END OF POSTING REPORT

Author: **Damien BLANC (WASH Adviser/RSO Nairobi)**

Date: **Position occupied from the 1st of February 2010 to 7th of July 2014.**

Introduction

The following document is the end of posting report of the author who took his position as a WASH Adviser in Eastern, Central and Southern Regional office on the first of February 2010 and left on the 7th of July 2014.

This report aims as being used as an "Aide Mémoire" for the person who will take over the position.

- ✾ First section presents a general overview of the regional and nation-wide crisis ongoing in the area the position covers. It is widely illustrated with thematic maps and completed with links to reference documents and/or websites;

- ✾ Second section presents the WASH (mainly) and shelter ongoing programs in each of the countries mentioned in the first section. It presents an overview of the major WASH partners for each country and the main problematic addressed. It is complemented with links to mission reports;

- ✾ Third section presents the main update and challenges in the WASH sector as a thematic policy of the DG-ECHO;

- ✾ Fourth section highlights some of the challenges linked to the position itself;

- ✾ Fifth position highlights main gaps observed on a frequent basis in the field when monitoring partners' projects;

- ✾ Sixth section describes the filling architecture of the computer used by the author during his assignment.

TABLE CONTENT

1 Geographical review of the contexts

1.1 Regional review

Beside the specificities of the humanitarian problematic for each country, some have an impact of a regional scope. The following presents an overview of the magnitudes of the different regional crisis. It is mainly focused on refugees.

1.1.1 Somalia Civil Unrest (Horn of Africa)

Long lasting internal conflicts in Somalia lead its population to flee to Ethiopia, Kenya, and to a lesser extent, Djibouti. Main refugee camps located on the borders of the country are:

↬ **Kenya (1)** (Dadaab, North Eastern Province, Dadaab and Alinjugur camps): It was created in the early 90s. It hosts a population of 408,280, 96% of whom are Somali refugees[1]. The camps population is stabilized;

↬ **Kenya (2)** (Kakuma, Turkana Province, one Camp): Created in 1992. It hosts a population of 147,612 refugees, 37% of whom are Somali refugees[2]. The camps population is increasing due to South Sudan civil unrest (see §1.1.2);

↬ **Ethiopia (1)** (Dolo Ado, South east of Somali Region, six camps,): Created in 2010-2011. They host a population of 200,556, all of whom are Somali[3]. The camp populations are stabilized; and

↬ **Ethiopia (2)** (Jijiga, North of Somali Region, three camps): they were created in the late 80s- early 90s. They host a population of 38,271 refugees, all of whom are Somali[4]. The camp populations are stabilized or decreasing.

Other refugees from the Horn of Africa are Somalis located in **Djibouti** (22,234 people[5]) and Eritreans in Ethiopia (87,654).

Besides refugees, the Horn of Africa is affected by internal displacement (1.5 M of people affected, droughts, natural disasters (landslides, floods) and epidemic (malaria, measles, Ebola fever, cholera, yellow fever, polio and meningitis)[6].

1.1.2 South Sudan civil unrest

The mid December 2013 South Sudanese crisis catalyzed the traditional antagonism which existed between and among the main ethnic groups (Dinka and Nuer) in Western South Sudan. Political agendas of president Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar used and exacerbated this antagonism in order to have the operational basis which will insure them political weight. It resulted in exactions from both parties over the South Sudanese population and in massive influxes of refugees on the neighboring countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya. Main refugees camps located on the borders of the country are:

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[1] Source: UNHCR as of 30th of June 2013 (On Internet : SomaliRefugeesinKenyaFactsheet29-1-2014pdf);

[2] Source : UNHCR as of 31st of March 2014 (On internet : KakumaCampPopulation_2014-03-30);

[3] Source: UNHCR as of 28th of February 2014 (On internet: Pop.OfConcerntoUNHCRasof28February2014);

[4] Source : UNHCR as of 28th of February 2014.(On Internet: https://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/region.php?id=11&country=65);

[5] Source: February 2014 ECHO, Djibouti Factsheet (On Internet : http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/djibouti_en.pdf)

[6] More details are available on the ECHO HIP on Horn of Africa at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/HoA_en.pdf

- ✤ **Ethiopia** (Gambela, West of the country, five camps). Some were created in the mid-80s ((Pugnido refugees camp) but most of them (Pagak, Leitchuor, Akobo, Tierkidi) were created to host the recent influx of South Sudanese. Population is 135,750 and still increasing[7]. Hosting conditions are extremely bad;

- ✤ **Kenya** (Kakuma, See §1.1.1): It hosts a population of 147,612 refugees, 42% of whom are South Sudanese refugees[8]. The camps population is increasing due to the continuous influx of South Sudanese refugees. Camps extension is prospected at a 60 km distance from Kakuma;

- ✤ **Uganda** (Adjumani, Arua and Kiryandongo, North East of the country, three camps). They were created in December 2013 with the first arrivals of South Sudanese refugees. It hosts a population of 81,345[9], all of whom are South Sudanese[10]. The camp population is increasing daily threatening the hosting capacities of the camp (initially designed for 100,000); and

- ✤ **Sudan:** Some 67,401 South Sudanese are reported crossing the border to Sudan[11] located nearby the border at Kilo 10 camp.

1.1.3   DRC civil unrest

Since the mid-90s, long lasting internal conflicts in DRC lead its population to flee to Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda. Main refugees camps located on the border of the country are:

- ✤ **Tanzania** (Nyarugusu, Kigoma Region, one camp).. It was created in 1996-97. It hosts a total population of 68, 038 refugees, 94% of whom are Congolese[12]. The camp population is stabilized;

- ✤ **Burundi** (Regions of Ruyigi, Muyinga, Ngozi, Kancuzo and Bujumbura, Bwagiriza, Gasorwe, Kinama, Masasa and Kavumu camps). Those camps were created between 1996 and 2013 (Kavumu). They host a total refugee's population of 45,914, 99% of whom are Congolese[13]. The camps populations are stabilized;

- ✤ **Rwanda** (District of Rubavu, Gicumbi, Gatsibo, Karongi & Nyamagaba, camps of Nkamira(TC), Gihembe, Nyabiheke, Kiziba & Kigeme). Those camps were created between the 90s and 2012 (Kigeme, Nyabiheke). They host a total refugee's population of 74,089, 99% of whom are Congolese[14]. The camps populations are stabilized since 2013; and

- ✤ **Uganda** (District of Koboko, Hoima and Kisoro, settlements of Koboko, Kyangwali and Rwamanja). Those settlements were created over the past decades to host Congolese fleeing from the unrest in the Eastern of the Country (North Kivu). Main settlements are Koboko (3,701 refugees), Kyangwali (38,782) and Rwamwanja (53, 734)[15] for a total refugee population in Uganda of 172,650[16].

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[7] Source :*Op. Cit.*

[8] Source : UNHCR as of 31st of March 2014 (Internet: KakumaCampPopulation_2014-03-30).

[9] Source: UNHCR as of 14th of March 2014 (Internet: UNHCRSouthSudanSituationUpdate716MARCH2014). Other sources at : http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=229.

[10] Source: UNHCR as of 28th of February 2014 (Internet: Pop.OfConcerntoUNHCRasof28February2014).

[11] Source: OCHA: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan_Humanitarian_Snapshot_30_April_2014.pdf

[12] Source: UNHCR as of May 2013 (Internet: http://www.unhcr.org/524d87c99.html).

[13] Source : UNHCR as of January 2014 (Internet : http://www.unhcr.org/512f7e986.html).

[14] Source : UNHCR as of September 2013 (Internet : http://www.unhcr.org/524d86a69.html).

[15] UNHCR Uganda Emergency update 23-29 April 2014.

[16] Source: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483c06.html

1.1.4 CAR civil unrest

In December 2012, a multiple coalition of armed groups united as the Seleka Alliance. They ousted President Bozize in March 2013. Anti-Balaka groups opposed to the Seleka reached the capital in December 2013 and ousted the Seleka supported President Djotodia. The fighting antagonized factions on religious basis and expanded to the whole population: Muslims (Seleka) versus Christians (Anti-Balaka). The unprotected Central African Muslims try fleeing to the bordering countries:

✥ **DRC**: (Province Equateur, camps of Boyabu, Inke and Mole): The CAR refugees are located in camps (27,112) and their surroundings (22,461)[17]. The population in the camps is increasing (Boyabu), stable (Mole) or decreasing (Inke). Nevertheless, due to the ongoing unrest in CAR and the high number of refugees outside the camps, those trends are considered as volatile;

✥ **Cameroon**: In Cameroun, CAR refugees are settled in sites (more than 300) located in rural East (114,046 refugees), Adamaoua (53,673) and North (2,751) regions along the border and in urban areas (Yaoundé: 8,206 & Douala: 5860)[18]. A part from the North Region, the refugees' population is increasing;

✥ **Chad** : CAR Refugees are located in two main regions: Logone Oriental (Dosseye, Gondje and Amboko areas: 41,815 refugees), Grand Sido (Belom and Moyo areas: 41,011) for a total national caseload of 97,833 refugees[19]. The number of sites and camps is unclear at that time and population tends to increase in most areas but Gondje; and

✥ **Congo Brazaville**: Total Car refugees' population is 15,615 mainly located in Likouala Department, in Betou camp (4,919 refugees) and its surrounding (7,410) on the border with CAR, in Brazaville (2,610), and other places to a lesser extent (676)[20]. Trends are in the increase of refugees in Betou area.

1.1.5 Southern Africa Disaster Preparedness

Southern African countries (Mozambique, Madagascar, Malawi) are prone to natural disasters (floods, cyclones, locust) which combined with weak institutions weaken the population's coping mechanisms.

Since 2008, ECHO has been supporting Disaster Preparedness actions (DIPECHO) in those countries. From the 1st to the ongoing 4th DIPECHO, the aim is to strengthen and capacitate the community in order to enhance their resilience.

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[17] Source : UNHCR as of 17th of April 2014 (Internet : http://data.unhcr.org/car/settlement.php?id=35&country=46&region=29).

[18] Source : UNHCR as of 25th of April 2014 (Internet : http://data.unhcr.org/car/settlement.php?id=80&country=44&region=36).

[19] Source: UNHCR as of between 15 and 29th of April. The total figure includes some 7,500 refugees who were there before the CAR 2012 unrest (Internet: http://data.unhcr.org/car/country.php?id=41).

[20] Source: UNHCR as of between 15 and 23rd of April (Internet: http://data.unhcr.org/car/country.php?id=45).

1.2   Country review

1.2.1   Sudan

Sudan is bearing the aftermath of the Darfur Crisis which started in 2003 and resulted in 1,8 million of IDPs in the Darfur Region. In 2009, the Government of Sudan expelled most of the international INGOS working in the Darfur region and those still active are working under high pressure and administrative constraints from the authorities.

Between 2010 and 2014, the Darfur context remained quite volatile with exactions on local populations. Within the five states of Darfur, tensions in South and North Darfur used to be the most recurrent and violent. Very recently (2013) it even affected the West Darfur Region. Reason for populations' harassments is a blurry mixture between land issues, pastoralists and farmers, ethnic antagonism and heavily armed banditry.

Main consequences are:

- ✥ A pendulum movement between the IDPs camps and lands of origin with camps playing an attractive role for both security and access to commodities (food, WASH, health care, etc.); and

- ✥ An establishment in new areas where the populations feel safer but has no or very limited access to basic services (see map page 5).

The Darfur crisis extended to the south of the country (South Kordofan, White and Blue Nile Regions) with a supplementary layer of tensions linked to the disputed territory of Abyei between South Sudan and Sudan and the control of the oil fields and their related production facilities.

The core emergency response in both areas consists in support to IDPs camps and rapid response.

Late 2013, the clash in South Sudan resulted in movements of South Sudanese in the Sub-Region, including Sudan. Refugees are located near the border with South Sudan (Camp Kilo 10). Humanitarian access is limited[21], situation is reported under control but exposed to continuous influx (See map page 6). As of 30th of April, more than 67,000 South Sudanese have fled to Sudan.

Links:

HIP 2014 Sudan:

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/sudan-southsudan_en.pdf

EC online data:

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/sudan_fr.htm

ECHO Factsheet on Sudan

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/sudan_en.pdf

Reference maps (OCHA) :

http://unocha.org/sudan/maps-graphics/thematic-maps

Mission reports on office computer :

C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Sudan\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission report

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[21] Only INGO present on the 22nd of May was MSF.

OCHA

Displacements in Darfur since late February 2014

192,162 IDPs
on 25 May 2014
118,732 verified returns

Total displacement

Displacements in Darfur between January and late February 2014

11,035 IDPs (no returns verified)

These displacements took place in South and East Darfur and were caused by inter-communal fighting, tensions and insecurity

2,000 (HAC) people displaced to unknown locations in South Darfur

1,435 (IOM) people arrived in Al Salam camp

1,325 people arrived in Khor Omer camp

800 (IOM) people arrived in El Serif camp

4,000 (HAC) people arrived in Dimo village

1,475 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in Yassin town

327 (WFP) people displaced within Alliet locality

1,800 (WFP) people displaced within Alliet locality

458 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in El Neem camp

135 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in Seleia town

273 (Community leaders) people arrived in Yassin town

437 (Community leaders) people arrived in Higeig village

1,233 (Community leaders) people arrived in Sania Afando village

5,000 (IOM tracking hubs) people arrived in Keikei/Sania Deleiba

4,400 (WFP) people arrived in Melit team site

12,500 (Community leaders) people displaced within Kutum, Melit and El Fasher localities

23,737 (WFP/WFP partners) people arrived in villages in El Fasher locality

40,732 (IOM tracking hubs) people arrived in Zamzam camp

4,310 (Local Community) people arrived in Nifasha and Shadad camps, Shangil Tobay town

3,094 (UNAMID) people arrived in Khor Abeche team site

1,314 (IA needs assessment) people displaced within El Taweisha locality

3,310 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in Labado team site

1,369 (IOM) people arrived in Belel camp

16,296 (IOM/HAC) people arrived in Kalma camp

8,281 (IOM) people arrived in El Serif camp

12,453 (IOM) people arrived in Al Salam camp

11,653 (IOM/HAC) people arrived in Otash camp

3,057 (IOM/HAC) people arrived in Dereige camp

7,200 (WFP/WFP partners) people arrived in Korma town and Korma team site

850 (NSF-EO/OeB) people arrived in El Sireaf town

8,480 (IA needs assessment-AC) people arrived in 5 villages in Kreinik locality

730 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in Sanidadi village

500 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in Hashaba village

3,350 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in Umtajouk village

1,530 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in Hameedia camp

13,298 (WFP) people arrived in Tawilla town and surrounding camps

55 (IA needs assessment) people arrived in Al Salam camp

NORTH DARFUR
WEST DARFUR
CENTRAL DARFUR
SOUTH DARFUR
EAST DARFUR
CHAD

El Geneina
Zalingei
El Fasher
Nyala
Ed Daein

Assessments

Assistance

Legend

Colour denotes level of access
Accessible
Restricted
Intermittent or no access in past 1 year

State capital
Primary town
IDP camp
Airport/main
Airfield
Conflict
UNAMID Team site

Update on displacement in Darfur as of 25th of May 2014 (Source: OCHA)

↗ 916 (HAC/WFP) displaced to El Roseires locality
Response:

↗↗ 549 (COR) arrived to Ed Damazin town

↗ 956 (HAC/WFP) displaced to Al Tadamon locality
Response:

↗ 4,280 (HAC/WFP) displaced within Geissan locality
Response:

↗ 4,300 (HAC) returned to Diglo
Response:

↗ 2,004 (HAC/WFP) displaced within Kurmuk locality
Response:

↗↗ 3,625 (ASSIST) arrived to Blue Nile State

↗ 2,383 (HAC/WFP) displaced within Bau locality
Response:

↗ 2,000 (UNHCR) returned to Blue Nile State

↗↗ 35,229 (HAC/COR) arrived to White Nile State

↗ 2,350 (HAC) displaced to Um Baraka

↗ 4,016 (VRRC) returned to Um Baraka

↗ 70,000 (SPLM-N) displaced in areas with no access

↗ 10,817 (HAC/IOM) displaced to Rashad town
Response: / / : 10,817,
Gaps:

↗ 5,483 (VRRC) returned to El Fayd

↗↗ 3,121 (HAC/IOM) arrived to Abu Jubaiha locality
Response: / / : 3,121,
: 409

↗ 13,896 (VRRC) returned to Abu Kershola
Response: : 29,764 : 4,800,
: 3,280, : 751, : 100,

↗ 20,000 (SPLM-N) displaced in areas with no access

↗↗ 10,711 (HAC/IOM) arrived to El Leri town
Response: : 10,711, : 7,260,
: 6,300, : 2,000, : 1,005
Gap: : 4,411, : 461

↗ 4,116 (VRRC) returned to Umm Barambita

↗ 2,253 (VRRC) returned to Khor El Daliab

↗ 125 (HAC/SRCS) displaced to Dalami town
Response: : 125,
Gap:

↗ 102 (HAC) displaced to Habila locality

LEGEND
◉ State capital
◎ Primary town
• Settlement
Displaced people
Returnees
Reported conflict
Areas with no / restricted access (approximate and for informative purpose only)
South Sudanese arrivals
K10 relocation site
Localities that have received South Sudanese arrivals

Response:
Education, Food, Health, NFIs, Nutrition, Wash

South Kordofan and Blue Nile Population movement as of 30th of April 2014 (Source: OCHA)

Until Mid-December 2013, South Sudan was confronted to medium intensity conflict affecting mainly states located on the Easter side of the country (Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei). Reason for populations' harassments consisted mainly in ethnic antagonism mixed with banditry among pastoralists (cattle robbery).

It resulted in low to medium scale populations' movements and core humanitarian support focused on short term emergency response.

Another source of tension was conflict over the disputed area of Abyei between South Sudan and Sudan resulting in movement of population in Western Bahr el Ghazal and Unity).

In December 2013, clash between the President Salva Kiir (of Dinka ethnic group) and his Vice President Riek Machar (Nuer) catalyzed those tensions and resulted in massive movements of population within and outside the country. Most affected areas are Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States (See map p8). As of now, it is considered that this crisis will severely affect more than 1 in 2 South Sudanese by December 2014. 4 million people face alarming food insecurity, up to 1.5 million people become internally displaced, 863,000 people seek refuge in neighbouring countries (see §1.1.2).

In the meantime, some 270,000 Sudanese refugees remain in South Sudan in Upper Nile (Maban County) and Unity (Yida County).

Access to those populations depends on the level of violence in the area. Some of the IDPs have sought refuge in UNMIS controlled area (so called PoC: Protection of Civilians) where they can receive shelter and some limited humanitarian support due to lack of space and access. Support has started to deploy beyond those PoC but is still very dependent on the attacks of any of the two groups involved in the unrest.

On April 23rd , cholera outbreak was declared in Juba. Cholera cases are 188 as of 19th of May with 9 fatalities (see map page 9[22]). Main response is led by WHO, UNICEF, MEDAIR & MSF (case management) and UNICEF, PAH, MEDAIR, Oxfam, People in Need & NPA (WASH). Juba water services are extremely poor with a production which covers no more than 7% of the population's need and network losses estimated at 65%. Most people rely on the Nile river to cover their needs. In terms of sanitation, average is one shared latrine per 10 households.

So far the epidemic is contained in Juba but it is feared to spread across country and beyond (as it happened in 2008) :IDPs fleeing the country use the Nile River and pass through Juba where the first case is believed to originate from (through Nile River water drinking).

Links:

HIP 2014 Sudan:

 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/sudan-southsudan_en.pdf

EC online data:

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/south-sudan_fr.htm

ECHO Factsheet on South Sudan :

 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/south-sudan_en.pdf

Reference maps (USAID) :

http://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/recent-reported-incidents-violence-south-sudan-21-may-2014

OCHA Situation Report:

http://southsudan.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/UNOCHA%20Sitrep%20%2337%20-%2024May2014.pdf

Cholera data in office computer:

C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 South Sudan\00 Contextual\00 Thematic Cholera 2014

Mission report in office computer:

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[22] Latest update available on 1st of June is 1,124 cumulated cases with 27 fatalities (Source ECHO Flash report of the 4th of June).

Recent report of Incident as of 21st of May 2014 (Source USAID)

Cholera Outbreak Situation as of 19th of May in Juba (Source: WHO)

Juba na-Bari

Kworjik

Kworjit

Nyaing

Luwe (Gezira)

Munuki Block 'A'

Munuki Block 'B'

Munuki Block 'C'

Juba Airport Premises

Juba na-Bari

Hai Gudele

Munuki

Tongping

Ghabat

Kuweit

Tarawar

Mudria

Jalaba

Amarat

Temeregia

Juba Town

Dar-el-Salam

Suk Hager

Ministries

Gonya

Muozifin

JTH

Rock City

Mouna

Buluk

Mobil

Jerusalem

Gezira

Zendia

Hai Cinema

Nyakama

Soura

MTC

Juba University

Nimra Talata

Neem

Malakal

Nyakuron

Hai Negli

Malakal Cemetary

Jebel Kujur

Atlabara 'B'

Konyo Konyo Market

Atlabara 'C'

Atlabara 'A'

Malakia

Hai Kator West

Konyo Konyo

Nyakuron Imtidat

Kator

Hai Jebel

Hai Gumbo

Lologu

Legend

G	Health Facilities
G	Cholera cases
	Landmarks
	River
	Swamps

1.2.3 Ethiopia

Ethiopia is recurrently affected by droughts and weather hazards which result in food insecurity. The 2013-2014 cycle is considered as of medium risk as per food insecurity is concerned.

Number of clan clashes and flood regularly affect Ethiopia and result in populations' movement. There are 412 600 IDPs in country as of February 2014.

Ethiopia is hosting 453 000 refugees coming for the bordering countries (53% Somalis, 19.5% South Sudanese, 19% Eritrean s, 7.5% Sudanese and 1% others). Main camps are located in Dolo Ado (200 556 Somali refugees, cf. §1.1.1), Gambela (135 750 South Sudanese refugees cf. §1.1.2) and in Benishangui Gumuz (Ethiopia, West of the country, five camps). Population is 40,781 most of whom are Sudanese (80%)[23].

Cholera affects the country once every five to seven years on average. The influx of South Sudanese refugees coming from cholera affected areas (Juba, cf.§1.2.2) could trigger an outbreak in the region where hosting conditions are very poor, sanitation wise.

Main humanitarian response consists in rapid response and support to basic services in camps.

Location of main refugees camps in Ethiopia (Source UNHCR)

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[23] Source: *Op. Cit.*

Mission report in office computer:

C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Ethiopie\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report

1.2.4 Djibouti

Djibouti is also a major transit point for mixed migration to the Arabian Peninsula, via Yemen. In 2012, about 107 000 people transited through the country. In 2013, the numbers are reduced, partly due to more difficult access to Saudi Arabia, and mass expulsions from the country.

There are Over 22 000 registered refugees in Djibouti, mainly in two remote camps, Ali Addeh and Hol Hol, while a number live in urban areas. The majority of the refugees are from Somalia, with a section coming from Eritrea.

The refugee crisis is a combination of protracted and current caseloads, with some refugees having arrived in Djibouti 20 years ago, and new refugees still arriving. The most urgent need remain shelter, water, protection, and finding durable solutions for the refugees[24].

Main humanitarian support consists in addressing the needs of the refugees. DRR activities are also supported in the agricultural sector in order to secure access to water and food diversity.

Location of main refugees camps in Djibouti (Source UNHCR)

Links:

HIP 2014 Horn of Africa:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/HoA_en.pdf
EC online data:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/djibouti_en.htm
ECHO Factsheet on Ethiopia:

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[24] Source: ECHO, Factsheet on Djibouti, February 2014.

1.2.5   Somalia

The food security outlook has improved marginally compared to September 2013 but a significant part of the population is living in precarious conditions and remains at risk of sliding back into crisis. The nutrition situation for children under five remains very critical, particularly in the southern regions worst hit by famine in 2011.

Somalia's 1.1 million displaced people are in a particularly vulnerable situation; 75%of those unable to meet their household food needs are also displaced and often face violence, discrimination and abuse.

Conflict and violence continue to cause displacement and disrupt agriculture and markets, with negative consequences on the food security situation.

Operating conditions in Somalia are extremely difficult, and aid workers face security threats and restrictions to access the people most in need, rendering it more important than ever to fully apply and respect the humanitarian principles in any intervention.

Today's humanitarian situation is similar to conditions prior to the 2011 famine–numbers are showing slight improvements but resources are dwindling and access remains a challenge

Main humanitarian support consists in life-saving interventions in the areas of protection, food security, health, nutrition, shelter, water/sanitation/hygiene and coordination of aid.

These actions will focus mainly on the most affected regions of south and central Somalia, where needs are still the greatest. In addition, it will also address pockets of vulnerability in Puntland and Somaliland[25].

Links:

[25] Source: ECHO, Factsheet on Somalia, February 2014

OCHA

Somalia is at risk of sliding back into crisis because its fragile food security situation is likely to deteriorate in the coming months. This is due to a combination of delayed rains, rising food prices and continued conflict especially in agro-pastoral areas of southern and central Somalia. Conditions are worryingly similar to the pre-famine period of 2010. Despite the serious situation, funding for Somalia in 2014 is critically low.

POPULATION MOVEMENT

72,700 people are temporarily displaced[1]

Includes 21,000 people unverified in Hiraan

7 regions directly/indirectly affected by military offensive

The military offensive has led to population movements and slowed down planting in affected areas. It also resulted in increased food prices in towns affected by the Al Shabaab blockage of main supply routes.

# of population movements by region (in thousands)

Hiraan 27.0
Bakool 7.0
Bay 17.0
Banadir 8.4
Lower Shabelle 9.4
Gedo 3.1
Lower Juba 0.9
Mogadishu

IMPACT ON FOOD SECURITY

The food security and nutrition situation are likely to deteriorate if movement and trade restrictions persist and the current rains fail, according to Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), and Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM).

Seasonal calendar[3]

Jilaal dry season
Gu rains
Hagaa dry season
Deyr rains

J F M A M J J A S O N D

203,000 children are estimated to be acutely malnourished

25% of these children are severely malnourished

Improved rainfall will be critical in parts of the north where access to water for people and livestock is currently low.

Main Areas experiencing dry conditions

Bari
Sanaag
Sool
Nugaal
Mudug
Togdheer
Woqooyi Galbeed
Galgaduud

FUNDING

Somalia CAP is only 17% funded and $773 million is still needed by the end of the year.[4]

US$773 million requirement

17% funded ($160 million)

Map

INDIAN OCEAN

Gulf of Aden

YEMEN
DJIBOUTI
ERITREA
ETHIOPIA
KENYA

Bari 170
Sanaag 65
Nugaal 73
Sool 46
Mudug 160
Togdheer 132
Woqooyi Galbeed 220
Awdal 85
Galgaduud 133
Middle Shabelle 212
Banadir 568
Hiraan 120
Mogadishu
Lower Shabelle 255
Bakool 115
Bay 203
Gedo 105
Middle Juba 94
Lower Juba 144

2.9 million people in need

People in emergency 0.1M
People in crisis 0.8M
People in stressed 2.0M

Livelihood zones
Riverine
Agropastoral

# of people in need (in thousands)[2]

50 km

Humanitarian Snapshot as of May 2014 (Source OCHA)

13

1.2.6 Uganda

ECHO closed its office in Uganda in 2011 as humanitarian crisis had reduced since the reduction of Lord Resistance Army exactions. Until December 2013, main support was to Congolese refugees fleeing the Kivu region located in the West and South West part of the country (total population 172, 650 See §1.1.3).

The massive influx of South Sudanese refugee in the North and North West part of the country (81,345, see §1.1.2) surprized the humanitarian communities. Main response is provided by UNICEF & UNHCR with their implementing partners (DRC, URC). In order to cope with the expected next influx of refugees (up to total 300,000[26]), their response strategy needs to be focused on an emergency mode (as of now, it remains very development oriented).

A cholera outbreak started on March the 21st in the North West of the country (Rhino camp) in an area hosting South Sudanese refugees (Arua settlement). Cumulated number of cases was 107 as of beginning of May (with 6 fatalities) most of whom were women (90%) from the host community (106 cases out 107). The crisis seems contained and UNHCR is upgrading its capacities. They remain rather weak in the WASH sector.

Main Refugees Settlements Location in Uganda (Source: ECHO & UNHCR)

Links:

*HIP Bridging Facility for refugee population and host communities directly or indirectly affected by the spill over of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan to the neighbouring countries from the Bridging Facility :*

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/south_sudan_hf_01000_en.pdf

EC online data:

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/uganda_en.htm

OCHA (Reliefweb):

http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-humanitarian-snapshot-april-2014-issued-16-may-2014

Mission report in office computer:

C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Uganda\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report

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[26] OCHA most likely scenario as of end of May. This figure is believed to be exaggerated as 200,00 to 250,000 seem to be more realistic figures.

1.2.7   Kenya

Kenya hosts one of the largest refugee camps in the world (Dadaab refugee camp, over 369,000 refugees, mostly from Somalia). Gaps in humanitarian assistance, especially in shelter, sanitation and protection, require urgent and sustained attention. The situation inside Dadaab and along the border with Somalia is volatile, leading to growing concerns for the safety of humanitarian workers.

On North West side of the country, Kakuma camp host over 155'000 refugees mainly from Somalia, South Sudan and the Great Lakes. It has camp has exceeded its capacity. A steady influx of South Sudanese refugees since December 2013 has resulted in increased land and water scarcity and severe overcrowding. A new camp is required urgently to ease the congestion.

The food security and nutrition situation has deteriorated with the people in need of humanitarian assistance increasing to 1.3 million from 800 000 after the 2013 seasonal rainfall.

Kenya is a disaster-prone country in need of strengthened emergency preparedness and response capacities[27].

Most humanitarian support is dedicated to basic services in camps and disaster risk reduction activities in the North of the country (Turkana,..).

Location of Refugee camps in Kenya (Source UNHCR)

Links:

HIP 2014 Horn of Africa:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/HoA_en.pdf
EC online data:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/kenya_en.htm
ECHO Factsheet on Kenya:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/kenya_en.pdf
UNHCR:

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[27] Source : ECHO, Factsheet on Kenya, April 2014

1.2.8   Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi

Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi are bearing the refugees caseload triggered by the Rwanda genocide in 1994.

Rwanda: In 2013, almost 75,000 refugees resided in the country, located in four camps and a transit centre. Between January and June 2013, a further 15,000 refugees crossed into Rwanda seeking refuge due to a deterioration of the security situation in the DRC.

As the influx from the DRC continues, the Government has identified a site, in Mugombwa, where a fifth refugee camp needs to be established. With an average monthly arrival rate of 2,600 individuals, the number of refugees for 2014 may rise to almost 91,000 persons.

Tanzania : In 2010, the Tanzanian decided to naturalize more than 162,000 Burundian refugees who had lived in three settlements in the west of the country for more than 40 years. In August 2011 their relocation was suspended pending further consultations within the Government on the formalization of their status. The future of the NNTs remains linked to the finalization of this consultative process. In late 2012, almost 35,000 Burundian former refugees were assisted to return home from Mtabila camp. The situation in Nyarugusu camp, where over 68,000 refugees reside, continues to deteriorate with limited self-reliance options and increasing dependence on humanitarian assistance. In 2014, there still over 105,000 refugees in Nyarugusu camp and the "Old Settlements" of Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu.

Burundi : Since the beginning of 2014, Burundi have hosted more than 50,000 refugees originating mainly from DRC and 80,000 IDPs.

Most human support is dedicated to providing basic service to refugees (through UNHCR).

Location of Refugee camps in the Lakes (Source UNHCR)

1.2.9   Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The chronic and complex humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) persists. At least 40 armed groups continue to commit human rights abuses in the eastern provinces of the DRC.

Over 2.9million people are displaced within the DRC. The end of M23's insurgency has led to some disarmament and reintegration of members of armed groups, and an improvement of the security situation in theor former area of control. However, it has not yet translated into a significant flow of returnees.

The remaining armed groups continue to cause displacements in most areas of eastern DRC. In 2014, exaction in the Katanga province (in Pweto and Mano territoires) led to internal displacement fleeing exactions from local armed group of estimated 100,000 between December 2013 and April 2014.

Abuses of power and violence, including looting, rape, abductions, and forced recruitment of children by armed groups and the Congolese army continue to be a major concern;

Lack of basic services and infrastructure in eastern DRC is exacerbated by the conflicts causing enormous humanitarian needs. An estimated 6.4 million people are at crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity. 2.5 million Children under the age of 5 are acutely malnourished.

Cholera is now considered as endemic in the lakes with a prevalence along the lakes Kivu and Tanganyika. In 2013, total caseload was 26,942 with 491 fatalities. As of week 15 in 2014, cumulated number of cases is 7,688 (see map page 20). Provinces the most affected are Katanga (3,568 cases), South Kivu (2,709), and North Kivu (1,372[28]).

Humanitarian response consists mainly in rapid response mechanisms, health care (vaccination) and cholera case management and outbreak containment.

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[28] Source RDC WASH Cluster.

Democratic Republic of Congo: Internally Displaced People and returnees (march 2014)

As of 31 March 2014, the DRC has some 2,635,000 internal displaced persons, a decrease of 11 % compared to the last quarter of 2013.

Key figures

- 2.6 million of internally displaced people, 300,000 less than in December 2013.
- Downward trend in all the provinces, except for Katanga.
- 500,000 peoples are currently displaced in Katanga against 50,000 in 2011.
- 97% of forced displacement caused by insecurity linked to armed conflict.
- Around 42% of IDPs living in sites against 28% in December 2013.

Trend over the last two quarters

Provinces	Situation as of 31 Dec. 2013		Situation as of 31 March 2014		TRENDS	
	IDPs	Returnees	IDPs	Returnees*	IDPs	Returnees
North Kivu	1,123,446	635,738	1,076,745	664,251		
South Kivu	579,607	498,198	518,201	513,284		
Orientale	549,921	156,356	366,802	274,108		
Katanga	402,220	232,841	500,284	217,380		
Maniema	293,510	140,725	172,840	140,725		
Total	2,963,704	1,844,002	2,634,872	1,809,748		

* Returnees during the past 18 months

People flee due to ...

- Ethnic / land conflicts 1,705 — 0.1%
- Armed conflicts 1,269,016 — 81.4%
- Natural disasters 16,000 PDI — 1.0%
- Unknown 17,805 — 1.2%
- Preventive displacements due to insecurity 253,601 — 16.3%

... and find refuge in ...

- Sites 1,110,918 — 42%
- Host families 1,523,954 — 58%

190,151 newly displaced people (during the 1st quarter of 2014)

- Katanga 98,064
- North Kivu 55,302
- Maniema 18,680
- South Kivu 18,105

Map provinces: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, UGANDA, RWANDA, BURUNDI, TANZANIA, ZAMBIA, ANGOLA, REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Orientale 366,802 / 274,108
North Kivu 1,076,745 / 664,251
South Kivu 518,201 / 513,284
Maniema 172,840 / 140,725
Katanga 500,284 / 217,380
Kasai Oriental, Kasai Occidental, Equateur, Bandundu, Kinshasa, Bas Congo

Number of internally displaced persons 000
Number of returnees 000

Creation date: 25 april 2014   Sources: CMP, OCHA and partners   Feedback: ocha.drc@un.org   www.unocha.org/drc   www.rdc-humanitaire.net   Twitter: @UNOCHA_DRC

Latest displacement in eastern DRC as of 30th of March 2014 (Source OCHA)

Orientale

274,108 returnees
recorded during the last 18 months

366,802 IDPs

Ituri 82,240
Haut-Uele 48,931
102,450
223,793
Bas-Uele 42,937
10,704
Tshopo 29,855
Kisangani

- Significant decrease in the number of IDPs in HUBU.
- Significant increase in the number of returnees following the link in areas formely affected by the activism of the LRA.

Maniema

140,725 returnees
recorded during the last 18 months

172,840 IDPs

Lubutu 7,950
Punia 74,365
64,820
Pangi 42,480
Kindu
Kallo 9,505
Kabambare 85,860
9,665
Kasongo 38,365

- Important decline in the number of IDPs (59%) compared to the last quarter of 2013.
- Recent return movements to South Kivu (Shabunda).

Change in IDPs figure since december 2013

Change in the number of returnees in the last 18 months

South Kivu

513,284 returnees
recorded during the last 18 months

518,201 IDPs

Idjwi 15,500
6,660
42,187
Bukavu 2,755
Kalehe 153,445
22,938
208,014 Kabare 24,110
965
Shabunda 164,790
Mwenga 99,027
33,136
78,010
Walungu
Uvira 23,785
45,556
Fizi 67,500
56,798

- 18,105 newly displaced persons (93.4% of total) between January and March 2014.
- Kalehe (40%), Mwenga (19%), Shabunda (15%), Fizi (11%), are the most affected territories.

North Kivu

664,251 returnees
recorded during the last 18 months

1,076,745 IDPs

Beni 211,435
177,270
Butembo Olcha
Lubero 152,215
93,946
Rutshuru 272,016
Masisi 88,215
329,857 66,903
Nyiragongo 107,237
Goma
Walikale 160,023
280,220

- Remains the most affected province by forced displacements.
- Slight decrease due to return in the Masisi, Walikale and Rutshuru.
- 90% of forced displacements due to the action of armed groups.

Katanga

217,380 returnees
recorded during the last 18 months

500,284 IDPs

Kalemie 68,729
Moba 9,129
Pweto 14,185
82,386
Manono 182,835
62,893 83,710
Malemba-Nkulu 5,685 50,978
Mitwaba 98,016
Kasenga 16,345
Likasi 11,341
1,895
7,776 Lubudi 22,998
Kambove
Lubumbashi

- 100,000 newly displaced in the last 3 months.
- Pweto (37%), Malemba-Nkulu (17%) et Kalemie (13%) are territories with the largest IDPs population.
- Only 5,685 people returned home during the first quarter of 2014.

800 Number of returned people

000 Number of IDPs

The boundaries, names and designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Latest Displacement per Province as per 30th of March (Source : OCHA)

19

Comparison of the outbreak at the beginning of the years 2013 & 2014 (Source: Cluster WASH RDC)

Following the escalation of the inter-communal violence in the beginning of December 2013, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the Central African Republic (CAR) has increased to about 600,000. Around 160,000 are reported in the capital Bangui. Sixty per cent of them are children. Over half of the 4.6 million population of the country is in immediate need of aid

There are huge protection concerns for all civilians. Aid workers are equally affected. A rapid restoration of security is vital to ensure conditions in which relief organisations can operate unhindered. The security situation remains extremely volatile and unpredictable. Violence, looting and killings are on-going against communities in Bangui and mainly in north-west part of the country.

The crisis has forced an estimated 100,000 people since December 2013 into Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Congo (see § 1.1.4) bringing the number of Central African refugees in neighbouring countries to almost 350,000[29].

CAR, with capital Bangui in particular, is prone to cholera outbreak. So far none has occurred since the beginning of the crisis. The dire conditions in which the populations of Bangui are surviving may trigger an epidemic of worrying scale.

Main humanitarian response consists in rapid response, support to basic services in IDPs camps. With the first returnees, shelter activities have been recently initiated.

Links:

HIP 2014 RCA:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/CAR_en.pdf

EC online data:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/rdc_en.htm

ECHO Factsheet on RCA:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/central_african_en.htm,

Mission report in office computer:
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[29] ECHO, Factsheet on CAR, May 2014

Central African Crisis: Regional Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 02 May 2014)

OCHA

The security situation remains extremely volatile and unpredictable throughout the country. Ongoing violence and attacks against civilians, especially Muslim communities in Bangui, are causing population displacements into neighbouring Chad, Cameroon, Republic of Congo and the DRC. Humanitarian operations continue to be constrained by severe funding gaps, active fighting and attacks on the population, aid workers and assets. The number of IDPs has decreased by 58,000 over the past week in Bangui.

KEY FIGURES [1]

Internally Displaced Persons (as of 29 April)

584,932 IDPs in CAR

159,932 IDPs in Bangui (43 sites)

Refugees (as of 29 April)

355,710 CAR refugees in neighboring countries

288 300 320 325 348 356
Feb 18 Mar 18 Mar 26 Apr 03 Apr 23 Apr 29 ('000)

Evacuees (as of 29 April)

119,210 total evacuees from CAR [2]

Evacuees include third-country nationals and returning migrants

Total IDPs, Refugees and Evacuees since December 2013

CHAD 97,262 / 8,000
SUDAN
SOUTH SUDAN

Haut-Mbomou 18
Vakaga
Haute-Kotto 16
Bamingui-Bangoran 10
Mbomou 47
Ouaka 34
Nana Gribizi 23
Kémo
Ouham 181
Ombella M'Poko 15
Basse-Kotto 25
Bangui 178
Lobaye 7
Ouham Pendé 34
Nana Mambéré 7
Mambéré Kadéi 2
Sangha-Mbaere

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 608 / 12,874
CONGO 1,000 / 8,303
CAMEROON 15,680 / 77,749

Number of IDPs in thousands
Refugee arrivals since Dec. 2013
Evacuees since Dec. 2013
Population movement
Area of high tension

Total IDPs
IDPs in Bangui
(in thousands)

825 702 625 644 603 585
602 392 302 208 200 219 178 160
94 57
Dec15 Dec31 Jan26 Feb25 Mar27 Apr16 Apr23 Apr28

refugees up to Nov13
new arrivals from Dec13
Total (thousands)
Cameroon 78
Chad 8
RD Congo 13
Congo 8
86 97 56 16

Evacuees destination countries

Chad 97,262
Cameroon 15,680
Other countries 6,268

FUNDING (US$)

Funding continues to be insufficient to meet growing needs. CCCM, Education and Emergency Telecommunications sectors have not received any funding despite high needs at IDP sites, children out of school since December, and the lack of communication infrastructure.

CAR funding (as of 30 April)

$ 547 million requested
$ 161 million received

29%

CERF requests and allocations to the crisis in 2014 (USD$)

Pending allocations/Requests
Allocations

1M 2.7 M 4.2 M 9.0 M 10.9 M
Congo Cameroon Chad Central African Republic

Humanitarian Snapshot as of 2nd of May 2014 (Source: OCHA)

22

1.2.11 Madagascar

Madagascar is regularly affected by cyclones which affects mainly the Eastern coast of the Island. Cyclones imply strong winds and heavy rainfalls which destroy the livelihood of the local population (crops bending or field flooding) and isolate population (bridge or road destruction and/or flooding). Moreover, Madagascar is more and more infested by locusts which have spread almost all over the country.

Many areas of Madagascar have experienced a natural shock in the last two seasons: cyclone Haruna in 2013; cyclone Giovanna in 2012 followed by Storm Irina two weeks later; a locust infestation which ravaged crops and poor rainfall in some areas. For an already vulnerable population, the ability to cope after the disasters is weakening and food consumption for families in the lean season is reduced.

Main response consist in strengthening the resilience of population through the introduction of cyclone protection facilities (shelter) and natural defences (trees, mangrove) the securing of services (water supply) and the enhancement of recovery capacity (introduction of new seeds or variety of plants). This response is done through regional approach which covers other Southern African countries (see §1.1.5).

The 2011-2012 Cyclones Season in the South of the Indian Ocean (Source: Cyclone Extreme)

Links:

HIP 2014 DIPECHO Southern Africa and Indian Ocean :

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/dipecho_southernafrica-indianocean_en.pdf,

EC online data:

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/madagascar_en.htm,

Cyclone Extreme :

http://www.cyclonextreme.com/cyclonereunionsaison11-12.htm

Mission report in office computer:

C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Madagascar\01 ECHO\06 Reporting\Mission Report

1.2.12 Other Southern Africa (Zimbabwe, Namibia, Malawi)

There are no or limited WASH activities in those countries, for more information, please refer to the links below.

Links:

HIP 2014 DIPECHO Southern Africa and Indian Ocean :

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/dipecho_southernafrica-indianocean_en.pdf,

EC online data:

Zimbabwe: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/madagascar_en.htm,

Southern Africa: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub_saharian/southern-africa_en.htm

Mission report in office computer:

Zimbabwe: C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Zimbabwe\01 ECHO\06 Reporting\Mission report

Southern Africa: C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Africa Southern\01 ECHO\06 Reporting\Mission Report

2 WASH sector overview per country

As 2014, the RSO is involved in support to projects in at least 21 countries of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa. Seven of which have a dedicated ECHO offices (see table aside).

Among those countries at least 10 had on going WASH or Shelter projects funded by the DG-ECHO. Number of financed projects is 66 as per financial year 2013.

Countries of operations	
With ECHO Offices	*Without*
Sudan	Djibouti
South Sudan	Uganda
Ethiopia	Rwanda
(Somalia[30])	
Kenya	Burundi
RDC	Tanzania
CAR	Malawi
Zimbabwe	Mozambique
	Madagascar
	Angola
	Namibia

Countries under Eastern, Central & Southern Africa RSO support

DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Tanzania and Rwanda were managed by another WASH Adviser until 2012. The description of the support required from those countries by the WASH adviser in this report reflects only the 2012-2014 periods.

In the next sections, the reported statistics have been extracted from DG-ECHO HOPE database. Related number of projects and amounts are classified as per fiscal year and cover 2010 to 2013 periods.

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[30] There is an office but no permanent expatriates' presence. The main Somalia office is located in Nairobi (Kenya).

2.1   Sudan

2.1.1   ECHO support overview

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in Sudan

2010 -2013 Shelter of the WASH Project in Sudan

Sudan is requesting RSO WASH mission support twice a year. It allows having a rather good understanding of the situation and the related WASH & Shelter sectors strategy.

In the WASH sector, main strategy is to support the IDPs camps and to set a rapid response mechanism in Darfur regions. Over the past years, support was concentrated in the Darfur States. The observable drops between 2011 and 2012 in the upper charts is linked to the independence of South Sudan. ECHO partners in the WASH sector are mostly the same along the years:

- ✤ **CARE (CIS)** is based in South and Central Darfur. They are in charge of the WASH services in several camps. Their main weakness is the lack of monitoring of their activities. For more information on CARE, please refer to office folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Sudan\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission report\WASH\12 11 17 to 12 02 WASH RSO Mission*;

- ✤ **TGH** is based in Western and Central Darfur. They are in charge of the WASH services in several camps and settlements and are starting rapid response activities as for 2013-2014. Their activities have not been recently monitored. For more (though rather old) information on TGH, please refer to office folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Sudan\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission report\WASH\12 02 22 to 12 03 02 WASH RSO Mission*;

- ✤ **NCA-DCA** is based in Central Darfur. They are in charge of the WASH services in one camp. As for CARE, their main weakness is the lack of monitoring. They used to promote themselves as expert in solar pumping. Recent field visit revealed otherwise. For more information on NCA-DCA, please refer to office folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Sudan\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission report\WASH\14 02 05 to 13 SUDAN WASH RSO Mission\Report*;

- ✤ **Islamic Relief Worldwide** is base in Central Darfur. They are in charge of the WASH service in camps and surrounding communities. They are the weakest actors, technical wise, but they have an access to communities the other actors do not. They have not been monitored since 2012. For more information, please refer to office folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Sudan\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission report\WASH\12 02 22 to 12 03 02 WASH RSO Mission*;

- ✤ **COOPI** is located in North Darfur. Until recently they had a rather strong community support focus with pinball support to camps. Over the years 2013-2014, they have adopted to a rapid response strategy. COOPI activities have never been monitored by the WASH RSO Expert; and

- ✤ **GOAL** is a new player in the WASH sector (starting 2014) with a focus on camp support and rapid response in coordination with COOPI (North Darfur). They have not been monitored.

Support to the Shelter sector consisted in support UNHCR only in 2013. There is no comprehensive sector strategy as of now for shelter.

2.1.2 Other actors

Most of the Core actors in the WASH sector (ACF, OGB) have been expelled in 2009 and have not been able to return to Sudan. The number of operational actors is limited, and the one with proper WASH specialists even more.

The UN agencies have not been able to set a cluster mechanism. As of now, the coordination platforms is still refered as the WASH sector group. UNICEF is leading the coordination with an extremely weak added value. Due to UNICEF's linkage with the government, they are bound to work through local institutions (WES: Water & Environmental Sanitation) which do not monitor water supply and have no commitments with regards to the quality of service. UNICEF regularly advocate for ECHO' support beside their unability to confront their institutional limits. For more information on UNICEF in Sudan please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Sudan\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission report\WASH\14 02 05 to 13 SUDAN WASH RSO Mission\Report*.

A review of the appraisals submitted to ECHO for the WASH sector for 2014 in Sudan is available in the following folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Sudan\01 ECHO\02 Apraisals\2014 Sudan LoI review*.

2.1.3 Other

Logistic can be a huge constraint and obtaining a visa for Sudan is extremely erratic. It can take up to two months to get one. With security hazards in Sudan it is likely that the mission can be canceled in the meantime or while in capital city. It is therefore recommended to ask for a long duration visa, or to wait before collecting it at the Sudanese Embassy that security clearance is provided.

Mission usually last two weeks as at least three days is required once in Khartoum to get the travel permit to Darfur.

2.2 South Sudan

2.2.1 ECHO support overview

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in South Sudan*

2010 -2013 Shelter of the WASH Project in South Sudan*

* : Before 2012, Project in South Sudan are accounted as part of Sudan's

South Sudan is requesting RSO WASH mission support twice a year. It allows having a rather good understanding of the situation and the related WASH & Shelter sectors strategy. With the recent crisis, surge capacity support have been required in January 2014.

In the WASH sector, main strategy is to support the camps (IDPs and Refugees) and the rapid response mechanism which has a national coverage. ECHO partners in the WASH sector are mostly the same along the years (some new comers have arrived with the December 2013 crisis though):

> ✧ **Solidarités** has been one of the NGOs who received the biggest grants in order to conduct WASH activities in Refugee camps (Payang and Maban counties), insure WASH cluster coordination at state level (Unity and Upper Nile) and participate to the Rapid Response mechanism at national level. With the recent crisis, Solidarités has withdrawn from the refugee camps and focuses on the rapid response mechanism. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 South Sudan\01 ECHO\06*

- ↳ ***Oxfam-GB***: As for Solidarités, Oxfam was involved in camps WASH service management (Maban) and rapid response at nation level. They have withdrawn from the refugee camp. They have been deeply involved in the response of the first movement of population of the crisis (PoC in Juba, Minkaman in Lake State). They are involved in the cholera response (see below). For more information, *please refer to the links in Solidarités' section*;

- ↳ **Intermon** is a new player who proposed to resume OGB's WASH activities in Minkaman after they left;

- ↳ ***PAH***: PAH was involved in rapid response in Jonglei State before the crisis and acted as WASH Cluster lead at state level (Jonglei). With the crisis, they have been actively involved in the support to PoCs (Bor, Juba) and their surroundings. They are involved in the cholera response (see below). For more information, please refer to the links in Solidarités' section and *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 South Sudan\01 ECHO\06 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\12 03 20 to 24 WASH RSO Mission report*;

- ↳ ***MEDAIR***: MEDAIR was part of the Nationwide rapid response setting and were in involved in the support to the WASH sector in Maban county (Refugee camps). They have been able to participate to the rapid response in Juba and Jonglei (North of the State). For more information, please refer to the links in Solidarités' section. They are a core actor in the cholera response (see below);

- ↳ **IRC** is in charge of the WASH services in Pariang County. They withdrew their team on January[31] and focused on rapid response around Juba. They have not been monitored between 2010 & 2014;

- ↳ **ACTED** is in charge of the WASH services in Maban County. They took over camp services previously managed by Oxfam-GB late 2013. With the recent crisis, they remain one of the only WASH actors on the ground. They have developed as well a GIS capacity with REACH and are able to produce some descriptive maps of the service settings;

- ↳ **UNHCR** is in charge of the Sudanese refugees in Upper Nile (Maban County) and Unity (Pariang). ECHO is co-financing a grant which includes WASH activities in the camps; and

- ↳ **UNICEF**: has been supported by ECHO for the strengthening of the WASH core pipeline. As the whole agency, UNICEF has been a rather weak counterpart with development focused agenda even during the ongoing crisis. They have yet not been able to assess the efficiency of their core pipeline (the performance of their supply chain remain undocumented). With the recent replacement of their head of office, they may be able to deliver.

  On the other hand, as a WASH cluster lead, UNICEF has been extremely helpful and delivering as per coordination is concerned in a time when such was very needed (small to medium scale clashes erupting all over the country). These performances are person-related and not linked to the institution. They will have to be reevaluated once the actual WASH cluster coordinator is replaced (2014).

As per the ongoing cholera crisis, the response setting is in the making under the coordination of the WASH Cluster. As of Early June 2014, main targeted actors are (for the WASH sector cholera containment activities):

- ↳ **ACF ES:** The Spanish emergency team has been deployed as of end of May. They

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[31]

focus on community sensitization, households disinfection and small hardware interventions (repairs);

↳ **Oxfam** has set one emergency water treatment unit along the Nile (downstream) and intends to set two more. They initiated bucket flocculation and chlorination;

↳ **MEDAIR** is deployed in the three main markets. They do hygiene promotion and have set 200 hand washing facilities and 11 water stations of total 46 m^3 capacity. A borehole assessment is ongoing in the surrounding communities with the objective to enhance access to safe water.

↳ **IFRC,** International Federation of the Red cross intends to focus on a community based cholera response with the support of South Sudan red cross;

↳ **UNICEF & WHO** have submitted an appraisal with skyrocketing unit costs with limited justification and almost not coordinated approach. As of now, they (UNICEF) are not a priority support; and

↳ **Other actors** may be targeted in the coming weeks or months (NRC).

2.2.2 Other actors

A review of the appraisal submitted to ECHO for the WASH sector for 2014 in South Sudan is available in the following folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 South Sudan\01 ECHO\02 Apraisals\2014 South Sudan LoI review.*

2.2.3 Other

There is no specific logistic constraint to access to the country. Traveling in the country is mostly done by plane with twice a day flight. The access from one place to another is rather difficult during the rainy season.

2.3 Ethiopia

2.3.1 ECHO support overview

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in South Sudan*   *2010 -2013 Shelter of the WASH Project in South Sudan**

Ethiopia is requesting RSO WASH mission support once a year. It allows having a rather good understanding of the situation and the related WASH & Shelter sectors strategy. With the recent South Sudanese crisis, mission frequency may become twice a year.

In the WASH sector, main strategy is to support the camps (South Sudanese and Somali Refugees), a rapid response mechanism which has a national coverage and a contribution to the resilience of the population (mainly in SNNPR region). ECHO partners in the WASH sector are:

↳ **IRC** who manages the Water supply system of three refugee camps in Dollo Ado. They have embarked themselves in huge waternetwork systems it will be surprizing they will be able to manage them properly. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Ethiopie\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\12 04 14 to 18 WASH RSO Mission to Dolo Ado* & *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Ethiopie\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\14 03 02 to 15 WASH RSO Ethiopia Mission*;

↳ **CORDAID** is involved in the resilience projects developed for Ethiopia. No monitoring

of those projects could be made possible since 2012;

- ⇨ **ACF-FR & CARE-AT** have food projects with a WASH component. No monitoring of those projects could be made possible since 2012; and

- ⇨ **NRC** has been involved in the response to South Sudanese refugees. Monitoring has been done at the early onstage of the crisis in March 2014. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Ethiopie\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\14 03 02 to 15 WASH RSO Ethiopia Mission*.

2.3.2   Other actors

As per WASH response in Dollo Ado, **UNICEF** has been rather weak and focused on limited inputs in the hygiene sub sector. It seems that they have been sideline by the UNHCR.

- ⇨ **UNHCR** has embarked itself in a WASH response which is hampered by too-optimistic assumptions:

  - ⇨ For Water Supply, they have set industrial types facilities in order to treat adequatly the turbiditiy of the water exctracted from the only river. They learnt as they set the facilities. It resulted in improperly dimensioned (and later upgraded involving extra costs) and improperly located facilities. Moreover, their implementing partners have limited if any capaciities to run such type of facilities. In order to limit the risks, they have decided to multiply the number of boreholes which may eventually make all those facilities (coagulation tanks, sedimentation tanks) useless; and

  - ⇨ For sanitation, they are investing resource in the piloting of urine diversion type of facilities. This strategy is held by one single person within the UNHCR team. Its soon-to-come departure is likely to affect the quality of implementation of such design and eventually its relevancy.

  In Gambela; they have settled refugees in improper sites. The sites targetting was local authority personal-agenda driven. It underlines the limited advocacy capacities the UN agencies have towards the Ethiopian institutions; and

- ⇨ **LWF** is as well a WASH actor quite present in both Dollo Ado (Somalia Crisis) and Gambela (South Sudanese crisis). Their poor performance in Dollo Ado tends to question their added value in Gambela. They have limited supervision capacities in the operation and maintenance of water supply facilities. Resources in Gambela, even limited, showed skills in facilities (boreholes) setting though.

For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Ethiopie\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\14 03 02 to 15 WASH RSO Ethiopia Mission*.

A review of the appraisal submitted to ECHO for the WASH sector for 2014 in Ethiopia is available in the following folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Ethiopie\01 ECHO\02 Apraisals\2014 Ethiopia LoI review*.

2.3.3   Other

No specific constraint to organize a mission to Ethiopia.

2.4 Djibouti

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in Djibouti

The Chart aside does not reflect the ongoing level of activities as it is based on completed programs.

They are still partners involved in the WASH and Shelter sector in Djibouti: UNHCR and NRC. WASH is not considered as an entry point sector but included in nutrition & health strategies.

No support has been required from the country team since 2012. Country strategy is linked to the Horn of Africa's.

For more information please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Djibouti\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report.*

2.5 Somalia

2.5.1 ECHO support overview

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in Somalia*

2010 -2013 Shelter of the WASH Project in Somalia*

Somalia has nt requested RSO WASH mission support since 2012. The WASH sector is being consulted on pinball occasions for technical backups. The absence of request from Somalia team is not a problem in itself as one the country TA is a member of DG ECHO WASH Sector Group (Aquarius). He has taken the lead on WASH related issues in Somalia. Should he be replaced in the future, greater involvement of the RSO may be required in the WASH & shelter sectors. Moreover, the presence of the country TAs in the same office as the RSO allows a fluid ad-hoc interaction whenever required.

In the WASH sector, main strategy is to support to rapid response mechanism which has a national coverage and a contribution to the resilience of the population.

In 2013, ECHO partners in the WASH sector are: UNICEF, PAH, IRC, DRC as stand alone projects and Solidarités, ICRC, ACF, CARE, COOPI, Concern as part of other sectors led projects. UNHCR is an ECHO partner in the shelter sector.

2.5.2 Other actors

A review of the appraisal submitted to ECHO for 2014 in Somalia is available in the following folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Somalia\01 ECHO\02 Apraisals.*

2.5.3 Other

Access to country is extremely difficult due to security reason. The country team monitors the situation and leads the mission organization together with the security department in Nairobi and Brussels.

2.6   Uganda

Until the Sudanese Crisis, there has been only two WASH (ACF, 2011-2013, €801,995) and Shelter (UNHCR 2011, 2,000,000[32]) projects for Uganda. The ECHO office in Uganda was closed in 2011. Uganda projects are under Kenya & Uganda Office management based in Nairobi.

Country Technical Assistant has required RSO WASH mission support once for the monitoring of ACF project. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Uganda\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\13 05 26 to 30 WASH RSO Uganda Mission*

There were no more Uganda WASH & Shelter Specific projects until the recent South Sudanese crisis.

Surge capacities have been required as well to monitor the Congolese influx on the Southern side of the country in 2013.

The presence of the country TA in the same office as the RSO allows a fluid ad-hoc interaction whenever required.

UNICEF has been targeted as a partner to address the first needs of the South Sudanese crisis (€600,000, 6 months repsonse, with **DRC** as their implementing partner). Their response was rather inadapted but allow to cope with the first influx of refugees. A second grant request for UNICEF is on going. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Uganda\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\14 05 04 to 09 WASH RSO Uganda Mission Report*

2.7   Kenya

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in Kenya*

2010 -2013 Shelter of the WASH Project in Kenya*

Kenya has not requested RSO WASH mission support since 2012. The WASH sector is being consulted on pinball occasions for technical backups. The absence of request from Kenya team is not a problem in itself as the presence of the country TA in the same office as the RSO allows a fluid ad-hoc interaction whenever required.

In the WASH sector, main strategy is assistance to displaced populations and, resilience building in the broader context of enhancing capacities of vulnerable populations to respond to future shocks. It Includes WASH activities in support to preparedness and response (water related epidemic, emergency responses mechanisms, resilience-related activities). WASH related strategies are a strengthening component of health, nutrition and food assistance interventions.

In 2013, ECHO partners in the WASH sector are: CARE, FICR and MSF-ES as stand alone projects (for a total €4,657,254) and the UK Red Cross as part of other sectors led projects (€800,000 Shelter). In the shelter sector, partners in 2013 were UNHCR & UK Red Cross as core sector (M€ 5.3) and MSF-Be as part of other sectors led projects (€300,000 Health).

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[32] There has been another DG-ECHO supported UNHCR's regional project including Uganda for the refugee response in 2012 (€6,500,000) and 2013 (€7,000,000).

2.8 Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi*

2010 -2013 Shelter of the WASH Project in Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi**

The Lake region is supported through a regional envelop dedicated to the support to refugees affected by the eastern DRC crisis. It covers the three countries and Uganda and focuses on refugees in the shelter and protection sectors. In 2013 Supported partners are UNHCR (Shelter, 7,000,000) as as stand alone projects and IOM as part of other sectors led projects (Protection, €500,000).

Files are managed by RSO's Rapid Response Technical Adviser. The WASH sector is being consulted on pinball occasion for technical details and can be led to do adhoc missions as per needed (three in 2012-2013). Form more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Uganda\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\13 07 22 to 25 WASH RSO Uganda (Bundibugyo) Mission & C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Rwanda\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\13 04 03 to 05 Rwanda WASH RSO Mission (Kigeme) & C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Rwanda\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\13 10 22 to 24 Rwanda WASH RSO Mission (Kigeme).*

2.9 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

2.9.1 ECHO support overview

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in DRC

In the shelter sector last project was in 2010 (1 M€, CARE, as part of a DRR led project).

DRC country team is requesting RSO WASH mission support twice a year. It allows having a rather good understanding of the situation and the related WASH & Shelter sectors strategies.

In the WASH sector, main strategy is to support the rapid response mechanism and cholera epidemic containment in the eastern provinces of DRC (Province Orientale, North & South Kivu and Katanga).

In the cholera containment component, ECHO has been working with the same partners over the past years (at least since 2011). Their cholera response is still meeting shortfalls such as too slow alert system, a limited household case tracking and georeferencing and limited analysis on cholera route identification.

The cholera strategy is closely linked to UNICEF with a strong resilience component aiming at facilitating the access to household water treatment product at the end of an emergency response ("Reprise communautaire"). For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Congo\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\14 05 04 to 09 UNICEF Workshop Reprise Communautaire.*

ECHO main partners in the WASH sector are:

🖎 **Solidarités** is involved in cholera containment activities in Baraka (Katanga) and Goma (North Kivu). They have submitted a proposal for an emergency response to

population's movement in Kantaga Province (Pweto area). They have a tendency to under dimension their resources which can result in some worrying monitoring gaps. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Congo\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\13 09 09 to 21 East DRC WASH RSO Mission*;

✤ **ACF** is involved in cholera containment activities in Minova (South Kivu). They used to focus on community-based approach type of intervention (until 2013). They have recently adapted to a more relevant emergency response strategy. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Congo\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\12 09 17 to 29 East DRC WASH RSO Mission*;

✤ **Oxfam-GB:** is involved in cholera containment activities in Uvira (South Kivu). OGB is the NGO which is able to produce the most relevant strategy among all the partners supported by ECHO and it the one that has the worst operational results. OGB is institutionally defaulting in eastern DRC[33]. They have taken initiative which can jeopardize the on-going strategy of "Reprise Communautaire"[34], failed to monitor properly their projects[35] and disregarded coordination efforts. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Congo\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\12 09 17 to 29 East DRC WASH RSO Mission*;

✤ **CESVI** is located in Province Orientale with a rapid response component and act as backup in case of cholera outbreak in the province since 2013. They have not been monitored yet;

✤ **UNICEF** is holding the RRMP mechanism (Réponse Rapide aux Mouvements des Populations) which is a coordination platform to address internal movements of population fleeing local armed group exactions. They are deployed mainly in North Kivu. For more information, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Congo\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission Report\WASH\13 09 09 to 21 East DRC WASH RSO Mission*.

UNICEF is as well leading the WASH cluster coordination in Eastern DRC for the cholera containment activities coordination. So far, the agency has had a very significant added value in terms of gathering the NGOs involved in the response for coordinating and harmonizing the tools used in the response. The expertise of the agency is person-driven. Unfortunately, this person is to live the country by end of June 2014. Support to the WASH cluster may need to be reconsidered if the replacement person is not able to offer the same level of outcomes; and

✤ In 2013, other partner have been supported by DG ECHO in the WASH sector (**Christian Aid**, 1,5M€) or in the Shelter sector (**World Vision**, € 320,000). Their activities have not been monitored during the past year.

2.9.2 Other actors

A review of the WASH appraisal submitted to ECHO for 2014 in DRC is available in the following folders . *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Congo\01 ECHO\02 Apraisals\2014 DRC LoI review* and *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Congo\01 ECHO\02 Apraisals\2014 DRC FED Kantaga review.*

2.9.3 Other

Access to eastern RDC is not difficult and usually done through Rwanda. It requires the delivery of multi entry visas for Rwanda and one overnight in Kigali. Due to the geographical extend of the country, two weeks of monitoring are usually required.

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[33] They have had to dismiss 75 % of their staff in 2012 and to repeat the same in 2013.

[34] The involvement of the OCC in the quality control of the chlorinated Water their supported local NGO produces.

[35] In 2011-2012, Oxfam has been able to track and document the wells they built or rehabilitated in Province Orientale.

2.10   Central Republic of Africa (CAR)

2.10.1 ECHO support overview

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in CAR

2010 -2013 Shelter of the WASH Project in CAR

In 2013, RSO WASH support to CAR office has been overlapped by greater priorities. Last mission done in 2012 did not allow onsite visit due to securiy constraints.

In the WASH sector, main strategy is assistance to displaced populations through an early warning coordination platform set in Bangui. Until very recently, it was almost impossible to deploy support in remote areas of the country. Situation seems to have stabilized but remains very volatile.

In 2013 main partner involved in the WASH sector are Solidarités (2 grants: Rapid Response, € 550,000 and Support to urban populations 1.4 M€) and Acted (Rapid Response €550,000). ACF has been involved in the coordination mechanism (260,000 €) and ICRC as part of a Food Assistance led program (4 M€).

In the Shelter sector, main partners are MSF-B (€405,732) and Première Urgence (€ 510,000).

2.10.2 Other actors

A review of the WASH appraisal submitted to ECHO for 2014 in CAR is available in the following folder . *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Congo\01 ECHO\02 Apraisals\2014 DRC LoI review* (after the DRC review)*.*

2.11   Madagascar

2010 -2013 Overview of the DIPECHO Project in Madagascar

2010 -2013 Shelter of the Emergency Project in Madagascar

There is on average a support mission once a year in Madagascar, pending on the intensity of the cyclone season. It allows having a rather good understanding of the situation and the related WASH & Shelter sectors strategy channeled into the DIPECHO and rapid response projetcs.

In the WASH sector, main strategy is to support the rapid response linked to the aftermaths of the cyclones crossing the country and to contribute to the DIPECHO resilience component addressing the same problematic (cyclones). Most of the DIPECHO outputs are the setting of

an alert system, the promotion of short cycle or cyclone resilient varieties of plants, the mitigation of the cyclones impact through environmental actions, the setting of cyclone resistant access and shelters.

There is not that much of WASH outputs in the DIPECHO programs but most of the food related ones involve hydraulics techniques (dams, river, catchments), access requires civil engineering background (roads, bridge) not to mention the shelter as a core component of the DIPECHO programs too (cyclone shelters and cyclone resistant houses).

Usually the actors involved in the emergency response are the one already engaged in the the DIPECHO programs. They are:

- ✤ **FAO**: In charge of the coordination and the institutional support to the others DIPECHO partners envoloved in food assistance;

- ✤ **ICCO** has food assistance related activities in the South East coast of the country (Faratangana and Vangaindrano). They are as well in charge of the coordination of the DIPECHO partners. This coordination appears to be rather weak and consist mainly in information sharing and organization of pinball comon events. The strategic coordination is the weakness of this coordination;

- ✤ **CARE** has the greatest number of activities within the DIPECHO partner in Madagascar. They are deployed in the North (Sambava & Antsinana), Center (Mananjary) and South West (Vangaindrano) coast of the country. They have food assistance, access and shelter activities;

- ✤ **MEDAIR** has endorsed the WASH part of the DIPECHO with the promotion of flood proof water point. Other main activities are the promotion of an alert system and cyclones resistant house designs; and

- ✤ Recently **ACF** has been involved in the emergency response of the Haruna Cyclone aftermaths which affected the West coest of the country (Tuléar).

For more information on DIPECHO projects and emergency response, please refer to : *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Madagascar\01 ECHO\06 Reporting\Mission Report*.

2.12 Other Southern Africa (Zimbabwe, Namibia, Malawi)

2010 -2013 Overview of the WASH Project in Southern Africa (but Madagascar)

2010 -2013 Shelter of the WASH Project in Southern Africa (but Madagascar)

Out of the 34 WASH and shelter projects funded by ECHO in Southern Africa (but Madagascar), 24 were dedicated to cholera prevention in Zimbabwe. ECHO has phased out of Zimbabwe in the WASH and shelter sectors in 2013. For more information on WASH & shelter project supported by ECHO between 2010 and 2013, please refer to : *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Zimbabwe\01 ECHO\06 Reporting\Mission report\WASH Mission report*.

In the other countries, intervention are either emergency response or DIPECHO related. The guiding strategy is similar to Madagascar"s with a lesser number of partners. In 2013, Main WASH partners in the region are FICR (Shelter, €500,000), Save the Children (800,000, WASH) and CAFOD (WASH). All of them are located in Mozambique. None of them required the support of the RSO for any of the two sectors since at least 2012.

For more information on DIPECHO projects and emergency response, please refer to: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Mozambique\01 ECHO\06 Reporting\Mission Report* and *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Africa Southern\01 ECHO\06 Reporting\Mission Report*.

3   WASH & Shelter policies

3.1   Progress status

3.1.1   Staff Working Document (SWD)

The WASH sector group ("Aquarius") has a rather well developed annual work plan (AWP) which includes:

- ⅏ Contribution to DG-ECHO WASH strategy & programming) in attending to Aquarius annual review meeting in Brussels. The last one was held in May 2014.

- ⅏ Optimizing the efficiency and effectiveness of DG ECHO's WASH & Shelter field network which has two components:

  - ⅏ Quarterly reporting on WASH & Shelter related issues. For examples of quaterly, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\00 Bruxelles\00 A Policy & SST\01 AQUARIUS\03 Quaterly reports*; and

  - ⅏ Assistance Aquarius WASH teleconferences held once every six weeks and insuring WASH and Shelter coherence in the areas covered by the position.

- ⅏ Roll out of the WASH Policy and developing (unpacking) the staff working document (SWD[36]);

- ⅏ The development of WASH related tools (such as GIS referenced database, checklists); and

- ⅏ Development of an internal WASH database;

For more information on the Aquarius AWP and WASH SWD refer to:

- ⅏ *Aquarius AWP: C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\00 Bruxelles\00 A Policy & SST\01 AQUARIUS\00 Aquarius Workplans\2013-2014;* and

- ⅏ *WASH SWD: C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\00 Bruxelles\00 A Policy & SST\A4 Specific Thematic Policy\WASH policy\WASH Policy 2012*

3.1.2   Enhanced Response Capacity (ERC)

The Enhanced Response Capacity projects are global projects which aim at strengthening the humanitarian response capacity.

For the WASH sector, it focuses on the support to the Global WASH cluster and the setting of different regional response tools incarnated by different INGOs: The Rapid Assessment Team (RAT), the Rapid Response Team (RRT) and the Regional Emergency Coordination Advisor (RECA).

In Eastern Africa, the RECA focal point is Tearfund. They have been confronted to staffing issues in 2013. Contacts are to be resumed in June-July 2013.

For more information on the Global WASH Cluster and related tool, please refer to the folder: *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\00 Bruxelles\00 A Policy & SST\01 AQUARIUS\01 Enhanced Response Capacity\Global WASH Cluster*. Updates from the WASH Sector Policy Adviser can be requested as well.

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[36] The Staff Working Document is the root document for DG ECHO WASH sector policy.

3.2   Main operational challenges

3.2.1   *Key Result Indicators (KRI): Advantages and limits*

The Key Result Indicators (KRI) are projects indicators which have been integrated in the single forms the partners are using to submit and report the actions DG-ECHO supports. It aimed at harmonizing the criteria measured by the partners in order to enhance the coherency of analysis for each sector.

This tool has been fast tracked by headquarter as it presented obvious communication opportunities since the KRI offered aggregations potential among countries and continents. It was first introduced for the 2014 appraisals submission. The partners initially tried to introduce their own indicators in the system[37] but eventually the use of KRI expanded and is now more systematic.

The main problem is that the KRI are useless as long as they are not structured around proper protocols of collection. One examples to illustrate the failure of the KRI as of now is :
"Number of persons provided with sufficient and safe water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene use (standard: Every person provided with > 15 litres/day)". The way it can be collected varies:

ᗏ A qualified NGO would make a household survey twice a year using a 5% statistically accurate sample size (usually around 400 households targeted in refugees context), assess the water storage capacity in each household, the number of time those are filled during the day, the number of people using this water for domestic purposes. It will produce an effective measurement of the water consumed per person per day.

ᗏ For UNHCR, the same indicator is calculated as the ration between the quantity of water produced (or extracted) and the estimated number of users, regardless of the losses along the network, the other potential users (host, implementing partners, other agencies) and the other potential uses (for brick making, gardening purposes, etc). It produces an inaccurate measurement of the water consumed per person per day.

The first protocol is a relevant but resource demanding information indicator, the second is an inaccurate but easy-to-collect information indicator. The KRI consider the quality of both as equal. Aggregation of both results in a minimum common denominator quality indicator, meaning the information aggregated from the KRI is inaccurate (to say the least).

Main solution to give sense to those KRI is to impose specific guidance and protocols in their collections. Minimum level of information required (Means of verification) is

ᗏ The site were the information is collected;

ᗏ How often this information is collected; and

ᗏ What is the size of the sample used when collecting this information (or what is the statistical accuracy of the survey)?

These guidance and protocols should be integrated in DG-ECHO requirements as soon as possible. Until then, the KRI will only allow the DG-ECHO to communicate on inaccurate statements.

For the full list of KRI, please refer to *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\00 Bruxelles\00 A Policy & SST\01 AQUARIUS\01 Thematic\Indicator Focus*

3.2.2   *Operational recommendations short-fallings.*

One of the tasks of the WASH advisor is to produce operational guidance and recommendations to ECHO's partner. The short falling is that there is no contractual obligation for the partner with regard to quality performance. There are only two cases when payment can be denied to the partners:

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[37] It is still possible as a « Custom indicator » section is still accessible online.

- ⌖ The expected result has not been achieved in the scope of the emergency (too late); or

- ⌖ It has not been delivered at all (which is the same, eventually).

But whether the service is of extremely poor quality or of remarkable performance, there is no institutional guidance or technical prescription which can acknowledge it. In other words, the quality of the service is not acknowledged by ECHO. And support to partners can be renewed years after years even though the quality of its action is extremely poor.

Here again solution would be to have technical prescriptions endorsed by ECHO which will allow the country TAs and the RSOs to acknowledge the quality of the outputs produced by the partners.

4   Nairobi WASH Adviser Position 'Specifics

4.1   Absence of regional coordination (multi-polar coordination mechanisms)

The position and its related coordination environment do not allow the proper setting of a regional WASH & Shelter coordination platform as the one existing in Dakar.

In Nairobi there is no coordination mechanism which covers the same scope of countries as the one covered by ECHO Eastern, Central and Southern WASH & Shelter adviser.

Main hub and coordination platform are dedicated to the Horn of Africa, mainly confined to Somalia and its bordering countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti). It is Somalia agenda driven and covered by the ECHO Somalia country team.

There is as of now no real platform for the coordination of the response of the South Sudanese crisis. Some meeting have been held in Nairobi but no mechanism is yet established (though it is in Addis Abeba at political level). There is no coordination mechanism in Nairobi for the lakes sub region as well, or, for Central Africa.

A regional WASH and shelter forum which would design strategies and contingencies (for cholera preparedness, for WASH mainstreaming in nutrition and health strategies, for rapid response to movement of population) for an area covering Somalia to South Sudan down to Eastern DRC is still to be established. Short falling is that there is no partner nor agency that has a portfolio of countries of that size and the participation to several platforms of lesser coverage is not efficient (time demanding and limited coherency).

4.2   Wide scope of country to cover

In 2012, the number of WASH Adviser positions in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa was reduced from two to one. The number of countries to cover by the remaining WASH adviser rose from twelve to twenty one. As of 2014, two of those countries are under UN L3 level (CAR and South Sudan).

As of today the position is by far the one bearing the greatest number of on-going projects among all the WASH RSO advisers in the DG-ECHO (see charts below).

Total budget for WASH Projects per RSO from 1994 to 2013

Total budget for Shelter Projects per RSO from 1994 to 2013

The number of countries and crisis to cover is too important for one single person. The support of Program Officer or Program Assistant is of limited added value as the issue is not as much as the workload per country but the number of countries itself.

As of 2012, the WASH RSO Adviser support has been focused and organized around the mission to countries. Number of mission per month fluctuates between one and two with an average duration of 10 days (movements included).

On the other hand, no other position in the WASH & Shelter sectors offers such a wide scope of countries and humanitarian problematic to deal with.

4.3   Working with TA's.

One of the key elements of the position is the relation with country Technical Assistants.

The added value of a technical adviser is to be able to draw a sector strategy adapted to the context and to program its implementation in accordance with the partners the DG-ECHO has available in the country.

The role of an adviser is to advise, not prescribe nor control. It remains of the responsibility of the country Technical Assistant to decide whether sector support is requested. If required, it is still of his/her responsibility to decide whether or not to implement the related recommendations. This decision is balanced between the DG-ECHO partners' capacity, the variety of partners available, the security context, and the capacity of the country team to integrate technical recommendations they are not necessarily familiar with or whose workload does not allow them to channel technical recommendations as precisely as the sector expert would wish to

Working modalities adopted is to provide time to country team to implement those recommendations. It may require a step by step approach which implies several "layers" of advices (several missions or repeated recommendations over several projects monitoring) to enable them to absorb and integrate them as part of their regular project monitoring checklist. It is a capacitating process.

One of the most efficient ways to highlight projects deficiencies is done on the spot, during on-site visits; while diagnosis the effectiveness of a WASH service and looking for solutions with the partner if defaulting.

5   Some common technical issues met in most countries

5.1   Solar pumping

Solar pumping is often considered as the panacea of all problems with regards to supplying water through networks. A part from the initial investment, it is costless in terms of operation, it requires no maintenance and it is long lasting.

All those statements are theoretical, widely promoted by solar pump manufacturers and never tested in field conditions such as emergency responses in isolated areas:

 ✧ The first challenge which is always disregarded by the NGO who wants to promote the solar pumping is that those pumps have often a low yield. It may be able to cover existing needs but is unlikely to address unexpected ones. It is therefore not adapted to acute emergency response when the final caseload of people to support is yet unknown.

 The solution proposed is usually to have the solar system being backed up by a classic fossil-energy powered system. This duplication of systems implies the duplication of capacities, of spare parts, of consumables, of supply chains which contradict the overall objective the introduction of solar pumping is meant to cover: a simplification of the operation and maintenance of the water supply services;

 ✧ Second challenge is that solar panels are an asset which is of interest for the population: it provides electricity which can be used for other purposes (phone charging, engine powering, lightening, etc). The solar panels are therefore exposed to robberies a 500 Kg fuel powered generator is less likely to be. Solar pumping should therefore not be introduced in area where security and population's involvement is not granted;

 ✧ Third challenge is that a solar pump is powered by… Sun. Meaning that it can only operate during sun hours. The issue is that the water needs to be delivered when needed. And water is being collected in the first hours of the morning at sunrise and in the last hours of the day at sunset. Problem is to be able to refill the reservoirs emptied in the evening during the night with a system that only work during the day. There are alternatives:

  ↳ Two double the capacity of the storage system and to pay for solar pumps which have a very good yield. Investments cost will skyrocket and the overall strategy to save money on operation and maintenance may be challenged by the cost of the pumps and reservoirs (and their related maintenance); or

  ↳ Two set a battery system which will store energy and allow the pumping of water during the night. Problem is that it introduces a set of element which does not have the same resistance as the solar pump itself and implies operation and maintenance costs (not to mention they are exposed to robbery). This option tends to challenges the advantage of a solar system too; and

 ✧ Fourth challenge is that if solar powered systems require limited operation and maintenance, they *still* require operation and maintenance, skilled technicians and proper spare parts network.

 For instance, one of the weak elements of the solar pumping system is the control panel which controls the power which supplies the pump). This control panel is likely to break down or to reset. If the repairs are not complicated, they still require skilled technicians to do it. It is not rare that those control panels are bypassed as unskilled

local technicians are unable to understand the electronic inside the control panel. It exposes the solar pump and damages it in the short term; and

- ✎ Fifth challenge is that solar panels are often misused or mishandled. Broken solar panel is not rare and requires replacement as it has an impact on the overall system performance (field example is available at *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\01 Sudan\01 ECHO\07 Reporting\Mission report\WASH\14 02 05 to 13 SUDAN WASH RSO Mission\Report*).

The partners have to insure that all of those issues are addressed prior to promote this costly alternative to fossil-powered pumps. In practical terms, it implies:

- ✎ That the solar pumping is able to cover the existing needs with extra capacities based on the existing contingency plan in case of extra coverage required. This must be illustrated with a graphic showing the daily production, storage and water demand;

- ✎ The system should be *simple*, meaning avoiding set of batteries to compensate the limited pumping and storage capacities of the network;

- ✎ A operation and maintenance plan should be made available;

- ✎ Skilled repairer and spare supply chain should be *already* available in the country with access to the system; and

- ✎ Solar pumping systems should already exist in the country with proven added value as per compared to the classical options.

Main related questions to answer are:

- ✎ *Financial*: Is the technology cheaper in the mid term than the existing ones?

- ✎ *Technical*: Is the technology addressing the needs with the same performance as the existing ones?

- ✎ *Operation & Maintenance* wise: Does the technology has an added-value in terms of operational & maintenance as per compared to the existing one (including access to spares, and renewal equipment)?

- ✎ *Environmental*: Is the new technology better adapted to the environment as the existing ones?

- ✎ *Contextual*: Is the technology more coherent than the existing ones with regards to the evolution of the needs?

- ✎ *Strategic* wise: is the promoter likely to insure the sustainability of the performance of the new technology in the mid to long term.

5.2   Chlorination

It is a common observation to have insufficient chlorine in water networks managed by DG-ECHO supported partners. It reveals the limited skills the partners have in the proper monitoring of the chlorination process[38]. One the most common mistakes are:

- ✎ Chlorine is poured in the reservoir once, 30 minutes prior to distribution. Water is not chlorinated anymore. If the demand exceed the reservoir capacity, water goes directly from the borehole to the network without being chlorinated at reservoir level; or

- ✎ System is equipped with online chlorination devices but the chlorine concentration is not monitored. It results in excessively chlorinated water the users complain about or insufficiently chlorinated water which does not guaranty its quality.

Moreover turbidity and pH are often disregarded when those parameters are paramount to insure the quality of the water (one insure that the pathogen are exposed to the product, the second that the product is efficient).

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[38] Including UN Agencies.

Solution is to systematize free residual chlorine (FRC) monitoring at distribution (minimum value is 0,5mg/l) and household level (trace of FRC) with both NTU <5 and acidic pH.

Country teams have been provided with kits and training in order to enable them to monitor the quality of the water distributed during their monitoring mission.

5.3   Project monitoring

In most of the project, most partners have too weak monitoring protocol to guaranty the reality of the result they report in the single form. Main weaknesses are:

- Improper site targeting for monitoring: for instance monitoring the quality of the water at production site instead of households level;

- Improper frequency of monitoring: for instance monitoring the quality of the water only once (usually when the borehole is just being equipped) when water quality monitoring requires a regular control of the water chemical and bacteriological contents;

- Improper sample size: for instance the improvement of the knowledge is done on a limited number of households when the statistical accuracy required for acknowledging the effect of an action (here, hygiene promotion) is 5%, which can imply the monitoring of 300 to 400 households.

This short falling is not addressed by the setting of KRI as they are now and requires the DG-ECHO to set its own standards to ascertain the reality of the results we fund (see §3.2.1 on KRI).

5.4   Partner reliability & accountability

There is no reliable partner in the WASH sector as MSF-F could be for the health sector. Performances are very person dependent. If some partners may be able to provide support from their headquarter (ACF) or at regional level (UNICEF, UNHCR), all are reluctant to do so and most do not even have this capacity.

From one partner to another, from one year to another, performance can drastically change and those are particularly difficult to address since DG-ECHO does not imbed quality performance in its monitoring tools (see §3.2.2).

Moreover, the template of the single forms does not oblige having an overview of how the partners intend to process their activities when methodology description is paramount to assess if the partner has designed the proper setting to achieve the expected results.

Solution would reside in systematizing the following information in each activity description:

- The organization chart to complete the activity (number of teams, number of staff involved);

- The proper monitoring protocols set to ascertain the achievement of the result (based on the above description (see §3.2.1 and § 5.4); and

- The timeframe required to set the service (from inputs to outputs) and the one to monitor it (from outputs to results).

Of course such level of information is not recommended in acute emergency phase as rapidity of deployment cannot be delayed for proposal writing reasons but it should be systematic for any other type of contexts (post-Acute, pro-tracted, chronic, etc.).

Promoting such level of details at the activity section will still allow a certain flexibility as activities sections are not contractual in the single form (only achievement of results is) and proposed methodology can be changed in case of unexpected assumption without requiring an amendment.

Moreover it will oblige the partners to task the right person to write the proposal. It will avoid "Meta-description" of activities such as "we will process the activity using our utmost

standards" (as if they would use their worst) usually written by people who do not have a clue of the operation issues and challenges in the field.

6   Office Organization (computer organization system)

The following section describes how the information is organized in the computer use by the WASH advisor in Nairobi.

6.1   Office computer filing system

There are four types of main folders all of which have a shortcut at desktop level:

- Country folders;
- DG-ECHO folders;
- Technical folder; and
- Paperwork folder.

6.1.1   Country Folders

They are the most numerous and structured folders. Each country folder contains the following sub- folder:

- 01 Congo
  - 00 Contextual
    - 00 MAPS
    - 00 Thematic
    - 01 Travelling
    - 02 Partners' report
    - 03 Studies
    - 04 Law Rules and Policies
    - 05 Non WASH
  - 01 ECHO
    - 00 ECHO Office
    - 01 HIP, Operational Guidances & AWP
    - 02 Apraisals
    - 03 On going Project
      - ACF SK,NK 14 03 14 12 2014 91008
        - 00 Letter of Intention
        - 01 Counterpart Report and FU
          - 00 Appraisal
          - 01 Monitoring
          - 02 Interim
          - 03 Modification
          - 04 Final
          - 05 Evauation
          - 06 Other Partner's document
        - 02 Grant and Amendments
        - 03 Mission reports
        - 04 Pictures
    - 04 completed Project
    - 05 Rejected project
    - 06 Dashboard
    - 07 Reporting

↳ "00 Contextual" which gather all the folders related to the country which are not related to ECHO. It contains:

- ↳ A "00 Map" folder where country maps (administrative, etc) are stored;

- ↳ A "00 Thematic" folder which contains all the folders related to a specific thematic (for instance cholera caseloads reports);

- ↳ A "01 Travelling" folder which contains all the requirement to travel within the country (those folders are empty for most countries);

- ↳ A "02 Partner report" folder which contain all the reports made by partners or other actors in the WASH and shelter sector. It is usually minutes of meeting or report produced by the actor out of the requirement of their ECHO funding (if they benefit from any);

- ↳ A "03 Studies" folder which contains all the studies in the WASH & shelter sectors related to the country and not funded by ECHO;

- ↳ "A "04 Law rules and policy" folder which contains the institutional documents from the WASH & Shelter related ministries. It could be laws or strategic plans for instance; and

- ↳ A "Non WASH" folder which contains the folders of relevance for the country but which are not WASH or shelter related.

↳ "

↳ 01 ECHO" folder which gather all the ECHO related folders linked the country in the WASH and Shelter sectors. It contains a maximum of seven sub folders:

- ↳ A "00 ECHO Office" folder where details of the ECHO office are reported (travelling requirement, contacts). These folders are empty for most countries;

- ↳ A "01 HIP, Operational Guidance & AWP" folder where the different versions of Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP), Operational Guidance, Annual Working Plan (AWP), Evaluation and FINAT are stored;

- ↳ A "02 Apraisals" folder which contain all the WASH & Shelter appraisals regardless of their future funding or not. Most useful sub folder is the Letter of Intention review (LOI) classified by year;

- ↳ A "03 On going Project" folder which contains all the document produced by the partner in the framework of it action funded by ECHO. It includes the appraisal, the interim report, the modification report, the final report both on Single Form and/or Fichop template and it includes the document (reports, evaluation, studies) the partner has produced in the framework of this specific appraisal;

- ↳ A "04 Completed Project" folder which archives all the completed projects. It has the same structure as the ones available in the "03 On-going Project" folder;

- ↳ A "05 Rejected Project" folder which contains all the rejected project;

- A "06 Dashboard" folder which contains the dashboards supplied by the country team; and

- A "07 reporting" folder which contains all the ECHO reports related to the country (monthly report, mission report, end of posting report, crisis report and map, sitrep, etc.). and

- "02 Other Donor" folder which gathers all the WASH and Shelter folders related to other donors active in the country. Sub folders are classified per donor.

They are same sub regional folders as well (Eastern Africa, Southern Africa) which are classified using the same logic (with some small differences not worth being described here).

6.1.2   DG-ECHO Folders

DG-ECHO folder is gathering the documents related to other structures of the DG-ECHO. They are mainly two type of folder: The RSOs folder and the Headquarter folder.

6.1.2.1   RSO FOLDER (INCLUDING NAIROBI)

RSO Files are classified into maximum five sub folder:

- "00 Operation" folder which contains files related to RSO related workflow (mission planning, AWP, etc) and organisation;

- "00 Reports" folder contains the RSO related reports (monthly reports, humsit report, end of posting reports, etc.);

- "01 Administration" folder contains all the administration related documents including human resource, finance and information pack);

- "02 Logistic" folder contains all logistic related documents such as contacts, medical information, house related information, etc); and

- "03 Security" folder contains all security related documents (from KK Security as well as from the EU Delegation).

Headquarter folder contains:

- The Directorate sub folders classified by units. Most important one are the:
  - "00 A Policy & SST" which contains all the Aquarius related files and Specific thematic policies; and
  - C4 (Human resources) which contains all the files related to human resource management.
- The Head of Directorate folder which contains the communication he sent us;
- The minutes of the ECHO management meetings and steering committee minutes;
- The contact folder of ECHO staff at Brussels level; and
- Some other folders of relevance at that level of classification ("05 All Expert day mission", "04 Other UE", etc.).

6.1.3 Technical folder ("00 Technic")

This is the folder containing all the technical documents. It contains four sub folders :

- "00 Standards & Indicators" contains all collected documents on standards and indicators. It is divided by sector (WASH, Shelter, DRR, etc) and then classified by agencies;
- "01 Operational" contains all collected documents related to project designing and implementation. It is divided by sector (WASH, Shelter, DRR, etc) and for each of them in four sub folders:
  - "Assessment, Monitoring & Evaluation" contains the documents about how to process assessment, monitoring and evaluation. It is then classified by agencies;

- ⮂ "Designs and Products" contains documents about designs and products. It is then classified by type of inputs, service or activities (Water Kits, Water Transportation, etc) and then by type of tools for some of them (for pumps for instance);

- ⮂ "Strategy and programming" contains the documents about how to design strategies and programming. It is then classified by problematic (Capacity building, WASH and cholera, etc.) and by sub problematic for some of them (water catchment for instance); and

- ⮂ "Whole Project management" contains document which cover from strategic aspect to design and product (for instance "ACF-Water-Sanitation-Hygiene-for-Populations-at-Risk").

- ⮂ "02 Background document" contains all collected documents on studies and sectors overviews. It is divided by sector (WASH, Shelter, DRR, etc) and then classified by sector strategies, coverage and studies & experience; and

- ⮂ "03 Office tools" contains tips about the office software. Report templates, etc.

6.1 Mail filing system

Mail filing system entry point is the country, the RSOs, ECHO and "Others".

- ⮂ The Country folders are sub-divided by partners or actors. Each partner folder is divided in two folders: "IN" where incoming mails are stored and "OUT" where outgoing mails are stored. The country folder contains as well an "00 IN" and a "00 OUT" which contains country related mails (received and sent) such as the one containing the ECHO office monthly report, or mails which are not partners or actors specific;

- ⮂ The RSOs folders are sub-divided by sector. Sub-folder are as well divided in "IN" & "OUT". It contains the sectors specific emails sent by the sector advisors;

- ⮂ The "ECHO" folder is structured the same way as the one in the office computer. It is classified as per Directorate, Unit with an "IN" & "OUT" distinction at the end of the system. As for the Office "ECHO" folder, most important sub-folders are A4 (Thematic Policy") and C4 ("Human Resources"). It contains as well the Aquarius mail exchanges in a dedicated sub-folder; and

- ⮂ The "Others" folder contains different contact which are not directly ECHO related

All above Outlook Exchange folders are stored in *C:\Users\dblanc\Documents\MAIL*.

6.2 Access to information and updating

6.2.1 Access to information

There are two ways to get access to the stored information:

- ⮂ Through the architecture of the filing system of the office computer; or

- ⮂ Through the email filing system.

Most reports can be found in any of the two systems.

6.2.2 Information updating

With such an elaborated architecture, the proper updating of the system (in particular for the ECHO funding related documents such as the appraisals, interim reports, etc.) is time consuming. It can only be updated when mission or office activities are limited : during the rainy season (July-August) or during the holiday (Summer & Christmas mainly).

Feed-back Request Box