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Third Countries in the areas of Migration and Asylum**

Desk Study on Migration and Development

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Executive Summary

The **overall objective** of this desk study is to inform internal reflection within the European Commission in view of furthering policy development at EU level on migration and development (M&D). Primarily based on a literature review¹, it provides an analysis of main lessons learned, good practices and success stories in key thematic sub-areas of the M&D agenda and related policy recommendations and operational orientations. The study addresses separately “traditional” M&D issues and inter-linkages between migration and selected economic and social development sectors. However, mainstreaming could be better promoted in future policy or reflection documents by addressing “traditional” M&D issues directly under relevant development sectors pertaining to the three pillars of sustainable development. The study also includes an analysis of existing research on “addressing the root causes of irregular and forced migration through development cooperation” and related recommendations, as well as recommendations on key issues and questions to be highlighted in possible public consultation documents.

The study fully takes into account the **South-South dimension** of migration, calling for a more comprehensive approach encompassing not only intra-regional but also extra-regional and internal migration, as well as transit migration. A combination of economic and demographic drivers, compounded by the financial and economic crisis in much of the developed world, are indeed contributing to transform an increasingly large and diverse number of developing countries into migration hubs. However, it is internal migration that remains the predominant form of South-South mobility. To date, M&D policy discussions have not adequately addressed internal migration. There is urgent need to look into the growth, poverty-reduction and human development implications of this form of mobility, which is still overwhelmingly seen in a negative light. The multi-faceted vulnerabilities of internal migrants, in many ways similar to those of their international counterparts, should also be addressed. In addition urbanisation, which interconnects with both internal and international migration, should also receive enhanced attention. The study also calls for reconsidering discourses and approaches to transit migration, acknowledging the limitations of the irregular migration and control approach and questioning the strict distinction established between transit and destination countries. Transit through developing countries, whether northbound or southbound, is de facto a form of South-South temporary - and in many instances permanent – immigration and there would be need to consider the associated development challenges in this light.

The development impacts of **remittances** are still constrained by high transfer costs, widespread informality and the limited availability of remittance-related financial services and products. The existing EU priorities remain valid, including: reducing transfer costs; fostering competition and transparency for transfers originating in the EU itself; supporting remittance sending and receiving partner countries in implementing legal and regulatory reforms; broadening the range of remittance

¹Beside the list of references, a mapping of major studies and evaluations of operational initiatives in selected priority areas is included in annex I.

service providers; and linking remittances to financial services and products that would enable migrants to better manage their resources and build assets. Future work should however better take into account South-South transfers and the barriers faced in this context. Individual South-South transfers are generally smaller than North-South transfers but they reach more and poorer people and can result in higher aggregate amounts, especially when factoring the internal dimension. There is also need to better address migrant vulnerabilities, by making financial education a central component of remittance-related action and building capacities in the areas of consumer protection and financial sector oversight.

The developmental impacts of migration go well beyond remittances, encompassing the effects of a much wider range of financial, but also human, social and cultural transfers from the **diaspora**. While much attention has focused on diasporas in developed countries, recent evidence demonstrates that such transfers do take place in a South-South context and that there is also a vivid diaspora tissue in a number of developing countries. Future work on diaspora should continue to build capacities in developing countries of origin and destination, strengthening attention to the South-South dimension. In developing countries of origin, work should focus on the following priorities: supporting diaspora mapping exercises; promoting conducive conditions for diaspora engagement while avoiding to create distortions between emigrants and the local population - post-crisis contexts might represent a specific case where dedicated incentives might be appropriate; better embedding diaspora engagement in development planning and strengthening the involvement of line institutions beside dedicated diaspora bodies; supporting effective outreach strategies, including for support and protection purposes. In developing countries of destination, the promotion of migrants' rights, empowerment and integration appears as the best-suited strategy, although indirect, to foster South-South diaspora engagement.

Available evidence consistently indicates that flexible migration regimes are the most effective way to promote **circular migration** while migratory restrictions discourage circulation in favour of permanent settlement. This calls for putting much greater emphasis on legislative measures aiming at facilitating circulation such as enhanced opportunities for labour immigration, more flexible entry and residence regimes (e.g. multiple entry visas, facilitated re-entry procedures, extended possibilities of absence under residence regimes) or dual citizenship provisions. Work should also be stepped-up as regards access to, and portability of, social security benefits. Being one of the policy areas with greatest potential impact for maximising the development impact of migration, including circular migration, the recognition of experience, skills and qualifications would deserve a stronger and better-coordinated EU response. This area is indeed highly relevant for work under most areas covered by this study, including diaspora, "brain drain", employment/labour market, PSD, education and health. As regards targeted circular migration schemes, they have been criticised for: being de facto temporary schemes as they only allow migration under pre-set conditions and for predetermined periods of time; being of a pilot nature, mostly small-scale, with limited potential impacts; involving mainly low-skilled workers and offering limited room for skills' acquisition; and more fundamentally presenting severe gaps in terms of migrants' rights and protection, integration and reintegration. Future

experimentation in this area should imperatively address these issues. Finally, circular migration is a major component of South-South movements, encompassing various patterns such as cross-border migration, seasonal migration including pastoralism and nomadism, and internal circular migration. Future work on circular migration should therefore target both South-North and South-South movements paying due attention to these specific forms of movement. As regards international circulation, developing countries of destination should be supported in establishing legislative environments conducive to circulation, exploring both bilateral and regional avenues in the context of regional integration processes.

As with all other areas of the traditional agenda, the South-South dimension has not been adequately considered under “**brain drain**” related work. Yet skilled and student migration also take place in a South-South context, including internally. There is increasing evidence that the “brain drain” approach in the health sector overemphasises the role of international migration in the health workforce crisis when it is best understood as a symptom of a more structural crisis. The EC could indeed consider abandoning reference to the “brain drain” in favour of more neutral references to skilled migration reflecting the current state of knowledge. Beyond “ethical recruitment” policies, which can be questioned on both ethical and effectiveness grounds, strengthening human resource development and planning strategies and improving structural conditions in countries of origin appear as better strategies to promote training, retention, circulation and return of the highly skilled. In addition, institutional partnerships between education and research actors appear preferable to schemes based on facilitating individual temporary or permanent returns for promoting skills circulation - except possibly in post-conflict contexts. Cooperation should be strongly stepped-up on recognition of qualifications issues, which is also the best strategy to address over-qualification and deskilling (“brain waste”). Future work could also pilot a new generation of bilateral arrangements, focusing on skills creation and skills flow in given priority sectors, and covering not only recognition issues but also innovative mechanisms for training co-financing between countries of origin and destination. All of the above should be done in both a South-North and South-South context, exploring regional integration approaches along with bilateral avenues, in the areas of education, training and research, and in relevant priority sectors such as health.

Inter-linkages between **labour market/employment**, migration and development are multiple, with labour migration conditions, and in particular migrant workers’ protection, being crucial determinants of developmental implications. Yet a very important share of labour migration within the developing world takes place informally and migrant workers often cumulate multiple vulnerabilities that expose them to exploitation and abuse. Beyond the normative rights-based perspective, there is great scope for reinforcing the labour market approach to migration in EU development cooperation. There is need to support partner countries in developing knowledge and forecasts of labour market dynamics and their inter-linkages with internal and international migration, including migration impacts on the labour force and economic development. Efforts in related areas of data-collection, management and analysis can contribute to build the economic case for protection and serve as a basis for improved policy-making on labour migration, including through bilateral or

regional labour mobility agreements and schemes. Crucially, such schemes should reflect the realities of labour market demand and labour migration trends, offering regular migration channels at all skills levels. Beyond employment and migration inter-linkages, the fact that conditions prevailing on the labour market are often extremely poor for the population at large in developing countries calls for a mainstreaming approach. In fact, most priorities pursued so far on labour migration connect to broader cooperation priorities in the employment sector. In particular, irregular labour migration should be approached in connection with labour market informality. Reflecting on alternative approaches to address the challenges faced by those working in the informal economy, including migrants, should be a major area of focus. Increasing engagement with social partners and the private sector in areas such as skills needs assessments, intermediation and recruitment, or trafficking for labour exploitation - which has received insufficient attention compared with trafficking for sexual exploitation - should be another key priority.

The migration dimension should be better mainstreamed within broader **private sector development** (PSD) strategies based on partner countries' needs, including priority sectors for the economy. There is indeed significant convergence between the EU PSD strategy under development cooperation and priorities pursued so far through migration-related work e.g. in areas such as strengthening the MSMEs sector including in the informal economy or enhancing access to finance and financial inclusion and the link with remittances. Future work on PSD should focus on both countries of origin and destination: migrants, including internal migrants, should also be considered as a target group in receiving areas wherever relevant, based on sound assessments of their characteristics. While many migrants in developing countries are poor and vulnerable, there are also better-off segments involved in business creation and investment activities. Future support aiming at mobilising migrants in relation with entrepreneurship and investment should put stronger emphasis on the overall business and investment climate, and migration policy conditions facilitating circulation. Support should also be better tailored to the specific needs of distinct segments of the diaspora. More efforts should be put on identifying remittance-linked vehicles for small-scale migrant entrepreneurship and investment. As regards larger-scale migrant entrepreneurs and investors, they appear to be primarily motivated by general economic and financial climate indicators and efforts should primarily be geared towards improving those. In general, targeting migrants under PSD support programmes should not entail the creation of specific incentives or support measures for migrants as opposed to local entrepreneurs or investors, even though some specific activities might be undertaken to reach out to them. Post-conflict and fragile contexts might again be considered differently, with more space for specific diaspora engagement schemes.

Relevant work aiming at enhancing the positive impacts of migration for **education** in countries of origin (e.g. through the mobilisation of skilled diaspora members, the whole remittance agenda, inter alia the development of remittance-backed education products or facilitating migration as a social protection strategy) are addressed in the "brain drain", remittances and social protection sections of the study. As regards countries of destination and transit, future development cooperation should focus on enhancing access to education for internal and international migrants, including

forced migrants. Those vulnerable groups should be specifically targeted under mainstream education strategies, and partner countries should be supported in planning and delivering education services that also cater for them. Including a migration-related target under the education goal of the SDGs and disaggregating education data by migratory status would be very useful in this respect. In addition, a more economic approach highlighting the overall economic contribution of migrants to destination countries and areas and challenging the “burden” vision should also be mobilised in advocating for inclusive education systems. Finally, future cooperation in this area should pay enhanced attention to the local and urban dimensions, building local capacities and fostering exchanges of good practices among cities.

In addition to relevant orientations contained in sections on “brain drain”, remittances (including remittance-backed health/insurance products) and social protection, recommendations in the **health** sector are very similar to those put forward for the education sector. Those are in fact relevant for enhancing access to all social services (housing, water and sanitation, etc.). As is the case with education, future cooperation on migration and health should not be limited to countries of origin and should also address the needs of countries of destination and transit. In particular, enhancing access to health in countries of transit and destination for international and internal migrants, including refugees and IDPs, should be a key priority, mainstreamed under future cooperation in the health sector. Recommendations in this area are similar to those highlighted above for education. A final remark relevant to all social sectors is that while development cooperation can foster the utilisation of migrant resources for enhancing social development or support civil society in providing social services in certain contexts, building states’ capacities to meet their responsibilities in providing social services at origin and destination should remain the primary objective in the medium to long-term.

Internal and international migrants face major challenges in accessing formal **social protection**. As a major destination area, the EU should do more to improve the portability of social security rights for migrants residing in its territory. Under development cooperation, the EU should adopt a differentiated approach, based on the status of the social protection sector in partner countries. A number of middle-income countries have sufficiently well established social security systems to allow for the development of social security agreements or voluntary social security schemes for migrants. However, the opportunity to support such agreements and schemes, including on a regional basis, in contexts where formal social protection is less developed should be carefully assessed. In certain cases, efforts should primarily be geared towards the comprehensive strengthening of the social protection system with migration being mainstreamed through targeting migrants as a vulnerable group. The EU Approach to social protection under development cooperation already gives consideration to specific challenges faced by migrants, opening space for migration mainstreaming. As in other sectors, sensitisation and advocacy efforts, including through specific migrant-related interventions, should be foreseen to promote migrants’ access to social protection. Finally, internal and international migration and remittances themselves constitute vital social protection strategies for many poor people, particularly in a South-South context. Therefore a relevant approach to social protection is to strengthen migration policy frameworks to

ensure that these movements take place in the best possible conditions. The whole agenda on remittances - including but not limited to the development of remittance-backed microinsurance/insurance products - should also contribute to making these private social protection strategies more effective.

The notion of **“addressing the root causes of irregular and forced migration through development cooperation”** should be resisted by DEVCO, as it raises a number of major issues: i) “root causes” approaches are grounded in migration control objectives, not in development objectives; ii) referring to the “root causes of irregular and forced migration” contributes to the conflation of migration and asylum issues which contributes to jeopardise international protection; iii) the notion of “root causes” derives from a very partial understanding of the dynamics sustaining irregular - and even to a certain extent forced – migration, which ignore, in particular, factors originating in destination countries and migration regimes themselves; iv) the “root causes” approach is grounded in simplistic, and generally false, assumptions about the nature of inter-linkages between overall and sectorial development processes, irregular, and forced migration.

Overall and sectorial development cooperation should primarily target irregular and forced migrants on the ground that they are particularly vulnerable groups. In addition, irregular and forced migration are likely to result in more negative developmental outcomes than regular and voluntary forms of migration for low- and middle-income countries of destination and origin. Therefore, cooperation on migration should aim at promoting regular and voluntary forms of migration. However, response strategies should be designed with extreme care, considering the specificities of irregularity in South-South contexts of widespread informality and avoiding nurturing stigmatisation. In particular, answers aiming at addressing irregular migration from the crime angle such as anti-smuggling and trafficking interventions should be completed by approaches looking into labour market dynamics. In contexts of prevalent informality, cooperation should aim at promoting the gradual formalisation of migration while avoiding to inadvertently create barriers where they did not previously exist.

Rather than starting with the policy objective of reducing certain specific forms of migration in line with the “root causes” philosophy, development cooperation would be better inspired to ground its action in the general understanding that development processes generate internal and international population movements. In addition, even if reducing the prevalence of irregular and forced migration can be considered legitimate from a development perspective, there are many reasons why development cooperation is unlikely to meet related expectations. Therefore the key policy objective to be supported through overall and sectorial development cooperation should be to adequately prepare and plan for the likely impacts of internal and international migration and mobility - in terms of scale, direction, quality, composition - generated by development processes. These likely implications should be factored in overall and sectorial development planning. In parallel cooperation in the migration area should aim to enhance migration governance to ensure that these movements take place in adequate conditions.

Finally, adequately addressing irregular and forced migration raises substantial policy coherence issues. First, a number of “root causes” of irregular and forced migration

fall within the remit of other internal and external EU policies. Second, whether the EU is well-placed to promote the sort of comprehensive, long-term and “do no harm” development strategies that would be required in developing countries can also be questioned, given that it has proved unable or unwilling itself to engage into such forward-looking reforms. Beyond the specific issues of irregular and forced migration, one can observe an increasing disconnect between the developmental approach to migration promoted by DEVCO and the overall EU approach to migration issues, which is likely to compromise the implementation of a truly development-oriented approach under development cooperation.

In light of the above, possible issues and questions for inclusion in public consultation documents on future development cooperation on M&D could be clustered around the following sub-themes: rationale and overall objective(s); SDGs/Post-2015; strengths and weaknesses; ownership/alignment; South-South migration; internal migration; urban and local development; transit migration; “traditional” M&D agenda; migration mainstreaming; sectorial priorities - necessarily including employment/labour market and education, training and skills; informality; partnership with research, civil society, social partners and private sector; policy coherence.

1 Introduction and structure of the desk study

This study is submitted as part of **Service Contract DCI-MIGR/2014/349-985 - Desk study on migration and development**, which aims at producing a desk study containing a literature review and recommendations for policy priorities and operational approaches and responses on EU migration and development (M&D) policy. The objective is to inform internal reflection within the European Commission in view of furthering policy development at EU level. As requested, geographic coverage includes all non-EU countries eligible for EU development cooperation and the analysis covers specificities of developing host-, transit- and destination countries and takes into account South-South as well as South-North migration.

In line with the ToRs, the study includes:


- i. **A mapping of major studies on the links between M&D and evaluations of operational initiatives**, which could provide input to future EU policy development in selected priority areas². The mapping - included in annex I - consists of an excel file containing selected recent references from a variety of sources including European States and other donors, international organisations, academia and relevant civil society organisations.
- ii. **An analysis of main lessons learned, good practices and success stories in key thematic sub-areas of the M&D agenda and related policy recommendations and operational orientations**. Each thematic sub-section includes: a) a “rationale” section providing a brief overview of M&D inter-linkages in the considered area; b) a “challenges and lessons learned” section presenting highlights drawn from past development cooperation experience from both the EU and other actors; and c) a “way forward” section outlining possible directions for future cooperation. In line with the ToRs, the analysis covers separately remittances, diaspora, circular migration and brain drain – section 3. The social consequences of migration are addressed under “Selected policy sectors – Social development”, which focuses in particular on education, health and social protection – Section 5. Migration mainstreaming in these three social sectors is covered under the same section, while section 4, “Selected policy sectors – Economic development” covers mainstreaming in the areas of labour market/employment and private sector development³. Assisting developing destination countries in better managing immigration has not been included as a specific section but is dealt with as a crosscutting issue in all sections. The desk study indeed places specific emphasis on the South-South dimension in all its components, including internal migration, (see section 2 for a brief

²Although the mapping includes a category on “refugees and development”, limited attention has been devoted to information collection in this area, as this issue is only marginally addressed in the desk study, being covered by another service contract currently under implementation.

³Given time constraints for the realisation of this study, the analysis has been limited to sectors mentioned in the ToRs, with the exception of social protection, which was considered necessary to cover the social consequences of migration requirement, in addition to health and education.

contextualisation) and therefore includes relevant orientations for receiving countries and areas in all thematic sub-sections. Priority was given in the literature review to South-South migration case studies, and numerous examples are provided throughout the text to illustrate salient characteristics of South-South migration.

This somehow hybrid structure could be abandoned in the future policy/reflection document, in favour of a structure that would briefly introduce the major policy lines and priorities⁴ - and key areas of focus to date but include most of the actual content directly under sections addressing migration inter-linkages with key sectors under the three pillars – economic, social and environmental - of sustainable development. In such a structure, traditional M&D issues (remittances, diaspora, etc.) would be mainstreamed throughout the three pillars. The EU-funded project “Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration and Development: Case Studies and Policy Recommendations (IPPMD)” implemented by the OECD offers a possible categorisation of the main policy sectors to be considered as follows:



Source: OECD, 2014, IPPMD Conceptual Framework – Draft Paper for discussion.

- iii. **An analysis of existing research on addressing the root causes of irregular and forced migration through development cooperation and related recommendations** on how EU development cooperation could reduce these movements by better addressing these root causes. The analysis is provided in section 6.

⁴E.g. prioritisation of internal migration; transit countries as destination countries; innovative approaches to informality; labour market approach; stepping-up work recognition of qualifications, skills and experience; focus on diaspora engagement in crisis and post-crisis contexts, etc.

- iv. **Recommendations on key issues and questions to be highlighted in public consultation documents for a possible future Commission policy paper on M&D.** These recommendations are included in section 7.

2 South-South migration: towards a more comprehensive approach

From a development perspective, one of the major policy shifts introduced by the 2013 Communication on Maximising the Development Impact of Migration is certainly the South-South focus. Relevant work had already been undertaken, e.g. through the EU-funded ACP Observatory on Migration or regional initiatives such as the ECOWAS Free movement and migration project, but the Communication provides for a much needed policy framework to step-up work in this area.

Emerging economies in the global South are indeed increasingly becoming migration hubs⁵. Economic drivers⁶ are combined with demographic factors as a number of developing countries are – or will soon be - faced with falling fertility and population ageing⁷. This trend is further supported by the financial and economic crisis context in most of the developed world, which is in addition likely to result in increasingly restrictive migration regimes. Importantly, the phenomenon is not limited to the BRICS, but also includes a wide diversity of emerging migration poles, as highlighted for instance by recent research by the ACP Observatory on Migration (2013a) in countries like Angola, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Timor Leste, or Trinidad and Tobago.

The Communication strongly picks-up on the intra-regional dimension of South-South migration, which was already factored in the Agenda for Change through the focus on regional labour mobility. Intra-regional migration is indeed a major component of South-South flows. According to UNDESA (2013), the share of international migrants living within their area of birth is higher than 30% for most developing sub-regions - the only exceptions being Northern Africa, Central Asia, the Caribbean, Central America and the Pacific sub-regions – and reaches as high as 69% in West Africa. It has also been estimated that almost 80% of South-South migration takes place between countries with contiguous borders (Ratha and Shaw,

⁵This section is concerned with South-South migration but note should also be taken of intensifying reverse migration trends from the North to the South. According to some observers, North-South migration “will likely grow robustly” (Papademetriou, 2012). This North-South migration will involve both return movements and new migration flows – a trend already observable - and calls for “recalibrating Europe’s place in the world” in terms of future migration flows (Collett, 2013).

⁶According to UNDP (2013), the joint GDPs of Brazil, China and India will overtake the combined economies of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, Canada, Italy and Germany within this decade.

⁷According to Taran (2014), over half of the 224 recognized countries and political territories are at or well below zero population growth fertility rates. The author gives the following examples from various regions: Africa: Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Seychelles, Tunisia. Asia: Bhutan, Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, both South and North Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. Americas: Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, USA, plus nearly all Caribbean states. Argentina, Mexico, Peru are 'almost there' with 2.25 rates in 2013. All EU member countries. Eurasia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Middle East: Bahrain, Iran, Lebanon, Qatar. Saudi Arabia is at 2.21.

2007). Intra-regional mobility is expected to increase in the future, due inter alia to lower costs of travel, the increasing importance of regional economic integration, and restrictive immigration policies in the context of the financial and economic crisis in the North (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013a).

However, South-South migration encompasses two other dimensions, namely extra-regional migration and internal migration, which have received much less attention.

As noted by the ACP Observatory on migration (2013a), “**extra-regional migration** in the South–South context is experiencing changes in patterns. A few years back, South-South extra-regional migration was driven by oil-based economic development, as in the case of Gulf countries. Today it is linked to the rise of China and, more generally, of the BRICS countries”. Research by the Observatory demonstrates this increasing diversification of patterns, including for instance Asian and African migration to LAC countries or bi-directional flows between sub-Saharan Africa and China, which are part of a broader “emerging Sino-African trade system”. Finally, the greatest component of South-South migration is **internal migration** (including its forced component, internal displacement), which has however been side-lined to date in M&D policy discussions and in development cooperation on migration, with a few exceptions in “mega-countries” such as India and China⁸. Research on M&D in a South-South context, as opposed to policy, has been insisting on the predominance and significance of internal migration for developing countries, with clear impacts on growth, poverty-reduction and human development⁹. Like international migration, internal migration is driven by structural inequalities among diverse regions. Both internal and international migration are strongly inter-related with **urbanisation**. While there has been increasing recognition of the developmental potential of international migration, internal migration remains overwhelmingly seen as a symptom of local development failure rather than an enabling factor for development.

The 2013 Communication has highlighted the crucial contribution of internal migration to “the functioning of cities as centres of growth”. However, much more emphasis needs to be put on these aspects in future EU policy development and operational activities as the focus primarily remains on challenges raised by internal migration in the context of urbanisation, e.g. in terms of increasing pressure on social services¹⁰. Internal migration should be mainstreamed in future work on M&D, and

⁸There are an estimated 400 million migrants in India (compared with some 11 million international migrants), while there are an estimated 262.6 million rural migrant workers in China (UNESCO, 2014).

⁹See e.g. recent work by the University of Sussex-based Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium which focuses on the relationship between regional migration, internal migration and poverty and is located in six regions across Asia, Africa and Europe (<http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/aboutus>) or by the ACP Observatory on Migration (<http://www.acpmigration-obs.org/PublicationsInternalMigration>) as well as ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013a, which highlights that internal mobility is the most important type of movement.

¹⁰The presentation of the KNOMAD thematic working group on internal migration and urbanisation highlights e.g. that “currently, more than 80 percent of Sub-Saharan governments are negatively disposed towards internal migration, and there is a need more

the protection and rights of internal migrants should receive enhanced attention. As highlighted by a recent study in the Indian context (UNESCO, 2013), many of the challenges faced by internal migrants are in essence similar to those faced by international migrants¹¹. Overall, despite the numerical importance of internal migration, its development potential and the multi-faceted vulnerabilities of internal migrants, internal migration has received marginal consideration in development strategies of both developing countries and their development cooperation partners, including the EU.

Importantly, **internal and international migration are interrelated**, as highlighted in the 2013 Communication, both through replacement effects by internal migrants and because migration towards cities is often a first step towards international migration. The artificiality of borders in various developing regions also questions the strict distinction between the internal and international dimension, as cross-border movers certainly do not consider themselves as international migrants. Similarly, **South-South and South-North flows interconnect**, including through replacement effects (e.g. when internal or international South-South migrants replace workers who have emigrated to the North) or when South-South migration is a first step towards South-North migration. As noted by the ACP Observatory on migration (2013a), “mobility cannot be arbitrarily separated among flows within and between the North and South, but is rather a continuum in which the current era of globalization creates particular patterns according to historical and economic realities. In this sense, South–South migration is part of a wider global migration system, both influenced by it and influencing it”.

An interesting dimension of this South-South/South-North discussion is **transit migration**. The policy discourse on transit migration has originally been framed in Northern destination areas, particularly the EU and the USA, “which at a certain point started to label their Southern neighbours as transit countries” (Marconi, 2010). Within this discourse, transit migration has been primarily conceptualised as a dimension of irregular migration. Consequently, the policy response has been to prevent migrants to make the final leg of the journey by strengthened border control,

broadly to move away from such perceptions towards accepting migration and urbanization”. This working group should become an important reference on these issues when outputs start becoming available. See <http://www.knomad.org/thematic-working-groups/internal-migration-and-urbanization>

¹¹“Internal migrants, of which 70.7 per cent are women, are excluded from the economic, cultural, social and political life of society and are often treated as second-class citizens. The constraints faced by migrants are many - lack of formal residency rights; lack of identity proof; lack of political representation; inadequate housing; low-paid, insecure or hazardous work; extreme vulnerability of women and children to trafficking and sex exploitation; exclusion from state-provided services such as health and education and discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, class or gender”. More generally, this study is a very useful reference on internal migration that provides ample ground for better including the internal migration dimension under future development cooperation. The study puts forward 10 key areas for better inclusion of migrant workers, including: registration and identity; political and civic inclusion; labour market inclusion; legal aid and dispute resolution; inclusion of women internal migrants; inclusion through access to food; inclusion through housing; educational inclusion; public health inclusion; and financial inclusion. Best practice project examples and success stories are presented in each of these areas. Deshingkar and Akter (2009), on which this study greatly relies, is another important resource on internal migration.

pressuring designated transit countries to participate in this effort, with no consideration for the actual challenges faced by migrants and countries involved. Increasingly difficult border crossings and resulting higher costs for migrants have been forcing those to spend longer periods in those countries, with many getting indefinitely stranded. What might indeed have been intended as a transit South-North movement was therefore converted into a South-South form of temporary - and in many instances permanent - immigration. In addition, the transit discourse has obscured the fact that for a significant share of immigrants in many so-called transit countries, these countries have been destinations in their own rights, the transit lens being irrelevant¹². Yet the Northbound transit discourse has been used by transit States to negate their status of immigration countries and ignore the needs of these two categories of migrants, considered to be “just passing through”. This obscures the fact that these countries are de facto receiving countries, facing opportunities and challenges that are not much different in nature to those faced by so-called “destination countries”¹³. The strict distinction established between transit and destination countries should therefore be questioned, not only because a country can fulfill both functions simultaneously, but also because **a transit country is facto a destination country**. This, and the nature of the development challenges it implies has not been properly acknowledged to date, neither by development cooperation actors nor by the concerned countries. Finally, it has also taken time to acknowledge that the transit phenomenon, and associated challenges, also takes place in contexts where the final destination is a developing country. In any case, the situation of transit countries situated on Southbound routes has globally attracted much less attention.

3 Traditional M&D agenda

3.1 Remittances

3.1.1 Rationale

Remittances to developing countries in 2013 totalled USD 414 billion, amounting to more than three times official development assistance (ODA) flows and, excluding China, significantly exceeding foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to

¹²A recent illustration of the misplaced tendency to indiscriminately apply a transit lens to flows in certain countries is provided in EUI (2014): “The same month as the Lampedusa tragedy, 92 persons were found dead in central Sahara on the desert route from Niger to Algeria. The immediate reaction was to denounce the dangers of irregular migration across the Sahara to the EU, even though no one knows where these migrants had been headed. Was it Europe or, more probably, Algeria? Migrants smuggled across the Mediterranean are mainly young men. Instead the people dead in the Sahara were mostly women and children, a fact which suggests that they might have been hoping to reunite with husbands and fathers in Algeria, a country that is to host some 100,000 migrant workers from Sub-Saharan Africa”.

¹³See e.g. Marconi (2010), who notes that the way in which the transit issue has been framed by Northern receiving countries “leaves out of focus the effects of immigration, both temporary and permanent, in cities of these so called transit countries, preventing the development of adequate institutional structures and local sensemaking processes to cope with it”.

those countries. They are expected to reach USD 435 billion in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). Remittances are most often discussed in the context of voluntary migration yet they also flow to families left behind in countries affected by conflict and disasters, some of them sent by refugees and other forced migrants¹⁴. The remainder of this section uses the generic term “migrant” to refer to all categories of migrants, irrespective of the causes of migration, voluntary or involuntary. Official remittance amounts, which only encompass recorded flows, do not reflect the full picture, as remittances remain under-recorded due to data collection gaps and the significant share of informal transfers. The proportion of households receiving remittances - estimated in average at 15% with peaks up to 25 or 30% in some countries and regions, such as Central Asia, Central America and South Caucasus - gives another indication of the significance of these flows for developing countries¹⁵. Remittances greatly impact on poverty reduction and human development in countries of origin. Yet the development potential of remittances remains hindered by the fact that **migrants and their families lose billions of dollars annually due to high transfer costs**. A number of key factors underpin high remittance transfer costs to developing countries, including the highly concentrated nature of remittance markets, traditionally dominated by a handful of money transfer operators (MTOs), and existing practices aiming at restricting competition such as exclusivity agreements between MTOs, banks and other agents. Participation in the remittance market is further restricted in a number of countries by regulations that prevent certain categories of actors to perform transfer services, such as microfinance institutions (MFIs) or post offices, despite their greater potential outreach to rural populations. As a result, rural recipients face both higher financial costs, which can reach as high as 25%, and hidden costs such as time and travel costs necessary to pick-up their money. Poor transparency on remittance transfer costs - including exchange rates, fees and potential taxes applied - is another key factor behind high prices, raising major consumer protection concerns in the remittance industry. Under-developed financial infrastructure and limited financial literacy and inclusion, which severely limit the options available to migrants and their families, also contribute to high remittance transfer costs to developing countries.

The informal character of a significant proportion of remittance transfers also limits their positive effects on development in a number of ways. At household level, informal transfers cannot be used to build history with financial institutions that could support loans, nor generate interests or savings or be linked to other financial products that could help build assets and reduce vulnerability. Informal transfers are also risky as users are left without any form of legal protection. Finally, although high formal transfer costs are among the main reasons for recurring to informal channels, those have been found to be even more expensive in a number of contexts. At

¹⁴See e.g. World Bank (2014): “during conflict and disasters, remittances play an important role in securing the livelihoods of those left behind and helping prevent further forced migration. Sending remittances through formal channels, however, becomes more difficult. While ongoing conflict limits the potential development impact of remittances, these can play an important role in recovery”.

¹⁵Gay Ellis C. and Orozco M., 2014. According to IFAD (2013a), remittances go to about one in ten Asian households.

aggregate levels, limited formal transfers and associated deposit and savings accounts constrain the credit capacities of the financial system, foreign exchange reserves and balance of payment, as well as countries' credit worthiness.

Finally, the developmental impacts of remittances are constrained by the **limited availability of remittance-related financial services and products** targeted to the diversified needs of migrants and their families. The development of financial products for the most vulnerable segments of the migrant population does not necessarily appeal to mainstream financial institutions, while other non-traditional actors might be constrained by regulatory and capacity issues. At the other end of the spectrum, it has proved difficult to offer products with the levels of attractiveness and security that better-off and well-integrated segments of the diaspora might be after, which is linked to wider business-climate and investment conditions.

The EU has committed to the G8 and G20 target of reducing the global average cost of transferring remittances to 5% by 2014. Beyond cost reduction, the EU has focused on enhancing the formalisation of remittance transfers and promoting their developmental impact, including through the development of remittance-backed products and the promotion of financial education. Support has also been provided to partner countries on remittance data-collection, management and analysis as a basis for improved policy-making in this area.

3.1.2 Challenges and lessons learned

The 5% target has not been reached, although the global average cost has indeed decreased to 7,9% in 2014. In addition, this global average hides significant differences in the cost of sending remittances to the various developing regions, with the cost of sending remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa remaining the highest at 11.3% (World Bank, 2014). The factors driving high remittance costs are exacerbated in the South-South context, where the more limited amounts at stake, both globally and per transaction, also reduce opportunities for economies of scale. Most of the 20 most expensive bilateral corridors are actually South-South corridors¹⁶.

Despite these pressing challenges, and as highlighted in the most recent EU policy documents, **the focus of cooperation on remittances has overwhelmingly been on North-South transfers**. The explanation partly lies in the **predominant informality of South-South transfers**, which has been confirmed by recent research¹⁷. Due to their greater informality, South-South transfers are underestimated in remittance statistics and therefore less visible. According to some World Bank estimates however, 30 to 45% of remittances to developing countries are South-South transfers. In addition, migration to Southern growth poles increasingly translates into a **growing share of official transfers originating from the South** for a number of developing countries. The financial crisis, which affected North-South

¹⁶There are however huge disparities within developing regions, which makes a corridor approach even more relevant when working on remittance transfer costs.

¹⁷Including by the EU-funded ACP Observatory on Migration (2013a). E.g. an ACP Observatory case study on South-South transfers to Lesotho (2012) found that about 90% of those take place informally.

remittances far more than South-South remittances, has also contributed to this trend¹⁸.

Another reason why South-South transfers have attracted less interest is that migration between developing countries results in **smaller remitted amounts** due to the more limited income gains it implies for migrants. **South-South transfers nevertheless hold great potential for poverty reduction**. South-South migration is less costly and as such involves a greater proportion of poor, low-educated and rural people than South-North migration. South-South remittances flow in greater proportions to such households, reducing their vulnerability and making a significant wellbeing impact for them. It also seems more common for households to receive remittances from more than one sender in a South-South context, illustrating the greater accessibility of South-South migration. The greater share of South-South remittances spent on primary household needs, such as consumer expenses, utility bills, health, education or clothing, as opposed to less immediate needs and savings is another indication that they flow to poorer households.

There is in addition a crucial component of South-South remittances that has so far been ignored in development cooperation, i.e. **internal transfers**. However internal migration, being accessible to more and poorer people, is a greater component of South-South migration than international migration, and this translates into significant streams of domestic remittances. In addition, some developing countries host huge numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who also send remittances. Although statistical data on internal remittances are not readily available, existing case studies reveal that the above-mentioned pattern – smaller remittance amounts but flowing to more and poorer people with crucial welfare implications for those involved - is further reinforced at this internal level. There is also evidence that internal remittances exceed international remittances in a number of developing countries in terms of aggregate amounts, as the numbers involved compensate the smaller size of individual transfers (Castado et al. 2012; Deshingkar P. and McKay A., 2014). According to some estimates, domestic remittances touch 4,5 times as many people as international remittances and are worth 3 times as much (Nielsen K. quoted in IFAD 2014). A final dimension, which has not attracted enough attention, relates to **in-kind remittances**, such as merchandise and food, which are significant forms of transfers in a South-South context, both internally and internationally.

Although limited, available evidence on South-South remittances¹⁹ points towards important differences related to the characteristics of migrants involved and receiving

¹⁸E.g. a recent study of the Argentina-Bolivia remittance corridor (IOM, 2014a) notes that in addition to Argentina, two Southern countries, Brazil and Chile, have recently joined the 5 major origin countries of remittances to Bolivia, having surpassed Italy in the context of the crisis affecting this country. A 2010 comparative case study in the LAC context also notes that the economic crisis was felt more acutely along a North-South (USA-Costa Rica) than a South-South (Costa Rica-Nicaragua) remittance corridor (FOMIN, 2010a).

¹⁹ There are few analyses and case studies on South-South remittances that take a comparative perspective with North-South remittances. Weiss Fagen and Bump (2005), which focuses on Nicaraguans remitting from Costa Rica, Haitians remitting from the Dominican Republic, and Bolivians sending money home from Argentina and making a comparison with Latino-Americans remitting from the USA and Ratha and Shaw (2007) remain useful references, in addition to FOMIN (2010a), already mentioned.

households, as well as sending and receiving patterns, including amounts, frequency, and use of remittances. Future EU support should therefore comprehensively address the issue of remittances, paying due attention to the significant poverty reduction potential of South-South remittances, both among and within developing countries, and to their specificities.

Beyond this aspect, lessons learned from past projects' experience²⁰ confirm the validity of several priorities already guiding EU cooperation on remittances, including work on legal and regulatory frameworks that should receive even more attention in the future. Legal and regulatory reform is often an essential dimension of expanding the range of remittance actors and products. **Insufficient consideration of the legal and regulatory dimensions has been a major factor of failure** in the past for projects aiming at empowering new actors and developing new products, particularly transnational products, on the remittance market. Specific attention should also be paid to **policy coherence**, particularly in relation to regulations and compliance requirements on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), which can negatively impact on costs, competition and innovation in the remittance markets and for which a proportional and balanced approach should be upheld. This is a particularly salient issue in a number of conflict contexts, Somalia being a case in point²¹.

While broadening the range of remittance providers is considered an essential priority, a number of challenges have been faced in the past. A key lesson learned is that support should be tailored to the existing market structure in each country as well as local sociocultural factors that influence preference for, and trust in, certain categories of actors over others. In addition, there is need to pay attention to the distinctive features of various categories of actors. For instance, postal networks and MFIs are faced with major infrastructure and technical equipment constraints and capacity issues to use upgraded equipment and develop and market new products. Careful consideration also needs to be given to liquidity management capacities and the establishment of sound economic models that can compensate for the expensive costs of delivering cash in remote and sometimes insecure areas. In this respect, experience shows that product cross-selling is an essential element of sustainability. As regards the private sector, a major challenge lies in convincing some of the private sector actors of the interest of working with the poorer segments of the migrant population and their families²². When it comes to mobile technologies, experience shows that success stories have emerged in the context of strong domestic markets, illustrating the pertinence of developing strategies comprehensively addressing internal and international remittances. There are also

²⁰This study primarily builds on recommendations from FOMIN (2010b), IFAD (2014, 2013a and 2013b), European Commission (2012) and European Commission (2014).

²¹See World Bank (2014) on the impacts of UK and USA AML/CFT regulations on remittance transfers to Somalia and current DFID-led efforts to "develop a "Temporary Safer Corridor" pilot for UK-Somali remittances while the Somali AML/CFT regime is being developed".

²²There is anecdotal evidence for instance that some commercial banks poorly treat low-income migrant workers, discouraging them from recurring to formal bank channels. Such occurrences are reported e.g. in ILO, 2014a.

important regulatory issues linked to mobile cross-border transfers, not least about AML aspects, that still need to be resolved.

Regarding the development of remittance-backed services and products²³, past interventions have not always relied on sound needs assessments of targeted beneficiaries. A significant share of migrant workers are economically and socially vulnerable not least due to the conditions under which their migration takes place, including the need to sell assets and contract debts to finance migration costs. The multifaceted vulnerability of a significant share of migrants, which correlates with high levels of financial exclusion, is a major factor behind the prevalence of informal transfers as well as the difficulties in providing adequate remittance-backed services and products to migrants. Migrant socioeconomic vulnerability and the irregularity of their earnings - particularly for irregular migrants and those in the informal sector - make them reluctant to financially committing over a long period, as opposed to the more flexible and ad hoc sending of remittances. Significant proportions of migrants do not have a bank account in the country where they live and work, and this is linked to a great extent with wider informality in terms of residence and working status. These proportions are greater among migrants living in developing countries, where levels of financial illiteracy and exclusion in the population at large, and irregularity within the migrant population, are higher. General institutional mistrust is an essential motivation for vulnerable migrants to use informal transfers and be wary of financial services and products, particularly for those in irregular situation, but there is also a specific mistrust in banks, which reflects the actual fragility of the financial system in many developing countries²⁴. A final consideration reflecting the actual vulnerability of many migrants is that **remittances sometimes flow from families to the migrants**, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. This can occur when migrants pursue higher education without earning income or when they do not succeed in making a living at destination, with the cost of supporting an emigrant in the North being more expensive than in a South-South context (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013b). Some migrants stranded in transit also rely on family remittances to continue their journey or simply survive (Marconi, 2010).

While financial education has progressively become an important priority, these aspects have not always been adequately factored in remittance-linked interventions. For instance, unrealistic assumptions about interest and capacities for business-creation, investment, or participation in complex financial schemes have led to project failure in the past, particularly in contexts where remittances are being

²³Links between remittances and private sector development, including business creation and investment, are discussed separately in section 4.2.

²⁴A recent survey finds one in three Latino-American migrants in the USA to be economically vulnerable, taking into account migrants' debt ratios, risk levels, incomes, and savings, with higher levels of vulnerability for specific groups including recent arrivals, migrants without children, women, low-educated and undocumented migrants. About 40% of surveyed migrants do not have a bank account in the USA, and irregular status is the main reason quoted by half of them (FOMIN, 2014). In a South-South context, a recent survey among Bolivian migrants in Argentina finds that 88% of them do not have a bank account in Argentina. The main reason invoked is mistrust in banks, which is not surprising in the case of Argentina, followed by low incomes, undocumented status and lack of financial education (IOM, 2014a).

primarily used for meeting basic and immediate household consumption needs. Feasibility studies demonstrate that migrants' needs and interests can be different from expectations (see e.g. ILO, 2012) and can bring up dimensions that had not been taken into account (e.g. the need to cater for the situation of households with several family members in migration). Finally, migrant socioeconomic vulnerability needs to be carefully assessed before pressuring them to make additional financial commitments, as many migrants, and particularly women, already jeopardise their own well being to remit²⁵.

Finally, research and previous interventions on remittances have shown that **remittance sending and receiving patterns are strongly gendered**, a factor that needs to be factored in remittance-related interventions, particularly in the area of financial education.

3.1.3 *The way forward*

The EU and its Members States should continue their effort to **reduce remittance transfer costs, enhance their formalisation and promote their developmental impact**, in line with their international commitments. In this respect, the November 2014 "G20 plan to facilitate remittance flows" includes a renewed commitment to the 5% target, in recognition of the implications of remittances for growth, poverty-reduction and financial inclusion. In addition, the Outcome Document of the Open Working Group (OWG) for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) includes a target linked to "the reduction of the remittance transfer costs to less than 3% by 2030 and the elimination of remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%" under goal 10 aiming to reduce inequality within and among countries. Action towards these overall objectives should concentrate on the following priorities.

First, the EU should continue to foster competition and transparency for transfers originating in the EU itself, including through its own internal policies²⁶. Under

²⁵In this respect, approaches aiming at increasing family pressure on migrants can be questioned. See e.g. (ILO, 2012): "Families in the country of origin have an important role to play in persuading migrants to contribute to premium costs. (...). The relatives of migrants are a natural motivating factor in this kind of project, as they are able to point out priorities that migrants may not have correctly evaluated".

²⁶The EU is a major source of remittances, with over 28 billion flowing to non-EU countries in 2013 according to Eurostat (<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6457244/2-09012015-AP-EN.pdf/18f662ac-8b70-4254-a45b-10b78613a5a4>). Several EU Member States and the EU itself have supported the establishment of various remittance comparison websites aiming at fostering competition and transparency. In addition, the 2007 Directive on payment services significantly contributed to increase competition by harmonising licensing provisions and requiring Member States to maintain a public register of all authorised payment institutions. It also established rules on transparency (total price of a transaction, transfer fees charged, exchange rate applied, speed of the service), forbid implicit fees, and laid down rules on the execution of payments. A recast of the directive is currently being discussed, which would extend some of its obligations to so called 'one-leg payments' where only one of the payment services providers is located within the Single Euro Payments Area²⁶, a step already taken by a number of Member States on a voluntary basis. As noted in the EU 2013 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, adherence to the general principles for international remittances — a set of international standards adopted in 2007 with the aim of setting policy objectives for safe and transparent remittances markets — is sufficiently good but could still be improved for some specific competition related aspects:

development cooperation, the EU should **support major remittance sending and receiving partner countries in implementing legal and regulatory reforms** and establishing standards and practices for regulators in order to facilitate affordable, efficient and secure remittance flows. Reforms recently introduced by some developing countries have contributed to improve the remittance environment. Yet exclusivity clauses, poor competition, non-transparency and restrictive market structures still characterise many partner countries, resulting in limited access and high costs for senders and receivers, particularly for South-South transfers. Partner countries should be supported in aligning with the general principles for international remittances in all relevant areas: transparency and consumer protection, payment system infrastructure, legal and regulatory environment, market structure and competition, and governance and risk management. **Work on South-South transfers could privilege a corridor approach** allowing for coherent support on both the sending and the receiving side and promoting bilateral agreements on remittances²⁷. Where regional organisations have competencies in areas relevant for the remittance legal and regulatory environment, bilateral action should be complemented by a regional approach.

Second, the EU should continue to support efforts aiming at **broadening the existing range of remittance providers and services** in order to enhance access, and improve and diversify the offer of remittance services, particularly in remote areas. Potential providers include postal networks, MFIs, credit unions, cooperatives, retail shops, etc. Project experience has confirmed the great potential of **postal networks and MFIs** to reach out to rural populations under-served by mainstream financial institutions and supporting these two categories of actors should remain a priority. Beyond public and socially oriented institutions, the **private sector** could play an important role in broadening the offer of remittance-linked financial services. Useful action in this area would involve working on perceptions, including through market and business model studies to demonstrate that remittance senders and recipients can be a profitable market target. Encouraging **partnerships between various categories of actors with distinct orientations** can also be a successful way of building on their respective strengths, and a paying strategy in terms of confidence-building.

The development of **electronic and mobile services** is another viable strategy for increasing access to formal transfer mechanisms and associated products, with the private sector being an important driver of innovation in this area. Mobile technologies have the potential to reduce both financial and hidden costs for remittance recipients. They can be used by the unbanked to perform a number of financial operations, although most advanced operations do require a link with a bank account, which is also required to build credit history (IFAD, 2013a). There are success stories in this area in various regions (with the Kenyan M-Pesa experience

exclusivity contracts exist in many markets in the EU and in some Member States it is very difficult for money transfer operators to open bank accounts.

²⁷ See e.g. ILO study on remittance-backed products in the Philippines (2013a), which includes promoting bilateral agreements on remittances with countries of destination to enhance cooperation and compatibility on regulatory, procedural and data aspects as a key recommendation.

being one of the best known) but the level of penetration of these technologies is the highest in Asia, with already clear impacts on improving access and reducing costs in a number of countries (IFAD, 2014; ILO, 2013).

Linking remittances to other financial services and products that would enable migrants to better manage their resources and build assets, hence fostering their economic wellbeing, is an essential component of enhancing their developmental impact. Existing experience with promoting remittance-backed financial services and products (savings accounts, loans, educational saving plans, health/insurance products, etc.) indicates that this **is a promising avenue** that should be further supported. Challenges are however huge to design adequately tailored products based on sound feasibility assessments²⁸, with microfinance approaches holding the greatest potential for poorer segments. There are a few success stories that should be used as a basis for scaling-up and replication²⁹ and more efforts should be put into experimenting this type of products. Particular attention should be paid to already highlighted success factors such as: careful needs assessments; confidence-building including through the careful choice of migrant-trusted implementers (e.g. cooperatives) and sound management of schemes, mistrust being as much of a barrier as economic constraints; effective medium and long-term campaigning - as opposed to short-term/ad hoc outreach activities – based on differentiated marketing and outreach strategies tailored to specific target groups including both migrants and their families, as well as interactive and engaging approaches and personalised attention. In addition, support to financial product development should go hand in hand with capacity building on **consumer protection** and **financial sector oversight** to adequately protect remittance senders and receivers, particularly the most vulnerable, who might not be aware of the risks associated with some products on offer³⁰.

²⁸A representative review of these challenges are highlighted in an ILO feasibility study of resource mobilization among migrant communities for developing health microinsurance in the country of origin (ILO, 2012).

²⁹The Seguros Futuro scheme based on partnership between an insurer and cooperatives and supported by the ILO Microinsurance Facility is a case in point. The scheme offers: a “body repatriation and remittance protection”, which covers 12 monthly remittances in case of death of the migrant plus the basic insured amount. There is further cover for all the body repatriation procedures and expenses; “remittance protection”, with an insured amount of US\$ 100 at a premium of US\$ 1, which can be directly linked to the remittance payment if the cooperative decides to do so or left as an option; “family without borders”, which gives the family a choice to insure up to three family members with a body repatriation cover. As of December 2013 a total of 27,627 policies were active throughout the whole range of products that were offered either to migrant families or through remittance payments (ILO 2014e).

³⁰ILO (2013a) highlights that “bankruptcies involving endowment programmes, particularly the fold-up of major educational plans, bank runs and closures of several rural banks, the loss of investments from various scams and get-rich-quick schemes targeting a gullible public, including scores of migrant worker-investors” have resulted in “a not insubstantial loss of faith on the Philippine financial market and the ability of government to regulate and protect investors”. The study recalls in particular that thousands of Filipino migrant workers who had invested in pre-need educational plans offered by private insurance companies lost their funds when these companies went bankrupt and proved unable to service the promised benefits, prompting the government to reform licencing and oversight provisions. ILO (2012) provide another example of a remittance-based scheme bankruptcy in the health insurance sector: the “Assistance des Résidents Immigrés pour leur Famille en Afrique” (ARIFA)

This approach should be complemented by actions aiming at promoting financial literacy. There is a large consensus on the need to continue supporting **financial education as a central component of remittance-related action**³¹. Low levels of financial literacy, correlated with financial exclusion, are among key reasons for informal transfers and limit the capacity of senders and recipients to leverage remittances for their economic enhancement. At the same time, remittances offer a very good entry point to promote financial education. A wealth of instruments on financial education for migrants has now been developed that should be better capitalised in future projects, while adjusting existing material to the specificities of target groups, including **gender and other characteristics** (age, education levels, rural/urban and regional differences, etc.). Careful attention should also be paid to providers of financial education to reach out to the target groups, while generating trust, **avoiding conflicts of interests**, and ensuring that information provided is in the best interest of migrants and their families. Remittance comparison websites could be used more broadly for financial education purposes, especially in destination countries, where establishing effective and efficient means of diffusion has been a challenge.

Finally, the EU should continue to support partner countries on **remittance data-collection, management and analysis**. Supporting **additional research on remittances** is also needed as a basis for evidence-based policy-making in this area. The need to strengthen data and research on migration will appear in other sections of this paper and is in fact a transversal priority in M&D. Efforts in this area, including support to **improved “migration profile” processes and statistical and research capacity building** should remain a priority under EU development cooperation.

However, as highlighted in various evaluation reports, **existing research already conducted under EU-funded projects is not adequately shared and capitalised** which raises issues about the meaning of calling for yet further research. There would be need to devote significant resources to a comprehensive compilation exercise that would map all relevant studies and research outputs from all existing EU projects under various instruments (including other thematic programmes, geographic instruments, the FP7 programme...) and propose a thematic classification as well as website architecture to make those publicly accessible by theme and region/country.

3.2 Diaspora

3.2.1 Rationale

The developmental impacts of migration go well beyond remittances, encompassing the effects of a much wider range of financial, but also human, social and cultural transfers from the diaspora. Through their transnational social networks and connections, migrants - and refugees - have the potential to act as bridges linking

designed for Senegalese migrants in France to cover their family members in Senegal.

³¹Financial education is e.g. a fully built-in component in the Seguro Futuros project.

their host and home countries. In certain conditions, migrants can play a role in boosting investment and business creation and contribute to foster trade for the benefits of both countries of origin and destination. Diaspora members are also potential reservoirs of human resources, in the form of skills and experience acquired through the migration cycle. More generally, diaspora contribute to the circulation of ideas and values, impacting social and cultural models. Part of the diaspora is also engaged in philanthropy and volunteering activities in countries of origin, including through migrant associations and networks. Governments in countries of origin are increasingly aware of the huge development potential of diasporas, and a growing number have taken steps to foster diaspora engagement, including the creation of dedicated institutions and the implementation of targeted policies and programmes. Supporting the mobilisation of diasporas as development actors has been a key priority under migration-related development cooperation.

3.2.2 Challenges and lessons learned

The diaspora engagement agenda has mainly concentrated on South-North migration. As noted by the ACP Observatory on Migration (2013a), “while many countries in the South have ministries or other entities, such as diaspora desks, devoted to engagement with diaspora members in the North, the link to members residing in other countries within the region is often limited and incoherent”. As for remittances, the rationale for this South-North focus partly lies in the perception that South-South migrants have more limited resources to be leveraged for the benefit of their countries of origin. While this might hold true in general terms, analysis needs to move beyond such generalisations. As noted in the previous section on remittances, the smaller individual transfers observed in a South-South context result in crucial poverty reduction impacts and in certain cases higher aggregate amounts than North-South transfers, especially when factoring the internal dimension. Recent research on other forms of diaspora resources, including by the EU-funded ACP Observatory on Migration, similarly reveals that crucial financial, human, social and cultural transfers do take place in the South-South context. In addition, research finds some diasporas in the South to be structured by a dense web of associations and networks, some of which are surprisingly large in terms of membership. In sum, **the study of South-South Diasporas reveals a nuanced and complex picture**, with different diaspora profiles arising in different contexts, illustrating the need to study each particular case (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013)³².

Reflecting the **specific character of each diaspora** has precisely been a challenge for diaspora engagement strategies in the past, and one of the major lessons learned relates to the need to support **careful assessments** of diaspora potential, interest and structure on a case-by-case basis. Yet **diaspora mappings** are difficult and costly exercises to implement for diaspora-related institutions in developing countries, many of which are under-funded, lack technical capacities, and suffer from the absence of a sustained political commitment. A number of cooperation projects

³²See e.g. differences between Basotho and Nigerian diasporas in terms of investment potential in the private sector development section of this paper.

have focused on profiling specific diasporas in developed destination countries, complementing existing statistical and administrative data with qualitative surveys, but very little has been done in developing destination countries where knowledge of diasporas remains highly fragmentary.

Moreover, diaspora engagement in countries of origin, including through temporary or permanent return, primarily depends on **overall development conditions** in countries of origin (including governance, rule of law, business climate, etc.). When such conditions exist, diasporas do engage with their countries of origin, including in the absence of any specific mobilisation programme. Return migration is widespread³³ and most returns are spontaneous; conversely, when conditions deteriorate, spontaneous return rates decline (INED, 2014). In such cases, diaspora engagement strategies are unlikely to be successful in both attracting candidates and allowing them to make a significant impact. One way that has been used to address this challenge is to provide **specific incentives** to diaspora members, e.g. in the form of salary top-ups, preferential tax and investment conditions, etc. However, such measures are difficult to justify as they raise serious legitimacy and equity issues and jeopardise the already difficult reintegration process of diaspora members.

Post-crisis contexts might represent a specific case to be approached slightly differently. Diaspora members are often the first to engage again with their countries of origin and take risks in such contexts. In doing so, they can play a key role in the recovery and rehabilitation and supporting the transition from emergency to development, precisely **contributing to re-establishing basic development conditions**. Acknowledging this potential, IOM (2013a) highlights that “it is in the area of post-crisis reconstruction and rehabilitation that the argument for linking diasporas and development may be most compelling”. The report provides various country examples where diasporas have been influential in a post-crisis context as well as possible engagement strategies and programmes, most of them aiming at encouraging return of diaspora members (such programmes are discussed in the brain drain section of this paper). However diaspora engagement in situations where the crisis results from conflict as opposed to disaster is particularly challenging. The role of diasporas in conflict contexts is notoriously ambiguous and it is not always clear whether they are actually peace makers or peace wreckers. They are in any case profoundly heterogeneous and divided, including along the lines that are at the very root of conflict. It is therefore particularly challenging to define criteria for diaspora engagement in conflict contexts, and in particular to identify legitimate and representative actors to cooperate with³⁴.

More generally, the **characteristics of diasporas and their organisations**, including issues linked to **heterogeneity, volatility and limited capacities**, are key issues which constrain their ability to engage as actors of development. This makes identifying representative, stable and effective interlocutors and partners difficult for

³³Available data for OECD countries indicate that depending on the country of destination and the period of time considered, 20% to 50% of immigrants leave within five years after their arrival, either to return home or to move on to a third country (secondary emigration), (Dumont and Spielvogel, 2008).

³⁴See e.g. Sinatti (2010) for a reflection on these issues.

both origin and destination countries. In addition, **many diaspora organisations concentrate their activities on fostering socialisation and integration in host societies** as opposed to promoting development in origin countries. Recent research by the Observatory on Migration in a South-South context highlights that this is not necessarily different in a South-South context³⁵. The experience of the first phase of the EU-funded project aiming at establishing a 'European-wide African Diaspora Platform' illustrates these challenges (GIZ, 2013). The diversity of organisations backgrounds, capacities, interests and needs and the corresponding heterogeneity of ideas and expectations have proved to be problematic issues, along with representativeness. In addition, the focus was placed on the structuration of the platform in Europe more than on development-oriented activities in Africa, a tendency that can be explained at an early stage, but should be addressed in the recently launched second phase.

Effective diaspora mobilisation has also been hampered by **insufficient links between diaspora engagement efforts and overall development strategies** in countries of origin, both at national and local level. Spontaneous diaspora activities are not necessarily consistent with development priorities in areas of origin. Depending on the conditions of diaspora formation, diasporas can even have openly conflicting agendas with those of authorities in countries of origin. As regards official policies and programmes, they have sometimes paid more attention to institutional aspects linked to the creation of diaspora-engagement institutions, than to the actual objectives pursued, in line with development priorities. Yet clarifying those is an essential element of developing effective diaspora engagement strategies and ensuring necessary local buy-in. This requires involving all institutional actors, including relevant line ministries, especially since specific diaspora institutions tend to lack the necessary financial, technical and political resources to implement their vision.

A final consideration is that the existing **development environment in countries of destination** is also essential as migrant wellbeing and integration levels in their host country also determine diaspora engagement capacities.

3.2.3 *The way forward*

The EU should continue to **build capacities for diaspora engagement in countries of origin, while strengthening its attention to diasporas in the South**³⁶. In particular, countries of origin should be supported in **conducting diaspora mapping** exercises to better apprehend major diaspora characteristics, whether geographic (e.g. concentration or dispersion), demographic (age and gender), legal (e.g. proportion of documented vs. undocumented migrants, long-term vs. temporary contract-based migrants), socio-economic (e.g. employment, self-

³⁵ACP Observatory on Migration (2013a). E.g. a survey found that only a third of associations formed by immigrants in Cameroon found aimed at engaging with activities in their countries of origin (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013b).

³⁶Useful tools and guidelines include IOM and MPI (2012) and ICMPD and IOM (2013). For the local level, relevant guidance can be found in material produced under the JMDI project (2010, 2011, 2013).

employment, unemployment, formal vs. informal employment, income levels and other prosperity and integration indicators, etc.) or educational. Such mappings should also investigate the needs, motivations and interests of the diaspora, as well as its modes of organisation/structuration, which need to be taken into account for engagement strategies to be successful.

Support should focus on creating **conducive conditions for diaspora engagement**, including through “policies oriented towards transnationalism” such as dual citizenship and out-of-country voting rights for diaspora members³⁷, and more generally policies aiming at removing regulatory, bureaucratic and informational barriers. In their recent review of available evidence on the impacts of M&D policies, McKenzie and Yang (2014) refer to evidence that indeed tends to demonstrate that “migrants from countries which offer dual citizenship send more remittances and express higher intents to return”. However, extreme care should be applied in extending this support to measures that could create distortions between emigrants and the local population.

Such efforts aiming at fostering diaspora engagement should also be **better embedded in development planning**, clearly establishing how diaspora resources can contribute to specific development priorities and goals at national and local level, while clarifying the necessary conditions for such engagement to effectively take place. In order to promote such diaspora mainstreaming in overall and sectorial development planning, support should not only focus on existing or new diaspora engagement institutions, but also aim at **strengthening the involvement of line ministries**. For instance, strategies aiming at mobilising skills and knowledge from the diaspora should better involve ministries of education, research, labour or employment as well relevant agencies such as public employment services.

Finally, development cooperation should strengthen countries of origin capacities to design and implement effective **outreach strategies** to liaise with their citizens abroad, including for **support and protection purposes**, as migrant wellbeing and trust in national institutions are key factors of engagement. In this respect, consular cards delivered in destination countries are considered a promising avenue, as they can help migrants to access various public or private services requiring proof of identity. Having a clear picture of existing diaspora structures and communication channels is essential to implement such strategies. Here again the South-South dimension should be fully taken on board by developing countries of origin, which has not really been the case to date³⁸.

There is also a role, although more limited, for development cooperation to directly **support diaspora organisations in European countries of destination**, provided adequate representativeness is ensured and the focus strongly remains on

³⁷ACP Observatory on Migration (2013a), which gives the examples of Kenya where the 2010 Constitution foresees both rights, and those have started to be implemented despite major challenges.

³⁸E.g. Weiss Fagen and Bump (2005) contrasts the interest of various Latino-American countries in supporting their emigrants in the USA (including through various forms of consular support) to the very limited interest shown in protecting their citizens in other Latino-American countries. There have however been some interesting developments since this study. E.g. Nicaragua, one of the countries studied, has started delivering consular cards to its nationals in Costa Rica (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013a).

development activities in countries of origin. Diaspora platforms are also important for consultation purposes, in order to integrate diaspora perspectives and insights into development cooperation. However, supporting diasporas as actors of development in destination countries is primarily a PCD issue. Internal provisions on dual citizenship and secure residence regimes are of particular relevance, along with policies aiming at enhancing migrant wellbeing and integration in host countries, which support capacities to engage for development in countries of origin. Internal EU and Member States policies aiming at fighting discrimination and xenophobia, empowering migrants, promoting their integration and strengthening their rights are therefore an important component of supporting diaspora engagement.

Within developing countries of destination, development cooperation aiming at **promoting migrants' rights, empowerment and integration** - a cross-cutting priority under EU development cooperation - appears as the best-suited strategy to foster South-South diaspora engagement, as it contributes to create **conducive conditions for diaspora transfers** (financial, human, social, cultural, etc.). The challenges in this area are huge, as existing comparative studies indicate that the situation of migrants in Southern destination countries is typically worse in terms of rights' protection than the situation of their counterparts in the North (e.g. Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Weiss Fagen and Bump, 2005). "Most countries in the South do not realize that they are immigration countries" (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013a) and migrants' integration has not really received policy attention in most developing countries.

However, as highlighted in a 2011 OECD paper focusing on West Africa, **addressing integration issues is often highly complex in a South-South context**. On the one side, post-independence West Africa has been experiencing high levels of xenophobia, scapegoating, discrimination and violations of migrants' human rights, often encouraged and exploited by political leaders. This non-integration carries high costs, especially "when tensions spiral out of control" as was the case in Cote d'Ivoire. Yet on the other side, many of the rights inaccessible to migrants are also inaccessible to the population at large and relative deprivation tends to be lower than in the North. In addition, widespread informality in border crossing and on labour markets and existing ties across "artificial" borders means that immigration and integration are somehow easier in a South-South context. Responses need to factor such specificities, including "the high circularity of migration, prevalent informal labour market activities, and low relative deprivation between the locally born and immigrants". In such contexts, which are characteristic of many South-South corridors, the paper advocates against policy frameworks exclusively oriented towards immigrants and calls for **universal reforms in key areas such as employment, social protection and education, which would at the same time include specific measures to protect and include migrants** to avoid their marginalisation in the general reform process.

3.3 Circular migration

3.3.1 Rationale

In recent years, there has been an increase in temporary and so-called circular – the confusion between the two is one of the major challenges in this area as will be highlighted below - migration programmes, as opposed to more permanent forms of migration without a time limit and allowing for settlement in the destination country. These include: seasonal programmes, sector-based schemes in both low- and highly skilled occupations, trainee programmes, working holiday visas and intra-company transfers. At the same time, circular migration, presented as a “triple win” for countries of destination and origin and migrants themselves, has been a major area of focus in the M&D nexus, particularly at the EU level.

In the EU context, circular migration has been defined as “a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries”, and encompassing two different forms of movement:

- Third country nationals settled in the EU who engage in a temporary activity (business, professional, voluntary or other) in their country of origin, while retaining their main residence in one of the Member States. In this respect, the EU approach to circulation migration closely connects to its approach to brain drain, with circular migration understood as one avenue to address brain drain;
- Persons residing in a third country who come to the EU temporarily, mainly for work or study, but re-establish their main residence and activity in their country of origin when their residence title expires³⁹.

More recently, circular migration has been defined as “repeated cycles of back-and-forth mobility over a period of time for the purpose of economic activity or study, which takes place within a legal framework allowing facilitated re-entry between two or more countries”⁴⁰. Circular migration is therefore a subset of both temporary and return migration, but can in theory be distinguished from those in that it implies “regular and repetitive series of outward and return movements”⁴¹.

As noted in the 2011 SWP, the EU approach to circular migration has focused on two main types of measures which can be mutually supportive: **legislative measures aiming at facilitating circulation** – such as multiple entry permits or legislations providing for periods of absence from the country of destination without affecting residence rights – on the one side, and **targeted circular migration programmes or schemes**, on the other side. Particular emphasis is put in EU policy documents on the portability of social and pension rights as a facilitator for circular migration.

The EU focus so far has been exclusively on circulation between the EU and developing countries, and there has been virtually no attention to the South-South

³⁹COM (2007) 248 final.

⁴⁰SEC (2011) 1353 final.

⁴¹Skeldon, 2012. Skeldon in addition considers flexibility - with the circular migrant being free to return at any time - as the other defining feature of circular migration, as opposed to temporary migration.

dimension of circular migration. In addition, it should be noted that legislative measures have mainly been approached from the EU side, with a focus on internal EU policies from a PCD perspective. This dimension does not directly pertain to development cooperation, as would be the case for the promotion of legislative measures in developing countries. The promotion of circular migration programmes or schemes, on the other side, has been supported through development cooperation.

3.3.2 *Challenges and lessons learned*

From a development perspective, a major weakness in the EU approach to circular migration to date is that the South-South dimension has been largely ignored, despite **circular migration being a major component of South-South movements**. Recent research by the ACP Observatory on migration (2013a) highlights that returns “are more feasible and widespread” in a South-South context, due inter alia to the porosity of borders, the greater ease of re-entry into destination countries, geographic and cultural proximity and lower travel costs. The greater prevalence of circular migration in a South-South context is one of the major findings of the few existing studies attempting to compare South-North and South-South migration patterns⁴².

South-South circular migration is multi-dimensional and encompasses distinct components, including **cross-border migration** - referring to routine crossings by border populations - and **seasonal migration**, including **pastoralism**. A South-South dimension that has attracted even less attention under development cooperation is **internal circular migration**. This is paradoxical since regular short-term movements back and forth movement between villages and towns in particular are a key phenomenon in many developing countries, and circular migration was first conceptualised in this internal context as of the 70s⁴³. Internal circulation migration appears as a vital household livelihood strategy, particularly for poorer segments of the population, to diversify resources and therefore improve welfare and reduce risks in case of external shock. According to some (e.g. Sekldon, 2012), this type of circular migration is less likely to have significant poverty-reduction implications than

⁴²This is e.g. one of the major conclusions of a study comparing migration and remittance patterns of Nicaraguans in Costa Rica, Haitian in the Dominican Republic and Bolivians in Argentina with those of Latino-American migrants in the USA (Weiss Fagen and Bump, 2005): “In these three countries, shorter distances and relatively easier border crossings lead to more “circular migration,” or journeying back and forth of migrants. It is easy for contractors from the wealthier neighboring countries to recruit workers for varying periods of time. While there are considerable numbers of circular migrants in the United States, and contract labor arrangements cover much of the agricultural labor from Mexico and the Caribbean, migrants in the United States overall, stay for longer periods of time than their counterparts in Latin American countries”. The greater circularity of South-South movements was also highlighted at the EC-organised expert roundtable on “The role of migration in development strategies” held in Brussels in January 2013 (see e.g. <http://redcross.eu/en/upload/documents/pdf/2013/Migration/FINAL%20Rountable%20Report%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20Migration%20in%20Development%20Strategies%202.pdf>).

⁴³Skeldon, 2012, who notes that the international dimension of circular migration emerged much later as a field of research with the influence of transnationalism studies.

longer-term forms of migration. However, it is in many cases one of the few options available to poorer people in developing countries to support their subsistence and survival and as such needs to be facilitated⁴⁴.

Although not directly pertaining to the field of development cooperation, legislative measures aiming at facilitating circular migration towards the EU have been a major component of the EU strategy and as such are discussed here. This is also relevant because lessons learned in this area can inform future efforts aiming at supporting similar legislative measures in partner countries under development cooperation. Generally speaking, very few European countries “have really included circular migration as part of their policy reflections, and even fewer have attempted to translate this policy interest into concrete measures” (ECDPM and ICMPD, 2013)⁴⁵. In particular, while the EU legal migration framework incorporates some measures to facilitate circular migration, **limited progress has been achieved in terms of establishing a legal framework conducive to circular migration in EU Member States** where the preferred approach has been on experimenting small-scale circular migration schemes or programmes.

As noted in ECDPM and ICMPD (2013), one country, Sweden, stands as a clear exception, having prioritised this issue⁴⁶, and promoting an approach precisely centred on the establishment of a conducive legal and policy framework in various areas, including labour market legislation. The Swedish approach is detailed in a recent government communication on PCD focusing on migration flows (Swedish Government, 2014). The document highlights that “discussions on circular migration at the European level tend to focus on specific programmes or bilateral agreements that state the conditions for length of stay, issuance of permits and return, so-called restrained circular migration”. By contrast with this “restrained circular migration”, the Swedish approach advocates for a renewed EU approach promoting “spontaneous migration” through the removal of obstacles to circulation and the facilitation of legal ways to migrate, including labour immigration **at all skills levels**⁴⁷.

The Swedish perspective echoes the widespread view among the research community that what has been supported in recent years is in most instances

⁴⁴As noted in UNESCO, 2013, in the Indian context, “several studies have pointed out that migration is not always permanent and seasonal and circular migration is widespread, especially among the socio-economically deprived groups, such as the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Castes (OBCs), who are asset-poor and face resource and livelihood deficits (Deshingkar and Akter, 2009)”.

⁴⁵ILO (2010) similarly notes: “While circular migration is encouraged by the EU and other destination countries, many national visa regimes in practice discourage circulation”.

⁴⁶An independent Parliamentary Committee for circular migration and development was appointed in 2009 and submitted its recommendations in 2011. In April 2014 the Government presented a bill to Parliament with concrete proposals in several policy areas deriving from those recommendations and aimed at facilitating circular migration and promoting its positive effects on development. In addition, Sweden is currently working on improving its statistical measurement of circular migration (see e.g. <http://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/1671#sthash.ZZRbvKPC.dpuf>).

⁴⁷See e.g. <http://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/78#sthash.aFNuRZcM.dpuf>: “The Swedish system recognizes that we need workers of all skill levels and in many different branches and sectors. The reform is therefore designed to allow workers of all skill levels to migrate to Sweden under one general framework and with access to a wide range of rights”.

temporary migration “under a nicer-sounding name” (e.g. Castles and Ozkul, 2014) as real circular migration implies both “regularity” and “flexibility” understood as the possibility for migrants to freely circulate (Skeldon, 2012). Such flexibility requires legal and policy reform measures such as those conducted in Sweden, as opposed to specific schemes associated with strict migration restrictions. Recent programmes purporting to foster circular migration which do not meet these two criteria, for instance in the Netherlands and Spain, have therefore been considered “de facto temporary migration programmes” (McLoughlin et al., 2011) as they only allow migration under pre-set conditions and for predetermined periods of time. However, a widely held view in the research community is that the most effective way to promote circulation is precisely to limit such restrictions. Paradoxically, granting permanent settlement rights precisely seems to be an effective strategy to encourage circulation and therefore enabling mobility is a recurrent policy recommendation. Conversely, there is some evidence that migratory restrictions discourage circulation in favour of permanent settlement⁴⁸, as evidenced for instance by the FP7-funded MAFE research project⁴⁹. The greater circularity observed in a South-South context where movement is in practice easier corroborates this observation, as does the history of European migration to the US in the first half of the 20th century, associated with much higher rates of circulation and return than usually assumed⁵⁰.

For several observers therefore (e.g. Castles and Ozkul, 2014), it is the first dimension of circular migration (third country nationals settled in the EU who engage in a temporary activity in their country of origin, while retaining their main residence in one of the Member States), as opposed to the second dimension (admission of third-country nationals under specific circular/temporary schemes with a return conditionality) that holds the greatest potential to actually enhance circulation and its developmental impacts⁵¹. These observers indeed **criticise the alleged triple win**

⁴⁸See e.g. in Hugo (2013): “Permanent settlement - denoted by the acquisition of permanent resident status or citizenship - does not necessarily interrupt circulation between the origin and destination. Indeed, some research indicates that migrants with secure legal status are more likely than others to go back to their origin area or country frequently”; (...) “The easier it is to travel into and out of the destination, the more likely migrants are to opt for a circular strategy over permanent settlement”; or “Indeed, the decision to settle permanently in the destination is sometimes influenced by the difficulty and expense associated with frequent border crossings”.

⁴⁹INED, 2014. The project, which focuses on return migration from Europe to Senegal and the Democratic Republic of Congo notes a decline in return which is explained inter alia by “the gradual closure of the European borders to migrant workers”, resulting in an evolution of migration strategies: “Migrants who, in the past, were free to come and go (for example, Senegalese citizens did not need a visa to enter France until 1987) now tend to settle more permanently. At the same time, returning home has become a more perilous option: migrants know that if they fail to rebuild their life in their home country, it will be difficult for them to leave a second time”.

⁵⁰Intervention by Regina Grafe “Putting Migration and Mobility into a Historical Perspective”, at the November 2014 EUI Conference *The ‘Lampedusa Dilemma’: Global Flows and Closed Borders. What should Europe do?* The author argues that when migration is not politically and financially costly, it is an open-ended, and often circular, process rather than a one way round movement. Live video recording available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQfuyhfbr-l>

⁵¹A recently launched EU-funded research project (2014-2018), based on the premise that circular migration initiatives “often rely on a poor understanding of the reasons why some migrants spontaneously return and circulate, and others do not”, will look into: the drivers of

effect of such circular/temporary schemes⁵², including those supported under EU development cooperation, for a variety of reasons, many of which are already acknowledged in the 2011 Commission SWP. They have usually been of a **pilot nature, mostly small-scale, with limited potential impacts** on developing countries of origin (European Commission, 2011). This contrasts with other destination regions, including gulf oil states or parts of East Asia, which massively rely on short-term schemes. Those are however strictly temporary, as opposed to circular, migration schemes.

Moreover, they have **mainly involved low skilled seasonal and agricultural workers** (European Commission, 2011). Whether such schemes actually offer training opportunities and contribute to the acquisition of new skills, competences and knowledge and enhanced employability upon return – one of major theoretical channels for positive impacts for migrants and their countries of origin - can therefore be questioned. Some observers note that this type of schemes usually associated with highly restrictive conditions primarily target the low-skilled, while the highly-skilled benefit from much more flexible migration regimes and are actually encouraged to settle permanently (Castles and Ozkul, 2014).

More generally, skills acquisition and transfer through circular migration are dependent upon the effective **recognition of skills**, during migration and upon return. This issue is mentioned in EU policy documents on M&D but this is an area where much more could be done in both a South-North and South-South context, as “mechanisms for the international recognition of skills and experience remain nascent and filled with hidden protectionism” (Clemens, 2013).

The restrictive conditions imposed on mainly lower-skilled workers under such schemes also raise **important concerns regarding migrants’ rights and protection, including in the EU itself**, as evidenced by a recent review of the situation of temporary migrant workers in the Spanish agricultural sector (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2012) which points out **severe gaps in legal, social and working conditions**. In particular, these migrants experience gaps in access to welfare provisions and social security both in host countries and upon return due to portability issues⁵³. As these programmes usually do not allow migrants to bring family members with them, they result in family disruptions, especially considering that the migrants involved are typically young. This might result in delays or rupture in marriages and partnerships, and children being left alone and at risk⁵⁴. Another

return and circulation decisions; the role of such initiatives in shaping these decisions; and the impacts of different types of temporary, permanent and circular mobility for all parties involved. The only documentation available at this stage is the project concept document submitted with the offer, which might already contain interesting insights. See <http://www.temperproject.eu/>

⁵²See e.g. Castles and Ozkul (2014) for a comprehensive review of main criticisms of alleged effects on countries of destination, origin and migrants.

⁵³In the Spanish case, inter alia: unemployment coverage is not provided; pension contribution is not compulsory resulting in contribution gaps; access to healthcare is restricted in practice as these migrants are not entitled to paid sick leave and therefore only visit doctors in extreme cases; and housing conditions are often sub-standard.

⁵⁴Castles and Ozkul (2014). The authors recall for instance that under the “Integrated Management Programme for Seasonal Immigration between Morocco and the Province of

key issue is that migrant permits are legally tied to a specific job and employer, which places them in a situation of dependence and vulnerability and discourages them from reporting exploitation and abuse by employers and intermediaries. Combined with other factors including geographical dispersion and intense rhythms of work resulting in limited access to these workers by unions and labour representatives, this precarious legal status contributes to sub-standard working conditions compared with natives. As noted in the 2011 EC SWP, access to specific integration measures for temporary/circular migrants, as well as reintegration measures in the source country, still needs to be improved.

This brings up a final consideration which has somehow been side-lined in the circular migration debate, namely that the potential impact of circular migration, and more generally of any strategy relying on transfers of migrant resources⁵⁵, crucially depends on **conducive conditions and measures, including reintegration measures, in countries of origin**.

3.3.3 *The way forward*

Given their greater potential for development, **more emphasis should be put in the future on legislative measures aiming at facilitating circulation as opposed to targeted circular migration programmes or schemes**. This section primarily focuses on the way forward under EU development cooperation. However, a number of orientations derive from the previous section as far as **EU internal policies** are concerned, and in particular the need for the EU and Member States to step-up efforts towards the creation of legislative environments conducive to circulation **at all skills levels** in various policy areas in line with the Swedish approach, including: enhanced opportunities for labour immigration, more flexible entry and residence regimes (including multiple entry visas, facilitated re-entry procedures, extended possibilities of absence under residence regimes), dual citizenship provisions, enhanced access to, and portability of, social security benefits⁵⁶, etc. As noted by some observers (e.g. Castles and Ozkul, 2014), the rationale for admitting low-skilled workers under constrained circular migration schemes encouraging workers' rotation in sectors where demand is actually structural, such as care and domestic work, is particularly weak and broader legislative reform facilitating such migration would be a better suited response.

Under development cooperation, the South-South dimension should be fully addressed and **developing countries of destination should be supported in establishing such legislative environments conducive to circulation**⁵⁷. The

Huelva" (aiming at attracting workers from Morocco to work in strawberry and citrus fruit cultivation in Cartaya, Spain, and initially co-financed by AENEAS), the selection process was changed to focus exclusively on women aged less than 40 who had children in order to increase the low rates of return initially observed.

⁵⁵See also previous section on diaspora engagement.

⁵⁶See section 5.3 on social protection.

⁵⁷ Such as dual citizenship. ACP Observatory on migration (2013a) notes that South Africa has barred dual citizenship for migrants whose origin countries do not allow dual citizenship, such as Lesotho, which means that such migrants have to cut their legal ties with their

challenges in this area are huge as developing countries themselves are characterised by increasingly restrictive migration policies. Despite their weaknesses, **regional integration processes** offer some of the best opportunities to support international South-South circulation through facilitated entry, residence, work and establishment regimes, and the EU should continue supporting such processes. As underlined in section 3.1 on labour market/employment, a crucial challenge in the South-South regional context, similar to what can be observed in a South-North context, is to cater for the organised circulation of low- and medium-skilled workers, which represent the majority of South-South migrants, and not only of the highly-skilled. Support to **border management** capacities, in line with the EU IBM approach pursuing both facilitation and security objectives should be an essential component of these efforts⁵⁸.

More attention should also be paid to specific forms of circulation that are prevalent in a South-South context, such as **seasonal** and **cross-border migration**, looking into ways of promoting formalisation while avoiding to inadvertently create barriers where they did not previously exist. One avenue for cross-border migration is the promotion of establishment of “smart card entry systems for cross-border commuting such as those in place between Singapore and Malaysia” (Hugo, 2013), which could be replicated in other contexts⁵⁹. In addition, **internal circular migration** should be prioritised under development cooperation. Conducive and rights-based legal and policy frameworks should also be promoted at this level as internal migrants, and particularly seasonal and circular migrants, face major challenges in accessing rights and protection. This is highlighted by a recent study in the Indian context, which notes that “despite the fact that approximately three out of every ten Indians are internal migrants, internal migration has been accorded very low priority by the government, and existing policies of the Indian state have failed in providing legal or social protection to this vulnerable group”. The study further observes that “internal migrants, especially seasonal and circular migrants, constitute a “floating” population, as they alternate between living at their source and destination locations, and in turn lose access to social protection benefits linked to the place of residence”. Similar to what can be observed in the Chinese context with the “hukou” system (see e.g. Skeldon, 2012), the Indian case demonstrates that access to, and portability of, social benefit entitlements is also a major issue for internal, and particularly seasonal and circular, internal migrants (UNESCO, 2013).

Finally, **conducive conditions and measures in countries of origin** should be further promoted through development cooperation as a determinant component of circular migration strategies. Some of these measures are directly migration-related, such as those allowing migrants to stay outside the source country for longer periods

respective countries of origin.

⁵⁸See e.g. the final report of the EC-organised expert roundtable on Promoting Integrated Border Management (IBM) in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (<http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-migration-asylum/blog/roundtable-promoting-integrated-border-management-ibm-latin-america-and-sub-saharan-africa>)

⁵⁹For instance ECCAS’ legal regime foresees the issuance of a specific free movement card for the facilitation of cross-border movements of this category of people. The card is only valid in the border area where it is issued (FIIAPP, ICMPD and IDEP, 2013). However, the regime does not seem to be functional.

of time, without losing property, voting, or working rights or return and reintegration support measures, but others relate to broad development cooperation priorities in areas such as good governance, democracy and the rule of law, private sector development, investment and business climate, education and training, etc.

As regards **targeted circular migration programmes or schemes, they should be considered in the South-South as well as in the South-North context and the protection dimension should be strongly reinforced** to address existing gaps in many of these schemes and ensure favourable legal, social and working conditions for migrants. Challenges in this area are even greater in a South-South context where migrants' protection is often minimal and integration support measures virtually absent, even more so for temporary migrants. Support in this area could focus on both **bilateral and regional arrangements** as the regional level also offers a potential framework for enhancing protection and rights in various areas, e.g. as regards the portability of **social security entitlements** which is rightly considered in the EU framework as a major dimension of circulation⁶⁰.

Finally, **work on qualifications and skills issues should be strongly stepped-up**, as already noted in the 2013 EC Communication. Enhanced education and training systems, including validation aspects, in countries of origin can contribute to a better integration of labour emigrants at destination. In addition, countries of origin also need to strengthen those systems, including validation aspects, to reintegrate their emigrants upon return. In countries of destination, validation and recognition issues are essential to allow immigrants to make use of the qualifications and skills acquired in their countries of origin. In both cases, skills recognition is essential to address the over-qualification of migrant workers ("brain waste"). **This area is absolutely crucial for circular migration and labour migration in general to produce positive impacts** for all three parties involved, as highlighted during the 2013-2014 GFMD⁶¹. While the 2013 Communication puts particular emphasis on the intra-regional dimension, skills recognition should be promoted in both a **South-North** (recognition of non-EU qualifications within the EU) and **South-South** context, exploring both **bilateral and multilateral/regional avenues**, and focusing on **all skills levels**. However, challenges are huge, not least because of the multiplicity of stakeholders involved beyond national public authorities, starting with professional associations and bodies involved in defining professional standards and requirements. Those are often reluctant to enhance access for immigrants and the negotiation of mutual recognition arrangements has proved difficult even in a North-North context⁶².

Replicating and scaling-up initiatives in this area will require strong coordination between development actors dealing with cooperation on education, training and employment, as well as line DGs and relevant agencies at the EU level. There are various promising operational initiatives already implemented that could be replicated or scaled-up, such as a project implemented by the Swedish Employment Agency in

⁶⁰See section 5.3 on social protection for recommendations in this particular area.

⁶¹See in particular RT2.1. "Enhancing the development impacts of labour migration and circular mobility through more systematic labour market and skills matching".

⁶²See e.g. Sumption et al. 2013.

Moldova in partnership with the ETF⁶³. This particular South-North project includes two important features that should be replicated in further initiatives in this area: i) the integration of the **informal dimension**, even more relevant in a South-South context; and ii) the **holistic approach** which addresses recognition issues in the context of migration as part of a broader support to the VET and skills development, validation and accreditation sector. The ETF already implements various initiatives in this area⁶⁴ but cooperation should be stepped-up. In a South-South context, the EU-supported development of the Operational Repertoire of Jobs and Professions (ROAME), which aims at developing a common nomenclature of jobs and facilitating labour migration among participating countries (originally Benin, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal, most recently joined by Togo) seems to be an interesting example. Support should be also given to the development of **regional** mutual recognition arrangements and frameworks in the context of regional integration processes, such as the one under development within the ASEAN. However, there would be need to advocate for the consideration of all skills levels and not only the highly-skilled as is the case in the ASEAN process.

More generally, **the recognition of experience, skills and qualifications is one of the policy areas with greatest potential impact for the realisation of the potential benefits of migration** (also highlighted in the following sections on brain drain, labour market/employment, education and health). It has routinely been mentioned in EU policy documents on M&D, but it can be argued that limited reflection has taken place on how the EU could coherently and comprehensively address the issue in both its South-North (recognition of foreign skills and qualifications within the EU) and South-South dimensions, building for instance on work undertaken in the EU context to inform initiatives in a South-South context. Work is undertaken in a relatively isolated way by various EC actors within DG DEVCO under development cooperation (education, training, research, employment, migration, etc.) and other relevant DGs, including agencies such as the ETF. An interesting initiative would be to organise an expert roundtable bringing specialists and relevant EU actors together to discuss the various dimensions, - including South-North and South-South - of this issue, concrete policy and operational orientations for the future, as well as division of labour between the multiplicity of relevant EU actors. A further step could be a reflection or policy document outlining an integrated EU approach to this issue.

⁶³Under this project, the Swedish Employment Agency, in cooperation with the ETF, inter alia supports its Moldovan counterpart in the development of a national qualifications framework in line with EU standards. The objective is to facilitate the validation and recognition of skills acquired by informal and non-formal work in the EU, and hence promote the labour market reintegration of returnees. The work on validation represents a small part of a larger reform effort that also includes the introduction of a new professional classification system, professional standards, amended legislation and improved vocational training.

⁶⁴Such as a project which aims to facilitate convergence of qualifications in key sectors for migrant labour (tourism and construction) between four Southern Mediterranean countries and Italy, Spain and France (see http://www.etf.europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/Qualifications_brings_both_sides_of_Mediterranean_a_bit_closer_EN)

3.4 Brain drain

3.4.1 Rationale

Highly skilled migration to the OECD is on the rise⁶⁵. Student migration as an entry gate to employment in destination countries is also rising in importance as a facet of this phenomenon. **“Brain drain”, referred to in the 2013 EU PCD report as “the massive emigration of the highly skilled leading to shortages in important sectors, in particular health”,** has been a major area of focus under the EU “traditional” agenda on M&D. Total emigration rates are positively correlated with income levels, ranging from 0,9% in low-income countries to 3,2% for high-income OECD countries. However, the correlation is reversed for highly skilled emigration rates, which range from 7,1% in low-income countries to 3,4% for high-income OECD countries. At the regional level, Asia is the major provider of highly skilled emigrants, yet it is Africa, with more than 4 times less emigrants, which has the highest skilled emigration rate at 9,6%. At country level, the highest skilled emigration rates characterise low-income countries, small countries and island states⁶⁶. This points towards the key distinction between absolute and relative figures in appreciating the “brain drain”. Due the crucial significance of health for development, the health workforce crisis⁶⁷ and high emigration rates of health workers observed in many developing countries⁶⁸, attention to the “brain drain” since the mid-2000s has mostly focused on the health sector, including at the EU level. “Brain waste”, referring to the over-qualification of migrant workers has also emerged as an important EU priority. Migrant deskilling, to which migrant women are more exposed than their male counterparts (IOM, 2012), is indeed widespread. More generally, highly skilled migrants in OECD countries face high levels of underemployment and unemployment, although with differences depending on regions of origin⁶⁹.

The EU response defined in the GAMM aims at counteracting brain drain and brain waste and promoting brain circulation. At the internal level, a major policy

⁶⁵ There were 35 million migrants with tertiary education in the OECD in 2010/11 (representing 30% of the migrant stock, compared with 24% in 2000/01), which represents an unprecedented increase of 70% over the past ten years and reflects the greater education level of recent arrivals. Over the same period, the number of tertiary educated migrant women increased by 79%, an increase of 17 percentage points greater than that for male migrants. (Dumont et al. 2014). Unless otherwise stated, statistics in this section are from the same source.

⁶⁶ A small group of 16 countries have emigration rates of the high-skilled 30% or more. These are mainly countries in Latin America (Guyana, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Jamaica, Honduras and Belize), Africa (Zimbabwe, Mauritius, the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Zambia) as well as Oceania and Europe (Tonga, Fiji, Albania and Malta).

⁶⁷ A 2006 WHO report highlighted that 57 countries suffered from a critical shortage of health service providers (doctors, nurses and midwives), 36 of which were in Sub-Saharan Africa.

⁶⁸ E.g. the WHO report noted that doctors trained in Ghana - a country suffering from a critical shortage of health service providers - and working in 8 OECD receiving countries represented as much as 29% of their home country workforce.

⁶⁹ Highly skilled African and Latin American emigrants experience the highest unemployment rates of around 11% and 9%, respectively.

line has been the promotion of so-called “ethical recruitment” in the health sector through advocacy for the implementation of the WHO Code of practice on the international recruitment of health personnel by EU Member States and other destination countries⁷⁰. More generally, the EU Blue Card Directive allows Member States to reject applications in order to ensure ethical recruitment. Internal measures aiming at fostering the circulation of the highly skilled, including students and researchers, are also part of the EU approach. Under development cooperation, the EU strategy has also prioritised circular or temporary migration as well as permanent or temporary return. Other priorities have included: cooperation, partnership and networking among education and research institutions; work on curricula and certification processes; and human resource development strategies in countries of origin, including measures aiming at enhancing structural conditions in order to better train, retain, attract and reintegrate skilled workers. Most operational initiatives have focused on the health sector.

3.4.2 *Challenges and lessons learned*

As with all other areas of the traditional agenda, **the South-South dimension has not been adequately considered**. Yet recent research by the ACP Observatory on migration (2013a) highlights that “highly skilled migrants also move within the South” and that “movements of the tertiary-educated are high within and towards certain sub-regions such as East Africa (...) and the Caribbean (...) and to regional hubs like South-Africa”, with countries such as Kenya and South Africa becoming “regional power and economic centres, dominating the regional skills market”⁷¹. Student migration is also an important component of skilled movements in a South-South context⁷². Interestingly, the study also notes that “the skills of labour migrants in the South are fully utilised, that is, “brain waste” is not an issue”, although high levels of self-employment are a likely indication that challenges persist for migrants to have their skills recognised and work in their professional area. Once again, the **internal dimension** is significant. As noted by the Observatory, “the growth in the labour mobility of skilled workers is equally impressive within national borders”. This internal brain drain has long been highlighted by researchers in the health sector, and includes both a spatial dimension (from rural to urban areas) and a sectorial one. Clemens (2007) notes for instance that “the number of trained health professionals within South Africa and Kenya who work outside the public sector or entirely outside the health sector greatly exceeds the number who work outside the country”. Similarly, DRC (2006) using OECD data highlights that although 32,000 nurse vacancies existed in the public sector over the period 1996-2001, the OECD estimated that, “there were another 35,000 registered nurses who were inactive or

⁷⁰ E.g. through the “Health workers for all and all for health workers” project (<https://interact.healthworkers4all.eu/display/public/NEWS/HW4All+online+collaboration+platform%3A+Latest+news;jsessionid=C2A74FA2DB82279BA3778EDD182968DF>)

⁷¹ References and various other examples in different regions are provided in ACP Observatory on migration, 2013a.

⁷² Observatory on Migration, 2013a, which provides examples in the various ACP sub-regions.

unemployed” in the country during the same period.

It also important to note that **approaches aiming at preventing the movement of skilled workers through “ethical recruitment” policies, have long been criticised** by a significant part of the research community (see e.g. DRC, 2006). They are actually **ethically questionable** since they prevent individuals from significantly improving their circumstances and conflict with the basic human right of skilled migrants to leave their country of origin if they so wish. **The rationale for such policies is also considered weak** because they tend to ignore the positive effects of skilled migration while exaggerating its negative “brain drain” implications⁷³. Clemens (2013), one of the major opponents of the “brain drain” approach provides a review of the most recent evidence of these benefits. Those include highest rates of spontaneous return than usually assumed and wider benefits occurring in the absence of return through multidimensional transfers (money⁷⁴, skills, technology, democratic values, etc.) and potential increased investment in education⁷⁵. Critics of the “brain drain” vision that sustains ethical recruitment approaches, such as Clemens and Skeldon (e.g. 2008a and 2008b, see also DRC, 2006), consider that **this approach makes international migration a major cause of the health workforce crisis when it has – in general - marginal explanatory power and is best understood as a symptom of a more structural crisis in the health sector**. Clemens (2013) argues that “skill shortages in developing countries are the result of a complex mix of structural factors, which persist whether workers stay or emigrate” and that such factors “are largely beyond the reach of migration policy”⁷⁶. A major analytical flaw in the typical “brain drain” vision is that the costs of skilled migration for countries of origin are exaggerated as they tend to be based on

⁷³“A remarkably resilient idea, despite scholars providing a more nuanced approach, is the concept of “brain drain”, which refers to the outflow of large numbers of highly-skilled migrants, a phenomenon considered detrimental to the development of origin countries. (...) Nevertheless, UNDP (2009) found the effects of brain drain on countries of origin less negative than commonly assumed” (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013). Key references in the “brain drain” debate - including both pessimistic and optimistic views of skilled migration – can e.g. be found in OECD, 2014.

⁷⁴In this respect, the review refers to recent evidence showing that “contrary to conventional wisdom, skilled migrants are as likely to send remittances as their less-skilled peers. And when they do remit they send larger amounts. Thus, more educated migrants in general remit greater amounts to their countries of origin than do less skilled migrants” (Bollard et al. 2011).

⁷⁵This is a particularly debated area, with no conclusive generalised evidence in one direction or another: in certain cases, skilled emigration prospects might encourage investment in higher education. But in other contexts, it might well be that migration rather than education is encouraged since low skilled migration opportunities pay more than high skilled jobs in countries of origin (GFMD, 2014).

⁷⁶Clemens (2013) notes that “even if destination countries could somehow force the reversal of all skilled migration to date, this would do relatively little to address critical skill shortages broadly among origin countries. For example, all African-born doctors and nurses working in OECD countries in 2007 constituted only 12 percent of the World Health Organization’s estimated shortage of health workers in the region”. Work by Clemens in 53 African countries has also showed that no straightforward correlation exists between emigration rates of health workers and basic health indicators in the considered countries. In fact, broad health measures are worse in African countries that have experienced the least emigration of health workers. In addition, his work shows that African countries with the lowest stock of domestic health workers are also those with the lowest stocks of health workers abroad.

questionable assumptions. One of them is that the costs of training are entirely born by countries of origin. Yet training can also be funded by other States or private bodies (e.g. through grants and scholarships) or privately by the student and his family. The privatisation of education, an increasing phenomenon in middle or high-income countries, also exists in low-income countries⁷⁷. And as already noted, an increasing number of students precisely migrate to acquire their higher education abroad. Another assumption is that highly skilled emigrants would otherwise be fully put at use in source countries, which leads to overestimate the positive externalities they would be able to produce. However structural conditions in home countries limit these externalities. As noted by Skeldon (2008b) for the health sector, “the question of the extent to which highly-trained medical personnel can truly make a difference in areas where basic facilities are lacking” is worth asking. In fact, many skilled workers are actually underemployed or unemployed in their country of origin, or work totally outside their professional sector due to poor working conditions, as highlighted by the previously mentioned example of health workers in Kenya and South Africa. In such conditions, skilled migration can potentially have positive impacts by alleviating some of the skilled labour market pressure in countries of origin and enabling those migrants to make use of their skills.

For critics, the weak rationale sustaining approaches aiming at preventing the movement of skilled workers makes them unlikely to succeed. Indeed they argue that “restricting skilled nationals’ ability to leave their countries of origin has not been shown to yield the intended benefits and brings substantial costs” (Clemens, 2013).

A less restrictive approach supporting permanent or temporary return of the highly skilled has been faced with the same challenges already highlighted in previous sections on diaspora engagement and circular migration, and in particular the **need for structural conditions in countries of origin to be right** for such schemes to be attractive and actually make an impact. These conditions relate not only to working conditions in the targeted sector, but also to broader living conditions (housing, transportation, health, schooling for children) and broader good governance and security climate. A number of targeted programmes have intended to support skills transfers from highly skilled migrants through permanent or temporary, including IOM-implemented RQN (return of qualified nationals) and TRQN (temporary return of qualified nationals) and MIDA (migration for development in Africa) projects, UNDP-led TOKTEN (transfer of knowledge through expatriate nationals) or the German Returning Experts Programme, currently under evaluation⁷⁸. A key lesson learned from these programmes is that in the absence of conducive conditions or strong targeted incentives compensating for this, “well-established diaspora members, especially those with children born in the destination country, are less likely to return permanently or even temporarily to contribute to the development of their country of origin” (IOM and MPI, 2012)⁷⁹. Yet, providing such

⁷⁷WHO (2006) notes that “in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 2001 and 2003 the number of medical and nursing graduates doubled, largely as a result of a private sector-led increase in the training of health workers”.

⁷⁸Some of those have been supported by the EC such as the IOM-implemented Return of Qualified Afghans programme.

⁷⁹A similar point is made in European Commission 2011.

incentives to diaspora members as opposed to their local counterparts raises equity issues and such practices have indeed been found to feed resentment among non-migrants.

In addition, it increases the costs of these programmes, which are already considered resource-intensive in relation to the impact they are actually able to make. Outlining the weaknesses of existing evaluations of such programmes, McKenzie and Yang (2014) for instance note that all of these programmes are extremely small-scale in terms of the numbers of migrants involved in any given country and that those promoting temporary engagement usually involve very short periods of stay. They conclude that **the “sporadic” nature of the engagement, combined with available evidence on the nature of activities conducted, make sustainable impacts doubtful**. IOM and MPI (2012) make a similar point. However McKenzie and Yang note that the added-value of such programmes might be more significant “in post-conflict societies with severe skill shortages” although “there is little evidence to date to measure actual impacts”. This links up to the point already made in the diaspora section, i.e. that there might be a specific and stronger case for supporting certain forms of diaspora engagement - including through resource intensive programmes that might not be justified and impactful in other situations – in a post-crisis context.

As noted in the circular migration section, very similar criticisms have been addressed to **temporary/circular migration programmes**, which have usually been of a pilot nature, mostly small-scale, with limited potential impacts on developing countries of origin (European Commission, 2011), in addition to involving primarily low skilled workers. An interesting point is that there might in any case be very limited scope for implementing such programmes for the highly skilled in the context of a global “competition for talent”, as noted by Castles and Ozkul: “as for highly-skilled workers, there is considerable evidence that migrants prefer opportunities for long-term residence and family reunion - even if they plan to leave in the long run. Attempts to attract highly-skilled personnel on a temporary basis - like the German Government’s scheme to recruit Indian IT workers - have not been very successful, as the highly-skilled can choose from a range of competitive offers”.

Another set of issues emerging from experience is that **highly skilled migration initiatives have not been sufficiently embedded in broader human resources development strategies**. For instance, evaluations of the RQN, MIDA, TOTKTEN and the like programmes reviewed in IOM and MPI (2012) show that they have not really been based on sound assessments of human resources’ needs in origin countries, in line with overall development objectives and priority sectors. Ownership by countries of origin and receiving institutions has not been strong enough and, partly related to this, reintegration support provided to returnees has been minimal. Conversely, some of the EU-funded projects aiming at promoting the circulation of health professionals, although financed under the TPMA, have marginally addressed the issue of migration. They have instead focused on core health sector issues such as the improvement of training and education standards in countries of origin (European Commission, 2014). These observations have led to some questioning of the effectiveness of having highly skilled migration projects separated from broader initiatives in the areas of health, education and training or research.

As regards “brain waste”, many contend that the phenomenon is aggravated by ethical recruitment policies as the likely unintended effect is that the highly-skilled will still migrate but will be forced to work outside of their field of expertise⁸⁰. More generally, promoting the **recognition of qualifications** is seen as the most relevant policy orientation in this area.

3.4.3 *The way forward*

As a general remark, the EU could consider abandoning the “brain drain” terminology in favour of more neutral references to skilled migration, skills flows or skills circulation. This is because the reference to “brain drain” overemphasises the negative consequences of international skilled migration and fails to account for its benefits and the complexity of the issues at stake, as highlighted by research in the health sector.

While it is important for EU countries and destination countries in general to step-up their own efforts in developing their skilled workforce, the ethical recruitment approach aiming to prevent the recruitment of skilled workers from certain developing countries is questionable. However, ethical recruitment is a major feature of the EU strategy and this seems unlikely to change in the short-term⁸¹. Lessons can and should nevertheless be learned from the criticisms put forward by researchers and various international organisations as they provide strong orientations on the type of initiatives under development cooperation that are more likely to make a significant impact, and particularly the crucial need to address structural human resources and workforce issues in source countries.

In this respect, the EU should continue to **build partner countries’ human resource base in key sectors affected by high levels of skilled emigration** in public service, academia and the private sector. Building the human resource base is indeed a major way of addressing these issues⁸², which involves stepping-up cooperation in the education, training and research areas. Migration expertise should also be fed into development cooperation in these areas to ensure that all relevant dimensions of migration, including its South-South and internal components, are taken into account. Such human resource development and planning strategies should be based on sound assessments of the skill needs of developing countries as well as key migration trends. In the health sector for instance, the EU should

⁸⁰See e.g. Clemens, 2013. This phenomenon is already documented. As noted in OECD (2014), “countries like Australia and Canada have reported several cases of medical staff with foreign diplomas working as taxi drivers for example”.

⁸¹There are however some inflections in some countries. E.g. the Swedish Government (2014), while still advocating for the WHO Global Code of Practice paradoxically is of the view that “brain drain is a real problem for some countries of origin, but the solution does not lie in preventing individuals from migrating. Work on the factors behind the brain drain is key, as well as measures to strengthen positive developments effects of existing migration”.

⁸²Dumont et al. (2014) note that “the rising educational attainment of the global population has mitigated the negative effects of the increase in emigration rates of the high-skilled for many regions and countries. Although the number of tertiary educated African migrants in OECD countries increased dramatically (80%) between 2000/01 and 2010/11, the emigration rate of the highly educated of the region went down. This is explained by the sharp increase - almost doubling - in the population with tertiary education between 2000/01 and 2010/11”.

continue supporting developing countries with the development of health workforce strategies that address spatial distribution issues, taking into account the most pressing needs related to primary health care in rural areas and slums as well as current migration patterns. In many countries, such strategies would imply the creation of so-called “two-tier” systems of training “in which doctors and nurses are trained to international standards and it is accepted that losses will occur, but many others are trained to more basic levels of health care in order to have the most appropriate personnel for poor rural areas” (e.g. DRC, 2006). Although those are controversial, the WHO has long recognised the necessity to adjust training to needs and demand. More generally, human resource development strategies should factor the likely impacts of educational curricula on emigration. Enhanced levels of education impact inter alia on the employability of nationals abroad, making emigration easier. Mismatches between such curricula and actual domestic labour market needs and opportunities are likely to reinforce this phenomenon and result in enhanced emigration. In certain cases, health financing reforms might also be explored so that prospective emigrants rely on private as opposed to public financing, as is already taking place in the Philippines with regard to nurses. Another priority is to **enhance working conditions and incentives** in sectors affected by high rates of skilled emigration, addressing financial as well as broader issues such as the lack of infrastructure. This should be complemented by broader reforms in source countries since poor governance, insecurity, etc. also drive highly skilled migration. Improving structural conditions in countries of origin is the single best strategy to facilitate retention, circulation and return of the highly skilled.

The migration and mobility dimension should continue to be factored under cooperation in the education, training and research areas, or under specific sectors such as health, through the **promotion of institutional partnerships between education and research actors**, in both a South-North and South-South context, including through exchange and scholarship programmes. This type of institutional partnerships seem more promising than schemes based on facilitating individual returns and skills transfers in the spirit of RQNs, MIDA, TOKTEN and the like which have not demonstrated impact, except possibly in post-conflict contexts characterised by particularly severe skills shortages⁸³. Closely related to this, cooperation should be strongly stepped-up on **recognition of qualifications issues**, in both a South-North and South-South context, as already noted in the circular migration section. This is also the single best strategy to address over-qualification and deskilling issue.

In a South-South context, **regional approaches** should be promoted along with bilateral ones. A recent review of the strategies, policies and programmes of 6 African RECs in the area of higher education provides interesting insights into on-going regional initiatives linked to the harmonisation and mutual recognition of certificates and qualifications and the development of regional centres of excellence and the challenges they face (FIIAPP, ICMPD and IDEP, 2012). Here again, the

⁸³However, some observers see prospects for replicating such programmes in a South-South context (ACP Observatory on migration, 2013a), building on existing South-South skilled flows and the greater socio-economic and cultural proximities between countries involved that might result in easier reintegration of temporary or permanent returnees.

leadership should rather be with development cooperation actors working on education and research or sectorial issues such as health, but the migration dimension should be adequately mainstreamed.

An area where development cooperation on migration could possibly play a (co)leading role is the **piloting of a new generation of bilateral arrangements between important pairs of origin and destination countries**, such as those called for by Clemens (2013). He proposes that such pairs engage into **broad cooperation and partnership for skills creation and flow in given sectors**, including through bilateral agreements. Such partnerships would not only provide for the **mutual recognition of qualifications and experience** but could also provide the framework for experimenting innovative mechanisms for **training co-financing** between countries of origin and destination. In the health sector for instance, they would require broad partnerships among all relevant actors, including national institutions (particularly Ministries of labour, health, education, immigration, foreign affairs, and development cooperation), private sector and professional associations, trade unions, specialised international organisations and research actors.

4 Selected policy sectors – Economic development

4.1 Labour market/employment

4.1.1 Rationale – Inter-linkages

The ILO estimates that migrant workers and their families account for about 90% of all international migrants. **Labour migration, including within the global South, is primarily driven by socio-economic and demographic disparities.** Many developing countries are faced with high fertility and population growth and struggle to educate and absorb their youth into the labour market, in a context already marked by severe decent work deficits. There are currently 1.8 billion youth (between the age of 10 and 24) of which 90% live in developing countries where they are confronted with massive unemployment or poor-quality employment linked with high working poverty (UNFPA, 2014). At the same time, a number of countries experience low fertility and population ageing resulting in shrinking working-age populations. Beyond traditional “Northern” countries, this will increasingly become the case of various emerging economies in the global South, including several BRICS⁸⁴. But the phenomenon is bound to extend well beyond the BRICS (Taran, 2014).

The demand for migrant labour, including in a South-South context, concerns both the low- and the highly skilled. Increasingly knowledge-based societies are engaged in a global competition for “talent”⁸⁵ and the highly skilled constitute an

⁸⁴According to recent estimates, Russia and Brazil will face significant labour shortages already by 2020, while China and India will be in this situation in 2030 (The Boston Consulting Group, 2014).

⁸⁵The Asian region, in particular, is expected to become a major player in the competition to attract talent from within and outside Asia, competing inter alia with Europe (Gächter, 2013). “Competition for talent”, including by emerging economies, is a recurrent theme of business forecast analyses (see e.g. ManPower Group, 2013 and PWC, 2014).

increasing proportion of immigrants towards certain countries, notably in the OECD (Dumont et al. 2014). However, the great majority of migrant workers are low-skilled and concentrate in agriculture, food production, mining and forestry, heavy industry, construction as well as service sectors such as hotels and catering, restaurants, care and domestic work, often in so-called “3D” jobs (dirty, difficult and dangerous) avoided by native-born workers. Developing countries of destination also experience this phenomenon of labour market segmentation and South-South migration encompasses both high-skilled and low-skilled flows, although the later are predominant. Interestingly, and contrary to widely held assumptions, attracting low-skilled workers in periods of economic boom can also be challenging⁸⁶.

Inter-linkages between employment and migration are multiple, and go well beyond the role of labour markets conditions as push or pull factors.

Dependency on labour migration is a common feature in developing countries. On the receiving side, key economic sectors in many developing countries of destination strongly rely on migrant labour, whether international⁸⁷ or internal⁸⁸. On the sending side, foreign employment is essential in many developing countries, relieving pressures on domestic labour markets, in addition to providing remittances⁸⁹. In addition, migration impacts on labour markets at both origin and destination by modifying the size and characteristics of the labour force. Such impacts can be positive or negative depending on the situation of affected segments of the labour market (shortages and surplus), the characteristics of those who migrate (including skills and productivity levels), and the extent to which migrants and non-migrants are substitutes. Available evidence points towards negligible impacts of immigration on employment and wage levels in developed countries of destination, certainly due to limited substitution to native workers. However, little is known about developing countries of destination where impacts might be more important due to inefficient labour markets and greater substitution and where immigration might also contribute to increase informality (OECD, 2014). In developing countries of origin, emigration can create replacement effects by certain segments of the population (e.g. women, children) or by other categories of internal or international migrants⁹⁰. There are also

⁸⁶Le Bras (2014) highlights that attracting migrants in sufficient number in such contexts has proven difficult, noting that “when the demand for work was high in Europe after the first world war or in the sixties, the migrants did not come in sufficient number. It was necessary to send recruiters who solicited candidates”.

⁸⁷E.g. a recent study highlights that Thailand’s fishing industry – the country’s fish exports rank third globally with a USD 7 billion annual value in 2010 and the industry contributes to 1,2% of annual GDP – overwhelmingly relies on migrant workers from neighbouring Myanmar and Cambodia. This is attributed inter alia to differences of population demographics and economic development between those countries, with Thailand characterised by higher economic growth, a better-educated workforce, and a working age population expected to soon start shrinking (ILO, 2014b).

⁸⁸In one of the few studies attempting to measure the economic impacts of internal migration in key economic sectors, Deshingkar and Akter (2009) calculate that there are roughly 100 million circular migrants in India contributing 10% to the national GDP.

⁸⁹Promoting foreign employment has become a strategic objective in a number of developing countries, notably those taking part in the “Colombo Process” on “the management of overseas employment and contractual labour for countries of origin in Asia” (IOM, 2011).

⁹⁰A recent illustration of this phenomenon is provided by an IOM study of the labour force

broader indirect impacts, for instance through skilled immigration rising productivity and innovation at the macro-level. At origin, remittances can foster the development of human capital, hence modifying the characteristics of the labour force. In certain conditions, migrant investment and entrepreneurship might also lead to employment creation.

In any case, **the conditions under which labour migration occurs, and in particular respect for migrant workers' rights, are crucial determinants of its developmental implications.** Labour migration is governed by national legal and policy frameworks, and when they exist, bilateral - legally binding treaties or non-binding Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) – and regional agreements. Yet in many developing countries, labour migration policies and legislations remain under-developed and present significant protection gaps. Bilateral and regional agreements often present similar weaknesses and their coverage is insufficient, either because such agreements are not in place or because they are not properly implemented. In practice therefore, **a very important share of labour migration within the developing world, particularly at low-skilled levels, takes place outside policy and legal frameworks.** While the ILO estimates the proportion of irregular migrants worldwide at 10-15% of all migrants⁹¹, undocumented migration is a much more widespread phenomenon in a South-South context⁹².

Irregularity places migrants in a particularly vulnerable situation on the labour market, inhibiting them from accessing rights, reporting violations and seeking protection for fear of detection, detention and deportation. **Transit migrants** – who might have entered regularly but slip into irregularity if they cannot continue their journey due to border obstacles, financial or other constraints – are in a particularly vulnerable situation on labour markets. On the one side, they are easy preys for exploitation and trafficking, sometimes being “paid” in promised assistance with onward migration. On the other side, there is a total absence of strategy aiming at protecting them. On the contrary, the increasing focus on “fighting irregular migration” in many transit countries results in authorities chasing transit migrants and organising police round-ups in areas they are known to live and work in. In such areas, migrants are therefore much more exposed to arrest, detention and deportation and react by trying to make themselves “invisible”. This invisibilisation strategy, which in extreme cases leads migrants to reducing outings out of their accommodation and workplace (in certain cases confounded) to a strict minimum, makes them even more difficult to identify and support for migrant-help organisations.

engaged in cotton harvest in Tajikistan (IOM, 2014b). The massive labour emigration of rural Tajik men to the Russian Federation and other neighbouring countries – 73% of surveyed families report at least one member currently in labour migration abroad - results in students, school children and women filling the gaps for seasonal labour in cotton harvesting.

⁹¹See Castles et al. (2012) for a relatively recent review of available irregular migration estimates by world regions.

⁹²The above-mentioned study of the Thai fishing sector provides a recent illustration of this phenomenon, with the great majority of the almost 600 fishermen surveyed being irregular migrants from Cambodia and Myanmar: “Only one of the migrant fishers reported having a work permit, and two-thirds had no documentation whatsoever or had obtained a local document which had no legal standing. The remainder reported having entered the regularization process” (ILO, 2014b).

Irrespective of their legal status, migrant workers often cumulate multiple vulnerabilities (economic, social, cultural, linguistic, etc.) **that make them more exposed to exploitation and abuse**⁹³, including of the most severe forms. According to the ILO, 44% of the estimated 20.9 million victims of forced labour are internal or international migrants (ILO, 2012). Trafficking for forced labour indeed accounts for a significant and rapidly increasing share of detected cases of trafficking in persons, representing 36% globally, and reaching 47% of cases detected in South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, and 49% in Africa and the Middle East (UNODC, 2012). In addition, the frontier between smuggling and trafficking is not always clear, as migrants initially smuggled can be ultimately deceived into situations of trafficking and exploitation⁹⁴. More generally, migrant workers, particularly the lower-skilled, are widely exposed to the unethical practices of the private recruitment industry which has been playing an increasing role in labour migration, such as disproportionate fees and associated debt bondage, false information and promises, etc.

Asylum-seekers and refugees are another particularly vulnerable group on the labour market as their right to work, guaranteed in the Geneva Convention and other human right instruments, is often not respected, whether de facto or de jure. They are often settled in remote areas far from job opportunities and markets, and might in addition be faced with restrictions of movements, such as interdiction to leave camps.

Migrant women, youths and children are particularly vulnerable on labour markets. The feminisation of migration can be both a consequence and component of empowerment. Yet the majority of migrant women continue to work in low-end, poorly recognised and regulated jobs, often in the informal sector. Domestic work is a case in point. Women, a substantial share of which are migrant, represent 83% of the workforce in this sector, which is particularly prone to exploitative working conditions and abuse (ILO, 2013b). Women and girls are also particularly exposed to the most abusive forms of migration, accounting for about 75% of all trafficked victims detected globally (UNODC, 2012). 60% of international migrants under the age of 20 live in developing countries, and those at work constitute a particularly vulnerable group, even more so when they migrate independently. Migrant children in a South-South context are particularly exposed to child labour and there is evidence that their working conditions are worse than those of local child labourers⁹⁵. Migrant youths are also a specifically vulnerable group (GMG, 2014).

To address the challenges associated with labour migration, the EU has been supporting partner countries in five main areas: support to policy design, policy dialogue and policy development; reinforcement of labour migration management and labour matching capacities; protection of migrants' rights; human capital development, brain-drain and brain-waste; and temporary and circular labour

⁹³In some cases, their pairs perpetrate those. Migrant networks are primary providers of support, including in finding employment, yet overreliance on such networks can result in isolation facilitating exploitation and abuse.

⁹⁴See e.g. ACP Observatory on Migration (2013) for illustrations of this in a South-South context.

⁹⁵See Chapter on migrant children in child labour in IOM, 2013b.

migration schemes⁹⁶. A number of anti-trafficking interventions are also relevant from an employment perspective. In addition, given the intra-regional nature of a significant share of South-South migration, regional labour mobility has progressively become an important priority.

4.1.2 Challenges and lessons learned

A significant share of development cooperation interventions relating to labour migration has taken an exclusively normative approach as opposed to a labour market approach. The typical focus has been on addressing protection gaps in national legislations against international instruments and standards, developing new policy and legal frameworks, and promoting their implementation through sensitisation and capacity building. However, this approach has proved to be moderately successful in convincing partner countries to lift restrictive and discriminatory policy and legal frameworks for migrant work or actually apply such policy revisions in practice. This has also been the case at the regional level in relation with the development or implementation of regional mobility regimes. Free movement of people has been promoted by many regional organisations as an unquestionable legal imperative deriving from their founding treaty or subsequent secondary acts, without much space for debating its rationale and implications. The result has been in many instances that regional frameworks are not effective because instruments aiming at their operationalisation are not ratified or properly implemented by member states.

What has been missing to a great extent is an evidence-based economic approach highlighting the actual and potential benefits of labour migration through analysing actual dynamics on labour markets, including supply and demand at different skills levels, and their interconnections with migration. While the rights-based dimension is fundamental, it has been argued that a greater focus on the labour market perspective would be useful, including in advancing the protection agenda⁹⁷. In the context of EU development cooperation, although the Agenda for Change highlights the interrelationship between migration and employment, much more could be done to fully address the interconnections between labour markets and migration. This could foster the necessary political will not only to improve legal regimes but also to actually implement them. Yet this would require data and statistics about labour markets and labour migration and properly functioning labour market information systems that are unavailable in most developing countries.

The limited application of a labour market approach also results in a vision that puts the blame on migrants themselves for being in an irregular situation rather than recognising the underlying demand for their work and the responsibilities of intermediaries and employers. This is particularly concerning in a context where irregular migrants are increasingly criminalised, including in a South-

⁹⁶Human capital development, brain drain” and “brain waste” and temporary and circular labour migration schemes are discussed separately in sections 3.3. and 3.4.

⁹⁷This is one of main conclusions of a recent independent evaluation of the ILO's work on international labour migration (ILO, 2013).

South context. Undocumented South-South migrants are indeed particularly exposed to harassment and abuse by authorities (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013), which sometimes collude with smugglers and traffickers. Arbitrary arrest, detention and deportation are not uncommon in many developing countries. While irregular status is a major cause of exploitation and abuse of migrant workers, the challenge is to address this issue without nurturing stigmatisation. This is particularly important in a number of South-South corridors where people have long been routinely crossing borders in an informal way, leading to situations where “regularity” is the exception rather than the norm. **“Informality”, rather than “irregularity” might be a better suited characterisation of this type of situations**⁹⁸.

This links up to another key challenge for development cooperation on labour migration, namely that **conditions prevailing on the labour market are extremely poor for the population at large, and not only for – international - migrants**. This potentially questions the legitimacy and effectiveness of employment-related interventions specifically targeting international migrants. Informality and associated protection gaps in particular are major features of labour markets in most developing economies for migrants and natives alike, including **internal migrants**⁹⁹. This explains one of the key challenges emerging from interventions aiming at protecting migrant workers, i.e. that they do not usually see themselves as victims of particularly exploitative situations as their working conditions are commonplace for all workers alike in their countries of origin and, in a South-South context, in many countries of destination¹⁰⁰.

Similarly, capacity gaps in the areas of policy design, dialogue and development as well labour market management and labour matching capacities **exist in all employment-related areas, and are not specific to labour migration**. Intermediation capacities, for instance, need to be addressed in a holistic manner. It would not appear legitimate to support international job placement capacities when those are not effective in the first place in the domestic context, as is the case in many developing countries. In addition, the required expertise is similar in both cases and related support should therefore not be artificially segmented. The same can be said about human resource development strategies, including vocational education and training and skills development and validation strategies. In countries of origin, a number of past interventions have supported the development of dedicated trainings

⁹⁸See e.g. ILO 2014c: “When, as in many developing regions, borders are permeable in the absence of any effective border control, the distinction between regular and irregular becomes blurred. **The movement tends to be from informality in one country to informality in another**”.

⁹⁹E.g. according to UNESCO (2013) internal migrants in India “are mostly employed in the informal economy (...). Devoid of social security and legal protection, they work in poor conditions and face labour market discrimination. Minimum wages are often flouted and employers bear no responsibility for health, shelter and other basic requirements of migrants”. The report also provides evidence of internal trafficking and bonded labour.

¹⁰⁰As noted by Berket (2013), migrants “who come from poorly regulated economies, where grey economy and black market working conditions are common” do not easily identify themselves as victims of labour trafficking. Similarly, ILO’s recent study on the Thai fishing sector (2014b) finds that a majority of surveyed migrant workers are not aware that they are working in particularly exploitative conditions, having a very limited understanding of their labour rights.

for would-be migrants or returnees in isolation from broader VET and skills-related interventions. This approach has been questioned, not least because actual migration opportunities abroad depend on external factors and cannot be guaranteed (European Commission, 2011). In addition, VET and skills-related efforts should first and foremost aim at addressing domestic unemployment and underemployment and foreign employment strategies should not be seen as a mean to leave those issues unattended. In developing countries of destination, very limited attention has been paid to date to migrants as a disadvantaged group in VET and skills-related interventions and this should be addressed in the future.

In the area of trafficking, a specific challenge has been that **the existing international approach has been developed primarily with a view to fighting trafficking for sexual exploitation**. This has resulted in a particular imagery of the potential victim and the perpetrator¹⁰¹, which has framed approaches to the “4 Ps” in a specific way. Consequently, labour market actors (labour/employment administrations, including labour inspectorates and employment agencies, trade unions, employer unions, private recruitment agencies, private companies, etc.) have insufficiently been involved in anti-trafficking efforts. In a similar vein, responses to trafficking for labour exploitation have insufficiently relied on international and national labour instruments and standards. In addition, the broader labour market dynamics, including supply and demand for cheap labour, that underpin trafficking for labour market exploitation have not attracted sufficient attention.

Returns of experience from interventions supporting intra-regional labour mobility are still limited, as this has only recently emerged as a priority for the EU. A major challenge is that **mobility within regional organisations has primarily been dealt with from a free movement perspective rather than through a labour market/employment lens**, although with significant differences in approaches¹⁰². More generally, social policies, including labour market and employment policies, are only an emerging area for most regional organisations, as noted for instance by a recent review in the African context (FIIAPP, ICMPD, and IDEP, 2013). For both reasons, regional labour migration policies remain clearly under-developed. Preliminary lessons learned indicate that rebalancing the approach to better factor the labour market perspective to regional mobility will require stepping-up cooperation with social affairs interlocutors within regional organisations. Cooperation to date has tended to prioritise migration/free movement departments, whose natural national counterparts are ministries of interior/immigration/security,

¹⁰¹As noted by Berket (2013) “the image of a “professional” criminal who exploits women for sex work should be complemented by the faces of employers (e.g. farmers, factory, restaurant and hotel managers, construction site foremen and construction companies), who may run what appear to be entirely legitimate businesses but who use the labour or services of exploited and trafficked persons”. The whole argument in this paragraph is based on this publication.

¹⁰²General regimes of free movement of labour (e.g. ECOWAS) are exceptional. Most regional organisations consider liberalising the movement of certain categories of workers (e.g. for specific skill categories). Some are only working on the free movement of other categories of persons (tourists, students, business visitors, service providers, etc.). Overlapping memberships in several regional groupings represent a specific challenge, especially when approaches differ – e.g. mobility of workers vs. mobility of service providers.

with the result of focusing discussions on the security dimension of border management. Within Regional Consultative Processes on migration (RCPs), there has also been a tendency to focus on border/security aspects, even though developmental perspectives are progressively introduced. The Colombo process stands as an exception, being the only RCP specifically focusing on labour migration. A potential benefit of strengthening the labour market approach to regional mobility would be once again to put the focus on supply and demand dynamics, **including at lower skills levels**. At present, most discussions on the regional mobility of workers are focused on the highly skilled, even though these categories might represent a minority of intra-regional migrants. As a result, the lower skilled continue to move irregularly which bears negative consequences for all parties¹⁰³.

A final lesson learned from past interventions relates to the need to continue and step-up cooperation with social partners¹⁰⁴. Trade unions have a key role to play in informing and protecting migrant workers. The private sector and employer organisations have unique insights into labour markets needs and can greatly contribute to advocacy as regards free movement and labour migration. It is also crucial to target the private sector as part of efforts to ensure the respect of migrant workers' rights, including at the recruitment stage, given the increasing role of private recruitment agencies as opposed to public employment services in the organisation of international labour migration.

4.1.3 The way forward

Although the Agenda for Change places great emphasis on the inter-linkages between employment and migration, there is still a great scope for **reinforcing the labour market approach to migration** in EU development cooperation, both at bilateral and regional level¹⁰⁵. The normative rights-based perspective, which has somehow dominated to date, should be complemented by an economic approach based on analyses and forecasts of labour market dynamics and their inter-linkages

¹⁰³For instance, a recent report about the ASEAN integration process notes that “although the ASEAN Economic Community provides for the free movement of some groups of highly-skilled professionals, its approach stands in sharp contrast with existing realities. Labour migration within ASEAN is mainly dominated by low- and medium-skilled workers in manufacturing, construction, fishing and domestic work and it is likely to remain so long into the medium term. Recognising additional occupations under multilateral frameworks could provide better channels for such workers, while promoting a more sustainable and legitimate mode of managing labour mobility, offering benefits for both source and destination countries” (ILO, 2014d).

¹⁰⁴This is highlighted, inter alia in European Commission, 2011 and in ILO 2013c.

¹⁰⁵This desk-study is limited to actions to be undertaken under EU development cooperation and therefore does not analyse challenges, lessons learned and possible options as far as European labour migration policies are concerned, even though those are of great relevance for the migration and development agenda. As a general comment however, it can be said that the need for a stronger labour market approach that would better factor actual labour market needs at all skills levels also applies in the EU context. Sweden's labour immigration reform offers an interesting example going in this direction (see e.g. <http://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/78#sthash.aFNuRZcM.dpuf>)

with migration. This is in line with the orientations taken at the 2013-2014 GFMD, where the labour market approach has received particular emphasis¹⁰⁶.

In particular, there is a need to deepen **knowledge on labour force shortages and surplus and labour matching needs at all relevant levels, including low-skills levels**. This can serve as a basis for improved policy-making on labour migration, including the negotiation and implementation of better-informed **bilateral or regional labour mobility agreements and schemes, including for the lower skilled**¹⁰⁷. The EU has engaged in supporting skills mapping/profiling exercises in a number of countries, including through the European Training Foundation, and cooperation in this area should be stepped-up. There is also a need to enhance knowledge on the impacts of migration, including **internal migration**, on the labour force and broader economic development, including in developing countries of destination. This could actually help building the economic case for better managing internal and international labour migration, including through regional arrangements, and enhancing the protection of migrant workers. An EU-funded project implemented by the ILO and the OECD was recently launched in this area, with the objective of analysing the economic contribution of labour migration in developing countries of destination¹⁰⁸. Such an approach could **focus on specific economic sectors** where labour migration plays a particularly important role, **including at the regional level**¹⁰⁹. It should also fully encompass the forced migration dimension, as refugee and IDPs are active on labour markets and also make significant economic contributions¹¹⁰.

Reinforcing capacities for **labour market and labour migration data-collection and management** is a key component of efforts in this direction. The EU has engaged in various relevant interventions, for instance in the areas of labour market information systems (LMIS) and decent work indicators and this should remain a priority for cooperation, given existing capacity gaps¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁶See in particular discussions under RT 2.1. “Enhancing the development impacts of labour migration and circular mobility through more systematic labour market and skills matching”.

¹⁰⁷The KNOMAD initiative includes working groups on both skilled and low-skilled migration. The later conducted inter alia a review of bilateral agreements on low-skilled labour migration, which findings could certainly inform future development cooperation efforts. See http://www.knomad.org/powerpoints/low_skilled_labor_migration/KNOMAD%20TWG3%20BLA%20workshop%20summary.pdf

¹⁰⁸The project will look into macro-economic effects (most notably contribution to GDP and growth but also consumption, investment, inflation, etc.); impacts on the labour market (sector analysis, impact on wages, labour shortage, employment, productivity, skills level, etc.); impact on public finances and social services (fiscal incomes/costs, etc.); and other impacts (e.g. potential impact on the environment, etc.).

¹⁰⁹See e.g. recent work supported by ILO on the fishing sector in the ASEAN region as part of the ASEAN Triangle project: http://www.ilo.org/asia/whatwedo/events/WCMS_220410/lang--en/index.htm

¹¹⁰ See e.g. the “Labour Market Impacts of Forced Migration Project”: <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~qehs0697/lamfor.html>

¹¹¹E.g. a recent ACP Observatory study on labour migration within the ECOWAS (Awumbila et al. 2014) notes the following: “Almost all countries lack comprehensive labour force data and statistics on labour migration. Closely related is the absence of LMISs in countries participating in this study. All 15 countries covered in this study had no functional LMIS and only three countries – namely Senegal, Ghana and the Gambia – have made some efforts

Building the evidence base on the significance of migration for developing countries of origin and destination should serve as a basis for **mainstreaming internal and international migration in employment strategies**. Indeed, given the strong inter-linkages between migration and employment in many developing countries, the success of employment strategies will in many instances depend on the adequate factoring of migration, including the likely migration impacts of any envisioned strategy. At the same time, there is great scope for mainstreaming labour migration into EU cooperation on employment as most priorities pursued so far on labour migration connect to broader cooperation priorities in the employment sector, inter alia: decent work and workers' protection, particularly in the informal economy; labour market analysis; labour intermediation; VET, skills development, validation and recognition; fight against exploitation, forced labour and worst forms of child labour, etc. This convergence of priorities reflects the fact many of the challenges faced in managing labour migration are linked to wider issues affecting labour market management capacities in general.

For instance, the prevalence of **undocumented labour migration in a South-South context cannot be addressed independently from the general informality** prevailing on labour markets in many developing countries that puts migrants and natives alike at risk of exploitative working conditions. Addressing informal employment is an important priority for EU cooperation on employment and undocumented labour migration should be approached from this broader perspective. Standard approaches taken to date such as information campaigns on the risks associated with irregular labour migration might need to be adjusted in a South-South context where labour markets structurally function with high levels of undeclared work for the population at large. While cooperation on labour migration has primarily focused on formal mechanisms governing labour migration, the realities of South-South migration make it necessary to reflect on **alternative approaches** to address the situation of the overwhelming majority of migrant workers who work in the **informal economy**.

Similarly, the crucial issue of **skills recognition**¹¹², which is an essential component of labour matching and should constitute a major priority for cooperation on labour migration, cannot be meaningfully addressed in isolation from the strengthening of VET systems and wider skills development, validation and accreditation strategies, in both countries of origin and destination. More generally, while most labour migration projects to date have focused on developing countries of origin, priority should also be put in the future on mainstreaming migration in employment strategies **in developing in countries of destination**. This should include **internal migration**, which is a full component of labour migration¹¹³ and in a number of developing countries the most important one. The issue has only attracted

towards the establishment of LMIS. Thus, governments are missing out the opportunity to monitor and evaluate the structure of their labour markets for policy decisions and formulation”.

¹¹²See sections on circular migration and brain drain.

¹¹³IOM includes this key dimension in its definition of labour migration as the “movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment”.

attention to date in mega-countries like India or China¹¹⁴ but is of particular relevance in many developing countries.

A final priority for future cooperation on labour migration would be to **increase engagement with social partners and with the private sector**. To date interventions aiming at protecting migrant workers have involved more efficiently civil society organisations than social partners. This is evident for instance in the anti-trafficking area where NGOs active in the area of women and human rights have been prominent partners, reflecting the over-emphasis on trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The private sector should be a key actor in efforts aiming at assessing skills and labour matching needs, in the spirit of discussions engaged during the 2013-2014 GFMD in priority sectors. Another area where private sector involvement is key is labour migration intermediation. Efforts in this area cannot be limited to public employment services that actually play a limited and decreasing role in intermediation as opposed to private recruitment actors. Initiatives like ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative and IOM-led Public Private Alliance for Fair and Ethical Recruitment rightly put emphasis on norms and regulations, including self-regulation, applicable to the private recruitment industry in order to combat abuse and exploitation of migrant workers.

4.2 Private sector development

4.2.1 Rationale

At a macro-level, and if formally transferred and linked to bank accounts, remittances have the potential to foster private sector development through increasing credit opportunities by the financial system for the population at large, including non-migrant households. At the micro-level, remittances can support entrepreneurship and investment by migrants themselves – remotely during migration and upon return – as well as family members left behind.

Beyond remittances, a number of countries have experimented various instruments targeting high-profile diaspora segments to foster capital markets' development and ultimately support economic development. Diaspora bonds, successfully implemented since 1951 in Israel for instance, are a case in point. The rationale behind the issuance of such instruments is that migrants have a different assessment of investment risk, being better connected and informed about the situation in their origin countries.

More generally, knowledge of the local context is a clear advantage in both investment and business creation. In addition, migrants might be motivated by

¹¹⁴See e.g. UNESCO 2013 which includes labour market inclusion among key priorities for enhancing the social inclusion of internal migrants in India and highlights, inter alia, the importance of skills-development. See also the « Protecting and Promoting the Rights of China's Vulnerable Migrants » project (<http://www.mdgfund.org/content/protectingandpromotingrightschinasvulnerablemigrants>) which aims at addressing the vulnerabilities of young low-skilled internal migrants from rural areas faced with major social exclusion and labour exploitation risks, by increasing access to social services, better implementing existing legislation, and improving educational, vocational and life-skills training opportunities.

patriotic feelings leading them to accept greater risks and lower rates of return over longer periods. In addition, migrants can acquire specific financial, human, social and cultural resources through their experience abroad that can potentially be mobilised for private sector development. There are indeed some convincing examples where the diaspora has played a major role in private sector development in origin countries. Among the most often quoted examples are the major role played by the diaspora in China through foreign direct investment or the contribution of the Indian diaspora to the development of the IT sector in this country.

Private sector oriented interventions under EU development cooperation have tried to exploit the potential of remittances by linking them to credit and investment. The overall objective has been to enhance longer-term development impacts for those directly involved (by reducing dependence on migration and remittances) and for the wider community (by enhancing economic activity and employment-creation). Finally, there has been an interest on building on the potentially more willing attitude of migrants to engage in entrepreneurship and investment “back home” in post-conflict and fragile situations where other private sector actors might be reluctant to take the risk.

4.2.2 Challenges and lessons learned

Support programmes and projects in this area have encountered a number of challenges¹¹⁵.

The first one relates to the presence or absence of a **conducive environment, from both the business and investment climate and the migration perspectives**. The prevalence of friendly conditions in countries of origin for entrepreneurship, investment and trade, are a central determinant of migrants’ and refugees’ propensity to engage in such activities and largely determine their success. As regards diaspora bonds for instance, it has proved difficult to replicate the Israeli experience by generating sufficient confidence in the local economic and financial system. As noted in IOM and MPI (2012), “despite improvements in credit ratings among a number of developing and emerging economies, governments must still face the challenge of convincing members of their diaspora to purchase government bonds”. Such conditions relate to the business and investment climate specifically as well as broader factors, including the situation in the financial sector, trade facilitation, infrastructure or workforce qualification. A number of entrepreneurship or investment support projects have found it difficult for instance to achieve their expected objectives due to insufficient credit facilities (e.g. EU-funded REMADE project in Ghana).

As regards the migratory environment, experience shows that restrictive regimes hamper the potential contribution diasporas could make to private sector development¹¹⁶. Being able to move back and forth freely is essential to prepare -

¹¹⁵The main resources used for this section are FOMIN (2010b), IFAD (2013b), Fransen et al. (2013), GIZ (2013), IOM and MPI (2012).

¹¹⁶And diaspora engagement more generally (see arguments already developed under diaspora, circular migration and brain drain sections in particular).

including assessing market conditions - and implement a business or investment project. It is also an essential element of security for migrants, given the risks associated with any entrepreneurial or investment activity, particularly in developing countries where uncertainties are higher. This also relates to security conditions, particularly in post-conflict contexts. This explains why programmes conditioning business support to permanent return have proved unable to attract significant interest from the diaspora¹¹⁷.

The second challenge has been to adequately **define and analyse target groups and tailor support** to the specific needs of distinct segments. At the individual level, there is a need to better distinguish between active entrepreneurship and investment in financial instruments. More generally, it cannot be assumed that any diaspora has the same resources and skills to engage in entrepreneurship and investment activities, which links up to the necessity of conducting careful diaspora mappings before designing entrepreneurship and investment promotion strategies¹¹⁸. There are numerous examples of projects that have tried to foster migrant entrepreneurship or investment without sufficiently analysing their profiles, intentions, as well as the best ways to communicate and reach out to them, hence failing to achieve the expected results¹¹⁹. In addition, while entrepreneurship support has given particular attention to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), it has proved particularly difficult to design and tailor investment support initiatives and offer safe and attractive opportunities to small-scale investors.

Beyond issues linked to unfavourable local investment conditions, analyses of failed projects in this area highlight the **difficulty of finding the right implementers**, with insufficient involvement of actors with business expertise, such as chambers of commerce, as a major issue. Public authorities, whether national or local, hometown associations or NGOs with limited business expertise have often been in the lead, with mixed results¹²⁰. At the same time, identifying for-profit organisations (e.g. commercial banks) to work with small-scale entrepreneurs and investors is difficult,

¹¹⁷This point is clearly made for instance in IOM and ICMPD (2012), Fransen et al. (2013) and GIZ (2013), with the GIZ paper providing examples of such project failures.

¹¹⁸Recent research conducted in a South-South context contrasts for instance the situation of the Basotho and Nigerian diasporas in Africa with regards to diaspora investment potential (ACP Obs. 2013a). A significant proportion of the Nigerians diasporas in Ghana and South Africa appears to have a strong entrepreneurial and investor profile, relatively high levels of income, has acquired assets for private investment in Nigeria, and is interested in investing further in the country in various economic sectors, provided certain conditions are met (Olatuyi et al. 2013). By contrast, the typical Basotho migrant is a low-educated and low-income male mine worker in South-Africa, with remittances playing a key role in receiving households' survival, raising dependency issues and leaving very limited space for investment (Nalane et al., 2012). What can be achieved, the type of support required, as well as the necessary communication and outreach strategies will necessarily differ in the two situations.

¹¹⁹The REMADE project is a case in point (European Commission 2012, 2013 and 2014 as well as monitoring reports).

¹²⁰See e.g. McKenzie and Yang (2014), in relation with the failed Mi Comunidad (My community) project of the Mexican state of Guanajuato, which aimed at using investments by migrants to start small maquiladora garment manufacturing plants in migrants' communities of origin. See also FOMIN (2010b) regarding projects aiming at linking remittances and productive investment in Latin America, particularly through migrant associations.

as already noted in relation with remittances projects (FOMIN 2010b, IOM and MPI, 2012).

A final set of issues regarding target groups relate to the **legitimacy and effectiveness of designing specific programmes for migrants, as opposed to broader programmes** that can cater for would-be entrepreneurs and investors at large, including migrants (see e.g. Fransen et al., 2013 and GIZ, 2013). Special incentives and support measures for migrants (e.g. savings accounts with preferential interest rates) might create market distortions to the detriment of the local population, without being able to attract a significant number of migrants in the absence of broader conducive conditions¹²¹.

4.2.3 *The way forward*

Future support aiming at mobilising the diaspora in relation with entrepreneurship and investment should put stronger emphasis on the **overall business and investment climate**, and be connected to, and consistent with, broader private sector development strategies in partner countries, as well as with efforts in inter-related areas (e.g. financial sector, trade, etc.). More attention should also be paid to policies that facilitate **circulation** (see circular migration section), including issues of entry, residence, and citizenship. Specific regimes for the mobility of business persons, as is e.g. envisaged under the tripartite free trade negotiations between COMESA, EAC and SADC should also be looked into. The EU strategy on private sector under development cooperation indeed recognises migration management as a determinant of the investment climate¹²².

An important way to increase consistency would be to **mainstream the migration dimension in private sector development strategies** wherever relevant. This should be based on partner countries needs, including priority sectors for the economy, as well as the specific characteristics of their diasporas. Depending on each context, very distinct strategies can be put in place, including financial inclusion-oriented strategies targeting the poorest and most vulnerable, support to micro and small businesses and small-scale investment, or strategies targeting high-profile diaspora members, for instance through more complex investment schemes (e.g. diaspora bonds). In certain cases, comprehensive strategies including a combination of these elements might be needed to respond to the potential and needs of various segments.

¹²¹McKenzie and Yang (2014) conclude their review of the evidence on small-business development projects for migrants as follows: “While such programs can sound intuitively appealing (...) there is no existing evidence as to their success. Moreover, there are at least three concerns with such programs. The first is that not everybody wants to be an entrepreneur, and many return migrants will have been working in wage jobs previously, with no experience in running a business. Second, existing evaluations of training programs have had at best mixed results, even amongst those individuals interested in starting businesses (...) and there is no reason to expect return migrants to be particularly good at running businesses. Third, it is unclear why such programs should be targeted explicitly at return migrants, rather than being part of a portfolio of training and work assistance options offered to all individuals in a given region”.

¹²²COM 2014 263 Final.

The EU strategy on private sector under development cooperation, which already mainstreams migration to a certain extent, offers considerable opportunities for mainstreaming migration in countries of origin, wherever relevant. The strategy rightly prioritises the **strengthening of MSMEs** given the vital role they play in job creation. This has been a major area of focus of migration-related work and more efforts should be made to ensure that migrants and migrant households are considered as potential targets in such initiatives, whenever relevant. **Access to finance and financial inclusion** are also important strategic orientations for the EU work on private sector under development cooperation, with a clear link established with **remittances**, offering an important avenue for migration mainstreaming.

While this aspect has attracted less attention, there is also an important scope for mainstreaming migration in PSD strategies **in developing countries of transit and destination**. The EU **focus on MSMEs - including in the informal economy** to support formalisation and improve productivity and working conditions in the informal sector - would again be an important entry point¹²³. Indeed, migrants represent a very significant share of the MSME and informal economy tissue in certain sectors in a number of developing countries. In this respect, **both the internal** (see previous section) **and forced – refugees and IDPs - dimensions of migration need to be fully taken into account**. Refugees in particular are often legally excluded from the formal employment sector and therefore turn to the informal sector, including through self-employment and MSME creation. In addition to their quantitative importance, immigrants can transfer important resources to host societies, such as know-how and ways to do business, including in a South-South context¹²⁴. When it comes to working conditions in the informal economy, internal and international migrants should also receive specific attention as a target group in destination countries, particularly in sectors that heavily rely on them, due to their specific vulnerabilities. Those are acknowledged in the above-mentioned EU PSD strategy, in relation to the promotion of responsible business practices through EU development policy. Indeed, the strategy highlights that particular attention needs to be given to ensuring fair and transparent practices in the employment and treatment of migrant workers.

As regards investment promotion, more efforts should be put on identifying vehicles for **small-scale investments** that can offer both security and good return levels. There have been a few successes in this area¹²⁵, but much more needs to be done to explore this type of schemes and replicate the most successful experiences. Attention should be paid in particular to the availability of matching sources of financing (grants or loans) to complement migrant resources. As regards **larger-scale investments**, diasporas' readiness to take significant additional risks out of

¹²³COM 2014 263 Final. The Communication notes that an estimated 60 to 80 per cent of enterprises in developing economies are informal firms.

¹²⁴For instance, a recent case study of the fishery sector in Senegal and Gambia notes the significant benefits for local economies brought by Ghanaian immigrants through the introduction of new fishing, conservation and treatment techniques which have contributed to boost productivity and exports (Gueye, 2013).

¹²⁵E.g. the award winning Atikha project supported by the FFR in the Philippines pooled the relatively modest monthly savings of 900 migrants in an agricultural cooperative which reinvested them in the start-up of new businesses in communities of origin. The scheme proved able to offer good return levels to the migrant investors (IFAD 2013b and 2014).

“patriotism” have not really materialised. For instance, most diaspora bonds experiences have failed to attract significant interest. Efforts should therefore primarily be geared towards strengthening the financial sector, generating confidence in the prospects of the economy, and more generally in the country’s political stability. This can be done as part of a mainstream FDI attraction strategy targeting all investors alike, even though some specific activities might be undertaken to reach out and communicate with potential diaspora investors once conditions are attractive enough.

Specific attention should be devoted to diaspora engagement for the private sector in **post-conflict countries and fragile states**, where diasporas might indeed have a distinctive part to play, as already highlighted. Experiences similar to the IFAD-implemented “Diaspora Investment in Agriculture Initiative” would be worth exploring¹²⁶. For instance the Initiative, which aims to “help migrant investors build a bridge between the end of conflict and the beginning of development in their home communities”, has recently launched a programme for “Enhancing food security in the horn of Africa through diaspora investment in Agriculture”.

In general, **targeting migrants under PSD support programmes should not necessarily entail the creation of specific incentives or support measures** for migrants as opposed to local entrepreneurs or investors as those can create distortions that may not be legitimate. In addition, a great part of the required support is in essence of the same nature, irrespective of the migrant background of beneficiaries (e.g. access to funding, networks, mentoring, business coaching, etc.). There is need however to pay attention to the specificities of migrants as a target group in terms of tailoring information and advisory services and designing effective **communication and outreach strategies**: e.g. through embassies, consulates, cooperation between chambers of commerce at origin and destination, business networks, the setting-up of dedicated “one-stop shop” information centres and websites, the organisation of business and investment events and fairs for the diaspora, etc. (see e.g. GIZ, 2013).

In terms of implementers, different types of actors (e.g. for profit / non profit) have different strengths and weaknesses, and one promising approach is to foster **alliances and partnerships**.

5 Selected policy sectors – Social development

5.1 Education

5.1.1 Rationale

Inter-linkages between education and migration are multifaceted. A first area of focus, which has received lots of attention in the M&D nexus, relates to the **increasing migration of the highly skilled** (understood as tertiary educated) and

¹²⁶ See <http://www.ifad.org/remittances/pub/dia.pdf>. The Initiative covers, inter alia, Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Tunisia.

its debated impacts on countries of origin - impacts on countries of destination are widely considered positive and countries of destination are actually competing for attracting such migrants, including through preferential migration regimes. Student migration – migration for the completion of higher education - is also an increasing component of these skilled migration flows. Education policies in origin and destination countries also impact on highly skilled migration, inter alia by affecting the employability of emigrants abroad, a phenomenon reinforced when opportunities are limited in the domestic labour market. These issues are discussed separately in the “brain drain” section.

Another important area of focus relates to the **inter-linkages between migration, access to, and provision of, education at inferior levels (primary and secondary education)** in both countries of origin and destination. There are two contradictory ways in which migration is thought to impact on education **in countries of origin**. On the positive side, remittances can, and in many cases are, used to finance education expenditures (this also applies to higher education levels). Through their contribution to the household budget, they can also relieve pressure on the need to rely on child labour. OECD (2014) and GFMD (2014) include various references providing evidence of these beneficial impacts in a number of cases. There are numerous examples of remittances positively affecting education in receiving households, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, with beneficial impacts on education expenditure levels, children enrolment rates, school attendance and drop-out levels, as well as school performance and literacy. The gender dimension is important as women appear to spend a greater share of remittances towards family welfare, including education. GFMD (2014) also refers to evidence that social remittances can positively impact on the prioritisation of education by migrant-related households (during migration or upon return). On the negative side, the migration of one or both parents can create a replacement effect by child or adolescent labour. School drop-out and school performance levels might also be negatively impacted as a result of psychosocial disorders and the lack of control and support resulting from the absence of one or both parents (GFMD, 2014)¹²⁷. The emigration of education personnel can also negatively affect access to, and provision of, educational services in both quantitative and qualitative terms, although this issue is more acute at the higher education level. In sum, inter-linkages between migration and education in countries of origin is mixed and country-specific. Another important way in which migration can impact on education in countries of origin is in cases of mass returns (e.g. of refugees) pressurising education systems that might already be under strain.

In countries of destination – and even more in countries of transit - migrant and refugee children are a particularly **vulnerable group facing major difficulties in accessing education**, in violation of the rights enshrined in multiple human and migrant rights international instruments. Specific groups such as children migrating with parents in transit, engaged in short-term circular/seasonal migration, in irregular situation (national legislation often excludes children of irregular migrants from

¹²⁷Mara et al. (2012) also includes a review of the evidence on the impact of remittances on education in receiving households.

schooling, either in law or in practice¹²⁸) or with refugee parents in camps face even higher restrictions in their access to education. Another reason for limited access to education is that many poor migrant households rely on child labour for their survival, at the expense of education¹²⁹. The situation is even direr for children migrating independently and engaged in child labour, including of the worst forms, with no opportunity to access education. Migrant children also have specific needs (e.g. need for language support, psychosocial support, need to catch up with missed schooling, etc.). At the same time, the pressure that mass influxes of migrants or refugees can place on often already strained education systems also needs to be acknowledged, although it has to be weighted against the wider benefits associated with migrant presence and the economic and social costs resulting from absent or poor education provided to migrant children.

Conversely, **the state of the education system and education policies at both origin and destination and the gaps between them can impact on migration** (e.g. when migration is undertaken for education purposes) **and return** (e.g. for diaspora members with children in schooling in their destination countries) **decisions**.

The EU approach to education as part of the M&D debate has principally focused on “brain drain” and the potential benefits of remittances on education. Preoccupation with the negative educational consequences of family separation has emerged more recently, as of 2011 (GAMM and accompanying SWP). Less emphasis has been put on developing countries of destination.

5.1.2 Challenges and lessons learned

A main weakness in the M&D debate to date as far as education is concerned is that **attention has almost exclusively focused on developing countries of origin**. “Brain drain”, the potential of remittances in enhancing access to education and more recently the consequences of psychosocial fragilities caused by family separation have been the main priorities. Challenges and lessons learned in these three areas are discussed elsewhere in this paper, in sections on “brain drain”, remittances, and social protection, respectively. Challenges for education systems raised by mass influxes of returnees have attracted less attention. Those are not really different in

¹²⁸IOM (2013b) provides numerous examples in various countries, where although universal free education is theoretically provided, it is conditioned upon proof of permanent residence and either inaccessible or accessible with extra fees to children not fulfilling this requirement. Beyond these legal restrictions, the report notes that “migrant children may also experience restricted access beyond express prohibition, for example, through informal barriers due to financial costs, lack of information, discrimination and a climate of fear of discovery and detention/deportation. Migrants may also be reluctant to use public services, or allow their children to access these services, because of state policies which formally criminalize irregular migration”.

¹²⁹IOM (2013b) highlights that “even if migrant children have access to education (which they most often do not), the time and energy that working requires from them makes them too busy or too tired for study. There is a marked pattern where migrant child labourers are far less likely than local child labourers to attend school”. The report provides several examples to illustrate this phenomenon.

nature from issues faced by destination countries confronted with similar situations, which are discussed below.

What has been missing to a great extent is consideration for the situation of migrant and refugee children in developing destination countries, where they are confronted with widespread violations of their right to education, which are even more acute for children in irregular situation. **The situation is even direr for irregular migrants in so-called transit countries, yet this aspect has received even less attention**¹³⁰. This relates to a general flaw in the way the whole transit discourse and policy approach has been framed (see also introductory section on transit migration). Transit countries - and to great extent development cooperation actors - have failed to acknowledge that the extended, and even semi-permanent/permanent character of transit migration, de facto converts transit countries in destination countries. Framing transit migrants as just “passing through” is used as an excuse by receiving countries to evade any responsibility to protect them, respect their most basic human rights including through basic social services’ provision, and foster their integration. In the few cases where transit migrants are able to access public services, it is “the product of a discretionary laissez-faire attitude”, including by individual agents, “that is far from guaranteeing to migrants an equal and constant access to public services on the basis of the respect of their fundamental human rights”. In addition the fight against irregular migration lens applied to transit migrants is resulting in increasingly insecure conditions for them in cities. In some cases, they are forced to leave cities and settle in makeshift encampment in rural areas where they are totally deprived of access to even the most basic resources and services (Marconi, 2010).

In general, **addressing the basic needs of transit migrant is left to migrant-support organisations** (NGOs, churches, etc.). Although those play an invaluable role, they by no means have the financial capacity to support all transit migrants. They also face difficulties in reaching out to a population in irregular situation that has converted invisibility into its main adaptation strategy. In addition, this “mission” of migrant support groups is not officially acknowledged and in some cases barely tolerated (e.g. Istanbul), and this additional barrier leaves them with very limited freedom of action. Finally, such actors tend to work on immediate emergency assistance and short-term needs rather than from a longer-term development perspective that would reflect the long-term settlement needs of transit migrants, illustrated for instance by the challenges faced the “second generation” of migrant children who are born in transit and grow up without access to education. This points towards similarities in the challenges faced in addressing the situations of stranded transit migrants and people in protracted displacement and researchers have indeed been calling for recognition of the protracted nature of such transit situations (IPPR, 2013).

Another dimension that needs to be fully taken into account is internal migration. First, internal child migrants, and particularly short-term migrants, face

¹³⁰This paragraph extensively builds on Marconi (2010), which focuses on “transit cities in transit countries” based on the compared cases of Tijuana and Istanbul as well as IPPR (2013) which focuses on the Moroccan case.

difficulties very similar to those faced by their international counterparts. Those include issues resulting from the lack of required proofs of identity or residence and other factors linked to their migration patterns¹³¹. Access to education for internally displaced children is even more of a challenge. Second, the lack of education facilities beyond primary level in underserved rural areas is a driver of internal child migration. However high living costs in cities often compel children to work at the same time, which often results in school dropout. Education costs can also be drivers of internal child migration for work (e.g. during the summer months)¹³².

Migration impacts on education services, including in the internal context, have received more attention. However, **the dominant vision focuses on the extra cost that migrant and refugee children might represent without acknowledging the positive economic impacts that they make in parallel in receiving areas, including cities.** On the one side, there is no denial that migrant and refugee children, especially in the case of important inflows, can exert pressure on education systems. The situation is even more complex when the capacities of such systems are already overstretched and when local children also have limited access to education. In such situations, it would not be legitimate to specifically focus on supporting education for migrant children without also considering the needs of the population at large (see e.g. OECD, 2012). On the other side, the “burden” vision of internal and international migrants only reflects one side of the story and needs to be challenged. E.g. UNESCO (2013) highlights that far from being a drain on the Indian society and economy, internal migrants are in fact “providing a subsidy” by contributing cheap labour for manufacturing and services and in doing so making a key contribution to the national GDP” (estimated at 10%). Similar points are made for instance in the transit migration literature with multiple examples of cities along transit routes experiencing economic dynamism or revitalization as a consequence of migrant presence.

A final lesson learned relates to the **importance of the local - and particularly urban - dimension.** Local authorities frequently lack resources and experience on migration but are at the frontline in provision of social services, including education (see e.g. Thouez, 2014). In this respect, urbanisation interconnects with most forms and patterns of migration, including for instance forced (with increasing numbers of urban refugees), transit¹³³, or cross-border migration¹³⁴.

¹³¹See e.g. UNESCO (2013): “Seasonal migrants often take their children along when they migrate for work, which negatively impacts upon the regular and continued schooling of children. (...) This temporary discontinuation of study frequently results in their dropping out of school altogether. In the case that migrant children take up education at the destination, they face learning difficulties based on differences in academic curricula and language, especially in the case of inter-state migration (Deshingkar and Sandi, 2012). Re- enrolment in source schools at the end of a migration cycle is rare, and when it occurs, migrant children are often readmitted in the same class owing to inflexible school procedures and lack of remedial classes to cover learning deficits. (...) Further, migrant children are often inducted as child labour at worksites (...). Despite the Child Labour (Prohibitions & Regulation) Act, 1986, children work for long hours as unregistered and invisible workers in family labour units, whose wages are paid on a piece-rate basis”.

¹³²IOM (2013b) provides various examples of such situations.

¹³³Marconi (2010) highlights for instance in the case of transit migration that “the current academic and political discourse on transit migration largely focuses on the implications for,

5.1.3 *The way forward*

Orientations for future development cooperation in the areas of “brain drain”, remittances and social protection are provided in other sections of this paper. As highlighted in relation with other areas, work aiming at enhancing the positive impacts of migration for education in countries of origin (e.g. through the mobilisation of skilled diaspora members, the whole remittance agenda, inter alia the development of remittance-backed education products or facilitating migration as a social protection strategy) should not dilute the primary responsibility of the State to provide universal access to education.

Access to education for migrant and refugee children in countries of destination and transit should be mainstreamed in future development cooperation in the education sector, in line with international human rights obligations. Partner countries should be supported in planning and delivering education services that also cater for the internal and international migrant population. Possible approaches should include supporting the expansion and upgrading of services to cope with additional demand or promoting financial support mechanisms: support to the sector; cash or in-kind assistance, etc. In cases where partner States remain unwilling or unable to provide social services - including education - to migrants, migrant help organisations should be supported, both in providing such services and in conducting advocacy for inclusive public service delivery. Along with civil society advocacy, data and research should be supported, particularly in under-research areas such as living conditions of transit migrants in the South in order to break the vicious circle of invisibility of this population, with intentional invisibility feeding institutional invisibility and vice versa (Marconi, 2010). While civil society can provide part of the response in the short-term, the responsibility of providing public services rests with the State and all efforts should be made to avoid creating parallel systems and foster taking-over by national and local authorities in the medium and long-term.

Including a migration-related target under the education goal of the SDGs would be very useful to focus attention on the specific vulnerabilities of migrant and refugee children. The July 2014 Outcome Document of the SDGs Open Working Group does not include such a target¹³⁵. However it includes a general recognition of the specific vulnerabilities of migrants as it calls for data and statistics disaggregation by migratory status – and several other characteristics that are potentially relevant, such as race, ethnicity, or geographic location. If implemented, this should help prioritise the situation of migrants, including in relation with education. Strengthening

and responsibilities of, ‘transit countries’ or on the irregular situation of ‘transit migrants’, but very little reference is made to the physical nodes of transit routes where migrants stop over and often get stranded, i.e. urban areas”.

¹³⁴E.g. “no less than a fourth of African capital cities are located less than 30 km from a border inherited from colonial times. Some, e.g. Lomé, are directly on the border” (see <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-migration-asylum/document/final-report-roundtable-ibm-latin-america-and-sub-saharan-africa-september-2013>).

¹³⁵Contrary to the proposal made in the June 2014 EC Communication on P2015 which included a target specifically referring to ethnic minorities, migrants and refugees.

the evidence base would support advocacy efforts to remove barriers and include migrants as a specific vulnerable group under mainstream education initiatives. In addition, a more economic approach highlighting the economic contribution of migrants to destination countries and areas should be mobilised to complement the rights-based perspective in advocating for inclusive education systems, in order to factually challenge the mainstream “burden” vision (see also section on labour market/employment). More generally, as migration can also be a consequence of the lack of access to education in rural areas – a strategy that not always pays off for migrant children - efforts aiming at strengthening the education system in such areas could provide the rural youth with a larger range of opportunities. In order to fully address the migration dimension in education cooperation, migration expertise should be included in the design and implementation of education initiatives, whenever relevant.

Future cooperation in this area should also pay enhanced attention to the local and urban dimensions. This policy area is gaining importance in M&D thinking¹³⁶, in recognition of both the key contribution of migrants to urbanisation and the fact that cities in particular are in the frontline in addressing migrant integration and service provision challenges. Increasing work by dedicated networks such as Cities of Migration and Metropolis, as well as the recently organised first Mayoral Forum on Mobility, Migration and Development - Barcelona, 2014 - illustrate that cities are more and more coming together to discuss common opportunities and challenges associated with migration and mobility. This area of focus is already present in the EU policy framework on M&D but needs enhanced operationalisation. **Capacity building** based on existing good practices, including within the EU¹³⁷, **should be available to cities in developing countries in the area of migrant education.** **Cooperation projects among cities** aiming at building capacities and fostering **exchanges of good practices on migrant education** in both a South-North and South-South (among cities in the EU and developing countries) context could also be supported. Cooperation could be supported among cities more particularly experiencing one or several common migration forms and patterns: e.g. cities hosting primarily internal migrants, cross-border migrants, seasonal migrants, transit migrants, urban refugees, etc.

¹³⁶E.g. “In order to highlight migrants’ contribution in shaping sustainable cities of the future, the *World Migration Report 2015* will examine the complex dynamics between migrants and cities and new partnerships being forged at the local level among migrants, local government, civil society and the private sector to manage highly mobile, diverse cities for mutual benefit. It will showcase various local initiatives to create inclusive regulatory environments for migrants and their resources, which can improve migrants’ well-being and leverage the broader developmental benefits of migration for origin and host societies. It will offer practical policy options to create an opportunity structure to maximize the benefits of urban migration. *World Migration Report 2015* will be launched at the Ministerial Conference on Migrants and Cities in Fall 2015”. (see http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Migration_Initiatives2015.pdf). Other recent recollection of good practices include UN Habitat “Good Urban Practices for Migrants’ Inclusion” database available online (<http://mirror.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=508&cid=10547&activeid=10545>) and The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration (2014).

¹³⁷Some of which might be found in the portfolio of projects supported by the European Fund for the Integration of non-EU immigrants (EIF).

5.2 Health

5.2.1 Rationale

The **impacts of health workforce emigration on developing countries of origin**, discussed in the brain drain section, have been a central and particularly controversial area of focus. There is however increasing recognition that emigration is, in most cases, only a marginal explanatory factor in the health workforce crisis and its impacts on health outcomes. The reverse relationship, namely the importance of health policies - particularly health workforce policies - and the situation in the health sector at origin and destination in driving health workers movement, appears to be much more significant¹³⁸. Evidence on **impacts at origin at the household level** is mixed. On the one side, there is ample anecdotal evidence that remittances are used by receiving households to invest in health and health insurance and react to health emergencies. In numerous cases, they have been found to improve health outcomes (e.g. reduction in child mortality, higher birth and child weights, improvements in child nutrition and growth) for such households. Positive impacts through social remittances (e.g. safe water drinking, use of mosquito nets, annual medical check-ups, increasing use of prenatal care, enhanced knowledge of sexual and reproductive health issues, abandonment of risky burial traditions) are also documented. On the other side, migration has been found to negatively impact on the health of family members left behind - particularly children and the elderly - in a number of cases. Migration can indeed create a care gap and family separation result in mental health problems. Migration might also result in loss of health coverage due to the departure of the main wage earner.

In countries of destination, health workers' immigration undoubtedly helps filling labour shortages, while qualitative impacts on health care service provision are more debated. In violation of their basic human rights entitlements, **migrants and refugees face obstacles in accessing health care in countries of transit and destination**¹³⁹. This issue is even more acute in a South-South context. As already noted in the education sector, particularly vulnerable groups include migrants in transit¹⁴⁰, short-term circular/seasonal migrants, migrants in irregular situation and forced migrants. In general, migrants are exposed to specific vulnerabilities and risks, particularly in terms of working conditions and occupational health and safety. They

¹³⁸Relevant references are provided in the "brain drain" section. Multiple recent references for other points discussed in this section can be found in GFMD (2014), Mara et al. (2012) and in OECD (2014).

¹³⁹See IOM (2013) for a recent and comprehensive analysis of the human right to health and other relevant human rights in the context of health and migration, as well the health challenges and vulnerabilities faced by migrants at all stages of the migration process.

¹⁴⁰See IOM (2013c) for a review of specific health threats faced by migrants in transit, including: life-threatening travel conditions (e.g. in container trucks); physical and psychosocial damage resulting from frequent violence and abuse by authorities, smugglers, local communities or even travel companions; and disease contamination risks, including TB, during imprisonment and detention. The review focuses on mixed flows from various African sub-regions towards Southern Africa.

tend to work in high risk and hazardous sectors, especially in the informal sector, where accidents are frequent. Migration can also result in a disruption of networks and cultural, community or social norms/conventions, leading e.g. to risky sexual behaviours such as unsafe sex or sex work. Migrants, and in particular forced migrants, are more exposed to mental health problems – also upon return. Women, youth and children – particularly those unaccompanied - also have specific vulnerabilities. Women and girls in particular are particularly vulnerable to GBV, sexual exploitation, and trafficking for this purpose and might face difficulties in accessing sexual and reproductive health services. Barriers to access are multidimensional, including: legal (e.g. lack of portability of social security benefits), administrative and financial barriers; de jure/de facto discrimination; migrants' own behaviour (e.g. fear of contact with authorities); unfamiliarity with health systems; linguistic and cultural barriers, etc. Another dimension to be taken into account is that migrants, and particularly women, can in certain cases forsake spending for their own health or education to remit and provide for the needs of their relatives, and particularly their children, in those areas.

Migrants and refugees, especially in cases of mass influx, can also exert pressure on already stretched services - the same applies to returnees in countries of origin. In addition, migration can contribute to the **spreading of infectious diseases** such as tuberculosis, AIDS or hepatitis in both origin – when circulation and return are widespread - and destination countries, adding to the pressure on health sectors. This is more likely to happen when broader living conditions are poor and access to other social services - housing, water and sanitation, education – restricted (e.g. in camps and slums). However these problems need to be assessed more broadly against other impacts of migrant or returnee presence that might be positive, as well as the public health and broader socioeconomic costs of not granting health access to migrants.

Health system and health policies can also be determinants of migration at both destination and origin where, interestingly, the relationship is far from being univocal (e.g. migrants might choose not to migrate due to concerns for the health situation and coverage of family members to be left behind).

Similar to what has been observed in the education sector, the EU approach to health under M&D policy has principally focused on countries of origin, primarily through addressing the “brain drain” in the health sector and enhancing the potential benefits of remittances on health and social protection. Preoccupation with the negative health and social protection consequences of family separation has emerged more recently, as of 2011 (GAMM and accompanying SWP). There has been limited focus on the situation of developing countries of transit and destination.

5.2.2 Challenges and lessons learned

Challenges and lessons learned in the areas of “brain drain”, remittances and social protection are addressed in other sections of this paper. As already observed in relation to education, a major weakness in the approach taken to date is that **the situation of developing countries of transit and destination** (also relevant for countries of origin in the case of returnee influx) has not been adequately addressed.

In addition, the **internal dimension** has not been comprehensively addressed, despite internal migrants also facing difficulties to access healthcare and access to health care facilities being among internal migration drivers - in addition to the internal distribution of health workers being a major dimension of the health workforce crisis, as noted in the brain drain section. When considered, internal migration is usually only seen in negative terms in relation with the strain it puts on urban health services, without acknowledging the broader picture that also includes considerable economic and development benefits accruing from internal migration. This view needs to be challenged. E.g. a recent ACP Observatory on Migration study (2013) looking into the urban and health development impacts of internal migration in the Cameroonian context, while confirming the resulting pressure on health care services, highlights that internal migration is one of the main drivers of urban development and broader national economic development given its contributions to the informal sector. The study calls for enhancing governance of internal migration in a balanced manner, addressing challenges while building on opportunities.

Other elements already highlighted in the education section are also relevant for the health sector (and for social services delivery more generally), namely: the need to appreciate the situation of migrants in relation with **conditions prevailing for the population at large** as relative deprivation of migrants can actually be quite low in contexts where health systems are generally under-developed; and the **importance of the local dimension**.

5.2.3 *The way forward*

Orientations for future development cooperation in the areas of “brain drain”, remittances (including remittance-backed health/insurance products) and social protection are addressed in other sections of this paper.

Regarding other relevant orientations they are very similar to those in the education sector and are therefore only briefly reviewed here. Development cooperation interventions should foster the utilisation of migrant resources for enhancing health outcomes or support civil society in providing health services in certain contexts. Yet the state responsibility in providing health services at origin and destination should remain the central guiding principle, and efforts should be geared towards building capacities in this direction in the medium- and long-term. **Enhancing access to health in countries of transit and destination** for international and internal migrants, including refugees and IDPs, should be a key priority, **mainstreamed under future development cooperation in the health sector**. In parallel to building the capacities of national and local authorities (see education section for possible approaches on supporting inclusive planning and delivering of such basic social services), civil society and academia should be targeted in support of advocacy efforts.

In addition to the requirement for data disaggregation by migratory status, it would also be useful for the P2015 development framework to include **migration-related targets and indicators under the health goal of the SDGs**. This would reflect migrants' specific vulnerabilities and the strong inter—linkages between migration and health. A recent article makes a compelling argument for migration

mainstreaming in the health sector as far as tuberculosis is concerned, convincingly arguing that “progress towards the MDG targets and future post-2015 TB targets will be impossible without expanding health systems coverage for TB services to migrants who remain a “key affected” and marginalized population in several countries”¹⁴¹. In addition, development cooperation should support further research on migration and health, with the objective of better documenting the vulnerabilities and needs of migrants, while replacing those in the broader context of the benefits associated with migrant presence, and the public health and other costs of ignoring migrants’ health issues. In order to fully address the migration dimension in health cooperation, migration expertise should be included in the design and implementation of health initiatives, whenever relevant.

The EU has already started moving towards migration mainstreaming in the health sector, for example in Morocco, where it has been supporting the establishment of universal basic health coverage since 2001. Under the latest phase of the EU support to this process, the EC has called upon migration expertise to address issues linked to integration and access to social/health services for migrants, and particularly vulnerable migrants. This seems to indicate prospects for better including vulnerable migrants under the country’s health policy. Such positive developments – which need to be confirmed¹⁴² - have been made possible partly as the result of the constructive dialogue progressively forged with Morocco through intensive past cooperation on migration with authorities, research and civil society actors, which culminated in the signature of a Mobility Partnership in 2013. This has certainly contributed to increasing awareness of the very difficult situation faced by migrants - particularly sub-Saharanans – living or transiting through the country. This evolution is reflected in the 2011 national Constitution, which “strongly affirmed the central importance of human rights, including those of Morocco’s irregular population” (IPPR, 2014).

Finally, similar to what has been observed in relation with education, future cooperation should pay enhanced attention to the **local and urban dimensions of health service provision**, building capacities and encouraging exchanges and cooperation among local authorities and cities faced with the challenge of accommodating the health needs of significant migrant populations.

5.3 Social protection

5.3.1 *Rationale*

By reducing risks and vulnerabilities, access to social protection is an essential element of migrant wellbeing that in turn conditions broader positive impacts for both sending and receiving societies. In developing countries, **migration is often in itself**

¹⁴¹Dhavan and Mosca (2014). This article is a perfect resource for a specific case study on migration and health, and more generally for building the case for migration mainstreaming in the health sector.

¹⁴²This paragraph is based on the author’s understanding of terms of reference recently issued by the Delegation and confirmation of this interpretation, if not already available, would need to be sought from the Delegation.

a private social protection strategy through which households faced with under-developed social protection systems diversify their sources of income and increase their capacity to react to adverse shocks¹⁴³. The countercyclical character of remittances illustrates this function¹⁴⁴. **Migrants face major challenges in accessing formal social protection**, including social security and social services. Indiscriminate access in host countries combined with portability of social security rights between home and host countries are indeed unavailable to a large majority of migrants. It has been estimated that 23% of migrants worldwide are in this favourable situation, with the proportion dropping to respectively 15% and 2% for migrants originating from middle-income and low-income countries (Avato et al., 2009). This is because migrants from poorer countries tend to move to other poor countries, and more often do so irregularly. In any case, poor countries of destination do not have a proper social protection system in place to cater for those moving regularly. At the same time, **international migration creates additional vulnerabilities that would require further social protection strategies** at both destination and origin. Among those are adverse consequences deriving from the separation of families, including psychosocial risks and care issues, particularly for children and the elderly. The social impacts of migration are also strongly gendered, with specific vulnerabilities for women and girls, whether migrating or left-behind. While attention tends to focus on social protection issues during migration, there is also a need to address social challenges associated with return and reintegration¹⁴⁵. Finally, for those formally employed and contributing to social protection systems in host countries, the lack of portability of social security rights is a major obstacle to circulation and return. As such, it limits the positive developmental impacts origin countries can derive from migration through diaspora engagement. Another possible consequence of the lack of portability mentioned in various EC policy documents might be to push a portion of migrants intending to return into irregular forms of work, as they cannot expect to benefit from their contributions back home. A number of migration-related interventions under development cooperation have therefore focused on increasing access to social security and social services for migrants and their families, and addressing portability gaps, which has proved to be a challenging area of work.

5.3.2 *Challenges and lessons learned*

¹⁴³This does not imply that the absence of social protection can be systematised as a push factor for emigration: a recent review of existing studies found that, depending on local contexts and characteristics of social protection systems, access to social protection could either increase or decrease the likelihood of migration (Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine, 2013, mentioned in OECD, 2014). In certain conditions, enhanced social protection might actually provide households with the resources required to migrate.

¹⁴⁴See Bettin et al. (2014) for a recent study confirming that remittances “are negatively correlated with the business cycle in recipient countries, and increase especially strongly in response to adverse exogenous shocks, such as natural disasters or large declines in the terms of trade” (based on study of remittances from 103 Italian provinces to 107 developing countries over the period 2005-2011).

¹⁴⁵These issues are analysed in more detail in the 2011 EC SWP on migration and development.

A number of EU-funded interventions have aimed at supporting the negotiation, ratification and implementation of **bilateral and multilateral social security agreements** by developing countries, including in a South-South context. This is indeed an area where the regional dimension can be of relevance as a number of regional organisations are working towards the establishment of multilateral social security regimes. Such agreements are for instance in place within CARICOM and MERCOSUR. Several African RECs have been active in this area, including the ECOWAS. The EU is currently supporting the implementation of the revised ECOWAS General Convention on Social Security adopted in 2013¹⁴⁶.

There are multiple challenges to the implementation of social security agreements in developing countries. Few of these agreements have been concluded and existing ones are often not implemented, due to the lack of ratification by State parties, the absence of administrative arrangements for their application, and general capacity issues for their operationalisation. The implementation of such highly technical and complex agreements requires resources that are unavailable in many developing countries. In addition, such agreements need to be periodically revised to reflect the changing nature of migration over time – including the characteristics of migrants and destinations - as well as the evolutions in the social security systems in both home and host countries. It is also an area that requires advanced inter-institutional coordination between various ministries and institutions, including those in charge of foreign affairs, employment and labour, and social security. The experience of the ECOWAS to date is a good illustration of the depth of challenges at stake¹⁴⁷ but in a different geographic context, a recent study on Ukraine had highlighted constraints that were very similar in nature¹⁴⁸. It can in fact be argued that until well-functioning protection systems are in place in concerned countries, attempts to set-up portability regimes might be premature (Avato et al. 2009).

In a number of contexts, supporting bilateral or multilateral social security agreements is therefore not a promising avenue, both in terms of feasibility and capacity to reach a significant number of migrants. An alternative to extend migrant social security coverage in cases where receiving countries are either unwilling¹⁴⁹ or unable to enter into such agreements is the **development of voluntary insurance**

¹⁴⁶See <http://www.fmmwestafrica.com/#!/labourmigration/c9l>

¹⁴⁷The process was recently revived with support from various donors and technical partners but a first ECOWAS General Convention on Social Security had first been drafted in 1993 and adopted in 2004, which was never ratified and did not enter into force for various reasons detailed e.g. in FIIAPP, ICMPD and IDEP, 2013.

¹⁴⁸ILO, 2013d concludes that Ukraine “faces major challenges in the implementation of social security agreements” and estimates that “only 7–10 percent of Ukrainian citizens who are registered in the consulates of foreign countries receive social security benefits based on the agreements”. Beyond the large proportion of migrants in irregular situation, human resources and skills shortages, including language skills, are major constraints. The study notes for instance: “the Pension Fund of Ukraine has only five staff members in the international relations department to process the 600 inquiries it receives from abroad per week”.

¹⁴⁹Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries typically do not offer access to their social security systems to immigrants, nor do they ask them to contribute, which makes portability issues irrelevant. They only foresee health insurance to be provided in theory by the visa sponsor (Avato et al. 2009).

schemes by countries of origin. Such schemes are offered by national security systems of sending countries to migrants abroad and their families. The Philippines for instance has developed an important range of government insurance products for migrant workers¹⁵⁰. This is one of the key recommendations of a recent study on social protection for Senegalese migrants in Côte d'Ivoire and Gambia (Coulibaly et al. 2013e). However, this is again an option that is only available to countries of origin where the social security system is sufficiently developed and required capacities exist.

Where this is not the case, the priority should be on **reinforcing the system as whole before attempting to develop specific social protection schemes for migrants**. This is because it is not only migrants that lack access to social protection in many developing countries but the population at large. The proportion of the world's migrants enjoying full social security coverage (23%) needs to be put in perspective by recalling that only about 20% of the world's working-age population has access to comprehensive social protection¹⁵¹. Similarly, those working in the formal sector are also a minority within the native population. A recent review of selected EU-funded projects aiming at addressing the social consequences of migration finds that, although international migrants are confronted with some specific issues, they face a lot of common problems with other vulnerable segments of the population, including **internal migrants**, which derive from general weaknesses of the social protection systems. The review therefore questions the legitimacy of addressing the social protection problems of migrants without attending also to very close or similar needs of other vulnerable parts of the population (European Commission, 2014).

In particular, **the internal dimension of social protection has received limited attention to date** within M&D interventions. Yet it is a crucial issue in many developing countries. As already noted in the circular migration section, internal migrants - and particularly circular or seasonal migrants - are often unable to claim social protection entitlements and remain excluded from government sponsored schemes and programmes, especially when those are conditioned upon proof of residence in the receiving area. This is e.g. the case in India and "**creating portability of social protection entitlements for internal migrants**" is one of the 10 key principles put forward in a recent study on the social inclusion of internal migrants in India (UNESCO, 2013)¹⁵².

Moving beyond governmental actions, some interventions have supported the development of other protection schemes for migrants and their families, primarily by supporting the development **remittance-backed microinsurance/insurance products offered by other actors** such as cooperatives, MFIs or the private sector. Challenges and lessons learned in this area are similar to those encountered for all remittance-based transnational products. Those relate to legal and regulatory as well

¹⁵⁰See ILO (2013a) study on remittance-backed products in the Philippines for a review of those in the areas of social security, health and housing (the health component is mandatory prior to being deployed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration).

¹⁵¹COM (2012) 446 Final.

¹⁵²For a discussion of similar issues in the Chinese context, see e.g. IDRC, 2013.

as operational processes constraints in a cross-border setting, difficulties in reaching out and generating trust among the legally and socio-economically vulnerable migrant segments, financial education and consumer protection issues, etc.¹⁵³. It can also be argued that further enhancing migrants' capacity to provide for their own social protection through private remittance-based schemes does not contribute to maintaining pressure on governments to cater for what should be primarily a public responsibility responding to the needs of all households, migrant and non-migrant¹⁵⁴.

5.3.3 *The way forward*

As a major destination area, **the EU should do more to improve the portability of social security rights for migrants residing in its territory** that might wish to circulate or return, temporarily or permanently, to their countries of origin, in line with the 2012 Communication on "The external dimension of EU social security coordination". EU Member States should continue to extend the geographic coverage of their bilateral agreements, while providing partner countries with the necessary capacities to negotiate and implement such agreements¹⁵⁵. However, there would also be need to move beyond the bilateral approach, which has produced patchy results and an incomplete network of different agreements, and develop a common approach to external social security coordination, as argued in the 2012 Communication.

When working with partner countries under development cooperation, the EU should adopt **a differentiated approach, based on the status of the social protection sector in each partner country**. There are indeed important differences between developing countries. Schematically, the situation is generally not the same in middle- and low-income countries, as highlighted in the 2012 EC Communication on Social protection in EU development cooperation. A number of middle-income countries have sufficiently well established social security systems that allow for the negotiation and implementation of social security agreements¹⁵⁶ or the development of voluntary social security schemes for migrants. Developing or strengthening such agreements and schemes specifically targeting migrants should therefore remain a priority in a number of contexts. The opportunity to support such agreements and schemes, including at the REC level, in contexts where formal social protection is less developed should be carefully assessed, based on feasibility and impact – number of migrants likely to be actually covered – criteria.

In certain cases, efforts might primarily be geared towards the **comprehensive strengthening of the system** as a whole. However, the migration dimension should be mainstreamed wherever relevant by **including both international and internal**

¹⁵³See e.g. ILO (2011).

¹⁵⁴This issue is discussed e.g. in OECD, 2014.

¹⁵⁵For instance, the 2013d ILO study noted that Ukraine had concluded such agreements with 8 EU Member States but that there were no agreements in place with EU countries receiving large numbers of Ukrainian migrant workers such as Greece and Italy.

¹⁵⁶Avato et al. (2009) estimate for instance that countries like Morocco, Algeria and Turkey have managed to ensure comprehensive access and portability for respectively 89, 87 and 68% of their emigrants.

migrants among vulnerable groups to be more specifically targeted. The EU Approach to social protection under development cooperation (2012 Communication) already gives consideration to issues faced by migrants in terms of coverage and portability, opening space for migration mainstreaming. Partner countries might however not be initially receptive to the idea that migrants deserve specific attention in this area. Receiving countries might fear the extra-burden on already weak systems¹⁵⁷. Origin countries on the other side might consider migrant households to be already privileged by the receipt of remittances, without necessarily being aware of some of the more detrimental social impacts of migration, such as those resulting from family separation, or the specific social challenges faced by returnees. There might therefore still be a need for specific projects to sensitise and raise awareness on the specific social protection challenges faced by migrants and their families. E.g. European Commission (2014) notes that project TPMA 259-777 on “Addressing the negative effects of migration on minors and family left behind” in Moldova contributed to sensitise social institutions and services to the situation of minors separated from their parents by international and internal migration, with the result that this issue is now integrated in the new legislation on children at risk.

Finally, since internal and international migration themselves constitute vital social protection strategies for many poor people, particularly in a South-South context, a relevant approach to social protection is to **strengthen migration policy frameworks to ensure that these movement take place in a safe and regular way, and to promote migrants’ rights and empowerment. The whole agenda on remittances (see section 3.1) also contributes to making these private social protection strategies more effective.** Within this agenda, more attention should be paid to the development of **microinsurance/insurance products** linked to remittances. Very few projects have been developed at a significant scale and more efforts should be put into experimenting this type of products, without losing sight of government primary responsibility in the field of social protection. In addition, it is interesting to note that work on remittances, through **financial education**, offers an entry point to address some of the negative social impacts of migration. By broadening options available to migrants and their families and promoting shared responsibility in the use of remittances, financial education can touch upon issues of dependency, socially-constrained expectations and obligations, and power and gender relations within migrant households (European Commission, 2014).

6 Addressing the root causes of irregular and forced migration through development cooperation

6.1 Clarifying objectives, categories and expectations

¹⁵⁷As noted in OECD 2014, “a widespread view in OECD countries is that migrants are net benefiter of the social system, although in reality estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration show that it is around zero on average (OECD, 2013)”. This however applies to developed destination countries and research would need to document impacts on developing destination countries.

6.1.1 Objectives

The academic literature is essentially critical about the policy objective of “addressing the root causes of - irregular and forced - migration”. One of the major reasons for this critical stance lies in the agenda underpinning this approach. Castles and Van Hear (2011) highlight that although “root causes” policy approaches emerged somehow separately as from the 1970s for economic and forced migration, they have been sharing a similar objective, i.e. the **containment of unwanted categories of migrants**, namely low-skilled labour migrants and asylum-seekers from developing countries. As from the 1990s, awareness of the increasingly “mixed” nature of migration flows and the rise of the notion of an “asylum-migration nexus” has led to a more unified agenda. This is evident in the terminology used in latest Council conclusions: “addressing the root causes of **irregular and forced** migration”. According to these authors, the development of “root causes” approaches also results from a “gradual comprehension that border control measures on their own were ineffective” in preventing such unwanted South-North migration flows¹⁵⁸. Extremely close arguments are put forward by De Haas (e.g. 2007), who argues that the rise of “root causes” - or “development instead of migration” – approaches is a reaction to “the failure of restrictionism”, an attempt to come up with “smart solutions” to “manage (read curb) migration”. This view of the “root causes” approach as a containment strategy is in fact predominant in the literature. Another illustration in the context of forced migration can be found in Lindstrom (2005).

There is indeed no denial that the strong come-back in recent Council conclusions¹⁵⁹ of the “root causes” approach is primarily driven by the recent increase in trans-Mediterranean mixed flows and the corresponding irregular migration/asylum pressure felt in particular by a number of “frontline” Southern EU countries¹⁶⁰. While these national interest considerations dominate, EU Member States are also - to a certain extent - motivated by the need to address the increasing death toll paid by refugees and migrants in their desperate attempts to reach European shores¹⁶¹.

There would therefore be need for DG DEVCO to be particularly careful in answering these calls, making sure for a start that **any response strategy under development cooperation is firmly rooted in its mandate**. This mandate is about “adapting to the evolving needs of partner countries”, encompassing “cooperation with developing countries at different stages of development, including with countries graduated from

¹⁵⁸Which is not surprising considering that researchers widely consider restrictive migration regimes to actually be one the major “root causes” of irregular migration (see *infra*).

¹⁵⁹Including those from the December 2014 Foreign Affairs (Development) Council meeting in Brussels.

¹⁶⁰See European University Institute (2014) for a deconstruction of the EU Member States “frontline” stereotype in relation with asylum, showing *inter alia* that far more applications are considered in Germany, France, and Sweden than in Greece, Italy or Spain.

¹⁶¹It is worth noting that political attention and public perceptions in the EU overwhelmingly focus on irregular entry, particularly by sea, overlooking other and numerically more important pathways into irregularity, such as regular entry followed by visa overstaying. The focus on irregular entry by sea also results in a biased vision of “African invasion” does that does correspond to the reality of irregular migration. Comparing findings to public discussions, the Clandestino project found that Asian and European nationalities were underestimated compared to African nationalities, which were overestimated.

bilateral development assistance to cover the specific needs of these countries during the transition period between low income countries and upper middle income countries". Furthermore, "DG DEVCO is responsible for formulating European Union development policy and sectoral policies in order to reduce poverty in the world, to ensure sustainable economic, social and environmental development and to promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance and the respect of human rights, notably through external aid"¹⁶².

While this might seem like stating the obvious, there is a crucial need to recall that any EU action under development cooperation - whether directly related to migration or aiming at addressing so-called "root causes" in other sectors - should respond to these overall objectives, which has clearly not always been the case. **An in-depth reflection on harmonised criteria for determining which type of migration-related development cooperation interventions are really development-oriented would be required**¹⁶³.

In any case, it needs to be recalled that the consequences that irregular and forced migration from third countries might have on EU Member States are not a legitimate starting point for designing development cooperation interventions. This has implications in terms of geographic focus. Decisions to engage in overall and sectorial development cooperation with specific countries or regions should not be contingent upon the perceived migration pressure those might exert on the EU, and even less upon the degree of cooperation they might show in controlling migration flows towards the EU. While the "root causes" approach might be "perfectly palatable in the South, since its logical consequence is increased flows of foreign direct investment and official development assistance" (Crush, 2013), partner countries should not be lured into emigration prevention strategies through development aid packages. Yet, a number of EU Member States have been taking steps in this direction, subordinating development cooperation to restrictive and security-driven migration control policies (ECDPM and ICMPD, 2013). This practice has long been denounced by development NGOs, not least for being at odds with the M&D agenda (see e.g. Concord, 2010). The strong EC stance taken against this type of conditionality in the 2013 Report on PCD should be reiterated in any future policy document. In addition, from a DEVCO perspective, development cooperation in the migration sector strictly speaking should be grounded in the development needs of partner countries, irrespective of their perceived position as countries of origin of unwanted flows to the EU, rather than in the migration control objectives of the EU.

6.1.2 Categories

Another major criticism of the policy objective of "addressing the root causes of - irregular and forced - migration" is linked to the collapsing of irregular and forced migrants into a somehow indistinct lump category. Migration flows are indeed increasingly mixed, with different categories of people traveling along the

¹⁶²https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/mission-statement-december-2014_en.pdf

¹⁶³This could be done at EU level through a specific study commissioned to a research team by DEVCO or promoted at the OECD level to agree on a set of criteria for migration-related interventions DAC-ability.

same routes, using the same means and facing similar abuse along the way. Interestingly, this is partly the result of recent policies, including those of the EU. Many developed countries, including EU Members States, have indeed made it increasingly difficult for asylum seekers to regularly reach their territory to claim asylum. In any case, people fleeing conflict and violence outbreaks can find it hard to qualify for refugee status under the Geneva Convention if they cannot demonstrate targeted persecution. The EU legal framework foresees “temporary protection” for people involved in mass displacement, yet this has not been the response to recent crises¹⁶⁴. Consequently, asylum seekers have increasingly tried to enter the EU irregularly, without the required documents, resorting to smugglers, and in some cases falling prey to traffickers. Conversely, the restricted opportunities for labour migration, particularly at low skill levels, might lead some primarily economic migrants with no access to regular entry channels to resort to asylum claims. As highlighted by a huge body of literature, the difficulty is that distinctions between various categories such as victims of trafficking, asylum seekers and irregular economic migrants are not so clear-cut in reality. Motivations are often mixed and migrants can change categories along the way, including in destination countries, e.g. when a rejected claim converts an asylum seeker into an irregular migrant.

At the same time, this complex reality should not be used to weaken the international protection space. **By lumping together “irregular and forced migration”, there is a clear danger for migrants in mixed flows to be primarily view as irregular migrants** rather than people with legitimate international protection claims. This explains why UNHCR in particular rapidly abandoned the notion of an “asylum-migration nexus”¹⁶⁵. This argument can e.g. be found in Lindstrom (2005). According to the author, “matters of asylum and migration have been increasingly conflated”, with the result that asylum is increasingly perceived within the framework of irregular immigration and related control measures. Noting that this seriously undermines the protection space within the EU, the author calls for retaining “a clear distinction between asylum- and labour-related migration”.

In the current EU context, the majority of migrants smuggled across the Mediterranean have legitimate international protection claims¹⁶⁶. The Council

¹⁶⁴See e.g. Ruhs and Van Hear (2014): “over the past 25 years or so, we can detect a clear policy development in most high-income countries, away from permanent or temporary protection to policies focused on regional containment. European countries’ main policy response to displacement of people in Kosovo and Bosnia was to offer “temporary protection”. (...) Over 100,000 people fleeing the conflict in Kosovo were given temporary protection status under the “Humanitarian Evacuation Programme” in European and other high-income countries (the US was the only country to offer permanent protection). In contrast, in the case of the geopolitical shocks in Libya and Syria, the primary policy response of European countries has been “containment” in neighbouring countries. (...) By the end of 2013, over 95% of the 3 million+ refugees fleeing conflicts in Syria were in neighbouring countries. Except for Germany and Sweden, European countries have accepted very few refugees from Syria”.

¹⁶⁵See Castles and Van Hear (2011) for an account of “The rise and fall of the migration-asylum nexus”.

¹⁶⁶See e.g. EUI 2014, which notes that the majority of those involved in those flows “come from countries that are either themselves subject to extreme political conditions (absence of state, dictatorship, civil war, etc.) or neighbours of such countries” and that those in need of

requests for “addressing the root causes of irregular and forced migration” should therefore be taken with extreme care, and the same precaution applies in a South-South context. There is indeed a great risk of collapsing irregular and forced migrants into an indistinct lump category, hence weakening international protection standards and obligations.

6.1.3 *Expectations*

A third cluster of criticisms of the “root causes” approach in the literature relates to unrealistic expectations, which derive from a very partial understanding of the dynamics sustaining irregular, and even to a certain extent forced, migration. Schematically, the logic seems to be that those phenomena primarily result from problems “there” in developing countries that cause people to come “here” in developed countries and would be solved if such problems were addressed through development cooperation. However, one needs to acknowledge that some key “root causes” of irregular and forced migration are beyond the mandate and reach of development cooperation.

Internal EU policies in a broad range of sectors affect conditions in developing countries, contributing to shape push factors, which raises PCD issues. To take just one example, critics consider that trade policies, including those of the EU, hamper exports from migrant sending countries and contribute to maintaining low commodity prices, hence negatively impacting development, including wages and employment (see e.g. De Haas, 2007).

In addition, **irregular migration**, defined as undocumented, voluntary, economic/labour migration¹⁶⁷, cannot be understood by focusing exclusively on countries of origin. Labour migration, whether regular or irregular, is driven by demographic and socio-economic disparities between sending and receiving countries and therefore a comprehensive systemic view is required. While there are strong push factors in those developing countries that face difficulties in providing decent work opportunities to rapidly increasing and young populations, **there is clearly a demand-side (or pull factors) to economic migration, including in its irregular dimension.** Low fertility and population ageing result in shrinking working-age populations. In parallel, increasingly dual labour markets strongly rely on migrant labour, and in particular irregular migrant labour, in certain sectors. Agriculture, food production, mining and forestry, heavy industry, construction as well as service sectors such as hotels and catering, restaurants, care and domestic work all structurally rely on migrant work, including irregular, often in so-called “3D” jobs (dirty, difficult and dangerous) avoided by native-born workers. This has been

international protection lack the opportunity to seek such protection in the region they come from. As noted in the same report, the October 2013 Lampedusa shipwreck “mainly concerned individuals from Somalia, Eritrea and Syria. **Many of the migrants had good reasons to seek asylum and would have been eligible for international protection if they had managed to arrive in the European Union (...). Most of these people are not ordinary migrants, but genuine refugees. They should not have to ask to be admitted as a special favour: they have a right to asylum, unless a safe third country can welcome them**”.

¹⁶⁷Obviously, categories in reality are not so clear-cut, see previous section.

analysed in detail by the ILO (e.g. 2010) and by many researchers.

Another dimension to take into account is the increasing closure of borders, particularly for low skilled workers. The combination of sustained structural demand for both low- and highly skilled migrant labour and limited regular migration channels – particularly for the low-skilled - is a central determinant of irregular migration, and one of the factors sustaining smuggling and trafficking, as part of the broader “migration business”, a view widely shared by migration researchers. All these arguments were convincingly recalled in the EU context during the recent EUI Conference devoted to the “Lampedusa dilemma: Global Flows and **Closed Borders**”, in particular during sessions on “Migration and the demographic dilemma for Europe”¹⁶⁸, “European labour markets and the potential of irregular migration”¹⁶⁹ and “Governing irregular migration: new challenges and new actors”. As noted by one of the speakers¹⁷⁰, **“the causes of irregular migration broadly lie in the intersections between people’s search for better life prospects, labour market demands, and restrictive immigration controls”**. The increasing closure of borders also acts as a “root cause” of irregular migration through another mechanism: by restricting regular channels for seeking asylum, it converts forced migrants into irregular migrants.

In addition, there are other dynamics that sustain migration, including irregular and - to a certain extent - forced migration, in particular **transnational networks and the phenomenon of chain migration**, as well as the embedding of a “**culture of migration**” in sending areas. This explains why push factors alone cannot predict the levels of migration, including irregular. For instance, regions with similar or worse poverty or persecution levels will be less migratory than others that are objectively better off. This point is systematically brought up by practitioners and researchers working on irregular migration and mixed flows¹⁷¹. Similar lessons can be learnt from the history of European migration, challenging the “strong focus on welfare gaps and political crises as single driving forces of migration”¹⁷². Moreover, there are other structural factors that sustain migration such as transformations affecting the areas of communications and transportation.

As regards forced migration, it should also be clarified that in many instances the root causes of displacement are beyond the mandate and reach of development cooperation. Once conflict breaks out, as is the case in Syria,

¹⁶⁸See e.g. intervention and background paper by Philippe Fargues “Why Pro-Immigration Policies Must Be Part of an Adaptation to Predictable Demographic Changes in Europe”.

¹⁶⁹See e.g. Dolado (2014), clearly demonstrating how reliance on irregular migration has been an integral part of a number of Southern European countries economic development system before the crisis. See also Martin (2014), which describes a US “benign neglect” policy allowing the country to benefit from the work of 8M undocumented migrants (5% of the 155M workforce) without bearing most costs, and in particular social assistance costs.

¹⁷⁰Triandafyllidou (2014).

¹⁷¹See e.g. Horwood (2013) in the Horn context or IPPR (2013) regarding irregular Sub-Saharan “transit” migration in Morocco.

¹⁷²Intervention by Regina Grafe “Putting Migration and Mobility into a Historical Perspective” at the above-mentioned EUI Conference. The author also notes: “History would suggest that migration movements will persist even if immediate political crisis and war in the regions of out-migration cease”. Live video recording available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQfuyhfbr-I>

development cooperation can try to act along humanitarian aid to address the needs of the displaced and major receiving countries, as is the case inter alia through the RDPP. It can also try to prevent further destabilisation and conflict in neighbouring countries and the wider region, but it cannot address the root causes of the Syrian displacement crisis. In sum, development cooperation can act on possible “root causes” before conflict blows-up through conflict prevention, and in the post-conflict transition phase, but not during conflict.

6.2 Questioning assumptions on inter-linkages between irregular and forced migration and development

6.2.1 Development impacts of irregular and forced migration

Questioning commonly held assumptions about the developmental impacts of forced migration, including acknowledging potential and actual opportunities and benefits associated with forced migration, has recently been a major area of work for DEVCO. Reflections in this area will be encapsulated in a forthcoming staff working document. Therefore this section only addresses assumptions about the developmental impacts of irregular migration.

There is no denial that irregular migration places migrants in a particularly vulnerable situation and that its broader developmental implications are less positive than those of regular migration for all parties involved. Reducing the share of irregular migration is therefore a legitimate development cooperation objective. However, one should be extremely careful in designing strategies in this area. **There is indeed a significant danger for ill-conceived responses to irregular migration to actually do more harm than good to an already highly vulnerable population.** The risk is to create obstacles to forms of movement that, although irregular, still have positive developmental impacts for those involved and for developing countries.

In a South-South context, it needs to be recalled that in many instances, differences between the situation of migrants, including irregular migrants, and the native population are relatively low, and are a matter of degree rather than nature. In addition, being an irregular migrant in a context where the population at large is “undocumented” – in the sense that identity documents are not readily available to natives – and where public services are largely inaccessible to most is necessarily different from being in the same situation in a developed destination country. In such contexts, irregular migrants can actually “integrate” more easily, blending within the larger population without being stigmatised as such and accessing those social services that might be available. The development of national identification systems can actually make irregular migrants more visible and weaken their position¹⁷³. By

¹⁷³This issue is e.g. brought up by OECD (2012) in the Ghanaian context where an individual identification system is being developed. The authors note: “it is not clear, however, how and whether such systems will help or deter the integration of immigrants. What will this mean for the country’s irregular immigrants as only those with regular status were authorised to register? (...) The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) urged that the new national identification system cover all immigrants at the very least along the Togo and Ghana border, where many cross daily for work and informal commercial activities. (...). An important long term question

focusing on irregular migration in developing countries, **the danger is for development cooperation to contribute to the stigmatisation of undocumented migrants**, making them more susceptible to be harassed, detained and deported. This should be carefully analysed, especially considering that in many instances in a South-South context, irregular migration is the norm and not the exception. In this sense, **the distinction between a “good” form of migration, i.e. regular migration, as opposed to a “bad” form of migration, i.e. irregular migration can be questioned**. The situation is more accurately described as systemic informality affecting all socioeconomic dimensions, including migration.

In addition, **this predominantly irregular migration does not only produce positive outcomes for those involved**, for whom it is a crucial livelihood strategy, **but also for countries of origin and destination**, even though those benefits would certainly be higher if migration was taking place in a regular framework. For countries of origin, and to take just one example, irregular migrants send remittances just like their regular counterparts do. For destination countries, the example of the Thai fishing industry, a major economic sector almost exclusively relying on irregular migrant workers from neighbouring countries, has been discussed elsewhere in this report. To take another striking example, informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is estimated to contribute 43% of African GDP¹⁷⁴, as highlighted during the September 2013 ETEM roundtable on IBM in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Interestingly, roundtable discussions also underlined that weak border controls, e.g. in Africa, have also allowed refugees to cross borders without barriers, facilitating access to protection. When regular channels for seeking asylum are unavailable, **irregular migration – better qualified as informal in porous border contexts – is not only a crucial livelihood strategy for the poor: it can also be a life-saving strategy**.

6.2.2 Irregular and forced migration impacts of development

Forced migration both results from, and constitutes, a violation of human rights and security and its root causes need to be addressed. The root causes of conflict and violence induced forced migration (persecution, torture, human rights violations, armed conflict, political instability, weak governance, state repression, indiscriminate violence, etc.) are well known. Those are development gaps that can be addressed through development cooperation in the broad area of human rights and governance. Development cooperation clearly has a major role to play in addressing these root causes and preventing conflict and violence. Development cooperation in those areas is notoriously challenging but it could indeed be argued that if objectives could

is whether the tolerance the country has exemplified over the years for irregular immigrants will remain, now that it will be easier to differentiate between foreigners and the local population”.

¹⁷⁴ Presentation by Allan Hall, World Bank, available at <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-migration-asylum/document/ibm-and-small-and-informal-cross-border-trade>. Other striking statistics were provided in this presentation: “ICBT contributes 17.6 USD billion per year to SADC economy; in some African countries, informal regional trade flows represent up to 90% of official flows; women represent 60 to 70% of ICBT in Africa; 20 to 30% of African trade is informal trade carried out by women”.

be fully achieved and root causes adequately tackled, conflict and violence induced forced migration would indeed decrease. The same could probably be said for forced migration induced by environmental factors: cooperation in these areas is essential; if achieved, objectives could certainly reduce environmentally induced displacement; but here again, environmental degradation and climate change challenges are huge and objectives incredibly difficult to achieve. There is however a clear limitation to this reasoning, namely that it is based on the assumption of a purely forced form of migration, which does not reflect the generally mixed nature of migration motivations (see *infra*).

Similarly assuming that a “pure” form irregular migration - understood as undocumented, voluntary, economic/labour migration – can be isolated, the relationship between development and irregular migration appears to be much more complex. This is because **irregular migration defined in this way is basically economic/labour migration taking place outside of - and more accurately in many instances in the absence of – adequate formal/regular channels**. As previously noted, root causes for this phenomenon are to be found not only in push factors in countries of origin, but also in other drivers, *inter alia* pull factors and characteristics of labour markets in countries of destination and in restrictive labour migration regimes. Therefore attempting to address push factors in developing countries of origin without taking into account the other dimensions is unlikely to succeed.

But there is a more fundamental issue at stake, namely that contrary to conventional ideas, **the causal relationship between development processes and economic migration does not obey to a simplistic model of development gaps producing emigration**. Such ideas “are ultimately based on “push-pull”, neoclassical and other equilibrium models which assume an inversely proportional relationship between absolute levels and relative differences of wealth and migration. By contrast, another group of theories postulate that development leads to generally *increased* levels of migration and that societies go through migration transitions characterised by an inverted U-shaped pattern of emigration” (De Haas, 2010). There are still important knowledge gaps on how exactly development impacts on migration since most research and policy work has concentrated on the reverse causality¹⁷⁵. However, theoretical and empirical research and available evidence corroborates the second group of theories: successful development processes in poorer countries of origin initially tend to increase rather than decrease economic migration. **Therefore, if conditions are not in place for this labour migration to take place regularly, then addressing development challenges might well result in more, rather than less, irregular economic migration.**

In what can be considered the landmark and foundational paper in bringing attention

¹⁷⁵See e.g. Bakewell (2013): “there has been much more work on the impact of migration (often identified as a problematic process) on development, with very little consideration of the impact of development on migration”; (...) “It seems we understand far too little about the implications of development initiatives on mobility: whether it demands (or even forces) mobility (...); whether it enables mobility; or whether it inhibits movement”; see also Skeldon (2013): “much less attention has been directed at how development, or more exactly specific development programmes, goals or targets, are likely to impact upon migration”.

to the “M&D nexus” into policy circles, Nyberg-Sørensen et al. (2002) already warned about the existence of an **inverted-U relationship between economic development and emigration**. Referring to one of the numerous theoretical elaborations of this phenomenon by Martin, they noted that “**the ‘migration hump’ suggests that some economic development generates both the resources and the incentives for people to migrate. By implication, poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy**”. Other leading migration researchers (e.g. Bakewell, Castles, Clemens, De Haas, Skeldon, Van Hear, to name just a few), have consistently and repeatedly been warning policy makers about the fundamental flaw of the “root causes” approach casting development, and therefore development cooperation, as a way to reduce emigration from poor countries. They argue that this is based on a fundamental misperception of the relationship between development and migration, contradicted by available evidence. Their views have sometimes been picked-up – e.g. in the UNDP 2009 Human Development Report - but the “root causes” approach has remained remarkably resilient in policy circles.

There is however a large body of literature theorising the fact that poorer countries experience a “mobility transition” accompanied by increasing emigration as they develop, and that emigration only tends to slow down past a certain development level¹⁷⁶. Clemens provides a detailed overview of the six main hypotheses that have been put forward to explain this phenomenon: 1) **demographic transition**: economic development can be accompanied by - and in fact contributes to produce - a demographic transition that can result in a rising population and youth bulge. In certain conditions, this can lead to rising unemployment and thus emigration pressure, especially since emigration is typically undertaken by young people¹⁷⁷; 2) **credit constraints**: economic development can contribute to lift credit constraints through several channels, enabling more people to finance the up-front costs of migration. Migration is indeed a very costly - and therefore selective - process that necessitates resources. This explains why emigration rates from poorest countries - and poorest segments of the population within a given country - are actually the lowest; 3) **information asymmetry**: once a few workers have migrated, they can accelerate further emigration by providing information to would-be migrants about job

¹⁷⁶Clemens (2014) provides one of the most comprehensive and up-to-date accounts of this theoretical literature, recalling that this phenomenon has been widely theorised, though with different names: “this inverted-U relationship has been called the ‘mobility transition’ (Zelinsky 1971), ‘migration curve’ (Akerman 1976), ‘migration transition’ (Gould 1979), ‘migration hump’ (Martin 1993), and ‘emigration lifecycle’ (Hatton and Williamson 1994)”. The scope and timeframe of this study did not allow exploring the primary references in this quote and they are therefore not included in the reference list. But the paper by Clemens contains an extensive bibliography for further reference. It is also important to note that several of these theories also look into the impacts on development on immigration, but this study only focuses on the emigration aspect, which is the one relevant to discussing “root causes” approaches.

¹⁷⁷De Haas (2010) questions the “demographic determinism” of some mobility transition theories, arguing that the link between population growth and emigration is not direct: “people do not migrate “because of” population growth. This will only happen if population growth goes along with sluggish economic growth and high unemployment. (...). The other way around, ageing, stagnant and even declining populations may experience high emigration under unfavourable economic conditions, which is the case in several East European countries”.

opportunities, income levels, living costs, regular and irregular migration channels, etc. The need for obtaining such information ex-ante can also be reduced as migrant networks at destination can provide access to some of these resources (jobs, housing, etc.); 4) **structural change and worker dislocation**: economic development - especially when combined with trade liberalisation - produces profound structural change, with some economic sectors rising and others, particularly agriculture, declining. In particular, “the opportunity cost of departing declining sectors falls, changing the relative costs and benefits of both domestic and international migration”; 5) **inequality**: economic development can change the distribution of income, affecting both relative and absolute deprivation levels of various groups, which in turn affects expectations and aspirations as well as the potential gains from emigration. There are also feedback effects that can further impact on emigration, e.g. if emigration leads to increased inequality at origin; 6) **immigration barriers abroad**: emigration today is easier for high-income workers than for their low-income counterparts due to both visa and non-visa policies. Economic development lowers these barriers - e.g. if it results in a better education system delivering internationally recognised qualifications – hence facilitating emigration¹⁷⁸.

De Haas (2010), one of the leading researchers working on the determinants of migration¹⁷⁹, provides another useful review of the theoretical literature. He also defends the validity of “mobility transition” models, though with some theoretical additions. Inter alia, he puts particular emphasis on the **interplay of capabilities – based on Sen’s concept of human development - and aspirations in driving emigration**¹⁸⁰. Development increases both migration capabilities and life enhancement aspirations. One of De Haas’ arguments is that, at the beginning of the process, “aspirations grow faster than local opportunities can offer”, resulting in an initial acceleration of emigration. The concept of “aspirations” also allows “to go beyond income indicators and to conceptualise migration as a function of opportunity differentials”. It also helps to account for the strong explanatory power of relative as much as absolute deprivation levels and perceptions.

Beyond theoretical elaborations, both Clemens (2014) and De Haas (2010) attempt to test the migration transition empirically. Both conclude that **there is consistent evidence pointing towards the existence of this “mobility transition”** characterised, inter alia, by an inverted-U relationship between development and emigration. Clemens bases his conclusion on: a) a very comprehensive review of available macro and micro studies in this area; and b) his own work, plotting emigration stocks and flows against income levels (per capita GDP at Purchasing Power Parity). His conclusion is that emigrant stocks increase with economic development “between PPP income per capita of roughly \$600 (that of today’s Niger or Ethiopia) and about \$7,500 (today’s Albania or Colombia)”. The pattern only

¹⁷⁸This is a very rough account of the theoretical literature reviewed by Clemens. See his paper for a more detailed account of these theoretical elaborations and a comprehensive list of references.

¹⁷⁹De Haas led inter alia the FP7-funded 2010-2014 “Determinants of International Migration” (DEMIG) research project: <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/projects/demig>

¹⁸⁰“Resources” and “incentives” in the above-included quote from Nyberg-Sørensen et al.

reverses “for countries with per-capita incomes above roughly PPP\$7,000–8,000”, i.e. countries defined by the World Bank as upper-middle- or high-income. Net emigration flows similarly increase until countries reach “an income per capita of roughly PPP\$5,000–6,000 (today’s Jordan or Jamaica)”, and only thereafter falls. De Haas (2010) approach is interesting in that he uses various testing models looking into both economic development (using per capita GDP indicators) and broader human development indicators (using, inter alia, literacy levels, HDI indicators, and political freedom and rights ranking¹⁸¹). He concludes that his “results confirm the main hypotheses of transition theory” since, inter alia, “higher levels of economic and human development as proxied by HDI and GDP indicators, respectively, are associated to higher overall levels of migration” and “have the predicted U-curve effect on emigration”¹⁸². De Haas also attempts to put forward some GDP per capita and HDI estimate values above which emigrant stocks start to decline¹⁸³.

The existence of this “migration hump” is somehow acknowledged in policy discourses¹⁸⁴ when they introduce the notion that the “root causes” strategy can only be a medium to long-term strategy. Yet, Clemens rightly notes that “such statements rarely define the length of the “short term”, and are often made in the context of ongoing crises of high migration flows under pressure for short term action”. He therefore undertakes to estimate the mobility transition duration, understood as “the time for a given country to reach income per capita of PPP\$7,000” and concludes that **“the migration transition is a process of generations” and, for some countries “it may take on the order of a century”**¹⁸⁵. His overall conclusion is that **there is no empirical economic basis for the “root causes” approach, “at least on a timescale that is meaningful to most politicians”**.

Research addressing the “root causes” approach focuses on general impacts of development processes - understood either in strict economic terms or in broader

¹⁸¹Based on the ranking system developed by Freedom House.

¹⁸²Both authors however highlight that considerable theoretical and empirical research is still needed. Although both authors conclude to the **general** validity of the inverted-U mobility transition, some variations from the model are observable (see in particular De Haas paper on this aspect). In any case, there is need to better understand and test underlying causal mechanisms/channels such as the six hypotheses reviewed by Clemens, their relative weight in the transition and the ways in which they interplay in given contexts.

¹⁸³The scope of the study does not allow for exploring similarities and differences between the GDP estimates put forward by those authors, which would entail a quite technical discussion on testing models, data sources, etc. **The important policy message is that their overall conclusion is similar**. It could however be interesting to approach the authors to see how their findings match: being able to put forward relatively consistent GDP per capita figures from two different sources would reinforce the argument.

¹⁸⁴Clemens provides an overview of the evolution of “conventional wisdom in policy circles” underpinning the root causes approach, namely the belief that development assistance can reduce migration, which he traces back to the mid-1950s.

¹⁸⁵“At a healthy real per capita growth rate of 2% per year, it would take 133 years for a country starting from \$500 per capita (today’s Niger or Burundi) and 63 years for a country starting from \$2,000 per capita (today’s Cambodia or Zambia). At a strong growth rate of 3% per year, these durations would be 89 years and 42 years, respectively. These are optimistic growth scenarios, given that during 1960–2000 the average country experienced real growth in per capita income of 1.8% per year (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003: 4). And most poor countries grew more slowly”.

human development terms - on migration in general, and not specifically on irregular or forced migration. However, the conclusions are valid for irregular migration, which is basically the form that migration will take in the absence of regular channels for movement. They are also valid for forced migration to the extent that migration is rarely purely forced or purely economic: conflict and poverty often occur in the same places and economic and human development factors are likely to play a role in a combination of factors leading to forced migration. In addition, De Haas (2010) does focus on some elements that are relevant for forced migration, such as political freedoms (see *infra*). Similarly, when looking at given development sectors, as requested by the ToRs, it is difficult to identify research looking at their potential impacts specifically on irregular and forced migration. Using the nine policy sectors of the OECD IPPMD project (agriculture, labour market, trade, investment, financial services, education and skills, health, social protection, environment), the exceptions are probably agriculture (food security aspects) and environment, as well as the cross-cutting issues (human rights, gender, governance). In these areas, a specific literature exists in relation with drivers of forced migration. However, the same reasoning as above can be applied to conclude that **research on the impacts of these sectors on migration in general is relevant for irregular and forced migration.**

OECD (2014), which focuses on migration in general, therefore constitutes a useful reference as it contains, *inter alia*, a literature review of the ways in which sectorial policies affect migration in countries of origin. Some of these inter-linkages have also been explored in the thematic sections of this study. The clear policy message deriving from a sectorial approach echoes the critical stance of the “root causes” academic literature: **there is basically no clear-cut and easy to grasp causal relationship between sectorial development and migration, through which addressing sectorial development gaps would reduce emigration.** The empirical evidence is mixed and context specific. The scope of this exercise does not allow for a systematic review of this evidence by sector, but the following examples provide a telling illustration of the complexity, variability and context-sensitivity of sectorial development on emigration.

As counter-intuitive as it might seem, **a recent literature review of 29 case studies** (Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2013) **found access to formal social protection programmes to be as likely to increase as to decrease emigration**, depending on “the design and implementation of the social protection programme, context, beneficiary characteristics, as well as the reasons that underpin a household’s decision to migrate”. The study concludes that “policy-makers cannot take it for granted that migration flows can be lowered with the provision of social protection”. This is *inter alia* because the propensity to migrate is determined by an overall context (including other economic and non-economic factors), and by the situation in other sectors (e.g. economic conditions and labour market prospects). This is linked to the mixed nature of most migration decisions, which makes it difficult to disentangle the respective and often contradictory effects of various factors. In addition, migration drivers also act indirectly via their impacts on other drivers, that might or might not affect emigration in the same direction: e.g. the social protection study finds that “programmes that have residency conditions attached can prevent

migration in the short-term, but may even increase migration in the long-term if beneficiaries' education levels increase"¹⁸⁶. Another important explanation is that households can view social protection and migration as complementary rather than substitute livelihood strategies: "some members within a household may continue pursuing migration, while others stay behind and receive social protection transfers". In this respect, social protection might precisely enable a given household to engage into migration by providing the necessary resources to finance the upfront costs.

To take another striking example of particular relevance for forced migration, De Haas (2010) finds that **"increased political rights are positively correlated to emigrant stocks, and vice versa"**. This might seem counterintuitive as one would expect more people to leave autocratically ruled countries, but it could be explained by the fact that such regimes tend to put higher constraints on people's mobility, for instance by high passport cost or exit visa requirements (cf. McKenzie 2005)".

These two examples bring attention to the consistent evidence that the poorest and the more oppressed that would have the most to gain from moving are also those facing the highest constraints, and having the most limited resources, to do so. They can only afford short-distance movements and actually even face a risk of being "trapped" in situations of extreme vulnerability, a phenomenon also brought-up by research in the environment sector. **From a pro-poor perspective, the relevant policy objective should therefore be to facilitate the movement of such highly vulnerable populations**, so that they have other possibilities than being trapped or forcibly displaced. Work already undertaken in the areas of disaster-risk reduction, adaptation and food security demonstrates that specific forms of migration can be successful adaptation and food strategies, including through remittances. By reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing resilience in communities of origin, they reduce the likelihood of higher-risk forms of migration and forced displacement at times of crises. Yet it needs to be acknowledged that **this "adaptation migration", which is one of the best options available to these vulnerable populations, mainly occurs irregularly in its international component**¹⁸⁷, due to the prevalent informality in a South-South context where most of it takes place and the lack of regular channels in both a South-South and South-North context.

6.3 The way forward

This section will not, strictly speaking, provide recommendations on how EU development cooperation could reduce irregular and forced movements by better addressing root causes, as requested by the ToRs. **The main recommendation from this study would actually be that this formulation should be resisted by DEVCO, as it raises major issues**, which have been reviewed in the previous sections:

- "Root causes" approaches are grounded in migration control objectives, not in

¹⁸⁶This aspect was already picked-up in the 2013 SWD on Environmental degradation, climate change and migration, which highlighted that environmental factors act not only directly but also indirectly via their impacts on other drivers (especially economic ones).

¹⁸⁷A great share of these movements actually take place internally, within developing countries.

development objectives which constitute DEVCO's mandate;

- Referring to the "root causes of irregular and forced migration" contributes to the conflation of migration and asylum issues which contributes to jeopardise international protection;
- The notion of "root causes" derives from a very partial understanding of the dynamics sustaining irregular - and even to a certain extent forced - migration, which ignore, in particular, pull factors in destination countries and more systemic issues of migration governance;
- The "root causes" approach is grounded in simplistic, and generally false, assumptions about the nature of inter-linkages between overall and sectorial development processes, irregular, and forced migration. Buying into the "root causes" discourse contributes to legitimate these misplaced assumptions.

Instead of buying into the "root causes" discourse, **DEVCO should put forward a development-grounded and rights-based rationale** for integrating migration into overall and sectorial development strategies, in general, and **for addressing irregular and forced migration, in particular**. This rationale should be based on existing evidence relating to the inter-linkages between overall and sectorial development processes, irregular, and forced migration. Although important knowledge gaps persist, available data and research give ample ground for putting forward a genuinely developmental alternative discourse. From DEVCO's perspective, **the reflection starting point should always be development, and not migration**: "development is important in its own right because it improves people's wellbeing and freedom, regardless of its impact on migration" (De Haas, 2007). In general, development cooperation should be about pursuing poverty-reduction and development objectives, not about attempting to produce supposedly desirable migration outcomes, a strategy that is not only misplaced but also bound to fail as argued by a considerable body of research¹⁸⁸. **In sum, development cooperation should aim at:**

- **Maximising the development impact of migration and mobility;**
- **Planning for migration and mobility**, acknowledging that they constitute integral components of development.

These two dimensions are detailed in turn, with specific emphasis on irregular and forced migration.

6.3.1 Development impacts of irregular and forced migration

The rationale for addressing irregular and forced migration should first be grounded in the following well-established impacts on development:

¹⁸⁸See e.g. Skeldon (e.g. 2008a): "Migration has proven singularly intractable to policy intervention"; De Haas (e.g. 2005): "Stay-at-home policies pursued by emigration countries have proved not only to be ineffective, but also, and more importantly, to be counterproductive by alienating migrants"; or Bakewell (e.g. 2013): "Understanding mainstreaming as "including desired migration outcomes in development programming – perhaps levels of emigration of graduates, levels of rural-urban migration, desired use of remittances and so forth" - would be moving into "dangerous territory" and would likely introduce "ideas of development which will rapidly be divorced from the interests of those subjected to them".

- From a migrant-centred perspective, irregular and forced migrants are highly vulnerable individuals in terms of poverty, human development and human rights outcomes. In particular, forced migration both results from, and constitutes, a violation of human rights and security;
- Taking a broader developmental perspective for low- and middle-income countries of destination and origin, the overall and sectorial developmental impacts of migration crucially depend on the forms of movements and the conditions under which migration take place. Compared with regular and voluntary forms of migration, irregular and forced migration are likely to result in more negative outcomes, not only for migrants themselves but also for developing sending and receiving countries.

Therefore, the overall objective of “maximising the development impact of migration” requires action along two complementary lines as far as irregular and forced migrants are concerned:

- In all relevant sectors of development cooperation: considering irregular and forced migrants as particularly vulnerable groups and addressing their specific needs. In fact, all migrants have specific vulnerabilities and the OWG SDGs Outcome Document rightly includes a call for disaggregating data by migratory status. Yet a call could be made for disaggregating data also for specific sub-groups of migrants, such as forced migrants. For obvious reasons linked to data constraints, it would be difficult to do the same for irregular migrants;
- In the migration sector strictly speaking: enhancing migration governance and promoting regular and voluntary forms of migration from and within low- and middle-income partner countries. “The facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies” is therefore a legitimate policy objective under development cooperation, rightly included in the OWG SDGs Outcome Document.

While promoting regular and voluntary – as opposed to irregular and forced – forms of movement is a legitimate development cooperation objective, extreme care needs to be put in designing response strategy. As the previous sections have tried to argue, and contrary to conventional assumptions, irregular migration is not all together “bad” and can actually have some positive and significant developmental impacts for those involved and for developing countries, as exemplified by the ICBT sector in Africa. In addition, in many instances in a South-South context where informality is systemic, irregular migration is basically the norm rather than the exception. Irregular - or informal - migration can also be not only a livelihood but also a life-saving strategy when it is the only option left to those trying to flee from life-threatening situations. Therefore **even the formulation of “addressing the root causes of irregular migration” is problematic**, as it can seem to convey a simplistic message that cannot account for the complexity of the developmental impacts of irregular migration, especially in contexts of widespread informality.

Development cooperation interventions should therefore try to understand how migration - including irregular migration - works out for the poor in given sectors and

contexts, in order to **design interventions that do not nurture stigmatisation or harm already highly vulnerable groups**. In particular, **answers should not be limited to fighting irregular migration from the “crime” angle** as can be the case through anti-smuggling and trafficking interventions. Those are of course necessary. There is evidence in a number of contexts that levels of abuse and violence imposed on migrants and refugees in mixed flows by smugglers and traffickers are increasing (as demonstrated e.g. by the work of the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat in the Horn context¹⁸⁹). Work in this area should certainly continue and be stepped-up. However, smuggling and trafficking are much more a consequence of the intersection of push and pull factors in a context of limited regular migration opportunities than a “root cause”. In addition, there is a great need to **approach these issues from a labour market angle** as argued in the relevant section of this study. The broader labour market dynamics, including supply and demand for cheap labour, that underpin trafficking for labour market exploitation need to be addressed, with adequate involvement of relevant labour market actors. This is crucial not to further stigmatise and criminalise a vulnerable population already suffering from the exploitation and abuse resulting from irregularity. This would also help addressing the full picture of irregularity, deriving from what happens in the labour market as much as from what happens at the borders¹⁹⁰.

Development cooperation should also promote the formalisation of migration while avoiding to inadvertently create barriers where they did not previously exist, including in relation with forced migration, as highlighted at the September 2013 ETEM IBM roundtable. Irregular migration must be replaced within the context of informality, particularly in a South-South context where such informality is the norm. There are very strong links between informality on labour markets and irregular migration and development cooperation should reflect those in its approaches to irregular migration. Innovative approaches based on such understanding of the prevalence of the informal in a South-South context should be promoted.

The objective should be to foster gradual formalisation, based on the actual realities of various predominant forms of informal South-South migration. For instance, DEVCO could support research/action in the area of **cross-border migration** and ways to promote gradual formalisation in this area. A few initiatives aiming at providing specific circulation cards to cross-border populations have already been mentioned in this report. OECD (2012) also mentions plans from the

¹⁸⁹<http://www.regionalmms.org/index.php?id=2>

¹⁹⁰See e.g. Triandafyllidou (2014): “The legal categories defining migrants in destination countries are rather complex, fluid, and often overlapping. Irregularity is not an “end-state”, neither an “on-off” condition. It rather entails an entire spectrum of categories involving various combinations of residence status and work arrangements and their compliance to national laws. The dynamic character of legal status becomes obvious when we consider extensive regularisation schemes or amnesties that erase irregularity. But it is also exemplified in the term “befallen illegality” which refers to those cases where migrants who have managed to obtain legal stay and work status, shift back to irregularity because of their inability to prove formally that they are employed and hence renew their stay permits. Legal status depends not simply on individual circumstances or strategies, neither solely on conditions of entry, but crucially on changes in immigration policy and employment-related developments”.

Ghana Immigration Service to equip border populations with “special identifications cards, complementary to the national system being put in place”. As regards ICBT, more work should also be put on developing simplified trade regimes (see final report of the IBM roundtable). Cross-border cooperation among local authorities, including e.g. facilitating access to cross-border social services infrastructure, would be another important area of work. Some work on these issues has e.g. been conducted by GIZ with the African Union and by the OECD Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) with the ECOWAS. However cross-border cooperation never really attracted interest from DEVCO, despite being of particular relevance from a development perspective. DEVCO could support work aiming at comprehensively reviewing cross-border migration related initiatives in all-above mentioned areas, analysing challenges and lessons learnt, and promoting replication of successful examples.

A similar initiative could be supported in relation with **seasonal migration** or with **nomadism and pastoralism**. The study did not look into these aspects, which closely connect to DEVCO’s work on food and agriculture, on the one side, and peace and security, on the other side. Yet those are evidently major forms of South-South migration that take place informally and can contribute to fuel conflict in a number of cases. Avenues to better protect those involved through some degree of formalisation while preventing conflict would need to be explored. The literature review did not cover these aspects but two recent resources might provide an up-to-date starting point in the West African context. The recently released Atlas of the Sahara Sahel (OECD SWAC, 2014) contains a chapter on “nomadism and mobility in the Sahara Sahel”¹⁹¹. A “High-level regional consultation on cross-border transhumance” also took place in Lomé on 29-30 January 2015 and outputs of this consultation could be looked into¹⁹². In another context, pastoralism is considered in IGAD Migration Policy Framework, pastoralism also being of specific relevance for that region. DEVCO could for instance encourage dialogue, exchange of best practices, cross-fertilisation among such regions where pastoralism is a salient issue. While these issues appear to be already tackled by other DEVCO units¹⁹³, it would make sense for the migration sector to be more engaged in order to bring in a migration and mobility approach to these issues.

6.3.2 *Irregular and forced migration impacts of development*

Rather than starting with the policy objective of reducing certain specific forms of migration in line with the “root causes” philosophy, **development cooperation would be better inspired to ground the migration mainstreaming rationale in the general understanding that migration and mobility are integral elements of**

¹⁹¹The publication includes various other relevant chapters on migration, borders, cross-border cooperation and freedom of movement.

¹⁹²The event was jointly organised by the government of Togo, the Billital Maroobe Network and the ECOWAS Commission, and facilitated by the Rural Hub. The meeting focused on the Regional Investment Programme in support of livestock breeding in West African coastal countries. This programme is an essential complement to the Regional Support Programme for Pastoralism in the Sahel (PRAPS), which is currently being implemented by CILSS with the support of the World Bank (see <http://www.cilss.bf/spip.php?article377>)

¹⁹³<http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/article/pastoralism-and-conflict>

development processes. In general, producing specific migration outcomes is not a legitimate objective under development cooperation and such strategies are unlikely to succeed. As regards irregular and forced migration specifically, previous sections have tried to argue that **even if reducing their prevalence can be considered legitimate from a development perspective, there are many reasons why development cooperation is unlikely to meet expectations in this area.** This is in particular because many of their “root causes” lie beyond development cooperation mandate and reach, and because the impacts of development processes on human movement, including irregular but also to a certain extent forced migration, do not obey to a simplistic scheme of development failure leading to emigration.

Contrary to the “sedentary bias” (Bakewell, 2008) that remains predominant in development thinking, theoretical and empirical research consistently highlight that development processes produce population movements. These movements are both internal and international - with internal migrants actually constituting the majority of those who move - and are strongly connected to urbanisation processes, an aspect strongly picked-up in the theoretical literature on the “mobility transition” (De Haas, 2010). In this respect, “root causes” approaches are also problematic in that they focus on emigration and ignore the internal dimension. Therefore the key policy objective to be supported through overall and sectorial development cooperation should be to adequately prepare and plan for the likely impacts of internal and international migration and mobility - in terms of scale, direction, quality, composition - generated by development processes. Such policies, which have been termed “accommodationist policies” are “those that seek to respond to and plan for the kinds of migration that are likely to occur in any particular development scenario” (Skeldon, 2008a). Migration should be considered in this long-term development planning perspective, just as other population dynamics. The failure to do so will result in inadequate planning, and therefore a failure to achieve overall and sectorial development objectives¹⁹⁴. **Preparing and planning for the likely impacts of development on migration and mobility requires action along two complementary lines:**

- In all relevant sectors of development cooperation: analyse the likely implications of overall and sectorial development on migration and mobility and factor those movements in sectorial planning;
- In the migration sector strictly speaking: analyse the likely implications of overall and sectorial development on migration and mobility and design “accommodationist” migration policies to ensure that these movements take place in adequate conditions for the maximum benefit of all parties involved.

¹⁹⁴On population dynamics issues, and in particular the need to plan for internal and international migration and urbanisation, see e.g. Capacity4dev article on “Integrating Population Dynamics into the Post-2015 Development Agenda: The Dhaka Declaration, inter alia: “the MDGs did not adequately integrate population aspects, adopting a static rather than dynamic approach to demography. For instance, poverty reduction or slum-related targets defined on the basis of 1990 population levels failed to proactively factor the effects of rapid population growth or spatial redistribution – e.g. through rural-urban migration - in a number of countries”.

6.3.3 *The need for a coherent EU approach to irregular and forced migration issues*

If the EU seriously intends to make any progress in addressing irregular and forced migration issues, promoting the share of regular and voluntary movements, it needs to **re-think a wide range of policies, well beyond development cooperation**. On the one side, push factors for irregular and forced migration in countries of origin are affected by a large array of internal (e.g. agriculture, trade, etc.) and external (e.g. diplomacy) EU policies. On the other side, pull factors linked to the structural functioning of European labour markets and increasingly restrictive labour migration regimes - particularly for the low-skilled - and asylum, are equally important as “root causes” of irregular migration towards the EU. Those areas are beyond the mandate and reach of development cooperation.

Staying within the mandate and reach of development cooperation, it would in theory be possible to take a more systemic view in the context of South-South migration, also looking into structural pull factors in developing countries of destination and increasingly restrictive migration regimes in the global South, particularly for the low skilled. As argued in this section, the developmental implications of irregular and forced migration are much less clear-cut than could be intuitively assumed. Therefore comprehensive, long-term and “do no harm” development strategies are required for developing countries to adequately address both the opportunities and challenges that migration, including irregular and forced migration, present.

However, the EU is unlikely to succeed in promoting such reforms in developing destination countries if it is perceived as applying a double discourse, being unable or unwilling itself to engage into such forward-looking reforms. The reality is that the EU is not particularly well placed to convey such a message to its developing partners. This is because EU Member States, in line with a more general trend in developed countries, have themselves been applying increasingly restrictive asylum and migration policies, basically considering migration, and in particular irregular and forced migration, as challenges and security threats (Lindstrom, 2005) rather than opportunities, a contradiction also noted in a recent ECDPM and ICMPD study (2013)¹⁹⁵. Ministries of Interior/DG HOME who are in the lead within the EU on irregular migration, as opposed to Ministries of Labour/Employment and Social Affairs/DG EMPL, have shaped an approach to irregular migration essentially centred on control and crime (smuggling and

¹⁹⁵An interesting indication of this contradiction or double discourse is that academics and migrant/refugee advocates are struggling to promote within the EU exactly the same developmental approaches that the EU pretends to encourage in developing countries. See e.g. Gathmann C. (2014): “Asylum seekers: an untapped resource in European labour markets?”, e.g.: “European governments should invest more in fostering economic integration of refugees in European labour markets rather than treating refugees as temporary burden to be tolerated”; (...) “one rationale for such a policy shift is the reality of being a refugee in the 21st century”; (...) being a refugee is not a temporary state but rather a long-term phenomenon spanning in some cases several generations. These facts suggest that European governments are well advised to think of refugees as a resource rather than a burden”.

trafficking) issues rather than labour market structures, including informality¹⁹⁶. Forced migration itself has been framed as a security issue (Lindstrom, 2005) and barriers have been increasing to prevent asylum seekers from reaching the EU. Many researchers (e.g. Lindstrom, 2005; Castles and Van Hear, 2011) actually consider the rise of the entire “forced migration and development agenda”, from the first initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s to the latest developments, as an integral element of a containment strategy of developed countries. This “aid in place of migration and protection” approach is seen as a strategy aiming at avoiding refugee “burden sharing” and “substituting the institution of asylum with the infusion of development aid” (Lindstrom, 2005).

Beyond the specific issues of irregular and forced migration, one can observe **an increasing disconnect between the comprehensive and developmental approach to migration promoted by DEVCO and the overall EU approach to migration issues**, as strongly highlighted at the January 2013 ETEM Roundtable on *The role of migration in development strategies*. In light of this double discourse issue, stepping-up political dialogue with partner countries “to convey the importance of developing sound migration policies, in their own developmental and reputational interest”, as recommended in the November 2014 Issues Paper, might not be such an easy endeavour. More generally, one can actually wonder if this increasing policy contradiction is actually sustainable in the longer term, as it compromises both the rationale and the chances of success of truly development-oriented work under development cooperation.

7 Recommendations on key issues and questions to be highlighted in public consultation documents

Possible issues and questions for inclusion in public consultation documents on M&D could include the following:

Rationale and overall objective(s):

- Is the development-oriented and rights-based rationale for addressing migration under development cooperation adequately addressed in existing EU policy documents?
- If not, how could this rationale be reinforced to ensure that migration-related development cooperation exclusively pursues poverty-reduction and sustainable development objectives?
- Should criteria be defined for determining the DAC-ability of migration-related interventions financed under development cooperation?

¹⁹⁶Although labour market informality is less prevalent in the EU context – just like irregular migration – much of what has been said having in mind a South-South context is also relevant for the EU context. As convincingly argued by the ILO representative at the EUI “Lampedusa dilemma” conference session on irregular migration and labour market, irregular migration in the EU cannot be discussed separately from the overall labour market situation of EU destination countries as irregular migrants often end up working in the informal economy. Therefore, any set of policies aiming at addressing irregular migration should also be looking at how informal economy issues could be addressed.

SDGs/Post-2015:

- How should migration concretely be integrated in P2015 development agenda (suggested targets and indicators)?

Strengths and weaknesses:

- Which are the main strengths and weaknesses of the current EU approach to migration under development cooperation?

Ownership / alignment:

- In the context of aid effectiveness and alignment of financing to national priorities, what can be done to make sure that migration-related interventions pay adequate attention to partner countries development needs?
- Which dimensions of migration should be given greater attention in order to better address development opportunities and challenges in low- and middle-income countries?
- Could you identify specific issues facing developing partner countries that have been neglected by the EU to date and propose innovative responses to address them?

South-South migration:

- Is the South-South as opposed to South-North categorisation of migration relevant?
- Are there essential differences between South-North and South-South migration and the related development opportunities and challenges faced by developed and developing countries?
- If yes, what could be considered as distinctive features of South-South migration?
- Should the South-South category be broken down into different sub-categories of South-South movements that would be more relevant (e.g. intra-regional, extra-regional, internal migration; cross-border migration; temporary, permanent migration; circular migration; seasonal migration; pastoralism and nomadism...)?
- If yes, could you highlight key priorities and propose orientations for innovative response strategies for each sub-category?

Internal migration:

- What are the main poverty-reduction and sustainable development implications of internal migration as the predominant form of South-South migration?
- Should development cooperation pay greater attention to internal migration?
- If yes, could you highlight key priorities and propose orientations for innovative response strategies?

Urban and local development:

- Has development cooperation adequately reflected the inter-linkages between internal and international migration, urbanisation and broader local development processes?
- If not, could you highlight key priorities and propose orientations for innovative response strategies?

Transit migration:

- To which extent is the distinction between transit migration and temporary/permanent immigration relevant in terms of development challenges faced by receiving countries?
- Is the irregular migration and control lens sufficient to address development challenges associated with transit migration?
- If not, could you highlight key priorities and propose orientations for innovative response strategies?

“Traditional” M&D agenda:

- Based on challenges and lessons learned from past development cooperation on remittances, diaspora, circular migration and brain drain, what should be the main policy orientations and priorities for future cooperation in those four areas?
- How could this traditional agenda be adequately extended to the South-South context? Should there be distinct priorities and approaches to each of these four policy areas based on possible distinctive features of South-South migration?

Migration mainstreaming:

- Could the rationale for integrating migration into overall and sectorial development cooperation be reinforced by looking not only into the impacts of migration on development but also into the reverse relationship (how development processes potentially generate migration and mobility)?
- In that case, how could such implications be factored in overall and sectorial development planning, supporting partner countries in preparing and planning for migration and mobility?
- Migrants have specific and multi-faceted vulnerabilities yet levels of relative deprivation with the local population can be quite low in less developed countries: how could this tension be resolved? How could a right balance between migrant specific interventions and mainstream interventions specifically targeting migrants be found? Are migrant specific interventions a necessary first step to build the evidence base and feed into advocacy for mainstreaming at a later stage?

Sectorial priorities:

- What should the main priorities for mainstreaming migration in the following sectors be? *List to be completed by DEVCO based on categorisation retained. Questions should be included for at least the following two sectors:*

Employment/labour market:

- Has the EU adequately addressed the inter-linkages between migration and employment under development cooperation?
- If not, what could be done to reinforce the labour market approach, looking into labour market dynamics sustaining both regular and irregular migration (e.g. also looking into trafficking for labour exploitation)?
- Has the EU adequately addressed labour migration in all its skills dimensions (low-, medium- and high-skilled migration)?
- If not, what could be done to enhance development cooperation responses across the full skill range?

Education, training and skills:

- Has the EU adequately addressed the inter-linkages between migration, education and training under development cooperation, particularly issues related to qualifications and skills recognition?
- If not, how could the EU step-up and better coordinate its response to the recognition of experiences, skills and qualifications?

Informality:

- How should migration be addressed in South-South contexts of widespread informality characterising the broader socioeconomic system?
- In particular, how can irregular migration be framed from a development perspective, reflecting inter-linkages with informal economy issues, particularly in contexts where irregular/informal migration is the norm rather than the exception?
- What could be innovative response strategies to address the informality-migration nexus?

Partnership: research, civil society, social partners, private sector:

- Has the EU adequately engaged with these various categories of actors in addressing migration under development cooperation?
- If not, how could engagement with categories that might have received less attention be improved and what should be key priority issues for partnership and cooperation with those?

Policy coherence

- Which do you think are the priority areas for increasing coherence between EU development cooperation and other internal and external policies as far as migration is concerned?
- Are the internal and external dimensions of EU migration policy coherent? And if not, how could coherence be enhanced from a development perspective?

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