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DIRECTION GENERALE POUR L'AIDE HUMANITAIRE & LA PROTECTION CIVILE
Regional Support Office for East and Southern Africa (Nairobi)

RAPPORT DE MISSION

Subject: Djibouti WASH RSO Mission
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Main partners and visited sites list:

Obock:

- WFP : local staff
- UNHCR: Marouanne Tassi (HoSO), Sophie XXX, Paul
- NRC: Sandra Hu (program Manager); local WASH staff
- The Johanniter: Veronique XXX (project manager)
- ONEAD: Chief of local center

Djibouti:

- UNHCR: Paul Ndaitouroum (Representative)
- WFP: Imed Khanfir (Program Manager), Ethienne XXX (new Program Manager)
- UNICEF: Moncef Moalla (deputy Representative), plus WASH project assistant
- The Johanniter: Sandrata Rakotoarison (Country Director)
- DR Congo: Lucas MARTEN-Perolino (Area Manager)
- NRC: Sandra Hu (Program Manager)
- ACF: Marie Christine PIPET (Country Director)
- EU delegation: Jose Puig Vara (chief of cooperation section) ; Christophe Forax (Chief of political section) acting head of delegation in Ambassador Silva absence.
- ONEAD: Phone and email contact with Mr Nachoan Ahmed, project manager at Exploitation Department

Ali Sabeh:

- UNHCR: Nadine XXX (Chief of Sub office), Mohamed XXX (Monitoring officer)
- NRC: Sandra Hu (Program Manager), plus local staff
- WFP: Imed Khanfir (Program Manager), Ethienne XXX (new Program Manager)

Appendices list:

- ❖ 1: Site report Hydrogeological mission Ali Hadded, Center of Hydrogeology CHYN, University of Neuchatel, 2011
- ❖ 2: Ali Sabeh camp, satellite imagery
- ❖ 3: Ali Sabeh, mapping of main facilities
- ❖ 4: Obock site UNHCR proposal camp development lay out

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The visit accompanied by the country TA Heather Blackweel in Djibouti took place during the 20th and the 23rd of July. The priority was to have an overview of the Markazi Yemenis refugee camp situation in Obock. In addition, brief monitoring of activities implemented by partners have been completed as well in Markazi and Ali Sabeh camps. Meeting with main partners and actors took place to better understand plan, challenges and gap encountered within the refugee's response in Djibouti, in terms of WASH.

The tricky aspect of the response in Djibouti is coming from a situation where the refugees population is small (especially Yemenis refugees) but in a complex political, social and environmental environment. Furthermore, the performance level and capacity of the partners on the ground are pretty weak in general and the funds availability very limited which generate a harsh concurrence among the partners and then no real synergy.

The main issues highlighted by the visit are:

- Lack of coordination and involvement of non-traditional humanitarian actors
- Lack of capacity by the partners and government institution and lack of strategic vision
- Lack of adaptation of the response to the context and local capacity
- Limited resources (water, livelihood, funds...)
- Level of assistance and dependency on the relief in Ali Sabeh
- Important gap in terms of solid waste management, hygiene promotion, drainage issues which are barely or not at all addressed so far; but also in operation and maintenance of water and sanitation facilities.

NRC remains the most relevant WASH partners on ground, despite the very low quality level and performance demonstrated during recent monitoring. NRC raised up significantly the capacity on the ground since a month (*new relevant Program and WASH manager, plus two hygiene promotion specialist from Ethiopian Office for short assignment to design the activity, built local capacity and do the set up*).

Furthermore, the others WASH actors are or new or/and capacity hasn't been demonstrated (*notably in the Yemenis refugees response*). The meetings we had with the potential WASH actors did not make us confident with their added value to improve the current level of performance. Changing the partners would not give us insurance that the performance will be higher in the current context.

The situation of water access in Obock remains very tricky. More information's are expected from ONEAD¹ in short time which will be give us a better idea of the level of access and the way to improve it.

Currently in Obock town there is already some shortage of water during the hottest time (July and August) and in the present configuration it seems that the capacity to supply more people from the poor condition hydraulic network is pretty limited and could not exceed present population of refugees (complain from host communities already start as during July and August as because of the heat it is the yearly pick time demands).

A brief update to the report will be done about the Obock water access situation, after reception of those data. The findings will be shared with the delegation as it could be an opportunity to make ours investments complementary.

¹ Organisation National de l'Eau et l'Assainissement de Djibouti

2. CAPACITY OF THE PARTNERS

The general technical skill in WASH and camp management are low, only few relevant WASH proficiency on ground, mainly coming from FAO, UNICEF and now NRC. There is a clear lack of vision for the camp organization and sustainability of action led in all the camp. Most the relief is deliver in the old way with very little input and involvement of the refugees, fortunately it seems that the situation is in progress of improvement, but given the level of dependency from where we start it will take time to progressively increase the community involvement and the sustainability of the services/facilities in place. In addition, so far whoever are the actors there is a serious lack in trying to adapt the relief to the local context. For instance, sometime the level of service in camp can be much better than surrounding host communities, but as much as possible actors are trying to balance service and find some benefit for the host communities with micro finance or share of some services when feasible.

The construction materials and technic to build facilities do not integrate the local capacity and existing construction materials and method. The level of community organization included in the very old camp such as Ali Sabeh (since 1994) is pretty low as the level of ownership. As consequence, the refugee's populations are totally dependent on the relief. Most of refugees in Ali Sabeh express disappointment from the vocational training they got, as it is not leading them to get a job. Somali refugees in the existing camps believe they will be resettled and this has created a lack self-reliance building.

UNHCR :

Markazi: there is a team of 2 persons on the ground, actually living at 45min. drive from the camp, in Tadjoura. The profile of the people in charge seems to don't match the one needed within the context. The head of office is a protection specialist who used to work for the African Union, and it is his first experience with UNHCR dealing with camp management (*so taking into account this parameter the person manage quite well in the context*). Given the confusion in terms of coordination and the difficulty to negotiate and advocate to the government, we need very proactive and creative person with high negotiation skill and a clear vision of the camp setting and sectorial as transectorial issues... Even whether some part of the coordination problem reported can be due to the local confusion and issues highlighted in the section on coordination, some topics/issue could have started to be addressed earlier, such as:

- Harmonization of partners strategy in terms of community approach and incentive
- Implementation of accountability mechanism
- Guidelines for camp implementation and management, with a section on community organization
- Development of basic monitoring tools, such as matrix, ...

Furthermore, the UNHCR staff present on the field were barely knowing what type of facilities are in the camp and what are their level of functionality as well as modalities to use it.

Ali Sabeh: Two persons have been met during the visit of the camp: One head of office, whom seems to be quite dynamic but in the meantime new and a national officer in charge notably to follow up WASH.

The Officer in charge of WASH accompanied the visit managed by NRC staff. The officer from UNHCR was discovering the problem during the visit and was barely able to understand them. The fact is that he is not a technician but at least he should have done the type of visit prior to our visit and raise his knowledge about the system whether he has to monitor NRC work. Some of the problem highlighted in the report notably in terms of equipment setting for instance, for instance presence or not of backup equipment, should have been identified in advanced. The same statement is valuable for the follow up of the work progress, the UNHCR staff was not very aware about where is NRC in their engagement in terms of achievement and effectiveness.

The relative low income of the refugee's population and difficulties to implement efficient livelihood project in such environment constitute also an obstacle to raise the level of contribution of the refugees.

The point is that in the meantime it is tricky to be able to recruit a strong senior profile to be based in such remote area as Obock or Ali Sabeh.

In anyway, the UNHCR have to improve their capacity of monitoring, develop a matrix to follow up indicator and achievement and control quality. Monitoring should be constructive and not only pointing out the problem but also proposing solution.

There is no sectorial meeting in Ali Sabeh so far.

NRC:

The WASH actions implemented by NRC in both Ali Sabeh and Markazi camps have been estimate as quite weak. One of the main reasons of low quality level of the achievement came from the lack of supervision but also of technical and management skill. However, NRC is building up its capacity on the ground since few weeks and substantial improvement are expected at short term. For instance, two hygiene promoter specialists from Ethiopia will be deployed for a 2-3 months period and in addition a new committed and dynamic program manager is in post, as well as an international WASH specialist. Unfortunately, the WASH specialist was in leave during the visit. During the visit of Ali Sabeh, the national WASH staff met did not demonstrate appropriate knowledge of the water supply system and its functioning. The feasibility to do some of the plan they have to upgrade the system hasn't been investigating (connection to a new well to an existing main supplying and pump station...). It was difficult to understand their program of work, despite of the fact they had one. The staff need capacity to be built and regular supervision and work plan with clear deliveries.

The staff of NRC in general seems to not be very proactive, resourceful and have no vision of a camp setting, with lack of reflexing regarding adaptation of the response and service/facilities to the context to facilitate sustainability. In the same way, the strategic thought of the local staff is pretty low, notably when it comes to community approach and sustainability.

Few staff (in Markazi and Ali Sabeh) has been identified with some relevant potential of improvement but again capacities have to be built and a work plan has to be produced to reach this objective.

In terms of hygiene promotion in Ali Sabeh, NRC did not start anything and wait for the coming of two specialists from their Ethiopian mission.

We have to take into account when assessing the performance of NRC, that in Ali Sabeh, they took over the operation and maintenance of the water supply system from CARE last april and got money from UNHCR only in June. In the meantime, the capacity has been recently improved substantially and improvements are quite expected at short term. In the meantime, given that the level of national staff is pretty low in Djibouti in anyway, there is a string need to import staff whom are more costly in a context of limited fund. And then, there is no guaranty to get better quality of intervention from another WASH actors present in the context.

The Johanniter (not ECHO funded partners):

2 international staff have been met during the mission, one in Obock and one in Djibouti. They were mainly working in the solid waste management; previously cover by the Djiboutian Red Crescent with support of IFRC. Their strategy seems to be not relevant apart the implementation of incinerator equipment. The feasibility haven't been investigate at all, for instance normally you try to understand which the main type of waste are and to define the best process to dispose it, which has not been done at all. So, The Jonnahiter plans to implement two units for incinerating waste.

The location has been identified by the site planner of UNHCR to avoid nuisance and risk of fire. The operation is not put in standby since the camps might be relocated. For the time being apart that, the Obock municipality is collecting the garbage tent by tent with a truck. The Johanitter was involved in hygiene promotion focusing on solid waste management but the only message they try to work on (by door by door visit of non-trained promoter) was to foster people to put their garbage in plastic bags, so very little relevancy. The staff met did not show a lot of dynamism and commitment. They mentioned that they might stop their activities related to the Yemenis refugees sometime in September has they will run out of fund. In the meantime, they mentioned that the German government (their donor) is keen to provide more money if the level of activities rises up, but this is not very clear as well.

DRC:

So far DRC is mainly involved in Livelihood. DRC is recently arrived in Djibouti and so far seems to focus more on livelihood and protection, despite they express interest in WASH. Even if they mention that they have capacity in WASH, they have no real strategy and not clear idea about the WASH situation in Obock. Whether, they have capacity in WASH the mission did not demonstrate effectiveness of it. They do not constitute for the time being a relevant partners for WASH. The fact is that their program manager gave a good impression during our meeting when it came to analyze of the situation, and especially when talking about livelihood and protection. DRC also express a potential track of involvement in camp management (see section on recommendation).

ACF:

ACF is new in the response to refugee's in Djibouti, so far they donated three bladders for Obock camp and a tent for AHA (Ethiopian NGO in charge of health in Obock camp). However, their flag is present in the camp. The meeting with their country director was not very relevant. They apparently work on a WASH response plan within the framework of UN appeal, They provide us a copy but there is no details on what they plan to do, though they mentioned an operational budget of about 800 000 euros. ACF build a lot on the fact that the NGO is well known in the WASH sector and can achieve a lot with professionalism, but within the context of Djibouti we did not had the chance to meet one of their WASH staff and their country director was even not enough to give us the main orientations of their plan for 800 000 euros. ACF is mainly involved in nutrition/food security in a more development approach, with some WASH component. For the time being, they seem to don't be a relevant partner in WASH in Djibouti.

3. FOCUS ON COORDINATION AND CAMP MANAGEMENT ISSUES

See also section on capacity of partners

In Markazi, the coordination and camp management is largely affected from the confusion (and underlying political and economic agendas at different level) and lack of experience of ONARS (OFFICE NATIONAL D'ASSISTANCE AUX RÉFUGIÉS ET SINISTRÉS in charge of refugees); Furthermore, there are so far about 8 NGO's (ACF, The Johanniter, AHA, NRC, IFRC/DRC, *First Lady* NGO, ALKHAKMA, King Selemani rescue center, plus the Sudanese ngo which already left and the Qatari Red Crescent which has some plan in future) and 2 UN agencies (WFP, UNHCR) involved in the camp for a very small population compare to usual refugee camps and IDP sites of the region.

The coordination problem is also enhanced by the involvement of few nontraditional actors who behave more as charity structure rather than humanitarian organization:

- ✓ Kind Selemani rescue center,
- ✓ Sudanese ngo,
- ✓ AL KHAKMA (Koweti ngo),
- ✓ Qatar Red Crescent,
- ✓ Djiboutian government plus individual trader.

During Ramadan many economical actors of the place and the government provided any kind of gift: food and non-food, to the refugees as alms is one of the five Islam pillar. Most of those structures do not have plan in future and tend to generate dependency by doing everything for the refugees. Some of those structure are doing one shot distribution or support, some try to have more regular and consistent support but most of time not in sustainable manner. For instance, so far Sudanese ngo brought cooling equipment for water, which consists of storage tank close with an outlet from air condition equipment blowing cool air in the tank with risk of contamination, King Selemani association were planning to install air condition in the tent when the local population do not have and when the efficiency under tent given the energy necessary is not very sustainable, heavy generator meaning high fuel consumption

have been also installed in the camp currently for lighting by those kind of actor. The main problem is instead of to have a kind of master plan to develop the camp including strategy on community participation, some they provide incentive for short period of time to anytime of involvement of the refugees without any strategy and harmonization among the various actors, etc...and then partners/actors who come with their asset according the plan, everybody is coming with his own perception of the needs or goods available at their level without real coordination... Actually, it seems that at the beginning some of those non-traditional actors tried to pass by UNHCR but since UNHCR explain that they will have to pay some fees to UNHCR to manage their relief, they decide to pass directly through the government which does not have proficiency in camp management and humanitarian relief setting. It is suspected that much of the hardware (generators) is promised to the local authority if/when refugees depart.

Qatari Red Crescent was planning to bring 300 housing units (from IKEA) to Obock for the refugees but no update about.

The Koweti NGO brought light and generator and provide fuel so far (but until when?), they implement a child space and provide 3 hot meals per day to the refugees during Ramadan, it will finish in august. The problem is people will go from 3 nice hot meals per day offer, back to WFP portion and need to cook, which might be source of problem and is not very coherent,

In addition, the lack of humanitarian funds for Djibouti makes put people in a position that anybody who can bring anything is welcome, disregard of coherency of the response.

Moreover, it seems that the WASH working group which takes place in Djibouti city is focus nowadays on the Yemenis crisis (source: UNICEF deputy representative and WASH officer), but UNHCR apparently do not attend this meeting as they mentioned that they have no WASH specialist on the ground. UNICEF is attending the UNHCR refugees working groups and general coordination meeting also organized at Djibouti city. The government does not implement effective coordination mechanism. Some UNHCR led working groups do not meet regularly.

Although (feedback from UNHCR) the WASH WG focuses on national issues is ran by UNICEF and UNHCR does not attend. UNHCR runs a WASH (and other sectors) WG which UNICEF does attend. And essentially it is all the same partners who have to attend two meetings because of the UNHCR insistence on separation due to refugees. This also does not allow for looking more at the long-term/development plans for Obock town/region with refugees in mind.

This gives an idea of the level of synergy among partners and confusion in terms of coordination.


In Markazi, UNHCR did a first coordination meeting with partners three weeks ago, the problem is most of the decision maker are in Djibouti and then there is very little added value to this meeting so far. The Prefet of Obock, officially in charge to coordinate the relief for Yemenis refugees organizes coordination very irregularly and limited attendees.

The **UNHCR propose to organize coordination meetings at regular bases** (frequency to be defined but could be on monthly basis according evolving of the situation) **on the ground in Obock** with decision makers from all the partners and stakeholder. Which constitute a relevant proposal but the problem of coordination and camp management/setting is serious enough to oblige us to try to handle it according several perspectives and not only by organization of meeting (few proposition are made in the recommendation section of this report). The main need is to gather people in Obock in order to define a common vision or the camp setting and the way to work with refugees (community contribution, organization, incentive...).

The dynamic of relationship between the government and UNHCR on the refugee’s case management is also quite harsh as **UNHCR seems to be perceived as a concurrent**. The political, economic and social agenda underlies for refugees in Djibouti are volatile and contribute to the confusion in coordination. The confusion in selection of a site to accommodate the refugees represents a good example of the consequences of the previously mentioned issue.

4. MAIN FINDINGS AND QUALITY ISSUES

4.1. WASH situation in Markazi (Obock):



During the last 3 weeks prior to our visit the Obock town and especially the camp site have been affected by **sandstorm**, with many tents that collapsed. The risk from those sandstorm and way to protect the camp site as much as possible must be investigated.

Public health:

According AHA the health partners of the camp, the main disease found in the camp are IRA² and diarrheal disease. In June the camp faced an outbreak of diarrheal disease, as mentioned further in the documents, the problem have been handle and the quality of water was highly suspected to be the source of disease. The doctor from AHA mentioned dirtiness of bladders and proximity of latrine as the cause of the outbreak. The link with the water seems to be obvious, but the guiltiness of latrine proximity can be put in question.

Profile of the refugees population:

In Markazi, we found nearly 485 people in the camp, about 900 pp had rent premises in Obock town during Ramadan and the sandstorm but they are expected to be back in came in a short duration. Disable people are host in hotel room paid by UNHCR.

Thus, the whole population of the camp so far is about 1500 persons, which constitute a small camp but in a complex context.

One of the tricky aspects of the refugee's case load in Obock is the difference between perception of the needs and coping capacity of the refugee's according their place of origin. For instance fisher men from Bab El Manbeb live in a pretty similar condition as they get in camp, they are very active and are used to cope with very limited resources, when the urban type of refugee's coming from Aden and Sanaa are much more reluctant to contribute in anything of camp live, even if they get incentive and are not. For instance fisher men got incentive as manpower to erect the tent, saved money from it which they use to rent house during the sandstorm and Ramadan when others categories had to stay in the camp. The refugees have different type of needs, etc...

The difference between those two categories of refugees constitutes a source of conflict within the camp. Given the difficulties to match the needs of both communities, the capacity of local market to cope with new demand and the volatile situation of the camp that might be relocated, as well as movement of the refugees, CASH based project seems to be pretty relevant within the context.



² Respiratory Infection

There is no leadership among the refugees which undermine community organization.

4.1.1. Water supply (more information regarding the water access in section focus on Obock water supply):

NRC is not in charge of water supply which should be ensuring by ONARS (the local camp manager/ government body).

In the camp, located few hundred meters from the Obock town storage tank, are spread 3 bladders of 15m³ (2 have been noticed, the third one being a 5m³ one instead of 15m³). One of bladder had a broken valve but nobody is in charge. Each bladder is filled once per day by water trucking. UNHCR own a cistern truck of 20m³, which does 3 rotations per day and fetch water downtown. So far, UNHCR do not pay water, but the responsible of ONEDA (local water authority) mentioned that they will have to start to pay in a short notice. Obock already faced shortage of water during the hottest time (July and August), not because the resources decrease but because the demands increase. In addition, generally people are pretty wasted water in Obock, in the meantime the efficiency of the distribution network might be very low.

The bladders are apparently dirty and never been washed.

Today, we have a bout 35m³ of storage capacity for a population of 500 to 1500pp. So, meaning if the bladders are filled once per day, **70 to 24L/day /cp**. So the demand for the current population is 35m³ for the time being and it is what is withdrawn from the town distribution network. Each bladder is connected to taps ramps of 6 taps (total 18 taps), meaning between **28 and 84 persons per taps**.

The bladders do not have appropriate shade and given the temperature of water, if there is any chlorine in it will be consumed very quickly.

There is no water test available by the actor, but ONEAD do water testing at borehole level every two months normally. So, data should be available and partners should have it on ground. The water distribute in the camp is chlorinate by ONEAD in the storage tank, but the process of chlorination is not clear and reliable. ONEAD used to have dozing pump injecting chlorine prior to the storage tank.

The water is **neither tested, nor chlorinated at camp level**. Two weeks ago they faced a diarrheal disease outbreak. The WASH working group recommended distribution of aquatab, but with no consistent demonstration and then many misused have been noticed. Although, the outbreak has been controlled and handled.

Apparently, WHO planned to come the week of 27 of July to test water at every levels.

The Koweti brought some equipment to cool water (see section coordination). There is about three 200-300L storage tank use to cool water and distribute it, but only one work somehow.

Nobody is in charge of care and maintenance of the hydraulic equipment.

4.1.2. Sanitation:

Latrine/bathing unit:

101 latrine/shower facilities are functional in the camp (meaning at **maximum, 20 pp/latrine**). Latrine and shower facilities: in the camp there is nowadays two type of design the old one with raw pit of between 2 to 3m according hardness of the ground (no lining), a concrete floor (not removable) with little drop hole, no cap, no aeration and a structure in wood and plastic sheeting with an open roof. The new design still propose the concrete floor, open roof, but this time with more appropriate drop hole and a space to implement vent pipe (not in place during the visit), same size of pit with no lining, and a structure in iron sheet. The quality of the concrete is very poor and then lifespan short with risk of collapsing at some point.

There is no strategic thinking around the latrine as in a way they plan to decommission them after short time (3 months to 1 year) as the seeping capacity of the ground is quite low, but in the meantime there is no lining and then desludging cannot be very efficient (can only desludge 40-60% of the pit to avoid collapsing) and decommissioning haven't been planned as the structure is not removable at least the main part meaning the floor/slab.

Usually, in such kind of situation temporally structure should have been implemented, for instance they should have made concrete slab removable and then given the space available and then plan relocation of the structure on the top on a new pit.

NRC is not involved in the cleaning of the latrine, The Johanniter did a distribution of product for 1 month and people so far clean it by themselves (actually the cleaning happen when they take their shower). Anyway people have to get organize to care about those facilities.

Given that in some location the ground is pretty rocky, NRC is planning to bring a jack hammer on site. According, the local team of NRC they need 2 persons during 10 days to dig a 3m deep latrine pit (after 50cm depth limestone rock is found).

All those issues are enhanced by the fact that as there are no showers facilities in the camp, people have shower in the latrine facilities and then they speed up the filling of the pit. That's why today, NRC is oblige to about every 3 months (according their staff) desludge the latrine pit with renting of a citern truck and pump. The cost is about 9000FDJ/latrine (50USD/latrine).

In addition, structures in iron sheet are not recommended in such kind of hot environment (about 45-50degrees) without shade. The staff did not even try to think that some of the existing local construction materials and technic could have been adapted. This type of approach is usually the most sustainable, suitable (adapted to the environment, climate, local capacity...), replicable, and cost efficient. This type of approach also reveals the type of mindset needed in humanitarian situation to be able to be efficient and adaptable to the numerous different type of context of intervention. Then, locally people built house with mortar made of special type of sand and salt available in the area (e.g.: the big Egyptian pyramid have used mortar made with special type of sand and salt of naxalite notably...).

Today, NRC planned to build bathing facilities to increase time between two desludging. Yet, this is not a sustainable and cost efficient approach in the context as the space is available and resources for desludging, etc... limited.

Unit cost of latrine: 400USD, which is pretty expensive for temporally latrine (with a rate of user under 20)

Drainage:

Natural lineaments are present in the camp area, nevertheless drainage of WASH facilities and in particular protection of latrine pit from run-off water intrusion is needed. The area of the camp is flat and no sign of erosion have been noticed around the camp.

Solid waste management:

There is no solid waste management so far in the camp apart limited action from IFRC/DRC³ and The Johanniter, as well as municipality of Obock who for the time being the only effective actor doing tent by tent garbage collection with truck. There is no community mobilization and organization planned to take care of this issue. IFRC/DRC volunteer used to collect themselves garbage at HH level.

As already mentioned in partner's capacity section, The Johanniter was planning to implement two incineration units with 5m deep pit. Since the location of the camp has been put in question, the project is in standby.

Numerous solid waste (mainly plastic) are spread around the camp, especially in the low point (lineament). So in case of rain all the waste will be disposed in the sea (not very environmental friendly approach). The camp is located on the right side of the road coming from Djibouti, few kilometer from the town, and the left side of the road facing the camp seems to be used as a dump site not only for the camp...

Given the numerous garbage spread away in the camp, UNHCR try to implement a collection point just by having a place fenced (wood plot and plastic sheeting) and then materialized for the people to bring and drop their garbage before disposal out of the camp. Unfortunately, garbage's were all around but not in the place committed to this purpose which remains empty.

The population is not that big, but accumulation of waste like this will generate more and more nuisance with proliferation of vermin, high vector of disease transmission.

There is no appropriate dump site to dispose the garbage and there is a need for it.

Hygiene promotion:

Few distribution of hygiene kit has been done by various partners with high re selling at the local market. Usually, hygiene kits are design to cover one month need. However, there is nobody in charge


³ Djiboutian Red Crescent

and there are no tools, method or capacity in place to raise the awareness of people about those issues and to drive them in how to deal with the new facilities and services they got in the camp and how to get organize at refugees level to improve the sanitary situation of their living area.

As previously mentioned, The Johanniter were the only actor doing some kind of hygiene promotion limited to a single message focusing on putting garbage in plastic bag at HH level to ease loading of the truck. The hygiene promoter used to be paid 1500FDJ/day (about 9USD/day), once per week.

No awareness posters have been noticed at all as well as any notice board or communal area.

4.2. WASH situation in ALI SABEH



4.2.1. Water supply:

Nowadays, according to the partners the water supply system abstracts water from two boreholes and one well. Given the topographic features of the pipeline, the pump located at borehole and well is pumping water until a storage tank connected to a booster station from which water is supplying the storage tank feeding the distribution network. The three resources in use provide about 30m³/hrs during 8hrs, meaning about 240m³/day. The booster pump is working with generator of 18kVA (using a speed and frequency controller the size of generator could have been much less and less fuel consumption as well). The booster station is part of regional plan from UNHCR to transfer fuel energy system to solar. Apparently, the water supply system encountered many problems of regulation.



NRC is planning **with UNICEF fund** to increase the water production by adding another well to the system at Nakal location (*see picture of already operational well*). The feasibility of this plan is not clear and it seems that it hasn't been carried out or even estimated. They want to pump water from this new well to an existing use in the system and from this one to pump water until the booster station.

The problem is if the water from the new well is going to the one in use, it will rise up the level of water in the well and then the existing well will work sometime when the level of groundwater is low as recharge well for the aquifer and a lot of the water will seep into the aquifer to balance the level. Secondly, the pump, the solar panel and the pipeline are designed for the current capacity and NRC did not check the level of flexibility to those equipment to increase the quantity of water without changing the pump and/or the pipeline. Hydraulic calculation to figure out the feasibility of this plan must be done.

Main problems noticed during the visit:

- Numerous borehole request rehabilitation (*according partners*), but nobody could explain why and what type of rehabilitation. About 5 of them have been registered.
- Some of the boreholes get salty water and refugees and host communities are reluctant to use such resources for drinking purposes at least. NRC is trying to select water resources without high rate of salt for the water supply.
- Vandalism and looting
- Low knowledge about the hydraulic equipment, and then about regulation capacity of the system. Proficiency in WASH for the local staff is pretty low; the WASH manager expatriate from NRC seems to be quite proficient technically. It was difficult to get accurate and clear information about the water supply system during the visit from both NRC staff and UNHCR, only the NRC program manager who just arrived had some relevant input.
- NRC plan to increase availability of safe water has to be carried out and hydraulic calculation has to be performed

- The pump of the well located in Nakal (bit far from the camp) had about 10 breakdowns since five years, which means that there is a problem in the way the pump is used and the energy supplied to the pump. It should be deeply investigate. There is no historic of breakdown, no record about the type of default or breakdown. The pump is changed at each breakdown.
- No chlorination is performed. One dosing pump for chlorine has been found at the booster station but it was out of order for some time already.
- Problem with backup equipment (*one breakdown on a generator or a pump will stop the water supply*):
 - There is no backup generator where are installed the solar panel
 - At the booster station, the backup generator is broken since 8months just because of one spare (the propeller of the ventilator has broken blade) to be replaced and not available in Djibouti but available in Nairobi.
 - At the booster station the backup pump received few years ago by CARE has never been installed as it arrived broken. The pump has never been send back to the provider Davis and Shirliff, so waste of money.

According to the last KAP survey (Dec. 2014), **62% of refugees in Ali Sabeh fetch water from unprotected wells** along the nearby wadi. Although use of piped water has increased from 2% to 25% in the last years, the fact that water network only reaches half of the camp together with the proximity of refugee shelter to unprotected wells make necessary further developments to ensure safe water is enough and accessible to all refugees.

Some vandalism has been faced by partners on the ground on the water supply system. According the partners, it seems that from host and refugees communities some individual organized water sale within the camp by donkey cart. The water use for this purpose is usually water from the private well. The water is sold 200FDJ for 100L. So, the good point is that at least it gives the habits for some of the people to pay for water, and it shows at some point that some people have to resources to do so.

Then, the water supply system providing free water to refugees and host communities is perceived as a concurrent. About 15 solar panels have been stolen, some have been damaged. So, it is very important to improve the security of that equipment. One of the main sources of the water supply system (piped water) is located a bit far from the camp and village and then NRC had to ensure the presence of a paid guard 24h/24, 7day/week.

During the visit it was not possible to get water analyze at least for the open dug well located in the wadi bed and own by private bodies.

At some point private actor should be integrated in a long term strategy to hand over the water supply system to the refugees and host communities at least to cover operating and minor maintenance cost. That's why as well, that it is important to start to work on decreasing running cost as much as possible (by for instance increasing resort to solar energy for pumping...) to make it more affordable for the users and then more sustainable.

4.2.2. Sanitation:

Latrine:

The first latrines built by CARE were made of stone in snail configuration (meaning without door). Those latrines are not removable and many of them are already filled. NRC had implemented about 205 “permanent latrine” made of concrete block with door in iron and 3-4m deep pit according to the hardness of the ground for digging, and equipped with vents pipe.

The problem is there is no strategy to sustain the functionality of those latrines since the pit will be filled. There is no desludging capacity on the ground, and in some compounds there is no space to dig a new pit, furthermore the structure is not removable. The NRC staff share their idea about what to do when the pit will be filled and they have in mind to add a new chamber on the existing pit straight next to the latrine, feasibility is not secured and might not be effective in all the cases. Moreover, still at some point the latrine pit will have to be desludged, which means need of funds for it or payment from people with low income and need to build or mobilize a desludging capacity for the camp. Those types of questions should have been investigated from the beginning.

Latrine unit cost : 400USD same as in Obock with totally different materials (according to NRC staff the price of construction materials is much more expensive in Obock; to be checked)

Solid waste management:

Spreading around of garbage hasn't been noticed over there. The camp area seems to be relatively quite clean.

NRC has the project to build 8 garbage pits, one per section.

Drainage:

NRC is not involved in drainage for the time being but they are planning it in their long term strategy and rely on existing hydrological survey from 2011. The camp is located on a hilly area drained by natural Wadi, given the vegetation cover it may be some problem of erosion, but no serious concern and events reported during the visit and no signs noticed of particular risk related to an area of the camp. We have to note as well, that the visit of the camp was very short, so some problems might have not been noticed during the visit on these topics.

4.2.3. Hygiene promotion:

In Ali Sabeh, NRC did not start hygiene promotion as they are waiting for two specialists from the Ethiopian office to come and define the strategy, build the capacity and develop the tools. So far, in the camp there are no posters for awareness at all, and either no notice board for information has been noticed within the camp. Initially, NRC proposes to implement three types of methods: the PHAST 7 steps, the CLTS and the CHAST for children. There is no coherence in such a strategy. Whether you implement a different method you make the facilitator confused and



New design of Latrine, Ali Addeh

sometime as well the target population, so you can built a strategy merging the two methods but there is no point to implement two type of method with such low proficiency in it. The two hygiene promotion specialists are expect beginning of august. NRC is quite late in this activity and should rush to start implementation.

4.3. Focus on Water access in Obock and camp site situation/capacity:

The water access remains one of the main challenges in setting up a refugee's camp in Obock region.

The refugees in Obock have already mentioned are supplied in water from the town water distribution network of the town. It was very difficult to get reliable and accurate data and we are still waiting for some information from ONEAD⁴ Djibouti to have better idea bout water access situation and way of improvement.

So far, what we know about the water access is that:

- The network is supplied by two boreholes about 120m deep. The pumps flow rate are 30m³/hrs and 24m³/hrs with 21hrs pumping time per day (which is huge pumping time) without dropping according the chief of ONEAD center in Obock. It is rare to find such pumping time then it would be interested to investigate whether the yield of the borehole could produce more water and if the current pumping rate is sustainable.
- Meaning that 1134m³/day are injected into the water supply system. The population of Obock is about 6000-7000pp, plus let say 1500 refugees today, it means about 133L/pp/day which much more than enough. Taking the pessimistic assumption of distribution network efficiency at 40%, the real water available at the level of consumer would around 54L/day/pp. According the local authority in Obock there is a lot of waste of water as well, despite of the entire connexions are normally equipped with water meter to promote economy on water.
- The pump are provided in energy by a 160Kva generator, which could be decrease by almost half whether they start one pump after the other, with good safe on the 215L of fuel used by day today (About 5000USD per month).
- The boreholes are connected to a storage tank by a 15km pipeline. The two boreholes are connected to the same two pipelines in parallel. One old of diameter 100 in asbestos pipe and one of 150mm diameter in PVC. The PVC one should have replaced the asbestos one but that they had too much leaks on the pipeline using only the PVC one it could be interested to investigate whether the leaks were due to the hydraulic hammer (because no protection of the pipeline against it) or just because the hydraulic load is too high.
- There is some kind of chlorination in the storage tank but they cannot know the volume of water when they perform it, so we can doubt a lot about effectiveness of the chlorination. They used to have a dosing pump to inject chlorine on the pipeline at the level of the borehole but it is not working any more.

⁴ Organisme National de l'Eau, l'Assainissement de Djibouti

- During the summer time (July and August) the shortage of water is regular in town. This situation is not due to the decreasing of the water resources but to the increasing of the demands.
- The distribution network is made of about 50 years old asbestos pipe (forbidden in terms of public health today).
- Given the age of the network and that the distribution is sectorized (meaning regular opening and closing of valve on the network), we can assume that the efficiency of the network is very low (about 40-50% or even less).
- Today the water truck from UNHCR fetches water in town, when there is a possibility to connect supplied directly the bladders from the town storage tank located 200m from the camp site. This has been confirmed by the chief of center. The pipeline could be equipped with a water meter and then the water should be paid to the ONEAD of Obock but with the smallest pricing rate (the one for basic consumer).
- There is very few high consumer of water in Obock mainly two or three. So, most of the consumption is domestic.
- ONEAD is mentioning shortage of water and at their level the solution would be to have a third borehole

All those informations show that there is shortage of water in town, especially at some time of the year. So, the performance of the system is not matching the need all year round for the resident population. It is then tricky to assume that the Obock water supply system can afford 2500 more people (refugees). In the meantime, looking at the water production it seems that today there is enough water, meaning that building of new borehole with its 15km pipeline, etc... might not be the best and most cost efficient way to improve water access in Obock.

In the meantime, building a third borehole will not improve the water access in very short time (in case of new influx of refugees), as time to do the survey and to get the borehole and pipeline functional would be minimum 6 months in the context since the money is granted.

3 options should be investigated to improve water access:

1. Check feasibility and possibility to improve water access by renewing in the first phase the main distribution network. This option would also have an added value on the public health of the population (by removing the asbestos pipe).
2. Check: feasibility and sustainability to increase the pumping rate in the borehole, and then change the pump; Capacity of the existing pipeline to cope with the additional quantity target. And we could cope with the need of additional power for bigger pump by a better to operate the pump and the generator.
3. Build a new borehole with new pipeline, etc...

The only way to improve rapidly the water access (in case of an influx of refugees) is to identify boreholes on the road between Tadjoura and Obock (many of them have been noticed during the visit), with enough capacity compare to the demands of the users to provide by trucking the camp with water.

Apparently UNICEF already proposes one to the UNHCR, but agreement with local users should be made (prior to the need) and quantity that could be abstract should be investigated.


LRRD: apparently there is track of collaboration with our colleagues of the delegation to follow up. They have some fund for WASH (host communities of Obock town) which could be complementary to an eventual ECHO funding for the refugees. We have been agreed to share my report with them and then we have to wait for a bit more technical information to assess the feasibility of a potential intervention.

5. RECOMMENDATION/ISSUE TO FOLLOW UP - CONCLUSION

Given that the location of the camp site in the Obock area might change in the short term, heavy investment should be put in standby until final statement on this issue.

5.1. Coordination and camp planning:

- Given the complexity of the problem of coordination and camp management, by principles the problem has to be addressed according different perspective/angle.
- Implementation of coordination meeting on the field in Obock with decision makers from partners and others actor in the camp (no need to do it very regularly if the situation does not evolve, but at least once per month)
- Produce or disclose if already existing a master/strategic plan for the camp with the needs, the modalities to work with refugees and host communities, the principle to be followed (for instance to use as much as possible local construction materials, promote community contribution, balance service between camp and host communities, ...)
- Get in touch with identified nontraditional actors such as Al Khakma, The King Seleimani Rescue center, the Qatari Red Crescent, ... to advocate/influence at the level of their headquarter to orient their type of relief and get them in the plan for the camp.
- Create necessary synergy among the UN agencies and humanitarian community to ensure relevant lobbying capacity and way to influence the government (site selection, modalities of relief, movement of the refugees, ...). Funds are limited and capacity of a single actor to influence and lobby to the local government very weak. That's why the humanitarian community must have one common vision, strategy and speak the same way to improve advocacy and lobbying capacity.
- Given that we cannot avoid the government and that UNHCR can be perceived by the government (ONAS) as a concurrent in the management of the refugees case load, another partners could be introduced to play the role of a kind of technical assistant on the field and at level of headquarter for the ONAS. This would constitute a way to build better and more adapted capacity at government level (ONAS) and then it would be a good way to influence this local stakeholder from the inside.



5.2. Water supply:

General:

- ⇒ Collect all the technical documentation about the water supply system and keep always available a copy on the site;
- ⇒ Produce an operating and maintenance plan for the water supply system with all the necessary information to start up, operate and regulate the system as well as guideline for regular maintenance
- ⇒ Keep record of the historic of breakdown with diagnosis
- ⇒ Ensure backup equipment for the hydraulic equipment in terms notably of pump and generator to secure the water supply
- ⇒ Investigate all the possibility to decrease the running cost of the water supply system (size of generator, solar panel, ...).
- ⇒ Develop a progressive strategy on 3 to 5 years to start community contribution to aim to manage at least operating and minor maintenance cost and to build local capacity for the operating and the basic maintenance of the water supply system; heavy maintenance should be ensured by ONEAD or others relevant and appropriate actors, to be identified; in parallel

Ali Sabeh:

- ⇒ Get in touch with Davis and Shirtlyff to check possibility to repair or replace the backup pump at the booster station

- ⇒ Produce a technical note regarding feasibility to increase the water production by adding a new well to the system (Funded by UNICEF).
 - Estimation of the needs and gaps in terms of safe water supply
 - Check impact of pumping from one well to another
 - Hydraulic capacity of the existing pipeline to cope with planned additional quantity of water (Head and flow)
 - Selection of pump and additional need of power (solar panel)
- ⇒ Improve pump protection with installation of valve with long lasting closing at the outlet of the pump to reduce impact of hydraulic hammer on the network. Assess need to implement others protection equipment like hydraulic vessel or inertia spare...
- ⇒ Start asap regular appropriate cleaning of solar panel and improve protection of the solar asset
- ⇒ Implement water meter at strategic location
- ⇒ Install a chlorination system and implement a water quality (mainly free chlorine residual) monitoring capacity and plan
- ⇒ Repair asap the backup generator at booster station (replacement of the propeller of the ventilator)
- ⇒ Improve the monitoring of the fuel consumption
- ⇒ Implement a water users survey to better understand the dynamic of water supply in the camp

Markazi (NRC is not in charge of water supply for the time being; it is ONAS with support of UNHCR):

- ⇒ Investigate the different option to improve water access in Obock town and their cost efficiency (see section focus on Water access in Obock)
- ⇒ Implement a capacity to operate and maintain the WASH facilities in the camp; repair the existing breakdown noticed during the visit asap
- ⇒ Improve community contribution in the regular daily activities
- ⇒ Start to perform chlorination of the water distribute within the camp and to implement appropriate monitoring capacity (to check the rate of chlorination and the free residual chlorine at every level)
- ⇒ Estimate accurately the needs of the camp in terms of water
- ⇒ If feasible supply directly the bladders from the close town's storage tank with a motor pump and a water meter on the pipeline
- ⇒ Ensure presence of shade on the bladders

5.3. Sanitation:

General:

By principle, the construction materials used for the shelter of the latrine (or bathing unit) should match the local way of construction (*to avoid to have latrine better built than the local house of the host communities in order to ensure a fair approach and avoid conflict related to this issue; to be also more cost efficient and ease replication*);

Improve community organization to ensure care and maintenance of the sanitation facilities.

Ali Sabeh:

- ⇒ Develop a strategy to ensure sustainability of the latrine (what the plan when the pit will be full)
- ⇒ Ensure presence of cap on the latrine drop hole and insect proof net on the vents pipe
- ⇒ Perform an inventory of the latrine with level of filling and need of decommissioning or rehabilitation
- ⇒ Improve the solid waste management and contribution of the community on this sub sector
- ⇒ Assess the need for drainage in the camp and develop a plan in accordance

Markazi:

- ⇒ Develop a strategy to ensure sustainability of the latrine (what the plan when the pit will be full)
- ⇒ Given that there is no problem of space in the camp, temporally latrine should be removable (meaning that the concrete slab should be realistically removable and as much as possible structure as well)
- ⇒ Ensure stability of the existing latrine concrete floor
- ⇒ Implement bathing unit to decrease the need of desludging
- ⇒ Improve the solid waste management and contribution of the community on this sub sector
- ⇒ Assess need of drainage

5.4. Hygiene promotion:

For both camp, there is a serious need to start asap to develop an appropriate strategy and work plan with adapted tools, method and guidelines. The capacity has to be built also within the camp population. Instead of to implement standard holistic approach, hygiene promotion messages should target activities in this sub sector. Notice board should be implemented at each water point and main public area which could be used for awareness as various information campaigns.

The hygiene promotion should at least target:

- ⇒ identified hygienic/public health issues/practices
- ⇒ community organization
- ⇒ care and maintenance of the WASH facilities