend to overlap.⁴⁵

120. Some stakeholders are convinced that the subsidiarity issue will be solved once the **Partnership Agreement and new CAADP Result Framework** are adopted (the Results Framework is currently under development). Others expressed the view that this will be the case only if those two new key overarching CAADP documents list the various action plans or commitment to action of all institutions and the related task division (including for MDTF supported action and process) starting with one clear plan for each Lead Institution.⁴⁶ Such plan, which could be included in an annex of the Partnership Agreement should also provide clarity on policies (like it is done in the G8 New Alliance Framework), and any other commitment, not only financial commitments. This would also be a way to **strengthen prioritisation**: even within Lead Institutions some believe that there is no real list of priorities for

⁴² If need be a “HSGOC” overseeing CAADP could be assisted by the NEPAD Steering Committee (SC) which consists of the Personal Representatives nominated by the Heads of States ; the SC is the policy organ which acts on behalf of the HSGOC in translating policies and decisions into implementation.

⁴³ In fact ECOWAS, during the last Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources Specialised Ministerial Committee meeting held in September in Lomé, suggested that a peer review mechanism should cover ECOWAP implementation.

⁴⁴ There have been numerous discussions regarding which organisation could or should legitimately represent the whole African private sector *vis-à-vis* AU Structures. A number of proposals, including the NEPAD Business Foundation, were put forward over the years, but no consensus has been built yet around this issue.

⁴⁵ Another example often used is that delays in launching of thematic JAGs is due to conflicting views among Lead Institutions on who should take the lead (for example this arose in the Joint Action Group on Regional Trade and Infrastructure). Another example, inherited from the general problem of overlapping membership of RECs in Africa, is that four RECs are simultaneously designing Regional CAADP Compacts in Eastern and Southern Africa.

⁴⁶ According to most interviewees the existing Annual Operational Plans of each Lead Institution do not include policy or strategic commitments but only a list of activities mostly funded through the CTF, like a simple logframe.

CAADP and some Lead Institution tend to answer/react to any new proposal/demand of assistance which ends up draining resources for the actual priorities and activities where that Lead Institution would have a clear mandate and comparative advantage.

121. ECOWAS is a region where, reportedly, subsidiarity works well and the task-division and coordination AUC-NPCA-REC-Member States is clearer than other RECs. For example, according to some interviewees, ECOWAS also has clearer documents (including the CTF project document) specifying CAADP targets, an overview of what activities regional resources fund, and what CTF resources will be dedicated to. Crucially, the case of ECOWAS demonstrates that “top-down” approaches where continental-level processes dictate what regional-level interventions should do, often under donor influence, do not work. Working at the regional level entails a level of sovereignty delegation to the RECs, which only Member States can do. No amount of “planning” at the continental level can force REC Member States to delegate more power to their RECs when it comes to policies like trade, input markets and subsidies, land management, etc.

122. **Better overall subsidiarity would also improve coherence, complementarity, and coordination of the action and processes supported through the MDTF itself.** It would, for example, describe how MDTF activities by Lead Institutions relate to country level activities, but also activities undertaken by other technical institutions (e.g. the AU’s IBAR, mandated on livestock issues, which receives resources by MDTF donors like the EC to support livestock dimensions within CAADP). MDTF subsidiarity would also mean that if activities are implemented at national level by continental institutions, RECs should always at least be consulted on use of funds especially when activities have a cross-country dimension. On the other hand, linking back to the above discussion on mainstreaming of CAADP in the official AU-RECs organs, stronger subsidiarity should not mean that a Partnership Agreement creates new layers and coordination mechanisms purely for CAADP support.⁴⁷

123. Several interviewees mentioned the case of the KIS as an example that unclear subsidiarity principles lead to a lack of progress. While the need for knowledge management infrastructure and some continental level coordination was not disputed, according to this view the KIS system should have built on capacities and needs at the national level, rather than being promoting more ‘top-down’.

124. In **terms of concrete task division of Lead Institution within CAADP processes**, clarifying subsidiarity would require to some extent a three-dimensional institutional analysis on existing mandates, thematic task division (who does what) and capacities (comparative advantage on each relevant theme). While there is a protocol between the AU and the RECs, a RECs-NPCA protocol is crucially missing. This has complicated the operational capacity of the service agency, for example, where RECs are principally responsible for CAADP implementation in their own regions but do not have access to this mechanism directly.

125. Many, especially at country level, believe that the AUC has a mostly political role that it should stick to. Accordingly, AUC should bring together lessons from different RECs, supervise continental processes such as high level peer reviews and the CAADP Results Framework, and push for political level engagement and consultations on issues of continental policy relevance. According to this view, the **AUC** should not execute MDTF projects (for instance by providing logistical and technical assistance to countries preparing for compacts and NAIPs), as it was not given the structures to run programmes, something some DPs seem to have overlooked (the two mandates can conflict sometimes and certainly create confusion especially in AU Member States, with legitimate complaints by RECs if the AUC does not involve them in national-level activities).

⁴⁷ For instance where RECs and DPs already have an overall well established coordination mechanism, creating a CAADP specific one would risk duplications.

126. **NPCA** on the other hand is mandated as an Executing Agency, so it has a role in developing and promoting the CAADP policy framework and tools, which the RECs, in turn, are mandated to implement (under NPCA guidance). **RECs** are more directly involved in helping their Member States in their own processes and in learning from each other (on what commitments by each involved, institutional arrangements and working systems in each country that leads to CAADP progress)⁴⁸. RECs should also play the role of filter between continental and national processes by, for example, mediating between the AUC/NPCA and their Member States position on CAADP.

127. Finally, it is important to note, as many stressed, that these types of clarifications discussed above would also be a **perfect justification of why an MDTF is needed in the future for African actors and Lead Institutions**. A stronger role of African countries in the continental CAADP process (also through higher level engagements), better mainstreaming of CAADP in the official AU-RECs organs, and clearer subsidiarity in CAADP implementation would indeed be a way of convincing donors and sceptics to fund a future MDTF. It would also be a useful step for DPs to engage at similar higher level during BMs and PPs (the current level of engagement is facing criticisms), with DPTT only acting as more technical facilitation/coordination within CAADP structures on a daily basis.

5.4. A future, more effective, MDTF implies new CTFs to support more institutions as well as priority themes?

Key message: Some interviewees voiced their opinion regarding to the World Bank's proposal for an "MDTF II" presented at the last CAADP Business Meeting in Abuja. In this section, we put some of those views forward, together with thinking 'out of the box'. Many of those observations reflect a wish to broaden the set of sub-themes relevant for food security as well as the institutions to be supported by the MDTF. Such discussions pointed also to the suggestion that the process to design any new trust fund should be deep and take the required amount of time.

128. It was natural for all interviewees to put forward observations and proposals on a possible future MDTF while addressing the effectiveness of the current MDTF in achieving its main goals. When discussing improvements needed for the MDTF, interviewees clarified that their **suggestions for stronger impact on Lead Institution capacity, national CAADP buy-in and alignment and coordination around CAADP, summarised in the sections above**, should certainly apply to any new trust fund.⁴⁹ Similarly, many stakeholders thought that a future MDTF should take into account the lessons on the **governance of the MDTF and the importance of stronger subsidiarity**, also reflected in this Report, so as to improve coherence complementarity and coordination of the actions and processes supported through the MDTF itself and the other types of CAADP support. In this section, we report additional stakeholders' views on the continuation of the MDTF.

129. Firstly, it is important to note that, given that all the resources of the current MDTF have been either spent or programmed already and that Lead Institutions and some donors have expressed their interest in further support, preliminary **discussions have started over the last couple of months on the eventuality of creating an "MDTF II"**. Those on-going consultations, led by the World Bank, are interesting for our assignment as they naturally cover what the involved partners believe to be areas where MDTF was not effective enough.

⁴⁸ There is an official coordination mechanism between the AUC and the RECs (although not specific to agriculture), but it is dormant. The one currently used on the side of BMs and PPs is informal in nature and funded under the GIZ Programme in support of AUC-NPCA.

⁴⁹ Originally the MDTF was due to expire in July 2014, but given some unspent resources and the slow start of certain CTFs, the decision was made to prolong MDTF until the end of 2016: all four current CTFs were topped up and extended until 2016, and the new ones (ECOWAS-SADC CTFs) will also last until end of 2015.

130. These **proposals**, outlined in a draft Concept Note presented at the October Abuja Business Meeting, are centred on more “alignment to the new CAADP Results Framework, to the principles and priorities outlined by original CAADP agreement and to the new priorities highlighted in the Sustaining CAADP Momentum Strategy”.⁵⁰ The “MDTF II” is proposed to have two funding modalities (much like the current ones: recipient executed CTFs and World Bank executed CTFs) and would provide three broad categories of support:

- To build technical and organisational capacity of African institutions mandated to support the CAADP process (window 1);
- To provide technical and financial support to strategic and/or thematic processes/work streams that will significantly contribute to effective delivery of the CAADP Results Framework (window 2);
- To provide technical and financial support to specific CAADP initiatives that will strengthen the delivery of CAADP results at a national level (window 3).

131. Some of those already involved in these preliminary discussions on the “MDTF II” were able to comment during our interviews on certain of those initial proposals. A recurrent point was that capacity building was a rather open-ended objective in the MDTF I, so some interviewees suggested that the related **window 1 should in the future be better targeted** at establishing models, tasks, systems and deliverables (and the related right mix of staff in Lead Institutions), in order to move from investment plan preparation to **operational excellence** and especially post-compact implementation tools to systematically boost the sector (for example, experts on nutrition should be able to operationalize nutrition plans, and not just scientific experts preparing sound documents).

132. A few interviewees on the other hand objected that the three broad categories of support currently proposed by the Bank risk mixing up **assistance to the CAADP Process and CAADP Substance** in the same trust fund. This could complicate things and create confusion. Alternatively they seemed to favour the creation of two separate MDTFs, one destined to capacity building activities for all of the Lead Institutions (Process) and one for investing directly into actual implementation (Substance) of NAIPs and RAIPs, or for financing FARA’s research activities in support of agricultural research (as opposed to FARA’s contribution to the process).

133. Other stakeholders suggested instead that if the objective of an MDTF II is to strengthen implementation on the ground then there could be only one fund but with the creation therein of a project preparation facility (for implementation action, such as assisting the preparation of GAFSP applications and other plans for concrete investment).⁵¹

134. Other comments to the current proposals by the World Bank on an “MDTF II” (learning from the experience of current MDTF) included:

- Many interviewees would like to see a cap on maximum share of total **MDTF II that can be directly administered by the Bank** (World Bank executed CTFs); and that these Bank administered parts should also be more focused and planned in advance like any other CTF,

⁵⁰ A second CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (CAADP MDTF 2), Draft Concept Note 21 October 2013.

⁵¹ Many stressed that this would be to help Lead Institutions assist countries in their projects preparation, as it is not the role of MDTF per se to design NAIP projects. A continental project preparation facility could risk taking away national ownership, unless funds are actually made available to national stakeholders for feasibility studies, business plans assessments etc.

including by exploiting the Bank's comparative advantage to a greater extent rather than trying to respond to any possible TA demand like it is currently the case;

- Considering the discussion above on the seemingly **excessive role of the MDTF** in overall CAADP-decision-making, many have stressed the importance of avoiding a similar situation with any future MDTF, while current proposals do not clarify how this would be achieved;
- Given the need for stronger subsidiarity and better task-division as outlined above, **all RECs should receive CTFs**, and more or less at the same time (not with time lag of years as it happened with existing CTFs), as well as RECs CTFs designed to provide much faster TA for their Member States, e.g. via a special TA window, a proper database of regional experts or a mechanism akin to a **regional service agency**.

135. Beyond the current consultations led by the World Bank on MDTF II, some interviewees had some particularly innovative ideas. Some, especially national level actors, thought that -now that a minimum awareness and capacity on CAADP had been built through the continental CAADP process led by Lead Institutions- **investment in facilitation of such overall processes should drastically decrease and a new MDTF should be mostly devoted to country-level programmes and activities** (e.g. to support key policy reforms, promote specific value-chains, sustain better inter-sectorial coordination, etc.). Others disagree, including within DPs and Lead Institutions, stressing that the MDTF is not an 'investment financing' fund for national plans; its niche continues to be supporting overarching processes, capacity development and organisational enabling, although that is not in contradiction with funding also some catalytic actions for leveraging further investment at regional and national levels.

136. What is clear is that if a new MDTF is to gain traction with national leaders and Ministers it needs to speak to why it is relevant for them at country level; while it seems from our interviews that at this stage the request for an MDTF II came from NPCA/AUC (during a formal presentation made by AUC/NPCA in October 2013 at the World Bank - International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings) and not African countries (or RECs) themselves.⁵² So a future MDTF could earmark **small CTFs for each country** for programme investment and leave only small CTFs to Lead institutions to run the overall CAADP Results Framework (M&E, lessons sharing, knowledge management and communications), political/advocacy high level efforts (such as the peer review mechanism discussed above) as well as tailored training for national stakeholders. If AU Member States were prepared to co-finance those CTF-sponsored country-level initiatives, this could also be a way to operationalize the recommendation made by most interviewees that more funding and support to CAADP should generally come directly from African countries themselves (as seen in section 5.3).

137. Many interviewees were clear that Lead Institutions are not the only institutions needed to support Food Security in Africa in future: many other institutions should be strengthened, so possibly a '**new MDTF' could create 'new CTFs' for 'new CAADP lead-institutions**'. They acknowledged that, like current Lead Institutions, any such 'new institution' should be accountable on any funds via the CAADP Results Framework and Partnership Agreement, with clarity on respective roles, commitments and targets. Examples of organisations mentioned included ASARECA, CORAF (i.e. a CTF for regional research organisations) especially if the new MDTF takes a more "thematic" angle to supporting countries. RESAKSS was often mentioned as important agency possibly to receive CTF

⁵² The AUC and NPCA always act on behalf of AU Member States, but our interviewees stressed that there was no national/regional consultation about the MDTF II nor any formal request by African countries to the World Bank or donors to establish such Fund.

given their specific practical role in helping countries on knowledge management /data and monitoring and links to RESAKSS national nodes (inbuilt subsidiarity already).

138. Particularly debated during interviews was the possibility of seeing **NSAs umbrella organisations at regional and continental level receiving CTFs**. While RFOs and NSAs seating in the MDTF PC have demanded this for some time (with some indirect backing by some DPs), and despite the fact that no one questioned the objective of having NSAs more involved in CAADP decision making and implementation (farmers are the producers and the ultimate CAADP beneficiaries), according to a number of interviewees a specific CTF devoted to NSAs and/or FOs would be difficult to design and organise, due to legitimacy and capacity issues.⁵³ According to those views, “inclusiveness *vis-à-vis* NSAs” is principally a national issue (and it would be tricky for an MDTF to select the properly representative NSA groups), while financial management capacity of most NSA is too low to guarantee due-diligence.

139. Counter-arguments were mentioned **in favour of CTFs for NSA**. Outside CAADP, NSA are supported via i) Challenge Funds ii) international PPPs iii) Grants (e.g. RFOs are supported by EC via IFAD), and legitimacy is not an issue in those cases; moreover lessons could be learnt and scaled up from existing programmes supporting NSAs within CAADP (e.g. GIZ). However, other interviewees responded that i) private sector challenge funds are a different case as assistance there is disbursed on the basis of due diligence and return on investment; ii) MDTF CTFs are flexible so NSA should just approach Lead Institutions and these would include in their CTF action plans to also support NSA (e.g. a specific sub-grant from the NPCA CTF could go to RFOs/CSOs). Despite different views, given the current trend of increasing attention of the donor community to involve private sector for development, this particular topic is likely to remain strong in the international agenda for the years to come.⁵⁴

140. Another proposal emerging from some of our interviews is that (some of the) **CTFs could be organised to support key priority themes** for food security, rather than institutions (like for example Joint Action Groups on Nutrition, Trade and Infrastructure, Climate Smart Agriculture, etc.) or special windows for stimulating PPPs in the context of CAADP. This implies questioning whether Lead Institutions are the right institutions to do thematic TA and expert-work. So according to this interpretation a future MDTF should provide some resources to Lead institutions for the overall process support and continental coordination, while other CTFs would be given to African knowledge institutions and expert-agencies for priority topics. This would also generate more capacity among African institutions more systematically, going beyond Lead Institutions. Launching CTFs to support key themes would require first an assessment of what other initiatives are on-going in those areas and what value the new MDTF funding would add, taking especially into account the priorities of Member States and national level stakeholders.⁵⁵

141. Interestingly, what emerged from our interviews is that those who are **not strictly involved in the MDTF-funded processes**, the national stakeholders like ADWG, Ministries of Agriculture and

⁵³ Even in countries that are presented as CAADP success stories like Ethiopia, evidence quoted by national stakeholders shows that participation in meetings of the Rural Economic Development and Food Security Working Group (coordinating CAADP) is 30% Government of Ethiopia, 65% DPs, 3% NSAs.

⁵⁴ Even if most interviewees agreed that effectively supporting an enabling environment for private sector is more important even than funding its participation in policy processes, it is also true that many believe the more interesting and dynamic experiences of PPP collaborations like the ATA in Ethiopia are not presently engaged/interested in CAADP; so bringing them into CAADP (at least for lesson sharing) would be worth devoting particular resources (e.g. via a specific CTF).

⁵⁵ Examples of priority themes mentioned include nutrition. Many initiatives already exist in this area, such as the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement, but the general assessment is that SUN and CAADP are not yet linked effectively. In such case, the added value of a new CTF for nutrition could be to fund a process to identify and implement synergies between SUN and CAADP, which in itself requires analysis, in-country dialogues, capacity building, lesson-sharing, etc and therefore would need dedicated financial and human resources.

economic operators like FOs (i.e. those closer to the real agriculture dynamics at local level) seemed **less sure** about the need to continue funding in future the MDTF in the present format, while many of those CAADP specialists and also contributors/beneficiaries of MDTF like Lead Institutions (i.e. those leading the process hence creating the official CAADP narrative about CAADP-led agriculture transformation) had little doubts about the need for a future MDTF, with at least some similarities to the current one.

142. All the above suggests that the **process to design any new trust fund should be deep and take the required amount of time**.⁵⁶ This would ensure: inclusivity; better ownership; gap analysis on where needs are; proper assessment of comparative advantages of different Lead Institutions and CTFs, as well as the role of the World Bank and other knowledge institutions in providing TA; clarification of the position and role of MDTF *vis-à-vis* other support mechanisms; taking stock of the MDTF lessons to better serve countries, and possibly improve CTF procedures, so as to better adapt to Lead Institutions' own procedures and adapt the fund-planning more quickly to changing circumstances.⁵⁷

143. Finally, the **timing** of such process for a new MDTF needs to take into account the need for broader inclusivity for better ownership (not only country leaders but wide range of stakeholders) and the need to finalise the Partnership Agreement and the new Results Framework (currently to be adopted at the next CAADP Partnership Platform at the end of March 2014), given the importance of aligning to them for the effectiveness of any future support to CAADP.

5.5. Hosting of a future MDTF

Key message: While stakeholders expressed clear areas where MDTF management could be improved, the World Bank still seemed to many best placed to manage a future fund. Other interviewees instead argued explicitly for any future multi donor trust fund to be hosted by an African institution. Ultimately this is a political decision to be taken by African countries together with any donor interested in contributing to a future MDTF.

144. Many interviewees believe that the **World Bank's role in managing the MDTF is too strong** comparatively to what was initially foreseen, particularly with regard to the MDTF's third component (the TA window). This is due, in part, to the fact that the Pillar Institutions model was phased out. As mentioned above, the TA window has also played a useful role in filling short-term gaps, something that is recognised by many stakeholders.

145. It is also worth stressing that this state of affairs is the result of an ad hoc arrangement, and was **not initially expected by the World Bank's CAADP Team**. The Team also finds the administration of the TA window challenging, since the difficult planning -linked to the open-ended nature of such window and the ad-hoc demands for assistance- translated into sub-optimal delivery (it also required appointing a Service Agency for all the administrative elements of all TA provision).

146. Some interviewees, particularly in relation to the first area of enquiry of this assessment, wondered whether the World Bank was best placed in terms of **expertise in the area of capacity building**, or at least if the current Team would not benefit from additional expertise on capacity building. This would seem particularly important if the capacity building component of the future MDTF is to be strengthened.

⁵⁶ As nicely put by some key stakeholders, "MDTF needs to be a patient fund, but that requires a patient process".

⁵⁷ According to some interviewees any activity funded via the World Bank Procurement procedures requires 45 days turnaround for any type of change, even the smallest.

147. Further, adding to the point above, numerous stakeholders (including CTF recipients), while recognising the benefits of being supported by an existing or future CTF, voiced clear criticisms as regards the “rather bureaucratic” approach taken by the Bank in managing the fund. Despite the fact that the World Bank Team would rather emphasise that their interactions with the Lead Institutions provide substantial space for technical and strategic input into the overall direction and technical competence of the Lead Institutions vis-à-vis CAADP, complaints from interviewees included: a lack of thematic expertise on agriculture⁵⁸, which is however abundant in other Bank departments but untapped for CAADP, a lack of explicit focus and approach to capacity building of recipient institutions, lack of proximity due to the MDTF Team being based in Washington; and slow responses in establishing CTFs. **Suggestions as to how to improve** these perceived deficiencies included:

- Linking MDTF management to country offices and thematic divisions in order to deepen World Bank input on policy and technical backstopping. This could also strengthen the World Bank's own alignment to the plans and processes supported through the MDTF.⁵⁹
- More regular involvement of World Bank management for more senior advice on certain strategic issues.
- Seconding someone from World Bank Head Offices or country offices to the Lead Institutions, or basing the CAADP Team in an African Country.
- Having the World Bank contribute to the MDTF with its own resources. This was seen as conducive to broadening the Bank's engagement with CAADP. It would also demonstrate commitment to the process.

148. Some interviewees argued explicitly for **any future multi donor trust fund to be hosted by an African institution**, mainly due to (i) proximity to African countries and actors, (ii) ownership and (iii) the fact that African institutions with required capacities do exist, for instance the African Development Bank. Insufficient (technical, managerial or financial) capacities are not an argument to some stakeholders, exactly as the MDTF serves partly to strengthen those.

149. However, general arguments from interviewees in favour of **maintaining the World Bank as host institution of the MDTF** included:

- The observation that Lead Institutions do not have the capacity to manage the complexities of an MDTF by themselves. The administrative requirements of an MDTF would also probably divert already thin human resources capacity.
- The idea that the MDTF raises the profile of agricultural and food security issues in the World Bank internally.

150. Further, it was unclear to some stakeholder what an institution like the African Development Bank would add compared to the World Bank. More importantly, no clear picture emerged from interviews with regard to a strong alternative to the World Bank for the hosting of the MDTF. In any case -it was the general consensus- ultimately this is a **political decision** to be taken by African countries together with any donor interested in contributing to a future MDTF.

⁵⁸ This is seen by some interviewees as having impeded the capacity of the Bank to provide partners with “strategic advice” on policy issues.

⁵⁹ Some World Bank country offices staff we spoke to knew nothing about MDTF, while in principle the World Bank's investment portfolio in individual African countries should be fully aligned to CAADP hence also MDTF funded processes managed by the World Bank CAADP Team.

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Annex II: PC Committee

PC Members	Seats	Appointment	Additional Information
AUC	1	Permanent	The AUC is the permanent chair of the PC
NPCA	1	Permanent	NPCA acts as a Secretariat of the PC
REC	1	Permanent	Seat rotates yearly among all for RECs sequentially
World Bank	1	Permanent	Fund Administrator
Development Partners	2	Permanent	Seat appointed by the development partner group
Knowledge Institution	1	Permanent	Seat rotates yearly between knowledge institutions
Private Sector	1	Permanent	Seat rotates yearly between private sector firms/organisations
Farmers Organisation	1	Permanent	Seat rotates yearly
Civil Society	1	Permanent	Seat rotates yearly between civil society organisations

Source: AUC and NPCA, CAADP MDTF: Partnership Committee Operations Manual Version 4, October 2013

Annex III: Graphs

Table 1. Donor commitments as of October 15, 2013

Donor	Amount Committed (millions)	Amount Committed (US\$ millions)	Contributions Paid In (US\$ millions)
USAID	USD 16,100,000	16.1	16.1
The Netherlands	USD 6,500,000	6.5	5.8
EU Commission	EUR 15,000,000	20.1	13.4
Irish Aid	EUR 2,610,000	3.7	3.7
French	EUR 988,836	1.3	1.3
DfID	GBP 10,000,000	15.6	15.6
Total		63.3	55.9

Source: World Bank, CAADP MDTF Stakeholder Status Report April 15 - October 15, 2013

Table 2. Actual and projected expenditures by component - 2008 to present


	Original Program Document Budget (\$millions)	Expenditures and Commitments to Date	
		TA fund under component 3 (\$millions)	TA fund reallocated by component (\$ millions)
Comp. 1: Continental and Regional platforms support	17.50	24.7	29.49
Comp. 2: Pillar support	20.00	1.10	3.57
Comp. 3a: Technical Assistance (TA) Fund	10.0	13.25	5.99
Comp. 3b: Supervision, Program management and administration	2.5	7.26	7.26
Total	60.0	46.31	46.31

Source: World Bank, CAADP MDTF Stakeholder Status Report April 15 - October 15, 2013


Table 3. CTF grant amounts and disbursements (US\$ millions)

Recipient	Grant amount	Disbursements to recipient to date	% disbursed as of Sep '13
AUC	4.0	2.9	72.1%
NPCA	3.5	3.5	100.0%
COMESA	4.5	4.5	100.0%
ECCAS	3.9	3.1	80.1%
CMA/WCA	1.1	1.1	100.0%
ECOWAS	4.9	0.0	0%
SADC	3.9	0.0	0%
Total	25.8	15.1	58.5%

Source: World Bank, CAADP MDTF Stakeholder Status Report April 15 - October 15, 2013


Figure 1: Breakdown of Support from the MDTF TA fund by Area of Support (April 2012)

Source: World Bank, Mid Term Review Status Report, April 2012

Figure 2: TA Fund support for Pillar-related activities (April 2012)


Source: World Bank, Mid Term Review Status Report, April 2012

Annex IV: The CAADP Process



Source: NEPAD.

Annex V: Draft CAADP Results Framework



Source: NPCA. 2013. Sustaining the CAADP momentum: 2013-2023. The CAADP Results Framework.

Annex VI: Interviews

Contacts	Organisation	Position	Country
CTF recipients			
Sam Kanyarukiga	COMESA Secretariat	CAADP Coordinator	Zambia
Nalishebo Mbeelo	COMESA Secretariat	Country Support expert	Zambia
William Dothi	COMESA Secretariat	M&E officer	Zambia
Ken Shawa	COMESA Secretariat	Policy Officer	Zambia
Joël Beassem	ECCAS - CEEAC	Head of Agriculture and Rural Development and FS-PDDAA Project	Gabon
Rassembaye Ngarhimdi	ECCAS - CEEAC	M&E FS -PDDAA Expert	Gabon
Alain Traoré	ECOWAS	Director Agriculture and Rural Development	Nigeria
Margaret Nyirenda	SADC secretariat	Director, Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Directorate	Botswana
Martin Muchero	SADC secretariat	RAP Technical Coordinator, Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Directorate	Botswana
Jonathan Mayuyuka Kaunda	SADC secretariat	Senior Programme Officer, Research, Policy and Strategy Development	Botswana
Boaz Keizire	AUC	Technical Adviser, DREA	Ethiopia
Komla Bissi	AUC	CAADP Adviser, DREA	Ethiopia
Martin Bwalya	NPCA	Head of CAADP	South Africa
Unami Mpofu	NPCA (former GIZ TA to NPCA)	Capacity Development Specialist	South Africa
Other RECs (with no CTF)			
Moses Marwa	EAC secretariat	Programme Officer Agriculture	Tanzania
Samuel Zziwa	IGAD secretariat	Program Manager Agriculture, Food Security and Livestock Development	Djibouti

Contacts	Organisation	Position	Country
Other key experts/regional stakeholders			
Mahamoudou Hamadoun	CILSS	Programme Coordinator	Burkina Faso
Kalilou Sylla	ROPPA	Executive Secretary	Burkina Faso
Stephen Muchiri	EAFF	Chief Executive Officer	Kenya
Ian Mashingaidze	FANRPAN	CAADP Programme Manager	South Africa
Arne Cartridge	Grow Africa	Director	Geneva
Godfrey Bahiigwa	IFPRI	Office Head IFPRI Eastern and Southern Africa Division	Ethiopia
Ousman Badiane	IFPRI	Africa Director	Washington
Michael Waithaka	ASARECA	Manager - Policy Analysis and Advocacy Program	Uganda
William Kingsmill	The Policy Practice	Principal	United Kingdom
Colin Poulton	Future agricultures Consortium	Research Fellow, Centre for Development, Environment and Policy, SOAS	UK
Guy Evers	FAO	Deputy Director, FAO Investment Centre	Italy
James Teftt	FAO	Senior Policy Officer	Italy
MDTF Contributing Donors			
Marco Serena	DFID	Regional Agriculture and Food Trade Advisor	UK
Terri Sarch	DFID	Wealth Creation Team Leader, Africa Regional Department	UK
Damien Barchiche	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France	Food security expert	France
Jeff Hill	USAID	Director for Food and Agriculture Policy	USA
Peter Ewell	USAID/East Africa	co-chair COMESA DPRWG	Kenya
Monique Calon	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, DGIS	Senior Policy Advisor Food Security & Markets	Netherlands

Contacts	Organisation	Position	Country
Eddie Brannigan	Irish Aid	Deputy Director Hunger Unit	Ireland
Bernard Rey	European Commission	Deputy Head of Unit Rural Development, Food Security and Nutrition, DG Development and Cooperation (current chair of the DPTT)	Belgium
Vittorio Cagnolati	European Commission	Program Manager, DG Development and Cooperation	Belgium
Non-contributing donors			
Begonia Rubio	Embassy of Spain to Nigeria	Liaison officer ECOWAS (current chair of the ECOWAP Donor Working Group)	Nigeria
Ousmane Djibo	GIZ	Programme Manager, Support to CAADP	South Africa
Haddis Tadesse	Gates Foundation	Country representative	Ethiopia
Odd Erik Arnesen	Norad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Senior Adviser	Norway
Steven Rothfuchs	CIDA	Policy Analyst, Southern and Eastern Africa	Canada
World Bank CAADP Team			
David Nielson	World Bank	Lead Agricultural Services Specialist	Washington
Tim Robertson	World Bank	Senior Agricultural Specialist	Washington
Melissa Brown	World Bank	Economist, RECs CTFs lead	Washington
National Stakeholders Ethiopia			
Ghidey Gebremedhin Debessu	Ministry of Agriculture	Advisor to the State Minister of Agricultural Development	Ethiopia
Ato Sorssa Nataa	CAADP Country Team	Secretariat of RED & FS at the time of PIF development and has also part of the 2nd PIF Review Team.	Ethiopia
Ato Demese Chanyalew	CAADP Country Team	Consultant for drafting of PIF & also member of 1st PIF Review Team.	Ethiopia
Kassahun Berhanu	University of Addis, Political Science Department	Lecturer	Ethiopia
Mirafe Gebriel Marcos	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Authority (ATA)	Chief of staff, office of the CEO	Ethiopia

Contacts	Organisation	Position	Country
Dr. Nega Wubeneh	Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Authority (ATA)	Director of Input/Output Markets	Ethiopia
Daniel Gad	Omega Farms	CEO, involved in Grow Africa & G8 New Alliance	Ethiopia
Gary Wallace	Rural Economic Development and Food Security RED&FS SWG	Donor Coordinator	Ethiopia
Assaye Legesse	World Bank Country Office	ASARECA Trust Fund Team Leader	Ethiopia
Mr. Dejene Abesha Haile	Ministry of Agriculture	RED&FS SWG Secretariat & CAADP Focal point	Ethiopia
National Stakeholders Tanzania			
Robert Turner	Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives	Principal Economist	Tanzania
Diana E. Tempelman	FAO	Vice Chair- ASWG and Country Director FAO	Tanzania
Ian Shanghvi	Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)	FANRPAN Node Desk Officer	Tanzania
Danford Sango	Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)	Assistant Research Fellow	Tanzania
Homma Minoru	Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	Chair person - ASWG and JICA senior official	Tanzania
Isaack Michael	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	Country programme assistant	Tanzania
David Nyange	Ex-USAID, currently advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives	Policy Advisor	Tanzania
Geoffrey Kirenga	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania, SAGCOT centre	Chief Executive Officer	Tanzania
Margaret Ndaba	Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, Tanzania	CAADP Country Coordinator	Tanzania
Daines Mtee	Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, Tanzania	CAADP Steering Committee	Tanzania
Adella Ng'atigwa	Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, Tanzania	CAADP Steering Committee	Tanzania
David Rohrbach	World Bank	Country Economist- Agri Sector	Tanzania

Contacts	Organisation	Position	Country
National Stakeholders Gabon			
Odile Angoran	FAO	Regional representative	Gabon
Ndong-Ndong Mesmin	Ministry of Agriculture Gabon	Focal Point PDDAA	Gabon
Ibrahim T. Mboulou	Association des consommateurs du Gabon	President	Gabon
Phil-Philo ABESSOLO. NDONG	Conseil National des OP du Gabon	Président	Gabon
Mulomba Boulingui Angelina	Fédération des coopératives du Gabon	Présidente	Gabon
National Stakeholders Senegal			
Ibrahima Diop	UNACOIS-JAPPO	Secretary General	Senegal
Badiane Aminata	Senegal USAID	Agricultural and Natural resource Management Specialist	Senegal
Sokhna Mbaye Diop	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment	CAADP Focal Point	Senegal
Ibrahima Mendy	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment	Director of Analysis, Forecast and Agricultural Statistics	Senegal
Ismaël Fofana	IFPRI	Senior Research Staff IFPRI West and Central Africa Division	Senegal
Yamar Mbodj	Hub Rural	Director	Senegal
Baba Dioum	Conference of Ministers of Agriculture in West and Central Africa (CMA/WCA)	General Coordinator	Senegal
National Stakeholders Cameroon			
Jean Claude Etoo'o	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Cameroon	Secretary General	Cameroon
Manievel Emmanuel Sene	World Bank for Agriculture Central African Republic, Cameroon and Gabon	Sr. Rural Development Specialist	Cameroon
Elisabeth Atangana	PROPAC	President	Cameroon

Contacts	Organisation	Position	Country
National Stakeholders Botswana			
Motlamedi Shatera	Ministry of Agriculture, Botswana	Director, Research and Statistics department, CAADP Focal point	Botswana
Baitsi Podisi	CCARDESA, Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research and Development for Southern Africa	Research and Advisory Services Coordinator	Botswana
Patrick Malope	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis	Senior Research fellow	Botswana
Robert Turner	USAID Trade Hub Southern Africa	Deputy Chief of Party and Director for Agriculture	Botswana
Tshepho Masire	Southern Beef Farmers Association.	Chair	Botswana

Annex VII: Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terms of Reference for an Independent Assessment of CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund, contributing to DFID and multi-donor Annual Review 2013

Introduction

1. The CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was established in 2008 in response to a request from African institutions to increase and align support to CAADP. The MDTF is managed by the World Bank. In 2013 the MDTF end spending date has been extended to 30 June 2016. DFID's current support is due to end by 30 June 2014. In light of this, DFID is about to undertake an Annual Review of progress to date and recommendations for any future support. This Independent Assessment will provide part of the analysis and evidence to support the joint donor annual review of the MDTF.

CAADP MDTF Theory of Change

2. The CAADP MDTF Theory of Change assumes that by strengthening the African Institutions that provide support to Country level agriculture policy making and planning, more countries will prioritise agriculture and produce better quality policies and investment plans. These will in turn attract both public funds and private sector investment. Better policy and planning and increased levels of investment will generate sustained growth in the agriculture sector which will in turn deliver developmental benefits in terms of jobs, income and food security.

Objectives and Key Questions

3. The objective of this consultancy is to assess to what extent the MDTF has strengthened CAADP lead institutions and CAADP performance. The Independent Assessment should answer the following questions:

Key Questions and sub-questions	Relevant stakeholders
➤ Is the MDTF building capacity of CAADP lead institutions supporting the implementation of CAADP? (e.g. have the CTFs built capacity of lead institutions? what about the World Bank-administered part of MDTF? what capacities have been improved and how? which capacities now merit further attention?)	CTF Recipients, World Bank Team, country level stakeholders
➤ How is CAADP performing? ⁶⁰ How far is CAADP implementation support through MDTF-sponsored institutions contributing to change agriculture policy making and planning in countries (e.g. to what extent African lead institutions have increased ownership and leadership in CAADP processes)? what is changing as a result in the agriculture sector? (e.g. what is the perception of key national and regional stakeholders of CAADP achievements, wider impacts and what CAADP should do differently? is there an exit strategy to MDTF and options to engage directly with CTF recipients?)	CTF Recipients, CAADP Country Teams, Sector Stakeholders (regional and national)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Has the MDTF improved alignment in CAADP support? (e.g. how have CTFs and World Bank-administered part of MDTF interacted?) Is the MDTF acting as a catalyst of other work and support to CAADP outside MDTF (e.g. what are the options for the future to engage directly with CTF recipients?)? What can we learn from such different donor practices? 	MDTF Contributing and non-contributing donors; CTF recipients; selected national stakeholders, GIZ, Gates, USAID, Dutch, Canada, Norway.
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Recipient

4. The primary recipients of the findings of this consultancy will be DFID, other MDTF donors, World Bank Team, and other key CAADP stakeholders.

Methodology

5. The consultancy will consist of a desk-based review of relevant evidence followed by qualitative interviews with relevant stakeholders including:

- CTF Recipients
- World Bank Team
- CAADP Country Teams
- Sector Stakeholders (regional and national)
- MDTF Contributing and non-contributing donors
- Other selected national stakeholders (interviews will be conducted in at least three countries)

Deliverables

6. Interview question guide for relevant stakeholders by 28 October
7. The first draft will be expected by 17th December 2013 and the final report by 20th January 2014 including comments from DFID and other key stakeholders. The report should contain an executive summary and should have a maximum of 30 pages.

Reporting Arrangements

8. ECDPM will report to the ARD at DFID.

About ECDPM

ECDPM was established in 1986 as an independent foundation to improve European cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Its main goal today is to broker effective partnerships between the European Union and the developing world, especially Africa. ECDPM promotes inclusive forms of development and cooperates with public and private sector organisations to better manage international relations. It also supports the reform of policies and institutions in both Europe and the developing world. One of ECDPM's key strengths is its extensive network of relations in developing countries, including emerging economies. Among its partners are multilateral institutions, international centres of excellence and a broad range of state and non-state organisations.

Thematic priorities

ECDPM organises its work around four themes:

- Reconciling values and interests in the external action of the EU and other international players
- Promoting economic governance and trade for inclusive and sustainable growth
- Supporting societal dynamics of change related to democracy and governance in developing countries, particularly Africa
- Addressing food security as a global public good through information and support to regional integration, markets and agriculture

Approach

ECDPM is a "think and do tank". It links policies and practice using a mix of roles and methods. ECDPM organises and facilitates policy dialogues, provides tailor-made analysis and advice, participates in South-North networks and does policy-oriented research with partners from the South.

ECDPM also assists with the implementation of policies and has a strong track record in evaluating policy impact. ECDPM's activities are largely designed to support institutions in the developing world to define their own agendas. ECDPM brings a frank and independent perspective to its activities, entering partnerships with an open mind and a clear focus on results.

For more information please visit www.ecdpm.org

ECDPM Discussion Papers

ECDPM Discussion Papers present initial findings of work-in-progress at the Centre to facilitate meaningful and substantive exchange on key policy questions. The aim is to stimulate broader reflection and informed debate on EU external action, with a focus on relations with countries in the South.

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