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The EU Roadmap process: taking stock
Capitalisation report

Tome I – Main Report

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The EU Roadmap process: taking stock
Capitalisation report

Tome I – Main Report

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Acronyms

ACP group of	Africa Caribbean and Pacific countries	LIC	Low income countries
CfP	Call for Proposals	LMIC	Lower middle-income countries
CODEV	Council Working Group on Development	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
CS	Civil Society	MS	Member State(s)
CSF	Civil Society Fund	MoSD	Ministry of Social Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	NGO	Non-governmental organisation
CSO – LA	Civil Society and Local Authorities (thematic programme)	ODA	Official development assistance
CSP	Country Strategy Paper	OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
CSP	Civil Society Proclamation	PNG	Papua New Guinea
DEVCO	Directorate General for Development and Co-operation EuropeAid	PPP	Public private partnerships
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
EC	European Commission	RM	Roadmap
EDF	European Development Fund	RMF	Roadmap facility
EE	Enabling environment	SA	South Africa
EEAS	European External Action Service	SBC	State building contracts
EEl	Enabling Environment Index	SME	Small medium enterprises
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights	SPSP	Sector Policy Support Programmes
EP	European Parliament	SRC	Sector reform contracts
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements	SWAP	Sector Wide Approaches
EU	European Union	TL	Team leader
EUD	European Union Delegation	UMIC	Upper middle-income countries
GDSP	Ghana Decentralisation Support Programme	UIC	Upper income countries
GGDC	Good governance and development contracts	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
GIMMA	Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach		
GNI	Gross national income		
GONGO	Governmental NGO		
HRCS	Human Rights Country Strategies		
ICT	Information and Communication Technology		
INGO	International NGO		
LDCs	Least Developed Countries		

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Executive summary

The exercise to develop **EU Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society** at country level was launched more than a year and a half ago. The goal was to translate the strategic orientations of the September 2012 Civil Society Communication "The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations" at country level, in order to strengthen Europe's engagement with civil society. 91 Roadmaps (accounting for 76% of the first generation) have already been received, with several more expected later this year.

In order to assist EU Delegations in Roadmap reviews, the RM Facility has created this capitalisation report. It was conceived as a **stocktaking and learning exercise** rather than an evaluation *per se*, both from a process and content perspective. 87 Roadmaps have been assessed, and this report offers the findings with a three-fold approach focusing on: (i) the context for EU engagement with CSOs; (ii) the RM process so far (mainly the elaboration phase at this point); and (iii) the content for EU engagement put forward by the RM documents.

The assessment was performed by typology of countries. Rather than applying a strict geographical division of countries, during the inception phase of the study it was decided to adopt a political/economic perspective and categorise countries based on a set of political and economic variables. Three key variables appeared particularly relevant to assess the countries and their commonalities. These were: (i) whether contexts are in a situation of fragility or not; (ii) what type of environment characterises CS operations, and (iii) their level of income.

The contexts examined in this report are far too diverse to provide an overall assessment. Notwithstanding such diversity, certain trends can be identified when looking into the countries from a political/economic perspective. Throughout the report general characterisations and trends regarding different aspects of the RM process in particular country clusters are offered.

The RM elaboration process

The **RM elaboration process** itself has been seen as a success thus far; it can be said that it is at least as important, if not moreso, than the end product itself. The RM process offers an opportunity to put into practice the paradigm shift put forward by the 2012 Communication and stop simply "doing business as usual".

Dialogue and consultation with local civil society has been a key aspect of the Roadmap development process, despite the EU ownership of the process and the document. The intensity, comprehensiveness, inclusiveness and breadth of the consultation process with CSOs have often been cited as outstanding features in general across all country contexts, with only a few exceptions. Several CSOs have acknowledged that EUDs are managing to reach out more widely and more locally, and the RM is allowing several of them to identify the remaining challenges and explore options for overcoming them. In the words of the European NGO platform CONCORD: "The drafting of Roadmaps for EU engagement with civil society is viewed as a major step in the right direction." Questionnaires, consultation meetings, and workshops have all been part of the highly participatory approach.

Consultations have also raised a number of relevant **challenges and questions**. First and foremost, it has become evident that there are no "blueprint" approaches on how to consult and establish dialogue with CSOs, as national contexts are simply too diverse to allow for uniform approaches. Secondly, the very process of consulting raises expectations on the side of CSOs and expectation management is therefore an important component in the process. Consultations also raise operational challenges, as they require time and add extra workload to the existing tasks of the EUDs. Finally, targeting and/or identifying the right actors continues to be one of the most fundamental questions in consultations, to ensure that the process is effective, and beyond the effectiveness question, to create legitimacy and credibility for the whole process. Hence there is a need to carefully map out the actors and their roles.

The Roadmap process is also **enhancing dialogue, mutual knowledge and even stronger cooperation between EUDs and MS**, as well as non-EU donors. In most countries, the process has been led by the EUDs, yet MS present in the country have contributed, even if on an *ad-hoc* basis. RMs can be understood as learning processes, as they imply a new and different way of working between the EUD and MS when it comes to CS engagement.

Knowledge generation has also been a big part of the Roadmap process. A good understanding of CSOs beyond the traditional NGOs is a precondition for effective engagement, and Roadmaps are positioned to help with this, as they

are country-driven strategic planning processes that attempt to bridge the gap between knowledge of the CSO landscape of a given country on the one hand, and EU programmes and instruments on the other. Knowledge generation, in terms of the RMs, does not necessarily mean engaging in lengthy and costly studies but rather tapping into existing knowledge at EUD and MS level. Following this, targeted studies can also help to address knowledge gaps that the Roadmap process may help identify.

Important **challenges and questions** have also been raised with regard to **knowledge generation** of the CS landscape. Several EUDs have not been able to tap into the already existing knowledge, as they were not aware of it, and knowledge is often fragmented within the EUD. Also, there is unfortunately usually little coordination with MS and other actors in terms of knowledge sharing. Additionally, EUDs have been using almost exclusively mapping studies, but these should not be considered “the magic bullet”, as other tools may be more suitable, depending on the context and knowledge needs. Finally, all too often the studies launched have been disconnected from the overall EU policy framework or from the Roadmap exercise. Moreover, studies have not always asked the right questions and do not always bring the right answers. As a consequence, the studies’ outcomes are not always used to their full potential.

The content of EU engagement

The **content of EU engagement** appears also to be evolving across countries and regions, with an overriding vision shared with MS. In the words of one of the EUDs involved in the global 2015 seminar, RMs provide “for the first time a shared EU institutional framework” for engagement with CSOs. They allow for **setting a vision** and **formalising a strategy**, with **concrete actions**. Even in the cases of EUDs more advanced in terms of engagement with CSOs, RMs appear to offer a **different and renewed perspective**, as they call for a stronger political and more diversified role of EUDs in their engagement with CSOs (including facilitation, brokering, mediation, convening, etc.) Additionally, Roadmaps appear to be progressively helping EUDs overcome the traditional instrument-driven approach and **develop a more coherent and effective strategy for working with CS** across units, sectors and instruments. Through their focus on knowledge, Roadmaps also offer an opportunity to base this new approach on solid and continuous analysis of CS dynamics.

The 2012 Communication has been a clear inspiration in the establishment of the priorities of

the RM documents. More than 60% of the RM documents assessed include priorities revolving around the three ambitions of the 2012 Communication (i.e. enabling environment, civil society participation in public policy and CSO capacity development). The distribution of priorities across the three ambitions of the 2012 Communication also appears to be well balanced, although it shows a preference towards the second and third ambitions of the 2012 Communication. This may be explained by the difficulties inherent in promoting the enabling environment, especially in non-conducive contexts and contexts in fragility and/or where the EU has limited leverage (as is the case in graduated countries).

Progress is also apparent regarding mainstreaming CSO involvement in EU sectors of cooperation. From the assessment conducted, it is evident that RMs offer a unique opportunity to act more consistently by raising awareness within EUDs (beyond CS focal points) on the critical roles played by CSOs in national political, economic and social processes. Eventually they promote deeper and more comprehensive engagement across the spectrum of EU cooperation sectors, be it at the level of policy dialogue or operational support. Experiences are however diverse and vary from country to country.

RM implementation

Roadmap implementation is still at an **early stage** of development, as most EUDs have been occupied thus far with finalising the RM documents. However, even if experience is limited, it is possible to anticipate that the implementation phase of the Roadmaps will unveil further questions and challenges, which will require flexible and adapted solutions.

The **links between the RM and the “programmatic” life** of the EUD are of utmost importance. The RMs are not programmatic documents themselves and their implementation relies on the spectrum of programmes and instruments available at the level of EUD and MS. Unless the linkages are clearly established, ensuring that the RM is “well anchored” in the reality of the EU programmes and instruments at country level, implementation will be very difficult, as will be follow-up.

Roadmaps should ideally reflect broader EU engagement in a country. In order to avoid their becoming a self-standing tool, it is therefore key that they are linked to and well integrated into the wider EU cooperation processes in the country. This includes programming of development cooperation but also political dialogue and diplomatic relations with the EU and MS. Several

participating EUDs observed that they are using the Roadmap exercise to reorient EU/ CS engagement strategies towards these new policy areas (e.g. trade).

It is also necessary to “keep up the momentum” in an effort to ensure the collective ownership of the Roadmap, both internally and externally, with MS and other interested donors. Of particular interest is ensuring the (co-) **ownership of the different actions** set out in the Roadmap, as well as an effective task division. The bulk of the coordination work is not over once the document is ready; rather it requires due attention to concretise the mainstreaming ambitions set forward in the RM documents and to use the available and best instruments and programmes in a complementary manner. Ultimately coordination inside the EUD is needed to prevent the RM from becoming a “CS focal point” document, instead of an EU vision at country level. Collective ownership by MS, and possibly other donors, is also of paramount importance if the exercise and process is to be a genuine EU process. In this regard, the assessment of the RM so far shows mixed records regarding the envisaged level of involvement of MS in the implementation of actions foreseen in the RM.

Monitoring & Following up of the RM

Experience with **monitoring and following up** of the RM is still limited, but the analysis done by the RM Facility shows some interesting indications regarding how EUDs and MS are moving forward in the follow up of the RM process and progress towards priorities. These practices have been developed very much at the EUDs’ own initiatives in a “learn by doing “ process. There seem to be a few key areas on which different EUDs have been focusing their attention in order to lay the ground for the establishment of a solid follow-up system. These are the fine-tuning of their dashboard, the establishment of baselines and targets in an effort to describe the current state of play and also identify the “ultimate goal”, and the setting up of an institutionalised mechanism to follow-up on the process and progress towards priorities.

Communication

Of the 91 RM finalised, 33 are public¹ and available at [capacity4dev](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/roadmaps) (<http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/roadmaps>). For 12 Roadmaps, summaries are published and available at capacity4dev. The rest of the Roadmaps that are finalised remain confidential. Some of the communication strategies used by EUDs to communicate on the RM process so far are the

publication of the Roadmap (or a summary) on the EUD website and even on MS webpages; the use of Twitter and Facebook accounts; the organisation, together with MS, of an event and a press conference on the launch of the Roadmap and the development of a tailored brochure on the Roadmap and its implementation. However, communication is still not used to its full extent, despite its pivotal role in effectively engaging as well as informing stakeholders on priorities and sharing knowledge with civil society.

Final remarks

In conclusion, roadmaps are ‘in place’ in most countries. Reportedly, they offer a real opportunity for EUDs and MS to be better equipped with sound knowledge about the CS landscape, share a common language and develop a common vision and agenda for engagement, linked to the country dynamics.

Almost half way through the cycle of the first generation of Roadmaps (2014-2018), today the priority is to activate the roadmaps effectively. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate (ideally with concrete results) that roadmaps can bring about real changes in the ways of doing business (and not just of “thinking business”) as well as in the quality of the EU support strategies and modalities towards CSOs. The challenges are, however, manifold and adequate support mechanisms as well as a further tailored approach (taking account of the political, economic and EUD institutional state of play in every context) will be necessary.

¹ As of mid August 2015

Introduction

0.1. The first generation of RM 2014-2017

It is now more than a year and a half year since the exercise to develop EU Country Roadmaps (RM) for engagement with Civil Society (CS) at country level was launched. Conceived as a joint initiative between the European Union and Member States (MS), RMs were introduced to translate at country level the strategic orientations of the September 2012 Civil Society Communication “The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations”. The aim was to strengthen Europe's engagement with civil society, through the development of a common strategic framework.


Box 1: Why EU Country Roadmaps?

EU country Roadmaps in a nutshell	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Roadmaps aim to improve the impact, predictability and visibility of EU actions, ensuring consistency and synergy throughout the various sectors covered by EU external relations. They are also intended to foster coordination and sharing of best practice with Member States and other international actors. ▪ Roadmaps identify long-term objectives of EU cooperation with CSOs and encompass dialogue as well as operational support, identifying appropriate working modalities. They are linked to the programming of EU external assistance, namely bilateral, regional and thematic cooperation. The human rights country strategies are also an important reference. ▪ Roadmaps are developed taking into account the views of civil society; they are to be updated whenever necessary and, where appropriate, made publicly available and shared with national authorities. 	

The target was to have a first generation of Roadmaps covering the period 2014-2017 in more than 119 countries. A second generation of Roadmaps, building on the lessons learnt from their predecessors, is expected to be developed from 2018 onwards.


As of the end of August 2015, **91 RMs** have been received (accounting for 76% of the total expected), with several more expected later in the year. The following graph shows the geographical distribution of the RMs finalised so far.

Figure 1: Regional distribution of RMs received as of the end of August 2015



“*Force majeure*” factors such as internal conflict (in countries such as Syria, Libya, Yemen, CAR), and humanitarian crises (like the Ebola crisis in West African countries such as Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia) have delayed the process in certain countries. The need to align the RM process to local processes, such as elections (in Mozambique), the lack of cooperation personnel inside EUDs (particularly in graduated countries in South America) or lengthy approval processes to ensure that all MS are on board (in countries such as Benin and Burkina Faso) have also played their part. The following figure shows the level of accomplishment by region, showing that neighbourhood East + Russia, the Caribbean, and Central America + Mexico are the regions where all RMs expected have been submitted.

Figure 2: Level of accomplishment by region



In addition to the guidance provided by headquarters (DEVCO B 2) to EU Delegations (EUD), and a number of regional and global seminars organised throughout 2014 and 2015, a support Roadmap Facility was set up to provide flexible and demand-driven support to the EC, both at global and country level. On a global level, the support was defined in four categories: guidance, training, information & communication, and stocktaking. At country level, the Facility provided tailored support, both through country missions and remote assistance. Country support was mobilised on a request basis, in the areas of dialogue & consultation with

CSOs, knowledge generation, dialogue with MS, priority-setting, implementation of the RM, mainstreaming of CS into EU operations and monitoring and evaluation. In total the Facility reached out to approximately 70 EUDs, and more than 60 were actually supported².

0.2. The capitalisation study: objectives, scope, methodology and limitations

Against this backdrop, in an effort to assist EU Delegations in further developing their first Roadmap in future reviews, the RM Facility was charged with the production of a capitalisation report as part of its global support mandate. Rather than being an evaluation *per se*, this report was conceived as a stocktaking and learning exercise for the first generation of Roadmaps, both from a process and content perspective. The capitalisation report is also intended to inform other parties (i.e. DEVCO/EEAS, management, MS and Council working groups, European and partner countries' CSOs).

All in all 87 Roadmaps (of the 91 documents that are available) and their respective feedback forms have been assessed by the RMF in the production of the capitalisation report. Adopting a three-fold approach the report focuses on:

- (i) the context for EU engagement with CSOs (as it emerges from the RM documents);
- (ii) the RM process so far. Here it is important to note that it mainly focuses on the elaboration phase of the RMs as most EUDs have been busy finalising their Roadmaps; implementation (let alone monitoring) is still at a very early stage of development;
- (iii) the content for EU engagement as put forward by the RM documents for the period 2014-2017. The follow-up and communication are also briefly covered, based on EU practice so far at country level.

Methodology-wise, the study is mainly desk-based and fundamentally qualitative, combining primary and secondary data³. However, some quantitative information (i.e. statistical data and analysis of the data) is also provided. To this end a spreadsheet was elaborated, to collate information mainly from the feedback forms but also from the Roadmap documents themselves, based on a set of 30 variables as follows:

Box 2: Variables used to assess the RM documents

Dimensions	Variables
A. KEY DATA	1. Country 2. Typology of country (i.e. fragile situation; non-enabling environment; low income; lower middle income; upper middle income and high income) 3. Region 4. Status (public/restricted) 5. Number of priorities 6. Number of indicators
B. THE PROCESS	7. Level of MS involvement 8. Mechanisms for CS involvement 9. Level of consultations with CSOs 10. Support provided to elaborate the RM (Y/N) 11. Type of support (RM facility, local support/others)
C. SCOPE	12. Key CS actors covered (NGOs, socio-economic partners, emerging actors, etc.)

² Through 20 country missions, more than 30 remote support interventions and several mentoring sessions.

³ With regard to primary data (i.e. the data collected from the source, also known as "raw" data) the study considered the Roadmap documents (both public and restricted). The main sources of secondary data (i.e. data already available, processed and collected from other than the user) were: the feedback forms drafted by DEVCO B2 country officers; the CONCORD 2014 survey on EU engagement with CSOs at country level; the various country reports elaborated throughout 2014 and 2015 by the Roadmap Facility experts and other relevant reports elaborated by other stakeholders (including the reports of the 2014 and 2015 global workshops). The report also draws strongly on the 2014 Roadmap Facility final report as this was the first capitalisation effort performed by the Facility, only accomplished last February.

D. PRIORITIES, INDICATORS AND ACTIONS	13. Number of priorities relating to the three ambitions of the 2012 Communication 14. Overall assessment of priorities (specific/mixed/generic) 15. Overall assessment of indicators (specific/mixed/generic) 16. Overall assessment of actions (specific/mixed/generic) 17. Specific programmes/instruments/etc. envisaged 18. Mainstreaming (Y/N) 19. Sectors of mainstreaming 20. MS involvement in the implementation of actions
E. THE CONTEXT	Enabling environment 21. Space for CSOs (EE) (open/mixed/restricted / restricted and shrinking) 22. Positive trends (if any) 23. Key challenges CS involvement in public policies 24. CS involvement in public policies (Y/N) 25. Sectors where involvement is possible/positive 26. Key challenges CS capacity 27. Coordination within CS (high/medium/low) 28. Legitimacy/internal governance (high/medium/low) 29. Main capacity weaknesses
F. FINAL COMMENTS	30. Final comments

The assessment has been performed according to typology of countries⁴ and then consolidated into a “meta” report (the one that follows). Rather than applying a strict geographical division of countries, during the inception phase of the study it was decided to adopt a political/economical perspective and categorise countries based on a set of political and economic variables. Three key variables appeared particularly relevant to assess the countries and their commonalities⁵. These were:

- (i) whether contexts are in a situation of fragility or not;
- (ii) what type of environment characterises CS operations;
- (iii) levels of income in the countries.

Box 3: Country clusters

Cluster	Countries included in the cluster
Fragile contexts (regardless of the environment)	Fragility is defined as low capacity and poor state performance with respect to security and development. A state is fragile when it is unable to provide basic human security and/or is unable create the public goods and conditions needed for

⁴ See Tome II, Annex 2 for the cluster reports

⁵ These variables have been selected as they impact the level of engagement with CSOs (i.e. depending on the available space), as well as the type of EU instruments and programmes used (for example, several middle-income countries are graduated from bilateral cooperation). See Annex 1 for the final clusters selected to categorise and analyse the RM. Combining the 3 aforementioned variables the following 5 relevant clusters have been identified:

- (i) Countries in a fragile situation (regardless of the situation of the environment⁵ and level of income);
- (ii) Countries which are not in a fragile situation, and where the environment is non-enabling (< 0,45 EEI CIVICUS) regardless of their level of income;
- (iii) Low-income countries (LIC) not falling in a fragile situation and where the environment is relatively conducive (>0,45 EEI);
- (iv) Lower middle-income countries not falling in a fragile situation and where the environment is relatively conducive (>0,45 EEI);
- (v) Higher middle income and high-income countries (HIC) not falling in a fragile situation and where the environment is relatively conducive (>0,45 EEI).

It is evident that more clusters emerge from combining the 3 variables yet not all of them are relevant for the intended analysis. See Tome II, Annex 1 for the list of countries for each cluster.

and level of income)	a minimum of human development. Based on the assessments of the 2015 State Fragility index ⁶ and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, 17 of the countries where a Roadmap process has taken place, is underway, or is planned in the future fall into this category. Information is only available, however, in 10 countries, as the challenging conditions have delayed several of the RM processes.
Non-enabling environments	This second cluster includes the countries which are not in a situation of fragility (see above) and which have a grade of < 0,45 in the Enabling Environment index (EEI) produced by CIVICUS ⁷ . 30 countries fall into this category, with 26 Roadmaps being finalised. Of these, 20 have been assessed for the purpose of the present report. It was not possible to assess some of the Roadmap documents even though they are ready, namely those of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Egypt, as they are considered highly confidential. Feedback forms for some of these countries were, however, consulted. The case of Burundi is also worth mentioning as the country has experienced turmoil and a constantly evolving and degrading context since the Roadmap document was signed. This makes the country eligible for the fragility cluster; the Roadmap document, as it was drafted, is therefore out-dated vis-à-vis the new context.
Low income countries	As of the 1 st of July 2014, low-income (LIC) economies are defined as those with a gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the <i>World Bank Atlas</i> method ⁸ , of \$1,045 or less in 2013. For the purposes of this report, this category includes only the countries falling under this category that are not in a situation of fragility and for which the environment is not categorised as non-enabling. In total, there are 18 countries where a RM process has taken place, is underway or planned in the future that fall into this category. Out of these countries, 15 have finalised their Roadmaps and one is under way (Mozambique), while in two countries the process has been delayed due to the Ebola crisis (Liberia and Sierra Leone).
Lower middle income countries	This group includes countries with a per capita gross national income (GNI) between \$1,045 and \$4,125, with no fragile situation and where the environment is relatively conducive (>0,45 EEI). Under this cluster, 29 countries have a Roadmap under way or planned in the future. Information is currently only available for 25 countries.
Upper middle income & higher income countries	This group includes countries with a per capita gross national income (GNI) above \$4,125 with no fragile situation and where the environment is relatively conducive (>0,45 EEI). HIC have a per capita gross national income of above \$12,746. Under this group, two HICs and 14 UMICs were assessed. No access was available to the Roadmaps and feedback forms of Botswana (process under way), Malaysia, Chile (process under way), Cuba, Suriname and Uruguay.

In parallel to the above-mentioned assessment of the Roadmap documents and feedback forms, the RM Facility also carried out an in-depth analysis of 40 RMs in relation to the design of priorities, indicators and actions. This analysis, together with both the remote and in-country support provided to EUDs in fine-tuning and operationalising their RMs, has provided the basis for the analysis included in section 4.3 of the present report⁹.

⁶ <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf>

⁷ <http://www.civicus.org/eei/>

⁸ <http://data.worldbank.org/news/2015-country-classifications>

⁹ A first pilot Roadmap Facility (RMF) was operational throughout 2014 and a follow-up RMF was set up in February 2015. They have provided both global and country support, through field missions and remote assistance. On a global level, the support has been articulated around 4 blocks: guidance, training, information & communication, and stocktaking. At country level, the Facility has provided demand-driven tailored support around the areas of dialogue & consultation with CSOs, knowledge generation, dialogue with MS, mainstreaming of CS into EU operations, priority setting and monitoring and evaluation. So far the Facility has reached out to more than 70 EUDs, of which 60 have been actually supported (through 21 country missions, 32 remote support interventions and several mentoring sessions back-to-back to the

Lastly, it is important to note that, considering its desk-work nature, the capitalisation study could not assess in depth the RM processes in each one of the countries assessed. Instead it relied on how these processes were characterised in the RM documents and feedback forms. Some first-hand information was however available during the workshops and support missions performed by RM Facility key and non-key experts.

0.3. How to read the report

The report is structured in six sections in addition to the executive summary and present introduction. A first section focuses on the context for EU-Civil Society relations, highlighting specific trends, opportunities and challenges linked to the different typology of countries (the so-called country clusters). A second section provides an overview of the RM process, duly highlighting “lessons learnt” and “good practice”. A third section provides an overview of the contents of EU engagement, paying special attention to programmatic and operational innovations as well as to mainstreaming of CS into EU focal sectors of cooperation. A fourth section focuses on implementation, following-up and monitoring. A fifth section revolves around communication and a sixth section puts forward a number of ideas and suggestions as to the way forward.

A second tome includes the annexes (i.e. more information on the methodology, reports by clusters, etc.)

Overall, the report is conceived as a set of “modules”, which can be easily customised depending on the target audience.

seminars). Initial discussions are also under way with a number of EUDs.

Section 1. The context for EU-CS engagement

The national contexts examined in this report (91 Roadmaps) are far too diverse to provide an overall assessment of the context for EU-CS engagement at a worldwide level. Notwithstanding such diversity, certain trends can be identified when analysing the Roadmap documents from a political/economic perspective. These trends are highlighted below, being structured around the three main aims of the 2012 Communication and cross-referenced, whenever possible, to the five clusters on which data analysis has been based for this report.

1.1. Trends in the environments where CS operates

In spite of the widespread recognition of CSOs as critical development actors, **recent years have seen a rising tide of restrictions on civil society in both democratic and authoritarian states.** In spite of the increase in protest action - or even, as a consequence of it - governments in various parts of the world are taking steps to impose increasingly restrictive laws on civil society. These are not only contrary to fundamental freedoms and international promises, but they also undermine development efforts. As the consortium members of the Civic Space Initiative¹⁰ report and the 2013 CIVICUS "State of Civil Society" report concludes, since 2011, more than fifty restrictive laws have been passed or considered worldwide that would restrict both the formation, operation, and funding of CSOs, and the right to peaceful assembly. This trend has become more acute since 2013. Government justifications for legislative constraints may include enhancing accountability and transparency of CSOs, counter-terrorism and improving national security or even state sovereignty.

The Roadmap documents assessed echo these trends. Of the 91 Roadmaps available, 20 relate to countries where the environment is considered non-conducive (based on the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index)¹¹ and 10 relate to contexts in fragility. The remaining 61 Roadmaps assessed relate to countries with a relative stable and conducive environment for CSOs. However, several of these countries, especially within the low income cluster, are also witnessing a number of concerning trends and state restrictions, as will be further detailed in the section that follows.

In the 20 Roadmaps analysed for countries with a disabling environment, legal barriers to CSOs reported by the Roadmaps include **restrictions to entry into the sector and/or to running operations.** These restrictions include: imprecise, incomplete or restrictive legal frameworks; cumbersome and/or arbitrary registration procedures; establishment of parallel regulatory mechanisms such as endorsement of new laws and/or amendments that limit CS participation; or simply having no mechanism for law implementation. **There are also limitations to freedom of speech, assembly and advocacy,** and/or restrictive financial regulations (e.g. limitations on or the need to obtain prior approval for international funding). This is the case in countries like Djibouti, Madagascar, The Gambia, Swaziland and Jordan among others. Laws are often vague and arbitrarily implemented. They may impose prohibitions that are biased and do not reflect legitimate policy aims, or are severe and disproportionate to any legitimate development or even counter-terrorist goal.

The Roadmap documents assessed for these countries also evidence how **CSOs are generally acknowledged and tolerated as service providers,** complementing or extending the services provided by the state. Several of the documents assessed report how governments increasingly require CSOs to "harmonise" their activities with national visions and priorities as

¹⁰ Submission on an Enabling Environment for Civil Society to the UN High Level Panel on the Post 2015 Development Agenda by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ARTICLE 19, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, and the World Movement for Democracy. 2013

¹¹ See section 0.2. of the report for more information about the country clusters.

set out in national development plans. This is the case in, for example, Uganda, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Bolivia, Jordan, etc. While justified in the interest of aid effectiveness, these requirements may underline CSOs' right to initiate and may limit CSOs' ability to reach out to marginalised communities or to focus on issues neglected by governments.

"Political" action by CSOs is only tolerated to a very limited extent in certain contexts, and often limited to selected topics agreed by the authorities. Human rights and governance-related actions (including the fight against corruption, governance of natural resources, etc.), which might imply confrontation with central government, tend to be limited, controlled and even forbidden (e.g. the outlawing of strikes and demonstrations). CSOs operating in these areas and challenging the status quo are particularly targeted. They remain at risk of unwarranted government interference and harassment, including arbitrary closure, severe sanctions or imprisonment of their CS leaders (for example in Azerbaijan and Venezuela). Generally speaking the media is under government control and independent journalists are often at risk, even when advocating basic development rights.

However, in most of the contexts assessed, it appears a **number of courageous individual CSOs are able to keep governance and human rights on their agenda**, even if adjustment may be necessary, such as through adapting jargon and using available space for dialogue. On this positive note, the fabric of civil society also appears to be rapidly evolving in several of the contexts assessed (e.g. Vietnam) as new and younger organisations, networks and groups, often led by women and/or youths, emerge in the arena. Vibrant mass media sectors are also shaping the discussion of the state of civil society, for example in Vietnam and Zambia. A few countries, such as Tajikistan and Jordan, appear also to be adopting legislation more favourable to CSOs and the right to assembly, and/or related to access to information, such as Morocco.

In the context of fragility, with widespread governance, poverty and often security challenges, **records are mixed** with regard to the environment for CSOs to exist and operate. In some countries, such as Nigeria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti, despite weak governance and prevalence of armed conflict and insecurity, the environment is generally viewed as supportive to CSOs. Basic freedoms are for the most part respected. CSOs, particularly those providing services to the people, are tolerated and even respected. Positive trends are also apparent in other contexts, despite the huge challenges ahead. This is the case in Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, as is illustrated by progress made in the establishment of new constitutions, by efforts to strengthen federalisation and renewed juridical frameworks and/or election prospects.

However, **impediments and challenges are still numerous and complex**. CSOs are confronted with legal frameworks which are inadequate as they are too old and/or do not acknowledge the different types of CSOs, particularly networks. There may also be an absence of enactment mechanisms, as well as complex and cumbersome registration procedures. Arbitrary state decisions are also common practice, for example in contexts like Sudan and Zimbabwe, coupled with strict state scrutiny and control over CS operations. International funding is not restricted in most of the contexts assessed but CSOs are, for the most part, confronted with disabling fiscal systems and a lack of tax incentives supporting their fundraising efforts. When it comes to "political" action by CSOs, as in the non-enabling environments, this is not tolerated in most of the countries assessed, being seen as an interference with state affairs, and may even be expressly forbidden. Media are often under government control, and in some contexts (such as Sudan) activists are forced to take extreme risks as they attempt to exercise basic rights and freedoms.

Several of the **low-income as well as lower middle-income countries** assessed show **characteristics of a favourable environment or a noticeable improvement in the direction of**

a supportive environment. Often governments and development partners in these countries have confirmed the leading role of CSOs in development and have committed to promoting an "enabling environment" and supporting a dynamic and frameworks that encourage active participation of CSOs in reform. In some cases positive government measures provide for funding for CSOs, for example through a Rapid Funding Envelope. However, **the Roadmaps also show examples of legislative and regulatory frameworks that are evolving, with a combination of liberal and repressive developments.** This combination can be found in countries such as Myanmar, where the once limited space for civil society in public life has expanded as a result of extensive political and economic reform, but controversial legislation and political, legal and judicial systems restrict fundamental freedoms and CSOs' ability to participate in the different domains of public life. Laos offers space for a certain level of pluralist debate, but restricts and regulates formal operating space for independent CSOs tightly. Civil society organisations in Bangladesh are key actors in development processes and have been considered examples of how it is possible to scale up innovative anti-poverty experiments into nationwide programs. However, at the same time, the existing legal framework is considered ineffective in defending freedom of expression, association and assembly.

All in all, **important differences prevail across countries** within the lower and lower middle-income clusters beyond economic considerations, due to their historical, cultural, political and social differences, making it difficult to give an overall assessment of the EE context. CSO weight and structure also vary greatly among these different contexts. Notwithstanding the risk of oversimplifying the trends, four broad categories can be distinguished:

The first group is composed **of low income and lower middle income countries** where (despite not being classified as non-enabling environments using the EEI categorisation), **trends are worrying as the formal operating space for independent CSOs is becoming increasingly regulated and/or restricted** and basic freedoms can be threatened. This is the case of countries such as Laos and Bangladesh. There are also countries such as Myanmar where unclear legal provisions can lead to a "climate of uncertainty, intimidation and fear of arrest". These environments are considered to be particularly threatening for human rights organisations, as well as those that hold critical positions vis-à-vis the authorities, given the judicial and extra-judicial harassment of CSOs, active citizens and individual activists or journalists. Severe restrictions of the operating space can also be caused by conflicts in the geographic environment, which lead to limiting measures against CSOs, as is the case for instance in Palestine. Thailand is also a case worth mentioning as the civil society space has shrunk significantly since the 2014 military coup. The new government has imposed martial law and a nationwide curfew, banned political gatherings, arrested and detained politicians and anti-coup activists, imposed Internet censorship and taken control of the media.

A second category is made of **those countries that apply a framework that has not been adjusted to the evolution of civil society** (Mauritania) and only recognise declared and authorised CSOs. These frameworks result in an exclusion mechanism since the registration system operates as a filter and excludes several types of CSOs, as is the case of Niger where foundations, platforms, forums, and the majority of community-based organisations are excluded. A practical example of exclusion is the limitation of the issuance of legal permits for unregistered organisations for public demonstration and assembly (Tanzania). Tensions between formal institutions and informal traditional leaders in socially and culturally complex environments, as is the case in Senegal, influence exclusion as well. These trends are worrying because the space for CS is shrinking while the CSO landscape is evolving in terms of the number and variety of CS actors, and the criteria for recognition stay the same. Reasons to stick to existing criteria may be a country's inability to cope with sensitive issues such as

human rights, principles of good governance, or conflicts between different layers of society (social, political, religious, linguistic).

In the third place, there is the group of countries with **an open space for civil society**, which generally respect the independent position of CSOs and their role in development, but where CSOs **face a lack of openness to criticism in the government**. These are countries where it is difficult for INGOs to register (Malawi), where there is an absence of specific regulations regarding civil society (Benin) or where there is pressure/social punishment when key political interests are at stake (Comoros).

Finally, there is the group of countries where the **framework presents no major obstacles to CSO operations but its implementation/enactment is incomplete**. Challenges in these countries are **often related to the lack of knowledge and/or even the incomplete application of the legal framework**. Citizens aren't always well informed about the law (Mali), there is a widespread lack of transparency and proper access to relevant public information and/or agencies in charge of the implementation of the framework don't always know the provisions regarding specific groups of CSOs, or appear to be disorganized (Togo). As far as application is concerned, some countries have burdensome or time-consuming procedures for registration (Armenia, Belize, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Ecuador, Moldova, Nicaragua, Tunisia, etc), particularly for those CSOs that work on sensitive issues such as human rights violations. They also run into problems due to the registration language or a lack of transparency and objectivity regarding the criteria applied in order to obtain legal status (Mauritania). This category includes countries in which the multiplicity of laws is a source of confusion (Tanzania) and countries where improvements are not applied uniformly across the country. Finally, tax laws and related legislation often establish significant obstacles for the operation of CSOs. Moreover, in the field of human rights, some CSOs still suffer from harassment and violence (India, Philippines, Maldives, Sri Lanka). However, an interesting aspect to point out is the development of media. This development has helped civil society publicise an increasingly large number of issues, and build pressure around topics such as corruption or failure of justice (Georgia, Tunisia, India, Sao Tomé & Príncipe).

The review of **Upper middle and upper income countries** demonstrates a **number of parallels in the situation of the enabling environment** in which civil society operates. In general, Civil Society has good space to operate and a rather supportive environment, with legal and policy frameworks in place (even if in most of the countries implementation of these frameworks could be further extended). Restrictions **are only evident in two of the sixteen countries assessed** (South Africa and Israel). In Israel the legal framework acknowledges the role of civil society and recognises the importance of consultation and dialogue with civil society actors; however, a clear framework for engagement between government institutions and civil society is missing and non-mainstream actors (i.e. Arab minority, socially disadvantaged groups, and social change organisations with a strong advocacy agenda) encounter difficulties and are often excluded from dialogue. In South Africa, the Roadmap notes a declining respect for civic space, particularly with regard to the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression (i.e. violent police interventions during demonstrations). The Roadmap also highlights a decline in access to information, an arbitrary application of the registration law and the need to reform the tax system for CSOs in the country.

Most of the countries assessed have a well-functioning, pro-active and comparatively capable civil society (particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Israel, Peru and South Africa). A few countries (such as Seychelles and Mexico) need their civil society actors to multiply and become more actively engaged. Generally, **CSOs are actively involved in service provision and encounter little or no opposition**. They work with their governments to a greater or lesser extent, but generally can operate rather freely. However, this is not always the case for those organisations that focus on human rights issues, democratisation,

transparency and sometimes rights of indigenous peoples, minorities, women or LGBT. One third of the Roadmaps are concerned about a shrinking operating space for these organisations.

Finally it is also important to underline that most of the countries under this cluster are confronted with growing **social inequality** (although this is not only a trend for HIC and UMIC but a world-wide trend) and a general decline in international funding coupled with limited financial sustainability of CSOs.

1.2. Trends in the involvement of CSOs in domestic public policies

When assessing CS involvement in domestic policies, **a mixed picture emerges**, with a number of relevant opportunities on the one hand, but also several substantial challenges on the other.

Opportunities emerge across countries, as CSOs' added value is increasingly acknowledged by governments. This means considering CSOs' outreach capacity to the most marginalised, power to promote and trigger innovation and capacity to react rapidly and flexibly, with a view to making policies more pro-poor and responsive to peoples' needs.

Conversely, CSOs' involvement in policy-dialogue is also hindered by a number of obstacles, both internal and external. On the internal side, limited research and advocacy capacity, coupled with insufficient resources and fragmentation of efforts, hinder dialogue efforts. On the external side, despite a number of positive trends, **lack of political will prevails**, often leading to "tick-the-box" consultations in several countries (i.e. where CSOs are consulted but their views are ignored) or "charade participation" by the usual suspects. Autocratic governments seeing CSOs as nuisance-makers is also a major constraint, as is their lack of capacity to engage in constructive dialogue. Consultation processes often fail to engage with key CS actors and they tend to be held in capital cities to the detriment of actors operating in rural and remote areas.

These challenges are particularly evident in countries with a **disabling environment**. In these contexts, as one would expect from an environment that is not conducive for CS operations, CSOs' actual involvement in the elaboration, implementation and/or monitoring of public policies both at local and national level remains, **at best circumscribed to non-sensitive sectors, such as the provision of basic services**. In these non-sensitive sectors CSOs can be widely acknowledged for bringing in added value, particularly in terms of outreach to vulnerable groups. In sectors which are considered controversial by partner governments, such as human rights and governance issues, CS participation in the public sphere is very limited and restricted to "friendly" CSOs (i.e. the so-called GONGOS) and to broad and general "non binding" consultations. However, some positive developments are to be noted at sector and local level¹².

In **contexts of fragility**, often characterised by a failing State, CSOs are usually acknowledged as key development actors, are widely consulted in the definition of national compacts and development/transition assistance frameworks (as for instance the cases of Somalia and Afghanistan show) and are well known to the public, mainly given the service-provision role they often carry out. However, as for the non-enabling environments, CSOs' actual involvement in the elaboration, implementation and/or monitoring of public policies, beyond

¹² In Zambia, CSOs are present in the 30 existing sector advisory groups, and active in budget monitoring, including budget support. In Madagascar and Ethiopia, even if participation at national level is very limited, some budget monitoring and service quality control at community and local level is taking place (e.g. the Ethiopian Social Accountability programme). Also, in Kyrgyzstan, Public Advisory Councils (PACs) have been established since 2011 to provide oversight and monitoring of the work of various government bodies, in most line ministries and agencies. At local level, CSOs are also highly involved in decision-making processes.

the broad national compacts, remains, for the most part, limited¹³. Challenges in some of these countries include the growing number of CSOs aligned to government directives, the historical background of mistrust and lack of cooperation between public actors and civil society, tribalism and partisan politics as well as lack of advocacy, accountability and engagement skills. Some positive developments arise, however, from the analysis of the Roadmaps, such as the case of Somalia and DRC¹⁴.

The assessment also evidences how civil society involvement in the public arena is not necessarily linked to a country's income. In the **low-income countries assessed**, the scale of CS participation ranges from 'limited' to 'high'. Consultations can be limited in different ways. In several countries, they are not systematic and are conducted in an *ad-hoc* manner. Governments often avoid selecting CSOs that might put forward a critical perspective to government policies (Ecuador, Lesotho, India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea). In other countries, consultations are based on limited or no access to relevant information on government draft policies. For the most part, this is often related to corruption problems (such as Ukraine, Moldova, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Cape Verde). There are also superficial consultations in the final stages of policy development, designed for information sharing only, with limited opportunities for CSOs to influence policy. Sri Lanka, Philippines, Cameroon, etc., are characterised by tokenistic engagement, particularly in more sensitive governance-related areas, human rights, religious freedom, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual (LGBT) or democratic issues. It is also the case that while wide and open consultations exist at the planning stage, once implementation is started there is very limited to non-existent space for constructive state-civil society cooperation (India, Salvador, PNG).

Generally, most of the governments recognise the contribution of civil society in addressing social policies and the delivery of services (education, health, youth, gender, etc.). However, significant barriers often exist for CSOs with mandates that include the critique of and/or advocacy for policy change or for those that represent the views of marginalised and vulnerable populations (Maldives, Congo-Brazzaville). Governments have also been particularly intolerant towards CSOs opposing the appropriation of natural resources such as oil, timber, mining, etc. (Armenia, Cameroun, Congo Brazzaville, Ecuador). However, on the positive side, some governments are making efforts to improve conditions for CSOs. They have created permanent institutionalised spaces for multi-stakeholder dialogue that include a diversity of civil society actors in monitoring development policies. There are several recent examples of progress in formally established multi-stakeholder dialogue that deserve closer attention and might be applicable in other countries, such as in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Cape Verde, particularly at local level.

However, while CS involvement in the public arena varies widely from one country to the other, the Roadmaps from low and lower-income countries shed light on two issues that put the role of CSOs as independent actors in policy dialogue under severe pressure.

First of all, the Roadmap processes assessed, particularly in low-income countries, illustrate **the influence that international aid (and its actors) has on processes of local development agenda setting**. The majority of CSOs depend on international partners and shape their agenda and activities according to the themes of calls for proposals or agendas of those partners. As a

¹³ In this, CSOs interviewed during the elaboration of several of the RM analysed by the Facility often refer to governmental consultation on public policies as "selective, symbolic and even tokenistic", particularly in sensitive thematic areas (such as human rights or governance-related topics).

¹⁴ In Somalia, CSOs were actively engaged in electoral observation, in policy discussions on the state budget as well as in discussions about the NGO Act through the "NGO Consultative Committee" set up by the Somaliland Ministry of Planning. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), CSOs are involved in the 15 thematic groups set up to discuss sectoral policies. However, lack of knowledge on social contract principles is prevalent on the sides of both the government and CS.

result, the number of specialised and professional CSOs is low because most CSOs tend to be involved in different sectors, following the availability of funding (Togo, Niger). Their strong dependence threatens their own sustainability and freedom of action (Tanzania, Malawi). Donors 'projectise' the work of CSOs. Local ownership and participation are limited since CSOs tend to be more accountable to these international actors than to local stakeholders and citizens. This often results in limited legitimacy in the eyes of public authorities and of the public (Bangladesh). They carry out imposed agendas, activities and projects, and apply approaches that are not adapted to local conditions (Palestine). The upward accountability to the donors suggests that they are in fact not a part of 'home-grown or organic' civil society since foreign interests are embedded in their work (Cambodia). The variability of funds of development partners makes it very difficult for CSOs to elaborate strategic and multiple year plans (Togo) and to position themselves for relevant inclusion in policy dialogue. Organisational systems and professional skills are built up to fit donor requirements and not to support their own strategies. The pattern of reduced resources in all countries leads to competition between CSOs (to be a privileged partner) and often overtakes the desire to work in coalition with others. This undermines the defence of CSOs' and beneficiaries' interests.

Secondly, similar to the less conducive environments, although to a lesser extent, the Roadmaps assessed in low income and lower middle-income countries also evidence the question of CSOs' affiliation with political parties and/or individuals with close ties to the government and its institutions. Several forms can be observed, ranging from dependency on charismatic individuals, often former or current civil servants, politicisation of certain CSOs (Togo), representatives of CS that are co-opted by certain public institutions (Senegal), to political infiltration that distorts the fundamental legitimacy of civil society (Niger). NGOs have been accused of being affiliated to political parties, causing a decrease in public trust in the civil society sector itself (Palestine). In Comoros, internal legitimacy is limited due to the control by one person who has contacts with the government and determines the level of engagement of the CSOs in policy dialogue and decision-making processes. In some contexts CSOs are being exploited by politics and politically active organisations are under greater political scrutiny. Cambodia introduced the "Hybrid Civil Society", referring to sub-national NGOs that occasionally have local authorities as members or even leaders. In Laos, government representatives sit on all INGO project steering committees; partnerships with district or provincial-level state institutions are required in most cases for projects implemented by CSOs. While having close ties with governments and politics doesn't mean that these CSOs are not important actors in the development landscape, their representativeness and independence become questionable.

With regard to the upper middle and upper income cluster, most Roadmaps assessed evidence how CSOs are generally involved in the development, implementation and monitoring of government policies. In several of the countries assessed, CSOs have successfully engaged in advocacy and campaigned to improve policies and monitor their implementation. CSOs also implement government programmes through sometimes well-consolidated public-private partnership schemes and act in the sectors or geographical areas where the government has little or no influence or service delivery requires innovation. CS involvement in public policy is only weaker in a few countries (such as Mexico, Fiji, Israel and Barbados). However, CSOs in all the upper income countries assessed are active in a broad spectrum of areas, appear to be well acquainted with legislative issues and policy gaps, increasingly cooperate with their peers as well as with specialised institutions (such as research centres) and, to a great extent, master the use of the space (both provided and claimed) for civic action.

1.3. Trends in CS capacity

CSOs capacity constraints are manifold, ranging from limitations in technical management and

leadership skills, to fundraising, to results management and issues of internal governance, coordination and networking.

In most of the **contexts in fragility** assessed, a **divide exists between, on the one hand a small number of large, often urban-based NGOs**, well experienced in service delivery and well known to the donors (i.e as they have often been used to channel services to the population), and on the other **community-based organisations**, which are often distanced from donors, albeit developing their own community resilience strategies and tools in times of crisis. CSOs and think tanks specialised in policy analysis, research-based advocacy, dialogue and institution building (the so-called infrastructure CSOs) are less developed but growing in several contexts. Women's groups (and their umbrella bodies) are also quickly developing and becoming more articulate and prominent in the public sphere, in most of the fragile contexts analysed.

CSOs in countries with a disabling environment for CSO are **often confronted with technical and political drawbacks**, which have as a consequence a significant lack of strategic planning and management skills, facing difficulties in defining organisational visions, evolving into transparent institutions and developing capacities to deepen the production of knowledge and sound empirical research. In political terms, **weak leadership and legitimacy make coordination and articulation of common positions difficult**, even though coordinating bodies exist. It is important to underline that CS capacity in these contexts is often undermined by CS relationships **vis-à-vis the government**. Issues such as governments' strategies to limit CSOs, monitored governance and human rights organisations, and co-option over certain organisations create a **divide within CSOs**. As a result, the CS landscape in these contexts is often characterised by a deep political division between those CSOs supporting the executive (e.g. GONGOs, co-opted CSOs¹⁵ and even Royal NGOs in some contexts such as Jordan) and independent CSOs, which struggle to keep their independence and/or exercise opposition. This situation often results in an acute polarisation of CSOs, which works to the detriment of CS effectiveness. Self-censorship as well as a lack of incentives to be accountable are also common issues, which, in turn, undermine CSOs' capacity to get organised and become credible. Finally, in several of the contexts assessed, CSOs (particularly those with a critical voice) are also confronted with a lack of sustainable sources of income and funding (except GONGOs and Royal NGOs). This often leads to competition among CSOs over the available funds rather than coordination of activities.

A high number of CSOs in the low-income countries whose Roadmaps have been analysed have limited capacity **with regard to coordination and collaboration** (Bangladesh, Benin, Cambodia, Comoros, Laos Mauritania, Niger, Palestine). Although coordinating structures (federations, platforms, networks, coalitions) may involve a large number of organisations, member organisations consider them in general neither as vehicles for channelling their voices and interests, nor as spaces in which a common agenda can be established or discussed to facilitate joining forces to generate opportunities for mutual strengthening. Sometimes this is because there is a total lack of member-based CSOs (with the exception of trades unions) and coalitions are at an early stage of development (Cambodia), or because of competing interests between coordinating structures and their members, and the members themselves (Benin, Niger), lack of recognition by governments of representative structures (Laos), lack of strategic positioning of coordinating structures (Comoros) or '*de facto* division', as in the case of Palestine, which restricts the creation of a unified civil society vision and common position. International CSOs have played a unifying role, facilitating the execution of a single project in a coordinated way in different areas of the Palestinian territories, with different local partners. Examples of countries with moderate coordination capacities are Myanmar, where

¹⁵ See next section for a more elaborated explanation of GONGOs and co-opted CSOs.

coordination between civil society organisations is gradually being stepped up while facing ‘segmentation’ of CSOs along ethnic and religious lines; Senegal, where coordinating structures are very productive in creating links with the government and assuring dialogue, but face problems of synergy; and Tanzania, where almost every district and region has a network of CSOs and many CSOs take part in African level networks and networks beyond the continent. Growing international interest in a country, combined with the organisation of large-scale conferences and networking events, strengthens the links with regional or global networks of CSOs (Myanmar).

Legitimacy is an area of concern in all Roadmaps in low income countries (and in general in most of the Roadmaps assessed, across clusters). This is partly due to the lack of capacity to effectively develop a strong and critical mass of citizens with a mid- or long-term vision, partly to the obligation of CSOs to respond to the agendas of international aid actors, and partly to the level of corruption, lack of transparency, absence of proper internal democratic structures, and poor monitoring and visibility of the work of CSOs. The promotion of operating standards, a code of ethics, and a code of conduct is often a subject of discussion. The quality of internal governance varies between the countries, but is mostly low and reflects the principles of good governance, the quality of leadership, strategic planning, financial stability, effective management systems and structures, human resources, project management skills, monitoring, and availability of tools such as accounting software, procedural manuals, etc. In Mali and Palestine the changing context requires frequent re-orientation and organisational adaptation.

Research and advocacy need more attention. Local civil society is not sufficiently equipped to conduct research and engage in evidence-based advocacy. Relationships with research institutes are limited. In Myanmar quality research and advocacy are still restricted by the local authorities, as CSOs need to obtain prior approval to carry out research activities, especially if these are deemed politically sensitive. In Tanzania most CSOs lack the skills needed for undertaking research that is seen as credible by the government and other development actors. In Bangladesh dissemination and knowledge sharing are limited. In Cambodia research appears to be a ‘lost skill’, and the lack of analytic and research capacity may to an extent stem from deeper cultural traditions, where teachers lead and students follow and are not allowed to question the teachings.

Most of the **lower middle income countries analysed** share the above assessment. The most critical questions are those of CSOs’ capacity to effectively engage in evidence-based advocacy and “constructive” policy engagement and CSOs’ sustainability (i.e. often CSOs are highly dependent on donor funds as local fundraising opportunities are very limited and/or nascent). As a matter of fact, in many of the lower middle-income countries CSO financing has been decreasing over time as international donors have withdrawn (e.g. Thailand, Philippines, Maldives, Samoa) to focus on lower income countries and/or fragile contexts. Often CSOs remain fragile (given the lack of funds, especially core funding, not particularly allocated to specific projects) and struggle to influence decision-makers or public opinion at large. Their lack of capacity leaves considerable room to increase their engagement in the areas of transparency and accountability.

In upper middle and upper income countries, coordination and networking are a priority area for capacity development. In most of the countries assessed, umbrellas or networks are set up between sectors, at territorial or at national level. However, the quality of networking and cooperation between CSOs shows mixed records and **vertical and horizontal integration could benefit from further strengthening** to avoid duplication of activities and waste of resources. Several Roadmaps indicate that networking and coordination beyond traditional NGOs and CSOs should improve. In some cases, the state has formalised partnerships with CS through a Memorandum of Understanding with the umbrella organisations to increase

collaboration with CSOs and encourage integrated development strategies. Albeit often challenging, there are also good practices consolidating alliances and strategies between different civil society actors, particularly in Latin America, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Colombia but also in countries such as Namibia, where the umbrella body for NGOs was revived to act as a collective voice for CSOs and provides supportive services to its member CSOs.

Section 2. A retrospective overview of the RM elaboration process

As the RM process evolves and EUDs move into the implementation and follow-up phases, important lessons begin to crystallize. First and foremost, it becomes evident that the process dimension is at least as important, if not more important, than the end product itself (i.e. the RM documents). What's more, as confirmed by the EUDs attending the various seminars organised and those serviced by the RM facility, the RM process offers an opportunity to put into practice the paradigm shift proposed by the 2012 Communication, vis-à-vis CSOs and also MS, as well with regard to knowledge generation. The CONCORD report on EU engagement at country level also supports this view. In the words of the European NGO platform¹⁶: "The drafting of Roadmaps for EUD engagement with civil society is viewed as a major step in the right direction."


2.1. Dialogue and consultation with local CSOs

Reportedly, EUDs are making significant progress in establishing a more institutionalised dialogue with CSOs that goes beyond periodic or *ad hoc* consultations. Indeed, despite the EU ownership of the process and the document (i.e. the Roadmap is first and foremost a tool for the EU), dialogue and consultation with local civil society are considered by EUDs and MS as key aspects of developing the Roadmap in an effort to achieve a common understanding and ownership regarding the Roadmap's process, objectives and realisation. As several CSOs have acknowledged when surveyed by CONCORD¹⁷, EUDs are managing to reach out more widely and more locally, and the RM is allowing several of them to identify the remaining challenges and explore options for overcoming them.

2.1.1. Key findings

Of the 91 RMs analysed, more than half depict an intense level of consultation during the elaboration phase. Around 47% of the RMs' consultation processes were labelled as intense (i.e. with several meetings organised and even a survey conducted) and around 4% "very intense" (meaning full involvement of civil society from the beginning of the process until adoption of the RM final version). In roughly 35% of the cases, CSOs were moderately consulted (i.e. with only some consultation during the process) and, for around 14% of the RMs, CSOs were barely consulted.

Figure 3: The level of consultations with CSOs



¹⁶ CONCORD, 2015

¹⁷ idem

In particular, the **roadmap elaboration process appears to be very intense and inclusive** (in terms of the outreach to CSOs other than the usual EU grantees and even to fluid forms of civic action and less formalised movements) **in contexts in fragility as well as in non-enabling environments**. In several of these countries, a number of workshops were organised, often in combination with a written survey reaching out to a wide spectrum of CSOs. This highly participatory approach involving a wide spectrum of CS stakeholders beyond traditional NGOs (e.g. traditional and religious leaders or informal groups) is fully in line with the recommendations regarding inclusiveness put forward by the New Deal for contexts in fragility. It mirrors the interest of the EU to engage strategically (also through continuous dialogue) with CSOs in countries where the environment is challenging for CSOs. The case of Afghanistan is particularly worth looking into.

In both **lower-income and low middle-income countries**, while the instruments used in the consultation process were different country by country, in general (with few exceptions) a lot of effort was put into getting input and meeting with a broad variety and large number of CSOs. Consultations occurred in both rural and urban areas and included local and international CSOs/NGOs, ranging in number from twelve to almost 500. Often CSOs also received questionnaires that served as input in the process. There is however room for improvement with regard to the preparation and feedback provided.

Finally, in **upper middle and high-income countries**, in all but two countries in the cluster, the EUDs used a participatory approach in developing the Roadmap by engaging in intensive consultations with civil society actors. In South Africa, consultations were principally held with professional CSOs and think tanks. In all other countries, except for Barbados where no information on consultation with civil society was provided, a series of meetings combined with other mechanisms was set up to engage broader representation of civil society. In several cases, the Roadmaps also included plans for their participation in implementing the priorities.

Box 4: Consultations for the Afghan RM

The consultation process for the RM in Afghanistan
<p>The Afghan Roadmap was developed in a highly consultative and inclusive way. As a first step, an online consultation with civil society, donors and other international partners was launched. The online survey for CSOs was available in English, Dari and Pashto in order to give an opportunity to those CSOs beyond the elite group of networks and large NGOs working in Kabul and other big cities. The questionnaire for CSOs contained 33 specific questions and 18 grouped around three areas of analysis: enabling environment, structured participation and roles, and capacity. The questionnaire for Member States and international partners contained 20 questions to gather information on the assistance provided to CSOs in terms of amounts, coordination, mandate and priorities, as well as recommendations to improve support to civil society in the future. 137 answers were received at the end of the consultation period. 127 CSOs representing over 14,000 staff members, including 3,000 women, participated in the online consultation (73 replied in English, 52 in Dari and 2 in Pashto), together with eight Member States and two international partners. The information gathered from the online consultation was then complemented by an extensive literature review, targeted interviews and focused group discussions. During the analysis of the online consultation responses, it was noticed that an overview of certain groups that are particularly active or have played an important role in civil society had not been captured well enough. For this reason, two focus group discussions with youth and trade unions were organised. In addition, two days of workshops, gathering over 100 representatives from civil society, including 20 from provinces, and a special session with donors, were also organised. The purpose of these workshops, held mainly in Dari and Pashto, was to share the preliminary findings of the consultation responses and prioritise long-term and immediate actions identified.</p>

¹⁸ The EN online questionnaires is available at the following links:

English <http://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/62ff6aca-8a3d-3212-59a2-9f92bd9b452c>

In terms of approaches, some EUDs, across the spectrum of typologies described above, used the 2012 Communication and its key messages and priorities, as an introduction to the RM process. Indeed, the Communication (with its 3 priorities) is the backbone to the Roadmap. Other EUDs organised consultation sessions after a survey, in order to validate its outcomes and discuss priorities. Some EUDs organised multi-sector meetings around a number of key questions (e.g. what are the key challenges and opportunities the context features; what are the priority areas for EU engagement? etc.), while other EUDs preferred to organise separate sectoral meetings, for each one of the sectors of concentration of EU cooperation, etc. Finally, when it comes to the specific tools and instruments, surveys and meetings/workshops (or a combination of both) were the preferred mechanisms. The table below provides a brief description of them, highlighting key features and lessons learnt.

Box 5: The use of surveys and workshops by EUDs - characteristics and lessons learnt

INSTRUMENT	CHARACTERISTICS	LESSONS LEARNT BY THE FACILITY	EXAMPLES
Use of questionnaires and surveys (online, paper dissemination)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ideal for baseline information and regular follow-up from the same group of individuals; - Good method for getting widespread feedback on aspects of a policy under discussion; - Allows for better outreach (i.e. to get a general reading of many people at once). It is particularly relevant in big countries (e.g. Indonesia) and/or when a large number of CSOs need to be reached and/or where resources are too limited to organise live consultations; - When multiple-choice questions are used, it allows data to be easily and quickly compiled. Open-ended questions allow for richer and more in-depth answers but may be difficult to analyse. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Choose a limited number of questions to prevent "questionnaire fatigue"; - Use questionnaires in the local language to allow for better outreach to local organisations; - Use appropriate and straightforward language and questions which can be easily understood by participants; - Find a balance between closed questions (easier to assess and allowing for greater focus) and open-ended questions that provide sufficient space for participants to freely express themselves (i.e. say what they want to say); - Build on MS relations and networks to reach out beyond the "EU usual suspects." 	EUDs having developed questionnaires: Afghanistan, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Indonesia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Salvador, etc.
Workshops/ Consultation sessions /Focus groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good method for gaining more information where issues will bring multiple views and you are trying to understand the details and search for consensus; - Focus groups allow you to hear how individuals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide sufficient information and time in advance to allow for participants to be well prepared; - Select participants carefully and ensure women's and minority groups' participation; - Hold meetings in a local language, use appropriate and straightforward language 	Most of the EUDs assessed organised consultation sessions.

	<p>react to each other as well as to hear details. They also allow for divergence while at the same time remaining focused on covering key questions.</p>	<p>and questions which can be easily understood by participants;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Structure consultation sessions into simplified sections which can be easily followed by the participants (e.g. (i) analysis of problems faced by civil society; (ii) definition of priorities to address these issues; and (iii) definition of actions to achieve the priorities identified). - Provide sufficient space for participants to freely express themselves (i.e. say what they want to say) while, at the same time, remaining focused on the issues to be addressed; - Appoint facilitators/moderators (if possible local) to lead the discussions in order to contribute to depth and fluency of plenary sessions. 	
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2.1.2. Key questions and challenges

Consultations have also raised a number of relevant challenges and questions. First and foremost, it has become evident that there are no “blueprint” approaches on how to consult and dialogue with CSOs. National contexts are simply too diverse to allow for uniform approaches. Hence an adequate reading of the context, perspectives and correlation of forces using CS assessments, mappings, political economy assessments and/or sectoral studies appears essential.

Secondly, as experience shows, the very process of consulting raises expectations on the part of CSOs, particularly those that have been traditionally “below the EU radar.” Expectation management (encompassing due feedback and communication) is therefore an important component in the process, together with a systematic consideration of the political economy of CS dynamics. What’s more, some CSOs, particularly those that know the EU less well, could be reluctant to engage or reluctant to work together. Interests may be unclear or divergent, while CS, particularly networks and umbrella organisations, may be confronted with internal governance issues.

Experience also shows that targeting and/or identifying the right actors continues to be one of the most fundamental questions in consultations, to ensure that the process is effective, and beyond the effectiveness question, to create legitimacy and credibility for the whole process. The important actors in an effective Roadmap consultation process may include local or national NGOs, cooperatives, trade associations, etc., as well as think tanks, interest groups and even resource institutions, with particular technical or personal expertise. A thorough analysis deals not only with the major groups and institutions but also with the diversity that may exist within them. Hence there is a need to carefully map out the actors and their roles.

Clearly, most EUDs appear to be making significant progress in “reaching out beyond their usual interlocutors (i.e. their grantees)” and considering a wide representation of actors – ranging from their grantees, to actors beyond the EU radar - and also spanning from NGOs to trade unions, cooperatives, women’s movements, etc. However, additional efforts to promote inclusiveness are still needed in this regard, on the side of both EUDs and CSOs. True, insufficient coordination amongst CSOs¹⁹, a trend that can be observed in several countries as described under section 1 of the present report, often hampers the inclusiveness of consultation sessions.

¹⁹ CONCORD, 2015

It may also be important, as the Afghan, Nicaragua and Somalia case shows, to engage specific groups, like the poor, young, women, indigenous and other disadvantaged groups, who are often excluded from these processes because of the lack of knowledge and/or access to information, and physical and cultural distances to the decision-making centres. In some cases, good design and facilitation of the consultation sessions can help to address the problem of participation among “vulnerable groups”. Yet, in particular contexts, more proactive efforts may be required, including the organisation of separate discussions for specific groups/disadvantaged groups, to ensure their views are taken into account. Experience shows that different cultural groups may respond to different strategies of engagement.

Box 6: Relevant questions when considering “whom to invite”

Some questions to consider to make sure that no relevant CS actors are forgotten

- Which sectors of society have an interest in the issues that will be discussed in the Roadmap? Are those sectors represented in any organisations/bodies (particularly umbrella bodies/networks/coordination mechanisms) that can be identified as interlocutors?
- Which other sectors of civil society are concerned directly or indirectly with the Roadmap and/or will be impacted (positively and negatively)? Are they organised? Can we reach them?
- Who has influence in the community/area/etc. with regard to the issues that will be debated in the Roadmap?
- Who was involved in past EU consultations? Who was not involved in the past, but should have been, and what were the reasons?

Last but not least, consultations also raise operational challenges. They require time and add extra workload to the existing tasks of the EUDs in terms of organising consultation meetings or preparing questionnaires, facilitating reflection and exchange, and assessing and compiling the results. Providing feedback (i.e. informing CSOs of the outcomes of the consultations and how their input was used) is also an important task, though it is often neglected.


2.2. Dialogue and coordination with Member States and other non-EU donors

When it comes to relations with Member States, evidence shows that the Roadmap process is also enhancing dialogue, mutual knowledge and even stronger cooperation. In some cases this even goes beyond the European scope, to encompass also non-EU donors (e.g. UN agencies, USAID, Australian aid in the Pacific, etc.).

2.2.1. Key findings

Of the 91 RMs analyzed, in around 45% of cases, the MS participation could be considered as “high” (meaning full involvement of a varying number – from 3 to 8 – of MS in the RM preparation process, depending on the idiosyncrasy of the international development context in different countries), from the beginning of the process until adoption of the RM final version. In around 28% of the RMs’ drafting processes, the MS participation can be defined as “moderate” (with only some consultation during the process or with consultation during the whole process but with a reduced number of MS). For around 27% of the RMs, MS barely participated. Therefore, as a general trend, for around 3/4 of the RMs, MS participated actively or very actively in the RM process, although experiences are diverse across the spectrum of countries.

Figure 4: MS involvement



In countries in a **state of fragility**, strong coordination between development partners is an important stipulation, and all countries analysed in the cluster show a strong involvement of MS as well as of other relevant partners, including UN agencies, USAID, etc. in the roadmap process. Available coordination mechanisms such as existing governance and CS coordination groups have been used to discuss the Roadmaps and agree upon the priorities. Again, the case of Afghanistan is worth mentioning, where a questionnaire was sent to MS and international partners (10 in total) to gather information on their support to CSOs, also including recommendations for the enhancement of support.

Among countries **with a non-enabling environment**, all of the Roadmaps analysed show some degree of involvement from MS during the elaboration process. Some EUDs (e.g. Ethiopia) used existing coordination mechanisms to consult MS, while in others specific meetings relating to the drafting process were organised. In most cases, MS attended the meetings, but although endorsing the RMs their contributions and feedback were rather limited. In terms of implementation, MS involvement varies from country to country, but in general is expected to be low.

In several of the **lower-income countries** assessed, MS active in the countries participated in the elaboration of the Roadmaps, on a few occasions even as co-writer and/or co-leading the process (e.g. Senegal). In Bangladesh, the RM process was closely linked to the joint programming exercise, confirming the importance of support to CS “as a sector” and supporting efforts to mainstream CS.

Box 7: The RM process and Joint Programming in Bangladesh

The RM process and Joint Programming in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, the Roadmap process has become an integral part of the joint programming exercise. In February 2013, the EUD, Member States (UK, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, France) and Norway and Switzerland agreed to define a EU+ Roadmap for developing a joint analysis and reaching a shared vision of development challenges and priorities for EU+ joint response in line with the strategy of the Government of Bangladesh. As part of this exercise, joint studies were launched, such as the Country Gender Profile, the Political Economy Analysis (PEA), the Country Environmental Profile (on-going) and the Civil Society Mapping, all feeding into the joint analysis.

In October 2013, following the PEA's preliminary findings, the EU+ Development Counsellors held a

scenario-planning workshop. The main conclusions highlighted the need to develop new dialogue and partnership opportunities through alliances or platforms with emerging partners like youth, private sector including SMEs, a new generation of civil servants and civil society leaders, including religious ones. Furthermore, it was decided to build on existing – and/or develop new – initiatives for more resilient programmes/aid modalities.

In February 2014, the EU+ group held a 3rd workshop to develop the foundations of a shared vision of development challenges and priorities in Bangladesh and to work on a common approach to dialogue and support to government in preparing Bangladesh's 7th Five Year Plan (7FYP). Following the workshop, during which the CSO Mapping study was presented and discussed as an integral part of the joint brainstorming process, EU leads were identified for the different priority sectors and the EU Delegation took the lead on civil society.

The RM priorities were formulated by the EU+ group during several rounds of discussions and finalised following preliminary consultations with a selected number of CS representatives, amongst which were those involved in the CSO mapping study. This first round of consultation was aimed at ensuring the relevance of the priorities to civil society before engaging in the drafting of the underlying strategy. The EU+ group also contributed to the rest of the sections, initially drafted by the EUD. Interestingly, the Roadmap is considered by the EU+ group as the civil society "sector/area" document (of the joint programming exercise, under the lead of the EUD), whilst also being an opportunity to mainstream CS into the other sectors considered.

In some **lower middle-income countries** MS have taken an active part in the development of the RM from its earliest stages, and supported the EUD with analysis, written contributions, preparation of the methodology, workshops, coordination meetings, preparation of documents, etc. The process has represented an opportunity to harmonise visions, deepen coordination, and think together on the complementarities and synergies of accountability actions and citizen participation, and has brought strong credibility to the RM process (Nicaragua, Guatemala, Salvador, Ghana, Cameroon and India). However, some EUDs have had difficulties in getting MS fully on board and actively contributing to the process, due to time and resource restrictions. Belize for example, is a satellite office depending on the Jamaica EUD. Another example is Mongolia's cooperation, which is implemented by the EUD in Beijing. This represents a challenge for genuine discussions and coordination with MS present in Ulaanbaatar.

Among **upper middle and high-income countries**, in nine cases the Roadmap was developed with good involvement from MS, in four the involvement was average, and in one case no information was provided regarding MS involvement. In Namibia, for example, coordination with MS was excellent, with the UK, Spain, France, Germany and Finland actively participating in drafting Section 2 of the Roadmap, and also planning on contributing to its implementation to the extent that it is possible. Lebanon as well saw active involvement of MS in a series of meetings between the EUD and MS and the creation of a 'Roadmap Group with 11 focal points'. Peru also saw a high degree of cooperation, with MS meeting regularly and a study on donor-support strategies and tools being conducted.

2.2.2. Key questions and challenges

All in all, it seems that the message that the Roadmaps are a joint endeavour is in the process of trickling down at the level of MS embassies. There is great room for improvement but progress is evident, even at the level of policy dialogue as the RM allows EUDs and MS to adopt a common language and shared agenda.

In most countries, the process has been led by the EUDs, but MS present in the country have contributed, even if on an *ad-hoc* basis, sometimes through the cooperation of the political section(s) of their embassies. It must be noted that *ad-hoc* cooperation has often been due not

to a lack of will, but rather to a lack of resources and time constraints on the side of both EUDs and MS.

What's more, RMs need to be understood as learning processes in themselves, as they imply a different way of working between the EUD and MS when it comes to CS engagement. In other words, cooperation between the EUD and MS needs to be thought of as a process in itself, which requires adequate time and resources. Sometimes even external facilitation may be required to encourage the development of a common vision, let alone better collaboration between the operational and political sections to ensure enhanced cooperation.

2.3. Knowledge generation about the CS landscape

Over the past decade great strides have been made by the EU to advance knowledge on the CS landscape. The rapid expansion and diversification of CSOs, both in partner countries and in Europe, has led to the need for the EU, and other donors, to acquire a better understanding of CSOs beyond the traditional NGOs, as a precondition to effective engagement, both in terms of policy dialogue and service delivery.²⁰ To this end, mapping studies and CS assessments have been used as a key tool in understanding the roles, potential, capacities and weaknesses of domestic and external CSOs and in situating the actors within the political/economic context²¹.

All in all, Roadmaps enhance this trend considering their paramount analytical component. As can be concluded from the assessment conducted, Roadmaps are fundamentally country-driven strategic planning processes which attempt to bridge the gap between, on the one hand knowledge (i.e. the state of health of civil society in a given country vis-à-vis the 3 key priorities of the 2012 Communication and an assessment of EU engagement thus far), and EU programmes and instruments on the other.

2.3.1. Key findings

An important implication of this strong knowledge and evidence foundation is that RMs require knowledge and expertise. Yet this has not thus far (and should not in the future) mean necessarily engaging in lengthy and costly studies (i.e. mappings, evaluations, etc.) but rather tapping into existing knowledge at EUD and MS level, as well as using other relevant sources (i.e. local CSOs, think tanks, international CS-led studies about local CS, etc.) Eventually, targeted studies can also help to address knowledge gaps that the Roadmap process may help identify. This has been the case, for instance, in Peru, where a study specifically focusing on donor engagement practices was commissioned, or Haiti and Ivory Coast where a similar capitalisation study focusing on EU support is envisaged as part of the implementation of their Roadmap.

If and when mappings are necessary (as was the case in Bolivia, Comoros, Mozambique, Peru, Sudan or Uganda, among other EUDs), depending on the needs, objectives and intended use of the mapping, as well as on country conditions, EUDs have a menu of options. In this regard, experience shows that one of the key decisions that EUDs need to make is whether the mapping needs to be a general mapping (i.e. when there is not sufficient knowledge of the CS arena; when the EUD needs to identify CSOs in the framework of the programming process; etc.) or a more targeted mapping, for instance in the form of a sector mapping related to one or several of the focal EU areas of intervention. Once this decision is made, the mapping questions that define the scope of the mapping (i.e. what needs to be researched and

²⁰ EU (2012): Concept paper 3. Tools and methods. EuropeAid

²¹ The 2012 Communication, outcomes of the Structured Dialogue and several of the recent studies and evaluations (conducted since 2009) focusing on CS engagement highlight the importance the EU has attached to this assessment tool which is increasingly used across countries and regions beyond the ACP sphere, where it started being implemented following the signature of the Cotonou Agreement back in 2000.

answered by the study) need to be defined. This task is of paramount importance as it can strongly impact the quality and relevance of the outcomes of the mapping, vis-à-vis EUD need.

Based on the support experience of the RM Facility, Annex 3 (Tome II) outlines a tentative list of questions to guide a general or sectoral mapping exercise. Experience shows that a selection of dimensions (i.e. structure of CS, the enabling environment, CS engagement, CS capacity, etc.) as well as of research questions is usually necessary and that a trade-off is usually inevitable. This holds particularly true in general mappings, considering the breadth of the research.

2.3.2. Key challenges

Important challenges have been identified and questions raised with regard to knowledge generation of the CS landscape. First and foremost, it seems that several EUDs have not been able to tap into the already existing knowledge, as they were not aware of it (i.e. problem of institutional memory). As reported by several EUDs, knowledge is often fragmented across the different cooperative and political sections and documents²² within the EUD. Consequently, it is often difficult to “put the pieces of the knowledge puzzle together” and identify knowledge gaps and challenges (i.e. “what we do not know and should know”). Finally, there is usually little coordination between MS and other actors in terms of knowledge sharing. Nonetheless some EUDs appear to be making progress in this regard. This is the case in countries where joint programming is taking place or where joint coordinated studies have been commissioned (e.g. Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Peru, Mozambique, etc.).

Tool-wise, it seems that EUDs have been using almost exclusively (with some exceptions) mapping studies. However, these studies cannot be considered “the magic bullet” as other tools may be more suitable, depending on the context and knowledge needs. They include political economy assessments (PEA), programme and/or sector evaluations (such as the evaluation of the thematic programme conducted in Congo-Brazzaville), and/or targeted studies. In particular the issue of mainstreaming the CS component into other studies (e.g. sectoral studies, feasibility studies, etc.) needs to be further researched.

Last but not least, regarding the scope and outcome of the studies, evidence shows that too often the studies launched are disconnected from the overall EU policy framework (i.e. the 2012 Communication and its 3 strategic priorities) or from the Roadmap exercise, content and process-wise. All too often they are seen as the sole responsibility of the CS focal point. Moreover, studies do not always ask the right questions and do not always bring the right answers/the answers EUDs expect from them. As a consequence, the studies’ outcomes are not always used to their full potential. This is also due to the fact that the knowledge generated is not always easy to “digest” or is not shared with MS and/or CSOs.

2.4. Conclusions

All in all, in spite of the numerous challenges participation in the RM process entails, there has been ample support for the process at both headquarters, delegation and embassy level. Process-wise, as confirmed during the two global workshops organised in Brussels and as Roadmap support missions have also had the opportunity to verify, the development of Roadmaps appears to have already set things in motion as it offers an opportunity to strengthen the engagement with CSOs through consultations. Cooperation with MS also appears to have been enhanced, with some EUDs seeing RM as a window for better dialogue and cooperation, more sharing of experiences and enhanced visibility of EU cooperation. In the words of one of the EUDs involved in the global 2015 seminar, RMs provide “for the first time a shared EU institutional framework” for engagement with CSOs. They allow creating a

²² Documents such as programme and sector evaluations, ROM reports, concept notes for the thematic programme CSO & LA, mappings, governance studies, etc.).

vision and formalising a strategy, with concrete actions. They also allow the EU to move beyond its traditional donor role and provide visibility to all EU actions and to do so based on a thorough understanding of the context and local dynamics.

The process has not, however, been free from challenges, considering the paradigm change it entails. In addition to the challenges mentioned vis-à-vis consultation with CSOs and dialogue with MS (namely the expectations it raises, the need for expertise and knowledge, the required resources, etc.) one further challenge lies in the fact that the RM is “one player” in a broader EU system of programming and processes at country level. As evidenced during the seminar in June 2015, the accumulation of urgencies and competing priorities can dilute the Roadmap process, or overburden EU staff at country level. Besides, it has not always been evident for EUDs that the RM process is linked to other relevant processes at country level (e.g. human rights strategies, democracy profiles, etc.) For some EUDs the “process dimension” of the whole exercise needs to be further strengthened.

Section 3. The content of EU engagement

The content of EU engagement appears also to be evolving across countries and regions, with an overriding vision (something that didn't exist before) shared with MS and a number of innovations both at programmatic and operational level, also being introduced.

3.1. An overview of the priorities and actions which will guide EU engagement in the coming years

From the assessment carried out, it can be concluded that the 2012 Communication has been a clear inspiration to establish the priorities of the RM documents. More than 60% of the RM documents assessed include priorities revolving around the three ambitions of the 2012 Communication (i.e. enabling environment, civil society participation in public policies and CSO capacity development); about 35% integrate two of the three ambitions and only a few adopt a distinct approach, articulating the RM around key thematic or sectoral areas of intervention.

The distribution of priorities across the three ambitions of the 2012 Communication also appears to be well balanced, showing however a preference towards the second and third ambitions of the 2012 Communication (i.e. the priority less referred to being the one related to enabling environment).

In relation to the number of priorities, there is an average of six priorities per document, although some of the RMs have as many as 15 priorities. While a number of RMs have adopted the two-fold approach of deploying general and specific priorities, most of the RMs only depict one level of priorities and the records regarding their specificity are mixed (i.e. some RMs are quite specific in the results they intend to achieve or contribute to, while others remain more generic). It is however important to underline that such generic approaches may be intentional, in an effort to reach an agreement with MS and even other donors regarding the framework for engagement.

Now, on the specificities linked to the typologies of countries:

3.1.1. Priorities in contexts in fragility

In countries in a state of fragility, priorities linked to the enabling environment are present in all of the Roadmaps assessed. In this regard, most of the Roadmaps focus on space for CSOs to operate. Three areas appear to be of particular relevance: (i) support to develop (and enact) civil society legislation; (ii) an enhanced recognition of CSOs as legitimate development actors in their own right, free from unwarranted state interference, entitled to received foreign funding and allowed in public policy processes and (iii) enhanced monitoring efforts of the context evolution.

Priorities linked to the involvement of CSOs in public policies are also widely represented in all the roadmaps assessed. In some countries, such as Somalia, Chad and Zimbabwe, they are particularly prominent. This focus on State/CS interactions mirrors the important role that the EU attaches to CSOs in its peace-building, security support, and good governance efforts in contexts in fragility. All in all, a strong facilitation role is envisaged for the EU in an effort to bring CSOs closer to the respective national/regional/federal authorities and progressively strengthen CS involvement in key political processes as well as in the development, oversight and monitoring of national policy priorities.

Deepening and even structuring EU/CS dialogue is also a key area of interest. Even in the contexts where no formal mechanism for dialogue exists, the EU maintains regular contact with several CSOs, especially with networks and key advocacy actors, particularly those

actively working on the preservation of basic freedoms and rights and on sectors such as education and health.

Capacity is another dimension that is well represented, particularly in African countries like Chad and Zimbabwe, as well as in Afghanistan. Overall, capacity development needs are particularly manifest regarding research-based advocacy, policy dialogue, networking and fundraising. Another important area for improvement is the development of internal governance and mutual accountability systems, and of codes of conduct.

3.1.2. Priorities in non enabling environments

In contexts of countries with non-enabling environments, the RMs assessed are mixed, portraying specific as well as general priorities and indicators. The fact that almost half of the RMs contain general and broad priorities may be due to the challenges posed by a non-enabling context or the often-ambivalent position of the government vis-à-vis CSOs.

Considering the importance of the environment as the key factor in these contexts underlining CS action, RM priorities linked to the enabling environment are present in all the Roadmaps assessed. EE priorities vary from country to country as they reflect different degrees of restrictiveness of the environment (and hence of what is feasible to support or aim towards). Priorities range from monitoring the evolution of the environment to facilitating relations between the state and CSOs, researching evidence of the positive impact of CS roles and work at different levels, or supporting intercultural and interreligious initiatives of dialogue to smooth social divisions. Only Swaziland did not include any priority related to the EE.

Priorities linked to the involvement of CSOs in public policies are also widely represented. All RMs have at least one priority devoted to enhancing CS participation in national and/or sectoral policies as well as to international development programmes. Some of these priorities remain quite general, referring to CS participation in service delivery and in national policies, while others are more focused, aiming at promoting CS involvement in public policies through specific sectors such as agriculture (Morocco, Zambia), social sectors including social protection (Gambia and Tajikistan) and energy (Jordan).

Capacity is also well represented in all the RMs assessed. Only Venezuela does not have a priority related to strengthening CS capacities, while the RMs of Burundi, Swaziland and Russia contain three priorities devoted to CS capacity development. One area of particular attention is the strengthening of coordination and cooperation among CSOs and the reduction of divisions between organisations in an effort to overcome the challenges that hinder CS capacity to influence and promote change.

3.1.3. Priorities in low income countries

Across the spectrum of Roadmaps from low income countries, priorities related to the enabling environment cover a wide range of issues, mostly focused on finalising reforms, the improvement of existing legal frameworks, extending its scope by inclusion of emerging actors or giving positive impetus to the growing role of CSOs. Recognition of CSOs, their inclusive participation in legislative processes related to constitutional freedoms, and political dialogue regarding the enabling environment are mentioned as essential cornerstones in order to move in the right direction. Some priorities aim to ensure better geographical coverage or a higher level of inclusiveness of CSOs.

The Roadmaps underline a clear acknowledgement that meaningful and constructive relationships between governments and civil society and involvement of CSOs in public policies depend not only on legal and institutional frameworks. They also require thoughtful investment in confidence building, political will and greater responsiveness of governments at different levels, and in CSOs' capacity to act as independent and accountable partners. It has been emphasised that dialogue should not be limited to administrative levels but also reach

out to cultures, religions and different language groups in society and to cross-border exchange.

With regard to capacity, bilateral and multi-actor partnerships are viewed as a means to achieve inclusion and involvement of diverse stakeholders' viewpoints. The varieties of partnerships mentioned in the Roadmaps aim to strengthen collaboration over a broad set of actors. Needs are widely expressed regarding support to the elaboration and/or implementation of 'an official Code of Practice' or 'a charter/code of conduct' in order to increase local CSOs' capacity to perform their roles as independent development actors more effectively and to support good governance and to provide clear principles and standards for CSOs engagement.

Finally, partnerships are also sought with the private sector. As several of the Roadmaps assessed underline, "it is time to strengthen the relationship between CSOs and the private sector to increase the number of private actors in corporate social responsibility and to explore alternative ways for funding".

3.1.4. Priorities in lower middle income countries

Within the cluster of lower middle-income countries, priorities linked to the enabling environment are present in all the RMs assessed, except in four countries: the Philippines, Mongolia, the Maldives and Congo-Brazzaville. In this regard, most of them focus specifically on the harmonisation and modernisation of CS legislation.

Priorities linked to the involvement of CSOs in public policies (the second overall ambition of the EC) are also widely represented (except in Lesotho, the Maldives and Mongolia from the 25 RMs assessed). The primary focus remains on the role and the participation of civil society in policy and decision-making. In almost all of the countries, the need for better involvement of civil society in the legislative process in specific areas, such as anti-corruption policy, human rights, and environment, is highlighted.

Capacity development is represented in almost all RMs assessed. The goal is to reinforce CSOs' ability to engage in democratic governance, shape policy dialogues and promote government accountability (undertaking actions to improve research-based advocacy, policy dialogue, networking and fundraising, etc.). This is in order to both drive and sustain reforms and change. Another important area for improvement is the development of internal governance and mutual accountability systems, including gender mainstreaming, that CSOs exhort governments to follow.

It is interesting to highlight the Georgia RM, as it has taken capacity development as a separate focal area. It is not seen as an end in itself. Capacity development takes place in order to achieve a specific objective. Based on this understanding, capacity development is taken as a crosscutting issue, which will be supported in a sustained and long-term manner. Furthermore, Tunisia, Lesotho and Guatemala have selected one other priority, not related to the ambitions of the Communication, putting the accent on promoting coordination between CSOs, EU, MS & other donors (including division of labour and joint support where feasible). Conflict prevention (Ukraine), civic education and social enterprise (Georgia) are other priorities set.

3.1.5. Priorities in upper middle income and upper income countries

In countries of upper middle or high incomes, with the exception of Mauritius, all RMs define priorities related to the enabling environment. In Fiji, the EUD monitors the CS environment during regular meetings with key donors as well as through frequent informal meetings with CSOs. Colombia set a contextualised and practical priority of "Establishing a structured, informed and consistent dialogue with CSOs, the state and the international community."

Some other RMs, however, define priorities that are too general and fall way beyond the scope of EUD capability and action. Additionally, it was frequently mentioned in some of this cluster's RMs that the environment for CSOs' engagement in service provision is open, and legal frameworks are in place, yet those organisations that work in human rights increasingly encounter difficulties (e.g. Peru, Colombia, South Africa).

All Roadmaps of this cluster present priorities linked to the involvement of CSOs in public policies. The EUD can evidently play an important role as a catalyst for promoting engagement between civil society and national and local government.

This cluster's Roadmaps also all include actions to improve the capacity of CSOs. Comparatively, civil society in most HICs and UMICs is pro-active, diverse and vibrant, yet professionalisation continues to be a priority and lack of funding a concern.

The Roadmap for Peru, among others, proposes supporting civil society platforms to **improve their representativeness**. This is an important priority that can concretely contribute to enhancing collaboration and cooperation between civil society actors, and hence their collective voice in national policy-making. Indeed, the Colombia Roadmap also proposes to continue its support to **increase CSO capacities to network** and strengthen alliances in order to act more efficiently as development actors.

3.1.6. Final considerations on the actions

When it comes to the actions, in all categories of countries considered, on average the RM documents contain 30 actions, distributed across the spectrum of research, policy dialogue and operational support. However, some RMs are very comprehensive and ambitious, and go as far as 60 actions. As with the priorities, there is a good balance across the three ambitions of the 2012 Communication in terms of numbers of actions proposed, and most of the actions proposed appear to be relevant vis-à-vis the portrayed priorities.

The specificity of the actions is, however, one of the main weaknesses of the RM documents. Almost 50% of the actions proposed in the RM document are rather general²³ and not linked to specific implementation means (i.e. the EU instruments and programmes - also including those of the MS - that will be used to implement them). Even though 70% of the actions are associated with implementing actors²⁴, in most of the Roadmaps assessed there is only a general mention of them. In this, the EUD is in most of the cases the leading actor, with a mixed degree of MS involvement at implementation level. It is worth mentioning, however, that some of the documents assessed (about 15%) foresee real synergies between EU and MS (i.e. joint implementation of actions)²⁵. Last but not least, although it was not required, about 10% of the documents also include specific timings for the implementation of the actions²⁶. For others, specific work plans are currently under way (e.g. Madagascar, Ecuador, etc.)

²³Example of a broad action, not linked to a specific implementation means/activity: "to encourage relevant public authorities/line departments to carry out effective consultation with civil society". In this, the action is clear but the actual implementation (how to carry out the action) is not defined and the technical/financial instrument is not described.

²⁴An example of a precise action associated with an implementing actor and means: "A mapping of CSOs working in the field of vulnerable families, juveniles, women and children will be developed as part of the twinning project on social protection. The mapping is foreseen to enhance the capacity of the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) to engage with CSOs within this field. Implementing actor: primary responsibility of the MoSD with assistance from the EU implementing partner (Ireland)."

²⁵An example of an action promoting synergies among different actors is as follows: "Support to a CSO Social Enterprise Coalition (component 1) and support for individual projects supporting social enterprise models in communities (component 2). Means: Component 1 - Direct award under CSO/LA thematic programme. Component 2 - CSO/LA thematic programme CfP and synergies with ENPARD programme and VET SRC. Implementation responsible entities: EU Delegation, CSO Social Enterprise Coalition, CSO grantees."

²⁶Ukraine and Georgia are among the countries including some actions linked to implementation periods.

3.2. An overview of the programmatic and operational innovations that the RMs are triggering

Programme and operational-wise, the RMs appear to be prompting a number of innovations. As previously mentioned, sometimes these innovations have to do with the contents of the engagement. For example, several EUDs are creatively using the roadmap to try out new approaches to support the enabling environment; knowledge generation and policy dialogue are now seen by several EUDs as possible avenues for action, together with operational support, thus overcoming the traditional donor-recipient EU-CS relationship, etc.. In other cases, innovations are seen at the level of the aid modalities that are foreseen in the RM, with several EUDs paving the way for modalities other than the traditional CfP-based project approach. They include core and programme funding, follow-up grants, block grants, etc. However in most of the cases actual implementation of these modalities has not yet started.

Now taking a closer look into the contents of EU engagement for each one of the three ambitions of the 2012 Communication:

Many countries introduced innovative actions related to the enabling environment, the first ambition of the 2012 Communication. Some of these innovations can be seen in the following box, organised by country cluster.

Box 8: Innovative actions under Priority 1

	Innovative Actions Under Priority 1
Countries in fragile situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Research into traditional reconciliation processes as well as into land rights and conflict, with particular emphasis on returning internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and diaspora (Somalia). Research exploring alternative and sustainable funding mechanisms for local CSOs (Chad). Study on the harmonisation of existing laws with the newly adopted constitution (Zimbabwe). Sponsorship of an information portal with links to a variety of research that has been done about the context (Zimbabwe). Funding of public awareness-raising initiatives around the shortcomings of the current legal and institutional framework (draft, Cote d'Ivoire).
Non-enabling environments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct a mapping study to identify CSOs focusing on the promotion of good governance and transparent and accountable government, including a catalogue of CSO activities (Kazakhstan). Public awareness-raising campaigns targeting the general public and explaining the negative effects of official corruption and inadequate or poor, unchecked reporting on government activities (Kyrgyzstan) Evidence-based research on the impact of the Civil Society Proclamation (CSP) on CSOs' work (Ethiopia). Support to basket-fund arrangements such as Amkeni Wakenya (by UNDP) to harmonise development partner procedures and reach out to grassroots organisations (Kenya). Operational support to initiatives that support interreligious and intercultural dialogue on issues related to governance, social cohesion and the rule of law (Madagascar). Hold dialogue forums with CSOs to promote discussion and dialogue on the role of civil society actors (Vietnam). Facilitate platforms for debate and initiatives, through the participation in meetings and events promoted by CSOs and focusing on sensitive human rights issues (Tajikistan).
Low-Income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSOs will be supported in conducting a review of the current NGO Act and

Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> making a proposal for change in the legislation (Malawi) EE and protection of CS rights to be duly integrated in the joint vision under the joint programming for development cooperation programmes (Bangladesh) Capacity development to the State institutions/body in charge of NGO registration and supervision of activities (Niger) Conduct a review of application of human rights-based approaches in European and other partners' programmes for support to civil society (Cambodia) Undertake a study on existing legislation and administrative procedures/practices at all government levels and their impact on the enabling environment for CSOs (Myanmar)
Lower Middle-Income Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate and foster the implementation of the reforms foreseen in the Association Agreement (implementation of the AA articles on civil society involvement (Ukraine) Regular political dialogue with the relevant national authorities, in particular but not limited to Attorney General, Ministry of Interior, and Human Rights Ombudsman (joint action by all EU MS, Norway, Switzerland and OHCHR) (Guatemala). Holding CSO consultations on a broader agenda linked to political dialogue with the government (i.e. annual Human Rights Dialogue) and to the impact of EU policies (migration, trade, agriculture, governance and human rights) (Indonesia). Regular meetings held with organisations representing economic interests, including business and trade unions, professional associations and chambers of commerce, about the monitoring of regional integration and EPAs (Cameroon).
Upper Middle and High-Income Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support a fortnightly TV talk show to share key messages and concerns with its CSO members and society at large (Dominican Republic). The Mexico Roadmap proposes to enhance the involvement of CSOs in EUD efforts to analyse and address gaps in the current legal framework, and use existing dialogue mechanisms (e.g. EU Permanent Working Group with Civil Society on Human Rights was created in May 2013).

Additional innovative actions under the second priority (civil society participation in public policy) were proposed, as shown by country cluster in the following box.

Box 9: Innovative actions under Priority 2

	Innovations Under Priority 2
Countries in fragile situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Map out existing mechanisms for participatory policymaking/budgeting and citizen engagement to identify drivers for change, and include them in the focal sectors of cooperation (Nigeria & Haiti). Elaboration of guidelines addressed towards CSOs on social accountability (i.e. "how to hold governments accountable (DRC). Adopt a "do no harm" approach given the sensitivities exacerbated by the crisis and keep all options open, establishing dialogue with both state and non-state actors (Iraq).
Non-enabling environments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct a sectoral mapping in the focal sectors of EU cooperation to deepen the knowledge and understanding of CS involvement (Honduras). Provide Technical Assistance to the government to set standards for, regulate and monitor social services by CSOs (Kyrgyzstan). Support innovative CS initiatives to fight corruption (Madagascar). Send a calendar to CSOs well in advance with all the dialogue events foreseen in the year and their expected contributors (Morocco).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct a study to explore potential ideas for linking the corporate sector with CSOs including case studies and recommendations on how to build bridges between CSOs the private sector, and government agencies (Vietnam). Integrate in EU-funded programmes at least one indicator related to CS involvement (Honduras). Train all EU grantees in the use of advocacy tools (Venezuela). Allocate <i>ad-hoc</i> funds for CSOs' projects aiming at participation in policy-focused and governance initiatives and in systematic monitoring of implementation of PRSP (Tajikistan).
Low-Income Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to the drafting of a social accountability guide adapted to the local context (Benin) Support to the public relations/marketing of good practices of CS-state engagement (Mauritania) Support to the setting up of social accountability mechanisms to supervise local health services (Mauritania) Sectoral mapping studies focusing on CSOs' roles and interactions with government in education, health, water and sanitation, etc (Senegal) Organisation of annual meetings or a gathering of state institutions and CSOs, including socio-economic partners (Togo) Create entry points in programmes and projects to involve CS and communities in the activation of accountability mechanisms (Bangladesh) Promote the engagement of CSOs in the aid-effectiveness structure (Myanmar)
Lower Middle-Income Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support policy dialogue on social protection, to include social rights, indigenous peoples, rights of vulnerable groups. RM for engagement with CSOs on economic empowerment, persons with disabilities, women and gender equality, etc. (Philippines). Conduct a CSO mapping study to gain better understanding of the diverse CSOs, including their roles, capacity (constraints), legitimacy, interests and dynamics, particularly in the focal sectors of cooperation (education, fight against corruption, environment, etc.) (Indonesia). Provide political and diplomatic support, engaging with government and public authorities both in a public way (through public declarations) and through informal pressure (Ghana).
Upper Middle and High-Income Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the framework of support to the sugar cane sector, support a more structured dialogue with CSOs, delivering assistance on issues like sustainable development, environment, gender and the role of women in development. Four NGOs and two farmers' associations representing more than 15,000 farmers, participate in Programme Steering Committee meetings (Fiji) Set-up a EU/MS working group for the development and implementation of the Roadmap (Peru) Involve non-EU counterparts that are important players in support of civil society (Israel) Conduct a mapping of CSOs and projects to include them in the local development plans of the local authorities (Elias Piña, Dominican Republic).

Finally, several countries came up with innovations regarding the third ambition, CSO capacity development, as seen in the box below.

Box 10: Innovative actions under Priority 3

	Innovations Under Priority 3
Countries in fragile situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop a publicly accessible platform (modelled on the example of Cash Atlas) with information on all projects implemented by CSOs, including monitoring and evaluation reports and information from remote monitoring (Afghanistan).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fund a capitalisation study about the public-private-partnerships (PPP) developed to provide services across the country (DRC). ▪ Set up a CS working group to explore the possibility for more coordinated, flexible, demand and results-driven capacity development, ensuring appropriate geographic coverage (Nigeria). ▪ Conduct a comparative study assessing the different capacity development initiatives and schemes (Chad). ▪ Support capacity development initiatives for policy dialogue, particularly targeting CSOs, networks, and platforms active at local and national level (Zimbabwe). ▪ Embed “internal governance & accountability” incentives into the projects to be funded under Call for Proposals mechanisms (Haiti). ▪ Integrate a transversal internal governance/transparency component in all the projects to be funded under the Call for Proposals (CfP) launched by the EU (draft, Cote d’Ivoire).
Non-enabling environments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Systematically bring EU funding beneficiaries together as a community of practitioners leading to mutual empowerment, possibly to be enlarged with inclusion of beneficiaries of other programmes (Ethiopian Social Accountability programme, the DFID-led Civil Society Support Programme, etc.) (Ethiopia). ▪ Assist Community based organisations by contracting NGOs (either national or international) as providers of training activities in various fields (e.g. key topics such as team-building, strategic planning and communication, lobbying, advocacy) and to support the building of alliances (Jordan). ▪ Develop training modules for training of CSOs on different topical issues regarding organisational management and development cooperation (Swaziland). ▪ Set up of a NGO help desk under the Coordinating Assembly of NGOs to share information on EU funding and other relevant information on project cycle management (Swaziland). ▪ Introduce new funding modalities with more flexibility to support strategies for sustainability, encourage a more programmatic approach and support for consortiums to enable multiple dimensions of an issue to be addressed by NGOs collaborating (Uganda).
Low-Income Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support CSOs in analysing the issue of financial sustainability, drawing lessons from good practices in Malawi and the region (Malawi) ▪ Support CSOs to develop and implement a “quality label” /transparency charter/ code of conduct (Benin, Niger, Togo) ▪ Provide targeted support to women’s groups and women’s leaders to develop a gender agenda (Mauritania) ▪ Provide operational support targeting specifically social movements/non-traditional forms of civic action/emerging actors (Senegal) ▪ Use the support measures of the CSO-LA and EIDHR to support CSO networks and establish a ‘helpdesk’ to provide strategic support to CSOs (Laos) ▪ Finance a feasibility study to support the development of the Coordination Council of Palestinian NGOs (Palestine)
Lower Middle-Income Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mapping of inclusion of active citizenship culture at all levels of the educational system (Armenia). ▪ Establish a CSO code of conduct to encourage accountability, transparency and effectiveness (Tunisia). ▪ Increase the capacity of research centres in providing relevant information in order to build a citizenship informed about public issues that affect them (Nicaragua).
Upper Middle and High-Income Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Systematise good practices in advocacy within already implemented and on-going projects financed by the EU, to serve as a catalyst for internal dialogue (Argentina). ▪ Support for networking between local CS and European CSOs (Mexico).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Create specific websites and email groups providing information to their members about new opportunities for tendering and participation in EU sponsored projects (Barbados, Dominican Republic and St. Lucia).
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3.3. The question of mainstreaming

Progress is also apparent regarding the mainstreaming of CSO involvement in EU sectors of cooperation. From the assessment conducted, it is evident that RMs offer a unique tool to act more consistently by raising awareness within EUDs (beyond CS focal points) on the critical roles played by CSOs in national political, economic and social processes. This will eventually promote a deeper and more comprehensive engagement across the spectrum of EU cooperation sectors, whether it be at the level of policy dialogue or operational support. Experiences are, however, diverse and vary from country to country.

3.3.1. Key findings

In countries in a state of fragility (where bilateral cooperation may be disrupted) mainstreaming is not a priority in most of the RMs. Exceptions include Chad, where efforts are being made to deepen the involvement of CSOs in justice, peace-building and budget support, and Haiti, where deepened mainstreaming is foreseen in the 11th EDF, though concrete modalities are yet to be defined. It is worth noting, however, that in this cluster of countries CS is often very prominent in public life, particularly in the provision of basic services. The different dialogue mechanisms and frameworks set up to coordinate assistance also bring on board CSOs, and could provide important entry points to effective CS mainstreaming in the future.

Likewise, in countries with a non-enabling environment, mainstreaming does not appear as a priority in most of the RMs assessed. Rather it is a mechanism through which dialogue and CS participation can be further promoted. This is particularly relevant in social sectors, such as health, education, etc., which are considered to be non-confrontational and which offer an entry point for the deepening of CS engagement. Around 13 RMs include CS mainstreaming in different sectors of interventions (e.g. Madagascar, Kazakhstan).

In lower-income countries, for many contexts, mainstreaming is seen as an ongoing process, although it is sometimes limited to specific sectors. Sometimes this is with activities that are not focused on specific sectors but more generally on bringing CSOs on board as governance actors in the relevant public policy debates. It has been underlined that the Roadmap offers a means to progress on CSO mainstreaming and engagement with other types of CSOs, beyond traditional NGOs, such as Community based organisations (CBOs), think tanks and movements. In Benin, the elaboration of programme strategies includes regular consultations with CSOs. In Cambodia, efforts are made on an ongoing basis to facilitate complementarity and coherence of programmes, instruments and sectors, and in Laos an alignment between national and EU/MS priorities is encouraged. The UK is indicated to have a concrete approach to mainstreaming; in Malawi, for instance, a score-carding programme aims to enhance policy monitoring and quality of service delivery implemented by grassroots organisations, complemented by support to various levels of government responsible for the policy implementation and service provision in the sectors. Mainstreaming CS has also become one of the principles of the EU Local Strategy on Development Cooperation in Palestine, and CSOs have been involved in EU programming and monitoring exercises. Others will build up civil society mainstreaming towards the achievement of the identified priorities in the Roadmap (e.g. Bangladesh).

Within the lower-income country cluster, the process of developing the RM is seen as offering an **opportunity to promote the mainstreaming of CS inside EU cooperation** (Armenia,

Ukraine, Moldova, Tunisia, Belize, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville). Georgia has a strong focus on mainstreaming, with all priority sectors of EU cooperation addressed (justice, agriculture, public administration reform, vocational training, etc.). In Mongolia, priorities are based on the focal sectors of cooperation: governance of revenues from extractive industries for sustainable growth, and employment (an approach which promotes mainstreaming of CSOs into these sectors).

Mainstreaming is a priority in approximately two thirds of the high-income/upper middle-income countries. South Africa is one of the leading EUDs in terms of mainstreaming CS, as engagement of CSOs (particularly in justice and health) has led to policy innovation and an enhanced equity approach in service delivery and accountability. The EUD in the Dominican Republic sees mainstreaming in all sectors as a priority, working towards the participation of civil society in reform processes through co-administration with the government. In Israel, mainstreaming is a priority in education and other social sectors (e.g. gender); however, this is limited to a few organisations. CSOs in Mauritius are involved in the identification and formulation of budget support and also consulted during implementation. However, they are not directly engaged in implementing and monitoring of budget support operations.

All clusters considered, experience shows that the practice of mainstreaming of CSOs can be effective at two key levels: (i) the level of policy dialogue and (ii) the level of implementation of EU programmes, including budget and sectoral support. Within each of these levels, different potential entry points apply. CSOs' involvement manifests through spaces generally defined as 'opportunities, moments and channels' where citizens can organise and act to potentially influence policies, discourses, decisions and relationships which affect their lives and interests²⁷.

Selected approaches to CS participation in policy dialogue have been diverse, involving anything from merely guaranteeing improved access to information and data for CSOs to providing feedback and participating actively in the policy and budget process as shown in the table below. Experience shows that none of these approaches is good or bad "*per se*." The pertinence and feasibility of the selected participation approach (and its underpinning ambition) need to be assessed against the context, government willingness to engage and CSOs' capacities for evidence-based advocacy and dialogue, amongst other relevant factors.

Box 11: Degrees of CS involvement in policy dialogue

Transparency: access to information	Social accountability		Participatory policy-making and budgeting	
	To consult	To involve	To collaborate	To empower
To inform	To consult	To involve	To collaborate	To empower
Provide citizens with timely, comprehensive and objective information to assist them in understanding the policy problem, as well as the alternatives, challenges and opportunities.	Obtain citizens' feedback on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions, either directly (i.e. using ICTs, etc.) or through CSOs.	Work directly with CSOs throughout the policy process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and addressed.	Partner with CSOs in some aspects of the decision-making, including the development of alternatives and identification of the preferred solution.	Place part of the decision-making authority in the hands of citizens.

²⁷ Inspired by EuropeAid (2014): Promoting Civil Society participation in policy and budget processes. Tools and Methods Series. Reference Document. January 2014.

CSOs have also played different roles when invited to join policy dialogue (i.e. through the so-called invited spaces led by the government²⁸). Sometimes CSOs have participated in the assessments and discussions leading to the definition of national development strategies or sectoral policies. They have also participated in the “budget support dialogue”²⁹ or in the dialogue around the programming of EU assistance throughout the cycle (i.e. studies, identification, programme steering committees, audits).

Operational support is the **second area of CS mainstreaming**. Here, CSOs have been “mainstreamed” in different ways. In some instances, CSOs have participated in the **delivery of services** in programmes supported through an SPSP (e.g. in the sectors of health, education), or through ‘public-private partnerships’ (PPP), co-production schemes, etc. CSOs have also received EU funds based on their right of initiative to **undertake specific activities**, such as supporting the production of local evidence to feed national processes, to undertake advocacy and transparency campaigns to open or enlarge “claimed spaces” for dialogue³⁰ or to play a watchdog role for state institutions or the private sector. Some CSOs have also received EU funds **to invest in their capacity development** to strengthen specific dimensions such as their evidence-based advocacy or to promote alliances and networking with their peers and other relevant stakeholders (i.e. research centres, think tanks, international actors, etc.)

What follows are four examples of the strategies adopted by EUDs to promote mainstreaming of CSOs into EU operations at country level.

Box 12: Mainstreaming approaches and practices by EUDs

Ghana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • During the programming phase of the Ghana Decentralisation Support Programme (GDSP), particular attention was paid to the involvement of CSOs and traditional authorities in local government. Under GDSP phase I (Institutional Support) there was a specific component to support the establishment of the Social Accountability Platform for engagement between CSOs and government (the demand side of social accountability). Under GDSP phase II (Sector Reform Contract), one of the 12 performance indicators was linked to the promotion of local democracy, participation and accountability through the involvement of CSOs and traditional authorities. Also, under the NSA/LA thematic programme, a total of 12 grants have been awarded to different CSOs in order to work collaboratively with Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies and the citizenry to enhance social accountability and delivery of services. • In 2010, the EU and other donors introduced an engagement with CSOs as part of the budget support mechanism in the run-up to the annual reviews. • Complementarities between instruments were ensured during the programming of EU support to both the Independent Government Institutions (IGIs) and Ghana
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²⁸ In *invited spaces*, CS is invited by authorities as observer, for consultation or even active participation in decision making. Such participation will often be institutionalised and in some cases have a legal basis. In other cases the spaces may be more temporary, involving *ad-hoc* consultation forums. Examples include Civil Society consultations during the annual budget cycle at key strategic moments (e.g. planning, annual reviews, and policy development) as well as citizen participation in statutory oversight bodies such as parliamentary standing committees. The purpose of such participation will often be publicised in advance and it is considered good practice to provide feedback to the public on the inputs collected. Extracted from EC (2014).

²⁹ These include: (i) debates on the use of good governance and development contracts such as GGDC, sector reform contracts (SRC) and state building contracts (SBCs in fragile/transition states); (ii) discussion of the criteria and indicators underpinning the decision to programme and/or disburse EU funds and/or (iii) discussions on transparency and oversight of the budget/performance monitoring processes and systems, social audits, etc.

³⁰ *Claimed spaces* are established on the initiative of Civil Society and are often informal, organic and based on common concerns and identification. Examples of claimed spaces are advocacy initiatives taken by Civil Society to claim influence on e.g. legislation, constitutional revision processes, land grabbing conflicts, or discontent regarding public services or political decisions (EuropeAid, 2014).

	Integrated Migration Management Approach (GIMMA).
Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A new CSO-LA project implemented by the Indonesian Institute for Independent Judiciary, started in February 2015 for a period of 36 months. The action aims at empowering CSOs, law students and law lecturers with monitoring and reporting skills to enable them to engage in data-based advocacy with the Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office for institutional reform of the Anti-Corruption Courts. The action is complementary to the bilateral cooperation programme "EU Support to the Justice Sector Reform in Indonesia", implemented jointly with the UNDP, which began on 1 December 2014 to last a period of 60 months. The programme aims at increasing the transparency, integrity and accountability of the judiciary and the quality of justice services delivered to the people by (i) enhancing internal and external oversight mechanisms of the judiciary; (ii) enhancing knowledge and skills of judges and court staff; (iii) improving human resource and organisation management of the judiciary and (iv) enhancing the Case Management System and procedures. The financing agreement also envisages the involvement of CSO representatives as observers in the steering committee of the programme.
Georgia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinated and participatory policy-making is a key achievement of the Justice Sector Reform Contract (SRC), which involved CSOs in the programme's design from the outset. Also, the Georgian Bar Association has received broad capacity development support to enhance its status as a representative body. • In the agriculture sector, the budget support provided by the EU stipulated, as a condition of the support, the establishment of a stakeholder committee to engage in policy dialogue and monitor implementation of government strategies and policies in the sector. CSOs have also been involved in the design (e.g. Law on Co-operatives) of other elements necessary for the release of budget support tranches. Some 50% of the total budget of the SRC was allocated by CSOs in their role in support of the establishment of co-operatives throughout Georgia. • There are considerable opportunities for synergies between the Roadmap and the Public Administration Sector Reform Contract currently under development, especially in the decentralisation/sub-national administration and oversight/anti-corruption components. • CSOs were consulted by the Delegation at all stages of the design of the SRC in the Vocational Education and Training (VET) sector. In addition, CSOs will actively participate in implementation through actions focusing on partnerships with stakeholders at local level in VET service delivery and cooperation to develop public private partnerships.
Morocco	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three key programmes have been used to mainstream CSOs: (i) the programme to support National Literacy Strategy; (ii) the programme to support the Government agenda on gender equality and (iii) the programme to succeed the "advanced status" between Morocco and the EU. • Depending on the sectors, there was more or less emphasis put on sectoral policy dialogue (i.e. gradual involvement as the government opens and trust is built; use of steering committees as opportunities for CS engagement). Overall, it was easier to involve CSOs as implementing partners. • The key modalities used were: (i) involvement of CSOs as conditionality (literacy programme) and/or set up of a specific fund for CSOs (CfP; gender and advanced status); (ii) technical assistance/capacity development for CSOs in addition to funds.

3.3.2. Key challenges

Experience proves that mainstreaming is not free from challenges. First and foremost, as can be seen from the manifold experiences at country level, **mainstreaming entails bringing onto the scene actors with different and possibly conflicting interests** from those of the government and even actors that run the risk of being co-opted by elites or political parties in the opposition. Hence the **“who” question** needs to be carefully considered. Sectoral and general mappings (see section 3.1. on knowledge management) can be very useful to this end.

Secondly, there is also the **“why” question** (“why CSOs have to be engaged”) that needs to be addressed promptly. Yes, CSOs are actors in their own right who should be brought on board. However, the benefits and strengths of CS engagement & democratic ownership are not always sufficiently evident to build the case for enhanced mainstreaming.

Thirdly, there is the **“how” question**, which is also an important one to examine, in light of the different roles that CSOs can effectively play and the possibilities offered by the different EU instruments and programmes (both bilateral and thematic). All too often the issue of mainstreaming is linked to the idea of providing financial resources to CSOs. While sometimes this may be necessary, in other contexts the emphasis may be needed more at the level of policy dialogue.

Experience shows that **trust matters a great deal** and that it requires time and commitment to build trust. In contexts where the government has set up a number of spaces (i.e. the so-called invited spaces), it may be pertinent to start with them, sector by sector, and build on them progressively, carefully assessing what can realistically be achieved, depending on leverage, actors and perception. The added value of CSOs also needs to be carefully assessed and support may be required to develop the right arguments beyond the principles of engagement. In other contexts where the space is not available, it may prove effective to support CSO initiatives that push the democratic ownership agenda further and/or add value to current EU sector operations, so building trust and partnership relations between government and CSOs.

Besides, and closely linked, mainstreaming requires **“getting everyone on board”** inside EUDs. This is far from being the reality in many EUDs, where CS engagement is still seen as the responsibility of the CS focal point or, at best, of the governance section. Additional efforts are therefore needed in many EUDs to obtain the necessary ownership of sectoral task managers, political staff, and senior management.

Finally, one should be careful **not to “overload the system”**, particularly in the case of sensitive contexts. These include those where the government may only be willing to open spaces for dialogue in areas seen as non-controversial, such as basic services, or in more complex budget support and sector reform schemes.

3.4. Conclusions

All in all, Roadmaps seem to offer EUDs and MS an opportunity to stop simply “doing business as usual.” Even in the cases of EUDs more advanced in terms of engagement with CSOs, Roadmaps appear to offer a different and renewed perspective, as they call for a stronger political and more diversified role of EUDs in their engagement with CSOs. Indeed, Roadmaps encourage EUDs to go beyond the financial and operational dimensions of EU support and engage in a wider range of roles, including facilitation, brokering, mediation, convening, etc. These are roles to be played by different units and sections within the EUDs (not just the cooperation section, let alone the CS focal point).

Additionally, the impressive depth and the scope of the consultation with CSOs during the Roadmap process in many countries offer a real opportunity for engagement with CS beyond

the EU usual grantees and interlocutors. A large number and variety of CS actors (including marginalised communities and CSOs with a geographic diversity) have given input during the process, via questionnaires, consultation meetings or workshops. There is therefore a valuable shared ownership of the RM, as well as the creation or expansion of a space for CSOs (among multiple stakeholders) in the development process.

Furthermore, Roadmaps appear to be progressively helping EUDs overcome the traditional instrument-driven approach and develop a more coherent and effective strategy for working with CS across units, sectors and instruments. Through their focus on knowledge, Roadmaps also offer an opportunity to base this new approach on solid and continuous analysis of CS dynamics. Last but not least, RMs seem to offer a real opportunity to promote the mainstreaming of CS inside the EUD and promote stronger cooperation with MS and other donors active in supporting CSOs.

Challenges are, however, numerous and they appear particularly manifest as EUDs, together with MS, move from strategy to action in the implementation of the RM, as further developed in the section that follows.

Section 4. Moving from strategy to action and keeping track of progress

4.1. Implementing the Roadmaps: moving from strategy to action

As briefly indicated in the introduction of the report, implementation is still at an early stage of development, as most EUDs have so far been occupied with finalising the RM documents. However, even if experience is limited, based on the testimonies collected through the country support missions and the exchanges held during the regional and global seminars (particularly the global seminar in June), it is possible to predict that the implementation phase of the Roadmaps will unveil further questions and challenges requiring flexible and adapted solutions. The following section reflects an effort to identify these questions if not necessarily the answers, as they are yet to be elaborated.

4.1.1. The links between RM and other EU processes at country level

First and foremost there is the question of ensuring the links between the RM and the “programmatic” life of the EUD. In this regard it is important to underline that RMs are not programmatic documents themselves, nor do they have a specific budget allocated to them. Their implementation relies therefore on the spectrum of programmes and instruments available at the level of EUD and MS (e.g. thematic programmes such as CSO-LA or EIDHR, bilateral programmes, MS programmes, etc.). However, unless the linkages are clearly established, ensuring that the RM is “well anchored” in the reality of the EU programmes and instruments at country level, implementation will be very difficult, as will be follow-up.

Also, clear linkages with other on-going processes at country level are required (e.g. democracy profiles, HR strategies, etc.). As discussed during the two global seminars organised, Roadmaps should ideally reflect broader EU engagement in a country. In order to avoid the Roadmap becoming a self-standing tool, it is therefore key that it is linked to and well integrated into the wider EU cooperation processes in the country. This includes not only programming of development cooperation through its various instruments, but also political dialogue and diplomatic relations with partner countries. Countries with MIC status, for example, are faced with a changing EU agenda in which the balance tips from development to cooperation in the political sphere, in trade or on global public goods. Several participating EUDs observed that they are using the Roadmap exercise to reorient EU CS engagement strategies towards these new policy areas (e.g. trade).

4.1.2. Maintaining momentum inside the EUD and vis-à-vis MS

Secondly, there is the question of “keeping up the momentum” in an effort to ensure the collective ownership of the Roadmap, both inside the EUD (with other colleagues from their sections of cooperation and the political section of the EUD) vis-à-vis MS and other interested donors. As evidenced during the 2015 June seminar, now that the Roadmap is ‘in place’ in most countries, there is a need to show that this also brings about changes in the ways of working as well as in the quality of support strategies/modalities. Activating the roadmaps is therefore key if the risk of an implementation ‘slump’ and related loss of momentum is to be avoided³¹.

Inside the EUD, of particular interest is the question of ensuring the (co-) ownership of the different actions set out in the Roadmap as well as an effective task division. As discussed

³¹ Global EU Seminar: Engaging Strategically with Civil Society - Putting the Roadmaps into Practice. Brussels, 29 June – 1 July 2015. Summary of main messages. August 2015.

during the seminar in June 2015, the bulk of the coordination work inside the EUD is not over once the document is ready. On the contrary, it requires due attention to concretise the mainstreaming ambitions set out in the RM documents, as described above, and to use the available and best instruments and programmes in a complementary manner (as discussed above).

An added difficulty lies in confusion surrounding the leadership of and responsibility for RM implementation that often emerges in EUDs. While the RM should be seen as a highly political dossier involving not just the EU but also MS missions, in certain countries it is still treated as a purely operational affair. Procedures and capacity constraints are also having an impact on the process. Perhaps, as the report from the 2015 June Workshop underlines³², the biggest ‘frustration’ lies in the difficulty in matching these high policy ambitions with adequate means of implementation. EU operational support remains somewhat wedged between political ambitions and procedural rigidity.

Ultimately, coordination inside the EUD is needed to prevent the RM from becoming a “CS focal point” document, instead of an EU vision at country level. Some of the EUDs that are more advanced in implementation (e.g. Ecuador, Madagascar, Indonesia, Peru, etc.) are experimenting with different approaches to keep EUD staff engaged, ranging from the setting up of task forces to the organisation of regular meetings, etc.

Collective ownership by MS, and possibly other donors, is also of paramount importance if the exercise and process is to be a genuine EU process. In this regard, the assessment of the RM shows mixed records regarding the envisaged level of involvement of MS in the implementation of actions foreseen in the RM. In some countries the RM is closely linked to part of the joint programming exercise and a high level of involvement of MS can be expected. In other contexts, MS and their programmes are only briefly considered at the level of actions, and these remain quite general. All in all, MS involvement seems to be highly influenced by the existence of MS programmes dedicated to supporting CSOs and of both *ad-hoc* and formal coordination mechanisms around CS and/or broader governance issues among MS and development partners.

4.1.3. Dialogue with CSOs

Dialogue with CSOs on the implementation and follow-up of the RM is also necessary, to ensure that roadmaps are, in line with the underlying philosophy of the 2012 Communication, truly oriented towards empowering CSOs to be effective “governance actors”. They should have the capacity to participate in policy processes, support the delivery of development services, demand accountability or help in constructing the state (in fragile contexts). For EUDs this presents the challenge of ensuring that strategic support to civil society is closely connected to the dynamics within society³³.

Several EUDs have started to reflect on the above, exploring different systems and mechanisms (setting up reference and follow-up groups, steering committees, etc.) to ensure that the Roadmap implementation and follow-up is grounded in a continued participatory engagement with CSOs and even government actors, where relevant. Evidence shows that, regardless of the approach adopted by the EUD, it will be important that: (i) first and foremost the contents of the Roadmap are fed back to the participants of the consultation and to the wider CS community in one way or another and that (ii) CSOs are regularly updated during the implementation and follow-up of the RM. The specific modalities (creation of a working group integrating a number of CS representatives, regular reporting on the Roadmap dashboard,

³² idem

³³ idem

holding regular meetings with CSO representatives, etc.) will however have to be defined on a country-by-country basis.

4.1.4. The sequencing of actions and division of tasks

Finally, the sequencing of actions and distribution of tasks contemplated in the Roadmap are also important questions to consider. Here again, the answers will be different according to the local context. Nonetheless, as evidenced during the different seminars and support missions conducted by the RM Facility, there is clear added value in developing an overall strategy (by drafting a work plan, for instance, as in Madagascar and Ecuador) and in choosing a number of key actions that clearly identify the pathway the EU Delegation and Member States will follow to achieve or help in achieving the Roadmap's objectives over time. Furthermore, as a "living document", the Roadmap will need to be adjusted in coordination with the MS representatives in the country.

Box 13: Providing the RM with an operational dimension: the case of Ecuador

Implementation of the RM in Ecuador

1. Involvement of different actors in the preparation of the RM and in its follow-up: the cornerstone needed for a successful process. The RM of Ecuador was drafted by the EUD and a minimum of three MS, with additional provision of feedback from several CSOs. Furthermore, once the RM was drafted, a participatory approach was established in order to involve CS in the definition of the dimensions that should be prioritised when following up on the implementation of the RM.
2. The institutionalisation of the RM process: a set of three layers. Regarding the structure that has been put in place to follow up and operationalise the RM, there are three elements to be highlighted.
 - First, a Plenary Assembly, which has the overall steering role, is the forum under which general discussion of all participating entities takes place, and is composed of members of CS, MS and EUD (around 40 participants).
 - Second, the Follow-up Committee is a reduced entity that meets every 6 weeks and which prepares an annual work plan, according to priorities agreed by its members.
 - Third, entities of a much more operational nature, the thematic working groups, which are created according to the emerging needs in the RM follow-up process and according to a changing CS context. For example, it was considered that the issue of the legalisation of CSOs according to the Ecuadorian legal framework was of high importance, and a reduced working group was created in order to find suitable solutions to the challenges that the national legislation presented.
3. Working tools linked to the process: making the RM a concrete tool. On top of the institutional set-up outlined above, the RM implementation process is based on a) an overall methodology and a set of principles inspiring the works of the multiple stakeholders involved in the process and b) a matrix/work plan, with a clear set of working sectors, goals, actions and progress updates, which is established on an annual basis. These two instruments are key to the proper articulation of the process and to structuring the RM implementation follow-up in an optimal manner

4.2. Keeping track of the RM process and progress towards priorities

Even though, as with implementation, experience of monitoring and follow-up of the RM is still limited, analysis by the RM Facility shows some interesting indications regarding how EUDs and MS are moving forward in the follow-up of the RM process and progressing towards the priorities. These practices, which have been developed very much at the EUDs' own initiatives in a "learn by doing " process, can be used as a source of inspiration for other EUDs and MS who are currently considering approaches and mechanisms for the follow up of their own processes.

All in all, there seem to be a few key areas on which different EUDs have been focusing their attention in order to lay the ground for the establishment of a solid follow-up system. These are the fine-tuning of their dashboard (namely of the outcome indicators as process indicators are pre-defined and common to all RM), the establishment of baselines and targets in an effort

to describe the current state of play and identify the “ultimate goal”, and the setting up of an institutionalised mechanism to follow up on the process and progress towards priorities. It is however important to bear in mind that no blueprints (i.e. a model to be followed by all countries) exist. Considering the changing contexts and circumstances, some practices may suit some contexts better than others.

Box 14: On indicators³⁴

On indicators

The RM process and its logic differ in nature from the PCM methodology, according to which indicators must have a series of requirements (the so-called SMART criteria). In the RM context, indicators have to be adapted to local circumstances, where, for instance, indicators cannot be too specific in some cases, in order for a wide range of stakeholders to agree on the RM document. Therefore, and as a general principle, there are no good or bad practices of application in all cases in the RM process. Having said this, the following is an illustration of how different EUDs, within different regional and national contexts, have defined indicators that are adapted to their particular needs.

Priority 1: Enabling Environment

- Number and type of CSOs which have participated in the creation and implementation of the civil society legal framework
- In December 2016, there will be a system of follow-up and monitoring of the international commitments signed by (a given country), which can be fed to or consulted by any organisation or institution online
- The government's response to the needs of CSOs, including an improved registration process, is enhanced, with full respect to CSOs' autonomy
- Rate of HR violations reported to the authorities and rapidity and effectiveness of reaction, or level of adherence to International Conventions regarding freedom of association/assembly etc., and number of reported incidents/violations of these freedoms.

Priority 2 : Civil Society Participation in domestic policies

- Number of CSOs involved in consistent monitoring of the integration and enforcement of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction into key sector policies
- Number of policies, local development plans and budgets elaborated through participatory methodologies with CSOs
- Number of new integration frameworks that enhance collaboration between CSOs and local authorities and that have been adopted for the implementation of development projects
- Number, representation and regularity of coordination frameworks at sectoral and local levels in each of the priority intervention sectors of the EUD and MS.

Priority 3: Capacity Development

- Number of coordinated and common activities between CSOs as well as number of sustainable partnerships, as a result of support provided by EU and MS
- Increased use of mentoring by experienced CSOs for new initiatives, movements and civil society groups or regional CSOs
- Existing formal and informal networks support shared strategies or interests at national level, with a specific focus on including grass roots organisations, and at regional level
- Number of CSOs that adopt a code of conduct/code of ethics to deliver assistance in a transparent and accountable manner.

4.2.1. A fined-tuned dashboard: a good option to establish a solid basis for a consistent follow-up mechanism

Countries such as South Africa, Georgia, Afghanistan, Benin or Iraq have worked extensively in further defining the elements included in their dashboards, in some cases with the remote and/or in-country assistance of the Facility and in other cases with their own resources.

³⁴ See Tome II. Annex 4 for an extended list of good practice indicators

This fine-tuning task appears particularly relevant as EUDs move into the implementation and follow-up phase, in view of the shortcomings identified at the level of identification of outcome indicators. Indeed, the in-depth assessment of 40 RMs from the M&E perspective shows that there is significant room for improvement at the level of the outcome indicators that have been selected. To start with, it seems that the average number of indicators (20 with, in some cases, up to 39) remains too high to ensure a proper follow-up system: the more indicators, the more resources will be required to collect and assess data. Despite this high number, there seems to be a good balance between the three categories of priorities proposed by the 2012 Communication (around 30% of the indicators per priority). Proposed indicators also appear to be highly relevant (80% of them are considered relevant). However their measurability presents some challenges given the high level of resources needed or the breadth in definition of indicators. Other relevant findings include: about 1/3 of the indicators suggested are formulated as output indicators (instead of outcome indicators); also about 1/3 are not consistent with each other in their formulation (i.e. some of them being formulated as activities, others as results per se, others as outcome indicators).

Against this backdrop, the main activities that have been carried out by EUDs in the fine-tuning of the dashboard include the reduction in the number of indicators (maximum 2/3 per priority), the strengthening of links between indicators and priorities (making them more relevant) and ensuring that the proposed indicators can be measured with the resources available.

Box 15: The M&E system of the RM in South Africa

The follow-up system set up by the EUD in South Africa
<p>The EUD in South Africa requested support from the Facility in the fine-tuning of the dashboard and in the definition of a follow-up methodology. Following remote assistance from the Facility, a clear implementation strategy is now in place. Assistance provided included support in a) fine-tuning of the dashboard; b) definition of the reference group, who will be consulted on a regular basis and c) definition of the structure and preliminary version of the survey that will serve as a basis for carrying out the baseline study. Furthermore, a country mission is planned in order to work towards the operationalisation of the RM, strengthening its action-related component and launching the activities of the reference group. As a result of this two-phase support, the RM will be operational and its follow-up dimension strengthened. Some of the final indicators are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scope, frequency and diversity of public debate on the creation of sustainable and inclusive domestic funding structures (Public and Private) for CSOs • Number of proposals received from CSOs and integrated by the Government of South Africa to revise public funding structures • Number of CS networks and coalitions supported by the EU and MS around specific issues of common interest • Number of CS positions, projects and other initiatives tackling the needs of minorities, and of marginalised and traditionally excluded groups through the creation of networks and coalitions • Number of capacity development support initiatives, (provided by the EU, MS, private donors and other actors) to refine CSO accountability and CS engagement strategies vis-à-vis their constituencies • Number of advocacy and CS initiatives for engagement with state agencies supported by the EU, MS and other donors • Number of self-regulatory systems developed and adhered to by the sector • Number of actions in which CSOs have contributed to the improvement of public service and local governance administration (mainly through skills development and competence transfer initiatives) • Number of CS coalitions capable of engaging with government and the private sector on inclusive economic policies and job creation schemes • The number and quality of exchanges, cooperation and networking initiatives between EU and

South African CSOs.

4.2.2. The establishment of baselines and targets: an element not required by the 2012 Communication but proven highly useful to establish where we are standing and what we aim to achieve

Different EUDs have been working towards the definition, for each of the indicators included in the dashboard, of the situation at the moment of the RM drafting (the so-called baseline), and the quantification of the goals they want to achieve per indicator (target). Even though this was not a requirement *per se* in the RM template, several EUDs and MS, inspired by the results-based framework principles, have considered this important and “the way to go” in an effort to ensure an adequate assessment of the progress made in the implementation of the RM.

So far, some of the approaches used include the inclusion of baselines and targets in the RM document during its elaboration (Ivory Coast and Senegal) and the use of indicators for which information is already available, in order not to overwhelm the limited EUD resources with impractical systems of data collection and analysis (Mozambique).

Box 16: The M&E system of the RM in Mozambique

Indicators selected by the EUD in Mozambique
<p>The EUD in Mozambique has included the following indicators in its RM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Civicus Enabling Environment Index (baseline 2013) - http://civicus.org/eei/ ▪ Civicus Civic Space Monitor (baseline 2015) – www.civicus.org ▪ Ibrahim Index of African Governance (subset on Participation & Human Rights) http://www.moiibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/publications/2014/2014-iiag-country-profiles.pdf ▪ Worldwide Governance Indicators (subset on voice and accountability) - http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports ▪ UNDP National Human Development Index - http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components.

Another approach involves launching an independent baseline study (Georgia and Ukraine), a good option that requires, however, the existence of available resources at the disposal of the EUD. Others include a survey targeting CS representatives and resource persons (South Africa) and mapping studies and/or civil society and political economy assessments including the definition of a baseline for the dimensions assessed (Thailand).

Box 17: The baseline study launched by the EUD in Georgia

The baseline study launched by the EUD in Georgia
<p>The EUD in Georgia launched, in April 2015, a support mission to “conduct a baseline study for the Roadmap for engagement with CSOs in Georgia 2014-2017.” The study, funded by the Civil Society Dialogue for Progress (TA project), aims to assess the situation vis-à-vis the key priorities of the 2012 Communication and establish benchmark indicators with a view to measuring progress on the Roadmap for engagement with CSOs in Ukraine 2014-2017. More specifically the study aims to: (i) develop and conduct a baseline study (using appropriate methodologies and tools) to elaborate a baseline for a selected set of indicators included in the dashboard of the Roadmap for engagement with CSOs in Ukraine 2014-2017; (ii) fine-tune the list of indicators to be regularly measured, in an effort to make them more SMART and (iii) provide specific recommendations to be followed by the EUD for the yearly report on the Roadmap (i.e. reporting to be done against the selected list of indicators).</p> <p>Considering time and resource limitations, it was agreed to focus the baseline study and hence the resulting baseline on a selection of indicators as follows:</p>

- The legal environment is more conducive for civil society development (i.e. legislative framework is improved and implemented, tax code favouring donations, improved mechanism for CSOs to provide social services, civil society developing a common position on freedom of assembly law)
 - Examples of CSOs and civil servants working together, seeing it as a useful partnership for their work
 - Existing mechanisms for regular dialogue are improved and made more effective
 - A shift in civil society's role from controlling to influencing
 - The number of joint initiatives at local and national levels, *per sector*
 - Transparency and accountability mechanisms related to access of information, anti-corruption and media policy are in place *and are used by civic initiatives*
 - Clearer linkages of CSOs with their constituencies and authorities to plan, design and implement their activities
 - Civil society involvement in each programming and policy document
 - New cultural and educational initiatives contributing to reconciliation processes and trust building
 - The level of cooperation between CSOs and local authorities *in post conflict zone / on matters related to the conflict environment*
 - Involvement of CSOs in reconstruction / social integration efforts
 - Efficient communication between the government and civil society in the process of implementation of the energy and environment chapters of the Association Agreement and the Energy Community *Acquis* is established
 - Increased CSOs' capacities to act as watchdogs in protecting human rights, ensuring the transparency of law enforcement procedures, and in anticorruption activities
 - The level of participation of CSOs and business associations in policy making: (i) investment and economic development programmes tailored through consultations with CSOs and business associations; (ii) specific input of CSOs into formulation of economic policies and contribution to economic development
 - Economic development targeting social needs and human development, especially at local level.
- The study started in June 2015. It uses a methodology combining both quantitative and qualitative data analysis, including research work, and a survey comprising 200 interviews with CSOs. The awaited survey results will strengthen the RM drafted by the EUD. It will provide more "SMART oriented" indicators and a clearer picture, with information obtained at ground level, of the current situation regarding each of the indicators. It will also provide guidelines on how to report the progress achieved for each of those indicators.

4.2.3. The setup of an institutionalised mechanism to follow up on the process and on the progress achieved towards priorities

In some countries it has been decided to set up a new structure or use an existing one (donor governance coordination group, etc.) to steer the RM implementation process. Some initiatives in this regard include the setting up of a reference group with MS and CSOs (South Africa) or of an *ad-hoc* coordination group with MS (Peru), or giving the mandate to an on-going CS support programme (Benin). This can be done where such programmes exist, as is often the case in ACP countries.

Indeed, the existence of an institutionalised structure, which is involved not only in the RM implementation but also in its design, and reflects the CS challenges and opportunities in the given country, seems essential for a proper follow-up of the implementation process. It optimises resources, providing coherence between the RM and other strategic and operational initiatives and ensuring that momentum is maintained through all the stages of the RM process.

Section 5. Communication and visibility of the RM

According to the 2012 Communication, Roadmaps should “where appropriate” be made publicly available and shared with national authorities. This nuance is important as, despite the general rule of giving Roadmaps due visibility, in certain environments it has been deemed counterproductive to (fully) disclose the Roadmap as it could put Civil Society partners at risk or compromise EUD’s diplomatic relations. In these contexts, the Roadmap has been considered an internal document and Delegations and Member States have sometimes produced a short public version of the Roadmap, focusing on priorities and actions. This is particularly the case in highly sensitive environments, such as fragile environments or non-conducive environments. All in all, it is important to underline that the publication of the whole document (or alternatively a summary) is a decision entirely left to the EUD and MS.

Of the 91 Roadmaps finalised, 33 are public³⁵ and available at capacity4dev (<http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/roadmaps>). For 12 Roadmaps, summaries are published and available at capacity4dev. The rest of the Roadmaps that are finalised remain confidential. The capacity4dev platform contains a repository of the Roadmaps in order to ensure that the Roadmaps remain easily accessible for anybody interested.

EUDs themselves have also used their own communication channels to publicise the Roadmaps and inform about the process at country level. This has been done using different strategies, including:

- Publication of the Roadmap on the EUD website and on MS webpages. Some EUDs (eg Zimbabwe³⁶) also published an accompanying short article that briefly described the process of development of the Roadmap and presented the key priorities that will guide EU engagement with CSOs³⁷.
- Other EUDs which have restricted Roadmaps, publishing only a short summary on their website without further introduction (eg Indonesia, Belarus)
- Use of the EUD (and possibly MS) Twitter and Facebook accounts. For examples: see box below
- Organisation, together with MS, of an event and a press conference on the launch of the Roadmap. (e.g. Mozambique, Myanmar)
- Development of a tailored brochure on the Roadmap and its implementation to be distributed through the EUD and through CSOs and Member State embassies as well as during events and through the media. (e.g. South Africa).

³⁵ As of mid August 2015

³⁶ Example:

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zimbabwe/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140711_en.htm

³⁷ Example:

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zimbabwe/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140711_en.htm

Box 18: Use of social media by EUDs**Use of EUD Twitter and Facebook accounts**

The EUDs of Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Philippines are among the EUDs who regularly and effectively use social media accounts to draw attention to the Roadmap development and its implementation. Here are some of their tweets or facebook posts:



EUinAfghanistan @EUinAfghanistan . The #EU is currently drafting its Roadmap for engagement with civil society in #Afghanistan & increases involvement of CSOs in its work.



EUinLebanon @EUinLebanon 10 mrt. Roadmap for Engagement with #civil society to support CSOs 2 develop & link participation in policy making and service delivery #Lebanon



European Union in the Philippines
Publication: PHILIPPINES-EU COUNTRY ROADMAP FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 2014 - 2017
See full brochure here:
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/philippines/documents/more_info/publications/eu_country_strategy_cso_engagement.pdf

Reportedly, Roadmaps are also seen by a number of EUDs and MS as an opportunity to increase the visibility of the EU and its action in partner countries.

However, it needs to be noted that, despite the above good examples of communication, in general communication is still not used to its full extent. Not all of the Roadmaps that are public have been published on the EUD websites and few EUDs have deployed active communication strategies to inform about the RM process and content. Given the fact that communicating the Roadmap is paramount for successful implementation (as key stakeholders need to remain engaged and the momentum maintained), information and communication about the Roadmap process, in parallel with implementation and follow-up of the Roadmaps, remain crucial.

Section 6. The way forward: some ideas

Roadmaps are 'in place' in most countries. Reportedly, as evidenced throughout the report, they offer a real opportunity for EUDs and MS to be better equipped with sound knowledge about the CS landscape, share a common language and develop a common vision and agenda for engagement, appropriate to the country dynamics.

Almost half way through the cycle of the first generation of Roadmaps (2014-2018), today the priority is to activate the roadmaps effectively. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate (with concrete results) that Roadmaps can bring about real changes in the ways of doing business (and not just of "thinking business") as well as in the quality of EU support strategies and modalities towards CSOs.

The challenges are however manifold.

As evidenced throughout the report, the introduction of Roadmaps shifts thinking from an often *ad-hoc* project-based approach to a **long-term process approach of supporting CSOs in a context-sensitive way**. During the 2015 June seminar, several EUDs observed that this is a very different job compared to the traditional management of project approaches and related funding modalities (namely CfP) that they were entrusted with. The implementation of roadmaps will require the adoption of **gradual and flexible implementation strategies** whereby the EUD and MS systematically assess the context. Indeed, assessing is not a "one-shot" exercise but rather a continuous endeavour, identifying windows of opportunity to support CS and eventually finding ways to pool resources and capacities in coordinated or joint actions³⁸. **Adequate funding modalities** going beyond the classical CfP-based project approach, and integrating others such as block grants, core and programme funding, follow-up grants, direct awards, etc., are therefore paramount and procedures should not block the way to using them where suitable.

It is also evident, from the report but also from exchanges with EUDs, that even if a common overarching vision underpins the process (i.e. that of the 2012 Communication) and common guidelines are required, a **"blanket approach" to the process is simply not possible**, considering that contexts are far too diverse. This holds particularly true when considering fragile environments, non-conducive contexts and, on the other hand, countries where bilateral cooperation is being graduated. A clearer line on how to operate in **fragile environments and in sensitive environments** is necessary.

With regard to the first, and based on some of the experiences so far, it will be important to consider and assess **what can realistically be done and how the process needs to be adapted to the real politics and political economy of the context**, (e.g. Syria, Yemen). When the context is highly unstable and unpredictable, and citizens and CSOs are in "survival mode", strategic planning is often a "wishful thinking" exercise and other tasks (such as identifying those actors who remain active in the field) can be far more relevant. With regard to sensitive environments, the second consideration, - "how far the EUDs can go in political dialogue and operational support" - is a very relevant one.

Many EUDs are now engaged in the promotion of an enabling environment. Participants in the 2015 June seminar agreed that it is key to **seize the opportunity that Roadmaps bring for promoting change and building confidence**, particularly at the level of partner governments. These tend to be reluctant to accept donor interference, particularly with regard to sensitive issues and/or in delicate contexts, where the environment for pushing forward a human rights

³⁸ Global EU Seminar: Engaging Strategically with Civil Society - Putting the Roadmaps into Practice. Brussels, 29 June – 1 July 2015. Summary of main messages. August 2015

and governance agenda becomes more restricted. This puts pressure on EUDs to acquire greater skills in **'political intelligence' and capacity to assess and identify suitable entry points for supporting reformist forces**³⁹ (the so-called drivers for change). An alternative path in such restrictive environments can be that of engaging in sectoral policy areas where state and CSOs interests can more easily come together (e.g. health, education, children's rights or migration) and CS action is not perceived as "a threat" by the Government.

In the case of graduated countries, as indicated by the EUDs concerned during the 2015 June seminar⁴⁰, **more efforts are needed to raise awareness inside EUDs about the political nature of the Roadmap**. In the words of one of the EUDs: "It is not about money, or less and less, as cooperation funding dries out. Hence it is not fundamentally the job of cooperation sections to drive the agenda". The political section, and therefore EEAS, should be more proactively engaged, as they have the mandate and the staff. However, it is important that their understanding of engaging with CSOs goes far beyond the implementation and follow-up of the rights-based issues set out in the human rights country strategy. Trade sections, as well as any other relevant sections representing specific policy areas (e.g. environment, research and innovation, infrastructure, ICT, etc.) also need to be engaged much more proactively in the Roadmap process. They need to use the opportunity to carefully consider the types of CSOs (e.g. private sector representative organisations, chambers of commerce when non-profit, research centres, private non-profit universities, etc.), both local and European, to engage with, in the interest of both the EU and its core values, and the partner country.

Maintaining momentum will also be crucial, vis-à-vis key stakeholders. In this regard, **the setting up of an institutionalized mechanism at country level to follow up on the process** and progress towards priorities may be another relevant tool to consider. As some country experiences have shown, this mechanism could be embedded into existing and well-functioning coordination mechanisms (existing donor governance / CS coordination groups, for instance) or set up as a new space (e.g. a reference group such as the one currently being established in South Africa) if these do not exist. Its composition should also be carefully considered, integrating EUD and MS representatives (and other donors) and, when possible, a number of **key relevant CSO (e.g. networks, platforms, etc.) and/or resource persons in an effort to keep CSOs engaged and promote collective ownership in the follow-up of the implementation of the roadmap**. The case of Cambodia is worth highlighting as the EUD together with MS, in the framework of the Joint Programming exercise and as part of the implementation of the RM, is currently setting a process of institutionalised dialogue (the so-called structured dialogue, a name which takes after the process launched at headquarters level between 2010 and 2011) with CSOs.

Additionally, **thematic working groups** (i.e. working on different priorities/areas) could also be established, in line with the most urgent objectives included in the RM. The most relevant actors from both civil society and development sectors would participate. This would give the RM implementation process much more of a concrete and precise nature, going beyond overall policy goals towards a more specific set of goals linked to sub-themes. This has been the case, for instance, in Ecuador and this approach is already yielding concrete results. Myanmar is also considering setting up specialised groups to follow-up on the four priorities.

In the case of graduated countries it may even prove effective to **identify a "champion"** within the MS community who can "take the lead" together with the EUD political section.

³⁹ Idem

⁴⁰ DEVCO Exchange Seminar. Workgroup: Implementing the Roadmap in "graduated out" countries.. How to deal with new agendas when we have loss of (Cooperation) staff capacity? Internal note with the outcomes of discussions prepared by the delegates.

The effective implementation of roadmaps will also require **customized, country-tailored, results-oriented M&E systems**, which go far beyond the classical project/programme indicators to try to capture deeper changes in civil society and in the relationship with the state. A number of actions appear particularly relevant and timely to this end:

- Further fine-tuning of the priorities, actions and indicators, in line with the assessment provided in the report, may be necessary in several countries, in an effort to make Roadmaps more results-oriented and “actionable”
- In countries where Roadmaps are to become not just broad strategy frameworks but real steering tools, a special effort will be necessary to develop an implementation or work plan, allowing for a clear definition of task and division of labour
- Base line information and adequate data collection mechanisms (adapted to the resources available at the level of the EUD and MS or at the level of existing institutions) will also be key to start operationalising the M&E framework foreseen to measure progress towards the RM priorities.

Institutional-wise, it is expected that **EUDs will continue to play a pivotal role in facilitating the entire implementation process**, including brokering deals with MS and other interested donors. This demands levels of skill and quality time that are not always readily available inside EUDs considering the competing priorities and demands than often overburden staff ⁴¹. A number of actions appear particularly relevant in this regard:

- Both headquarters (at the level of EEAS but also DEVCO) as well as senior management in EUDs should **continue to provide the Roadmap process with adequate political weight**, ensuring that the Roadmap is not seen as a purely developmental tool but rather as a process. This should engage the whole EUD as well as MS, in line with the underlying philosophy of the 2012 Communication to empower CSOs to be effective “governance actors” with the capacity to participate in policy processes, support the delivery of development goods and services, demand accountability or help in constructing the state (particularly in fragile states)
- **Stronger incentives for MS engagement** are also needed for the implementation of the Roadmap as well as a real division of labour at country level. As the report evidences, coordination between EUDs and MS has been enhanced during the elaboration of the roadmaps, even if unevenly across countries and regions. However, MS involvement in the implementation and follow-up is, generally although with some exceptions, unclear or not sufficiently developed. A public diplomacy exercise may also be needed at headquarters (CODEV) level as well as in EU capitals
- Building on the two Roadmap facilities 2014 and 2015, **demand-driven tailored support** (in the form of a new RM facility) **should be made available to EUDs**, especially when **faced with dwindling human resources**. Yet, there are **limits to externalisation and the Roadmap process should not be led by technical assistance** but rather by EUDs and MS. It is therefore paramount that the new facility (running between 2015 and 2017) preserves its flexibility⁴². The process should also continue to work as a support facility promoting the ownership of EUDs throughout the process; the new facility should not be a classical TA facility in the sense of “doing on behalf of”, but rather a support facility aimed at assisting EUDs who remain in the driving seat throughout the Roadmap process. Ideally, locally recruited support to EUDs should also be guided by these principles

⁴¹ Idem

⁴² Reportedly, one of the key strengths of the 2014 and 2015 facilities has been their flexibility and reactivity to the rolling EUD requests for support.

- In addition, a **two-fold results-oriented approach will also be required in the future support mechanism** (i.e. the new RM facility), combining the aforementioned demand-driven strategic support provided to EUDs with continuous capitalisation and learning. The latter should focus on the implementation and follow-up processes across countries, in order to highlight lessons learnt, identify risks and obstacles and the means to overcoming them. This is particularly relevant in view of the new Roadmap cycle that will start from 2018 onwards.
- **Global and regional seminars** should continue to be regularly organized, in an effort to allow EUDs to present their results, voice their concerns and questions, exchange with their peers and with headquarters and obtain information and further guidance from headquarters. The last global seminar which took place in June 2015 proves how much information can be obtained from this kind of exercise, and how rich exchanges can be across EUDs as well as between EUDs and headquarters. The presence of other units (beyond DEVCO B2), of EEAS representatives and of a number of MS is also to be further encouraged.
- While global seminars should focus on taking stock of the general trends emerging from the RM process and on sharing worldwide experiences, **regional seminars could be tailored to the realities of the different regions**, therefore focusing on the topics that are more relevant to the EUDs in light of the regional geo-political and institutional contexts. In this regard, and based on a preliminary assessment of the regional trends emerging from the capitalisation exercise⁴³:

- In **Asia and Pacific countries, the promotion of an EE appears** particularly relevant, considering the worrying trends in the legal and institutional environment for CSOs in a number of countries (e.g. shrinking space for civil society and increased criminalisation of dissent remain). This is the case of countries such as India, Bangladesh or Thailand, amongst others.

The fact that several of the countries in the region are “graduated” (and therefore bilateral cooperation is phasing out) coupled with the often “limited political leverage” of the EU (in countries such as India, China, Indonesia or Thailand) calls **the EU to rethink its traditional approaches and develop new strategies with regard to political dialogue to promote fundamental reforms**. The question of economic and social cohesion is also a very timely and relevant one, considering the disparities that exist in several of these countries. Further, more strategic and even innovative uses of the thematic programmes (e.g. CSO & LA, EIDHR, etc.) also require further discussion and exchange.

Pacific countries may also need **tailored approach for the implementation and follow up of the RM**, which take on board their unique “insular” nature.

- In line with the Cotonou agreement dispositions, most of the **African countries** (and beyond them, ACP countries) have EDF funded programmes to support CSOs. In several of these countries at least two generations of these programmes (under the 9th and 10th EDF) have been already implemented and a new programmes (funded under the 11th EDF) may be currently in the process of being identified and formulated. The links between the RMs and these new EDF programmes (which will become for many of these countries the main implementing tool of the RM)

⁴³ It is important to underline that these are preliminary trends, which should be further researched and deepened as the capitalisation exercise has not been conducted based on a regional/geographical perspective but rather based on the clusters identified using the political economy considerations evoked in the introduction of the report.

need to be further discussed and strengthened to ensure the alignment of the two. **More capitalisation efforts are also required** (in line with the capitalisation report that was undertaken back in 2009 about the 9th EDF funded programmes) around the second and even third generation of EFD CS support programmes and their evolution in the new policy framework since the 2012 EC Communication.

The promotion of an EE (and the approaches and tools to do so) is another important area to be discussed with African EUDs as well as the question of policy and political dialogue to promote fundamental reforms. In this regard, sharing of practices on how to effectively and concretely integrate a human right-based approach to development in the different sectors and areas of work (to ensure that human rights dialogue is linked to other instruments and programmes) appears particularly relevant.

The role of CSOs in the provision of basic services, and cooperation with local authorities, is another area that could be further addressed, considering the important role played by CSOs in several of the African countries, where both the state at national level and local authorities have limited outreach and/or capacities.

Last but not least, **mainstreaming CSOs into the focal areas of EU cooperation** (discussing concrete approaches and tools to be used by Task Managers) is another important topic, particularly in more or less stable countries (i.e. not in situation of fragility) where CSOs are being progressively brought on board in the domestic public policy debates.

- Several of the **Latin American and Caribbean countries** are also “graduated”, and the EU is often confronted with limited leverage (in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, etc.). It is therefore important, as underlined for the Asian countries, **to rethink traditional approaches and develop new strategies, particularly with regard to political dialogue to promote fundamental reforms**, on the one hand, and with regard to strategies and programmes addressing social and economic inequality⁴⁴, on the other hand. More strategic and even innovative uses of the thematic programmes also require further discussion and exchange.

The **links between the RM and the geographical priorities and programmes**, on the one hand, and the links between the **national and regional agendas**, on the other hand, also need to be addressed. The latter is particularly relevant considering the importance of regional integration processes.

Last but not least, **cooperation with local and regional authorities** -in the form of territorial approaches to development, systems to promote social accountability at the local level and local governance, etc.- also require further research and capitalisation, in an effort to identify good practices, which can serve as a model for other countries in the region, but also in other parts of the world, where cooperation between LAs and CSOs is at an early stage of development.

⁴⁴ According to the World Bank analyses, around 80 million people in the region still live in extreme poverty – of whom half are in Brazil and Mexico – with a further 40% of Latin Americans at risk of falling back into poverty in the event of economic shocks or due to the effects of climate change on the region. And the picture gets yet more complex when looked at a subnational level (states and provinces), where standards of living differ significantly. Even if several of the countries in the region are focusing on reducing this gap, a second-generation reforms appears necessary.

- In the **neighbourhood region**, the promotion of an EE appears particularly relevant both in the Southern and Eastern regions. Also, the development of new approaches and sharing of experiences on how to work with new and more fluid forms of citizen action is another topic of interest, together with that of promoting policy dialogue. The links between the RM process and the NEAR agenda also need to be further deepened and better coordination is required between the RM processes and regional initiatives to promote and strengthen CS in the region (e.g. The Southern Mediterranean CS Forum⁴⁵). Exchanges with the Balkans, where successful strategies and programmes to support the capacity development of CSOs and promote tripartite policy dialogue have been launched, could also be promoted.
- In addition to the specific seminars to be organised (which offer a unique opportunity for EUDs to meet, exchange, discuss and learn), **more permanent regional spaces for dialogue** and exchange **of practical experiences** could also be made available for EUDs (e.g. using capacity4dev, with the support of headquarters and the new facility, etc.). **Regional task forces** could, for example, be set up to exchange best practice and innovative tools.
- **Regular field missions from DEVCO B.2** (if possible in partnership with the support missions conducted by the new facility) should be undertaken. In addition to request-driven missions, they could also be planned in a selection of countries representing the different clusters that the capitalization report is proposing, where the roadmap process raises a particular interest or concern. That is countries where mainstreaming is well advanced, or the RM process is conducted in parallel with or embedded into a joint programming process, graduated countries or where the process is confronted with challenges, etc.
- There is an increasing **proliferation of analytical and reporting tools** and/or thematic agendas at country level, often with overlapping goals, coupled with often-decreasing human resources. It is therefore recommended to explore, when conceiving and planning the new RM cycle (starting in 2018), the possibility **of integrating different strategies into fewer documents, or even into a single document**. Having a Roadmap that builds on or is integrated with the HRCS would minimise duplication while increasing the political profile of the Roadmap. A real harmonisation of different strategies and agendas requires a long-term approach and cannot be done in a reactive, *ad hoc* manner at yearly intervals. Harmonising all these tasks would have the additional benefit of more coherent M&E and reporting⁴⁶.

A special mention needs to be made of graduated countries where cooperation staff numbers have been severely reduced. As discussed during the 2015 June seminar, graduated countries will require a tailored and possibly reinforced support mechanism to prevent the roadmap exercise from being diluted.

Communication is another area where more efforts are required, considering the pivotal role it plays to effectively engage as well as to inform stakeholders on priorities and to share knowledge with civil society. In order to maintain the momentum of the development of the Roadmap it is fundamental to **provide feedback to the participants of the consultations** as well as to the wider CS community. Proper communication is also a first step to ensuring the continuous involvement of CSOs in the implementation of the Roadmap with a view to promoting joint ownership of the Roadmap. Therefore, for a number of countries, more effort should go into a more active strategy of communication between EUDs and MS on the one

⁴⁵ http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/280515_2nd_civil_society_forum_eu-southern_neighbourhood_en.htm

⁴⁶ *idem*

hand and CSOs and other stakeholders on the other. Examples of active communication or a communication strategy include:

- Regular communication updates on the state of play of implementation of the Roadmap, preferably through EUDs' social media accounts as well as through EUD and MS websites
- Promotion of the Roadmap through other EUD events and seizing the opportunity to explain the importance of the Roadmap to a wide public wherever possible
- Active involvement in the promotion of the Roadmap process of the EUD Press & Information department.

Simple communication strategies would help to emphasise the role of communication during the implementation phase of the Roadmaps. These strategies could also include the development of some key messages and identification of the appropriate communication tools in order to reach out to the different Roadmap target groups.

Annexes

See Tome II for the Annexes. They include the following:

Annex 1. Clusters of countries

Annex 2. Reports by clusters

Annex 3. List of tentative questions to guide a mapping study

Annex 4. Extended list of indicators