



EU ROADMAP FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN SURINAME

2024 – 2027

GENERAL INFORMATION

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Introduction

The EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society (RM) serves as a vital tool to enhance coordination within the EU Delegation and extend collaboration with Member States. This updated version, succeeding the 2021-2024 Roadmap, assesses the reality of civil society in Suriname and proposes a strategy and action plan for engaging with them. The assessment, conducted through consultations with European Union (EU) Member States, CSOs across various sectors in Suriname, and civil society experts¹, aims to identify effective strategies for the EU to enhance the impact and involvement of CSOs. The overarching goal is to foster a more cohesive and collaborative approach to supporting civil society in Suriname.

The timeline of the new Roadmap has been established in coordination with the timeline of the Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021-2027. The end date of the RM coincides with the end of the MIP 2021-2027. However, and considering the changing environment in Suriname and globally, it is suggested that an internal assessment is undertaken towards the end of 2025, to see if the analytical part, and the priorities and action plan, need to be updated, or if this version is still valid by then.

Suriname in Indices

Suriname is the smallest independent Dutch-speaking country in South America with just under 165,000 square kilometres divided into 10 administrative districts. With the lowest population density in the Latin American and Caribbean region² (SPS, 2021), the country has a diverse population of approximately 623,000 comprised of eight ethnic groups - primarily of Amerindian, African, Indian and Javanese descent. Indigenous people represent an estimated 4 per cent of the national population while as much as 20 per cent of the population identifies as maroon³, according to last national census data from 2012 (ABS, 2013). Two-thirds of the population is concentrated in Paramaribo, the capital and surrounding areas, with another 20 per cent in rural coastal areas and 14 per cent inland (Government of Suriname, 2019; 2022a). Approximately 25% of the population is younger than 15 years old (Government of Suriname, World Bank 2024). The estimated workforce is 236,000 with 36,000 youth (15-24 years old). Suriname has an emigration rate which is among the 20 highest in the world: approximately 42 per cent of Surinamese reside abroad.⁴ In April 2020, about 357,000 Surinamese nationals resided in the Netherlands. And while Suriname has a net migration rate⁵ of -1.7, the number of migrants living in Suriname nearly doubled in the past two decades (IOM, 2021) - with foreign women and girls that are vulnerable to sex trafficking, while men and boys are more susceptible to exploitation in agriculture, construction, coastal fishing boats and gold mines (Global organised crime index, 2023)⁶. The brain drain in the country is a reality, with prospective students and skilled workers leaving the country while lower-skilled migrants enter the country (OCHA, 2022).

Suriname is an upper-middle-income country with an economy that is driven by its abundant natural resources. Mining accounts for nearly half of public sector revenue and gold represents more than three quarters of total exports (World Bank 2024). Recent offshore oil discoveries have resulted in a final investment decision by a Franco-American consortium⁷ in October 2024 which will lead to oil production as of 2028.

¹ The assessment involved an online questionnaire completed by 24 organisations, 3 focus groups sessions with civil society (in Paramaribo, Nickerie, Brokopondo) with a collective participation of 34 civil society organisation and 5 in-depth interviews with resource persons.

² With less than four inhabitants per square kilometre

³ Afro-descendant communities

⁴ The primary destination country for emigrants is the Netherlands, followed by the United States of America, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, French Guiana and the Netherlands Antilles.

⁵ The number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants, including citizen and noncitizen

⁶ These groups at risk are vulnerable to human trafficking with an increasing influx of people from the Caribbean, Brazil, Haiti and Venezuela

⁷ TotalEnergies and APA Corporation



Macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability have been key challenges for Suriname. Prior macroeconomic mismanagement and COVID-19-related supply chain disruptions, caused Suriname’s economy to decline for several years. Suriname now recovers from fiscal challenges and while the macroeconomic situation is stabilizing with Government measures implemented in line with the International Monetary Fund program⁸, healthcare and education suffer. The economic recovery program supported by the Extended Fund Facility that was signed in December 2021, will be implemented until March 2025 (Investment Climate Statements: Suriname, US Department of State, 2024).

Suriname’s conservation efforts, represent an ongoing balancing act between development, improving the livelihoods of forest-dependent indigenous and maroon communities and the preservation of its distinct ecosystems. The Legatum ranks Suriname 82 out of 167 with high marks in natural environment (21st out of 167): 1st out of 167 countries in the “Forest, land and soil” sub-category and 3rd for the sub-category oceans. Recognised as a world leader in forest conservation, Suriname is one of only three countries globally with a negative carbon footprint (Kabinet van de President, Samenwerking essentieel voor koolstofkredieten-markt, 2024). The country has managed to conserve 93% of its forest cover and regularly renews its international commitments to combat deforestation. Suriname nevertheless faces challenges with interrelated issues of deforestation and illicit mining⁹ resulting in land degradation, aquatic ecosystem damage and livelihoods loss for hinterland communities (EITI, 2022). Some concessions are located on the territories of indigenous and Afro-descendant communities protected by several international and inter-American laws (CIRAD, 2024).¹⁰

Suriname underwent a change in government in 2020, which brought an end to the ten-year administration of the National Democratic Party (NDP). The V-DEM Democracy report (2024) has qualified Suriname as the only country that evolved in 2023 from an electoral to a liberal democracy.¹¹ In 2022 the Constitutional Court ruled that the electoral law was unconstitutional as it violated the rule of equality: fewer votes were necessary in rural less populated districts to win a seat for the National Assembly than in urban more populated areas. In 2023, the National Assembly passed an amendment in the electoral law, followed up by an amendment to the constitution to ensure a more equitable representation for the general population: voting districts have been eliminated and replaced by one voting district for the entire country. The new national electoral system is proportional to population density. This means that representation and participation in decision-making of the minority indigenous and tribal communities living in the hinterland (4% of population), is proportionate to their small number – with a risk of further marginalization if no other representations mechanisms are in place to represent their interests. The new law makes the participation of small- and medium-sized political parties also more challenging because of a higher required financial deposit to register than in the previous law.¹² In May 2025, the Parliamentary elections will be based on the new “one person, one vote” principle. With a young population (see supra), this election will be one in which a large group of voters will cast their vote for the very first time.

⁸ Aimed at restructuring debt, modernizing monetary and exchange rate policies, and addressing financial sector vulnerabilities

⁹ Despite accession to the Minamata Convention in August 2018, and the completion of the Minamata Initial Assessment project (MIA) (2019) by the National Institute for Environment and Development in Suriname (NIMOS), the government of Suriname has yet to implement the Minamata Convention and act on the project’s findings.

¹⁰ inter-American Court of Human Rights’ verdict of 2015 stipulating that the land rights of the inland population should be regulated and respected, has not been implemented by the government. In 2020, a draft bill to regulate collective rights was introduced but was not decided upon in 2023 (Freedom House, 2024).

¹¹ While electoral democracy focuses on the mechanics of elections and the ability to choose representatives, a liberal democracy more is a more comprehensive form of democracy that encompasses a broader framework that includes free and fair elections and also the protection of individual rights and liberties, the rule of law, and the separation of powers

¹² <https://www.sris.sr/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/SB-2023-158-nadere-wijziging-van-de-Kiesregeling.pdf>



Suriname faces difficulties with corruption which is translated in the 40 out of 100 score (2023) for the corruption perception index (transparency international 2023) - despite the new 2017 anticorruption law¹³ and the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Committee in May 2023 (Freedom House, 2024). The “measure of the prominence of corruption among government officials”¹⁴, shows a worsening trend with scores revealing that most challenges are within the legislative branch and the executive. Since the change of government in 2020, the judiciary has gained improved autonomy. It however is still undermined by corruption and nepotism¹⁵ affecting due process in civil and criminal proceedings (Freedom House, 2024).

Suriname is ranked 124 out of 193 countries in 2022 on the UN’s Human Development Index, at 0.690. This puts the country in the medium human development category. (UNDP, 2022). The COVID-19 pandemic caused important changes, with not only a sharp contraction of its gross domestic product (GDP), but also a significant rise in unemployment and poverty rates. In 2022, about 17.5 percent of the population lived below the World Bank’s upper middle-income poverty line of US\$ 6.85 (2017 purchasing power parity) per day - a poverty rate that is similar to that of other countries with comparable GDP per capita. (World Bank, 2024).

The constitution (Art. 8), prohibits race-based or ethnic discrimination as well as gender discrimination. In this framework, political equality with respect to civil liberties protection across social groups¹⁶, shows an improving trend from 0.63 (2016-2020) to 0.75 in 2023 (V-Dem, Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties).¹⁷

There are nevertheless significant inequalities in living conditions and income (Government of Suriname, 2022b) for which human capital deficiencies are important determinants: they intersect with patterns of ethnic and geographic inequality that have their roots in Suriname’s history of colonial rule and slavery. More than 25% of Surinamese in the interior of the country live below the upper-middle-income line (Suriname Poverty and Equity Assessment, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, 2024). Maroon and Indigenous people in the hinterland lack equal access to education and employment (Freedom House, 2024) and their traditional land rights are not guaranteed by law (OHCHR, 2024; Freedom House, 2024).

While progress has been made related to equal treatment of LGBTQI+ in the legal framework¹⁸, enforcement remains a challenge and LGBTQI+ still face societal discrimination, harassment and abuse by the police - despite being legal (Freedom House, 2024).

The Government has a Gender Vision Strategy Document for the period 2021 – 2035 laying out its implementation and assigning the Gender Affairs Bureau (BGA) of the Ministry of Home Affairs with related coordination (Gender Vision Strategy Document for the period 2021 – 2035). **Several gender indices cite inequalities between men and women:** the Women’s Global Peace and Security Index (WPS 2023) ranks

¹³ The Anti-Corruption Act still requires statutory decrees and operational mechanisms to make it fully effective

¹⁴ The overall score since 2017/18 was 0.57 and stabilised between 2020 and 2024 at 0.44. The scores for the Legislative branch: 0.21 (2020) and 0.17 (2022-2024) – and for the Executive branch: 0.40 (2020), 0.39 (2021), 0.43 (2022-2023) and 0.42 (2024) - With 0 being the minimum score and 1 being the maximum score - <https://worldjusticeproject.org/>

¹⁵ Which is also shown in score for the judicial branch: 0.66 (2020-2021), 0.63 (2022), 0.60 (2023), 0.62 (2024) - With 0 being the minimum score and 1 being the maximum score - <https://worldjusticeproject.org/>

¹⁶ Social groups as defined by ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language and region - With 0 being the minimum score and 1 being the maximum score

¹⁷ Which calculates the loss to achievements in reproductive health, empowerment and labour market participation due to inequality between men and women

¹⁸ Since 2014 same sex couples are included in ‘social laws’ related to general pension, national basic health insurance and the minimum hourly wage through the use of gender neutral terminology; in 2015 the Penal Code was revised to protect against discrimination and hate speech and in 2022 the Labour Violence and Sexual Harassment Act and Equal Treatment Employment Act were passed protecting against discrimination based on sexual attraction, orientation and gender identity in the workplace



Suriname 87 out of 177 while the Gender Inequality Index¹⁹ shows an overall improving trend with a value of 0.405²⁰ in 2022. Also, the % of women who hold seats in parliament, increased from 25.5% in 2017 to 29.4 percent in 2023 (Suriname Gender Score Card, World Bank, 2023). Gender based violence remains nevertheless pervasive despite efforts by the government (Freedom House, 2024). And while women outperform men in school in Suriname, their labor force participation rates (% for aged 15+) is 44,7% compared to 64.1% for men. Also, only 33% of firms have female participation in ownership (Suriname Poverty and Equity Assessment, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, 2024).

The trend of youth unemployment (% labor force 15-24) **is worsening** with 37.8% for young women and 17.8% for young men (Suriname Gender Score Card, World Bank 2024).

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¹⁹ Between 0 and 1: higher is greater inequality – UNDP <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-index#/indicies/GII>



PART I – BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEXT AND PAST EU ENGAGEMENT

1.1. The State of Civil Society

A. Brief overview of the landscape of CSOs in Suriname

Civil society in Suriname is comprised of formal and informal groups and organizations. Formal organisations are registered in the “Register of Foundations of the Chamber of Commerce”. Some are entirely autonomous of the state, while others depend on it. Movements and many community-based organisations are not formally registered. BINI²¹, the (Citizens' Initiative for Participation and Good Governance) for example is an informal platform of civil society organizations and individual citizens who advocate for a human rights-based approach to development as central to policy; more transparency and accountability of the State, as well as inclusiveness and participation in decision -making.

According to consulted CSOs, while the number of formally registered CSOs has been on the steady increase, many of them are non active. There is no general overview of civil society nor is there information readily available about the number of civil society organisations in Suriname. Consulted CSO’s main sources of finance are endogenous – mainly self-finance, the government of Suriname and the private sector. Many of the more established CSOs work at the national level. They are particularly engaged in human rights and related activities that target low-income families, women, youth and children, persons with disabilities, the elderly, indigenous and tribal peoples and hinterland communities. They mainly work on themes related to social protection, food security, healthcare, education, agriculture and rural development. Some are also engaged in forestry, the environment and climate change. CSOs are instrumental in awareness raising of local communities and implementing socio-economic initiatives and actions and that enhance human development, welfare, livelihood and social care for (vulnerable) groups. Civil society also plays a key role in lobbying and advocating for human rights, democracy, good governance and the environment.

Most civil society organisations are actively engaged in networking with other CSOs – mostly within their own sector or theme of activity as there is no overarching CSO umbrella organisation in Suriname. They conduct fact-based research, form alliances, stimulate debates on policies and strategic priorities, influence government agenda setting, monitor government policies and engage in advocacy and related policy dialogue and decision-making processes.

B. The enabling environment for CSOs

The freedoms of CSOs is enshrined in the Constitution of 1987 in Article 52. **Freedom of peaceful assembly and association and freedom of expression**²², are also guaranteed by the constitution and are generally respected (Freedom House, 2024). Nongovernmental organisations, including those engaged in human rights and governance related work, can function freely (Freedom House, 2024). In 2023, the government required permits for groups to protest - openly criticizing government officials, primarily the President, led to some arrests.²³ The very harsh defamation law,²⁴ can indeed constrain the freedom of expression – also among civil society and the media. Workers are free to join independent trade unions which are actively

²¹ Burgerinitiatief voor Participatie en Goed Bestuur (BINI) or Citizens' Initiative for Participation and Good Governance - <https://www.facebook.com/BurgerinitiatiefSR>

²² Including for members of the press and other media

²³ U.S. Department of State, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/suriname/>

²⁴ Providing for penalties for convictions, with prison terms of up to seven years in prison for “public expression of hate” toward the government – Reporters without Borders, 2022 - https://rsf.org/en/analyse_regionale/785



involved in politics – only isolated occurrences were reported of private sector employers denying collective bargaining rights to unions (Freedom House, 2024).

The Global Freedom Score (Freedom House, 2024) gives Suriname a 79 out of 100, putting the country into the “free” category. **Civicus has rated Suriname 77 out of 100 in 2023**, pushing the country into the “narrowed” category since 2022. This change in status from “open” to “narrowed” was however not due to changes in the situation on the ground but rather to the addition of new indicators for the year 2022. (Civicus Monitor of Civic Space 2023 – Civicus Monitor Report of 2019 and 2022). The **Core Civil Society Index (CCSI)**²⁵ confirms the above, as it has not been under 0.93 since 2020. It measures the extent to which government represses civil society; whether it controls the entry and exit of CSOs in public life and the extent to which people are involved in CSOs. The CCSI therefore gives more granular insights into the trends. **The control of the entry and exit** of CSOs is minimal²⁶ and this has stayed the same throughout 2020-2023. Consulted civil society organisations did not report related challenges. Indeed, formal civil society organisations are registered as associations, cooperatives, unions and foundations, in the “Register of Foundations of the Chamber of Commerce”. Many civil society organisations (CSOs) are registered as “foundation” under the “1968 Foundations Act” which refers to a foundation as “a legal entity created by a juridical act, which has no members, and which intends to achieve a specific goal with the aid of capital intended for that purpose”.

In terms of repression of CSOs, the score for 2020²⁷ indicates that it was moderate while 2021 and 2022²⁸ showed weak repression scores. Unfortunately, 2023²⁹, shows a trend of increasing repression against civil society with a score closer to “substantial repression”. This trend is echoed by the consultations with civil society: while for the previous (2021-2024) Roadmap, consultations revealed that 62% of consulted CSOs believed that the enabling environment for civil society organisations was only moderately supportive, this time 71% share this finding. Main reported hurdles were similar to the previous roadmap - a lack of dialogue with the government and understanding of the role of civil society; corruption, clientelism and red tape. Sustainable finance, qualified personnel, institutional capacity support mechanisms were also highlighted. Consulted organisations furthermore identified the need to clarify the non-profit status of CSOs and raised concerns about occasional constrained freedom of expression and underlined that political affiliation seems to matter more than the expertise brought by the civil society sector. Nevertheless, and in contradiction, while in the current consultation, only 15% of consulted civil society organisation reported a status quo in their enabling environment in the last five years, 60% indicate they noted a slight improvement. A forward-looking lens however unveils less optimism: only one third believes the situation will improve, a bit less than one third thinks it will get worse and one fourth reported believing in a future status quo. Compared to the previous roadmap consultation, civil society finds the international community less supportive in enhancing their enabling environment: whereas previously, 46% of consulted CSOs found the international community supportive, only 25% report this in the recent consultation. The percentage of CSOs reporting a moderate support remains similar (45% previously and 42% recently). To improve this, civil society hinted at a need for more adapted financing mechanisms that gives access to smaller local CSOs; support for institutional capacity strengthening and stronger dialogue mechanisms between civil society and the government as well as between civil society and the EU, its member states and likeminded donors.

The extent to which the government shares information, empowers people with tools to hold the government accountable, and fosters citizen participation in public policy deliberations, is measured by the Open

²⁵ With 0 being the minimum score and 1 being the maximum score - V-Dem https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/

²⁶ With a score of 2.81 (Minimal level of control requires a score of 3) - https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/ (input under search “Suriname” and under indicator “CSO control and exit”)

²⁷ With a score of 1.85 (Moderate repression of CSO requires a score of 2) - https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/ (input under search “Suriname” and under indicator “CSO repression”)

²⁸ With a score of 2.7 – Source: *ibid* 27

²⁹ With a score of 1,29 (Substantial repression requires a score of 1) – Source: *Ibid* 27



Government Index.³⁰ With an overall low score (0.38 in 2023)³¹, this index has been stable since 2020. Suriname indeed has no law to facilitate access to public information and access is in practice limited.³² Sub-scores for the Open Government Index, related to the **right to information (0,29 in 2024)**³³, and the **publication of law and government data** (0.32 (2020-2021), 0.34 (2022-2024)) are indeed low (but improving) and mirror this reality.

In terms of citizen participation in public policy deliberations, the government may consult with relevant stakeholders on regulations³⁴, but there is no required public process. The government presents draft laws and regulations to the Council of Ministers for discussion and approval. Once approved, the President’s advisory body, the State Council, considers the draft. If approved, the government presents a draft to the National Assembly for discussion, amendment, and approval, and then to the President for signature. Legislation only goes into effect with the signature of the President and after publication in the National Gazette. The enforcement mechanisms to ensure the government follows administrative processes are not public and are almost non-existent. There are also no centralized online locations where key regulatory actions, or their summaries, are published. Currently, a draft public administration law is with the National Assembly for discussion.³⁵

The extent to which people are involved in CSOs³⁶, shows overall a positive evolution of popular trust in civil society: while in 2020, voluntary CSOs existed but few people were active in them (score of 1.14 in 2020³⁷), in 2023, there is an increasingly diverse CSO landscape and more people consider it normal to be at least occasionally active in at least one of the CSOs (score of 2.63).

The freedom and independence of media in Suriname, has a score of 3 out of 4 (Freedom House, 2024) and is guaranteed by the constitution. The media sector in Suriname is fairly diverse - despite the very harsh defamation law,³⁸ the press is frequently critical of government while some journalist self-censor in response to pressure or intimidation from authorities. Three security agents of the Vice President were for example found guilty and sentenced by the court of an attack on journalist Jason Pinas and the theft of his cell phone in December 2021.³⁹

In general, there haven’t been government restrictions on access to the internet. In 2022 and 2023 however, journalists, members of the political opposition, their supporters, and other independent entities alleged government interference with and unlawful oversight of email and social media accounts. During riots in

³⁰ Open Government Index, 2024 - Word Justice Project - <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2024/Suriname/Open%20Government/>

³¹ With a maximum score of 1

³² Right to information: 0.30 (2020) 0.27 (2021), 0.31 (2022), 0.32 (2023), 0.29 (2024) – Publicised law and government data: 0.32 (2020-2021), 0.34 (2022-2024) - Complaints Mechanism: 0.38 (2020), 0.37 (2021-2022), 0.36 (2023), 0.38 (2024)– Civic Participation: 0.56 (2020), 0.55 (2021), 0.53 (2022), 0.52 (2023), 0.53 (2024) - Open Government Index - Word Justice Project - <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2024/Suriname/Open%20Government/>

³³ Right to information: 0.30 (2020) 0.27 (2021), 0.31 (2022), 0.32 (2023), 0.29 (2024)

³⁴ Rule-making and regulatory authority exists within relevant ministries at the national level.

³⁵ U.S Department of State, 2024 - Investment Climate Statements: Suriname - <https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/suriname/>

³⁶ A score of means 1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them; 2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal; 3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them – V-Dem.

³⁷ Close to the score of 1 meaning the voluntary CSOs exist but that few people are active in them

³⁸ Providing for penalties for convictions, with prison terms of up to seven years in prison for “public expression of hate” toward the government - https://rsf.org/en/analyse_regionale/785

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, 2023 - <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/suriname/>



February 2023, access to certain internet sites was restricted by authorities to ensure rioters could not share information, resulting in general restrictions on the internet for all.⁴⁰

Suriname has not yet an independent National Human Rights Institute.⁴¹ A draft law, adhering to the Paris Principles and taking into account consultations with indigenous peoples and tribal communities as well as civil society, is at the National Assembly but has not been promulgated. It is currently the Human Rights Office of the Ministry of Justice and Police that advises the government on regional and international proceedings against the state concerning human rights. It also prepares the state's response to various international human rights reports. Its effectiveness and independence however are limited, since it is under executive branch control. The legislative branch and the president's cabinet maintain their own human rights commissions.⁴²

As an upper middle income country, access to overseas development assistance (ODA) is limited and there is a clear trend of decreasing ODA grants: 26,3 million USD in 2020, 23,7 million USD in 2021 and 15 million USD in 2022.⁴³ The share of combined ODA grants of the EU institutions and the DAC EU Members,⁴⁴ provides respectively for 43%, 31% and 29% of the grand total of ODA grants of Suriname. The main EU member state ODA grant providers, are the Netherlands and France.⁴⁵ Multilaterals are the main ODA grant providers in Suriname. The UN, the EU and Canada are the main development partners that support civil society with grant schemes. Other types of support also come from France – e.g. in the framework of the 2024 Olympics or by bringing in specialised expertise. The Netherlands foresees to grant 66 million Euros as a compensation for its colonial past in Suriname. Half of it is for low-threshold social initiatives and the other half for policy. Whether the former will also benefit civil society organization initiatives is still unclear as it is mainly targeted at descendants. The sustainable development potential of remittances is substantial: in 2021, the remittances accounted for 170.4 million USD according to IOM.⁴⁶

There is no institutionalized capacity strengthening mechanism in place for civil society in Suriname and consultations revealed that there is little access for CSOs to capacity strengthening - even on an ad hoc basis.

C. CSOs involvement in domestic policies

Political accountability of governments can be enforced through vertical, horizontal, and diagonal accountability.⁴⁷ Diagonal accountability **depends on the civil society and media effectiveness and hence, their capacities to hold the government accountable.** This effectiveness is very highly rated for Suriname with a score of 0.92 for 2023 and very minimal variations in this trend since 2015.⁴⁸ This means that despite the above-mentioned challenges, the range of actions and mechanisms that citizen, civil society organisations,

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of State, 2023 - <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/suriname/>

⁴¹ <https://ccprcentre.org/ccprpages/is-there-a-national-human-rights-institution-in-suriname>

⁴² U.S. Department of State, 2022 - <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/suriname/>

⁴³ In million USD: grand total of ODA grants in 2020 : 26,3 ; 2021 : 23,7 ; 2022 : 15. – OECD, 2024, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/fbd9569c-en-fr>.

⁴⁴ In million USD: Combined ODA grants of the EU institutions and the DAC EU Members are in 2020 : 11,4 ; 2021 : 7,3 ; 2022 : 4,3. – OECD, 2024, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/fbd9569c-en-fr>.

⁴⁵ In million USD: the Netherlands (2020 : 4,6 ; 2021 : 2,6 ; 2022 : 1,1) - France (2020 : 0,8 ; 2021 : 0,7, 2022 : 0,6) – Belgium 2020 : 0,4 ; 2021 : 0,2 ; 2022 : 0,1 - Germany 2020 : 0,1 ; 2021 : 0,1 ; 2022 : 0,1 – OECD, 2024, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/fbd9569c-en-fr>.

⁴⁶ IOM, 2024 - <https://www.iom.int/countries/suriname>

⁴⁷ Vertical (electoral) accountability: institutions and actions that make the government accountable to the people through elections or political parties. Horizontal accountability: the checks and balances that are in place and used by the legislative and judicial branches of government to hold the executive branch accountable – V-Dem - https://v-dem.net/media/publications/pb_22_final.pdf

⁴⁸ With a score never going under 0.92 since 2015 (with a maximum score of 1)



and independent media use to hold the government accountable⁴⁹, is broad and that civil society is robust in its engagement.

A lack of institutionalized public consultation processes however, combined with limited access to information and a civil society ecosystem that is constrained in its networking, makes it nevertheless challenging for civil society to play its governance role. This is also reflected in the overall the Open Government Index⁵⁰ for 2023, which has a very low score, as mentioned in section B, and the V-Dem Civil Society Participation Index⁵¹ sub-score (“CSO consultation”), measuring the extent to which civil society organizations are routinely consulted by policymakers. It indicates for 2020 and 2021 that CSOs are consulted “to some degree (0.91) while in 2022, the score shows that “more consultations were taking place” (1.33). Unfortunately, this hasn’t set a trend as the score for 2023 (0,73), shows a situation that is worse than in the 2020-2021 years.⁵² Indeed, CSOs remain skeptical about the extent of their involvement in shaping national policies: 76% of consulted civil society organisations found that participation in both formulation and monitoring of public policy implementation, is limited to a few specific cases⁵³ while 57% indicated they participate with the government in the formulation of and / or monitoring of the implementation of public policies - of which 82% happens at the national level and 18% at district level. Indeed, while at the local level, the regulatory framework foresees for an institutionalized mechanism to facilitate structural consultation, dialogue and involvement of citizens in the policy-making cycle, it wasn’t mentioned by civil society organisations as particularly relevant to effective civic participation in policies. At the national level, the government occasionally hosts public consultations with the participation of civil society. Civil society organisations actively participate in those - whether on topics like human rights; gender, inclusion and women’s rights; youth; indigenous and tribal people; rural and hinterland communities; the environment and climate change or forestry. However, these consultations mostly do take place on an ad hoc basis. The consulted CSOs reported they participated in more institutionalized mechanisms to facilitate structural consultation/ dialogue in the policy-making cycle related to human rights⁵⁴; civic space; the environment / climate change⁵⁵ and forestry.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the civil society organisations that took part in it, perceived that their participation only had a marginal influence. Civil society furthermore reported that topics related to transparency and accountability of the government, indigenous land rights, human rights abuses, land property / reforms and extractive industries are difficult to engage on with government.

While there are thematic or location-based platforms, coalitions, and alliances (as will be further described in the next section), civil society does not have a unified, comprehensive engagement with the authorities in formulating public policies and decision making – e.g. through an CSO umbrella organization. The technical capacity challenges that many CSOs face, furthermore impede civil society in their contribution to public

⁴⁹ Formal and informal tools such as social mobilization and investigative journalism - Diagonal Accountability Index - V-Dem

⁵⁰ Open Government Index, Word Justice Project - <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2024/Suriname/Open%20Government/> - measures the openness of government defined by the extent to which a government shares information, empowers people with tools to hold the government accountable, and fosters citizen participation in public policy deliberations. This factor measures whether basic laws and information on legal rights are publicized and evaluates the quality of information published by the government.

⁵¹ V-Dem - https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/ - (input under search “Suriname” and under indicator “CSO consultation”)

⁵² Source: Ibid 51

⁵³ 24% say there is no participation of civil society organisations

⁵⁴ The presidential commission, ESAV (Het Platform van Inheemsen in Suriname in Eenheid Solidariteit Alliantie en Vooruitgang), ISOS (Integrale Samenwerking van Organisaties het Speciale Hulpvraag), Monitorings team for people in situation of handicap.

⁵⁵ Ministry of Spatial Planning and Environment. Some examples of topics on which there was a successful dialogue with the government are: National Biodiversity Strategy, National Adaptation Plan, Nationally Determined Contribution

⁵⁶ 32 % with the Stichting Bosbeheer en Bostoezicht – the REDD+ Strategy was cited as a good example for government / CSO dialogue



policy discussions. Consultations with civil society have furthermore highlighted that a degree of distrust among some CSOs is a hindrance to a strong civil society ecosystem in Suriname. As a result, collaboration and networking can be strained and issues of transparency persist. This trend is also reflected in Suriname's low global ranking for "Social Capital" (95th out of 167) with especially low scores for "interpersonal trust" (160th out of 167) (Legatum prosperity index, 2023). This low social capital score is echoed by the ranking given to Suriname, by SolAbility (139 out of 180 - "Social Capital Index", SolAbility, 2023). Suriname is considered more as a collectivistic society based on consensus in which people value equality, solidarity, loyalty and where conflicts are resolved by compromise and negotiation. The combination of the latter, with high scores on power distance (85 out of 100) and uncertainty avoidance (92 out of 100) mean an acceptance of a hierarchical order, a trend to favor centralization of power, clear rules, security and less openness to innovation (The culture factor, 2024).⁵⁷ These trends help to understand (civil) society dynamics in Suriname, the way they impact the civil ecosystem and their impact on the influence and the position of civil society as a collective vis-à-vis government.

There are however interesting examples of more structural engagement from civil society side.

BINI (Citizens' Initiative for Participation and Good Governance)⁵⁸ the civil society platform that brings together 20 key CSOs of Suriname and individual citizens who advocate for a human rights-based approach to development as central to policy; more transparency and accountability of the State, as well as inclusiveness and participation in decision-making is coordinated the CSO Projekta. It has published reports related to policy monitoring (e.g. 2017-2019) and also actively participates in policy spaces and decision-making processes of the government.

Inspired by the Jamaican experience, in June 2023, the business association from Suriname (Vereniging Surinaams Bedrijfsleven) together with the Banking association, entered into a partnership with the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance and Planning. Their Suriname Economic Oversight Board⁵⁹ is a permanent advice and monitoring Commission for the government for the implementation of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the government's recovery plan.

At the international level, in 2024, Projekta⁶⁰ has also coordinated the submission of a shadow report⁶¹ supplementing Suriname's report in the framework of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - with the support of EU supported "Stand With Us" programme.

With regards to the involvement of CSOs in the priority area of the EU, (i.e. the so-called bilateral level), consulted organisations working in the Forestry sector and climate change - also working with indigenous people, rural and hinterland communities - indicated they were all invited in the policy dialogue in their area of expertise and also participated in policy dialogue with the EU. Some organisations were also involved in the framework of a multilateral forum related to policy and programmes in the forestry sector.

D. CSOs' capacities and networking

⁵⁷ Scores 37 on motivation towards achievement and success – The culture factor, 2024 - <https://www.theculturefactor.com/country-comparison-tool?countries=suriname>

⁵⁸ Burgerinitiatief voor Participatie en Goed Bestuur (BINI)- <https://www.facebook.com/BurgerinitiatiefSR>

⁵⁹ Suriname Economic Oversight Board - <http://seob.sr/dashboards/macro-economische-indicatoren>

⁶⁰ Projekta, BINI (Citizens' Initiative for Participation and Good Governance) and the VIDS were live in Geneva, backed up by virtual participation of Projekta, VIDS, the LGBT Platform and WSW. They presented the shadow reports of Projekta, VIDS and LGBT Platform together, and the VIDS additionally apart, to members of the committee, and entered into consultation on them.

⁶¹ a method for non-government organisations (NGOs) to supplement and / or present alternative information to reports governments are required to submit under human rights treaties



Civil Society Organisations' readiness for their role can be evaluated from two primary perspectives: individual capacity and structural capacity. From an individual perspective, there are several intermediate CSOs in Suriname which possess the necessary competence, knowledge, and expertise to effectively carry out their work. Most of these organisations count less than five remunerated staff and can also rely on a number of volunteers. A handful have a more solid human resource base.⁶²

Their main sources of finance are endogenous.⁶³ They therefore do not need to comply with more complex reporting requirements of international donors and are also less driven by development partner priorities. Indeed, some civil society organisations in Suriname report having different needs than what calls for proposals from international donors fund⁶⁴ and whenever they want to participate in a call for proposals, there are several barriers: it is a substantial investment for their organization, many do not have the capacities to respond and often do not know how to fit in their work in the objectives of calls for proposals. Many also do not meet specific donor criteria (of financial thresholds). They therefore have no access to such funding. They are therefore not only constrained because of their capacities but also due to external constraints (i.e. the so-called structural capacity).

The vast majority of these middle-sized CSOs work at the national level and are based in Paramaribo - some of them are also based in districts. They are often well rooted in communities and operate in areas entailing some form of service provision, the promotion of socio-economic initiatives, awareness raising of local communities and capacity strengthening - less CSOs are engaged in monitoring of government policy and related policy dialogue. They however face challenges in their interaction with their constituencies: mainly the lack of resources for successful communication, difficulties with in-country logistics and in a lesser manner, insecurity. The blurring of norms and values within target groups (sense of responsibility), poor living conditions and financial stress also affects participation in the CSO initiatives.

Apart from these nation-wide CSOs and the probable hundreds, if not thousands of grass roots and community-based organisations (several of which remain informal), there is a smaller pool of CSOs which are regular partners of the EU and other relevant donors. This common pool of well-established organizations is much smaller.

International NGOs such as WWF Guianas and Conservation International are also amongst the donor implementing partners.

Resource constraints -as briefly assessed under section B- pose a recurrent challenge for CSOs in Suriname, encompassing financial limitations and a shortage of qualified human resources. The brain drain combined with staff leaving once they are trained and limited interest of youth to build a career in the non-profit sector, results in an overall unrepresentative civil society sector in terms of demography.

It is in this context that the majority of consulted CSOs indicated a strong need for access to institutional capacity strengthening as well as mastering the logical framework approach, project cycle management and financial management.

78% of consulted CSOs are member of a platform or network⁶⁵ which are all thematic or location based. As mentioned in sections A and C, there is no overarching network of CSOs in Suriname. While the BINI platform

⁶² between 5 and less than 20

⁶³ Self-finance, government, private sector

⁶⁴ E.g. infrastructure such as buildings or core funding

⁶⁵ Governance: BINI (Burgerinitiatief voor participatie en goed bestuur), Forestry: Tropenbos Internationaal Network, Climate and the environment: Groene NGO's, Water and sanitation: Waterplatform, Gender and women's rights: Gender platform (+ Nickerie), platform huiselijk geweld; LGBTQI rights: LGBTQI platform, People living with disability: Monitoring mensen met beperking; Indigenous and tribal people and their rights: VIDS, OSIP, OIS, IKSUR, ESAV, KAMPOS; and others: People Drug demand reduction network, Sex workers network, FIBOS - Federatie van instellingen bijzonder onderwijs Suriname, and at the district level: Change Nickerie Network



is a promising initiative, overall the civil society ecosystem remains relatively fragmented and is characterized by a lack of effective and efficient mechanisms for the exchange of knowledge and information and for periodic meetings between CSOs. While an unanimous agreement on the overarching vision is crucial for coalitions to succeed, the understanding among coalition members of their individual roles and how they contribute to the collective vision while pursuing their specific objectives is equally important: a broader coordination and coalition-building around shared interests, evidence-based lobbying and advocacy necessitates a shift from an individual-centric approach to a more collaborative mind-set (we) inside civil society. Otherwise, the CSOs that would like to be more effective stakeholders in decision- and policymaking, will remain confined in a role of service provider and charity. In this context, consulted CSOs stressed the need to strengthen the capacities of civil society to conduct rigorous research and recognize disinformation and fake news; draft position statements and policy papers; maintain effective communication to participate in substantive policy dialogue and undertake evidence-based advocacy with the government.

Only a few CSOs are member of regional and international platforms or cooperate at regional and international levels.⁶⁶

With a small population of which two thirds are based in Paramaribo, people across society, whether in the private sector, the government or civil society, are often familiar with each other. While this may give an impression of proximity, beside the very useful informal ad hoc exchanges, the need for more formalized platforms in which structured exchanges among the different actors can take place, is tangible: among civil society actors – across sectors, between civil society and their constituencies, between governments and civil society and also multistakeholder platforms including the private sector.

1.2. Lessons learnt from the EU engagement with the civil society

As indicated in Section C, the EU has had a strong engagement with civil society working in forestry - as the Suriname Forest Partnership is the EU's priority area in Suriname. The Suriname Forest Partnership aims at improving forest governance; enhancing livelihood opportunities of forest communities; increasing payment for ecosystem services (PES) and forest carbon finance; as well as protecting and restoring mangrove forests. A Team Europe Initiative (TEI) "Sustainable Forest Livelihoods Programme for communities in Guyana and Suriname" has kicked off with a first Steering Committee in January 2024 and will be implemented until 2027. It is funded by the European Union in partnership with the Agence Française de Développement and implemented by both WWF-Guianas and "Stichting Bosbeheer en Bostoezicht" (SBB) - the National Forestry Authority under the authority of the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Land and Forest Management. Given the importance of tribal and indigenous communities living in the forest areas in safeguarding biodiversity, their poverty and marginalization (cfr. supra), the TEI will strengthen: the capacities of local communities to improve governance with regards to forest resources and enhance the sustainability of nature- and forest-based livelihoods and related opportunities for indigenous, tribal, and local communities - At the time of drafting the Roadmap, the project was about to start designing a grant scheme based on calls for proposal to support civil society.

Support measures are also foreseen to support civil society to leverage the impact of the 2021-2027 Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) implementation in Suriname and the Guyana-Suriname Team Europe Initiative. In this framework, indigenous and tribal civil society organisations oversight capacities, skills and knowledge will be strengthened to enhance their participation in policy dialogue and decision making

⁶⁶ e.g. in the framework of Latindadd, Debt Justice UK, Caribbean Policy Center, Lions.



processes as well as their capacities to take up a watchdog role in areas relevant to the EU-Suriname Forest Partnership. At the time of drafting the Roadmap, the tendering for these support measure was ongoing.

It is also recommended to continue supporting civil society participation in relevant associated multilateral fora, steering committees of projects and in policy dialogue (with the EU and the government) in the framework related bilateral and TEI programmes. It could also be useful to provide relevant CSOs with small funds to provide alternative analyses and continue where possible, to create space for civil society participation in government decision making processes.

The EU has also supported forest governance through the CSO thematic budget line by promoting the articulation between community development plans from Maroon tribes and development plans at the resort and district levels - to prevent deforestation. The action thereby contributed to climate change mitigation, it enhanced livelihood opportunities for the communities, strengthened community participation and provided financial support for six community-based organizations (CBO) - particularly women led CBOs. It also contributed to the reconciliation of data collected in the field with national data on forest health and to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change reporting. This action was implemented by an international NGO and CSO from Suriname.

It would be recommended that the EU and Team Europe convenes meetings to facilitate exchanges among CSOs supported by the EU and TEI, in the forestry sector to exchange with the EU and each other to learn from each other and amplify each other's efforts to participate in decision making processes and policy dialogue.

The EU thematic budget line support (Civil Society Organisations, Human Rights and Democracy) has furthermore adopted a more systemic approach to strengthening thematic civil society ecosystems in Suriname related to LGBTQI+ rights ("Stand by Us") and a more place based thematic civil society ecosystem strengthening approach to improving systems for victims of domestic violence and child sexual abuse in Nickerie (Change Nickerie!). All of these actions, implemented by CSOs from Suriname, have ended in 2024 - except "Pride Alliance", also related to LGBTQI+ rights that ends by mid-2026.

Based on these experiences of EU systemic engagement with civil society ecosystem strengthening; the civil society consultations in Suriname; and key findings that there is a lack of sustainable capacity strengthening mechanisms combined with constrained networking in the civil society ecosystem; it is recommended to **continue to adopt and broaden the ecosystem strengthening approach**, by:

- **Reducing the ad hoc approach for capacity strengthening of civil society organisations** by putting in place a more sustainable capacity strengthening mechanism for civil society in Suriname e.g. through a CSO school with blended learning.
- **Strengthening a wider range of individual organisations** - Paramaribo and district based smaller CSOs as well as grassroot organisations in the hinterland through tailored support and engagement strategies based on realities, needs, and aspirations of CSOs. It is therefore recommended to combine cascade funding (to give small grants to CSOs) with practice-based capacity building based on an analysis of the relevant CSO actors.
- **Continuing to empower support organisations that create conditions for diverse civil society actors to be an active part of a more vibrant ecosystems** by e.g. stimulating the willingness and highlighting the benefits of working together; promoting collaborations between unusual suspects by e.g. coordinating collective input into policy on specific themes; by finding innovative ways to better connect CSOs with their constituencies.



- **Mapping and identifying groups⁶⁷ to set up an umbrella CSO platform** with an aim to build a more a collective civil society perspective and strengthening the connections of CSO from Paramaribo, district based smaller CSOs as well as grassroot organisations in the hinterland with other civil society organisations in the places in which they are active; within the sector in which they operate in and beyond their area or sector of operation. The umbrella CSO platform should enable CSOs to meet and exchange more often to e.g.:
 - Engage in information and knowledge exchange
 - Increase visibility of what happens in the CSO sector
 - Map, analyze and document know-how and tap into the diversity and strength of civil society by strategically leveraging the different roles that civil society actors play and cross sectoral approaches
 - Invest in shared learning, knowledge production and dissemination
 - Experiment with joining up strategies, joint advocacy and mutualization of resources
 - Deepen connections with civil servants and government leadership to:
 - Enhance their understanding of the role of civil society
 - Enhance civil society involvement through systematic and structural involvement in decision making processes, policy formulation, monitoring and implementation
 - Engage with international development partners on e.g. key advocacy topics and strategic CSO funding

Overall, outside of the scope of its priority area, the engagement of the EU with civil society has been more as a funding partner while actively engaging in public diplomacy events with those organisations. Systematic information sharing about its activities in the country and broader civil society engagement on policy issues hasn't been a common practice. **It is therefore recommended to expand the engagement of the EU with civil society in Suriname in order for civil society to get better insights of the EU's activities in Suriname and gain more proximity with the EU Delegation** - which is based in Guyana. In this framework, it is recommended to regularly and formally inform civil society about ongoing and future EU programs; to consult and involve civil society during the formulation phase of new programs / projects, during external monitoring and evaluation and during the preparation of the new programming (post 2027 EU programme). In the consultation, civil society suggested -as a best practice- to set-up of a grievance mechanism for EU projects.

Consultations with civil society highlighted that in 2018 and 2019, CSO had been consulted by the EU prior to its political dialogue with the government. Resuscitating this practice, would inform the EU's perspective with civil society experiences and positions on key policy issues. It would also broaden the scope of its partnership with civil society. To ensure the continuity of the dialogue, a group of civil society representatives could meet on quarterly basis with the EU, its member states and like-minded donors - to exchange on key policy issues. Once a year, this could be expanded to a broader group of CSOs for networking purposes

⁶⁷ It is key in this framework, to work with existing networks (78% of consulted CSOs are members of one)

PART II – EU STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN TO ENGAGE WITH CSOs

KEY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES	PRIORITIES FOR EU ENGAGEMENT WITH CS	ACTIONS/ACTIVITIES	INDICATIVE MEANS
<p>Ad hoc capacity strengthening of CSOs</p> <p>Access for civil society to capacity strengthening is limited</p> <p>Smaller and mid-sized CSO have no access to EU funding</p> <p>Weak civil society ecosystem</p> <p>Constraints for CSOs to connect with their constituencies</p> <p>CSOs are not informed of EU instruments and activities in Suriname</p> <p>CSOs face barriers in terms of capacities to develop proposals and report in line with EU standards and</p>	<p>1. Contribute to capacity strengthening efforts of civil society</p>	<p>1.1 Support capacity strengthening of a broader range of local CSOs (in number and type⁶⁸) working on country priorities such as natural resources protection & management, climate change, hinterland communities and indigenous tribal peoples’ rights; women’s rights, gender equality and children’s rights, the elections and other relevant issues - by integrating incentives in the calls for proposals and connecting the organisations that strengthen their capacities – e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Include a % of funds to be earmarked for tailored practice-based capacity strengthening, based on an analysis of relevant CSO actors • Promote adapted funding mechanisms allowing to reach actors which cannot be reached directly by the EU – e.g. using Financial Support to Third Parties using adapted procedures (including, although not limited to sub-granting - combined with practice-based capacity strengthening) • Promote the set-up of a sustainable capacity strengthening mechanism for a wide range of CSOs with communities of practice in which CSO staff dealing with similar capacity challenges can exchange • Support institutional strengthening (including international fundraising, financial autonomy; strategies for the rejuvenation of human resources; as well as CSO ecosystem-building); strengthening capacities in project cycle management, the logical framework; effective networking and partnership building, oversight capacities, fostering collective inclusive action, advocacy, drafting policy papers, conducting evidence-based research and recognizing disinformation to enhance participation in policy dialogue and decision making processes and take up a watchdog role • Support strengthening capacities of hinterland grassroots organisations by combining demand driven activities to improve community livelihoods with activities to empower them to improve governance with regards to forest resources and enhance the sustainability of nature- and forest-based livelihoods: e.g. increase knowledge of their rights and ways to enforce them, strengthen 	<p>Thematic budget lines – CSO, HR&D</p> <p>Suriname Forest Partnership - Support Measures</p> <p>TEI “Sustainable Forest Livelihoods Programme for communities in Guyana and Suriname”</p>

⁶⁸ Paramaribo and district based smaller and middle sized CSOs as well as grassroots organisations in the hinterland

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contractual procedures		<p>their connections and exchanges with other similar grassroots organisations and the broader CSO ecosystem to work on the root causes of their challenges.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen capacities, skills and knowledge of indigenous and tribal civil society organisations relevant to the EU-Suriname Forest Partnership to connect with their constituencies and enhance their participation in policy dialogue and decision-making processes as well as their oversight capacities to take up a watchdog role in the forestry sector • Promote trainings as a platform to establish connections between unusual suspects and organisations that are not familiar to each other • Promote innovative ways for CSOs to connect to their constituencies • Promote meaningful gender balanced involvement and youth engagement through intergenerational mentoring in CSOs led initiatives to strengthen CSO efforts towards gender equality and inclusion <p>1.2 Provide CSO with information on EU instruments and related processes and procedures and technical support in the areas of proposal development and reporting to comply with EU standards and contractual procedures. Where possible through designated European Commission facilities.</p> <p>1.3 Support the localization of EU development cooperation by actively promoting local CSO coalitions and partnerships with local CSOs, when International NGOs take the lead in projects</p>	<p>EU Delegation Cooperation Section and designated European Commission facilities</p> <p>Thematic budget lines – CSO, HR&D</p>
A civil society ecosystem that is constrained in its networking	2. Strengthen networking among civil society organizations to cultivate a shared yet diverse perspective, enabling them to contribute more effectively to the shaping, implementation,	<p>2.1 Promote the development of a CSO umbrella platform with the aim of building a more collective civil society perspective. The CSO umbrella platform should build on existing thematic and place-based networks. This platform should strengthen connections among CSOs in Paramaribo, district-based smaller CSOs, and grassroots organizations in the hinterland and foster collaboration within and across their localities and sectors - to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthen information exchange, shared learning and knowledge production / dissemination - Leverage the diversity and strengths of civil society expertise and roles and foster cross-sector collaboration 	Thematic budget lines – CSO, HR&D

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	<p>monitoring and evaluation of domestic policies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Amplify the visibility of CSO civil society contributions and achievements - Promote collaboration among civil society for resource pooling, collaborative action, and advocacy etc. - Deepen partnerships with the government; development partners; academia; the private sector; regional, international and global civil society networks – e.g. - Build connections with civil servants and government leaders to enhance understanding of the role of civil society and advocate for more systematic and structural involvement of CSOs in policy formulation and implementation - Engage international development partners on strategic civil society support / funding and key advocacy priorities to amplify influence 	
<p>Dialogue between Team Europe and CSOs is ad hoc (consultations are not structured)</p> <p>Civil Society lacks information about EU actions in Suriname</p> <p>Exchanges among and between civil society working in EU and TEI supported project and the EU / TEI are limited</p> <p>No exchanges with CSOs in preparation of the yearly EU political dialogue</p>	<p>3. Promote the constructive engagement between Team Europe Members, like-minded development partners and CSOs</p>	<p>3.1 Engage civil society in the preparation of the new programming (post 2027 EU programme); in the design, follow up, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of EU-supported actions and programmes (by including their engagement in related terms of reference); in steering committees of projects, in policy dialogue (with the EU and the government) and in relevant multilateral fora in the framework of related EU bilateral and TEI programmes. Provide e.g. relevant CSOs with small funds to provide alternative analyses and where possible, create space for civil society participation in government decision making processes.</p> <p>3.2 Convene meetings to facilitate exchanges among CSO supported by the EU and TEI, in the forestry sector: to stimulate learning by exchanging information, knowledge and experiences with the EU and with each other: and amplify mutual efforts to participate in decision making processes and policy dialogue.</p> <p>3.3 Inform civil society about ongoing and future EU programmes / projects.</p>	<p>EU Delegation Cooperation Section</p> <p>EU Delegation Cooperation Section</p> <p>EU Delegation Cooperation Section</p>

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<p>Dialogue among the EU, EU Member States and like-minded development partners is ad hoc</p>		<p>3.4 Consult civil society organisations for inputs prior to the EU political dialogue with the government of Suriname.</p> <p>3.5 Ensure continuity of the dialogue with civil society (through a group of civil society representatives) on quarterly basis with the EU, its member states and like-minded development partners: to exchange on experiences and key policy issues. Expand this dialogue once a year to a broader group of CSOs for networking purposes and to monitor the implementation of the roadmap.</p> <p>3.6 Strengthen existing and/or create new mechanisms for regular dialogue with the EU, EU Member States and like-minded development partners.</p>	<p>EU Delegation Cooperation and Political Section</p> <p>EU Delegation Cooperation and Political Section</p> <p>EU Delegation Cooperation and Political Section</p>
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PART III– FOLLOW-UP

PRIORITIES	INDICATORS (a base line shall be established in 2024)	SOURCES OF INFORMATION & MEANS OF VERIFICATION
<p>1. Contribute to capacity strengthening efforts of civil society</p>	<p>1.1.a Number of CSO and CSO networks/platforms per district and sector whose capacity has been strengthened through tailored practice-based learning on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Institutional strengthening (organisational governance, human resources and strategies for rejuvenation, finance including, programme, communication, external relations including CSO ecosystem-building, fundraising and financial autonomy) – Project cycle management and the logical framework – Effective networking, fostering collective inclusive action and partnership building – Oversight capacities, advocacy, drafting policy papers, conducting evidence-based research, recognizing disinformation – Participation in policy dialogue – Connecting with their constituencies 	<p>EU project reports</p>
	<p>1.1.b Number of CSOs of hinterland grassroots organisations supported by combining demand driven activities to improve community livelihoods with activities that empower them to improve governance with regards to forest resources and enhance the sustainability of nature- and forest-based livelihoods</p>	<p>EU project reports</p>
	<p>1.1.c A sustainable capacity strengthening mechanism for a wide range of CSOs is set up</p>	<p>EU project reports</p>
	<p>1.1.d Number of CSOs led initiatives to set up intergenerational mentoring for a gender balanced involvement of young people in civil society</p>	<p>EU project reports</p>
	<p>1.2.a Number of CSOs who benefitted from technical support in the areas of: proposal development and reporting to comply with EU standards and contractual procedures.</p>	<p>Training attendance list</p>
	<p>1.3.a Number of projects supported by the thematic budget lines that are implemented by local CSO coalitions or partnerships with local CSOs (when International NGOs take the lead in projects)</p>	<p>EU project documents</p>

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<p>2. Strengthen networking among civil society organizations to cultivate a shared yet diverse perspective, enabling them to contribute more effectively to the shaping, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of domestic policies</p>	<p>2.1 Existence of an operational CSO umbrella platform connected with existing thematic and place-based networks, promoting a more collective civil society perspective and strengthening connections among CSOs in Paramaribo, district-based smaller CSOs, and grassroots organizations in the hinterland - within and across their localities and sectors</p>	<p>EU project report CSO umbrella platform minutes / documents</p>
<p>3. Promote the constructive engagement between Team Europe Members, like-minded development partners and CSOs</p>	<p>3.1.a Number of civil society organisations CSOs actively involved in programming, project formulation, project monitoring and evaluation, and governance structures within the framework of bilateral and TEI actions and programmes in Suriname</p> <p>3.1.b Extent to which CSO involvement in programming, project formulation, project monitoring and evaluation, and governance structures within the framework of bilateral and TEI actions and programmes in Suriname, leads to concrete results (identification of problems, formulation of policy recommendations based on discussions and results, etc.).</p> <p>3.1.c Number of civil society organisations CSOs actively engaged in policy dialogue with the EU and the government that are supported by EU bilateral and TEI programmes with small funds to provide alternative analyses</p> <p>3.1.b Extent to which CSO's active engagement in policy dialogue with the EU and the government, leads to concrete results (formulation of policy recommendations taken up and addressed in minutes and policies).</p>	<p>EU and TEI project reports Minutes of programming preparations</p> <p>EU and TEI project steering committee minutes</p> <p>Project documents, monitoring and evaluation reports of EU and TEI projects</p> <p>EU and TEI forestry sector meeting minutes</p>

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	<p>3.2 Number of meetings per year with exchanges among CSO supported by the EU and TEI in the forestry sector that stimulate learning by exchanging information, knowledge and experiences with the EU and with each other - and amplify mutual efforts to participate in decision making processes and policy dialogue</p>	<p>Meeting minutes with CSOs, the EU and TEI active in the forestry sector</p>
	<p>3.3 Extent to which civil society from Suriname is informed about ongoing and future EU programmes / projects - and number of CSO reached out to</p>	<p>Minutes of Information sharing events, communications</p>
	<p>3.4 Extent to which civil society organisations have been consulted to provide inputs prior to the EU political dialogue with the government of Suriname</p>	<p>CSO - EU political dialogue preparation meeting minutes</p>
	<p>3.5.a Number of encounters organised per year with the EU, EU member states, like-minded development partners and civil society representatives to exchange on experiences and key policy issues</p>	<p>Invitations to and attendance register of EU, EU member states, like-minded development partners and civil society representatives</p>
	<p>3.5.b Extent to which the implementation of the roadmap is monitored by the EU, MS and CS in the yearly dialogue session with a broader group of CSOs</p>	<p>Minutes of yearly roadmap implementation meeting and networking meeting</p>
	<p>3.1 Number of encounters per year in which dialogue with the EU, EU Member States and like-minded development partners about inter alia civil society in Suriname takes place</p>	<p>Meeting minutes</p>

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Process indicators		
INDICATOR	TARGET	BASE LINE INFORMATION AND FURTHER COMMENTS
Involvement of Member States in the RM and like-minded development partners	Member States present in the country are actively involved in the RM process. Like-minded development partners consulted that are active in Suriname	<p>A meeting was conducted specifically with representatives from the European Union (EU) member states -the Netherlands and France, to inform them comprehensively about the process and seek their input on the strategic roadmap for engaging with civil society in Suriname.</p> <p>The first draft of the RM was discussed with EU MS and inputs were gathered from them, resulting in the final version of the RM.</p> <p>In-depth interviews took place with the Inter-American Development Bank Country Representative in Suriname, the Ambassador from the United States of America, Canada’s head of Cooperation responsible for Suriname and the governance focal point from UNDP.</p>
Number and quality of consultations held, number and diversity (in terms of location, sector, capacities) of CSOs consulted regarding the RM.	The RM entails consultations with a broad range of local CSOs. It leads to more permanent and structured dialogue.	<p>The evaluation comprised an online survey that was filled out by 24 organisations, three focus group sessions (in Paramaribo, one in Nickerie and one in Bronsweg) with a combined participation of 34 organisations active in from different districts and sectors, and 5 in-depth interviews conducted with CS experts. CSOs, networks and grassroots organisations were consulted. Women’s and youth organisations and organisations of indigenous people and people living with disability were included in the consultation.</p>
Complementarity of RM vis-à-vis related EU and other Donor partners’ processes.	RMs are complementary to related processes including human rights and democracy country strategies, the rights-based approach to development, gender action plans, etc.	<p>The RMs has been designed in complementarity with the human rights and democracy country strategy as well as with the gender action plan.</p>