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**Support to implementing partners
of SORUDEV, ZEAT-BEAD and
FSTP**

Final Report

**Thematic Performance Evaluation:
February 2016**

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on behalf of

**Cardno Emerging Markets (UK) Ltd
Lead Member of Cardno Consortium**



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Support to implementing partners of SORUDEV, ZEAT-BEAD and FSTP

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AFIS	Agriculture and Food Information System
AMTIP	Agricultural Marketing and Transformation Investment Programme
CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
CAMP	Comprehensive Agricultural Master Plan
CWW	Concern Worldwide
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUR	Euro
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
FFS	Farmer Field School
FSTP	Food Security Thematic Programme
GBG	Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal
GIS	Geographical Information System
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HARD	Hope Agency for Rural Development
IPs	Implementing Partners
IPM	Integrated Pest Management
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NALEP	National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Policy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PM	Project Manager
QRM	Quarterly Review Meeting
SMAFCRD	State Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development
SMARF	State Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries
SORUDEV	South Sudan Rural Development Programme
SSP	South Sudanese pound
TA	Technical Assistance
ToT	Training of Trainers
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UFSLMP	Urban Food Security, Livelihoods and Markets Project
VSF Germany	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Germany
VSLA	Village Savings and Loans Association
ZEAT-BEAD	Zonal Effort for Agricultural Transformation – Bahr-el-Ghazal Agricultural Development

1. Executive Summary

1.1 The Mission

South Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Even with a good harvest and peace and security, at least 1 in 3 people is affected by hunger. One of the most affected regions comprises the 4 (former) States of the Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal (GBG) region close to the Republic of Sudan, which is the target area of this evaluation. The border States also contain the highest number of recent returnees, who are generally more vulnerable to food insecurity. The European Union (EU) identified improved food security as a priority for its work in South Sudan, since this is fundamental to helping the country build community-level resilience and move away from a dependence on humanitarian aid through local economic development.

The objective of this evaluation is to make an overall independent assessment of the performance of the South Sudan Rural Development (SORUDEV) and Zonal Effort for Agricultural Transformation – Bahr-el-Ghazal Agricultural Development (ZEAT-BEAD) programmes under 3 thematic headings, namely: Agricultural Extension; Rural Finance (primarily in the form of Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs)); and Value Chain Development. Based on this assessment, the mission identifies key lessons learnt and proposes practical recommendations for follow-up actions, which could feed into the remaining period of these interventions (or the design process for a successor programme).

The study applies the 5 evaluation criteria of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Given the timing of this evaluation in ZEAT-BEAD's life span, much reliance has been placed on the progress of inception activities.

1.2 Evaluation Results

1.2.1 Relevance

SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD cover a very large geographical area whose population is predominantly poor and in need of assistance. Their combined objective of promoting sustainable livelihoods by supporting agricultural development and income generation opportunities is highly relevant to smallholder agriculture and food security and thus appears justified. The projects provide a logical and necessary means of improving the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, strengthening the productive capacity of smallholder farmers emerging from war, supporting national policies such as the National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Policy (NALEP) and the Comprehensive Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP)) and through this, contributing to rural development and improved livelihoods in the GBG region.

SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD's activities target several result areas across the various components, which may be summarised as : i) Increased agricultural production and productivity; ii) Construction of access road infrastructure to support farming communities; iii) Promotion of input and output markets and processing capacity; iv) Increased availability of agricultural finance to producers, traders and processors; and v) Enhanced Government capacity at national, State and County level through more effective information gathering and dissemination and the strengthening of agricultural extension service delivery.

The three field-level workshops conducted by the mission confirmed that the activities included in the two programmes are relevant to the needs of farmers. Some additional needs were identified which might be useful for future consideration.

Little, if any, gender analysis is visible in SORUDEV's or ZEAT-BEAD's documentation. The issue is primarily addressed through the disaggregation of participants according to gender. Vulnerable groups, particularly individuals subject to food insecurity, were not targeted by these interventions as smallholder farmers were required to have more than 2 feddans (approximately one hectare) of land under cultivation, which in a normal year is understood to provide sufficient production surpluses for commercial trade and/or value addition through processing and sale. Neither does environmental protection feature in the design or implementation of SORUDEV or ZEAT-BEAD.

1.2.2 Effectiveness

Each project has collected its own baseline data, with the major shortcoming being the near absence of agricultural production data per hectare (or feddan) or the total area under cultivation. This will make the future evaluation of some outcomes very challenging. Oxfam, as quoted below, states that staple crop production averages less than one tonne per hectare.

Local government officials interviewed by the mission were aware of the positive role that SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD could play, but expressed concerns regarding the sustainability of interventions. In line with the EU's Wau Resolution they expressed the view that community members must be assisted to achieve self-sustaining livelihoods rather than looking for free hand-outs. This strict application of an M4P approach¹ to agricultural development might however be questioned in light of recent predictions by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) of critical food shortages over coming months, which could undermine the work of any programme that targets enterprise development as potential entrepreneurs will have no surpluses to invest.

At community level, the respondents confirmed that VSLAs had been effective. Individuals had previously had access to self-formed savings groups, but this was the first time that they had been supported to on-lend their savings to group members. Those taking loans were mostly borrowing very small amounts for short periods to cover needs such as school fees and medical expenses, rather than for productive purposes. With monthly interest rates on VSLA loans of 10% and above, any income-generating activity needs a rapid turnover to make it a viable investment; effectively, this excludes all agricultural activities.

It is difficult for an outsider to discern the difference between the target groups under SORUDEV and those under the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP), although the latter should be cultivating less than 2 feddan. There was a wide variation in the amount of money saved monthly among the VSLAs formed under SORUDEV and the lending patterns within these groups did not indicate any increased willingness to make productive investment. Inevitably, marginally poor families with limited assets are vulnerable to sudden changes of fortune, such as the death or ill health of a family member, which will cause them to fall into a subsistence level of livelihood. Conversely, the ultra-poor can experience positive changes. Some analysis of the underlying characteristics of these target groups would be useful to better understand from which assistance they might best benefit in the future.

1.2.3 Efficiency

The nature of recent political, military and inter-communal instability in South Sudan has created fragmentation in the delivery of development projects. Many delays have occurred and most projects are behind schedule. Some may no longer be optimal in their design given the ever-changing economic and political realities in the country.

¹ M4P (the Making Markets Work for the Poor Approach) refers to an aid delivery methodology in which poor entrepreneurs (including farmers) are supported through interventions such as skills development and market linkages, but without subsidies or other inputs (which can distort the prevailing market forces and thereby reduce entrepreneurs' longer-term sustainability).

The fragmented nature of the SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD interventions, which are under at least 11 contracts with an additional contract for monitoring and coordination (which of itself has also been fragmented), does not allow for a streamlined or closely coordinated programme of support for the thematic areas under review.

A similar range of interventions under a single Programme Coordinating Unit (PCU) would be more efficient and allow for more cost-effective sharing of baseline data, management/monitoring resources and other assets. With many projects undergoing simultaneous implementation, a dedicated monitoring activity with emphasis on the learning of lessons by comparing differing methodologies would be very useful. It could enable innovations within the programmes to be tested with some rigour (such as the Lead Farmer versus the Farmer Field School (FFS) approach to extension training and the quality of imported ploughs versus those made locally). At present, successes and failures can only be judged in anecdotal terms.

ZEAT-BEAD has been the subject of a very recent Results-Orientated Monitoring (ROM) review to which reference can be made for more reflection on its projects' various logical frameworks and inception activities.

1.2.4 Impact

The underlying behavioural changes required to bring about developmental outcomes cannot be fast-forwarded, particularly in a country with very low levels of education and high levels of insecurity. Changing agricultural practices is a long-term and painstaking undertaking, which can be exacerbated by cultural traditions regarding livestock management and cropping technology. SORUDEV has made a start by introducing new concepts, but at this stage continuous reinforcement is required.

Undoubtedly, some short-term impacts will be produced by the smallholder projects under SORUDEV, such as the establishment of VSLAs and the benefits of extension training. The extent to which these short-term impacts can be translated into permanent changes will depend extensively on the consistency with which donors are able to support market-orientated policies, and this may be compromised if the predicted crises in food supplies materialise.

Even in more stable circumstances, a major constraint on SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD is the lack of time to implement a comprehensive rural development intervention, starting from very low baselines. It is expected that the SORUDEV smallholder projects will receive no-cost extensions to compensate for delays during their start-up phase, but these may last just 6 months, possibly excluding an additional agricultural season and are unlikely to alter final outcomes. Programmes of this nature need to run for at least 5 years, so that behavioural changes become engrained and surrounding communities are given the opportunity to learn from and eventually replicate positive outcomes.

1.2.5 Sustainability

Development projects aimed at providing sustainable livelihoods must struggle to strengthen the productive capacity of smallholder farmers in a country heavily dependent on imports, with a rapidly devaluing currency and hyperinflation. Consumers, farmers and traders cannot sustain demand or supply as the value of their cash is constantly depreciating. They must thus produce a significant surplus of staple crops, animal products and/or vegetables and successfully market them at increasing prices in sync with inflation in order to keep pace.

This requires constant market information updates, adequate post-harvest storage and processing and for vegetables, meat and fish, etc., access to direct marketing facilities. ZEAT-BEAD is planning to make a start on tackling these issues and detailed inception planning has

been completed by GIZ and the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), both of which are planning to develop Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) between the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and private entrepreneurs. This could ensure that the benefits of donor-funded investments are shared across society, rather than creating sub-optimal outcomes in which the GoSS directly (and inefficiently) co-opts a private sector activity, or an individual entrepreneur receives a subsidised asset. Much will depend on the effectiveness of these PPP agreements. The reluctance of the GoSS to lease out productive assets and its failure to ensure adequate quality controls was highlighted to the mission in discussion with the State Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries (SMARF) over the future of the Kuajok slaughterhouse, which was constructed some years ago by GIZ under a previous PPP agreement.

The SORUDEV project for the development of an Agriculture and Food Information System (AFIS) was conceived as a means of providing market information updates, but to date has focused on collating data relating to the post-2013 emergency. With the benefit of a one-year extension, AFIS may have the opportunity to refocus on agricultural markets, but a strategy for broadcasting information to farmers in remote rural locations is still lacking. Clearly, this database needs a permanent home within the GoSS and a secure funding base. This needs to be resolved prior to the end of AFIS' one-year no-cost extension.

Some advances in household/group storage design are being promoted by non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) under SORUDEV. It is not possible for this mission to determine the extent to which capacity exists at village level to handle a good harvest; however such storage facilities do not require external finance so if needed, families or groups can build more. In addition GIZ will build one warehouse, probably to be leased by an agricultural trader (under a PPP) so farmers can sell their surpluses to the trader. The trader will benefit from increasing post-harvest prices and will bear the financing costs of crop purchases, as well as the risk of damage. UNIDO will provide assistance with processing and market linkages for sorghum, groundnut, meat and fish, also with the use of PPPs where necessary.

The technologies introduced are appropriate to local needs. One issue that might be usefully researched is the promotion of animal traction, as quite a diversity of opinion is found among interviewees and between regions. Blacksmith training is emphasised under SORUDEV (FAO plans to train 100 more) and this is a useful value chain, but it was also reported that ploughs are fabricated using scrap metal as the imported metal bars are too expensive. The price, quality and durability of locally made ploughs could be assessed against the factory-made equivalents that are imported from Sudan (donkey ploughs) or Uganda (ox ploughs). In places it was claimed that the imported ploughs are better-quality as the correct metal is used and they have standardised dimensions such that replacement parts can be fitted with ease.

Animal welfare and the life expectancy of trained oxen/donkeys should also be included within the training curriculum. The workload placed on these animals during the short cultivation season is likely to be considerable; indeed, at one workshop it was reported that all the trained donkeys (supplied in Warrap State) had died.

The fragility of the environment in GBG and its very high susceptibility to the negative impacts of climate change must be high on the agenda of any future programme, as the impact on rural livelihoods could be very significant. Rapid population growth will exacerbate environmental concerns, along with the inevitable growth of charcoal-making ventures for sale to urban centres. If prosperity increases, wood-burning brick ovens will also become much more widespread.

Interventions specifically targeting the role of women in promoting household livelihoods should receive specific emphasis. The role of poultry and vegetable production and marketing in this regard was mentioned in several forums. Another issue frequently raised with regard to VSLAs is the very low level of literacy among rural women, most of whom are entirely illiterate.

This makes the operation of VSLAs much more challenging, with some all-female groups having to rely on a man to maintain their books of account. This puts all-female groups at risk of collapse if their books are not maintained properly. Indeed the overall level of bookkeeping within the VSLAs visited by this mission was quite poor, even though the actual requirements are very simple. This issue needs more attention from NGO management; one uniform, simple record-keeping format should be introduced to all groups and field workers should ensure that it is followed.

1.2.6 Recommendations

Second to feeder roads under UNOPS, the EU's major investment under ZEAT-BEAD is devoted to the FAO's Sustainable Agricultural Development through Strengthening Extension, Input Supply and Services project. Significant questions remain concerning the viability of this investment in terms of the nature of the proposed activities, the level of analysis that has been employed in the design, the proposed staffing structure and the scheduled delivery timetable. Exactly what value addition is FAO currently offering and does this represent good value for money? The actual needs of smallholders, as asserted by workshop participants are primarily around the three core themes covered by this evaluation:

- 1) Effective delivery of relevant extension messages;
- 2) Strengthened systems with regard to the administration of VSLAs, and;
- 3) Support to increase their access to all forms of agricultural inputs.

It is the intention of FAO to recruit NGOs to provide all support activities at the field-level, with FAO thereby adding their own additional tier of costly administration with little obvious value addition. Many of the activities proposed by FAO are not analysed or risk-assessed in any meaningful way. For example, in place of free distribution of inputs FAO intends to provide qualifying farmers with "coupons" that can be exchanged for farm inputs from "selected" agro-dealers. The cost of these coupons is to be effectively converted into an interest-free and uncollateralised loan, which the farmer is expected to re-pay post-harvest into some kind of community-managed revolving fund.

A huge number of questions arise from this strategy, the most fundamental issue being the basis upon which it can be assumed that the farmers will make these repayments, and if made, who at community level will have the expertise and credibility to manage the revolving fund. The history of microfinance schemes across the globe teaches us that none of these results, such as; the actual provision of agro-inputs (rather than cash or other items) in exchange for the coupons; actual repayment by the farmers; the revolving of the fund to other qualifying lenders; etc. can be guaranteed. A great deal of detailed groundwork and training at all levels will be required. Nothing can be achieved in the absence of highly motivated management, along with constant monitoring at the community level by field staff. The poor level of record keeping witnessed within a proportion of the VSLAs visited by this mission (although this was a very small sample) also illustrates that observation of even the simplest procedures should never be taken for granted.

With so many projects operating simultaneously (including the FSTP), the opportunity exists to learn a great deal more about the effectiveness of different approaches. FAO has proposed implementation strategies in the absence of detailed analysis of the underlying baseline situation, the complex community context, or lessons learnt to date. It is strongly recommended that strengthening existing approaches, using existing lessons learnt, should be preferred over any moves towards ambitious innovation, particularly within the context of rural finance.

Agricultural Extension

- The 4 SORUDEV NGOs are using various approaches to extension service provision. A recent review (financed by the Overseas Development Institute or ODI) of Farmer Field Schools (FFS), as referred to in Chapter 3, found that FFS will only work effectively if the groups are self-formed, homogenous and highly motivated. Various informants argued passionately to this mission that the Lead Farmer approach was preferable as, for example, Lead Farmers are permanently present within their communities and anyone (whether or not they are a member of the NGO's target group) could approach this farmer for advice (therefore higher rates of replication are likely). However, FAO argues in favour of the FFS approach. It seems likely that the final approach adopted may be less influential on final outcomes than on the level of motivation within the community or group. This level of motivation will be highly influenced by the effectiveness of each NGO's fieldwork. While not suggesting that the in-depth analysis conducted by ODI's researchers should be repeated, it would be useful to assess in more detail how effectively extension messages are being delivered under SORUDEV. This investigation could be informed with reference to some of the specific findings of the ODI report;
- All implementing partners (particularly under SORUDEV) need to cooperate with AFIS in order that they receive more accurate information on the changing socio-economic conditions in their target area and can better predict future issues around, e.g. food insecurity. As the AFIS database expands it will evolve into a resource on a much wider array of indicators, which should be of use to future development programmes.

Rural Finance

- Pilot projects (such as the provision of "agricultural loans" by the Hope Agency for Relief and Development (HARD)) should be undertaken in such a way that the methodology used is clearly recorded and the outcomes are measured and made available;
- NGOs need to pay closer attention to the monitoring of VSLAs in order to i) ensure proper record keeping; and ii) learn more about the effectiveness of these associations in meeting the aims and objectives of SORUDEV;
- Exchange visits could be arranged for some VSLA members to other groups who are performing at a high level, with the hope of promoting a more entrepreneurial attitude within groups that are currently too risk-averse to lend money for income generation;

Value Chain Development

- In addition to the work planned under ZEAT-BEAD, NGOs under SORUDEV have been piloting activities related to value chains for staple foods, including e.g. the promotion of improved designs for village-level storage facilities. These could enable farmers to achieve higher sale prices by retaining surplus grain for longer periods. Marketing groups have been established by some IPs, such as Concern Worldwide (CWW). In order to assess the outcomes and lessons learnt from such activities it is necessary for NGOs to closely monitor the results and their findings should be shared.

2. Introduction

South Sudan is characterised by widespread chronic food insecurity. All productive investments in the development of the rich natural resource base and large agricultural potential of the country have been curtailed by episodes of tribal and civil conflicts in most areas. Agricultural production and marketing are constrained by:

- Insufficient institutional and human capacity;
- Poor access to knowledge, skills and technology;
- Inefficient and degraded transfer systems of agricultural knowledge and skills;
- A lack of inputs, product supply and information; and
- Lack of critical infrastructure and product value enhancement, processing, etc.

The European Union (EU) is one of the major donors to have prioritised support to building the rural livelihood capabilities of the people of South Sudan in the agricultural sector, particularly since the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the creation of an independent South Sudan.

The framework of on-going EU support to agricultural sector development and to the enhancement of food and nutrition security in the country has 3 principal components, which are being implemented in the Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal (GBG) region comprising the (former) States of Western and Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes:

- 1) The South Sudan Rural Development (SORUDEV) Programme;
- 2) The Zonal Effort for Agricultural Transformation – Bahr-el-Ghazal Agricultural Development (ZEAT-BEAD); and
- 3) The Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP), which is not a direct focus of this assignment.

2.1 Description of the Assignment

The purpose of the assignment was to evaluate the performance of SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD implementing partners (IPs) in 3 strategic areas, identify where synergies should be developed and provide recommendations to the relevant stakeholders. The study applies the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

This short-term assignment was expedited over 2 missions of 3 weeks and considered the performance of the implementing partners in 3 thematic areas:

- Community-based extension;
- Rural financing; and
- Value chain development

The thematic evaluation was conducted in collaboration with a two-person advisory and technical assistance (TA) team tasked with coordinating and monitoring the implementation of all 3 programmes (including FSTP).

The following methods were used to conduct this evaluation:

1. A review was done of available information and materials (pertinent literature and background documents) dealing with issues covered under SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD;

2. Workshops involving field-level project staff, Government officials and farmer representatives were conducted in Wau, Kuajok and Rumbek. These focused primarily on the relevance of programme activities, but also discussed both effectiveness and sustainability. One workshop involving senior management staff and Government officials was conducted in Rumbek, which considered potential recommendations for the future implementation of the programmes. Summary outcomes of these workshops are provided in Annexes 2 to 5;
3. During the mission field visits were carried out in the four target (former) States, which during the course of the mission became 11 States. The consultant also attended the 5th Quarterly Review Meeting (QRM) on 26 to 28 January 2016 in Rumbek; and
4. Discussions were held with representatives of other donor institutions involved in the sector, being the UK Department for International Development (DfID), German cooperation (GIZ), the Japanese Agency for International Cooperation (JICA) and the Netherlands. These provided useful background information on how effectively livelihood interventions could be designed and implemented in the region. The discussions aimed to deepen understanding of the issues and constraints to be considered when working in an area that has been impacted by conflict over many years and how the post-conflict recovery strategy was planned.

An analytical and systematic approach has ensured that all issues are duly analysed before any conclusions are drawn. The methodological approach used required the triangulation of information provided by informants at all levels of programme implementation, from direct beneficiaries at village level up to GoSS officials at State and County level. Particular care was taken to obtain the views of project beneficiaries in a participative manner and particular emphasis placed on beneficiaries' perceptions of the relevance of the programmes.

The summary CV of the Evaluation Specialist who undertook this evaluation can be found in Annex 1.

2.2 Description of the Action

The South Sudan Rural Development (SORUDEV) Programme is a EUR 43,773,250 seven-year initiative, aimed at ensuring that the war-affected population of the Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal (GBG) region begins to engage in productive and profitable agricultural activities that ensure food security and increased household income.

SORUDEV Smallholder Projects

IP	Project	State (former)	Start Date	End Date (no-cost extensions expected)	Contract Value
NRC	Increased agricultural production and income for smallholder farmers affect by displacement	Based in Alek, Warrap State	May 2014	January 2017	EUR 2 million
NPA	Strengthening Smallholder Animal Traction Capacity and Extension Services in Lakes St.	Based in Rumbek, Lakes State	February 2014	February 2017	EUR 2 million
HARD	Smallholder Food Security and Livelihoods Project	Based in Wau, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal State	February 2014	February 2017	EUR 2 million
CWW	Implementation of SORUDEV smallholder component in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal State	Based in Nyamlell, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal State	June 2014	February 2017	EUR 2 million

NPA: Norwegian People's Aid NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council

These smallholder interventions focus on the development of sustainable livelihoods, including commercialised value addition. The Agriculture and Food Information System (AFIS) implemented by FAO and the Feeder Road Construction project in support of WFP operations in South Sudan also fall under the SORUDEV umbrella.

The purpose of the WFP contract, which includes a maximum of three roads in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap States, is to enhance the livelihoods of rural populations in areas of high agricultural potential by providing farm-to-market access (and access to education and health services) in support of improved community resilience to food-related shocks. In addition, WFP reports having undertaken some activities related to skills and market development training for farmers and plans to provide some 1,200 households with free distribution of agricultural seeds and tools. This mission understands that these activities have not been coordinated with the SORUDEV smallholder projects. WFP did not attend the 5th QRM at which policies for agricultural extension training, market development and access to farm inputs were discussed. In addition the approach WFP has adopted is at odds with the 2014 Wau Resolution on free distribution.

It is now the clear intention of the Delegation of the European Union (EUD) to South Sudan that all future SORUDEV interventions are implemented in close collaboration with each other as well as with the following initiative, the Zonal Effort for Agricultural Transformation – Bahr-el-Ghazal Agricultural Development (ZEAT-BEAD), which is being implemented under 5 separate contracts. Two of these are under FAO (one related to agricultural extension and value chain addition and the other specialising in pastoralist livelihoods). Two further contracts (under UNIDO and GIZ) are focused on marketing and value chain enhancement. Lastly, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is to construct feeder roads in 3 States, excluding (former) Lakes State. The intended beneficiaries of both SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD are smallholder farmers and pastoralists with the potential to produce a surplus. It is foreseen that the farmer groups formed under SORUDEV will be the primary beneficiaries of the ZEAT-BEAD interventions, along with additional beneficiaries targeted for interventions in value addition and feeder road construction and maintenance, among others.

ZEAT-BEAD was formulated in 2011, and the five projects were contracted to start their inception planning in February/March 2015, with total durations of up to 5 years. Due to delays in 2015, the inception report of the FAO Wau-based project is still to be confirmed at the time of writing. The objective of this combined programme is very much focused on promoting rural livelihoods using a variety of strategies which range from building access roads to providing education and training, supporting agri-business activities to enhance the productive capacity of farmers and strengthening links between smallholder farmers and agricultural service provision in terms of advice, supplies, processing and access to rural finance. These investments are all central to the process of livelihood transformation; however, only the 3 Wau-based projects, as set out below, have a direct bearing on the 3 thematic areas under this evaluation (see Notes 2, 3 and 4).

ZEAT-BEAD Projects

IP	Project	State (former)	Start Date	End Date (no-cost extensions expected)	Contract Value
FAO (Note 1)	Improved basic technical, literacy and numeracy skills among smallholder families and community members in agro-pastoralist settings	Based in Rumbek, Lakes State only	February 2015	January 2018	EUR 5 million
FAO (Note 2)	Sustainable Agricultural Development through Strengthening Extension, Input Supply and Services	Based in Wau, covering 3 states, excluding Lakes	February 2015	January 2020	EUR 12.5 million
GIZ (Note 3)	Agricultural marketing and transformation investment programme	Based in Wau, covering the GBG region	March 2015	January 2018	EUR 4 million
UNIDO (Note 4)	Enhanced local value addition and strengthened value chains	Based in Wau, covering the GBG region	February 2015	January 2017	EUR 2 million
UNOPS (Note 5)	Three Feeder Roads	Based in Juba covering 3 States, excluding Lakes	February 2015	January 2018	

Note 1) FAO Pastoralist: Specific Results

- Output 1: Household and community capacity for disaster risk reduction is enhanced
- Output 2: Livelihoods and sources of income among the target communities are diversified and enhanced
- Output 3: Skills, strategies and education essential to resilient pastoral livelihoods are provided
- Output 4: A replicable model for the enhancement of skills, strategies and education for resilient pastoral livelihoods is jointly developed with relevant institutions
- Output 5: The ability of relevant institutions to effectively coordinate service delivery systems is enhanced

Note 2) FAO: Sustainable Agricultural Development through Strengthening Extension, Input Supply and Services

- Result1: Harmonised curricula for private extension agents and animal health service providers defined, appropriate training expertise identified and a standardised extension system established
- Result 2: Understanding of NALEP by both Government extension staff and private extension agents is enhanced and State-level extension support plans are developed
- Result 3: A private sector, market-driven system for the supply of inputs and equipment, as well as the marketing of produce, is rolled out in the GBG region
- Result 4: A system for the delivery of good quality-services, including extension, which strongly relies on the private sector is rolled out in the GBG region

Note 3) Expected results from the GIZ action

- 1 slaughterhouse (Wau) constructed and operational
- 2 slaughterhouses (Aweil and Kuajok) rehabilitated and operational
- 1 slaughterhouse (Rumbek) upgraded and operational
- State ministries, County and town administrations accept and manage the outsourcing of public- owned facilities to private operators
- Private operators and their staff are trained and enabled to run the facilities according to the required technical and economic standards

Note 4) Expected results from the UNIDO action

- Output 1: Rapid assessment to identify potential commodities and upgrading strategies for at least five value chains finalised
- Output 2: Currently finalising five upgraded value chains and formulating upgraded strategies for implementation
- Output 3: Training at least 800 actors performing in the value chains and practising the technological and business tools for value addition enhancement

- Output 4: Four self-sustainable fully equipped agro-processing pilot centres to be established in selected locations, with farmer organisations benefiting directly from project assistance

Note 5) Location of proposed UNOPS feeder roads

- Kangi in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal
- Gok Machar in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal
- Ayein in Warrap

These roads were identified by UNOPS in May 2015 following detailed discussions with Government officials and consultations with SORUDEV projects. Although it was not possible to engage with the new value chain development interventions under GIZ and UNIDO. The IPs of the SORUDEV Smallholder projects have been selected by UNOPS to undertake community sensitisation work along the routes of these roads and may also be responsible for training community labour groups to undertake future maintenance work. In November 2015 a workshop was held in Wau in order to brief NGOs on this work.

3. Findings

3.1 Document Review

3.1.1 The Agriculture and Food Information System (AFIS)

The EU/SORUDEV-funded AFIS project was evaluated in November 2015. The report² finds that a lack of information on which to base decision-making in South Sudan is a problem which severely undermines the ability of both the GoSS and donors to make appropriate decisions regarding the delivery of services, particularly in the case of food security. At the inception stage of AFIS, the plan was to achieve a comprehensive transformation of the National and State information systems. However this outcome, which was foreseen in the logical framework, has changed focus since the beginning of the project due to the rapidly changing and challenging context involving intensified conflict at local level, which also affects road access and project implementation. As a result, the primary demand for information shifted from a development agenda toward a more humanitarian focus. In addition, a substantial component of the AFIS project has necessarily been focused on capacity development.

Given AFIS' initial focus, there was an expectation that the project would work closely with other SORUDEV components in both the collection of data and the dissemination of information. Given its subsequent refocus this ambition has not materialised. It was reported that the four NGOs implementing the livelihood components were all invited to send field staff for training in data collection techniques, but only the Hope Agency for Relief and Development (HARD) availed itself of this opportunity.

The above-referenced evaluation report states that the work being conducted by AFIS is essential to improving food security and nutrition information systems in South Sudan and to strengthening decision-making processes. The possibility of a no-cost extension based on expected budget availability at project end is highly recommended by the evaluation, as well as the evolution of the project into a next phase.

3.1.2 Farmer Field Schools (FFS)

The FAO project under ZEAT-BEAD is emphasising the Farmer Field School (FFS) model and plans to work with 400 FFS under its upcoming implementation. In addition, some of the SORUDEV projects also use this terminology to describe their extension activities. A 2014 report on Farmer Field Schools³ provides very comprehensive research into the

² Final evaluation of Agriculture and Food Information Systems for Decision Support in South Sudan (AFIS), Food and Agricultural Organisation, November 2015

³ Waddington, H and White, H, 2014. *Farmer field schools: from agricultural extension to adult education*, 3ie Systematic Review Summary 1. London: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie).

development of this extension technique since the late 1980s. It describes how support to agriculture has moved from top-down agricultural extension toward more participatory approaches that are better suited to smallholders. As a development approach, it states that:

“FFS has been used – and abused – in many ways. Some people see FFS as a type of agricultural extension, some see it solely as an adult education approach, and others see it as an attractive way to dress up transfer of technology. In reality, FFS has a very particular philosophy and methodology that is based on (among other things) discovery-based experiential learning and group approaches. It is a rather special approach that uses elements of pedagogy and social capital to influence agricultural practices, and includes growing emphasis on empowerment.”

It is clear from this quotation that the essence of a Farmer Field School is the group itself and its members' sense of their group's autonomy and self-realisation. Therefore, more mundane issues around the specific farming technology that is being transferred through members' contact with project-based extension workers should be less critical outcomes. Having met with a small sample of such groups during the course of this mission, it has to be stated that the impression gained was of groups formed by NGOs for the purpose of conveying extension messages and providing other group-based deliverables. It cannot be said that many groups encountered conveyed a sense of group empowerment. All the groups met were also operating VSLAs and in reference to this some were quite vocal, making it easy to gain the impression that this was the activity with which they were strongly engaged. However the timing of the mission, i.e. during the dry season when only vegetable cultivation was being practised, could have influenced these impressions.

The typical FFS approach aims to provide skills in crop cultivation and resource management using sustainable agricultural production methods such as integrated pest management (IPM). The farmer groups interviewed for this evaluation made little mention of IPM, but rather referenced their learning about correct seed spacing and weeding practices, etc.

Among its many findings the above report states that facilitator selection and training are crucial components in determining the quality of FFS training, and this seems likely to be a common element in any type of farming group extension methodology. Training of facilitators should focus on participatory techniques and facilitation skills and should emphasise the need to use language and concepts familiar to farmers. Facilitators should also have access to on-going support and backstopping from experts. All of the field staff working on SORUDEV projects had clearly received training in agricultural extension, although it is less clear whether they had the depth of knowledge and skills required for effective group mobilisation or the necessary backstopping from experts. These are issues that must be monitored in the future. There are on-going efforts by the Cardno Monitoring Team to ensure that extension workers have adequate training of trainer (ToT) extension material available to them when they are out in the field.

The report also finds that targeting better-off farmers is more conducive to creating agricultural impact, since they are better able to adopt the practices. Indeed this is in line with the approaches of both SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD. To date none of the NGOs has undertaken any platform-building activities, such as organising farmers' clubs or building local networks to encourage continued local collective action, and it is opinion of this mission that the time is not right for such moves. Mention was made to the mission of marketing groups having been formed, but these involved Lead Farmers rather than entire FFS. To encourage wider replication of improved techniques, given the very finite resources available for extension training, the eventual training of Lead Farmers within an FFS context seems inevitable. For these “Leaders” to be effective in replicating messages beyond their immediate group some form of incentive payment is required (as currently practised by

CWW), as it is very unlikely to happen organically at the community level.

3.1.3 Markets in South Sudan

A recent report commissioned by the ODI⁴ and undertaken by Oxfam provides good insight into the workings of markets in Juba and beyond. The authors remind us that:

“The potential for agricultural production in South Sudan is huge. Half of the country’s 82 million square hectares of agricultural land is suitable for agricultural production, yet only 4.5% is routinely under cultivation. Yields are low, with the average across all cereals generally below one ton per hectare (Oxfam, 2014).... With the exceptions of Central and Western Equatoria, markets are the main source of staple foods (apart from around harvest time in October), with up to 70% of households relying entirely on markets for their sorghum consumption during the lean season. Other key food items, such as meat, fish, sugar, fats and oils, are also mainly sourced in markets (WFP, 2014).”

Domestic production makes up 10-15% of the total supply in Juba’s markets. Much of this local produce comes from Greater Equatoria. Trader’s reported that they rent cars in order to buy from local producers. Producers themselves generally do not have the means, knowledge or connections to travel to Juba to sell their produce, instead transporting their products to the nearest market by bicycle or donkey cart (rarely seen in rural GBG). Retailers tend to sell to smaller shops and individual customers in Juba. Large amounts of goods (sorghum, maize, maize flour) are sold to traders from States upcountry, including in GBG. The South Sudanese market is dominated by foreign traders, with only about 15% being of South Sudanese origin (the majority are Darfuri, Somali, Eritrean, Ethiopian or Ugandan). Food prices in South Sudan have been highly volatile since independence in 2011. There are enormous price differences between different markets due to weak market integration across the country, mainly owing to insecurity, poor roads, high prices of fuel, illegal checkpoints, taxes and unfavourable exchange rates.

The above analysis clearly confirms the need for projects to increase the productivity of smallholders in the GBG region. However, it is less persuasive regarding the need for marketing support to local processors and traders of staple crops, since the region faces a food deficit almost every season, as asserted by AFIS. This indicates that any local surpluses are already traded, which was witnessed by the consultant during visits to local markets.

Little mention is made in the report of trade in animal products, which is the case in most publications, and analysis by GIZ points to slaughtering of animals exclusively for local consumption. The potential to expand the export of animal products undoubtedly exists (as a large number are grazed and informants from the State Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries (SMARF) refer to overstocking beyond the carrying capacity of the land, which is currently exacerbated by insecurity which prevents herders from moving their animals freely to fresh pasture. For meat exports to become a significant reality, cultural changes are required and Government veterinary services will require a great deal of support, of the type proposed by GIZ, to increase their ability to monitor animals for infectious diseases.

3.2 Findings from Field Work and Field-Level Workshops

3.2.1 Extension

Animal traction plays a key role in opening up larger areas to cultivation. However, the availability of labour for weeding is a significant constraint to productivity. Ideally, animal-drawn implements for planting and weeding need to be made available in addition to

⁴ Markets in crises: South Sudan case study, Irina Mosel and Emily Henderson, October 2015

ploughs, but it was reported that less than 10% of locally made ox-ploughs have been sold to date in Lakes State. Locally made ox-ploughs are often believed to be of better quality than imported ploughs, and apparently sell at half the price. Other reports suggest that farmers already own or have access to ox-ploughs due to previous efforts to diffuse this technology, and yet there are frequent requests for more ploughs. In fact, many statements about the status of ploughs appear contradictory, particularly those concerning the quality of locally made versus imported ploughs and tools. In Rumbek, it was widely reported that ploughs could not be made as traders were not importing the metal bars required for their fabrication, but elsewhere it was stated that the blacksmiths use recycled metal, but not necessarily of suitable strength or quality to be used for ploughing. In the absence of proper standards/quality control it is difficult to assess i) how satisfactory are locally made implements, as opposed to the imported alternatives; and ii) how easy it is to obtain a replacement plough shear that fits the plough in the absence of standard dimensions and fittings. It would be useful to conduct a small research project in order to establish these facts more clearly. FAO is planning to invest in the training of 100 additional blacksmiths, but it would be very unwise to proceed with this activity before the situation on the ground can be better understood.

Although not an activity targeted under SORUDEV, vegetable production was being undertaken by many communities (usually as a dry-season activity practised close to rivers) and predominantly by women). Under FSTP, ToT for vegetable production has included both Government and field staff. Shortages of labour for preparation, planting, weeding and irrigation continue to be a major constraint and plant pests and diseases (especially of tomato and okra) are a persistent problem. Nevertheless, the number of vegetable plots observed throughout this mission suggests that some local replication may be taking place and this is likely to increase over the coming years as vegetable consumption becomes more commonplace. Support to the marketing of vegetables could be considered and the introduction of innovative solar pumps for irrigation could dramatically increase levels of production as well as extending the growing season. With linkages to food fairs and cooking demonstrations and increased emphasis on improved nutrition, this production could become a major source of indigenous income generation. There is also an emerging need for the training of producers in vegetable pricing strategies.

Under the thematic area of extension, the 3 field-level workshops held in Wau, Kuajok and Rumbek identified what farmers need in order to increase productivity. Many of the suggestions are already being met under the SORUDEV smallholder projects but it is clear that some needs are either not being met or (in the opinion of participants) are being met inadequately. Given the heterogeneous nature of the strategies adopted by the 4 NGOs implementing these projects (partly owing to the distinct circumstances of each of the four target areas), it is not possible to reach any generalised conclusions on these findings. However, there are certain messages that came across consistently. Annexes 2, 3 and 4 provide additional points, but the following needs are understood to be the most relevant:

- More training and support for ploughing so that farmers can increase the area of land under cultivation;
- Additional implements for operations such as sowing and weeding;
- Support for income-generating projects to increase household income security (and provide commercial potential) such as poultry production and vegetable growing (including irrigation systems), which particularly interest women;
- Production of locally adapted seed varieties (multiplication) and the assured availability of seed prior to the start of the planting season;
- More intensive oversight and support from NGO senior staff and better training of frontline extension workers;

- More information on pest control and the correct use of pesticides;
- More information on crop rotation and early planting;
- Post-harvest management training and improved storage facilities; and
- More support to the control of livestock diseases.

3.2.2 Rural Finance and VSLAs

The move from relief to development requires a clear break from past donor support (which was orientated to the free provision of inputs), as well as good coordination between donors. It poses a challenge to both the NGOs and the beneficiaries, as an established mindset of “donor dependency” has to be changed and methodologies adapted accordingly. To ensure that all EU projects adopt a consistent developmental approach in the region, the “Wau Resolution” was agreed between the implementing partners of SORUDEV and FSTP in June 2014. This agreement required that all IPs adapt their implementation strategy and results frameworks to end the free distribution of inputs. In addition, they agreed to establish Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) within their groups so that members could aggregate their savings and make loans to individuals, preferably for the purchase of agricultural inputs. NGOs contracted a local consultant to provide training in VSLA establishment.

Experience with VSLAs, and particularly with those which are entirely financed and controlled by their members, consistently shows that members are reluctant to lend their money to other members to buy agricultural inputs. In addition, it is unlikely that a potential borrower would request such a loan. The reason being that the repayment periods are very short (often just one month) which is insufficient to enable a crop to be grown, harvested and sold, meaning the capital for repayment of the loan will not be available. In addition, the interest rates charged on such loans are very high (at least 10% per month) which is significantly greater than the expected return on agricultural activities over a six-month season. As a result, VSLA loans are often only provided for trading activities where the rapid turnover of stock enables the realisation of capital and the repayment of interest within a period of weeks.

Other uses for such loans are emergency food coverage in the “hunger gap”, medical expenditure and school fees. In these instances the money has to be found and other sources of finance are equally expensive. Such loans are typically very small. Some were invested into bulk food purchases (such as sugar and cooking oil) for petty trade. In other instances, the mission found that accumulated savings had been redistributed to group members immediately prior to Christmas and they reported spending this money on new clothes for their children, etc.

Given the food shortages in certain areas, VSLAs were reportedly increasingly being used to finance the purchase of food. There is a trend of declining savings among VSLA groups in some areas, which is expected to affect the procurement of inputs for the upcoming planting season.

Some small credit funds have been advanced to farmer groups by NGOs and have mostly been used to pay for additional labour for weeding (as the funds arrived too late in the season to purchase other inputs). Of the total amount loaned out in this way only 20% has been repaid as of the end of January. This is to be expected, as the field staff have not been trained to work as credit agents, the groups have not been adequately sensitised to how to use this money and their ability to repay has not been adequately assessed. Microfinance must be introduced very slowly, with very small loans provided only to the most reliable members in the first instance. Successful supervision of a credit programme in which

external funds are loaned out to community groups, in the expectation that they will be repaid into some form of revolving fund, is a job for specialised microfinance experts.

To understand how an individual VSLA is operating it is essential to examine the group's books of account. These are often difficult to access as they are stored for safekeeping in the cash box, which is triple-locked. In cases where the books were accessible it was noted that the quality of record keeping varied considerably; in a few instances it was excellent but in others it was not possible to reconcile anything, as the record had not been maintained properly. This is especially problematic for female-only groups, whose members are dependent on a literate man to fill in the cashbook. Strict monitoring by field officers is essential to prevent this problem building from month to month, and it is essential that a uniform and very simple methodology of bookkeeping be introduced to each VSLA. On the ground, this was very inconsistent despite the fact that simplicity is all that is required. As an addition (alternative) to maintaining one ledger per group, each member should have her/his individual savings and loan passbook. Reconciliation of these passbooks with the total cash available in the savings box is still required along with some means of the NGO effectively monitoring group level savings and loan activity to determine whether the outcomes are inline with their logical frameworks.

It would be interesting to systematically monitor a few key indicators to assess whether there are quantifiable differences between the saving and lending behaviours of the groups under SORUDEV and those under FSTP. Such monitoring would also enable an evaluation of the effectiveness of the VSLAs in meeting the aims and objectives of SORUDEV, e.g. the percentage of savings that are on-loaned and the percentage of loans that are taken for any kind of productive investment (including petty trade). On the basis of this information, groups that are performing poorly can be given additional support.

The issues raised at the field-level workshops which were of greatest relevance to the strengthening of VSLAs were:

- The need or literacy training;
- Training in improved methods of VSLA management and bookkeeping;
- Harmonised guidelines and group by-laws;
- Closer supervision and monitoring of VSLAs;
- More training in income generation;
- Need for additional capital to finance the purchase of inputs; and
- Apex organisations which enable federated groups of VSLAs to work together (rather ambitious at this point in time when communities are facing many political and financial challenges which might result in misallocation of the funds).

3.2.3 Value Chains

There is a need to clearly identify artisans, local seed producers and agro-agents who provide both backward (input) and forward (output) linkage to farmers. The SORUDEV NGOs have already established contact with some local agro-dealerships and it would be very useful to have a consolidated list that includes descriptions of their business activities and the area they are likely to serve. (This data could be easily collated under a more consolidated programme management structure.)

The modes of provision of aid in recent years are reported to have constrained the development of specialised agro-dealers, as businesses have sought to meet the demands of donor-funded programmes for large-scale orders of particular goods, such as specified seeds and tools. It is now time to introduce farmers directly to these dealerships so that the

dealers can better understand the requirements of the farmers and stock the appropriate inventories. Some NGOs have started to do this through the use of asset transfer schemes (cash for work) under which workers are paid partly in vouchers that can only be exchanged with an authorised agro-dealer (who then returns them to the NGO for payment).

Marketing groups will depend on farmers producing a surplus, which is then placed in a group storage facility for eventual sale. Inevitably, this requires a significant degree of trust within the group and proper record keeping is essential. These groups should effectively link farmers to bigger markets. Training in post-harvest handling will become increasingly important and should cover good practices for processing, sorting and grading, crop and grain storage and product pricing. The establishment of viable agro-dealership and produce-marketing groups is proving to be a challenging aspect of the projects and this is likely to continue until the political and military situation becomes more stable.

The issues raised at the field-level workshops which were of greatest relevance to the strengthening of value chains were:

- Improved processing capacity for groundnuts;
- Improved access to agro-suppliers with plentiful supplies of good-quality seed, among other inputs;
- Access to low-cost irrigation equipment for vegetable production;
- Better access to supplies of hand tools and ploughs, including spare parts;
- Mechanical traction and vehicles (to take produce to market) available for rent;
- Improved storage facilities; and
- More access roads.

3.3 Findings from the Management-Level Workshop

Listed below are some of the points raised at the management-level workshop held in Rumbek prior to the 5th Quarterly Review Meeting. See Annex 5 for more details.

3.3.1 Agricultural Extension

Extension guides

- The existing extension guide (collated from FAO material by Cardno TA) should be printed and distributed;
- Extension messages should be harmonised and better guidelines developed (note that this should be done by FAO);
- Extension training aids with pictures and diagrams should be produced to help train illiterate farmers;
- More information on pests and disease control is required;
- Emphasis should be placed on increasing agricultural productivity rather than increasing the area under cultivation, both of which are constrained at present.

Privatised extension agents

- The GoSS has a role to play, particularly regarding policy, monitoring and the certification of qualified agents;

- Agents must have an entrepreneurial mentality in order to be capable of selling their service and other inputs such that they earn a sustainable income;
- They should use harmonised extension guides;
- They should live in the communities that they are serving;
- The prices they charge should be monitored so as not to exploit farmers who do not have access to other retail outlets (note this is highly sensitive and could only be implemented if the GoSS stipulates a maximum mark-up percentage, which in itself would probably have to be at least 100% to cover the agents' time, financing and transportation costs, level of risk, etc.).

Innovations

- Privatised extension agents could provide inputs on credit, for repayment (with interest) post-harvest (note that this requires agents to have sufficient working capital to buy inputs in advance, as well as to be able to take the risk of non-payment for whatever reason, such as harvest failure, death of the creditor or simple default);
- NGOs could do more research into potential contract farming arrangements (it was reported that some deals do exist with companies in Sudan, but due to the official closure of the border these contracts are not openly disclosed);
- Local radio stations could be sponsored to convey extension messages via their programmes (note that this requires special attention to sustainability, with efforts made to obtain "suitable" advertising revenue).

3.3.2 Rural Finance and VSLAs

General

- In order to ensure strong group cohesion, groups must be self-selecting, have a common interest and be of similar socio-economic backgrounds;
- VSLAs need properly constituted by-laws and simple, transparent accounting procedures;
- The capacity of NGOs to monitor and support VSLAs is limited at present.

Savings

- The purpose of savings should be clearly agreed within the group;
- Training in numeracy and literacy is required (Vétérinaires sans Frontières (VSF) Germany reported doing this in Warrap State under FSTP).

Loans

- Clear guidelines on the purposes of borrowing should be provided to groups;
- Groups need further capacity building in order that loans may be advanced for income-generating purposes;
- Inter-group exchange visits to facilitate cross-learning could be promoted;
- A system could be established whereby guarantors and collateral are allowed (to enable non-members to borrow from a group, though this is very ambitious at this stage of development);

- External cash could be injected into VSLAs (as mentioned above, this requires additional institution-building skills on the part of the implementing agencies and is probably not appropriate at this point in time).

Potential for more formalised rural financing

- Linkages with other microfinance institutions could be established, although no suitable candidate institutions have been identified at present;
- There is huge potential for more formalised rural financing through the VSLA unions or linkages with banks (note this would entail specialised intermediation by an appropriate IP);
- There is a need to think outside the box and introduce mobile banking (such as the Mpesa example in Kenya).

3.3.3 Value Chains

The following actions were recommended to strengthen value chains:

- Identify and map existing agro-dealers;
- Provide capacity building to existing dealers (registration, training and quality control);
- Organise community-level field days/input trade fairs (numerous small events with wide geographical coverage);
- Support Government to monitor and regulate the quality of inputs;
- Support value addition for sorghum, including threshing, drying, sorting, storage and flour production (as planned by UNIDO);
- Support value addition for groundnut and sesame, including shelling, drying and oil and paste production (as planned by UNIDO);
- Support value addition for okra, including drying and storage;
- Support value addition for hides/skins, including improved flaying, de-fattening, preservation, processing methods and storage (as planned by UNIDO); and
- Establish an innovative value chain for fermented milk.

4. Evaluation Results

4.1 Relevance

SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD cover a very large geographical area whose population is predominantly poor and in need of assistance. Their combined objective of promoting sustainable livelihoods by supporting agricultural development and income generation opportunities is highly relevant to smallholder agriculture and food security and thus appears justified. The projects provide a logical and necessary means of improving the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, strengthening the capacity of smallholder farmers emerging from war, supporting national policies such as the National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Policy (NALEP) and the Comprehensive Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP)) and through this, contributing to rural development and improved livelihoods in the GBG region.

SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD's activities target several result areas across the various components, which may be summarised as: i) Increased agricultural production and productivity; ii) Construction of access road infrastructure to support farming communities; iii) Promotion of input and output markets and processing capacity; iv) Increased availability of agricultural finance to producers, traders and processors; and v) Enhanced Government capacity at national, State and County level through more effective information gathering and dissemination and the strengthening of extension service delivery.

Little, if any, gender analysis is visible in SORUDEV's or ZEAT-BEAD's documentation. The issue is primarily addressed through the disaggregation of participants according to gender. Vulnerable groups, particularly individuals subject to food insecurity were not targeted by these interventions as small-holder farmers were required to have more than 2 feddans (approximately one hectare) of land under cultivation, which in a normal year is understood to provide sufficient production surplus for commercial trade and/or value addition through processing and sale. Environmental protection does not feature in the design or implementation of SORUDEV or ZEAT-BEAD.

Three workshops conducted by the mission focused primarily on the relevance of the interventions from the point of view of farmers. The findings suggest that the activities being undertaken by both programmes are relevant: the participants were asked to identify all the priority interventions required by farmers to increase their livelihoods, and the resulting comprehensive lists contain all the activities currently being targeted, in addition to a few more.

The workshops also verified the relevance of the value chains selected under ZEAT-BEAD. Some additional suggestions were forthcoming, but UNIDO has conducted a detailed analysis of commodities and drawn conclusions as to where they could most effectively intervene. GIZ are working on grain storage, processing and marketing arrangements, as well as slaughterhouses. It was originally intended that all the work on value chains would be closely coordinated with UNOPS and WFP as these are engaged in the improvement of local access road networks, but regrettably the roads were identified and confirmed with the GoSS before the programme coordination mechanisms could be put in place. GIZ and UNIDO have since slightly modified their plans to better fit with these new access roads.

4.2 Effectiveness

The lack of data on production and hectares under cultivation in the baselines of the SORUDEV projects means that there is little means of establishing whether the intended increases have been achieved; although anecdotal accounts are available. In addition, the impact on programme delivery and the economic and social effects of the 2014 Wau Resolution is not being recorded in any way.

Local government officials interviewed by the mission are aware of the positive role that SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD could play, but expressed concerns regarding the sustainability of interventions. In line with the EU's Wau Resolution they expressed the view that community members must be assisted to achieve self-sustaining livelihoods rather than looking for free hand-outs. This strict application of an M4P approach⁵ to agricultural development might however be questioned in light of recent predictions (by FAO and WFP) of critical food shortages over coming months, which could potentially undermine the work of any programme that targets enterprise development, as farmers will not have surpluses to re-invest in their businesses.

At community level, the respondents confirmed that VSLAs had been highly effective. Individuals had previously had access to self-formed savings groups, but this was the first time that they had been supported to on-lend their savings to group members. Those taking loans were mostly borrowing very small amounts for short periods to cover needs such as school fees and medical expenses, rather than for productive purposes. With monthly interest rates on VSLA loans of 10% and above, any income-generating activity needs a rapid turnover to make it a viable investment; effectively, this excludes all agricultural activities.

It is difficult for an outsider to discern the difference between the target groups under SORUDEV and those under FSTP, although the latter should be cultivating less than 2 feddans. There was a wide variation in the amount of money saved monthly among the VSLAs formed under SORUDEV and the lending patterns within these groups did not indicate any increased willingness to make productive investment. Inevitably, marginally poor families with limited assets are vulnerable to sudden changes of fortune, such as the death or ill health of a family member, which will cause them to fall into a subsistence level of livelihood. Conversely, the ultra-poor can experience positive changes. Some analysis of the underlying characteristics of these target groups would be useful to better understand from which assistance they might best benefit in the future.

The EU's major investment under ZEAT-BEAD is devoted to the FAO's Sustainable Agricultural Development through Strengthening Extension, Input Supply and Services project. Significant questions remain concerning the viability of this investment in terms of the nature of the proposed activities, the level of analysis that has been employed in the design, the proposed staffing structure and the scheduled delivery timetable. Exactly what value addition is FAO currently offering and does this represent good value for money? The actual needs of smallholders, as asserted by workshop participants are primarily around the three core themes covered by this evaluation:

- 1) Effective delivery of relevant extension messages;
- 2) Strengthened systems with regard to the administration of VSLAs, and;
- 3) Support to increase their access to all forms of agricultural inputs.

It is the intention of FAO to recruit NGOs to provide all support activities at the field-level, with FAO thereby adding their own additional tier of costly administration with little obvious value addition. Many of the activities proposed by FAO are not analysed or risk-assessed in any meaningful way. For example, in place of free distribution of inputs FAO intends to provide qualifying farmers with "coupons" that can be exchanged for farm inputs from "selected" agro-dealers. The cost of these coupons is to be effectively converted into an

⁵ M4P (Marking Markets Work for the Poor Approach) refers to an aid delivery methodology in which poor entrepreneurs (including farmers) are supported through interventions such as skills development and market linkages, but without subsidies or other inputs (which can distort the prevailing markets forces and thereby reduce entrepreneurs' longer-term sustainability).

interest-free and uncollateralised loan, which the farmer is expected to re-pay post-harvest into some kind of community-managed revolving fund.

A huge number of questions arise from this strategy, the most fundamental issue being the basis upon which it can be assumed that the farmers will make these repayments, and if made, who at community level will have the expertise and credibility to manage the revolving fund. The history of microfinance schemes across the globe teaches us that none of these results can be achieved in the absence of well-trained and motivated management, along with constant monitoring by field staff. The poor level of record keeping witnessed within a large proportion of the VSLAs visited by this mission (although this was a very small sample) also illustrates that observation of even the simplest procedures can never be taken for granted.

Rather than pursue a complex programme of rural enterprise development, it may well be more effective for FAO to focus on the delivery of expertise under the core skills for which it is renowned. This could involve the deployment of experts to define how to better deliver its existing extension programmes by addressing issues such as; how to best support smallholder production improved/drought resistant (or locally produced) seed and production techniques that minimise the need for tillage, among others. Any FAO intervention must be planned within a realistic schedule of delivery (to ensure that the outcomes are timed to coincide with the deliverables of the other ZEAT-BEAD partners) and specifically, should target the production of surpluses that can be sold/processed within the value chains targeted by GIZ and UNIDO. After such a slow start-up it is highly unlikely that even a well-designed programme would be able to meet this target, since the new planting season is less than 12 weeks away.

There is a need to provide literacy training to female beneficiaries to enable them to function effectively within their VSLAs and develop small businesses. Activities such as vegetable and poultry production would also provide women with additional income, thus benefiting entire families.

4.3 Efficiency

The nature of recent political, military and inter-communal instability in South Sudan has created fragmentation in the delivery of development projects. Many delays have occurred and most projects are behind schedule. Some may no longer be optimal in their design given the ever-changing economic and political realities in the country.

The fragmented nature of the SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD interventions, which are under at least 11 contracts with an additional contract for monitoring and coordination (which of itself has also been fragmented), does not allow for a streamlined or closely coordinated programme of support for the thematic areas under review.

A similar range of interventions under a single Programme Coordinating Unit (PCU) would be more efficient and allow for more cost-effective sharing of baseline data, management/monitoring resources and other assets. With many projects undergoing simultaneous implementation, a dedicated monitoring activity with emphasis on the learning of lessons by comparing differing methodologies would be very useful. It could enable innovations within the programmes to be tested with some rigour (for example the Lead Farmer versus the FFS approach to extension training and the quality of imported ploughs versus those made locally). At present, successes and failures can only be judged in anecdotal terms.

ZEAT-BEAD has been the subject of a very recent ROM review, to which reference can be made for more reflection on its projects' various logical frameworks and inception activities, etc.

4.4 Impact

A major constraint on the achievement of effective results under the 3 thematic areas has been the lack of time in which to implement a comprehensive rural development intervention, starting from extremely low baselines. The underlying behavioural changes required to bring about developmental impacts cannot be fast-forwarded, particularly in a country with very low levels of education and high levels of insecurity. Changing agricultural practices is a long-term undertaking whose arduousness can be exacerbated by cultural traditions regarding livestock management and cropping technology. SORUDEV has made a start by introducing new concepts, but at this stage continuous reinforcement is required. It is expected that the SORUDEV smallholder projects will receive no-cost extensions to compensate for delays during their start-up phase, but these may last just 6 months, which may not even add one additional cropping season, and are unlikely to alter final outcomes. Programmes of this nature need to run for at least 5 years in order that behavioural changes become engrained and surrounding communities are given the opportunity to learn from and eventually replicate positive outcomes.

Undoubtedly, some short-term outcomes will be produced by the smallholder projects under SORUDEV, such as the establishment of VSLAs and the benefits of some extension training. The extent to which these short-term impacts can be translated into permanent changes will depend a great deal of the consistency with which donors are able to support market-orientated policies, and this may be compromised if the predicted crises in food supplies materialise.

4.5 Sustainability

Development projects aimed at providing sustainable livelihoods must struggle to deliver such an outcome in a country heavily dependent on imports, with a rapidly devaluing currency and hyperinflation. Consumers, farmers and traders cannot sustain demand or supply as the value of their cash is constantly depreciating. They must thus produce a significant surplus of staple crops, animal products and/or vegetables and successfully market them at increasing prices in sync with inflation in order to keep pace.

This requires constant market information updates, adequate post-harvest storage and processing and for vegetables, meat and fish, etc., access to direct marketing facilities. ZEAT-BEAD is planning to make a start on tackling these issues and detailed inception planning has been completed by GIZ and UNIDO, both of which are planning to develop Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) between the GoSS and private entrepreneurs. This could ensure that the benefits of donor-funded investments are shared across society, rather than creating sub-optimal outcomes in which the GoSS directly (and inefficiently) co-opts a private sector activity or an individual entrepreneur receives a subsidised asset. Much will depend on the effectiveness of these PPP agreements. The reluctance of the GoSS to lease out productive assets and its failure to ensure adequate quality controls was highlighted to the mission in discussion with the State Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries (SMARF) over the future of the Kuajok slaughterhouse, which was constructed some years ago by GIZ under a previous PPP agreement.

The SORUDEV project for the development of AFIS was conceived as a means of providing market information updates, but to date has focused on collating data relating to the post-2013 emergency. With the benefit of a one-year extension, AFIS may have the opportunity to refocus on agricultural markets, but a strategy for broadcasting information to farmers in remote rural locations is still lacking. Clearly, this database needs a permanent home within the GoSS and a secure funding base. This needs to be resolved prior to the end of AFIS' one year no-cost extension.

Some advances in household/group storage design are being promoted by NGOs under SORUDEV. It is not possible for this mission to determine the extent to which capacity exists at village level to handle a good harvest; however such storage facilities do not require external finance so if needed, families or groups can build more. In addition GIZ will build one warehouse, probably to be leased by an agricultural trader (under a PPP) so farmers can sell their surpluses to the trader. The trader will benefit from increasing post-harvest prices and will bear the financing costs of crop purchases, as well as the risk of damage. UNIDO will provide assistance with processing and market linkages for sorghum, groundnut, meat and fish, also with the use of PPPs where necessary.

The technologies introduced are appropriate to local needs. One issue that might be usefully researched is the promotion of animal traction, as quite a diversity of opinion is found among interviewees and between regions. Blacksmith training is emphasised under SORUDEV (FAO plans to train 100 more) and this is a useful value chain, but it was also reported that ploughs are fabricated using scrap metal as the imported metal bars are too expensive. The price, quality and durability of locally made ploughs could be assessed against the factory-made equivalents that are imported from Sudan (donkey ploughs) or Uganda (ox ploughs). In places it was claimed that the imported ploughs are better-quality as the correct metal is used and they have standardised dimensions such that replacement parts can be fitted with ease.

Animal welfare and the life expectancy of trained oxen/donkeys should also be included within the training curriculum. The workload placed on these animals during the short cultivation season is likely to be considerable; indeed, one workshop reported that all the trained donkeys (supplied by another donor) had died.

The fragility of the environment in GBG and its very high susceptibility to the negative impacts of climate change must be high on the agenda of any future programme as the impact on rural livelihoods could be very significant. Rapid population growth will exacerbate environmental concerns, along with the inevitable growth of charcoal-making ventures for sale to urban centres. If prosperity increases, wood-burning brick ovens will also become much more widespread.

Interventions specifically targeting the role of women in promoting household livelihoods should receive specific emphasis. The role of poultry and vegetable production and marketing in this regard was mentioned in several forums. Another issue frequently raised with regard to VSLAs is the very low level of literacy among rural women, most of whom are entirely illiterate. This makes the operation of VSLAs much more challenging, with some all-female groups having to rely on a man to maintain their books of account. This puts all-female groups at risk of collapse if their books are not maintained properly. Indeed the overall level of bookkeeping within the VSLAs visited by this mission was quite poor, even though the actual requirements are very simple. This issue needs more attention from NGO management; one uniform, simple record-keeping format should be introduced to all groups and field workers should ensure that it is followed.

SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD are aware of the Government's extension policy (NALEP) and the Comprehensive Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP) and the work of each project follows these. The lack of GoSS funding for local government significantly constrains the potential for effective oversight of agricultural extension, community finance, marketing and value chain development. In addition, alternative donor policies regarding the free distribution of inputs will have negative impact on all efforts to commercialise agriculture. To ensure fundamental change and sustainability, the GoSS needs to find a means of delivering business-enabling resources through local government.

Changing agricultural practices is a long-term undertaking whose arduousness can be exacerbated by cultural traditions regarding cropping systems. The extension training provided under SORUDEV has made a start by introducing new concepts, but it is too soon to judge the

level of sustainability achieved and the quality and appropriateness of the extension messages should be reviewed.

There is an underlying assumption that a VSLA, once formed under the umbrella of a donor-funded programme, will be sustained indefinitely by its members. There is little evidence to support this assumption. There is certainly evidence that groups with a high level of internal trust will agree to save small amounts of money and may support each other with the occasional emergency loan. In fact, such savings groups are widely reported to have been established without the intervention of an NGO, leading to the conclusion that it is the potential for lending which makes the VSLA distinctive. One fundamental issue with any form of rural finance intervention is that the process of developing the intervention is in itself a form of “institution building”. Such a process implies some degree of permanence and this requires a good number of years along with a specialised set of skills within the catalyst organisation. All of the programmes under review have very limited lifespans and do not have the required skill sets to build any kind of financial institution.

5. Recommendations

The overriding requirement of these interventions, particularly in the current context, is that they consolidate what they are already doing and do it as effectively as possible. There are evident gaps in both extension services and VSLAs which were highlighted at the workshops and should be addressed. Regarding agricultural extension, FAO should provide TA to ensure that the messages are appropriate and strengthen group formation and training methodologies.

Agricultural Extension

The simultaneous operation of so many projects (including the FSTP) provides an opportunity to learn a great deal more about the effectiveness of different approaches. At present, policy decisions are made in the absence of detailed analysis and the programmes need a well-designed, learning-based monitoring system. To date the monitoring of activities using logframes is undertaken, but there is little effort made to understand the successes and failures of different approaches and to learn lessons from these (which is a great opportunity that is currently being missed). The 4 SORUDEV NGOs are using various approaches to extension service provision. The recent ODI-financed review of Farmer Field Schools referenced in Chapter 3 found that FFS will only work effectively if the groups are self-formed, homogenous and highly motivated. Various informants passionately argued that the Lead Farmer approach was preferable as, e.g., lead farmers are permanently present within their communities and anyone (whether or not they are a member of the NGO's target group) can approach this farmer for advice (making higher rates of replication likely). A detailed comparative study of the two approaches could be undertaken in order to better assess their respective strengths and weaknesses and to recommend a future strategy.

Rather than pursuing a complex programme of rural enterprise development, it would be more effective in the current context for FAO to focus on the delivery of expertise under the core skills for which it is renowned. This could involve the deployment of experts to define how to better deliver its existing extension programmes by addressing issues such as how to best support smallholder production using improved/drought-resistant (or locally produced) seed and production techniques that minimise the need for tillage, among others. Any FAO intervention must be planned within a realistic schedule of delivery (to ensure that the outcomes are timed to coincide with the deliverables of the other ZEAT-BEAD partners) and specifically, should target the production of surpluses that can be sold/processed within the value chains targeted by GIZ and UNIDO.

To date the SORUDEV IPs have provided their own ToT to their staff, for the purpose of delivering extension messages and establishing demonstration plots for Lead Farmers. Under ZEAT-BEAD this work will be supported by FAO and Government departments will be asked to propose local people for training at a recognised training establishment. Following their graduation and accreditation, these trained extension workers will work with FFS on a commission-only basis and will have the opportunity to sell inputs to FFS members. This is foreseen as a permanent and sustainable solution to the need to ensure that farmers have timely access to the latest technology and good-quality inputs.

Privatisation of extension agents is the logical approach to achieving the longer-term delivery of a market-driven extension service. The selection of individuals to be trained as potential extension agents should be undertaken with great care so as to filter out people who do not have a natural entrepreneurial mentality or the ability to interact with farmers in a manner that will gain their confidence (the willingness to work very hard and take risks is also essential).

The Government should not simply be asked to recommend trainees as happened in the past. An open selection process should instead take place involving the shortlisting of candidates according to pre-defined characteristics as found in their CVs/letters of application (sent in response to a carefully worded advertisement). The shortlisted applicants should then be interviewed and a final selection of trainees made. Offers of training, which include clear guidelines to the work to be undertaken by the successful candidates, can then be made. In the absence of rigorous procedures there is a substantial risk that trainees will not take up the intended position and/or will use their newly acquired skills to obtain paid employment elsewhere. While it cannot eliminate this risk, a professionally designed selection process will mitigate it.

The above selection process could be undertaken by NGOs working in their respective areas, with the assistance of a selection committee (with the possible inclusion of one GoSS representative).

All IPs (particularly under SORUDEV) need to cooperate with AFIS in order that they receive more accurate information on the changing socio-economic conditions in their target area and can better predict future issues around, e.g. food insecurity. As the AFIS database expands it will evolve into a resource with a much wider array of indicators, which should be of use to future development programmes.

Rural Finance and VSLAs

Pilot projects (such as the provision of “agricultural loans” by the Hope Agency for Relief and Development) should be undertaken in such a way that the methodology used is clearly recorded and the outcomes are measured and made available

NGOs need to pay closer attention to the monitoring of VSLAs in order to i) ensure proper record keeping and; ii) learn more about the effectiveness of these associations in meeting the aims and objectives of SORUDEV.

Exchange visits could be arranged for some VSLA members to other groups who are performing at a high level, with the hope of promoting a more entrepreneurial attitude within groups that are too risk-averse to lend money for income generation.

There is a tendency to under-estimate the requirements of establishing effective rural financing schemes. Providing a capital injection by whatever means, be it in the form of a revolving fund or through a voucher scheme that envisages repayment into a revolving fund, is the easy part. Building an institutional framework to manage such a fund at the community level is very challenging indeed and is not a task that should be attempted by any time-limited programme, particularly within such a challenging environment as South Sudan. Contrary to the WAU resolution, it might be necessary to consider providing some form of matching grant (subsidy) to support farmers in purchasing their inputs. Or, an extension of cash for work activities, as provided under the FSTP projects, is an alternative approach for increasing farmer's purchasing power. In tandem with this, it is essential that some part of the farmer's increased purchasing power is tied to the purchase agricultural inputs and that the farmer is central to all decisions on what to purchase. Vouchers are a good (although not perfect) means of enabling farmers to approach input dealers directly. The implementers of such programmes need to work hard to ensure their integrity and to prevent the misallocation of vouchers, as well as to ensure that dealers are prepared to meet the expected demand of farmers.

Value Chain Development

In addition to the work planned under ZEAT-BEAD, the SORUDEV NGOs have been piloting activities related to value chains for staple foods, including e.g. the promotion of various improved designs for village-level storage facilities. These could enable farmers to achieve

higher sale prices by retaining surplus grain for longer periods. Marketing groups have been established by some IPs, such as CWW. In order to assess the outcomes and lessons learnt from such activities it is necessary for the NGOs to closely monitor the results and their findings should be shared.

There is a danger that, in pursuit of entrepreneurship and skills development, farmers will be imparted learning which will not actually benefit them, and may instead push them into controlling multiple activities in value chains that are not necessarily suited to their engagement such as the processing (value addition) and marketing of output. This could also hold them back from exploiting income-generating opportunities specific to their primary work of crop production, such as increasing crop diversification, or perhaps specialising in producing crops with higher commercial potential. It is common for donor-funded projects to assist farmer groups to start business and marketing initiatives, which prove unsustainable beyond programme closure. With relatively short-term interventions such as ZEAT-BEAD and SORUDEV, it is recommended to target farmers solely as producers with the potential to increase their production, rather than encouraging them to get involved in value addition activities. UNIDO should therefore assess whether it is preferable only to involve middlemen in value addition and marketing interventions.

There is a need to clearly identify artisans, local seed producers and agro-agents who provide both backward (input) and forward (output) linkage to farmers. The SORUDEV NGOs have already established contact with some local agro-dealerships and it would be very useful to have a consolidated list that includes descriptions of their business activities and the area they are likely to serve.

The Dutch Embassy is currently exploring the possibility of attracting large agro-dealerships operating in East Africa (possibly Uganda or Kenya) to set up franchise networks of agro-dealership in South Sudan. This appears to be a well-designed and entirely market-based intervention, but given current levels of insecurity it is unlikely to happen soon and would inevitably begin in the Equatorial region. If the border with Sudan were to reopen, a similar initiative might be explored with agro-dealerships around Khartoum, as in reality many commodities supplied to GBG come from north of the border, despite it being officially closed.

6. Conclusions

The immediate prospects for economic development in the GBG region, based on agriculture and livestock as the main drivers of change, are not good.

- Crop productivity remains low, e.g. around one tonne of sorghum per hectare, despite persistently high prices. This results in little if any available surplus for value addition;
- Farmers are slow to adopt innovations or accept change, particularly in the case of livestock management;
- Private sector investment in the region is very low and is likely to remain so until peace and security can be assured;
- Infrastructure for commercial agriculture (marketplaces, stores, equipment for post-harvest handling) is limited, along with the potential to transport produce to market. Farmers are very isolated from markets due to their highly scattered communities, poor roads and an absence of any form of haulage arrangement;
- Input supply systems are not functioning due to insecurity, hyper-inflation and currency devaluation. Farmers are considered “unbankable” and are therefore unable to buy inputs and new technologies due to a lack of capital.

With the benefit of hindsight, the programmes’ rapid move from relief to development, as required under the Wau Resolution, could have been premature in the context of the apparently worsening humanitarian situation. It will likely result in a slower pace of implementation and lower levels of delivery, despite having been introduced for good reasons within the context of a market-based strategy. ZEAT-BEAD and SORUDEV are being now implemented against a wider context of political instability, inter-communal conflict and food insecurity. The high level of political instability is causing sudden and unpredictable policy changes such as precipitous devaluation of the currency and the multiplication of States, such that their Government partners are in constant flux.

In order to implement rural development programmes within this context it is essential to focus on the simplest and most realistic targets rather than attempting to build any complex structures as FAO appears to be proposing for rural finance. As such, it is the view of this mission that the GIZ and UNIDO projects have done the most effective groundwork in that they have assessed the wider environment and have developed programming responses that are neither overly complex nor ambitious. However, they will still be extremely challenging to implement within the prevailing realities of South Sudan and may still prove to be ahead of their time.

The smallholder projects under SORUDEV are attempting to raise the production of farmers who have been assessed to have the potential to produce crop surpluses. This is a worthwhile ambition and should be kept as simple as possible. More attention needs to be paid to the quality of the extension messages that are being conveyed to farmers and FAO could play a very constructive role in this regard. For example with regard to:

- 1) The relevance of the messages (most emphasis is currently placed on issues around basic issues of seed spacing and weeding, etc.). To assess future needs regarding new messages or changes in emphasis, as appropriate. And to design a training curriculum to meet future needs
- 2) The training methodology. Whether it is effectively engaging with group members and whether knowledge is spreading to the wider community. If not, to introduce a strategy to address any shortcomings.

3) Training of Trainers. To ensure that extension workers have the necessary aptitudes and are adequately trained and resourced.

Many of the VSLAs created under the two programmes will undoubtedly outlive the projects as savings societies. More effort could be made to promote lending during the lifetime of the interventions in order to capitalise on the presence of supervising field staff while they are available to assist with record keeping and dispute resolution. For the VSLAs to become more permanent institutions, specialised support services are required. However, the prevailing insecurity does not bode well for this to become a reality in the coming few years.

Plans for access road construction with on-going maintenance are positive and highly relevant, if rather ambitious given current levels of insecurity. It might have been preferable at this time to target a much smaller road network using labour-intensive techniques as a means of injecting more cash into the local economy. However, the supply of sufficient numbers of underemployed workers and their seasonal availability would need to be assessed prior to the start of a labour intensive intervention.

Simpler, “grassroots” innovative approaches, such as those employed by FSTP projects, should be encouraged in future implementation and include the integration of vegetable production into farmer field schools (FFS), local seed multiplication, seed banks and seed distribution. The inclusion of literacy education is an important consideration that has so far been overlooked by SORUDEV, along with the production and distribution of adapted high-production poultry, both of which would primarily assist women.

An overarching consideration

A “complex emergency” situation is anticipated (reference: AFIS/WFP) in at least two of the former States of the GBG region due to a combination of critical food shortages and on-going political/military instability, leading to the displacement of populations and inter-communal conflict. This is in addition to severely disrupted supply chains and rampant inflation, exacerbated by the recent devaluation of the SSP.

In this context it is essential that development interventions “keep it simple”. Overly ambitious development scenarios are more likely to fail within this context as IPs are forced to constantly respond and adapt to the ever-changing security context. If the full impact of the current predictions materialises, it will no longer be realistic to implement development programmes. As quoted by WFP/FAO in their Special Working Paper on the Devaluation of the SSP (29 January 2016):

“...There is an immediate need to scale up social transfers to the poor and most vulnerable segments of the population by relief and development actors to compensate for the resultant welfare losses occasioned by the on-going economic challenges.”

Annex 1: Summary Curriculum Vitae of Evaluator

Name: Sarah Elizabeth Gray

Education:

Institution (Date from - Date to)	Degree(s) or Diploma(s) obtained:
Manchester Institute for Science & Technology (UMIST), 10/1992-09/1993	MSc Management and Implementation of Development Projects. (Dissertation in Social Forestry)
York University, 10/1976-07/1979	BA Economics

Language skills: Indicate competence on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 - excellent; 5 - basic)

Language	Reading	Speaking	Writing
English	1	1	1

Membership of professional bodies: Non-Executive Board Member of Westmill Solar Cooperative, Former local government representative; Member of local environmental organizations in Oxfordshire, as well as The Natural Beekeeping Association and Garden Organic (UK)

Other skills: Fully computer literate. Trained in auditing social and environmental responsibility in product value chains, 2014. Trained in accountancy in 1980s

Key qualifications:

- Ms Gray has 24 years professional experience on all aspects of **poverty reduction, enterprise development, the promotion of medium/small enterprises and value chain analysis**. She also has experience in low-income countries affected by climate change, including severe drought, and in post conflict and recovery areas where peace-building and community reconciliation approaches have been applied.
- Experienced in working with a wide range of donor institutions and on developing innovative approaches to private sector development, including challenge funds and has developed business cases for interventions.
- Since 2000 she has undertaken over 25 EU-funded assignments: identifications, formulations, mid-term reviews and final/ex-post evaluations focused on: enterprise development, food security, agricultural development/finance and poverty alleviation. A significant number of evaluations have been of complex programmes with budgets of up to \$40 million. **She has** worked as Team Leader on a large number of these studies.
- Has the ability to relate to and work in cooperation with team members from all backgrounds.
- Has extensive experience working with national governments and both bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies, including the DFID, Danida, Sida, World Bank.
- Has detailed knowledge of Project Cycle Management, Performance Indicators, Logical Framework Approach, and aid cooperation procedures. All her evaluations and reviews have used DAC/OECD evaluation criteria and theory
- Has excellent analytical and report writing skills.

Specific experience in the region:

Country	Date from - Date to
Ethiopia	2012
Uganda	2015
Kenya	2009, 2004
Ghana	2005
Malawi	2008, 2003/04
Tanzania	1999
Zimbabwe	1996
Sudan/South Sudan	1992/2015

Annex 2: Wau Workshop Report (23 November 2015)

Amarula Lodge, Wau

Brainstorming Session: Identification of farmers' actual needs

Participants: 4 Government representatives, 5 farmer representatives and 7 HARD staff

Participants first identified the actual needs, following which each individual identified their 5 top priorities through the use of colour-coded dots (5 coloured dots given to each participant).

Government: Blue; Farmers: Green; HARD Staff: Orange

Actual needs with more than 5 priority dots are highlighted in yellow.

Extension/Training Needs	GoSS	Farmers	HARD
Training of extension workers	2	2	3
How to use pesticides, including clothing and First Aid	1	1	-
Crop protection	2	-	-
Training of Lead Farmers	-	2	-
How to calculate yield (PET)	-	-	1
Increase the number of extension staff at Boma level	1	-	4
Identification of pests	1	-	-
Post-harvest management training and facilities	2	1	4
More contact with extension workers	-	-	-
Control of livestock diseases	-	-	-

Discussion of yellow-highlighted priorities

Why do farmers seem to have more interest in the Lead Farmer approach at Boma level?

- Farmers emphasised preference for the training of Lead Farmers because the Lead Farmers are more readily available and closer to the farmers. The Lead Farmers do the training with compensation (*note that the farmer representatives at the workshop are probably the Lead Farmers!*);
- Government-level extension staff are only present at State, County and Payam level and their visits are inadequate;
- The State Government Coordinator deployed to Rajar County reported that she has no work to do, no supervision and no logistics. She is only required to submit a monthly report.

What kind of storage facilities are needed?

At group level, the group needs improved stores to be built with bricks and mortar or tarpaulin. Training in the professional management of stores is required.

Savings and Loans (VSLAs)	GoSS	Farmers	HARD
Need savings to buy seeds and other inputs	2	5	1
Small business promotion	-	4	1
Establishment of an umbrella organisation for VSLAs	-	-	3
Disbursement of loans in time for the agricultural season	-	1	1

Discussion of yellow-highlighted priorities

Farmers should form themselves into groups (VSLAs) to buy equipment.

How are savings accumulated: individually or as a group?

Savings are accumulated through VSLAs and also via women's cooperative groups.

Potential small and medium-sized enterprises for business promotion were identified as:

- Training in tailoring and the supply of sewing machines;
- Food processing and value addition for groundnut and sesame;
- Income-generating activities to enable farmers to diversify their sources of income;
- Training in entrepreneurship;
- Construction of market infrastructure such as stalls, especially in the remoter Payams.

Value Chains	GoSS	Farmers	HARD
Good-quality seeds	2	1	-
Road improvement	-	-	5
Timely input supply	1	1	2
Early-maturing seed varieties	-	1	-
Larger quantities of seed	-	1	-
Higher local prices (or transport to Wau if this is not possible)	-	1	1
Better linkages with agro-dealers and buyers			1
Construction of market centres in outlying communities	-	-	-

Discussion of yellow-highlighted priorities

Why is road improvement identified as a priority by HARD staff as a priority, but not by Government or farmers?

Roads are important to farmers too, but particularly to those in Rajar County (who only had one representative at the meeting).

Other Needs	GoSS	Farmers	HARD
Modern agricultural equipment with training	2	3	-
Tractors	-	-	-
Ox-ploughs	-	-	-
Irrigation equipment	-	-	2
Fertiliser	-	-	-
Poor security/lack of policing	-	1	4
Animals for ploughing, with training (especially as the donkeys supplied died)	-	-	2
Provision of fruit trees	1	-	1

Discussion of yellow-highlighted priorities

10 tractors were provided by the Government. What happened to them?

- The tractors were meant to be sold to the cooperative but were taken by Government officials;
- Farmers should be provided with tractors and requested to pay in instalments;
- Tractors should be made available or bought through the contribution of farmers and cooperatives or by local NGOs for hiring to farmers;
- Farmers should form themselves into groups to buy equipment;
- Farmers would be delighted to try out the “Chinese” motorised tiller machines as a substitute for much more costly tractors (as a pilot project).

Why is security indicated as being of primary importance to GoSS and HARD, but not to the farmers?

Farmers have decided not to think too much about the prevailing security situation; if they did, they would not farm.

Afternoon Session: 3 x workgroups followed by discussion of issues that prevent delivery of the above needs to the farmers. The main points discussed were (in order of discussion):

- Poor security and the need to work with local leaders and UN agencies;
- Tractors intended for farmers were taken by GoSS officials and were not maintained;
- Ox-ploughs need to be bought by groups (members are willing to contribute), not individuals, and training is required;
- Termites need to be removed before planting but no chemicals are available for this;
- The Lead Farmer approach is preferred by some farmers and NGOs as extension workers are often unavailable;
- GoSS extension workers have no management support or logistics. They have been trained, but often poorly;
- Savings by group members are used to bridge the hunger gap, although some of the sorghum purchased is usually used for planting;
- There is need for quality assurance that seeds are viable for planting and are of the right type for the local conditions;
- Some groups want access to bank accounts so that they can borrow larger amounts;
- Farmers need to diversify their incomes in order to reduce the risk of failure. Income-generating activities such as sewing (for which machines would be needed), food processing and other value addition activities were suggested, although there is no support for micro-enterprises;
- Road improvement is a major issue in Rajar, but less so for other farmers;
- Storage facilities need to be improved so that they are secure from thieves and less vulnerable to rats, other pests and humidity. Group storage space would be very useful if training were provided in how to manage the stores. The facilities would have to be constructed on land belonging to a trustworthy person;
- Government has tried to restrict the operations of NGOs and therefore more dialogue is needed;
- Inputs must be delivered prior to the start of the rainy season (before roads become impassable) in order to avoid delays;
- Some inter-community tensions exist which prevent free movement. This requires additional awareness and reconciliation between local leaders;
- Donors must consult more extensively prior to imposing aid conditionalities;
- NGOs have no facilities in remoter areas and compounds should be built;
- Communities have a high level of aid dependency and aid policies are not well coordinated between donor agencies. It is thus difficult to abolish free distribution. There is also some duplication of NGO activities due to poor coordination and lack of cooperation between agencies;
- Most farmers are still not organised into groups or VSLAs;
- There are few literate people at Boma level and those that exist tend to migrate to urban areas;
- VSLAs need to have clear by-laws, preferably harmonised to some extent
- Agro-dealerships only exist at State level, but need representatives at Payam level.

Annex 3: Kuajok Workshop Report (25 November 2015)

Evaluation Workshop Day, Kuajok, 25 November 2015

Participants: 7 Government Representatives, 5 Farmer Representatives, 10 NGO staff

Brainstorming session: Identification of farmers' actual needs

Participants first identified the actual needs, following which each individual identified their 5 top priorities through the use of colour-coded dots (5 coloured dots given to each participant).

Actual needs with more than 5 priority dots are highlighted in yellow.

Brainstorming session followed by priority setting

World Vision: Blue; VSF Germany and NRC: Yellow; Farmers: Green; Government: Red

Extension/Training Needs	Blue	Yellow	Green	Red
Ox-plough training	2	4	5	6
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) training	2	3	2	1
Agro-Pastoralist Field School (APFS) training/groups	-	-	-	1
Farmer Field School (FFS) approach	1	1	-	1
Vegetable and fruit tree production	-	3	-	2
Land preparation and management	-	-	-	1
Natural resource management	1	-	-	-
Disaster preparedness	-	-	-	1
Post-harvest management	-	-	3	-
Seed multiplication	1	1	-	1
Cash crop production	1	-	-	-
Proper agronomic practices	-	4	1	1

Issues discussed in plenary session

Integrated Pest Management

This is the adoption of the full range of various pest management practices, i.e. biological control (use of other plants and insects to control pests), physical control (e.g. manually removing pests) and chemical control (agro-chemicals, which may be organic, such as a mix of local leaves). This must be combined with proper cultivation practices (timely weeding, correct spacing and plant population, and crop rotation).

FFS versus the Lead Farmer approach

Both of these can work well. FFS are mostly used in areas where most farmers live close to each other. Lead Farmers, when trained, can spread out more. Recently FFS have attracted more funding as ToT is always conducted and funded. They can also pick out a few individuals from the FFS group to be further supported as Lead Farmers and ensure that their own plots become the demonstration plot. The Lead Farmer approach has been described as more effective this season.

FFSs are only effective where they have incorporated VSLAs. VSF Germany introduced both VSLAs and literacy classes. Several participants emphasised that literacy was an essential to the success of VSLAs.

Vegetable and fruit tree production

The timeframe for vegetable production is much shorter and this is therefore more likely to be sustainable in the short term.

Savings, Loans and VSLAs	Blue	Yellow	Green	Red
Bookkeeping management (training)	-	2	3	-
Harmonised guidelines (with by-laws for each group)	1	1	1	1
Increased access to loans	2	2	-	1

VSLAs versus the traditional informal saving method

- Prior to the introduction of VSLAs, people used to save money under their boxes or buy assets such as animals. VSLAs are better because the money saved can be borrowed and earn interest. The VSLA provides the opportunity to raise seed capital, which has been a major success for most farmers since it was introduced;
- The other likely option is to approach the Agricultural Bank as a group – but the group must first have legal status;
- Government staff, who have regular salaries, access loans from KCB. One of the participants received 10,000 SSP to buy a motorbike for commercial use;
- There is also a farming group involved in contract farming whereby the contractor (or agro-dealer) provides seeds, tools and money for activities such as weeding. The farmers return these to the contractor after the harvest;
- Some farmers also received interest-free loans.

Weaknesses

- Some of the borrowers don't pay;
- Record keeping is difficult since most of the participants are illiterate;
- Members delay payment of their contributions. It is important to carefully select members when forming the group;
- The boxes have been stolen in the past when external funding was injected. No funding has been injected into the VSLAs supported under the current SORUDEV programme; hence the group sense of ownership is higher and care of the boxes is very meticulous. The boxes have 3 padlocks and no single person keeps the 3 keys;
- Where there are severe problems, groups dissolve and return the members' contributions. Where the groups are guided and well formed by the facilitating NGOs, they tend to anticipate the major problems and to incorporate remedies into their by-laws;
- Members are not very entrepreneurial and there is currently a very low level of commercial activity, resulting in few opportunities to start businesses. There is currently no business planning, despite this being absolutely essential.

Value Chains, Supplies and Marketing	Blue	Yellow	Green	Red
Ox-ploughs	3	4	1	4
Irrigation equipment	-	-	3	-
Seed (good-quality, adaptable to the season and the local environment, improved local variety)	2	1	-	-
Tools	-	-	-	-
Market information	2	1	1	3
Linkages with buyers	-	1	-	-
Ox-plough spare parts	-	-	-	1
Wire fencing	-	-	-	-
Pesticides	1	-	-	-
Processing of groundnut oil	-	-	-	2

Irrigation equipment

- Why did the NGOs and Government not mention irrigation equipment as a priority? The major issue is that of access to and supply of the items and their spare parts;
- There is need for an efficient supply chain. Farmers appear less interested in ox-ploughs than the other participants.

Market information

- NGOs and Government should employ and train agricultural marketing officers to collect market information and ensure its dissemination through local radio stations. This should be driven by the Government, but in the case of limited resources, training should be done by NGOs;

- Road linkages and transport are a major challenge. The agro-dealers should be involved;
- Farmers can come together in the form of a union, cooperative or group through which they can collect information and act as a platform to inform other farmers;
- Agro-dealers should be publicised through billboards and mobile phone networks.

Other needs	Blue	Yellow	Green	Red
Training of blacksmiths	-	-	-	-
Security of tenure (title deeds)	-	-	-	-
More support for				
<i>Fisheries</i>	-	-	1	3
<i>Animals</i>	1	1	-	1
<i>Beekeeping (apiculture)</i>	-	-	1	-
More research and development into seeds	-	-	1	6

More support to fisheries, animals and apiculture (beekeeping)

- There is a need to train people in milk processing/hygiene and animal diseases;
- More Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) should be trained;
- A supply chain should be set up to provide medicines and drugs;
- There is a need for improved dairy production through cross-breeding and artificial insemination;
- A market should be identified for animal skins.

There is a need for a fisheries cold chain but sustainability is a major issue. Traditional methods of fish preservation (such as salting or drying and handling) should be used and fishing with larger nets promoted.

There is also a need to control and manage fish ponds.

Final Session: 4 x workgroups followed by the discussion of Issues that prevent the delivery of the above needs to the farmers.

Annex 4: Rumbek Workshop Report (25 January 2016)

Participants: 6 farmer representatives, 13 Extension Workers from NPA and Government and 5 members of the NPA/FAO Technical Working Group

Identification of Farmers' needs and top priorities (Farmers: **Green**; Extension Workers: **Blue**; Project staff: **Red**)

Extension Training	Blue	Green	Red
Donkey ploughing (due to insecurity and cattle theft)	2	2	1
Livestock management	5	4	2
Training in groundnut production	1	5	
Crop rotation			
Ox-plough training in Awerial and Wulu Counties	11	1	
Early planting	4		1
More oversight and monitoring by senior NPA staff		2	
Poultry production and management, especially by women	3		1
Training before cultivation and at appropriate times of operation	6		
Training in fruit and vegetable production	5	2	
Pest and disease control	10		
More extension workers		1	
Agro-forestry	2	1	1
VSLAs/Savings and Loans	Blue	Green	Red
Improved VSLA management/training	8	5	1
Additional capital to pay for weeding of additional land	2	1	1
More VSLAs and more savings boxes	5	2	2
Closer supervision and monitoring of VSLAs and FFS		4	
VSLAs for youth involved in livestock production			1
VSLAs for CAHWs to enable the purchase of livestock medicine			2
More training in income generation	1	1	2
Value Chain	Blue	Green	Red
Milk and groundnut processing		2	1
Irrigation	6	3	2
Fertiliser	1		1
More suppliers of tools and ploughs	13	6	1
Vegetable seed	6	1	1
Tractors for rent			
Vehicles for transporting produce		1	
More access roads			1
Improved storage with increased protection against rats	2		
More water points for vegetable production	11	1	1
Other issues			
ToT in the use of ox-ploughs not available			
Diversion of food for assets requires more monitoring			
Training in adult literacy required for better VSLA management			
Some groups did not benefit from food for assets			

Annex 5: Senior Management Workshop (26 September 2015)

Recommendations for strengthening of the SORUDEV and ZEAT-BEAD Programmes

Group 1: Presentation on Extension Guides

Extension Guides

- Extension guides should be produced
- Need to include pictures and diagrams

For private extension

- Government should take part
- Must be entrepreneurs and understand that the purpose is to be private
- Use harmonised guides
- Should live in the same communities

Innovations

- Private extension workers should provide the inputs and set up paying methods based on production and timing of harvest
- They should market the extension package(s) and products they have
- There should be monitoring of performance at County and Boma level
- The prices they charge should be monitored so not to exploit the farmers

Group 2: Presentation on Extension Guides

Extension Guides

- Extension guides are available and of good quality and produced by the partners
- Extension training materials are not harmonised
- There are no guidelines
- Most extension materials are not localised
- Extension materials are not in local languages

Criteria

- There is a need to have at least primary-level education
- They should be motivated and interested in the area
- They should speak the local language and be accepted by the community
- They should live in the areas and local communities

Roles and Responsibilities

- Could be part of the vaccination campaigns
- Should be certified and have a licence
- Should be involved in innovation
- Should submit information to the Government
- Role of agro-dealers
- Provide services to partners

Innovations

- Private extension services through cooperative farming
- FFS
- Specialised companies promoting private extension
- Combining agro-dealership and extension services
- Providing extension services around tree nurseries

Discussion

- Local languages may be difficult

- Pictures are effective and should be combined
- Introduce extension radio programmes
- The examples used in the FFS manuals should be harmonised
- Flexible criteria for basic qualification and education level
- The extension guides do not include details on pests or diseases. To make this work, the issue of pests and diseases should be deepened with more references included

Group 3: Presentation on Rural Financing

Group cohesion

- Groups should be self-selecting and have a common interest
- Constitution and by-laws

Savings

- Very clear objective is needed
- Training of groups in small-scale business
- Training in numeracy and literacy
- Exchange visits for learning purposes

Loans

- Clear purpose and guidance on how to borrow
- Guarantors and collateral permitted for non-members to borrow
- Injection of funds into VSLAs
- Linkage with other microfinance institutions
- How can additional capital be injected?
 - o Revolving grants to VSLA groups
 - o Matching grants (based on business plans)
 - o Linkages with microfinance institutions and banks
 - o Formation of VSLA unions

Potential for more formalised rural financing

- There is huge potential for more formalised rural financing through VSLA unions
- Linkage with microfinance institutions and banks, including community banks

Group 4: Presentation on Rural Financing

How can the VSLA members be introduced to commercial agriculture?

- Raise awareness of agriculture as a business
- Clear aims and objectives
- Strict understanding of and respect for the rules and regulations of the VSLA

How can additional capital be introduced to rural communities?

- Link VSLAs to lending institutions, particularly to specialised institutions
- Use special instruments such as matching grants to increase capital within VSLAs

Is there potential for more formalised rural financing?

- Create an umbrella/apex organisation to bring many VSLAs together (but this is a long-term undertaking and cannot be considered under the existing programmes)

Discussion

- Capacity to monitor all outcomes is limited
- Most are run as welfare groups instead of investment groups
- Members should not be judged for what they spend their money on as it meets a procurement objective
- Possibility of introducing literacy and numeracy into the group training cycle (VSF Germany has introduced literacy into the VSLA group in Warrap)
- Do we really have links to modern and formal banking institutions?

- Need to think outside the box and include mobile banking such as Mpesa
- Need for basic business training, including how to start and how to know whether it is succeeding (Sarah)
- Monitoring needs to be increased to make the VSLA work better
- What is the best method of lending?
- How has the introduction of VSLAs worked since beginning in 2014?
- There is a reduction in the trading of staple crops such as cereals due to devaluation and insecurity
- There is limited movement of cargo
- There is a serious reduction of food availability and there is a food shortage in the greater economy
- Cash economy is running out

Group 5: Presentation on Value Chains

How can the programme support input supply?

- Identify/map agro-dealers
- Capacity building of existing suppliers (registration, training and quality control)
- Revolving fund and seed money for farmers and suppliers
- Organise field days/input trade fairs
- Support Government to monitor and regulate quality of inputs

Promotion of value addition

- Sorghum: Threshing, drying, sorting, storage and flour production
- Groundnut and sesame: Shelling, drying and oil/paste production
- Okra: drying and storage
- Hides/skins: Improved flaying, defatting, preservation, processing methods and storage

Innovative approaches

- Groundnut and sesame: Oil production
- Fermented milk

Discussion

- Need for quality tools, specification of standards and the licensing of dealers
- Seeds for field crops such as groundnut and sorghum are available
- Preference for vegetable seeds that are not produced in the country
- Input trade fairs are a good idea but should not to be too big or made to look difficult
- Emphasis should be on increased productivity and not just on increasing the amount of land under cultivation

Annex 6: Persons Met

Attendees at the 5th Quarterly Review Meeting

Agency	Name	Email	Telephone
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Consultees not present at the 5th Quarterly Review Meeting

Name	Organisation	Position
Vincent de Boer	Delegation of the European Union to South Sudan	
Riccardo Claudi	Delegation of the European Union to South Sudan	
Annie Chapados	DfID (UK)	Programme Manager
Lewis Mwangi Karieny (also Faruk Iqbal and other project staff)	Concern Worldwide (SORUDEV)	Food, Incomes and Markets Programme Manager
Pernille Nagal Sorensen	Senior Development Consultant	ROM monitor for ZEAT-BEAD
Ezana Kassa	FAO	Project Manager for Pastoralist Programme
Abdal Monilim Osman	FAO	
Evans Owino	HARD	Programme Manager (under SORUDEV)
Daniel J Deng	JICA	
MAFCRD	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development	
MARF	Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries	
MHPPE	Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment	
Eddington	NRC	
Aduca Adup Algoc	SMARF	DG SMARF in Warrap
Daniel Charu	UNIDO	
Justing	UNOPS	Programme Officer in Wau
Harald Rojahn	Urban Food Security, Livelihoods and Markets Project (UFSLMP)	Programme Coordinator