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DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AID
Regional Support Office for East and Southern Africa (Nairobi)

MISSION REPORT

Subject : Pillar 2: Basics service in conflicts/ North East Nigeria: Boko Haram affected population/ Support to IDPs in Borno State.

Author: Damien BLANC (*WASH Expert, West Africa Regional Office, Dakar*)

Date: From the 22nd to the 28th of November 2015

Actors Met:

European Delegation

KANEBI Kate; Programme Officer Food Security, Water, Sanitation & Environment, *met in EU delegation office in Abuja on 27th of November, kate.anwuli.kanebi@eeas.europa.eu; Common Embassy Complex, 21st Crescent off Constitution avenue, Central Business District, P.M.B. Garki, Abuja nigeria*

ADEGOKE Yetunde; Project Officer, rural & Social Development Section, *met in EU delegation office in Abuja on 27th of November, kate.anwuli.kanebi@eeas.europa.eu; Common Embassy Complex, 21st Crescent off Constitution avenue, Central Business District, P.M.B. Garki, Abuja nigeria*

UNICEF

NADAR Kanna; Chief Water, Sanitation & Hygiene, Abuja, *met in UNICEF office in Abuja on 27th of November, knadar@unicef.org, +234 706 4184 029, UNICEF, UN House, Plot 617/618 Diplomatic Drive, Central Business District, PMB 2851, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria.*

NDALE Franck; CFO Borno, *met in Maiduguri on 23rd of November, ndale@unicef.org, +234 903 7808 312, UNICEF, UN House, D25 Dalori Street, New GRA Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria.*

SALIHOU Lonis; WASH Specialist Maiduguri, *met in Maiduguri on 23rd & 24th of November, isalihou@unicef.org, UNICEF, UN House, D25 Dalori Street, New GRA Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria.*

OCHA

UKANACHO Chukwidi; Programme Associate, *met in Abuja on 23rd & 24th of November, ukanacho@un.org, +234 814 785 6373, OCHA, Anambra House, 19 T.Y. Danjuma Crescent, Asokoro, Abuja, Nigeria.*

ICRC

PIERREHUMBERT Guillaume; Water Habitat Coordinator, *met in Abuja on 27th of November, gpierrehumbert@icrc.org, +234 903 727 1089, ICRC, 5 Queen Elizabeth Street, Off Yakubu Gowon Crescent, By Aso Villa Gate, Abuja, Nigeria.*

NGANGA Martin Kamau; Wathab Delegate, *met in Maiduguri on the 23rd of November; mnganga@icrc.org, +234 903 122 8492, ICRC, House #7, Off Circular Road (Damboa Junct.) GRA, Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria.*

MSF-France

NKOLOLO MASSAMBA Marie Hortense; Medical Coordinator, *met in Abuja on 26th of November, msff-abuja-medco@paris.msf.org, +234 816 4989655, Médecins sans Frontières, French Section, Plot 26 Olu Agabi Close, Life camp, Gwarinpa District, Abuja, Nigeria.*

ACF

POUCHALAN Yannick, Country Director; *cd.ng@acf-international.org; +234 813 00 00 136/812 94 50 519, ACF, Plot n°69 Crescent, 6th Avenue, Gwarimpa, Abuja.*

Other technical staff from IMC, Save the Children, ACF were met during sites visit in Maiduguri between the 23rd and the 26th of November.


Visited Sites

Camp Sites

Arabic Teacher's College (ATC)
Women Teachers College (WTC)
Teachers Village Camps (TVC);
Galtimari Primary School Camp (UNICEF)
Bakassi Governmental College Camp (IRC/NRC/IMC)
Gubio Estate Camp/IMCICRC

Informal Site

Buzu Quarters/ Host (ACF)
Wulari Primary School Community(IMC)



Visited sites location in Maiduguri area

Executive summary.

The mission had a combined WASH a Protection lens with the participation of ECHO experts from both sectors (WASH for Dakar Regional office and Protection from Yaoundé Regional Office). It included a three day presence in Maiduguri (Borno State) which allowed having a broad overview of the issues at stakes, the main gaps and priorities.

One of the main challenges for the year 2015 was to bring humanitarian actors in a highly insecure environment with national and federal actors not necessarily enthusiastic at seeing their deployments. Although ECHO has been a key player in their presence on site, there are still issues which need a greater involvement from the whole donor community.

Main identified gaps are:

Lack of acknowledgement of the magnitude of the crisis among the institutional stakeholders: With more than 1.4 M IDPs in Borno state since April 2015 (and more than 1.6 M as of October) it is rather surprising that L3 mechanism has not yet been activated in order to acknowledged and highlight the magnitude and needs of the crisis. Main underlying assumption is that the economic and politic interests of a country like Nigeria may have hindered the diplomatic community to advocate for its activation.

Lack of targeting of the beneficiaries: The core of the humanitarian response is focused on the support to IDPs in camps and informal settlements (7.5% of the total IDPs caseload in Borno state) although some interventions (food & NFIs mainly) targeted a fraction of the IDPs hosted in the communities. The status of the IDPs held in the host communities remains mostly undocumented (exact location, pressure and access to existing public services, vulnerability). The setting of a coherent and comprehensive response will require specific effort and support in the targeting of this population.

Lack of coordination: As of now, there is limited if any effective coordination of the response. Observations made during the field visit revealed not only uncoordinated response among the WASH implementing partner but very little capacities among the actors in charge of this coordination (State Emergency Management Agency and UNICEF for the WASH sector). It results in patchy interventions when urban context requires coordinated and mutualized interventions. There is a need to have a graduated and structured coordination mechanism in the response. ECHO-supported UNICEF acknowledged this gap and intends to provide more resource in the field for 2016.

Lack of quality control: With limited resources, highly insecure environment and a crisis which magnitude has not yet been acknowledged, humanitarian actors have had difficulties to provide the required resource in terms of quantities and capacities. It triggered the use of local implementing partners with limited quality control mechanisms. In the WASH sector, it resulted in rather poor designing, setting and monitoring of the response provided. With increase,g access to beneficiaries as insecurity decreases and ECHO-led advocacy for better response from the donor community starting to be heard, operational actors must deploy resources in adequacy with the issues at stakes and related technical challenges. ECHO-supported ACF acknowledged this gap and intends to provide more resource in the field for 2016.

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
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1 Context

1.1 Displacement problematic in North East Nigeria

Nigeria population is frequently affected by conflicts (ethnic & pastoral), natural disaster which result in population movements. But since 2014 the violence committed by Boko Haram represents the major IDPs caseload in North East Nigeria and Borno state in particular.


2 233 506 IDPs (318 937 households) have been identified in North East Nigeria, 88.6% of whom (1 978 950 people) are due to Boko Haram insurgency.



IDPs location in 2015 in North East Nigeria [Source: IOM/DTM, October 2015]

The increase of IDPs during the year 2015 is due to both a better access (thus a better assessment of the caseload) and the deterioration of the security in Boko Haram affected areas.

In total 76 camps and informal settlements have been identified¹ with areas yet not accessible (in Borno state) for security reason. Only a fraction of those IDPs are living in camps (8%), the majority of them being hosted by local communities.




IDPs caseloads increase in 2015 in North East Nigeria [Source: IOM/DTM, October 2015]

¹ IOM DTM assessment from September to October 2015 covering 142 LGAs (Local Government Area) and 987 wards.

1.2 Displacement problematic in Maiduguri (Borno State)


1.2.1 Borno displacement Context



Location of IDPs in Borno States (left, [Source IOM] and IDPs' LGA of origin [Source: UNICEF])

The majority of IDPs in North Nigeria are located in Borno state (72% of the total caseload²). As of now, the IDPs identified in Borno state are located in 16 camps and 9 informal sites, with the major part of IDPs located in the LGA of Maiduguri (64% of the total Borno state caseload).

1.2.2 Humanitarian needs



Core NFI needs, sources of food supply and main disease as expressed by IDPs in Borno State [Source. IOM, October 2015]

From IOM sites assessments done in Borno in October 2015, humanitarian needs in camps and settlements may be synthesized as follows³:

- ↳ **Shelter:** Approximately half of the IDPs are living indoor while one out of ten has no shelter at all. The rest of them living in either tents or makeshift shelters. Blankets is mentioned as main need (22% of the population);
- ↳ **NFI:** Not more than half of the households have benefited from mosquito nets while being the most frequently mentioned needed NFI. A third of the IDPs have received cooking sets as well (22% of the IDPs mentions it as their core need);
- ↳ **Health:** Almost 85% of the IDPs report having access to health centers. Malaria is the most frequent disease mentioned among the IDPs (75%);

² 1,606,406 IDPs. followed by Yobe state (144,302 IDPs; 6.5%) and Adamawa (135,605; 6%).


³ Those figures have to be taken with caution as they are extrapolated from data expressed in quartiles and do not reflect the needs of most of the IDPs in host communities.

- ✦ **WASH:** There is no complain about water quality in less than 50% of the cases while only 5% of the IDPs have access to latrine shared by less than 50 users;
- ✦ **Food:** Daily access to food is granted for more than 75% of the IDPs. Most of the food (80%) comes from humanitarian distribution; and
- ✦ **Protection:** More than 90% of the IDPs reports benefitting from protection (mainly military).

1.3 ECHO response in the WASH & Shelter sector

ACF, IMC, Save the Children and ICRC are the main actors involved in the WASH & Shelter sectors.

In 2015, ECHO has been supporting all WASH actors but ICRC for a total of 5 171 360 € with ACF (1 321 687 €) and IMC (1 191 000 €) being the main partners (49% of the total fund allocated all sectors combined).



Support provided per sector, beneficiaries and ECHO partners in the WASH & shelter response in 2015⁴

2 Observation & Comments

2.1 Limited capacities

Given the scale, the urgency, the complexity and limited institutional capacities to address the problematic, the IASC level 3 interventions mechanism should have been activated since the beginning of 2015.

The absence of acknowledgment of the magnitude of the crisis may be found in the conjunction of four complementing factors:

1. The denial of the crisis at federal (central) level linked to rampant reasons such as ethnicity, distance, and political interest;
2. The absence of diplomatic leverage due to the prioritization of bilateral interests among the donor community as Nigeria is by far the greatest economy in the region, (if not in the entire sub-Saharan Africa);
3. The limited acknowledgement of the crisis combined with highly insecure environment where humanitarian actors are potential targets of the insurgents, led to limited response capacities among the UN agencies and the humanitarian NGOs; and
4. Response is mainly embedded in the SEMA (State Emergency Management Agency) strategy targeting mainly (if not only) the IDPs in camp and informal settlements (7.5% of the total IDPs caseload).

⁴ Those figures have to be taken with caution as there are double counting among the beneficiaries and the contribution to each sub sector is calculated on the pro rata of activities scheduled for each sub sector.

UNDISS is considering only six out of 27 LGAs in Borno as safe and provide very little if any security related modus operandi to the humanitarian actors⁵.

The status of IDPs in host communities remains unclear and the definition of the modalities of support is hampered by limited access due to security reason

2.1 Limited Coordination

In Borno state, the number of camp is to be reduced from 16 to 5. But, it is yet unclear which of them will be the final sites as conflicting information exists among the actors⁶. As of now, there are limited coordination mechanisms.


As for the WASH sector, in spite of weekly sector meetings, coordination, partners are not yet coordinating their response and the existing 5Ws table does not allow to have a proper overview of what has been done in each site nor does it can assess properly the extend of the existing gaps or provide accurate updates⁷.

2.1.1 In the camp

Site management is left to unskilled SEMA staff, usually a single person in charge of approx. 10 000 IDPs whose main task consists in granting access to any actors willing to provide any output to the camp. Such lack of supervision results in improper optimization of resources, duplication of activities and complex service management.

For instance Women Teacher College Camp, 7 boreholes have been equipped with hand pump (one); solar pumps (three) and with fossil energy powered pumps (three) for a population of 6 063 IDPs. A proper camp management would have certainly secured the water supply line with less boreholes and developed a proper water network which would had covered the related needs.

Same observation applies in Teacher Village camp where six boreholes were equipped with hand pumps (two), solar pumps (two) and fossil energy powered pumps (two) to cover the needs of 9 569 IDPs⁸.



Level of insecurity of LGAs in Borno [Source: UNICEF/UNDSS]



One motorized borehole and one equipped with hand pump in Women Teacher College Camp

Right: Bakassi Camp: Multi sector coordination meeting are held every two weeks (Health, Education, Protection, WASH NFI, Shelter & Camp Management). Water points inventory is 19 boreholes with only 11 operational (8 power with solar energy, 2 with fossil energy and 1 hand pump). UNICEF was unable to mention those functioning and those out of order and yet 3 more solar power boreholes were schedule.

Bakassi camp is hosting 10 875 IDPs (October 2015) and is scheduled to host IDPs from Women Teacher College Camp, Government Teacher Camp & Government College Camp (~20 000 extra IDPs in total)



⁵ UNDISS briefing done in Maiduguri upon the mission arrival was that due to the complexity of the context, it is recommended to trust one's « gut feelings ».

⁶ If Bakassi, Dalori 1 & 2 were targeted as final location sites, OCHA and UNICEF still had disagreement to choose the two remaining among Hadj Center, Stadium, Teacher Village & Farm Centre.

⁷ UNICEF nor OCHA was aware of the closure of MSF's Cholera Treatment Centre.

⁸ As of 23rd of November 2015 for both Women Teachers College & Teachers Villages camps.

2.1.2 In the Host Informal Settlements

Same level of lack of coordination has been observed for the support to IDPs hosted in communities, which suggest as well a limited presence of NGOs onsite.

The example of ACF not knowing that Save the Children had done two hand pumps in the same site (Buzu quarter) they intended to upgrade the existing water supply system underline the absence of effective coordination mechanism in the response. In the meantime, sanitation needs were far from being covered (22 latrines built for 3 000 people¹⁰).



Buzu Quarter Informal Settlement: Borehole rehabilitation targeted by ACF when Save the Children has processed already two hand pumps on site (3 000 IDPs hosted⁹).

2.2 Lack of quality control

Local capacities exist in Maiduguri to set the facilities required in the WASH sectors (water supply & sanitation mainly). Most of ECHO partners relied on those capacities to implement their activities. Unfortunately, the externalization of the implementation resulted in lesser (if any) supervision of the quality and related performance of the processed outputs.

2.2.1 Water Sanitation & Hygiene

2.2.1.1 WATER SUPPLY

Lack of coordination resulted in multiplication of boreholes in camps sites none of which related performance (specific yield) is known. As of now:

- ✦ It is impossible to know if the technical option chosen (hand pump, solar or fossil energy motorized pump) are able to address the needs of the IDPs hosted in camps;
- ✦ It is impossible to monitor the drawdown of the aquifer and thus its capacity to cover the water related needs; and
- ✦ Lack of technical capacities to assess and set a relevant response has been observed during the visit. For instance:
 - ✦ In Teachers Village Camp, UNICEF reported estimating the available water quantity based on the number of taps available regardless of the effective water supply capacity of the boreholes which diameter suggest limited performances (6" drilled, and 4" equipped);
 - ✦ In Galtimari Primary School Camp, UNICEF equipped a platform with a water tank when it was not yet finished. Leakages could already be observed on the side of the tank;
 - ✦ ACF intend to set solar pump in Buzu Quarter without knowing the yield of the borehole.

Moreover, most equipment is properly equipped resulting in limited maintenance or repair operations:

- ✦ None of the motorized borehole is equipped with minimum requirements such as control valve, non-return valve, water meter, piezometric data logger or air relief valve;
- ✦ None of the reservoir is equipped with by pass to enable maintenance and/or repair without disrupting the service;

The absence of such equipment has limited consequence on the where IDPs are to be relocated. On the other hand, it will be an issue in the management of camps dedicated to host those relocated IDPs.

⁹ Some of whom are on site since 2009.

¹⁰ 12 from ACF and 10 from STC. I.e.: one latrine for 137 users when minimum emergency standard is one for 50 users.

2.2.1.2 SANITATION

As of now, the sanitation gaps based on incomplete data collected by UNICEF in October 2015 is of 567 latrines for all existing camps:

- ✘ With a reported capacity of 30 latrines/week from UNICEF, it would require more than 4 months covering the emergency needs;
- ✘ That is without taking into account the relocation of IDPs in 5 camps which will create an even greater demand in terms of latrines;
- ✘ Targeted resettlement sites (Bakassi) have already half of their latrine full; and
- ✘ Bathing facilities gaps are worse than latrines.

In terms of quality of implementation:

- ✘ The construction of some latrine has been done without consolidating the pit which creates a collapsing hazard;
- ✘ None of the observed latrine is equipped with taped defecation holes; and
- ✘ Most of the water supply facilities do not have a proper drainage system which creates a health related hazard in a cholera prone environment.

2.2.1.3 HYGIENE

Most of the hygiene related outputs observed are ineffective:

- ✘ The hand washing facilities nearby the latrine are not properly functioning either because of lack of water or soap. It suggests that the maintenance system (water/hygiene committees) is ineffective; and
- ✘ When sensitization signboards have been displayed, it was poorly set limiting their lifespan and suggesting limited concern on hygiene related sensitization activities.



Absence of drainage in all sites (left: Bakassi Camp, Centre: Gubio Camp) and poorly executed latrine with collapsing pit and short life span hygiene promotion settings (right: Buzu Quarter Informal Camp)



Already filled latrine in Bakassi (Left), absence of solid waste management in Women Teacher College (Centre) and in Galtimari (right) the concrete of the platform is not dry but yet equipped water tank jeopardizing its lifespan (not to mention inadequate visibility)

2.2.2 Shelter & NFIs

2.2.2.1 SHELTER

Population hosted in camps benefit mainly from existing rooms (houses or classrooms) shared among several families (3 households per house¹¹ and 3 households per classroom on average). Little if any is done to adjust shelter size according to the cultural requirements of the households.



IDPs hosted in house initially dedicated to teachers at Teacher Village Camp (9 564 IDPs as of November 2014)

As of now, little has been done in terms of shelter implementation. The main concern is the hosting capacities of the five camps which will host the whole IDPs caseloads. Expected movements of population represent approx. 38 145 people to be relocated¹².

In the host communities, IDPs situation is not documented. Random interview held during the mission was in a rented house shared by 30 people (one extend family of two widows and nine couples with kids).



Makeshift shelters in Buzu Quarter Informal Settlement

A visit to an informal settlement showed limited if any support received shelter wise. Most of the shelters were of made of makeshift materials.

There are reported fluxes between the camps and the host communities, mainly when IDPs do not have the capacities to cover their daily expenses while in the communities. On one hand, it suggests that the poorest IDPs are located in the camps and focusing humanitarian support to the IDPs in the camps actually targets the most vulnerable ones. On the other hand, it highlights that IDPs prefer to be hosted in the communities rather than in the camps which highlights their reluctance to live there.

2.2.2.2 NFIS

NFIs have been distributed to IDPs in camps. Some IDPs in host communities did receive NFIs as well. From the two households interviewed during the mission, it appeared that the distributions processed were either incomplete or not addressing the needs:

- ✦ In Galtimari School Camp (506 IDPs hosted), two distributions were processed but the interviewed households claimed being excluded from the 2nd one as she was not registered. UNICEF reported that it was normal as she benefited from the 1st one. Problem was that most of the households benefited from both distributions. No monitoring/ complain mechanism was set;
- ✦ In a household in Wulari Community, only 2 of 11 households settled in the same compound benefited from NFI support.

¹¹ 1 room per family.

¹² 20 000 IDPs to Bakassi: A first arrival of 2 500 IDPs are scheduled by the end of the month. Land plotting had just started. 18 145 people to Dalory 1 (6 000 IDPs) & 2 (12 145 IDPs): 6 370 are expected by the end of December, with shelter activities (910 shelters) to start end of November. Two other hosting sites need to be clarified (see upper footnote).

Content of NFI kits consist mainly in jerrycan, bucket, soap, plastic tea pot and cups, mosquito net, solar light and household water treatment. There is little coherency from one actors to another:



NFIs & Food items provided to IDPs in Galtimari Primary School Camp

- ✦ Content, quantities¹³ and nature of items are different; and
- ✦ Consumable duration is not based on the real number of people per household but on a predefine ratio of people per house.

With the improvement of the security context and acknowledgement of the magnitude of the crisis, some partners intend to deploy more technical capacities on the ground:


- ✦ ACF will recruit an international expert in their next phase of project in Borno state; and
- ✦ UNICEF reported deploying a civil engineer and a hygiene Promotion specialist for Maiduguri¹⁴.

2.2.3 Cholera prone area


From September (week 37) until November (week 47), a cholera outbreak affected Borno State. Most of the data on cholera caseload were collected at camps level. Little is documented on the extent of the outbreak in the communities (not to mention those inaccessible for security reasons). Based on collected data, the most affected people were from the communities (57%) and from Jere camps (40% of the total caseload).



Weekly caseload of the cholera outbreak in Maiduguri [Source: OCHA]



Cholera case per LGAs (caseload and % total caseload)



Number of Cholera affected camps per LGA

Cholera statistics of 2015 outbreak in Borno state [Source: CDC/WHO/UNICEF]

The epidemic did not spread as initially feared and total affected is 1039 people (18 fatalities) from the communities (57%) and eleven IDPs camps (43%). The limited access to WASH facilities and concentration of people with limited resources should have triggered a wider

¹³ UNICEF provides IDPS with 3 kg of soap/ household/month, IMC 1.6Kg and the Red Cross 0.8 Kg. Those figures were those reported by interviewed IDPs.

¹⁴ Alongside with a coordinator at national level and a three months Short term staff from UNICEF global support team.

epidemic. Its containment may be linked to:

- ✦ The humanitarian response (led by MSF for case management and ICRC mainly for the contamination containment¹⁵);
- ✦ The fact that Borno state is a cholera prone environment¹⁶ where population may have developed a certain immunity (less likely) and is aware of the basic hygiene behaviors in case of cholera outbreak (most likely); and
- ✦ A certain degree of chance which should not be neglected.

With the current caseload of IDPs in Maiduguri and pressure on resources (habitat & WASH), another epidemic of wider impact is not unlikely in next cholera outbreak prone season (start. June 2016).

If such should appear and expand, there are limited capacities from the NGOs & local institution to contain & isolate sources of contamination in Maiduguri as of now.

3 Expert recommendations

3.1 Enhancing Capacities

The main challenge of the year 2015 was to bring humanitarian actors in a context where limited information was available on the possibilities of operating in a very insecure environment.

- ✦ With the improvement of the security situation and improving access to IDPs, ECHO partners should be able to deploy skilled human resources into Borno state to better coordinate and monitor the quality of the support provided to the IDPs in Borno State; and
- ✦ Since the acknowledgement of the humanitarian problematic by the diplomatic community is hampered at national level, there is a need to lift this advocacy at higher levels (IASC, Member State ministries, External Services) in order to trigger that acknowledgement within the countries supporting Nigeria.

3.2 Enhancing targeting

- ✦ As of now, the response is only addressing a limited fraction of the problematic. Little is known about the conditions of the IDPs hosted in communities in either accessible or inaccessible areas.
- ✦ A proper mapping of the areas of concentration of IDPs should be done in the LGAs of Borno state in order to have a proper overview of the problematic and allow a coherent coordination of the response;
- ✦ This mapping should be combined with an assessment of the impact of the IDPs on the access to existing public (health, water and sanitation, protection) and private sector led (shelter, informal businesses) services; and
- ✦ Those data combined with a proper typology of the population (IDPs and host communities) will define a vulnerability map which will allow a proper targeting of the area and populations to prioritize.

A first round of survey with DG ECHO-supported IOM DTM allowed having a first overview of the context. It is yet not sufficient to design a coherent global response though. Some ECHO partners are specialized in the collection of the related data (Intersos, INSO, IOM) while some other are in their GIS treatment (UN agencies information management, ACTED/REACH).

- ✦ Considering the complexity of the crisis, a specific sector should be created in the coordination platform on this specific issue (vulnerability mapping and analysis) with IOM as sector lead ;
- ✦ The related actors (Intersos, INSO, etc) should be sensitized to deploy the required resource to provide the humanitarian community with a coherent programmatic tool;

¹⁵ MSF-F set a Cholera Treatment Centre and ICRC has secured 79 water points in Maiduguri town (chlorination) and provided 9 outreach communities with equipment in order to secure theirs.

¹⁶ In October 2014, 4536 cases of cholera were reported [ACAPS, 30/10/14],

- ✧ With 98% of the IDPs expressed their wish to return provided some conditions are met and institutions slightly pro-active to have them do so, conditions met or not¹⁷, assessments should not only cover the actual location of IDPs but their place of origin or probable relocation in the perspective of a rapid return of IDPs.

3.3 Enhancing coordination

As of now, the existing coordination is not able to allow a pro-active and cost effective coordination of the response. For the WASH sector, the existing tool (5W table) needs to be enhanced:

- ✧ Response should not be designed on the basis of each implementing partners' capacities but on the most cost effective and performant setting to address the population's needs (including specific gender, disabled, cultural needs);
- ✧ Assessment, programmatic & monitoring tool (5W) should be disaggregated per area (camp or community unit) and updated on a weekly basis;
- ✧ Monitoring of WASH related services should not be calculated on the sole basis of theoretical SPHERE standards but based on the performance (access quantity and quality) and status (capacity, delivery and lifespan) of existing WASH outputs (including NFIs); and
- ✧ Minimum design standards should be agreed between the WASH stakeholder in the design of outputs and monitoring of their performance.

One of the main shortfalls in the existing coordination is that it is led by SEMA agents who have limited experience and capacities to address the related need. UNICEF as a government tightened agency is unable to confront them in a context like Nigeria. However fast their learning curve is, the existing crisis does not allow having a state led coordination improving as it learns.

- ✧ Considering the limited number of WASH NGOs, it is advised that NGOs insure coordination of activities between themselves and report to UNICEF for aggregation and updates to be presented to the SEMA coordination; and
- ✧ If number of WASH NGOs is to increase, update and aggregation of programmed or ongoing activities should be down through a coordination web platform facilitated by UNICEF (implementing partners providing the updates and UNICEF verifying and aggregating them). Coordination meeting should be focused on programming of new activities and securing coherence in the design/quality of the proposed outputs.

3.4 Enhancing Quality control

3.4.1 *Water Supply*

- ✧ Once needs are accurately known, the best solution to cover the water related needs of the IDPs in the camps and among the community is to have a proper diagnosis of the water networks of the cities in order to repair/improve production and repair/extend the water network. Only the vulnerable population out of the reach of the water network should be supported with an autonomous system. It can be done through:
 - ✧ NGOs or Organization who have the required knowledge (ICRC mainly); or
 - ✧ Through externalized skill embedded with a WASH partner (city technical services in the Nigerian context or La Fondation Véolia for instance).
- ✧ In the meantime, it is recommended to assess the capacities (borehole specific yield assessment) of all the boreholes processed and/or used to cover the need of the IDPs according to their ongoing and foreseen caseload;
- ✧ Once the borehole capacity is documented, it is recommended to equip them with the pump which will allow the best performance and thus reducing the number of equipment required. Solar pumping can be considered as an option provided repair

¹⁷ 5000 IDP originally from Borno currently displaced in Adamawa have been targeted by the government to return (either to their LGAs of origin or to IDP settlements in Borno). 98% registered IDP expressed at least one of three conditions for return (security, improvement of economic situation and food security).

and maintenance capacities are available¹⁸ and that it meets the water supply requirements;

- ☞ All borehole surface equipment should include as a minimum: control valve, non-return valve, water meter, piezometric data logger and air relief valve;
- ☞ Pumping and storage capacities should be designed in order to allow any maintenance and repair operation on boreholes and tanks without service disruption. It will include by-pass valves at reservoirs levels and diversion valves at supply lines;
- ☞ Distribution lines should include diversion valves for the same reason (maintenance & repair);
- ☞ Water tanks and distribution stands should be equipped with water meter in order to monitor the water consumption;
- ☞ Distribution stand and hand pump sites should be equipped with proper drainage system including drainage channels to remove spillage from the stand/apron and soak away¹⁹ pit to prevent any stagnant water;
- ☞ All water distribution sites should be properly delimited (ideally with fence or wall) and hygiene and proper use related messages displayed;
- ☞ The water committees should be exclusively composed of users²⁰ at all levels of management. They should have access to a users-led complaint mechanism²¹ with a voice at camp/community coordination meetings;
- ☞ Some camp (Bakassi for instance) have an area dedicated to agriculture/cropping. It is very likely that water will be used for crop watering. Such use should be monitored alongside with any use dedicated to economic purposes. A cost recovery mechanism should be set for this use. The collected money should contribute to the repair & maintenance costs of the water committees;
- ☞ A monthly monitoring system of the performance of the water supply should be set (aquifer levels, service demand, leakages detection, users pressure at distribution, users 'satisfaction, operation, maintenance & repair costs follow up).

3.4.2 Sanitation

- ☞ As for water supply, waste water network is the best solution in urban context. The coverage of this network in Maiduguri has not been documented during the mission. It is believed to be very small (if any). As a waste water network cannot be set in an emergency context, the best solution consists in monitoring and supporting the use of autonomous facilities (pit latrine);
- ☞ Latrine coverage should prioritize areas with highest concentration of people (camps and camp type settlements);
- ☞ Desludging capacities should be strengthened/supported in the host communities in order to avoid existing facilities being filled.
- ☞ A latrine is useful only if properly built. Close attention should be given to the proper setting of new facilities:
 - ☞ Reinforced pit wall if soil is unstable;
 - ☞ Latrines entrance should be facing the winds with air circulation opening (below the door at entrance, upper small window at the back);
 - ☞ Defecation holes should be always equipped with a tapping device;
 - ☞ Pit edge should be above the runoff water levels and always distant more than 30 meters from any boreholes (more if located higher);
 - ☞ Ventilation pipe should always be taped with metallic fly nets, their bases strengthened in order to resist against storms;
 - ☞ Pit apron should always be air tight and accessible from the outside in order to facilitate its desludging;
 - ☞ Public latrines should be gender separated and design adapted to all users

¹⁸ It should be the case as solar pumping is reported to be supported at state and/or federal level.

¹⁹ Crop garden irrigated by the drained water can be envisaged if space, pedology and topography allow it.

²⁰ Mainly women. Men are usually not in charge of the household water supply and less sensitive to its burden, thus less likely to seek for its reduction.

²¹ See upper remark.

- (children and disabled people);
- ☞ Public latrines should be equipped with hand washing station equipped with soap and water (diluted bleach is another option);
- ☞ Public latrines should always be equipped with light for use at night and never distant more than 50 meters from the households of the users; and
- ☞ In the short terms there should not be more than 50 users per latrine (20 in the mid-term).
- ☞ In host communities new emergency public latrines should not be considered as an option as it is likely to trigger public health issues if not properly maintained. It can be envisaged only in a camp type context (Buzu) when the use is limited to the sole people living in that area.
- ☞ Solid waste management activities should only be prioritized in area of great concentration of people (IDPs Camp and Informal settlement type of camp);
- ☞ A proper solid waste storage system should set in place (from household to group of households storage devices) completed by removal and disposal services;
- ☞ As for water supply, a proper monitoring of the status of the facilities, performance of the services and complain mechanism should be set for any new facility. Such monitoring should focus on:
 - ☞ The maximum number of users per latrine/public waste bin (based on a survey and not on a fictive ratio population/number of facilities);
 - ☞ The availability of soap and water at latrine levels (both public and private/household latrine) for hand washing;
 - ☞ The filling status of the latrine/bins and desludging/removal needs;
 - ☞ The cleanness of the latrine and proper equipment (tap for defecation hole);
 - ☞ The absence of solid waste in the environment and proper disposal (burial, burning site 500 m distant minimum from any household); and
 - ☞ The presence of long lasting hygiene related messages signboards;
- ☞ Drainage of temporary stagnant water sites should only be envisaged where there is a great concentration of people nearby (camps and informal settlements type), or where it represent a health hazard (nearby WASH & health facilities, cholera prone area). Solution aiming at enhancing water infiltration should always be prioritized (rather than water removal).

3.4.3 Shelter

Little was implemented in terms of shelter at the time of the mission. Beside the basic recommendations for any type of shelter setting (minimum surface per person, access to services, security requirements), special focus should be provided on shelter programming:

- ☞ The existing modus operandi (3 household per classrooms or house) did not take into consideration some cultural specificities (such as polygamy) or issues linked to family reunion (a household can encompass three generations); and
- ☞ The forecast design (7 people per tent) does not seem to have taken them into consideration too.

It is recommended that such requirements be mainstreamed as IDPs are being allocated shelter. It will require proper data collection (household composition interview), monitoring of household shelter allocation, the updating of the sites corrected capacities and related shelter gaps.

3.4.4 NFIs

In an urban context where most IDPs are hosted in communities or have access to the markets of a major town, the provision of in-kind items is questionable when the market would be more likely to absorb the demand at a lesser costs than the humanitarian actors.

- ☞ An Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) is recommended in order to assess if this assumption is correct;
- ☞ Based on the results of this EMMA, the opportunity to switch to a cash & voucher approach should be analyzed and set if relevant;
- ☞ One of the core expenses for the IDPs in host communities is the accommodation

rent. Such problematic should be integrated in the design of the response to some extent. IDPs targeting for High Intensity Manpower Activities (HIMA) could be envisaged (from camps & communities based on their vulnerability/income generating capacities) to address the issue;

- ↳ NFI, Coupon or cash amount should be provided according to the real status of the targeted households (number of people, family composition). It requires a different approach in the designing of the response²²;
- ↳ A monitoring of the use of the NFI/Voucher/Cash will be necessary, a great attention should be done in avoiding fraud (local seller with coupons, cash among the humanitarian staff) and protection of the beneficiaries (mainly with cash distribution); and
- ↳ As for the WASH sector, a complain mechanism should be accessible to the people entitled to receive the related NFI/Voucher/Cash support.

4 Sector policy compliance²³

4.1 Limited WASH capacities of humanitarian actors for urban area

With more than 1.4 M IDPs scattered in the urban host community of Maiduguri (Borno State), the technical response is challenging as it is out of the usual camp-type autonomous WASH service response. It requires mainly assessing the capacities of the existing network and key interventions which could improve its production improve and extend its distribution.

Most of DG-ECHO WASH partners are institutionally reluctant to engage in such type of support as they do not have the internal knowledge to provide it. If some partner may have some of their expatriate experienced in WASH urban setting, one of the only institution for which this knowledge is institutionalized is ICRC.

Though the technique involved is not very different from usual camp type response (only the scale is changed), there is a gap to address this type of WASH intervention among the WASH actors.

In the context of more and more populations in the third world living in urban areas, the strengthening of related technical knowledge will allow some pinball interventions (valve changing, supply of consumable, pipe replacement) which can be a game changer in terms of swift improvement of access to WASH services.

4.2 Lack of quality control

As it is more and more observed in DG-ECHO funded WASH programs, the quality of the implementation is more and more worrying. It has already been reported in previous reports and the outputs observed during the mission in Maiduguri illustrate this trend.

As of now, this lack of quality control cannot be acknowledged as there is no technical specification in the WASH sector.

If some worldwide use tool such as SPHERE standards provide some guidelines they are often use for what they are not meant to be (programmatic tools instead monitoring tools²⁴).

It is like if, in the health sector, ECHO would not bother to have medicine purchased either through Humanitarian Procurement Centre or from the local shop in the nearby village. There are no WASH minimum requirements which absence would allow ECHO not to fund a WASH project.

As reported in previous report, ECHO should have its own WASH Technical Specification in order to secure quality setting and control. Those are not difficult to produce as most donors use similar documents in the technical specifications of their tender.

²² Focusing on a person needs according to the household he/she lives in rather than focussing on a household kit which content does not necessarily fit to the family characteristic.

²³ The following section is an addendum to the mission report template dedicated to sector policy issues (A4).

²⁴ And to a certain extent, they are not even enough as monitoring tools as it does not contain any indication on where, how often and how accurate (coverage wise) this monitoring should be done.

4.3 Lack of rocking mechanism within the European Commission

The Maiduguri context is no different from most contexts whenever a crisis is affecting a country usually supported throughout development program. Even when the crisis is acknowledged by the development community (which is not yet the case for Maiduguri though), the response is conceived through a development lens which targets the strengthening of national institution.

Unfortunately, it is not when the house is on fire that you start to train firemen. You look for those available, wherever they can be. This rationale is not yet understood in the development community. The Ebola epidemic management is the main example over the past two years. Maiduguri is eligible too as the UN was designed and led by development focused resources to address the issue.

A sudden onset crisis has to be addressed by humanitarian actors specialized in emergency, whatever unsatisfying it can be for national authorities and diplomatic community.

Within the European Commission, the external services are too tightened to their diplomatic agenda or EDF programming to provide a significant response to sudden onset crisis. Even the mobilization of the B envelop (EDF non programmatic funds) is not easily accessible to address an unforeseen crisis. Assumption is that it is usually informally earmarked or kept as a flexible tool to complete the A-Envelop programmes and/or diplomatic leverage/attention.

There should be a DG to DG mechanism within the institution to allow the pre-empting of B-envelop funds when available if no top up is available from any other funding tools of DG-ECHO.

Feed-back Request Box

None