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REFUGEES, DISPLACED PERSONS AND EDUCATION:
NEW CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY

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Network for international policies and cooperation in education and training

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Editorial Address for this Special Issue:
Kenneth King, Saltoun Hall, Pencaitland,
Scotland, EH34 5DS, UK
Email: Kenneth.King@ed.ac.uk
The invaluable support to the Editor by Robert Palmer is very warmly acknowledged.
Email: rpalmer00@gmail.com

Secretariat Address:
Michel Carton, Executive Director
Email: michel.carton@graduateinstitute.ch
Aude Mellet, Communication Officer
Email : aude.mellet@graduateinstitute.ch
Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies (IHEID),
Post Box 136, Rue Rothschild 20, 1211 Geneva 21,
Switzerland.

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- stimulate and disseminate timely, concise, critical analysis and act as an incubator for new ideas
- broker knowledge at the interface between research, policy and practice

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- Education and training policies in the Agenda 2030
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What is *NORRAG News*?

NORRAG News is a digital analytical report that is produced twice a year. Each issue has a large number of short, sharp articles, focusing on policy implications of research findings and/or on the practical implications of new policies on international education and training formulated by development agencies, foundations and NGOs. The niche of NORRAG has been to identify a number of 'red threads' running through the complexity of the debates and the current aid and cooperation discourse, and to dedicate special issues of NORRAG News to the critical analysis of these themes.

Many issues of NORRAG News have been translated into French and Spanish, as well as into Chinese and Arabic from 2014 onwards.

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NORRAG News 53

REFUGEES, DISPLACED PERSONS AND EDUCATION:

NEW CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY

Initiating Memorandum for *NORRAG News (NN) 53*

When the Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report (GMR) of 2011 focused on *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, its focus was not principally with refugees at all, but with the massively deleterious effect of conflict on education. Arguably, the refugee crisis now affecting Europe has made this hidden crisis dramatically more open for Europe's population, though this crisis has not been at all hidden for those states neighboring conflict. The World Economic Forum (WEF) of 2016 has argued that 'top of the list of risks of highest concern …by a considerable margin, was large-scale involuntary migration'. Put another way, migration's sudden impact on the front-line states of Europe and on the main European destinations, Germany and Sweden, has brought into the open and into focus the millions of refugees already located in refugee camps and in host communities in countries surrounding Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, Palestine etc. In other words, the great burden of support for refugees and displaced persons has been long carried by countries of the Global South, with the assistance of the international relief agencies.

This issue of *NORRAG News (NN)* draws attention to many different dimensions of refugees, displaced persons and education, but it is not focused on economic migration or on migration for higher education per se, but on what the WEF calls 'involuntary migration' and its connections with education.

Amongst NN53's many concerns are, firstly, the way that the sheer scale of the refugee crisis has captured Western media and political attention. The reports of the possibility of reaching Germany or Sweden have translated into a once-in-a-lifetime chance of gaining access to Europe with its perceived education, employment and welfare opportunities. By contrast in the countries such as Lebanon and Jordan where almost one in five and one in seven persons respectively in the entire population is a refugee, the crisis caught media attention years ago.

Second, and related to the first, are questions about whether Europe's bilateral aid agencies as well as the European Commission, the UN agencies and the World Bank will need to rethink their development cooperation to take account of the costs of supporting genuine refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. If so, this would parallel the long-standing debate about whether the imputed costs of scholarships to Southern students into countries such as Germany, Japan and France can be counted as development aid (See recent GMRs). Will aid budgets need to be restructured to ensure that they are spent on what DFID calls the great global challenges – such as the root causes of mass migration? Will humanitarian aid need to be rethought so that education constitutes more than the present 2%?

Third, there are huge differences between what can be called the protracted refugees crises such as that of the Palestinians, still located in camps around the Middle East, including in Syria, more than 65 years after their flight, on the one hand, and the expulsion of the Uganda Asians in 1972, for example, where no one has been in a camp for ages, on the other. The difference in educational expenditure is massive, since UNWRA is still supporting some 500,000 school children in its schools across the Middle East region as well as many as 7,000 thousand TVET students.

Fourth, there are a whole series of issues concerning the access to and quality of education for internally displaced people (IDPs) and for refugees. These cover lack of trained teachers, double-shift schooling, lack of security, ghettoization, language training, and lack of progression to higher education. There are larger questions about whether the poor quality of education, and the lack of access to jobs, in the first host countries is itself a driver for further migration to Europe or North America. There are other, related, issues that affect the education and training of what might be termed externally displaced persons – people that have crossed borders involuntarily but who have, for various reasons, not registered officially as refugees.

Fifth, the sheer scale of the Syrian crisis, on the very borders of Europe, like the Balkans before it, demands special attention. Syria, a country with a long-standing tradition of compulsory education, now has millions of its young people out of secure, full-time schooling. There is talk of a lost generation, almost the de-schooling of Syria. NN53 reports on *Supporting Syria and the Region*, from the London Conference of 4th February 2016, and its implications particularly for education.

Foreword

Kenneth King,

University of Edinburgh and Editor of *NORRAG News*

Email: Kenneth.King@ed.ac.uk

We had planned that this special issue of *NORRAG News* on refugees would be available during May 2016, the month of the first-ever World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul on 23-24 May 2016. 'A Commitment to Address Forced Displacement' was understandably on its agenda for the first day.

Also in May 2016, the Kenya Government has threatened to close all its refugee camps, including Dadaab, one of the largest in the world. It is not impossible that with the official start of campaigning for next year's elections a week before the camps' announcement, refugees are perceived to be a factor in political outcomes.

Other parallels are obvious - with the use of the immigrant card in current US electioneering, and of the migrant crisis by Europe's far right parties, as well as immigration having a key place in the UK Referendum of June 23rd 2016.

NORRAG and *NORRAG News* have always followed critically the progress of world declarations and global goals since the World Conference in Jomtien (See NN7 & NN8). And it is noteworthy that refugees and those displaced by war already figured in Article 3 of the Jomtien's World Declaration on Education for All in 1990 – under the commitment to removing educational disparities.

Equally in the influential OECD-DAC report (1996) *Shaping the 21st Century* – which led to the Millennium Development Goals, one of the three key motives for promoting 'development' underlines the obvious conclusion that 'increased human security reduces pressures for migration and the accompanying social and environmental stresses'. Not surprisingly, under the Sustainable Development Goal 10 on reducing inequality, there is a key target (10.7) on migration: 'Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies'. Equally, in the *Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit*, the refugee crisis is linked to education, since half of refugee population are children, and half of these are missing out on primary education (UN, 2016: 21).

Our decision also to link this migrant focus to education was primarily because the provision of education is clearly critical to the reduction of inequality as well as to the promotion of mobility. These are very explicitly connected in the case of global educational migration, and are a key factor in what is termed economic migration. But the articles in this issue illustrate the crucial importance of education in forced or involuntary migration – not as a motive to migrate but as a vital way to cope with the new status of both internal and external displacement.

NORRAG's news update

The biennial survey of NORRAG members will be carried out in the next few months. We hope that at least 10% of our members will find the ten minutes needed to reply.

By the time of the next *NORRAG News (NN)*, towards the end of this year, NORRAG will be 30 years old. The first issue of NN appeared in November 1986. Ideas for how to mark the occasion are warmly welcomed. We shall include a space for suggestions in our short survey instrument.

17th May 2016

Reference

United Nations, 2016. *One humanity: Shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit*, United Nations, New York

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EDITORIALS

Involuntary Migration in Historical and Current Contexts

Kenneth King, University of Edinburgh and NORRAG

Email: Kenneth.King@ed.ac.uk

Not a 21st century experience

The forced flight and displacement of people are not new phenomena. In the history of most countries and continents there are terms that still vividly capture the mass movement of people against their will either within countries or across borders. The 'Highland Clearances', the 'White Highlands', 'Middle Passage', 'Partition', 'Group Areas Act', 'Holocaust', 'Nakba' and 'Down to the countryside movement' are just a handful of many hundreds of terms that point to particular periods, even centuries, of forced movement of people from their homes, villages, cities, lands or countries. In some parts of the world, the dispossession of homelands and countries by overseas migrants was ended by the end of empire; in other whole continents, the indigenous peoples permanently lost their homelands to overseas migrants.

The term refugee itself goes back to France in 1685 when the protection provided to the Protestant (Huguenot) minority in predominantly Catholic France was removed. Estimates of almost million people then sought refuge round the world.

Terminology remains important - and unclear

The idea that one can very neatly divide people on the move into involuntary migrants and economic migrants is fanciful (see also Khadria, NN53; Ahmed, NN53).[1] We set out to do so in this issue of *NORRAG News*, concentrating on the former. But we are aware that many asylum seekers are not aiming for any old asylum; rather, 'selectivity' is 'embedded in labour migration' (Preston, NN53); they have their eyes on a particular sanctuary if at all possible (Pop, NN53). Similarly with repatriation. That common aspiration amongst many refugee groups may be daunting if their homes, villages and lands have been taken by other groups through war. Flight from the direst poverty is arguably also a form of forced migration.

The multiple statuses of countries. These are sometimes referred to in refugee parlance as origin countries, transit countries or destination countries. But, confusingly, some countries turn out to be all three, as is the case of several, including Sudan (see Waterman, NN53).

Public or private options

In a world of dramatically increasing income inequality (See Monsutti, NN53 and Oxfam's *An economy for the 1%*), it should not be surprising to find that refugee destinations can in part be determined by readiness to pay. In other words, there are distinctions between the large majority of refugees who remain in the camps and cities of the states surrounding their countries of origin, and the smaller but still substantial number who pay agents to reach countries of choice. These operations are clearly very different in scale and motivation from the 'kindertransport' and underground railroad that respectively took Jewish children across national borders in Europe before the outbreak of WWII, and slaves to freedom in the Northern states of the USA in the 19th century.

Refugee majorities, minorities and media

Over decades of refugee flight, most have remained in the camps, towns and villages of their geographical neighbours whether in Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Thailand, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Uganda, Sudan or Kenya – to mention just a few. None of the ten countries that have taken in the most refugees are members of the EU. No less than 86% of the world's 60 million refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and asylum seekers

1 DFID's policy paper (2007) on *Moving out of poverty: Making migration work for poor people* focuses on 'voluntary economic migration' but makes the point that 'the distinction between (this) and other forms of migration - stimulated for example by conflict, human rights abuse and environmental stress – is a difficult one.'

remain in developing countries. Media attention in the West, however, has not focused on the camps and countries receiving the great majority of refugees, but primarily on the refugees seeking or succeeding to enter Europe (and North America).

The right to seek asylum and the right to education

The mass movements of millions of refugees after WWII was one of the origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 and of the UN's International Refugee Organisation of 1946, which became the UNHCR. The right to leave and to return to one's country, and the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution (Articles 13 and 14) come well before the right to education (Article 26). But education is perceived as critical to strengthening respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to the promotion of understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations. Hence it should not be surprising that it plays such a central role in the debates and the discourse about refugees. Which is why it is the focus of this issue of *NORRAG News.*

'Refugees' - 'almost every education challenge possible'

Benavot's telling phrase (NN53) points to the enormity of the education and skills situation faced by refugees. The fine words of Sustainable Development Goal 4 about ensuring *inclusive and equitable quality education and … lifelong learning opportunities* are a world away from the daily realities of the education accessible to refugee and internally displaced children. Access, mainstreaming, medium of instruction, certification, accreditation, progression, second chance education, and skills development are all hugely demanding where schooling and training are even actually available to refugee and IDP families. The utilisation of skills and knowledge are dependent on access to local labour markets which is another substantial hurdle in many host countries.

The iconic numbers

The UNHCR's *Global Trends Report* for 2015 gives the world total for refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers as almost 60 million, of which worldwide some 20 million were refugees, 38 million IDPs and 1.8 million asylum claimants.[2] The specifically educational figures are equally stark according to the May 2016 ODI report, *Education cannot wait*: that in the 35 crisis-affected countries there are no fewer than 17 million school-age refugees, IDPs and other populations of concern. In these same countries, of the 462 million children aged 3-18, it is claimed that 75 million are 'in the most desperate need of educational support' (Nicolai & Magee NN53; ODI, 2016). This dramatic figure of 75 million is larger than the world total of refugees and IDPs, and thus suggests that there are categories of educational deprivation affecting massively larger numbers of children and young people than those falling into the refugee, IDP and other concerned groups (see also Palmer, NN53). *The Global Trends Report* puts it simply: 'Half of the world's refugees are children'. Numbers turn out to be very critical in building images about the global migration crisis and its educational implications. Another crucial illustration of this is the figure of only 2% of the humanitarian aid budget being allocated to education.

We must continually remember, however, as we examine the education side of the migration crisis in the NN53 articles, that the crisis is substantially adding to an already weak educational situation in many countries and regions. Thus, there were 121 million children and adolescents out of school in 2012 worldwide,[3] and of these only some 34 million were in conflict-affected states. No less than half of these (17 million) were in Sub-Saharan Africa (EFA GMR, 2015: 2). We shall shortly note that only half of refugee children globally access primary school (Dryden-Peterson, NN53).

Imagining migrants and national identities

In addition to the above iconic numbers, the imaging of refugees in terms of their sheer scale has become commonplace. Thus 'mass' migration is reflected in metaphors of 'waves', 'influx', 'surges', and 'invasion' and their impact on services such as housing, health and schooling is conceptualized as 'completely unsustainable'. References to 'shortages', 'congestion', and 'overcrowding' are commonly employed to describe the 'pressure' put on national facilities. Education is frequently picked out to illustrate how 'immigration fuels overcrowd-

2 http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html

3 Readers will recall the iconic figure of 250 million children not learning the basics, even though half of them had had some schooling (2013/4 *EFA Global Monitoring Report*).

ing crisis', or how the additional pupils represent 'a ticking time-bomb' or have 'overwhelmed' the formal school system. By contrast with this coloured language, arguably schools have a particular role in rethinking different identities and multiculturalism at a time of a 'simmering but widespread unease at a loss of identity in a multicultural world' (Subhash, NN53). Equally, widespread adult education has a special opportunity and responsibility when the immigration 'threat' has become one of the key issues in the EU Referendum of 23rd June 2016 in the UK.

On the other side of the linguistic debate about migration is the frequent reference in NN53 articles to the 'lost generation' of Syrian refugee and IDP children and students who have been without schooling for many years. Equally, within many developing countries we have included a reference to the tens of millions of children 'left behind' with grandparents or other family members in the countryside by their parents who have left for the cities or for work abroad (Shaeffer, NN53).

Crucial role of education in protracted refugee settings

Even though large-scale refugee movements are often initially seen as temporary displacements, very early on, schooling is identified as perhaps the crucial mechanism to deal with relative poverty and the lack of economic opportunities in the camps. Schooling has often been organized by the refugees themselves, with the help of NGOs and host governments, or uniquely by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the case of Palestinian refugees. The determination of refugee families and their children to succeed via education has been noteworthy whether in the thirty years of exile for Rwandans in Uganda (Murison, NN53), or the almost 70 years of UNRWA's provision of schools for what are now almost 500,000 children across the Middle East, including in Syria. *Learning in the face of adversity* draws on the higher than average learning outcomes in these 700 UNRWA schools (Abdul-Hamid et al., NN53), but their learning experience could be explored in other settings (e.g. Afghani schools in Iran, and Syrian schools in Turkey – Asakuma, NN53 & Yamamoto, NN53).

Challenges to quality refugee education despite evidence of resilience

Despite widespread evidence of, and arguments for, refugee and IDP 'resilience', a key term in discussing cultures of refugee education (Naidoo, 53; Abdul-Hamid et al., NN53; Salem, NN53; Murison, NN53), there is also little doubt that the education provided to large migrant groups can suffer from a whole series of major systemic challenges.

First, there is *basic access*. As already mentioned, only half of refugee children worldwide manage to access primary school, and the situation is even worse at the secondary level (25%) [Dryden-Peterson, NN53]. These realities must be particularly severe when refugee children come out of settings that had achieved near universal primary and secondary education, as was apparently the case with Syria before the civil war.

Second, the situation reflects *compromise and educational expediency*. In several countries the only option for refugee children entering public primary and secondary schools was to accept to be part of double-shift system. In effect this could mean that insufficient curriculum was covered to be sure of gaining the end of high school certification (Salem, NN53; Fean & Marshall, NN53; Chatty, NN53). The case of Lebanon where as many as half a million Syrian school-age children have entered the country would illustrate best the kind of pressure placed on the national system of education. It should perhaps not be surprising that with refugee children in Lebanon numbering as many as the entire UNRWA school system (500,000), there is the most enormous pressure put on the local schools. Apparently, in this situation, only 19% of Syrian school-age children have got into Lebanese schools (ibid). This stark figure underlines the widespread worry reflected in the discourse of 'the lost generation' (ibid), or 'descholarisation' (Tran Thanh, NN53), mentioned earlier.

Third, there is *curricular and linguistic complexity.* Refugee families are faced with hugely demanding curricular choices, between schools offering their own language, teachers and culture, and that of state system which may mean immersion in a totally different language from their own. Decisions on these issues may be driven by changing assumptions about immanent return versus long-term exile.

Fourth, the SDG4 hope for a substantial increase in the *supply of qualified teachers* is probably very far from the realities of refugee education provision in many settings. Where there are very large numbers of children, there is always the risk of a double-shift or additional stream becoming an

entirely high concentration, 'immigrant class' (Pop & McLean, NN53). This is of course the case with camp schools where whole classes are comprised of refugees. Traditional teacher roles suddenly change when the school suddenly becomes double shift or where in the camp settings there are no longer working parents supporting the children's education. Ideals of participatory teaching and critical thinking may become a far cry from the realities of teaching and learning in refugee settings. In such situations, instead of illustrating the resilience we mentioned earlier or 'being spaces of possibility, schools can become markers of present precarity and dead-end futures' (Dryden-Peterson, NN53).

Trade-offs between formal education and informal work

The relations between school and work dramatically change where, as mentioned, parents can no longer legally access formal sector employment. This may lead to children seeking to secure informal work rather than school. In several settings the following tensions have become evident: 'The labour supply shock leads to higher unemployment and informal work, competition over low-skilled jobs and deteriorating work conditions' (Bardak, NN53). In the case of Syria which had a relatively highly developed industrial training system, there is clearly a massive need for skills rebuilding, but with more than 11 million people displaced, there are enormous challenge in replacing the kinds of regular skills development in the surrounding host countries that was available in Syria before the war (Al-Jouni, NN53). Precisely how the Syrian Donors' Conference of February 2016 can expect its pledge of 1.1 million job opportunities to be implemented by 2018 is worth interrogating.

There is no simple generalization to be made about skills development in the camps or destination countries and the local labour market. In the UNRWA training provision across the Middle-East region, on the one hand, there is a VET system that, though small, has been refined over almost 70 years. By contrast, skills development for Congolese refugees in Rwanda seems a far cry from any realistic demand-led provision (Storen, NN53). Where the learning outcomes have been affected by the host country's language and culture, even 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants may continue to access only '3D jobs (i.e., dirty, difficult, and dangerous)' as in the case of the Indo-Chinese in Japan (Maeda, NN53).

'Down with Western education' in an already education-deficient region

One of the more surprising sites of IDP concentration is in North-East Nigeria. There are no less than 2 million IDPs here, most of them in flight from the deliberate destruction of hundreds of their schools, both primary and secondary, on the grounds that Western education is forbidden (*Boko Haram*) [Higazi, NN53]. What needs more reflection is that this is one of the least educated regions in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa with the claim that about 46% of the population have never attended school, and only 12% have achieved primary education (Chijioke & Okoye, NN53). Boko Haram also judge it to be forbidden to work for state institutions including schools because of the widespread alleged corruption in the Nigerian state. But we don't currently know what proportion of the IDPs have not even participated in Western education. Many questions to be asked.

Quality higher education for refugees?

At the other end of the education scale from the 'education IDPs' fleeing from their burnt out schools in Nigeria are those competing for scholarships and academic positions abroad. Naturally a great deal of the priority attention for refugees and IDPs has focused on primary and secondary education provision given the sheer numbers of those without schools. Nevertheless, the opportunity to secure a scholarship or academic placement overseas has been hugely influential in a whole range of countries where academics and students were forced into exile. Bilateral agencies and International NGOs, as well as individuals, have been vital to the organization of scholarships, whether, through World University Service, for Chile in the Pinochet years (Avalos, NN53), or for Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe before majority rule (Preston, NN53). In a contemporary example, the Windle Trust and partners manage a creative programme of Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER) – which despite its name is open both to Kenyans and to refugees in Dadaab, the world's largest refugee camp – in North-East Kenya (Njogu & Shawyer, NN53).

Evidence, priorities and planning in refugee education

There are as many other dimensions of refugee education as there are different contexts and

countries. Because of the difficulty of systemic analysis of the rapidly changing situations in hugely diverse, conflict-affected countries, there is a great deal that simply cannot be generalised about what works best, how, why and at what cost (Smith, NN53; Burde & Guven, NN53). But it is abundantly clear that emergency actions in dramatic and urgent situations may take precedence over careful review of the evidence or of planning (MacEwan & Bird, NN53). It is already evident from the demography of Sub-Saharan Africa that with the continuing population explosion, and the impossibility of providing 500 million jobs over the next 25 years, the seeds of continued emigration from the continent are well in place (May & Dumont, NN53). Apart from flight from direst poverty, mentioned earlier, will flight from the massive absence of decent jobs and decent work be considered forced migration in the future?

The contested role of aid to refugees in the North versus poverty relief in the South

The last point above takes us straight to the debate and contestation about the use of development aid to cover the new and relatively large costs of supporting the minority of global refugees in OECD countries over the recent years of expanded refugee migration. The claim, for instance in Norway, is that almost 20% of its recently expanded aid budget is going to cover refugee budget items such as language courses, child care for unaccompanied minor asylum seekers, and grants to municipalities that settle refugees etc (Koffeld & Brynildsen, NN53). This makes the costs of refugees in the North parallel the debate about the imputed costs of scholarships as aid which has been on-going for several years. There are similar concerns in Germany and the Nordic countries more generally about how helping refugees in Europe should not remove funding from urgent poverty alleviation in the South (Boger & Ghawami, NN53) or from development and area studies institutions in the North (Melber, NN53).

Contexts and cultures of refugees and education

The above few pages cover only a handful of the countries and contexts discussed in this special issue of *NORRAG News*. The refugee and IDP situations in other articles span Japan, China, including Hong Kong ('the city of refugees' (Lo, NN53)), and the Koreas in East Asia; Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines in South East Asia; Bangladesh, Myanmar, India and Afghanistan in South Asia; Sudan, South Sudan, the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes in Africa; Romania and Austria in Europe; as well as articles that cover many different regions of the world in both historical and contemporary contexts (Preston, NN53).

'Lost generations', frameworks of reaction and communities of resilience

One of the outcomes of the widespread concern about Syria's 'lost generation' has been the rise of awareness about many other potentially 'lost generations' across the world. Most of these are in crisis-affected countries, but they are by no means all refugee and IDP children who make up the 75 million children who are 'in the most desperate need of educational support' (ODI, 2016). There are also potentially lost generations in countries that are not affected by conflict (see footnote 3). The value of advocacy around 'No lost generation' and 'Education cannot wait' is that they focus the aid and policy constituencies around particular targets. The other vitally important part of any response is recognizing the role of what may be called 'communities of resilience'. These have not waited for aid funds to set up schools, both formal and informal, and to organize support facilities. But the articles here vividly illustrate that these local community groups, local councils, local religious groups, and NGOS will be a crucial part of any aid platform or initiative (Pop & McLean, NN53). And most critical of all are the many different cultures and contexts of resilience amongst the refugee and IDP children themselves and their families.

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Refugees and Education in the 20th Century

Rosemary Preston,University of Warwick

Email: R.A.Preston@warwick.ac.uk

Keywords: Education and learning (formal, informal, tacit) at all levels; heritage cultures; languages; forced migrant selectivity, knowledge; destinations in situations of armed conflict; stages of settlement, training and support

Summary: Perspectives on multiple modes of 20th century education in refugee contexts, at different stages of asylum and settlement in different parts of the world. Refugee education is fragmented and not easy to synthesise. It implies knowledge of how it has evolved at different times and stages of exile processes, in respect of different people, in different parts of the world. From beginning to end, it includes tacit and incidental learning, and more and less formally organised provision. Information is needed at destinations about prior learning and how decisions will be shaped by policy and disciplinary interpretations in respect of different refuge-seeking groups.

With selectivity embedded in labour migration, so it is in escape from armed conflict. Those who flee, adults and children, perceive no alternative. The best-informed may foresee events and turn their assets to leaving safely, trained activists and militias among them. The less-advantaged leave later, in larger groups, in the face of danger, according to the interacting parameters of difference which mark them for attack (status, ethnicity, faith, gender, learning, and health). For everyone, prior knowledge, learning and cultural exposure structure departure, destination and journey experiences, with patterns reproduced over centuries (e.g. Jewish exile in Europe from 1200 to 1947) and in much shorter time frames (SE Asia in the 1970s). Well-endowed first comers may be welcome to host communities, with cooler receptions for the less advantaged, most often from across neighbouring borders. In large enough numbers, it is they who encounter registration delays and restrictions. Outcomes may be helped with prior knowledge of the asylum system, including awareness of local and international regulations and familiarity with settlement prospects (repatriation, long-term residence in places of initial asylum, or 3rd country resettlement) and their consonance with refugee lifestyle aspirations.

Involuntary migration across 20th century was unprecedented, twice linked to global war and then to continuing strife and proxy wars on all continents. Before and after WWI, host governments encouraged Eastern Europeans seeking asylum to learn national languages, to enhance their economic performance and prevent ghetto formation. In Britain and the US, refugee children in local schools, like work place colleagues, were forbidden the use of heritage vernaculars. Informally, exile communities prioritised the protection of heritage identities, language fluency and the traditions of home, through education and cultural events. Specific to politicised exiles will have been status-conferring adherence to the principles of their cause, through informal meetings and news sharing. Their intention will have been to repatriate as well-informed activists.

Until well after WWI, principles of self-sufficiency and *laissez faire* framed policy, with national and international bodies alike intolerant of charity to alleviate need. This permitted significant refugee participation in decisions about their own affairs, with naturalisation and professional development at their own expense facilitating access to work.[1] By 1930, gradual assistance with refugee resettlement and work-related training was a significant change, but overall they remained self-reliant. There was some on-the-job agricultural training,

1 From an educational perspective, this paragraph draws heavily on Easton-Calabria, Evan Elise (1915) *From Bottom-Up to Top-Down: The 'Pre-History' of Refugee Livelihoods Assistance from 1919 to 1979*, Journal of Refugee Studies, 28,3. 412-437, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fev004

linked to new rural development programmes and, in towns, many resumed past trades and professions. Between the wars, there was popular protest at support for refugee employment as host society residents were losing jobs. By WWII, levels of intervention increased, paving the way to the more authoritarian post-war refugee aid and development regime. In spite of the 1951 Geneva Conventions, refugees came to be treated as victims in need of protection, but denied the right to work. Decades on, they are most often deemed a costly drain on host resources, although in places of temporary settlement, they are of necessity engaged in refugee service provision.

Under UNHCR, the system became responsible for the shifting scenarios of refugee education, associated with post-colonial conflict and the more recent fragmentation of consolidated states. At some point, groups in flight (e.g. from West Papua to Sri Lanka, Mozambique, El Salvador and Chechnya) come to a halt and form a fragile settlement. The Jungle in Calais and Syrians on Lesbos are contemporary examples. Within days such groups seek how to organise activities for children, along with literacy, numeracy and identity framing history (faith, ethnicity, faction). Once embraced by NGO networks, UN rapid response facilitators may guide approaches to early and primary learning. Follow-on formal instruction in basic skills, might draw on the curriculum of countries of origin and/or asylum, depending on: settlement status (as illegal border crossers, recognised asylum seekers or legally registered refugees); the plan for and likely timing of settlement outcomes; any provision already made for those from the same communities and language groups, possibly including those with special needs. Such instruction will usually cater only to a proportion of those in need. Quality will be uneven, with poorly trained teachers and many days lost, attributable to domestic needs, settlement arrangements, factionalism, and disruption by violence, external attack and injury from unexploded ordinance. However good, for however long, formal recognition of learning may never be available, even when overseen by host government officials. Informally, savvy adults may individually arrange with camp personnel to learn the official languages of host or preferred destination countries. They will convene learning circles, often in secret, to review their prospects, share thinking about situations at home and the ways ahead. Over the years, it is not unusual to hear the phrase 'without paid employment, education is my work, education is my life'.

With protracted asylum in camps the size of cities, there will be multi-level education systems, from early childhood care and education to post-secondary vocational/professional training, perhaps even university studies, and a range of adult learning options. There will be continuous professional development of refugee teachers in technical and administrative areas, for most at fairly basic levels. Examples include 70 years of ongoing UNWRA education for Palestinians in the Middle East and 30 years of multi-lateral education for Namibian exiles in Zambia and Angola, prior to independence in 1990, including an extensive higher education scholarship programme in 43 countries. For the shorter term, systems such as those developed in the 1980s by Khmer governments in Thai border camps included on-the-job training in the making of artificial limbs, primary health care, income-generating weaving and embroidery, and trauma management. Western European nations provided countless scholarships to exiles of liberation movements and before the dissolution of the USSR (1991), there were dedicated programmes for African refugees in Eastern Europe, at vocational and tertiary levels. Cuba, from 1960, organised schools for tens of thousands of refugee children from Africa, using curricula from their countries of origin. They stayed through primary and secondary, in some cases through tertiary, until independence or before repatriating to contribute to nation-building and reconstruction.

On final settlement, there are new cycles of formal and informal learning, as those affected prepare to adapt back at home or to new environments, seeking recognition for qualifications and deploying skills to integrate. In the search for housing and work, they are variously pitted against other returnees and the population *in situ* and nationals of the new host country respectively. With notable exceptions, few returnees assume high status positions. The disabled needing rehabilitation are among the worst off, while angry returnee veterans without civilian training pose major threats. In new countries, professional cadres will often slot in at levels well below those expected, leaving younger generations to catch-up with what they have had to relinquish.

The Global Responsibility for Financing the Real Cost of Education in Emergencies and Protracted Conflict

Robert Palmer, University of Nottingham and NORRAG

Email: rpalmer00@gmail.com

Keywords: Education Cannot Wait Fund; World Humanitarian Summit

Summary: The Education Cannot Wait Fund is a positive step in the right direction, but is it really ambitious enough? Even if the Fund is resourced as planned, the world will still witness millions of children in crisis-affected countries waiting for a quality education, and millions more will grow up over the next 10-15 years and become youth and young adults who missed out on an education. The Fund will ignore children under the age of 3, and youth aged over 19 years. For many, it seems, education will have to wait. The Fund is imperfect. But it is a great start.

In the lead up to the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016 there is a great deal of discussion and hope regarding the 23rd May launch of the Education Cannot Wait Fund (see Nicolai and Magee, this issue); even while there is still open acknowledgement that 'the world's best professionals in education in emergencies… [have]… very little understanding of how it [the Fund] will work' (GEMR, 2016).

While the creation of this Fund is being warmly welcomed by most stakeholders, the details of what the Fund can do – and by when - in relation to the actual need is less discussed. Moreover, the assumptions on which cost estimates for the Fund are made say a lot about the expectations regarding a shared responsibility for financing education in emergencies and protracted conflict.

Price tag: Educating 75 million children in crisis-affected countries = US$11.7 billion per annum

It is stated that 75 million children aged 3-18 years, living in 35 crisis-affected countries, are in desperate need of educational support.[1] The total annual education cost across affected countries is estimated to average $156 per child (ODI, 2016), meaning that the real annual total cost of educating these 75 million children is **at least US$11.7bn** – *at least*, because this assumes a zero growth rate in the magnitude of children aged 3-18 years living in crisis-affected countries in need of an education.[2]

The cost assumptions built into the proposal for the Education Cannot Wait Fund are that while the total education cost across affected countries averages US$156 per child, domestic resources will contribute on average at least US$43 per child, and thus the financing gap (that needs to be filled by the Education Cannot Wait Fund) is U$113 per child.

US$8.5bn external financing gap per annum

To educate all 75 million in crisis-affected countries the total education cost is estimated to be US$11.7bn per annum, made up of US$3.2bn expected to come from domestic resources, and **US$8.5bn from external financing** (via the Education Cannot Wait Fund and other means).

1 Of these 75 million, 'while a number are out of school, for those in school, many are at risk of education disruption, drop out, and poor quality, alongside psychosocial and protection concerns' (Nicolai et al., 2015: 4).

2 In fact, we can't know what the number of children and young people out of school will be in 2030; it could be significantly more or less than the estimated 75 million in 2016.

Fig. 1. Projected financing gap, expected domestic contribution and total education cost (year 1 to year 15)



Source: author, based on figures in ODI (2016)[3]

Against the overall need of reaching 75 million children and an US$8.5bn external financing gap, the Education Cannot Wait Fund has the ambition to scale up annual financing from US$153m in year 1, to US$1.5bn by 2020. This, it is claimed will reach 1.36m children and young people in year 1 and 13.6m children and young people by year 5 (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Projected growth in funding to meet ambition

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
Total children and young people targeted	1,360,000	3.400,000	6,120,000	9,520,000	13,600,000
Total funding required ($)	$153 million	$383 million	$689 million	$1 billion	$1.5 billion

Source: ODI (2016)

What is less discussed, however, is the flip side to this. While it is acknowledged that 75 million children aged 3-18 years, living in 35 crisis-affected countries, are in desperate need of educational support (ODI, 2016), the Education Cannot Wait Fund will – even if fully resourced as expected – still leave millions of children and young people, well, waiting.

Education *Can* Wait (for funding)

The Education Cannot Wait Fund is rather misleading; because its level of ambition and projected scale up plans openly (though tacitly) acknowledge that for the majority of children and young people in crisis-affected countries education will have to wait – in the best case at least for 15 years (Fig. 3).

In year 1, the projected reach is 1.36m children and young people, meaning that 73.6m children and young people are left waiting for education. In year 2, the projected reach is 3.4m, meaning that 71.6m children and young people are waiting for their education. By year 5, the projected reach is 13.6m, meaning that 61.4m children and young people are still waiting. Somewhere around year 10 the number of children and young people reached will match the number of children and young people still waiting. Eventually, the plan is, that by year 2030 there will be no more children and young people in crisis-affected countries waiting for education.

3 The solid lines in the diagram refer to the numbers given in ODI (2016), and the dotted lines are extrapolated to 2030.

Fig. 3. Total number of children and young people in crisis-affected countries who are expected to wait for education



Source: author, based on figures in ODI (2016)

Even in this best case scenario, in the years running up to 2030, millions and millions of children and young people will have to wait, every year, for education. Education for millions, it seems, will have to wait.

Education *Can* Wait (if you're aged 0-3 or over 18)

While there are volumes of recent evidence highlighting the importance of early childhood learning and development – especially the first 1000 days – children aged 0-3 are not to be covered by the Education Cannot Wait Fund.

Further, while there is increasing concern about the need to support young people (especially those aged up to 30) in crisis-countries – especially countries that are affected by conflict – including through technical and vocational training, young people over 18 years are not to be covered by the Education Cannot Wait Fund.

The Education Cannot Wait Fund has decided to focus Fund efforts on the age range 3-18 years, 'as it was felt that… support to 0-3 year olds and over 18 young people and adults… was impractical in the first stages of Platform operation, and could be reconsidered **at a later date**' (ODI, 2016: 30, emphasis added). In other words, those aged 0-3 years and those aged 18+ who are living in crisis-affected countries perhaps will also have to wait for education.

The assumption of domestic financing

As noted above, the Education Cannot Wait Fund assumes that there will be significant funding available from countries' domestic resources to pay for the education of children and young people in crisis affected countries; that up to 30% of the total cost of educating such children and young people would be met in this way.

In some contexts this would be feasible, but in others less so. This assumption is less sound in low and middle income countries with large populations of refugees and/or displaced persons (IDPs). This assumption is unfair for the majority

of such countries that host refugees or IDPs, as they themselves are often resource-scarce; the UNHCR estimates that developing regions hosted 86% of the world's refugees, and that the Least Developed Countries host 25% of the global total (UNHCR, 2015). The expectation that countries that are already low (or even middle) income should be expected to part finance the global public good of educating refugees and displaced persons is unfair. Furthermore, one situation is not the same as the next; where there are significant movements of people to other countries (e.g. Syrians to Lebanon), should Lebanon be left to pay (even 30%) of the cost of so many children? The fact that such host countries are already paying considerably more than this 30% figure is very unjust.

A global compact on responsibility-sharing for the education of children and young people in crisis-affected countries

The UN Secretary General has recently called for the creation of a 'more predictable and equitable way of responding to large movements of refugees… through the adoption of a global compact on responsibility-sharing for refugees' (UN, 2016: 1). Such a global compact would encompass a range of support for such people, including education.

The setting up of the Education Cannot Wait Fund is certainly a positive step in the right direction. However, we also need to be realistic about the scale of the problem and make sure that not only is the Education Cannot Wait Fund fully resourced for the first 5 years, and that it is sufficiently scaled up to reach all 75 million children and young people by 2030, but also that the level of ambition is raised further to adopt a global compact that sees the responsibility for financing the education of children and young people in crisis-affected countries become truly shared so that low and middle income countries that host the majority of such children are not expected to pay about a third of the cost (in many cases, of course, such countries currently pay a lot more than this). We also need to **challenge the underlying assumption** of the Education Cannot Wait Fund: that for many millions of children and young people, education will have to wait. As Kolleen Bouchane (2016) of the Global Campaign for Education and Global Business Coalition for Education says, the Education Cannot Wait Fund is certainly 'imperfect. But it will be a start.'

48 hours of global military spending or education for 75 million children?

The Education Cannot Wait Fund will need US$8.5 billion per annum to reach all 75 million children in crisis affected countries. This may seem like a lot, but to put it into perspective it was equivalent to less than 48 hours of global military spending in 2015; put another way, if global military spending was reduced by only 0.5% and these funds were allocated instead to the Education Cannot Wait Fund, 75 million children would not be waiting for an education.

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Immigration, Multiculturalism and Identity: Globalization's Spin-offs Require an Honest Debate

Subhash Agrawal, India Focus, New Delhi

Email: Indiafocus@yahoo.com

Keywords: Multiculturalism; identity; immigration; community; globalization; local

Summary: The European refugee crisis is the latest eruption of a simmering but widespread unease at the loss of identity in a multicultural world. Despite repeated usage of the cliché "think global but act local", the overall push of globalization has been to ignore or downgrade the importance of local ways of life, local traditions and local community obligations. Instead of using harsh labels on either side, Europe needs to frame a balanced response to this crisis that respects national sensibilities while giving relief to refugees who are genuinely in need. The role of education is greater than ever.

Europe's latest refugee crisis and the sharp political backlash it is triggering is more than just a dreadful failure of consensus inside the European Union at a time when a united response is most needed. The eruption of this crisis actually speaks of a larger social and political disquiet that has been simmering across the world for almost two decades but which has neither been adequately addressed or even clearly framed in public discourse.

That is the fear of a loss of identity brought on by globalization.

Developing societies fear losing their cultural mooring and self-confidence under a flood of products and cultural influences from the West, while developed societies worry about the prospect of losing their way of life under uncontrolled immigration. For different reasons, both have long carried a painful awareness of slowly waylaying their cultural distinctiveness, and of losing primacy of their customs, values and loyalties within their own borders. As much as a reflex against foreign domination, there is a deep angst at a rapidly gaining 'market-economy' ethos that treats everyone as mere consumers and disdains anything to do with tradition, history or culture.

This public mood is more pervasive and has been around far longer than has been generally acknowledged. In the shrillness of the current debate, it is all but forgotten that there were extensive political protests even 10 years ago over immigration policies in France and the United Kingdom in the wake of a spate of immigrant riots. In fact, in an extensive poll of almost 55,000 people in 70 countries by the Gallup organization in December 2005, almost 47 percent of respondents wanted to close their national borders to new immigrants, a figure which was much higher in many European nations.

The growing estrangement between host and guest populations has been further fanned by the natural concentration of immigrants in just a few urban areas in every host country. Vancouver has changed much more than Canada in recent decades, Los Angeles much more than the United States and Melbourne much more than Australia.

A number of notable geopolitical events since 9/11 have also widened the divide between Islam and the West, and underscored the fragile nature of multicultural societies. The European establishment has been particularly challenged and numbed by the terror attacks in Madrid, London and Paris which were the result of violent extremists who associate themselves with the Daesh-led terrorist group. Violent extremists in Europe have had a field day in recruiting adherents. To the shock of an increasingly secularized continent, religious identity seems to have trumped national, community and social bonds.

While the current phase of globalization began with the end of the Cold War, the trend towards a multicultural society is much older. It started with steady waves of immigration to the United States

in the early part of the 20th century, and picked up speed during the economic boom years of the 1950s and 1960s when European governments opened their doors for cheap labour from neighbouring regions of northern Africa and Turkey, as did the Commonwealth countries of Canada, UK and Australia from their colonial cousins. Wrought with guilt after the two world wars, many European nations adopted a *laissez-faire* model of society. They frequently bent over backwards to accommodate newcomers, but not integrate them. If anything, religious and ethnic identities were allowed a free play because of the fear that to ask immigrants to accept values of their host society might be considered an act of cultural aggression. Over time, this lazy experiment with multicultural co-existence somehow congealed into lofty conventional wisdom.

According to the United Nations, there are currently more than 230 million international migrants around the world, including refugees. This is roughly equivalent to 46% of the population of the European Union. Most of these are concentrated in about a dozen OECD countries, some of whom now have a foreign-born population greater than 25 percent. The United States, still the primary destination for immigrants, has roughly 46 million foreign-born people, almost 15% of its population. Even illegal immigration continues at a high rate despite the risk of deportation or severe physical harm, and nearly 500,000 illegal crossings were caught in 2014 along the U.S.-Mexico border alone.

Meanwhile, and in the last two decades, during globalization's big push, public rhetoric of government, industry and media leaders has included an unmistakable air of patronizing tolerance if not derision towards the 'local.' Despite repeated usage of the cliché 'think global but act local', the overall push of globalization has been to promote a cosmopolitan worldview and to downgrade local obligations or commitments, including to community traditions, bonds, collective memory and all other things that often constitute a real identity for millions of people. The 'local' is seen as a museum-worthy collection of delightful oddities and artefacts that should be documented, archived, displayed and even occasionally celebrated, but never taken seriously as an intimate and crucial crutch of people's lives. It is meant to add a dash of colour, not to hog the limelight.

It is true that almost every seminal social change requires its early champions and eager apostles, and there is therefore a natural element of elitism built into the very definition of progress, innovation and change. But even so, the hubris and superciliousness of post-nationalistic global-think has been rather remarkable. For a vast majority of people, life continues to centre on jobs, housing, transportation, food and entertainment that is available in or near where they are born or where they work. The world is undoubtedly becoming more interdependent and connected, but our most tangible and conscious reality still remains the local and not the global.

As a perpetual social condition, or as an entrenched philosophy bestowed with virtue in its own right, multiculturalism has proven to be deeply problematic. The essence of a multicultural society is its emphasis on differences rather than on commonality, the very antithesis of assimilation. Originally, it might have been a useful idea - perhaps even noble - to provide more than adequate time to newcomers to join the mainstream at their own pace, but only as a tactical and temporary measure.

Even in the US, a country founded by immigrants and whose national consciousness is burnished with the ideal of welcoming, on its Statue of Liberty, the world's "huddled masses yearning to breathe free", assimilation of migrants in the fullest cultural way has now become a major theme in political discourse. America would hardly be the economic and military superpower it is today without its huge waves of immigrants from the 19th century onwards who gave America its overpowering lead in manufacturing, technology, innovation and patents. In fact, if all undocumented migrant workers in America packed up and left, the effect would be dramatic in terms of dislocation, work stoppage and a big price increase for a variety of daily products or services in the US. And yet, there is strong public opposition in the US to recent immigration reforms that would effectively legalize millions of undocumented workers. In recent polls, nine of every ten Americans think that immigration is a serious problem, and more Americans are wary of foreigners now than at any time in history. Fear over immigration is a primary reason for the popularity of a politician like Donald Trump.

Public discourse in the media and at major global forums generally adds very little new flesh to notions of citizenship, identity and community -

that is, outside of accepted legal definitions that by nature are sterile or technical. But globalization and its downstream effects have intensified soul searching, and there is a strong strand of thought that citizenship is a precious blend that includes a number of tangible and intangible ingredients, a mix of rights, privileges, responsibilities, obligations and multi-layered social contracts between the individual, state and society. Citizenship is a status that must be earned, not merely acquired in due time by those who choose to locate or work in a specific place. There is a large swathe of opinion that supports the view that a nation is strengthened by, and is morally correct to protect and promote, its core cultural values because this what nourishes social capital and democracy.

Many committed internationalists of course repeatedly intone the mantra of how the world has nothing to be scared by either cultural or human encounters. But howsoever irrational or wrong, the fear of identity loss, of feeling your way of life slipping away without your acquiescence or even preparation, is very real and very widespread. The real puzzle is why business, professional and media elites seem to be tuned into a frequency so completely different from most people.

To be clear, any criticism of multiculturalism as it currently exists in the West is not at all an endorsement of extreme views of the European or American populist far right, nor to promote exclusion or end of migration. It is rather, a case for a more honest and active understanding of multicultural co-existence and all its attendant problems, precisely in order to defuse tensions on both sides. In fact, the growth of immigration and multiculturalism has made the role of education far more crucial in social transformation, because no other institution or agency in life shapes our sense of mutual understanding or unleashes empathy as does schooling. The bottom line is this: immigration, integration and identity have now become deeply contentious and pressing public concerns of our time, and the role of education in helping us deal with these social tensions is far greater than ever before.

NEW CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID

Humanitarian Aid for Refugee Education: Why More is Needed

Aaron Benavot, Global Education Monitoring Report, UNESCO, Paris

Email: a.benavot@unesco.org

Keywords: Humanitarian aid; refugees; education; donor aid; aid architecture

Summary: Calculating how much aid is going to refugees is not an exact science. How could it be when by their very nature, refugees are on the move? What we do know is that refugees suffer from almost every education challenge possible, and humanitarian and development aid levels are grossly insufficient to meet their acute learning needs.

Conflict in all its forms has taken a huge toll on education systems. While often the attention is on the source of the fighting, the visible influx of refugees seeking safe haven in Europe this last year has turned Western eyes towards the plight of refugees. What we know is that the scale, and the complexity, of the responses required to fulfil the education needs of those seeking refuge from the fighting are not being met. The fact is that insufficient humanitarian and development aid systems, together with insufficient levels of domestic financing, are leaving millions of displaced children and youth excluded from their right to a quality education.

Refugees suffer from almost every education challenge possible: a lack of infrastructure, a lack of learning materials, and of sufficiently knowledgeable and well supported teachers, as well as persistent barriers to learning posed by language, poverty and gender. Many desperately need skills for self-reliance, well-being and prosperity. If fulfilled, this would generate human capital in refugee communities, critical for repatriation to, and the rebuilding of, their homelands. Yet, their plight often goes unheard, and their education needs therefore unmet, because data on moving people are hard, if not impossible to collect.

While the word 'refugees' may initially bring to mind the recent influx of people into Europe, 86% of all refugees are hosted in developing countries, restricted to camps or struggling to fit into urban centres throughout the developing world. These protracted crises, and long-standing challenges they spawn, are not being addressed by traditional humanitarian assistance. Indeed, as a GEM policy paper showed (GMR, 2015), countries with long-term crises are receiving less than half the amount of development aid than others.

The exact figures of aid to refugees are not easy to find. Just as the data on refugee camps and settlements remain murky, so too are the exact breakdowns of humanitarian aid going to support their needs, certainly in the area of education. Current sums include refugees, but also extend to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and children who are neither IDPs nor refugees. Likewise, figures from the OECD DAC, which reports on external aid to refugees from donors, are not broken down by sector; so real clarity on how much is going to meet the pressing education needs of displaced children and youth is anyone's guess.

What we do know is that humanitarian aid answered only 36% of education's request for funds in 2014, compared to an average of 60% for other sectors. Development aid is similarly failing to prioritize education in conflict settings with just 10% of aid disbursed to the education sector in 2013. Funding for education from humanitarian pooled funding mechanisms is small: just 3% went to the education sector, while 25% went to health between 2010 and 2014. This all leads to just one conclusion: refugees, as a significant segment of the affected people needing this aid, are being left without international assistance.

In addition, media attention brings aid with it. This means that millions of refugees whose plight the

media ignore, but who have been living in developing country camps their entire lifetime, have seen their school-aged years pass them by without support. Our analysis showed that just 4% of the 342 appeals made between 2000-2014 received over half of available humanitarian aid for education, all of which were heavily reported in the news.

It is a travesty that the education needs of so many displaced children and youth are left unanswered. Education provides them with shelter – literally and figuratively. It gives them essential knowledge and skills to thrive and survive following displacement and over the longer term. Overall, expanding education opportunity contributes to greater peace and security, as we will be showing in greater depth in the 2016 GEM Report. Clearly, those who hold the purse strings and those who make decisions on the ground must address the unmet needs of refugees, regardless of media visibility. Not doing so undermines our moral and collective responsibility to act with empathy and wisdom in the face of immense suffering.

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Joining Forces for an Education Crisis Platform

Susan Nicolai and Arran Magee, ODI, London

Emails: s.nicolai@odi.org.uk; a.magee@odi.org.uk

Keywords: Education; crisis; emergencies; humanitarian funding

Summary: *Education Cannot Wait* (ODI, May 2016) lays out a new collaborative approach to transform education response during emergencies and protracted crises. As pledges towards the multibillion dollar platform begin to come in, how will this new fund operate and in what ways might it shift global humanitarian and development architectures?

75 million children aged 3-18 years living in 35 crisis-affected countries are in the most desperate need of educational support. Within these same countries, there are over 17 million school-age refugees, internally displaced, and other populations of concern (Nicolai, et al., 2016). The Syrian crisis alone has left 1.4 million Syrian refugee children and youth aged 5-17 years in five neighbouring countries in need of educational assistance (No Lost Generation, 2016). Despite progress made by donors, aid agencies and NGOs working in dangerous and arduous conditions, only 50% of refugee children and only 35% of refugee girls around the world completed primary school, and only 25% of refugee adolescents attended secondary school (OECD, 2015).

The headline numbers speak for themselves. The current aid architecture is failing to fully support countries in fulfilling the right to education for millions of crisis-affected children.

More can be done. Following the failure to reach the Millennium Development Goals on education and the Dakar Goals on Education for All, a renewed momentum has formed around the importance of filling education gaps, leading to increased high-level political commitments to education for the most marginalised. Moreover, governments, donors and civil society are increasingly united in their demand for new approaches to education and joint and innovative finance mechanisms. Further, the evidence is stronger than ever that education improves life chances and is highly prioritised by children and families in emergencies (Nicolai & Hine, 2015).

At the Oslo summit in July 2015, calls were made for governments to establish an Education Crisis Platform to urgently address funding gaps, increase national and international capacities, join up planning and response across humanitarian and development divides and form a high-level group of champions to further global action. In an encouraging example of international response, hundreds of international, national and civil society actors have collaborated to input on design of this new platform.

Since then, a large group of 18 affected governments, donors, UN agencies and (I)NGOs came together to advise on the design of the platform. A further 500 some people fed into a global consultation process, and country application visits were made to Lebanon and South Sudan to better explore the approaches being proposed.

Resulting plans are laid out in *Education Cannot Wait: Proposing a fund for education in emergencies*, released in May 2016 (Nicolai, et al., 2016). It presents a new approach to transform the global education sector to deliver a more collaborative, agile and rapid response to crises. In line with the calls at the 2015 Oslo summit, it is proposed that the platform will include five functions:

- inspire political commitment;
- joint planning and response;
- generate and disburse new funding;
- strengthen international and national capacity;
- and improve accountability.

This platform will operate through the establishment of an Acceleration Facility to invest in existing actors to expand and extend collective work to deliver high-quality education services in crises, and a Breakthrough Fund to mobilise and disburse new funding for country-level delivery of education crisis response, channelling monies for rapid response, multi-year support, and dedicated funds for specific crises.

Whilst the initial call is for $150m in year 1, funds will need to scale up gradually to the level of $1.5 billion annually by 2020, in order to reach 13.6 million children and young people (18% of those affected). This involves a 5 year fundraising target of $3.85 billion. Albeit ambitious, this level of support sets a promising and important precedent for progress towards achieving education for all in line with SDG4 on education.

Even with this extraordinary effort, challenges would remain. The platform will only reach a small proportion of the many children affected by crisis, and education will remain underfunded. In 2013 only 2% of humanitarian funding went to education, and it continues to receive one of the smallest proportions of requested humanitarian aid – 40% of what it requested in 2013, compared with 86% for the food sector and 57% for the health sector (UNESCO, 2015). Recent calls for a doubling of humanitarian aid to education provides some hope; however, it is still estimated to fall short of required funding (UNESCO, 2015).

Of similar concern, we are yet to identify and thoroughly test effective approaches for providing education to children and youth in emergencies. A joint UNHCR, UNICEF and DFID project seeking new educational innovations for children and youth in crisis notes: "it is clear that routine responses have been unable to meet the educational needs of children in emergencies and that there is a need for new approaches that deliver quality educational services in crises settings" (UNHCR, 2016).

The design of *Education Cannot Wait*, however, tries to take these issues into account. Central to its approach is to establish a global finance facility, contributing to, and leveraging additional resources, aiming to drive a step-change in financing for education response in both emergencies and protracted crises. It also recognises the need for flexible long-term funding and support for an array of innovative education interventions to support the most vulnerable crisis-affected children and youth, with additional efforts made to support non-formal education where relevant. These components of the platform design provide promise of a more flexible and responsive development mechanism to shift the larger development architecture. As the platform begins to take shape and pledges come in around a planned launch at the World Humanitarian Summit this May, its success hangs on its ability to maintain the principles that shaped it.

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Challenges to a Comprehensive and Integrated EU Migration and Asylum Policy

Raphaëlle Faure and Mikaela Gavas, ODI, London
Anna Knoll, ECDPM, Maastricht

Emails: r.faure@odi.org.uk; m.gavas@odi.org.uk; ak@ecdpm.org

Keywords: comprehensive response; migration; asylum; EU

Summary: This article sets out three fundamental structural reasons for the failure to deliver a comprehensive and effective EU approach to the migration and refugee crisis.

The ongoing refugee crisis has revealed both political and structural impediments in the European Union's (EU) response to what has now been labelled 'Europe's biggest challenge'. A lack of leadership and coherent and coordinated policy-making, as well as poorly designed response mechanisms, has severely hampered Europe. And, yet, there are high expectations that the EU will help resolve the migration challenges faced by its Member States, particularly on curbing irregular immigration and managing local pressures on borders.

A lack of strategic and coherent policy approaches and their implementation within the EU institutions as well as between different EU Member States continues to cripple Europe. To date, large implementation gaps persist and EU Member States continually drag their feet in delivering on measures put forward by the Commission and to which Member States have signed up. Out of the agreed relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers only 660 had been relocated from Italy and Greece in early March 2016. Commitments by Member States to provide Greece and Italy with national experts to help run the so-called 'hotspots' where asylum seekers are to be processed upon arrival have to a large extent not been met. There is also a fair amount of scepticism about the EU institutions' ability to transform its migration governance due to its limited role on this issue, and given the continued centrality of the EU Member State as the driver of contemporary migration governance. Member States are in the driving seat as was clearly demonstrated recently by the negotiations on an EU-Turkey action plan taking place in the European Council among EU Heads of States and Governments.

There are at least **three fundamental structural reasons** for the current constraints on Europe to deliver a comprehensive and effective approach.

First, the current EU migration governance system of parallel competences that allows Member States to pursue their own policies alongside EU policy and the variety of actors involved affects the possibilities of a comprehensive and coherent external approach. Shared competences by the EU and its Member States become especially problematic when there are diverging interests and objectives, especially at a time when migration and asylum have become such a toxic subject in domestic politics. A prime example is the implementation of the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). While the EU has a balanced approach on paper, the problem is that the European Commission alone cannot implement it or make use of all the pillars of the GAMM without the cooperation of its Member States. As a result, the concrete implementation of the GAMM has been tilted towards a focus on security, readmission and border control, rather than making use of the full potential of EU migration tools. Over the past year, a number of Member States went a step further by disregarding the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation resulting in some countries closing their borders or building fences to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from entering their territory and in others letting asylum seekers apply for protection in their country in breach of EU rules. As Member States 'go it alone', the prospect of an EU comprehensive approach appears less and less likely despite regular high level summits to try and find a common solution.

Second, the co-existence of many actors who want their say in policies and who come from very different policy areas with varying if not conflicting interests poses challenges to an

integrated policy approach. The Directorate-General (DG) Migration and Home Affairs, which coordinates the European Commission's response to migration and asylum, has in the past transposed its concern for EU internal security to the external dimension of migration and asylum policy with a prime aim to stem irregular immigration. This approach has at times clashed with that of the external relations directorates of the European Commission, and in particular DG International Cooperation and Development. The result, in some cases, has been conflicting policy goals. For example, the strong focus on return and reintegration policies risks diverting attention away from the process of wider economic and political reform in partner countries. In addition, the insertion of readmission clauses in certain agreements has complicated negotiations with third countries. To date, the role of the European External Action Service, which is responsible for coordinating the EU's external action, has been restricted to taking the lead in only some components of the EU response, such as common security and defence missions, without necessarily succeeding in injecting a longer-term strategic vision into the EU's overall response. In light of different starting points and policy objectives, effective day-to-day coordination of approaches between the different EU Services still remains a challenge, despite improvements in the joint elaboration of overarching Commission policies such as the European Agenda on Migration.

Third, there is a myriad of fragmented, and in some cases, overlapping funding instruments that have a stake in addressing the external dimension of migration and asylum. Some partner countries and regions have numerous programmes, each with different terms and conditions. In some cases, the EU institutions have no general oversight of what is taking place on the ground. At times, this has promoted parallel activities such as training and business creation programmes for returnees, rather than reinforcing public schemes that are already working at the national level. It has yet to be seen whether the newly instated EU multi-donor Trust Funds will streamline responses or create yet another layer of funding instruments.

There are a number of incremental steps the EU could take to overcome some of these constraints. These include the possible appointment of a senior political advisor to build bridges between the external and internal dimension of migration and asylum policies across the EU system and between the EU institutions and the Member States; the establishment of an overarching strategy for international migration and asylum policy to overcome the disconnect at strategic levels between the internal and external dimensions of the EU's policies on migration as well as security; better information exchange and coordination of national policies at the EU level on both the internal and external dimensions of asylum and migration policy and a strengthening of the EU institutions' arbitration role so that they have the authority to ensure that EU rules are interpreted and applied consistently across Member States.

To be effective, however, the proposed measures would require far greater political recognition of the fact that a joint response is in the interest of EU Member States and the EU as a whole. This means that bilateral approaches need to be better reconciled with and embedded in one comprehensive EU approach. The current political direction of travel is, however, going in quite the opposite direction.

This article draws on the Report: Faure, Gavas and Knoll (2015): *"Challenges to a comprehensive EU migration and asylum policy"*.

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The Nordic Aid Domino: Nordic Exceptionalism Before a Fall

Øygunn Sundsbø Brynildsen and Kjersti Koffeld, Save the Children, Oslo

Emails: oygunn.Sundsbo.Brynildsen@reddbarna.no;
kjersti.koffeld@reddbarna.no

Keywords: ODA; refugee costs; Norway; OECD DAC

Summary: This article tells the story of a political fight over who should cover the costs of refugees in Europe. The opposition was strong when Nordic governments proposed to send the bill to the world's poorest, and the budget discussions continue in 2016.

At the UN Post 2015 Summit at the end of September 2015 Erna Solberg, Prime Minister of Norway, talked passionately about the new Sustainable Development Goals and promised that Norway would "do its outmost" to eradicate poverty. Then she went home and proposed the largest 'cuts' ever in Norwegian long term aid. This follows the same lines as Finland,[1] Denmark[2] and Sweden.[3]

Norway: the largest recipient of Norwegian aid

The government proposed to spend one fifth (21%) of the aid budget in 2016 on refugee related costs in Norway.[4] In 2015 the share was around 6% of the aid budget. The government, which is being criticized for robbing Peter to pay Paul,[5] argued that this was an exceptional situation, and that everyone would have to contribute. As if Norway – of all countries – would not be able to reallocate 9.5 billion NOK (just over 1 billion EUR, the expected additional cost related to receiving refugees in 2016) over its national budget without sending almost half of the bill to the world's poorest.

However, opposition parties in Parliament protested. Actually they disagreed so strongly that the aid budget created numerous headlines and radio debates at the end of 2015. Opposition parties have a fairly strong negotiation position, given that we're talking about a minority government coalition. They used this position to argue strongly against taking from the poor to pay for refugee related costs in Europe, and to some extent succeeded. They managed to increase the over-all ODA budget for 2016 to 37.3 billion NOK (1.1 % of GNI), of which a skyrocketing 19.64 % is being spent in Norway on refugee related costs. Just over half of the refugee related costs goes to run asylum centers. The other half is shared between the Ministry of Education and Research, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Ministry of Children and Equality. They cover budget items such as language courses, child care for unaccompanied minor asylum seekers, grants to municipalities that settle refugees,[6] administrative costs and more[7]. So, although Norway is a best-performer in terms of percentage of GNI spent on ODA, Norway is also the largest recipient of Norwegian aid. This means Norway receives ten times as much as the second largest recipient of Norwegian aid, which in 2014 was Afghanistan[8].

1 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/finland-slashes-development-aid-43-315280
2 http://www.eurodad.org/Entries/view/1546489/2015/10/15/What-happened-to-the-good-guys
3 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/nov/05/sweden-could-redirect-60-of-development-aid-funding-to-refugee-crisis?CMP=share_btn_f
4 In total 7.3bn NOK, of which 1.2 bn. was additional to the original budget proposal.
5 https://www.devex.com/news/norway-diverting-aid-to-cover-refugees-robbing-peter-to-pay-paul-87252
6 Government website, Settlement of refugees: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/asylum-regulations-in-norway/integrering/busetting-av-flyktningar/id2343754/
7 The National Budget 2016 (Prop. 1 S (2015–2016)) chapter 167: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/prop.-1-s-ud-20152016/id2456001/?q=&ch=2#KAP11_ch2
8 Figures for 2015 and 2016 are not yet available

So what?

Worryingly, these 'cuts' in long-term aid happen at a time when governments should be stepping up their efforts to eradicate poverty and help developing countries build the strong and stable societies needed to prevent future conflicts and humanitarian crises. Cutting support to building strong civil societies, cutting support that helps the least developed countries provide essential services to their populations, cutting support to those who hold their governments to account and speak up against human rights abuse or mismanagement – because we need the money at home. Not only does this go against the spirit of solidarity expressed at the UN Post 2015 Summit in September. It is simply not wise.

Inflating aid with in-donor spending and making donor countries become the largest recipients of their own development aid is particularly worrying when a number of countries are following the same path. Helen Clark (UNDP) and Erik Solheim (OECD-DAC) jointly expressed their concerns in November 2015 stating that "This [spending of ODA on refugee costs at home] is in accordance with rules set at a time when costs connected to refugees were negligible, but doing it at scale is unwise."[9] At the OECD-DAC meeting in Paris in February 2016, the donor countries did not heed the call from CSOs to prevent the diversion of ODA to fill domestic budget gaps as a result of the refugee crisis, by removing the loophole in the ODA rules. Rather, they will try to clarify the rules. Let's hope that other European countries won't use the Nordic countries as good examples to be followed this time around.

9 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/nov/16/refugee-crisis-must-not-deflect-us-from-our-long-term-development-aims

Refugee Aid Declared as ODA: It could be a Sleight of Hand!

Julia Boger and Kambiz Ghawami, World University Service, Wiesbaden, Germany

Emails: infostelle3@wusgermany.de; ghawami@wusgermany.de

Keywords: Refugees; education; ODA calculation; Germany

Summary: The increasing refugee flows are affecting European governments' budgets. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is currently discussing if costs spent on refugees can be declared as official development assistance (ODA). ODA, which in Germany is not even spent up to the required percentage of 0.7 of the gross national income (GNI), would thus be further diluted. This article presents the current debate on the topic and warns of a potential budgetary sleight of hand.

The increasing refugee flows are affecting European governments' budgets. In order to boost funds for allegedly "real" development cooperation, especially for education programs, governments show a clear trend towards declaring expenditures on refugees more freely as ODA than before. For instance, France requested that the cost of peacekeeping operations in certain developing countries be eligible for accounting as ODA. Other countries intend to spend even up to 30 percent of the total of their ODA on other than development purposes (Barbière, 2016). Therefore, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recently discussed at a high level meeting in Paris (18th – 19th of February 2016) how to unify the recognition of refugee costs.

According to the definition of the DAC, costs spent on refugees in the host country can generally be declared as ODA within the first twelve months of residence of the refugees. In Germany, costs of living (e.g. food, shelter, education) as well as medical treatment, primarily for refugees with approved asylum seekers' applications, are declared as ODA. Data analysis in VENRO's[1] latest publication, which deals with the question of how the goal of the ODA of 0.7 percent could be reached (VENRO 2016), shows that the share of ODA spent in Germany on the reception of refugees used to be moderate. While in 2010 about 0.6 percent (66 million euros) of the total German ODA was used for refugees, by 2014 the share had risen to one percent, which was then 129 million euros. It is likely that the share will continue to rise sharply in future because the numbers of refugees applying for asylum quadrupled as well. In fact, VENRO estimates that the share of ODA spent on the refugees' support will have risen up to 530 million euros in 2015 (VENRO, 2016: 9-10). ODA, which in Germany does not even reach the required percentage of 0.7 of the gross national income (GNI), could actually be increased, but is instead currently in danger of being even further diluted (Zapf 2016).

This leads to a warning by German civil society that such financial manoeuvers may appear as a budgetary sleight of hand and that they will carefully watch the calculation process of ODA in Germany. WUS, VENRO, as well as the NGO coalition of ONE, Oxfam and Save the Children call on EU leaders not to deal with the refugee crisis at the expense of the poorest of the world. They heavily criticize that these ODA accounting processes risk jeopardizing development objectives (Link, 2016). Because refugees and underprivileged people need support from us, in the host countries, the budgets for refugees in Germany must be increased significantly, not only to provide refugees the chance to continue their interrupted education in Germany, but also to provide additional support for schools in the refugee camps and host communities world-

1 VENRO is "the umbrella organization of development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Germany. The organization was founded in 1995 and consists of around 120 organizations. Their backgrounds lie in independent and church-related development co-operation, humanitarian aid as well as development education, public relations and advocacy" (www.venro.org/english/whoweare/).

wide. At the same time, ODA will also have to be increased, since helping the refugees in Europe does not equate to helping developing countries foster their social and economic development (Katèrla, 2016). The lesson we can learn from this situation is that the goals of sustainable development should not be sacrificed for short-term interests in times of financial bottlenecks (Kitterer, 2016). Instead of altering the ODA accounting processes, we should rather be consistent and actually increase the ODA. In other words, we are keeping a critical eye on the ODA numbers' game!

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Nordic Realities 2016: North-South Research Partnerships and South-North Migration: Knowledge Production Versus Refugees?

Henning Melber, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala

Email: henning.melber@dhf.uu.se

Keywords: ODA; Development Studies; African Studies; Norad; Norwegian Research Council; Norglobal; Nordic Africa Institute; Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)

Summary: The large influx of refugees into the Nordic countries has provoked a shift in state funding. ODA - aid money - is re-directed to domestic expenditure for coping with the challenges. But ODA is not only reduced for projects in the global south. Research related to North-South relations in the Nordic countries is also targeted and threatened by cuts.

The rather unexpected demands and challenges posed by the number of refugees who have arrived in the Nordic countries since the second half of 2015 take their toll. But looking at the subsequent initiatives by governments to re-allocate funds, one also gets the impression that refugees seem to come in handy as a rather convenient excuse to put a curb on hitherto state funded activities, which governments nowadays find less important. Notably these include Nordic research in global affairs and especially Development and African Studies. Such support was at times considered a trademark of a Nordic policy approach to North-South relations and partnerships. Poul Engberg Pedersen, the former Danish head of the Norwegian state aid agency Norad was recently quoted in the Norwegian based policy brief "Development Today" (no. 13-14/2015) as insisting "that the concept of Nordics as 'good guys' vanished years ago, if it ever existed". As he stated further: "A gap has emerged between political narrative and reality".

Researchers who are dependent upon state funds for their work on Southern societies and for their collaboration with individual and institutional Southern partners know by harsh experience what Engberg Pedersen is referring to. The days of reliable funding and a recognized research status are gone. The need to take care of refugees seems just to come at a opportune moment to justify further cuts of what the governments of the day do not any longer consider as relevant anyway. Reference to the so-called refugee crisis also allows them to re-direct funds previously channelled as ODA through aid agencies and NGOs into Southern projects to be absorbed into our Nordic domestic affairs. To some extent the Swedish coalition government between the Social Democrats and the Green Party might possibly be an exception. But since they are a minority government they are unable to allocate budgets without compromises (which again occasionally might serve as a convenient excuse).

Norway is the most prominent example for such policy shifts. Instead of tapping into its NOK 7,000 billion Oil Fund savings to cover some of the costs, the Norwegian minority government of the Conservative and the Progress Party stopped at short notice its annual tiny contribution to the Uppsala-based Nordic Africa Institute in late 2015. Not only was this in terms of savings a totally negligible amount, but also a bad deal: given what Nordic countries such as Norway, Finland and Iceland (and earlier on Denmark) got out of the Institute in terms of travel stipends, scholarships and visiting researchers for their countries (not to mention the Nordic scholars of their country in full employment), these were investments with a high return rate, indirectly subsidized by Sweden as the main funder of the Institute. The Institute has through its programmes since 1961 been building significant research capacity in all Nordic countries. Such withdrawal is therefore at best a politically motivated bad deal. It erodes not only the Nordic character of the Institute and hampers its excellence in African Studies but also documents that there is not much left of a common Nordic profile (not to mention vision) among the countries, which in their view deserves any commitment.

The same Norwegian government displayed an unexpected reluctance to fund the second round of a research programme originally established in 2009 as "Norway – Global Partner" (Norglobal) within the Norwegian Research Council through funds of Norad and the Foreign Ministry. Norglobal has funded several thematically focused research programmes within the field of Development Studies, all including collaboration with Southern scholars and institutions. The programme promoted and facilitated such collaboration with the intention to reduce structural disparities and enhance joint knowledge production, including research on some of the root causes for forced migration. One could actually argue that it has the potential to be a source of advice on how best to reduce migration flows. Norwegian scholars and institutions in the fields of Development Studies and African Studies have in recent years to some extent relied on successful project applications to Norglobal for anchoring their work also in some of the mainstream research institutions. Again, we are talking with regard to its proportions of pocket money required to keep Norglobal up and running. But it is at the same time essential additional money for researchers at institutions like the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo and several more specialized smaller research bodies, which through their work in the past contributed to the positive image of Norwegian African and Development Studies internationally.

The Danish government, which had pulled out of the Nordic Africa Institute already a decade ago, is currently targeting the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), which had just at the time been consolidated and was considered somewhat as a substitute for the disengagement from Uppsala. Now the Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen announced at the end of September 2015 that it is planned to re-locate DIIS from Copenhagen to Aarhus. The rationale given is to create a better regional balance and reduce disparities by creating employment outside of the capital. DIIS, however, was conceptualized as a think tank to support and serve Danish foreign policy, which continues to be decided upon in Copenhagen. It therefore comes as no surprise that those employed at DIIS see such a move as the beginning of the end. Being distanced from the client they should serve, they soon will be considered irrelevant, and then the employment in Aarhus will hardly be a good enough argument to keep DIIS operational. The Liberal government had also proposed to cut almost DKK 6 billion of aid money over two years for 2016/17.

These are bad times for ODA as well as for scholars in the Nordic countries engaged in Development and/or African Studies. But to blame the refugees for the dire situation would be falling for the pseudo-arguments by those in government. Rather, it seems that the financial requirements to cater adequately for the people seeking shelter away from their war torn homes are being used to justify political interventions, which otherwise might have been more difficult to execute. The victims will be both the people forced to seek other homes elsewhere because the root causes of their misery are not adequately addressed while the continued deterioration of living conditions are not stopped, and those Nordic and Southern scholars who try to contribute to find ways to identify such root causes and means to end them. But the latter would include the need to address policy issues at home, which those who govern are not keen to address.

The Unequal Educational Opportunities Experienced by Indo-Chinese Refugees Resettled in Japan

Mitsuko Maeda, Osaka Jogakuin University

Email: maeda@wilmina.ac.jp

Keywords: Indo-Chinese refugee; Japan; school education; second and third generation

Summary: Indo-Chinese refugees resettled in Japan have experienced various difficulties in receiving school education. As a consequence, for generations they have remained among the poorest segments of the population in Japan due largely to the unequal educational opportunities they have had to face.

Nearly 40 years has passed since Japan first encountered serious issues about the acceptance of refugees. In support of international calls, especially from USA, for relief in the massive outflow of Indo-Chinese refugees, Japan accepted 11,319 refugees between 1978 and 2005. Of these refugees, the majority were Vietnamese (74%), and the rest were Cambodian (12%) and Laotian (12%) (Refugee Assistance Headquarters, 2014). In order to promote their integration into the Japanese society, the government provided them necessary social services, such as Japanese language training, vocational training, housing assistance, healthcare and school education. Of the original eleven thousand or so Indo-Chinese refugees resettled in Japan, they are now in their second and third generations.

Indo-Chinese refugees have faced various difficulties in receiving school education in Japan over these generations. First generation refugees, who came to Japan when school-age, were given an opportunity to study in public elementary and junior high schools, but in reality many struggled to adapt to their Japanese schools. They had to tackle all sorts of challenges such as learning in Japanese, learning Japanese style school culture, and suffering from bullying and discriminations against them. The challenges were more severe for the older children who had no or little previous experience in receiving a school education in their home countries, but were now required to enroll in the age-corresponding grade. In many cases, their parents were unhelpful. Unlike parents of Japanese students, many of their parents could neither help their study at home, nor afford to send their children to supplementary schools (*juku*). These parents were too busy working and stabilizing their own lives to care about their children's education, and they also lacked the ability to communicate well with their children's teachers in Japanese. Help from Japanese teachers was also insufficient due to their lack of experience in dealing with foreign students. Local governments, CSOs and school officials were in the dark for ways to handle the issues. Under such circumstances, many Indo-Chinese children performed poorly in schools and some even gave up going to school. Eventually, with little education they had little choice but to find low-paying unskilled jobs, just as their parents had done.

The second and third generation refugee children were born in Japan. It is generally recognized that their difficulties in adapting to Japanese schools seem to be much less than what their parents had. Their Japanese language skills were more sufficient to communicate with their own teachers and classmates. At the same time, schools also made efforts to promote multicultural education. Additionally, various support systems for foreign students had been set up in schools and communities. Consequently, it appeared that some of the second generation Indo-Chinese refugees were successful in proceeding to senior high schools and universities, and were able to pursue a decent standard of living. Furthermore, by taking advantage of themselves being bilingual and coupled with investment boom in their previous home countries, some could find professional jobs such as translators and traders, and some were even successful in starting their own business.

In reality, however, such success stories were only

limited to a handful of these second generation Indo-Chinese refugees. In most cases, without sufficient support from the Japanese government and schools, the challenges they faced have persistently remained. One of these challenges is that, having been brought up in their native language at home, their Japanese language skills are often not proficient enough to productively learn their academic subjects to a competitive level in school. But, since they appear to speak and behave like their Japanese counterparts, such an underlying problem is often not noticeable. Consequently, such a problem has contributed to their lower academic performance and, in the extreme cases, school refusal. Because basic education for foreign national children is not compulsory, the government and schools often do not need to be concerned about such non-attendant incidences. Moreover, when it comes time for transitioning from Japanese junior high school to senior high school, these students of refugee origin do not find it easy to pass the entrance examination. Eventually, like their parents, with an insufficient education background, they are forced to take low-waged 3D jobs (i.e., dirty, difficult, and dangerous jobs). Thus, due to these unequal educational opportunities, these Indo-Chinese refugees have been denigrated to exist in a social status as the poorest segment of the population in Japan over generations.

It should be noted that there are further educational distinctions among the refugees due to their countries of origin. Compared with Vietnamese refugees, Cambodian and Laotian refugees have faced even more difficult situations. For the people in the latter two groups, their original home countries have been much behind Vietnam in educational development due to their historical, social and cultural situations such as poverty and civil wars, their families' capacity to support children is lower than the Vietnamese (Shimizu & Shimizu, 2001). Also, because they are in the minority groups of the Indo-Chinese refugees in Japan, it is even harder for them to adapt to the Japanese society. Unfortunately, their specific problems are not addressed due to the minority status (Inui, 2007). Indeed, research efforts that focus particularly on the issues facing Cambodian refugees in Japan can hardly be found. To make matters worse, there are just not enough Japanese people who can support Cambodian and Laotian refugees in their native languages. This is evidenced by the scarce learning opportunities offered for Cambodian and Laotian languages by Japanese universities (Otani, 2013).

Until now, many issues surrounding the Indo-Chinese refugees remain unnoticed and unresolved, and the Japanese people's interest in them has waned over time. Notwithstanding having the Indo-Chinese refugees remain on the sideline of society, the recent concern in Japan has been whether Japan should accept even more refugees, such as helping the world to address the Syrian refugees crisis, or not. It is therefore suggested here, that before taking on new refugee responsibilities, the more immediate and important questions for Japan should be: how can we support Indo-Chinese refugees escape the cycle of poverty, and what has Japan learnt from the experience of the acceptance of the Indo-Chinese refugees? Perhaps, such questions should be addressed first in our political and public debates before we should tackle any emerging new refugee issues. (See also Hitomi NN53)

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Japan's Support for Refugees Abroad, but not at Home?

Hitomi Yokoyama, UNICO Consulting, Tokyo

Email: hitomiyokoyama263@gmail.com

Keywords: Acceptance of refugees; Japan's cultural background; social engagement of refugees; unqualified refugees

Summary: Japanese government, despite being one of the largest aid donors, has been criticized since its Prime Minister says Japan needs to work on their own issues before accepting refugees. Is Japan taking this stand simply because of its conservative nature?

Pledge of financial assistance, but not to accept refugees?

On 29th September 2015, Japanese Prime Minister Abe presented his remarks at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, stating that Japan is ready to provide financial assistance in support of refugees and internally displaced persons from Syria and Iraq, in a figure of up to US$ 810 million, which would be triple the amount Japan had provided in the previous year.

The Japanese government, despite being one of the largest aid donors to refugees in the world, was intensely criticized as the Prime Minister mentioned this at a news conference after making the above financial pledges. He pointed out that before accepting or providing for refugees from Syria and Iraq, the Japanese government should tackle domestic challenges in the fields of economic restructuring through encouraging greater participation in the economy by women, by elderly people and by raising the birth-rate, comments which were obviously far from those reactions expressed by those countries that are actually accepting refugees. Prime Minister Abe explained that Japan would "discharge our own responsibility" in addressing the refugee crisis, which he described as helping to improve conditions that cause the exodus,[1] not by accepting refugees within the country.

Limited numbers of acceptances, but tightening operation

According to the Ministry of Justice, Japan received 7,586 applications for recognition of refugee status in 2015, a 52% increase over the previous year, and recognitions of the refugee status were given to 27 people,[2] an increase of 16 from the number of recognitions granted in 2014. In addition, 79 people were given permission to stay in Japan on humanitarian grounds. Although the Japanese government states that the number of cases of recognition of refugee status has doubled, it is clear that the number is still very low by international standards.





1 "Abe: Japan ready to help refugees, but not take them in", *Japan Times*, 30 Sept 2015. The story was covered in a number of media.

2 Out of 27 people, 20 were given Recognition of Refugee Status (Afghanistan 6, Syria 3, Ethiopia 3, Sri Lanka 3, Eritrea 3, and Nepal 2) and 7 others were approved through filing an objection against refusal.

Before revealing the above figures, the Ministry of Justice had revised its operation system for refugees[3] so as to screen out unqualified applicants or "bogus" asylum seekers, by prohibiting such people permission to work.

However, one expert considers that the government should not tighten up the regulation dealing with re-submission of applications without first having obtained the necessary approval, since this goes against the global trend.[4]

According to the Japan Association for Refugees, thousands of asylum seekers are left without work permission and public support from the government, and it can take up to 6 years on an average for an applicant to achieve recognition of refugee status.

The major counter-argument by the government is that approximately 30% of the applicants in 2014 did not qualify on the ground of persecution under the Refugee Convention. Furthermore, 684 out of 796 foreign nationals, or 80%, who were deemed as falling within the category of being "without grounds" as a result of their application for refugee status, filed an objection in 2013. These individuals did not qualify for humanitarian consideration, and had simply re-submitted their application (as of the end of June 2015).[5] Based on such interpretation, the government rejected 99% of the applications made in 2015, something considered as conservative in nature internationally. This conservative decision by the government of Japan is considered to come basically from Japan's cultural tendency to be less open to strangers.

Japan's cultural background and the shift towards global trend

After the Second World War, Japan had made tremendous achievements economically and despite the current economic recession, the nation enjoys a level of personal safety and material wealth, without people having to fight for survival. This has led Japanese people to take such an environment or living conditions (safety and convenience) for granted and makes it difficult for them to imagine life without such living conditions and quality and to complain whenever such conditions are lacking. Hence, large numbers of Japanese people lack the ability to imagine life outside such an environment.

The irony is that those who one day turned out to be refugees and were forced to flee from their own countries, are labelled as "refugees" on the TV screens which show their hardships but the truth is that they are just ordinary people who have been leading their normal lives until the day came when they were forced to leave their homes.

Without the recognition of refugee status, they are not allowed to receive any education or Japanese language lessons to enable them to live in the community, and of course they are not allowed to get a job, which makes it very difficult for them to survive. It deprives them of a chance for social engagement and participation, not only materially but also psychologically.

The former High Commissioner of UNHCR, Sadako Ogata, insisted on an aggressive acceptance of refugees, when referring to the "proactive pacifism" of the Abe administration.[6] Being a culturally conservative and rather closed nation, it is however by no means easy or simple for Japanese people to accept refugees or strangers immediately, but at the community level, or personal level, people are actually accepting the refugees and supporting them. If we consider the global situation as being in a state of emergency on the other hand, it is unrealistic to consider that the country has no capacity to receive refugees, since the current numbers may only come to several thousand. Japan, however, is located in East Asia, an area with potential for major political uncertainties.

The Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 suddenly destroyed millions of peoples' normal lives requiring emergency and humanitarian aid. We should remember that Japan has received international support from all over the world (from 142 countries including Iraq, and 39 organizations), both financially and materialistically, and psychologically as well. A case for reciprocity?

3 Outline of the Revisions for Operation of the Refugee Recognition System, September 2015, Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice

4 Mainichi Shimbun, 6 Oct 2015 (Japanese) http://mainichi.jp/articles/20151006/dde/012/010/007000c

5 Outline of the Revisions for Operation of the Refugee Recognition System, September 2015, Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice

6 "Sadako Ogata calls for more aggressive acceptance of refugees", Asahi Shimbun, 24 September 2015

North Korean Refugees in the Republic of Korea: A New Educational Foundation Needed

Jin Ah Kim, Seoul National University

Email: jinah13@snu.ac.kr

Keywords: North Korean refugee education; Global Citizenship Education

Summary: This article aims to propose Global Citizenship Education as an educational foundation for social and educational problems of North Korean refugees in South Korea.

Ever since the ceasefire of the Korean War was declared in 1953, there have been high levels of tension between the two Koreas, despite some occasional appeasement. One striking break-through in recent decades has been the rapid increase of North Korean refugees entering South Korea. These refugees have left North Korea for diverse reasons mostly related to survival. As of June 2015, 28,133 North Korean refugees have entered the Republic of Korea (South Korea); of whom 70% are women, and around 16% are under 20 years old. North Korean refugees usually arrive in South Korea after crossing two or more countries, such as China and countries in South East Asia. These North Korean refugees risk their lives as they escape North Korea. Without a proper identity, they have to endure the risk of repatriation, separation from families, hunger, robbery, sexual attacks, and even death throughout the escape route to South Korea.

As soon as North Korean refugees arrive in South Korea, they have to go through a process of investigation in order to check their identities. After the investigation, North Korean refugees are admitted to the Settlement Support Centre for North Korean Refugees for 're-education'. It offers a three-month curriculum that aims to provide psychological treatment and help North Korean refugees settle in the drastically different society of South. Taking account of age, level of education, work experience, health and ability to self-support, the curriculum provides an adequate level of education for social adaptation. Throughout the three month period, children at elementary school age attend Samjuk elementary school while youths at middle and high school age go to Hanadul school. Many refugee students had their education cut off either during the journey on the escape routes or in North Korea. After getting the 12 weeks 'adaptation training' at Samjuk elementary school and Hana-dul school, all students are transferred to regular schools in assigned districts for settlement.

The Korean Hana Foundation (symbolically meaning Foundation for One Unity in Korean language) conducted research on 744 North Korean refugee students in 2014. The research indicated that 58% of North Korean refugee students transferred to regular schools are hesitant to reveal that they are from North Korea at school. The reasons for not revealing vary widely, but the highest response was 'because they do not think it is necessary to reveal' (44%), followed by reasons such as 'because they are afraid that they will be discriminated against' (26%), and 'because they do not want to get attention for coming from North Korea' (16%) (Korea Hana Foundation, 2014). Arguably, North Korean refugee students feel that revealing their identity as a North Korean refugee could lead to disadvantage and discrimination as well in various ways. The research also showed that problems that North Korean refugee students are facing include 'catching up with the classes' (48%) followed by 'cultural/language adaptation' (15%) and 'relationship with friends' (8%). The academic difficulty that comes from different curriculum and lack of educational opportunity in the past is serious. Furthermore, North Korean refugee students feel social and cultural difficulty at school. Such social and cultural difficulties are not resolved through the government's single-sided 'adaptation education' aimed at North Korean refugee students. On the other hand, a recent study on South Korean youths' multicultural citizenship consciousness towards the diverse minority groups in the South Korean society revealed that South Korean youth

feel more positive about non-migrant minority groups, such as people with disabilities and sexual minority groups, than about migrant minority groups such as foreign workers and marriage immigrants. In particular, this study noted that South Korean youths' perceptions towards North Korean refugees were markedly more negative than their attitudes towards immigrant minority groups (Yoon, 2012). The research strongly implies that the educational approach should consider not only North Korean refugee students, but also South Korean students.

Therefore, before addressing North Korean refugee students' adaptation, it should first be emphasized to South Koreans that North Korean refugees in South Korea are in a very particular situation which should be understood in a broader context. The fact that Korea before the division into two Koreas had been a homogeneous nation for thousands of years has fostered South Korean's complicated perception towards North Korea. Although most of South Koreans have been chanting for unification for more than 60 years, with the prolonged state of ceasefire, amid the mounting tension between two Koreas has engraved complicated perception in the minds of South Koreans and *vice versa*. In one aspect, they perceive each other as 'one of us' within the frame of ethnicity, history, and culture, but they also perceive each other as the 'enemy' in the context of prolonged hostile relationship. To those generations who were born after the division of the nation in 1953, they are likely to be strangers to one another.

Furthermore, as a South Korean law acknowledges citizenship in principle for all North Koreans, North Korean refugees' status officially is changed from refugee to immigrant as they cross the border into South Korea. In other words, North Korean refugees are South Korean citizens. It clearly requires embracing of the South Korean society to accept North Korean refugees in the South. Despite the considerable uncertainty about two Koreas' immediate unification, the number of North Korean refugees is rising and the unification might eventually come. In this regard, North Korean refugee students' problem of adaptation now is a serious indicator that reveals the insufficient preparation for unification such as mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence.

That South Korean students are the important factor in North Korean refugee students' well-doing, not only at school but also in the society, leads to the next point: an adequate educational foundation must be provided for **both** South Korean students and North Korean refugee students. In this regard, particularly for South Korean students, Global Citizenship Education could be a key foundation. When looking at North Korean refugee issues from a worldwide perspective, there is a complex web of political and cultural/local and global processes entangled. Rather than enforcing unilateral nationalistic 'adaptation education' on North Korean refugee students, South Korean students as well need to be prepared to be able to make enlightened choices for their future society. Both South Korean students and North Korean refugee students need to be able to critically examine the complex entangled with multi-dimensional problems such as the Two Koreas. Although the two Koreas' identity as one-nation is valuable in promoting mutual understanding, there should be a wider frame of identity overcoming weaknesses of ethnocentrism and nation-based identity. Many North Korean refugee students face identity crisis not only throughout the escape routes, but also after settling in South Korea. South Korean students as well have a mixed feeling about perceiving North Korean refugee students as 'one of us' or 'one of them'. Global Citizenship Education could intervene at this critical juncture. Global Citizenship Education has many features and practices, but one of its outstanding virtues resides in its sense of their being a one-ness and permissiveness of being different across the globe. When perceiving the nature of social and educational problems of North Korean refugees through Global Citizenship Education, South Korean students would be able to embrace North Korean refugee students, neither enforcing assimilation nor ignoring them as if they were aliens.

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Towards a View of Education as Development AND Humanitarian Aid

Jordan Naidoo, UNESCO, Paris

Email: j.naidoo@unesco.org

Keywords: SDG 4; Education 2030; education in emergencies and protracted crises; humanitarian and development aid; resilient education systems; coordination

Summary: The importance of linking responses and funding of education in humanitarian contexts to longer-term development funding and intervention in light of the SDG agenda.

Sustainable Development (SDG) 4 and the Education 2030 Framework for Action (UNESCO, 2015) underscore that education is fundamental to achieving all the SDGs. To this end it is critical that education systems are relevant and respond to rapidly changing labour markets, technological advances, urbanization, migration, political instability, environmental degradation, natural hazards and disasters, competition for natural resources, demographic challenges, increasing global unemployment, persistent poverty, widening inequality and expanding threats to peace and safety.

The recognition of the centrality of education for human development and economic, social and environmental sustainability is a defining feature of the sustainable development agenda. Its holistic and humanistic vision informs a model of development that goes beyond a utilitarian approach to education. It understands education as inclusive and as crucial in promoting democracy and human rights, and enhancing global citizenship, tolerance and civic engagement as well as sustainable development.

Emergencies and protracted crises challenge this vision, and pose a serious threat to achieving the new SDG 4, and its goal to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. Humanitarian emergencies and protracted crises disrupted the education of more than 80 million children aged 3-18 in 35 countries in 2015 (ODI, 2016). Despite this, we continue to adopt a silo approach to response and funding of education in humanitarian contexts and to longer-term development.

The Syrian situation and refugee crisis now affecting Europe and the European neighbourhood countries underscores the fact that if we do not reform inefficient humanitarian and development aid systems and ensure greater linkages between both, while increasing domestic financing, we will continue to leave millions in conflict-affected countries excluded from education. The failure of humanitarian aid to prioritize education simply translates into too little funding. The globally agreed target for the minimum share of education in humanitarian aid to be at least 4% needs to be implemented and strengthened. Development aid, on the other hand, does not adequately support countries in long-term crises, nor their education sectors (UNESCO GEMR, 2015).

The largest education gaps are found in conflict and emergency situations. It is, therefore, critical to develop education systems that are more resilient and responsive in the face of conflict, social unrest and natural hazards – and to ensure that education is maintained during emergency, conflict and post-conflict situations. Better education is also central to preventing and mitigating conflicts and crises and to promoting peace. Natural disasters, pandemics and conflicts, and the resulting internal and cross-border displacement, can leave entire generations traumatized, uneducated and unprepared to contribute to the social and economic recovery of their country or region.

It is essential that countries institute measures to develop inclusive, responsive and resilient education systems to meet the needs of children, youth and adults in crisis contexts, including inter-

nally displaced persons and refugees. The principles of prevention, preparedness and response, and established international guidelines, such as the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies' (INEE) Minimum Standards, should guide planning and response. Education sector plans and policies should anticipate risks and include measures to respond to the educational needs of children and adults in crisis situations; they should also promote safety, resilience and social cohesion, with the aim of reducing the risks of conflict and natural disaster. The capacity of governments and civil society for disaster risk reduction, peace education, climate change adaptation and emergency preparedness and response should be strengthened at all levels to ensure that risk is mitigated and education maintained during all phases, from emergency response to recovery. Well-coordinated national, regional and global responses and systems are needed to prepare for and respond to emergencies and to 'build back' better, towards safer and more equitable education systems.

Linking emergency/relief, rehabilitation/recovery and development will reduce the need for future emergency response and better emergency response will ease the transition to more effective development. Hence, we must structure emergency response and development aid within an integrated framework that enhances coordination, delivers quality education services and outcomes, and reduces costs.

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China's Aid to Refugees since 1949

Meibo Huang and Weiqiang Zha, Xiamen University, China

Emails: mbhuang@xmu.edu.cn; 407226777@qq.com

Keywords: Indo-Chinese refugees; China's aid to Refugees

Summary: Refugees in China are made up of three main groups: Indo-Chinese refugees, the North Korean refugees and others. For the Indo-Chinese refugees who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese government did not set up refugee camps, but rather made long-term resettlement by ethnic nationalities. Nowadays, the biggest refugee problem in China relates to identity issues. By law, refugees have no right to work in China. For international refugees, China mainly makes donations or receives refugees as a transit country.

Chinese aid to refugees in China

After China rejoined the United Nations in 1971, it subsequently restored its support to the UNHCR (in 1979), and in 1982 signed the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

According to the UNHCR, by mid-2014 there were 301,033 refugees in China. These refugees comprise three main groups: Indo-Chinese refugees, North Korean, and then others. Indo-Chinese refugees were from 1977 huge wave of Chinese exclusion events in Southeast Asia. Individual refugees are students from some countries of instability such as Afghanistan and Iraq, who are forced to become refugees and stay in China. North Korean refugees are those who came from North Korea and who stayed in Northeast China (Shurong, 2015).

Massive numbers of Indo-Chinese refugees appeared in China during 1978-1979 since the policy of the Vietnamese authorities in 1977 forced several hundred thousand refugees to leave their homeland. A large number of Chinese Vietnamese fled to China, which were then referred to as Indo-Chinese refugees. During that period, the Chinese government received about 286,000 Indo-Chinese refugees, of whom about 91% are Chinese, 8% Vietnamese, and 1% Lao. From 1981 to 1982, the Chinese government received about 2500 refugees from Laos and Cambodia because of the civil war and the Chinese exclusion events in these countries.

There are usually three regular options for refugees internationally. First is voluntary repatriation. Once the situation of refugees' home countries improves, refugees can apply to return with the help of the UNHCR. Second is the option to settle in the country where refugees applied for refugee status and eventually become that country's citizens. Thirdly, refugees can apply to go to a third country which is willing to accept them and allow them eventually to become that country's citizens, such as the United States, Canada, France, Sweden, etc. China also uses these three methods to settle the status of refugees. Meanwhile, refugees could apply to UNHCR for economic help, UNHCR would carry out the assessment or evaluation on the economic situation of the refugees, and if eligible it will provide financial help for the refugees.

For the Indo-Chinese refugees from the 1970s to 1980s, the Chinese government had consulted with the Vietnamese government, hoping that the Vietnamese government can allow those refugees to return to Vietnam, but this did not succeed. So the Chinese government accepted all these refugees in a humanitarian spirit and with community responsibility. The main measures China took included: formulating relevant laws, strengthening border cooperation and implementing more humane policies. It is a matter of importance that the Chinese government did not set up refugee camps, but rather organised long-term resettlement by ethnic nationalities. All the refugees were sent to 263 state-owned farms in Guangxi, Guangdong, Yunnan, Fujian and Jiangxi provinces according to

the climate, geographic location, language, customs, and occupation in the refugees' homeland (Hongwei, 2007). And China provided initial shelter and living allowance for the refugees.

Currently, the daily management on refugees in China is mainly based on the *Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People's Republic of China*. The June 30th 2012 version of the law clearly mentions refugees for the first time: "during the screening period, foreigners applying for refugee status can stay in China by the temporary identification issued by the public security organ, and foreigners identified as refugees can stay and reside in China through the refugee ID issued by the public security organ".

Nowadays, the biggest problem for refugees in China is their identity issue. Without a regular Chinese ID, there are many difficulties in refugee's daily activities such as employment, credit and not least their children's education etc. As mentioned above, refugees need to apply for refugee status in China, but the process of certifying the status of refugees takes a long time. At present, there are two kinds of subsidies for refugees in China - the subsidies from UNHCR and those from the Chinese government. UNHCR has a unified standard subsidy in mainland China, which is CNY 1200 per month. The standard subsidy for refugees provided by the Chinese government differs according to different local governments. By law, the refugees have no right to work in China, because this identity is not included in *The Regulations for the Foreigners Employed in China*. In the future, it is expected the relevant law will be revised in order to better regulate the aid to the refugees and the related management of their right to work.

Chinese Aid to International Refugees

For international refugees, China mainly makes donations or receives refugees as a transit country. For example, from 1980 to 1988, with the help of the UN refugee agency and the financial support from Europe and America, China received more than 20,000 Indian Sikh refugees and Sri Lanka Tamil refugees as a refugee transit country. After the Iraq war in 2003, China not only provided assistance to Jordan's camps, but also accepted some Iraqi refugees as a transit country. In 2004, China set up the mechanism of foreign emergency humanitarian aid, making rescue action more quickly and efficiently. After the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, China donated to those suffering countries a total amount CNY 700 million. Because of its instability and continuing unrest, the Middle East refugee problem is of special concern. Thus in 2014, China provided humanitarian aid worth USD 16 million to the refugees from the civil war in Syria, and at the same time provided nearly USD 10 million aid to the Palestinian Authority.

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Education for Crisis-Affected People in West and Central Africa

Akemi Yonemura, UNESCO Regional Office for West Africa (Sahel)
Francesca Bonomo, UNICEF West and Central Africa Regional Office (WCARO)
Caroline Schmidt, UNHCR Regional Bureau West Africa

Emails: a.yonemura@unesco.org; fbonomo@unicef.org; schmidtc@unhcr.org

Keywords: Education; Crisis-affected people; Refugees; West and Central Africa; Sahel

Summary: While education is widely recognized as essential for human and economic development, resilience of individuals and societies, peace building, the education crisis is looming in the West and Central Africa region. UN agencies and partners are supporting governments in this region to respond to the education crises with a focus on collectively guaranteeing uninterrupted education in the humanitarian-development continuum.

While education is widely recognized as essential for human and economic development, resilience of individuals and societies, peace building, the education crisis is looming in the West and Central Africa region. Particularly in the Sahel region millions of people are excluded from realizing their potentials through a quality education.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the nine countries in the Sahel region, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad are facing extreme levels of vulnerability, being exposed to natural disasters and violent conflicts. The impact of abject poverty, fast population growth, climate change, recurrent food and nutrition crises, armed conflicts and violence and displacement varies across the countries. Since January 2014, more than 4.5 million people had fled their homes, representing a three-fold increase in less than 2 years. Most of these displaced people have lost their livelihoods and often are hosted in already highly vulnerable communities.

The education crisis in the Sahel region has been intensified as reflected in the low quality, low attendance and retention, particularly of the most vulnerable girls and boys. According to the Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report 2015 (UNESCO, 2015), all countries in the Sahel region except for Cameroon and Mauritania,[1] have scored low on the Education Development Index (EDI) in 2012. This reveals the complex challenges to achieve Education 2030 to provide the systems as well as financial, management and human capacities needed *to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all by 2030* and meet the education rights and needs of all learners, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

In this context, UN agencies and partners are supporting governments to respond to the education crises with a focus on collectively guaranteeing uninterrupted education in the humanitarian-development continuum.

UNESCO mainly works at the upstream policy level. Some examples of UNESCO initiatives include documentation and dissemination of good practices, such as a case: "Finding people to teach and making them good teachers in a complex IDP emergency: the case of Cote d'Ivoire from 2002" (Sesnan, 2011) and and the organization of research symposium on teacher migration with a focus on conflict affected countries (Commonwealth Secretariat & UNESCO-IICBA, 2012). To respond to Mali's security crisis, UNESCO offices in Bamako and Dakar implemented a project to build resilience in conflict-affected regions through technical vocational education and training (TVET), peace education, and disaster risk reduction (DRR). In addition, UNESCO has been contributing to the preparation of projects for the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel that highlights the importance of youth empowerment and prevention of violent extremism.

1 Cameroon is under medium EDI and Mauritania does not have data for this ranking.

UNICEF's programmatic priorities regard education, include out-of-school children, girls' education, peace building, Education in Emergencies, quality learning and early childhood education. In West and Central Africa UNICEF supports all Ministries of Education to adopt risk informed programming and reduce the impact of the crisis on the education systems, and on children and communities. Also UNICEF advocacy and technical support to government aim at ensuring continuity of access to education – as a form of protection – to all crisis affected boys and girls in safe learning environments, where children can heal and be resilient to insecure environments they live in.

Under its mandate to ensure international protection and promote human rights for refugees, UNHCR is responsible for ensuring access by refugee children and youth to education. Beyond a basic right, education for refugees is a fundamentally enabling right, providing essential knowledge and skills for protection, self-reliance and resilience, as well as for durable solutions in cases of repatriation, resettlement or local reintegration. Education plays a critical role not only for the protection of children and youth, but as a measure of normalcy and stability as well as development for the community as a whole. In other words, providing education from the start and reducing the impact of a crisis on a child's education is UNHCR's best investment in its longer term goal to assist refugees to become independent from external assistance. UNHCR's Education Strategy (2012-2016) includes early childhood education, lifelong learning and tertiary education (UNHCR, 2012) while UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategy (2014-2018) includes strategies for TVET (UNHCR, 2014). Strategic education responses in emergency and protracted crisis situations are in place in all Sahel countries. Teachers, at any point of the humanitarian-development continuum, are most critical to make learning happen in the classrooms.

Countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger respond simultaneously to two or three refugee groups, posing different challenges with regard among others to the curriculum choice, language of instruction and recognition of certification. UNHCR responds at varying stages to the rights and needs of refugee learners stretching from the emergency response to an approach of integrating refugee learners in the national education system (UNHCR, 2015). The response in all countries is coordinated with the respective Ministries of Education, UNICEF and other partners. In Chad, for example, UNESCO, UNICEF and UNHCR together with the Ministry of Education, have facilitated the curriculum transition to the Chadian curriculum for Sudanese refugees. Also the education response within the Regional Refugee Response Plan 2016 for Nigeria (UNHCR, 2016) has been prepared in a consultative manner and will be implemented in a coordinated way at the country level. UNICEF and UNHCR, with other global partners – including Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) – participate in global working group on teachers in crisis.

In November 2015, UNESCO Regional Office in Dakar in partnership with UN and multilateral agencies and civil society, organized Regional Consultation on the Education 2030 Agenda for West and Central Africa bringing together officials of ministries of education from countries in the West and Central Africa region, the INEE, as well as other actors and stakeholders in education in order to discuss how to translate global Education 2030 commitments into practice at the national and regional levels. The consultation has already resulted in the preparation of work to assist in education for refugees and IDPs in the Sahel. UNESCO, UNICEF, UNHCR and other partners are exploring a better coordination of efforts to support countries in their endeavor to mainstream Education 2030 in their education policy and planning processes and to achieve the Education 2030 targets (UNESCO Dakar, 2015).

In order to minimize the further deepening of the education crisis in the West and Central Africa region, peace and security will be an important prerequisite to ensure safe access to schools for children, youth and teachers. But education cannot wait, because every school term, every school year missed puts children and young persons more at risk to never complete their education, never reach the level of an education that potentially helps them to improve their standards of living; therefore political will, and human and financial resources are needed now to provide education services, even in situation of humanitarian crises.

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The Sharp Selectivity of Refugees Entering Europe: a Romanian Perspective

Andreea Pop, University of Marburg

Email: andreea.raluca.pop@gmail.com

Keywords: Refugee crisis; Europe; Eastern Europe; European Union; Romania

Summary: Refugees seek Western European countries, while ignoring Eastern European ones. The reasoning behind this choice could be based on the stereotypical perception of the region, cultural differences, but also on the unwillingness of these countries to receive refugees.

The past year Europe became aware of the gradually increasing numbers of refugees, who were seeking a new beginning on the old continent by fleeing their conflict-torn countries. Yet the asylum seekers present their claims and seek refuge only in certain European countries. Thus Western and Northern Europe have been overwhelmed by the requests, while Eastern Europe has been rather avoided.

One of the countries dodged by the asylum seekers is Romania. Many have speculated over this behaviour, starting with the obvious statement of the refugees being in search of higher living standards and an effective social system and ending with the assumption that there is little to no knowledge about this country among the refugees. The knowledge that might exist could be the stereotypical image created by the media or the pop culture: a grim 'communistic' region, where freedom is oppressed and drowned in poverty and corruption – this might even resemble the situation in their own countries. Therefore why bother seeking refuge in such a country when there are other options, which have been proven to sustain all expectations of a better life such as: multiculturalism, tolerance, enhanced business opportunities etc.? All these gains are in Western Europe.

One might even consider that some asylum seekers know exactly what their goal is and the conditions in countries such as Romania would prevent from fulfilling it. In addition to this, it is possible they have in-depth knowledge regarding the various asylum-granting procedures including information about their accessibility/level of difficulty and surely a country within the Schengen Area would be preferred. Last but not least, refugees should not all be considered as being poor or uneducated. Their lives and livelihoods have been destroyed or endangered by ongoing civil wars. It is a natural behaviour to seek security.

From another perspective, Romania is a unique country in the region: emerging from both Slavic and Roman ancestry, the culture and the language evolved into an identity which is not found among the neighbouring countries. Yet it survived countless dominations, amongst others the period of Ottoman rule. On top of this, even if it is declared a secular state, religion still plays an important role in the country. Thus one undisclosed fear of the citizens could emerge from the will to protect the particularity of the country. This part historical, part cultural argument can explain why the country showed only cautious acts of solidarity towards the refugees so far e.g. by opening the first European Emergency Transit Centre in 2008. In addition the asylum-granting procedure is a rather difficult and highly bureaucratic, non-transparent phase which could last up to two years. During this time the asylum seeker is granted shelter, some financial support and - in theory - also access to the job market. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index, which uses indicators such as labour market mobility or education for the measurement of policies aimed to integrate migrants, Romania is at a halfway favourable level. The government argues against receiving a large amount of refugees with statements such as lack of experience, finance or capacity/capabilities to accommodate refugees. However after being allocated the new quota of 4180 refugees for the next 1-2 years and receiving some financial help from the EU, President Iohannis officially agreed to these terms.

Furthermore Romania is still a transitional economy. People, especially in rural areas, struggle to make ends meet. That is why it is perhaps expected that the government shows solidarity towards Romanian people first and afterwards towards the refugees. Asylum seekers are seen not only as a threat to physical security, but also a threat to economic security of the citizens.

Hence neither refugees, nor Romania welcome the imposed EU-quotas on the dispersion of refugees and each of the parties has its own legitimate arguments based on their priorities and goals. For this reason there is a need of a comprehensive, inclusive solution, which would address the needs of both parties. One important factor should be noted however; most parties ignore the development potential of Eastern and especially South Eastern Europe: low living expenses, little competition, good climate, vast amounts of unused land etc. The rising economies of this region could very well be where refugees would have a higher chance of starting a successful new life. But a well-thought out strategy usually takes time to conceive and to implement, while the current situation demands quick action.

Further reading

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Romania - 2015 UNHCR sub-regional operations profile - Northern, Western, Central and Southern Europe http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48df96.html (20.02.2016)

Towards a Global Landscape of Inequality? The Afghans and the 'Refugee Crisis' in Europe

Alessandro Monsutti, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

Email: alessandro.monsutti@graduateinstitute.ch

Keywords: Refugee crisis; asylum; inequality; Afghans; Europe

Summary: Twenty-five years after the fall of the Soviet Union, economic and social indicators show that we live in an increasingly inequitable world. Beside the series of conflicts ravaging the Middle East, the so-called 'refugee crisis' in Europe must be situated more broadly within this global landscape of exclusion.

In a report published in January 2016, Oxfam demonstrates that wealth is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a tiny rich elite.[1] According to the British nongovernmental organisation, 1% of people own more than the rest of humanity and 62 people hold the same as half the world. Beyond the wishful thinking of the Millennium Development Goals, these figures show that 25 years after the fall of the Soviet Union we live in an increasingly inequitable world.

Therefore, to speak of a "refugee crisis" in Europe obfuscates the deep processes that are at stake. Whether they are labelled "asylum seekers," "refugees" or "economic migrants", whether they flee from violence or poverty, from a war or a repressive government, how can we not situate the mass influx in Europe of people from the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa or elsewhere in this global landscape of inequality and exclusion?

Afghanistan has inherited the sad legacy of the Cold War. The communist coup in 1978, the Soviet invasion in 1979, the withdrawal of the Red Army in 1989, the fall of the Kabul regime in 1992, the emergence of the Taliban in 1994-95, the international intervention in reaction to the September 11 attacks and, finally, the partial withdrawal of the US-led coalition forces are the landmarks of an endless conflict. In 1990, Afghans were the largest displaced group falling under UNHCR's mandate with more than 6 million persons. Today, they still constitute the second-largest refugee population after Syrians. In the 1980s, the vast majority of them went to Pakistan or Iran. However, the international geostrategic context has changed and these two countries are no longer willing to open their doors. In Afghanistan itself, the reduction of the foreign presence is the expression of a political and military deadlock rather than the successful outcome of reconstruction. Indicators do not announce any improvement. Firstly, the country is a demographic bomb: cities are saturated with the return of millions of refugees since 2001 and the high population growth while rural areas cannot absorb more people. Secondly, the economy related to the reconstruction effort and international presence collapsed after 2014. The withdrawal of the international community has left a vacuum for the emerging middle-class and young people that suddenly found themselves unemployed. Last but not least, the level of violence remains very high. During the last ten years, the country had the sad privilege of having been systematically ranked among the world's five least peaceful countries by the Global Peace Index.[2]

As they are no longer welcome in Pakistan and Iran, Afghans are forced to look for new destinations. After nearly forty years of war, all segments of the population have been affected by forced displacement. It is nonetheless possible to distinguish three main categories – or four depending on the way they are grouped – among the Afghans that have been coming to Europe in the last few years. The first category includes unaccompanied minors and young adults, mostly Hazaras from central Afghanistan. Being increasingly marginalised in Pakistan and Iran, where many of them have taken refuge, and considering that they have al-

1 https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/economy-1

2 http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index.

ways been treated as second-class citizens by the Afghan state, they try their luck in Europe. Without money and network ties, they represent a particularly vulnerable population.

The second category is constituted by rural people from the South and East. They come from what is sometimes called the "Pashtun Belt," a region where fighting rages between the government and the Taliban. They flee a conflict that they do not or no longer identify with and repeat that "this is not our war." Most of them are men, aged from 20 to 40; they are poorly protected by the government and threatened with forced recruitment by the insurrection. They travel without their families and hope to bring their wife and children subsequently.

The third category is composed by urban dwellers whose way of life was linked to the international military or humanitarian presence: they were accountants, translators, drivers or guards for international or nongovernmental organisations, or government civil servants. They have lost their sources of income and fear that they will suffer revenge. Usually traveling as a family, they have money, which paradoxically makes them also vulnerable. Women – even sometimes families without men – are found mainly in this group, although the first two categories include more and more families too. The fourth category is actually a subcategory of the previous one: young urban people who benefited from training programmes proposed by foreign organisations.

These youngsters use social media and aim to live in a cosmopolitan, different and open world. But in Afghanistan, they are left facing a labour market unable to integrate them or fulfil their aspirations.

For all asylum seekers alike, the situation of the country of origin or first reception is not the only source of trauma. The journey itself, with its unforeseen traps and sufferings, as well as the reception conditions in Europe are equally so. For instance, crossing the sea is a heavy and at times tragic ordeal. In Lesbos, in a reception centre hardly different from a prison, I have met young people that kept saying, as if to convince themselves: "This is not Europe!" This denial sprang from the fact that the encountered reality did not correspond to their imaginary one, all the more so as they did not understand why they were subjected to exclusion and mistrust.

In short, there are no grounds for assuming that the flows of persons from Afghanistan – but also from Syria, Iraq, Eritrea or Sub-Saharan Africa – will recede. They result from global structural imbalances and it is misleading to distinguish between security, economic and demographic issues. Europe is ageing and in need of new blood. These migrants are young, motivated and willing to work and, as such, have much to offer. However, it would take political courage to declare this in the face of a mainly hostile public opinion in Europe – and we remain far from that.

EDUCATION, SKILLS AND FORCED MIGRATION: THEMATIC PRIORITIES

QUALITY EDUCATION AND RESILIENCE

Lessons Learnt from 67 Years of UNWRA Support to the Education of Palestinian Refugees

Husein Abdul-Hamid, Joel Reyes, Harry Patrinos, World Bank, Washington

Emails: habdulhamid@worldbank.org; jreyes@worldbank.org; hpatrinos@worldbank.org

Keywords: Refugees; education; resilience; protracted; response; Palestine

Summary: Delivery of education services to communities in conflict-ridden states requires an adjustment in the education model to make it meaningful and relevant. This model requires an increased focus on resilience, ensuring that the relevant education stakeholders—supported by education system structures and services—get together to create an environment that provides academic and socio-emotional support to protect, ensure learning and improve the well-being of the child.

Years of research in education have confirmed that building schools, providing teachers, and providing inputs such as textbooks are all important, but it is not enough to improve student learning. How schools and school systems use those resources matters a great deal in driving learning. This is especially so for education systems and communities facing extreme adversities, including forced displacement. In these contexts, resilient education systems also need to focus on improving the non-input factors that, together, drive learning and support recovery, functioning and positive change in the midst of adversity. Education systems must ensure that the education received is meaningful and relevant, that information flows for accountability, that incentives and financing structures help schools and education actors navigate risks, and that behaviors and systems address the causes and consequences of crises. These factors apply within and outside the formal education system, and in the public and private education sectors alike.

The UNRWA experience provides insights into systems level efforts that sustain, amidst a difficult context, quality learning opportunities for all children and youth. Palestine refugees are achieving higher-than-average learning outcomes in spite of the adverse circumstances they live under. Their education system—the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees in the Near East—operates one of the largest non-governmental school systems in the Middle East. It manages nearly 700 schools, has hired 17,000 staff, educates more than 500,000 refugee students each year, and operates in five areas, including the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab Republic. Contrary to what might be expected from a resource-constrained administration serving refugee students who continually face a multitude of adversities, UNRWA students outperform public schools in the three regions—the West Bank and Gaza and Jordan—by a year's worth of learning.

In the book, *Learning in the Face of Adversity: The UNRWA Education Program for Palestine Refugees* we sought to explain how a school system responsible for helping educate refugees is achieving relatively high results. We highlight the fact that in a context of adversity and conflict, an education system requires more than the mainstream education model. It demands also a resilience approach. From the mainstream lens, the UNRWA system exhibits the effective classroom practices of teachers, strong school leadership, assessments and shared accountability for learning, which support organizational adaptability and performance in the face of adversity. However, its resilience approach also calls for the recognition of the risks and vulnerabilities that students face. It points to foster community-based strengths and a commitment to build relevant interactions across education systems, school and communities towards the protection, wellbeing and learning of students in such challenging contexts. For UNRWA, a resilience approach does not imply that schools and communities at risk are left to fend alone, but calls for an alignment and institutionalization of relevant education services and systems to foster and support the resilience pro-

cesses of which students, teachers and families avail themselves.

Any system can draw lessons from experiences in education resilience. At the policy level, education systems need to make explicit the multiple goals of education systems in contexts of adversity: access with protection, learning with wellbeing, and skills for productive lives and contributions to social issues (cohesion, peace, justice, etc.). Education programs must be relevant to address the multiple goals: curriculum with both high academic standards and social values, teachers' pedagogical skills with recognition to provide care and socio-emotional support to students; non-violent discipline that restores positive relations, etc. Education systems need to create a community and culture of learning that recognizes the adversity of vulnerable groups and promotes collaboration amongst the school, the teacher, the parent and the community, all focusing on student achievement, protection and well-being. This resilience-based approach gauges and promotes existing assets and opportunities to support students to manage the adversities they face, protecting them from harm, and helping them achieve their educational outcomes. UNRWA, as an experience of protracted displacement, provides some initial lessons on how to merge education humanitarian and development support in such adverse contexts:

- Make explicit the short and longer-term goals for education actors facing adversities: protection and access, wellbeing and learning, and productive and other social transformative skills.
- Connect schools to a wider community and culture of learning that supports the child and ensures that the education received is meaningful and relevant. Learning is supported by many actors including teachers, students, peers, family members and the community.
- Provide teachers with explicit standards regarding what students must know and be able to do, while receiving direction and support on how to achieve these standards through innovative curricular, pedagogical, and classroom and school management approaches.
- Encourage school staff to model a positive identity, strategies for wellbeing, and pedagogical satisfaction through their interaction with students inside and outside of the classroom. Teachers are accessible role models for their students, providing them with motivation, a sense of responsibility, and kindness and support in times of need.
- Recognize that the sense of community appears to be strengthened by the fact that in contexts of crises, teachers can originate from the same at-risk population and share similar difficult living situations. However, teachers as well as students and families require support and cannot be left alone to fend for themselves.
- Commit to support students' holistic competence in the midst of adversity - through academic guidance and socioemotional support – and in the transition to longer term development.

In conclusion, this research offers a better understanding of how education systems can serve a given at-risk population, while concentrating efforts to end any structural causes of adversity.

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Additional readings:

http://saber.worldbank.org

www.worldbank.org/education/resilience

EDUCATION, SKILLS AND FORCED MIGRATION: THEMATIC PRIORITIES

SKILLS DEVELOPMENT

Diversity of Education and Skills Support for Refugees in the European Neighbourhood Region[1]

Ummuhan Bardak, European Training Foundation, Turin

Email: Ummuhan.Bardak@etf.europa.eu

Keywords: Diversity of refugees; developing countries; education and training; identification of learning requirements; skills audit; guidance and counselling

Summary: Already existing challenges of education and training systems in the European Neighbourhood are aggravated by the arrival of refugees, but thousands of new learners can be a strong driver for change in static systems. Precise data are crucial for clarification of learning requirements, while skills audits, qualification frameworks, recognition of qualifications, validation of non-formal and informal learning are important tools for recognising different education levels of refugees.

Contrary to migration literature, evidence on the effects of forced displacement on host communities is scarce. Limited studies on refugees from Europe indicate that forcibly displaced persons differ from regular migrants: their age composition is more likely younger with a higher share of children; household sizes tend to be larger, though with many single persons; education and skill levels are often lower which contributes to their harder integration into the labour market. They are particularly vulnerable due to the traumatic experiences associated with forced migration and often suffer from psychological distress. Many are not able to provide proper documentation that would prove their previous life experience and certify their level of education, skills or jobs. All these aspects require from host countries a higher level of (emergency) support on food, shelter, healthcare and education services.

Today millions of people are forcibly displaced fleeing instability and violence, but the great majority generally move and stay in their close neighbourhoods that are mostly low or middle-income developing countries. One recent example affecting Europe as well is the number of Syrian refugees who are sheltered mainly in three neighbours: Turkey (over 2.5 million), Jordan (1.3 million) and Lebanon (1.2 million). Absorbing large numbers of displaced people is a serious challenge for any host country, even with well-performing education and training systems, but the situation in developing countries can be dire and potentially explosive, given that they are already host to large migration flows from neighbours as well as being host to the transit of irregular migrants.

In the European Neighbourhood, refugees place enormous strain on host societies and increase public spending for food and shelter, healthcare and education services.[2] The labour supply shock leads to higher unemployment and informal work, competition over low-skilled jobs and deteriorating work conditions. The prices of basic commodities, services and rents increase. More importantly, the developmental challenges of education and training systems are aggravated, given the existing problems experienced by their own citizens; e.g. massification of primary and lower secondary education, lower enrolment at upper secondary education, stiff competition for higher education, declining quality of education, high number of early school leavers, small low quality second-chance vocational education and training (VET).[3]

1 The term 'European Neighbourhood' is used here for the neighbouring countries surrounding the EU external borders; including the countries in the South and East Mediterranean, Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and South Caucasia.

2 For examples, please see ILO (2013), *Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Their Employment Profile*; ILO and FAFO (2015), *Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market*; and World Bank (2015), *The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labour Market*, Policy Research Working Paper No.7402.

3 ETF (2012), *UfM Regional Employability Review*: http://www.etf.europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/UfM_regional_employability_review; ETF (2015), *The Challenge of Youth Employability in Arab Mediterranean Countries: the role of Active Labour Market Programmes*: http://www.etf.europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/Youth_employability_AMCs; ETF (2015), NEETs: *An Overview in ETF Partner Countries*: www.etf.europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/NEET_ETF_partner_countries

Additional pressure of refugees on already deficient education and training services in terms of access and quality may exacerbate the already difficult conditions of poor communities and generate increasing tensions and hostility. On the other hand, the sudden shock of thousands of new learners from different nationalities/ethnicities, diverse cultures/languages and individual stories/expectations can be a strong driver for change in static systems. They can force changes in education and VET reforms that host countries have waited for for ages – e.g. inclusive education, flexible curricula, digital learning, emphasis on languages, individuality and interpersonal relations, practical orientation – if the governments take the opportunity.

Precise data are a first crucial step for clarification of learning requirements; e.g. accurate and reliable information about the refugees' level of education and training, skills and experiences, and the qualification structure. This requires nationally compatible procedures and tools for determining competences in a valid manner. Refugees can be very diverse in terms of age, gender, education and skill levels, work experience, family situation, wealth and resources, country of origin, rural/urban, and the conditions of their leaving home. All these aspects significantly influence their learning requirements.

Mapping and assessment of refugees' foreign qualifications, skills and work experience can be done through a skills audit. Qualifications frameworks, recognition of qualifications and validation of non-formal and informal learning are all important tools complementary to each other, and useful for all residents, considering that most refugees have low or medium-level education. Alternative assessment methods are needed for the challenge of lack of proof on skills and knowledge; e.g. combinations of aptitude tests, exams, workplace observation, practical demonstration of skills in simulation scenarios, review of work samples. As one-size-fits-all models fail to consider the diverse range and background of refugees, the resulting policy measures need to differ in nature, type and length according every person.

The second step is providing guidance and counselling to help refugees understand suitable education and training options and make informed choices. Early access to education and training opportunities is crucial, as is guidance and counselling on available options. Particular attention is needed for young women and children refugees who are the most vulnerable group, potentially exposed to child labour and sexual exploitation. As learning a host country language is necessary for participation in education and training, language and socio-cultural orientation must be integrated right from the beginning in refugee-support packages, though taking the different starting points of learners into account.

While promoting the school enrolment among refugee children, youth must have access to VET opportunities or apprenticeships to complement existing skills and qualifications to adapt host country specificities. Recognising the fact that not all refugee children/youth would be accommodated in the formal education system, there might be a need for the action of NGOs for non-formal education and training. Participation of refugees in active labour market measures, in particular providing training in the enterprises and work-based learning opportunities will facilitate their first entry, while entrepreneurial learning and support can help better-off refugees to start business.

This is indeed no longer crisis management, but an ideal picture of skills development and matching strategy for the long-term development of host countries. Short-term measures need to move toward medium-term self-reliance through human development opportunities and access to labour market. Policy measures should be part of a comprehensive national strategy, rather than project-based activities. Success comes from attention to refugees' characteristics and qualifications, provision of continuous guidance and integrated services, involvement of local authorities and mainstreaming services, coordination among service providers, strong employers' involvement in work-based learning and employment-related measures, and expectations management on both sides.

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The Shortcomings of Vocational Training in Long-Term Refugee Camps: Observations from Lebanon and Rwanda

Inga Storen, University of Oxford

Email: inga.storen@education.ox.ac.uk

Keywords: Protracted refugee situations; TVET; skills training; Rwanda; Lebanon

Summary: Observations from vocational training programs in long-term refugee camps in Lebanon and Rwanda reveal shortcomings in training provision. A major concern is the discrepancy between training offered and the demands of the labour market.

"Which skills would you like us to offer training in?" we ask the refugee youth, and tick off our methodological boxes labelled "participatory approach" and "community-based initiative". As the refugee protection regime attempts to move from relief to development—from emergency assistance to sustainable support—the inclusion of refugees in the design of programs has increased. However, simply asking refugees for their input does not ensure a less paternalistic or top-down approach. Posing a couple of questions is far from engaging refugee communities in a meaningful dialogue. When asked the question above, many refugees must answer from a standpoint of little to no information about the labour market in which they hope to be employed. Whether the graduates of vocational training programs aspire to find gainful employment in the host community, in their country of origin, or in a country of resettlement, they are gravely uninformed of the realities waiting beyond the camp. Even for refugees wishing to find in-camp employment, the information available to them is scarce. In this brief piece, I reflect on my experiences from two very different refugee situations: the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and the Congolese camps in Rwanda. These contexts differ in numerous ways—from local legal framework to duration—yet, each refugee setting offers insight into aspects of vocational training, and how it is failing the youth it is intended to help.

Secondary school enrolment ratios in protracted refugee situations rarely measure above 30 percent— usually considerably lower. Enrolment in tertiary education usually lies at around one percent. Vocational training, then, represents an alternative route to gainful employment, typically offering practical skills instead of literacy and numeracy. Among the common incentives to set up such programs, of course, is to decrease youth idleness, and increase refugee agency. Indeed, a majority of organizational reports or UN publications point to how employment can help battle youth depression and frustration. It is perhaps from this rationalization that the idea that any and all training is beneficial, as long as it keeps youth occupied and "off the streets". It might also explain the often-observed discrepancies between skills training offered and skills in demand in the labour market.

Such is the case in Rwanda. When the question "Which skills would you like us to offer trainings in?" was posed to the Congolese refugees in long-term Rwandan camps, the answers were overwhelmingly 'car mechanics' for boys and 'hairdressing' for girls. The actors involved in vocational training naturally sought to accommodate these demands. Anyone who has been to the Rwandan camps knows that there are few cars that need repairing. Moreover, the market for hairdressers is already over saturated. As refugees graduate from the training programs, therefore, they meet a market without any room for them. Because refugees are allowed to work in Rwanda, it is curious that the training providers and donors have not reached out to the Ministry of Labour or even potential employers. If they had, they might have realized the persistent demand for construction workers, plumbers, electricians, and hospitality workers. I am also inclined to believe that had the refugee youth known about these market demands, they would not be as quick and unanimous in their demand for car mechanics and hairdressers.

In Lebanon, the situation of vocational training is fundamentally different. While in the country, I lived and worked with refugee youth who, like their parents before them, had grown up in the camps. The legal restrictions on refugee access to higher education and certain forms of employment are strict in Lebanon, and with increasing pressure from the influx of Syrian refugees, the opportunities for refugees to find gainful employment is scant. The specialized UN agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, has for years offered technical and vocational education and training (TVET) to youth and adults in the camps. Perhaps because of the unquestionable longevity of the Palestinian situation, UNRWA has been diligent in carrying out labor market assessments to ensure that youth have a chance of finding employment upon graduation. In addition, UNRWA offers career counselling and support for refugees who wish to apply for jobs in the local community. Despite these encouraging measures, there are serious shortcomings of the vocational training available to Palestinian refugees. One important issue is the limited spaces available: only around six thousand TVET spots are offered by UNRWA in the entire region. Another issue is the lack of English literacy classes in the vocational training programs. Although the official language of instruction (LOI) in UNRWA schools is English (as is the LOI in Lebanese schools), few refugees actually master the language by the time they reach adolescence. The youth I got to know were either in secondary school, or had dropped out and were looking for paid work. Only a small number of them were able to hold a conversation in English: the rest got through their schoolwork by memorizing paragraphs and model answers. Some tried to memorize phrases to use in job interviews. Impressively, many of them had memorized the UN convention of human rights, but when we talked about whether or not their own basic rights were met, they shrugged their shoulders, unable to answer. So much for empowering refugees through human rights education!

Informed dialogue, not uninformed consultations: conversations, not surveys. This is how I might sum up an important lesson I took away from my experience in, and research into, long-term refugee settings in Lebanon and Rwanda. Although I in many ways oppose the three-solution paradigm within which most refugee programs are envisioned—resettlement, voluntary repatriation, or local integration—I do recognize the value of reimagining vocational training programs along these divisions. Are youth expecting to be resettled? Then language and computer skills are vital, as well as training in a field in which the person is likely to find a job. This could be anything from public transportation to elderly care. For the majority of refugees that are not resettled in a third country, how many are considering repatriating, but are held back by concerns of unemployability in their country of origin? In this scenario, collecting data on market demands could help provide these refugees with skills and knowledge that would increase their chances of gainful employment upon return. In cases where the legal framework in the host country allows refugees to work or set up businesses, vocational in-camp training must attempt to align with the local labour market, as well as offer courses that foster entrepreneurial skills and financial literacy.

Returning to the donor-driven assistance in many protracted refugee settings, we might argue that the success of a vocational training program should be measured by the number of youth it helps employ rather than the number of students it graduates. Donors should be encouraged to use similar evaluation criteria when selecting which schemes to support. Similarly, research-funding bodies should support inquiry into how we might develop better market assessment tools, or indeed what the demands are in various labour markets (host country, country of origin, camp, etc.).

Those working to design vocational programs might also pose the following questions. Could refugees be offered skills that might improve quality of life in the camps, such as agriculture, carpentry, or midwifery? Could refugees take on the production and distribution of basic commodities like charcoal, pots and pans, or sanitary items— commodities usually administered by humanitarian agencies? After all, "empowerment" and "agency" have become buzzwords in the field of refugee protection and assistance. We should therefore ask: Are there ways of supporting refugee empowerment besides offering sensitization workshops on gender-based violence or introducing cash credit transfer systems?

The donor-driven emergency framework of humanitarian assistance in refugee camps has produced vocational training programs with quick-fix solutions and short-term prospects. Limited by cost and time, few, if any, programs carry out assessment of the market or consumers. One could

argue that vocational training programs in refugee camps have two main functions. The first is to increase employability and the second is to decrease idleness. Have we become so concerned with the latter, that we are failing to meet the former? Why are we not making a greater effort to engage refugees and potential employers in an informed dialogue on training needs?

To conclude my series of questions, I offer the following list of suggestions, aimed at donors, local governments, employers, relief agencies, and researchers alike.

- In addition to reaching out to youth, put effort into recruiting, training, and paying teachers and trainers with a diverse set of skills.
- Invest not only in the training itself, but also in follow-up sessions, career guidance, job/apprenticeship placement, and small funds to support start-ups.
- Provide refugees with information on labour market demands, and involve them in the design of skills training program curricula.
- Regardless of the skills program, offer supplementary classes in English literacy, financial literacy, and/or computer literacy.
- Encourage and fund research into market demands and best practices.

EDUCATION, SKILLS AND FORCED MIGRATION: THEMATIC PRIORITIES

TEACHERS AND REFUGEES

Moving on? The Impact of Education for Refugees in First Asylum Countries

Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Harvard Graduate School of Education

Email: sarah_dryden-peterson@gse.harvard.edu

Keywords: refugee; teachers; country of first asylum; language of instruction; discrimination; pedagogy

Summary: Four dimensions of refugees' educational experiences are critical for teachers of refugees to understand: sporadic and limited schooling, language confusion, poor instruction, and school-based discrimination.

Educating large numbers of refugees is a new experience for most teachers. This is particularly true in Europe and North America, where prior to this year there have been very small numbers of refugees. What do teachers of refugees in these contexts need to know about their refugee students to help them succeed in school and become part of a new community?

Teachers need to know that 86 percent of refugees globally live in a country that neighbors the refugee's conflict-affected country of origin. For example, the greatest numbers of Afghan refugees live in Pakistan; Congolese in Uganda; Somalis in Kenya, and Syrians in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Countries hosting the greatest number of refugees globally now integrate refugees into their national education systems: refugees and citizens following the same curriculum; in the same language; sometimes, but not always, in the same classrooms. At the same time, these countries usually have already under-resourced and over-stretched education systems.

Yet, these countries also have the most experience in meeting the educational needs of large numbers of refugees. My research over the past decade in these settings of first asylum highlights four dimensions of refugees' educational experiences that are critical for teachers of refugees to understand: sporadic and limited schooling, language confusion, poor instruction, and school-based discrimination.

Sporadic and limited schooling. Only half of refugee children globally access primary education, which compares to 93 percent of all children. At secondary level, access rates are even lower, at 25 percent. These access rates do not usually represent children who have never been in school. For refugees, access is often sporadic, with missed years of schooling due to acute conflict in countries of origin or legal restrictions in sites of exile. As a result, refugee children are often behind their age-appropriate grade level.

Language confusion. By definition, refugees flee across international borders. This movement exposes refugee children to new education systems, often with a new language of instruction. Refugee children, and even adolescents, are often made to repeat early primary classes because "that is where language learning happens," despite the disconnect between students' language abilities and cognitive capacities. Further, there can be shifts in language policy, guided by politics between nation-states and assumptions about long-term exile or imminent return to the country of origin. Even for refugee children who remain in one place, these shifts result in language confusion and difficulty mastering academic content.

Poor instruction. Teachers of refugee students often have little subject matter or pedagogical training, with many lacking even the 10 days of training that would classify them as 'trained', according to international definitions for refugees. In addition, class sizes often reach well over 100. Teachers of refugees describe feeling ill-equipped to meet the academic, social, and emotional needs of their refugee students. In this context, student participation is rare, and children are not expected to work in groups, ask questions, and engage in exploration. In settings where these are expecta-

tions for students, refugee children often struggle to adapt.

School-based discrimination. In their countries of origin and of first asylum, refugee children often experience curriculum that is highly politicized and discriminatory and have experiences in school that make them feel that they do not belong. Instead of being spaces of possibility, schools can become markers of present precarity and dead-end futures. Teachers of refugees have the enormous task of building relationships with refugee children and families that restore trust in schools.

Refugee children's educational experiences often involve sporadic and limited schooling, language confusion, poor instruction, and school-based discrimination. Teachers' understanding of these previous experiences can help refugee children, no matter where they find exile, to succeed academically and to become part of their new communities.

Suggestions for further reading

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- Inside Syrian Refugee Schools: In refugee schools, teachers struggle to create good conditions for learning.
- Inside Syrian Refugee Schools: Making room for refugees in second shifts.
- Inside Syrian Refugee Schools: In their search for a destination, teachers face difficult choices.

Teachers and the Politics of Education Inclusion for Refugees in Europe

Daniel Pop and Hugh McLean, Open Society Foundations, Budapest and London

Emails: daniel.pop@opensocietyfoundations.org; hugh.mclean@opensocietyfoundations.org

Keywords: Teaching refugee and asylum-seeker children; teacher professional support; education inclusion; human rights; mainstream schooling.

Summary: Addressing school and teacher support needs for the education of asylum-seeker and refugee children.

When schools open for the new academic year on September 1st, 2016 the extent to which European Union (EU) member states have met their legal obligations to ensure education access for asylum-seeker and refugee children will become clear. The right to education for these children is immediately realisable under human rights laws that are binding for all member states. The recent influx and overall increasing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe allow little room for prevarication. UNICEF spokeswoman, Sarah Crowe, said in February 2016 that children accounted for "36% of those risking the treacherous sea crossing between Greece and Turkey" and that children and women on the move made up "60%" of those entering from Macedonia. This marked a significant shift from June 2015, when 73% of refugees were adult males and only one in 10 was under the age of 18.

Beyond the urgent short-term humanitarian needs, the longer term failure to meet human rights obligations to articulate and deliver effective inclusion in education is likely to replicate and widen gaps in educational outcomes between children of immigrant backgrounds compared with that of their native peers. Lower educational outcomes negatively impact on social and economic inclusion and integration, risking an increased vulnerability to marginalisation and radicalisation.

The escalation of refugee inflows in 2015 (and the likely similar rates in 2016, unless the ethically questionable EU March agreement with Turkey actually works) has led to intense public debates on immigration. The discourses are significantly shaped by country socio-political contexts, policy traditions and national vocabularies: typically, however, they converge around national policies favouring restriction of immigration and securitization. While there may be less appetite for a discussion about tolerant and open societies in this context, the professional challenge to include refugee children in classrooms remains unavoidable for education systems, schools and teachers.

Is a professional discussion still possible when the political space for reasoned debate appears to be closing? Despite the overall inadequate political response, there remains a general recognition of the importance of a positive school environment for all learners. Whatever the delay in resolving the larger policy questions, local answers in classrooms, schools and communities have to be found. The current political climate has delayed public system level responses and, as a result, schools as well as education professionals, parents and pupils across Europe are ill-prepared and currently poorly supported in any effort to recognize and respond to the multiple challenges faced by refugee and asylum-seeker children. They must, after all, learn a new language while grappling with unfamiliar educational and social systems, often in the face of anger and hostility.

Most refugee-background pupils have had minimal or significantly-disrupted formal education prior to their arrival in the new country; all have experienced trauma. Parents, teachers and pupils in host countries have heard repeatedly about the supposed security, health and welfare system 'threats' posed by refugees. Poor political leadership and increasingly active agitation by right-wing organisations and politicians threaten

to make inclusion efforts untenable at community and school-levels. Without adequate support, schools are likely to replicate existing divisions and hostile reactions. Beyond simple enrolment rate statistics, therefore, the "success" or "failure" of education inclusion will depend on the extent to which refugee and asylum-seeker children end up in low-quality, high-concentration "immigrant schools" rather than mainstream education. Whatever the context, tailored support for the efforts of teachers and schools to address the additional challenges is essential. There is compelling evidence that assigning refugee and asylum-seeker children to schools without support leads to low educational outcomes for all children. It will be necessary to foster an educational process that is built on the principles of democratic participation and human rights focused on both the involvement of all learners in the everyday life of schools and of families in the broader community. An approach that attempts to democratise school governance and strengthen accountability to local communities will depend on the relationships teachers are able to build but must be fully sanctioned by their schools and supported by education policy. Teachers will need to handle increased diversity in their classrooms, as well as the expectations of parents and the aspirations of communities; they are on the frontline of immigration policy.

How will Europe fare in its task to deliver an effective institutional and rights-based approach to the task of inclusive educational inclusion and integration of education for asylum-seekers and refugee children? September 1st 2016 will unveil the best and the worst of Europe's responses. On whichever prevails rests not only the individual futures of so many children, but the future of all of Europe for a generation. Europe's teachers, particularly, but also the continent's education systems and pupils' schools can either rally to meet these challenges or face the consequences of deepening segregation and social conflict.

EDUCATION, SKILLS AND FORCED MIGRATION: THEMATIC PRIORITIES

REFUGEE ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION

Chilean Refugees During the Pinochet Dictatorship (1973-1989): Assistance and Entrepreneurship

Beatrice Avalos, Centre for Advanced Research in Education, University of Chile

Email: bavalos@terra.cl

Keywords: Refugees; generation of support; higher education students.

Summary: The effects of the Chilean dictatorship (1973-1989) on exile conditions are discussed, emphasising the support received for students and academics by organisations around the world, and particularly the World University Service.

Considering that Chile at the time of the military of coup in 1973 was a country of no more than 9 million people, the number of those who left the country for reasons of direct persecution, forced into exile, or as a precautionary measure was considerable; somewhere between 500,000 and 1,800,000 (Sznajder & Roniger, 2007). Right at the start of the dictatorship, it was made clear that anybody leaving the country forcibly or voluntarily and considered to be a "dangerous" person to the Regime, would not be allowed to return. To insure that this would be the case those attempting to renew passports abroad would have them marked with an "L" indicating their exile condition. Among those that left Chile were individuals and families from all social strata. With the help of governments, institutions and non-governmental agencies, these exiles arrived in a range of countries in Latin America (mainly in Venezuela and Mexico), in Western Europe (Spain, Sweden, Italy, France, United Kingdom), Eastern Europe, Australia, Canada and the USA. There was some sorting by social, political and educational origins as for example, a large number of professionals as well as the former government officials, including President Allende's widow went to Mexico. They joined academic ranks at research centres and universities, as well as contributing to the arts and literature. And they retain a tremendous sense of being a part of those countries that received them. This was also the case of those who went to Sweden, illustrated today by a Chilean professor with two chairs: one in a Chilean university and the other in a Swedish one. In other countries such as Canada, Australia and Britain there was more of a mix of people.

There were those from working class backgrounds who found it difficult to adjust to language and cultural diversity despite the fact that with time their children became thoroughly adjusted to their foster country. I remember two cases. The first one occurred the first year I arrived to teach at Cardiff University in 1974 (then University College Cardiff) when someone who learnt about my Chilean condition asked me to visit a family in one of the Welsh valleys still producing coal, in order to help sort out misunderstandings between the generous family who had brought into their house a Chilean working class father and his three children. The father was weary of letting his children go out with the other family's youngsters to social events. There was need for mediation. The other case was in Canada in the early 1980s where a Chilean father, unable to learn English, worked as a gardener in a public park (happily though) while his daughter who introduced me to him was a university student. In both these countries and almost everywhere they went, Chileans supported by local political and social organizations were active in denouncing, helping where possible, informing and preparing for return. The Chile Solidarity Campaign in the UK, including British and Chilean members, grew out of these efforts. Similar organisations sprang up everywhere.

Those who left Chile with incomplete university studies, young academics, artists, intellectuals, found a place in many of the countries that received them. However, a unique initiative occurred in Britain thanks to the involvement of British academics and the World University Service (WUS). Soon after the military coup, Alan Angel, a professor at St. Anthony's College, Oxford University sought to persuade WUS to develop a scholarship programme for Chilean academics and students (still in or out of Chile). As narrated by Alan Phillips, its former General Secretary, WUS was then a

small organisation that had managed a programme of scholarships for Hungarian and Czechoslovak exiles in the 1950s and that at the time was combating education discrimination and apartheid in Southern Africa, through scholarships and bursaries for secondary education there. Faced with the request to assist Chile, WUS committed itself to promoting a scholarship programme for Chilean refugees, beginning with the establishment in 1973 of support groups in 60 British Universities and Polytechnics. It then took on the gigantic task of convincing the Labour Government, reluctant to do so, to approve funding. This was formalized in mid-1974 with the establishment of a committee to oversee the programme including British academics and what then was the Overseas Development Ministry. The complexities of managing and implementing the programme over ten years were enormous. But the rewards were also great, assisting over 900 Chileans to complete their studies. The effects were not just the provision of a place to study but also, in many cases, the saving of lives since students who were in dangerous conditions in Chile were able to leave, thanks to WUS. Phillips' assessment of the overall effects is eloquent in this respect:

> WUS used its practical experience and good reputation, to work with other support groups and organisations like Christian Aid and Oxfam to transform the refugee landscape, helping to form the British Refugee Council which was then able to provide much more effective statutory support for refugees.

Without doubt, the assistance of many countries to Chilean exiles made a difference in their lives thereafter, whether they remained in their adopted countries or returned to Chile. But WUS offers an exemplar of decision to push for solidarity, to find the means to assist, to work with other organisations, to struggle against adversity –all of which in the current refugee "crisis" should be recalled and considered at the very least as an inspiration.

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New Opportunities in Higher Education in Refugee Camps: Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER)

Marangu Njogu, Windle Trust Kenya, Nairobi and
Robin Shawyer, Windle Federation, Wallingford, UK

Emails: marangu@windle.org ; robin@windle.org.uk

Keywords: Refugees; Dadaab; Borderless.

Summary: The Borderless Higher Education for Refugees project (BHER) is a pilot for the collaborative delivery of gender equitable higher education and teacher training opportunities in refugee camps. The BHER partnership provides cost-effective options for increasing educational opportunity and upgrading the quality of teaching in refugee camps as well as investing in the long term stability of conflict-affected areas.

The Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER) programme is an innovative partnership between the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Canadian and Kenyan Universities, with Windle Trust, which has sought to bring relevant and transferable education and skills training to the Dadaab Refugee Camp, the largest refugee camp in Africa. Dadaab Refugee Camp comprises four separate camps near Dadaab Town in Eastern Kenya which together are home to about 350,000 refugees, mainly from Somalia.

Now in its third decade as a refugee camp Dadaab has become a multifaceted semi-urban environment and the education sector has developed to parallel the education system elsewhere in Kenya. There are now seven secondary schools in Dadaab operating under the oversight of Windle Trust Kenya with over 4,000 pupils attending these schools.

Such educational options enhance morale and give young refugees and the wider community a sense of purpose: they reduce idleness and the likelihood of youth being recruited into radical or anti-social groupings. However at the post-secondary level opportunities for refugees graduating from the seven secondary schools remain extremely limited. "Once you complete your secondary school certificate, there is no other place to go to improve your education," said Abdullahi Abdi, a 20 year-old taking part in BHER. "A lot of people remain in the refugee complex and become idle. So you cannot even imagine what a golden opportunity this is for us."

The BHER Programme

York University in Toronto, in partnership with Kenyatta University, is offering primary teacher training courses which are certified by Kenyatta University. The University of British Columbia, in partnership with Moi University, is offering courses in Secondary Teacher Training. In this case the certification is by Moi University. BHER delivers programmes with content acceptable to all the participating universities and of international quality. The BHER programme aims to raise teaching standards in the primary and secondary schools in the refugee camp and in the surrounding areas, and ultimately in the refugees' home country.

A number of new courses are being introduced in 2016 including Community Development and Extension, Public and Policy Administration, Geography and Community Health Education. BHER has the potential to offer a wide range of higher education courses within the refugee camp setting: "We see a direct connection between higher education and peace building," says Prof. Giles, Director of the Refugee Studies Centre of York University. "Like our Kenyan partners and other Canadian partners, we think education is the basis for building better countries, for moving away from militarization to productive ways to earning a living."

Numbers and Equity

Gender equity is at the foundation of this project. Currently there are 370 students enrolled on the BHER project of whom 94 are women. 105 of the students are Kenyans from Dadaab town and the surrounding area and 265 students are refugees in the Dadaab camps.

Funding

The project is undertaken with the financial support of the Government of Canada of CDN $4,531,976 for the period of 2013-2018 administered through York University in Canada. UNHCR has paid for students to travel to the BHER learning centre as well as providing transport for visiting lecturers.

Management

York University leads the initiative and has fiduciary responsibilities to the donor. UNHCR offices in Geneva, Nairobi and Dadaab support the initiative.

Responsibilities of the BHER Consortium Members

a. Windle Trust Kenya, the local representative of an international NGO with longstanding experience of delivering education in refugee camps and similar contexts, manages the operations of the BHER project at the field level in Dadaab, Kenya and assists in fundraising and partnership efforts nationally and internationally.

b. York University delivers the Certificate in Educational Studies (Elementary) and one undergraduate degree in Geography, as well as having a leadership role in BHER.

c. Kenyatta University delivers the Diploma in Teacher Education – Primary and two undergraduate degrees in Education.

d. The University of British Columbia and Moi University deliver a Diploma in Teacher Education - Secondary.

e. Moi University delivers a Community Health Education undergraduate degree.

Structure and Delivery of the Programme

The courses are modular, enabling the students to progress from certificate to diploma to degree level. Many of those on the programme are already working as untrained teachers in the refugee camp and the timing of the courses reflects this, each stage being designed to take about twice the length of the equivalent full time programmes. One element in the success of BHER has been a flexible response to the technological and security challenges which are inherent to the operating environment. Proximity to Somalia makes Dadaab a sometimes dangerous place. A Kenyan primary school teacher was killed by an armed gang in April 2015, at the same time that gunmen attacked university students in nearby Garissa town killing 148 students and injuring many others. Special security assessments are made to minimise the security risks both to students and to visiting lecturers on the BHER programme and these have operated effectively. The need to prepare for a variety of delivery methods was recognised at the planning stage and delivery methods have been adapted as the project has developed.

BHER harnesses recent advances in educational provision and communication and tests how best to take advantage of such advances. As technology continues to advance, new opportunities will arise; so BHER is not a model which is set in stone but one which will evolve as technological advances and the capacities of educational institutions develop. This is particularly true in the area of personalised and interactive learning.

Monitoring and Learning Lessons

Careful monitoring of the progress of the students is a core commitment and a comprehensive mid-term evaluation was undertaken in September 2015. Community researchers have been engaged in the planning and monitoring of BHER. In addition to the involvement of local volunteers in Kenya, the University of British Columbia has recruited seven of the refugees on the WUSC student refugee programme in Canada who formerly lived in Dadaab as a research group monitoring the programme and providing advice to those implementing the programme. This research group has detailed knowledge of the challenges facing refugees in Dadaab, a deep commitment to ensuring the programme is effective and a capacity to engage with the students and the wider refugee community in Dadaab.

Learning Centre

The BHER Learning Centre established in Dadaab town is run as a "campus" of Kenyatta University and is accessible both to refugee students and the students from the local population. This dedicated facility has proved to be valuable academically but also as a catalyst to good relations between the local Kenyan population and the refugees. The local community in Dadaab, aware of the importance of education for both refugee and local communities, donated a 40-acre land where the BHER Learning Centre was constructed and now operates.

Does it Work?

It is too early to evaluate the full impact of the BHER programme in Dadaab. There are particular risks and challenges in a refugee camp setting which are likely to result in students dropping out of the programme or underperforming. These include the movement of refugees through resettlement to a third country or through repatriation to their own country. However the international structure of the programme and the online delivery of programmes make the study portable such that any student who plans to resettle elsewhere or repatriate may continue studies online until these are completed in the new place of residence.

Further Reading

Ben Rawlence "City of Thorns" (2016) - captures the experience of the refugees in Dadaab through an account of the lives of nine refugees living in the camp.

Innovation in Education: Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER): https://refugeereview.wordpress.com/2013/08/06/borderless-higher-education-for-refuges/

Exploring Paradoxes around Higher Education in Protracted Refugee Situations 2009, http://www.eenet.org.uk/resources/docs/Higher_Ed_Refugees_Thailand.pdf

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Kenya's Dadaab finds innovative ways to educate knowledge-hungry refugees http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jan/31/kenya-dadaab-innovative-educate-refugees

Bringing Universities to Refugee Camps in Kenya: https://refugeereview.wordpress.com/practitioner-reports/bher-project-magpayo

Scholarships for Refugees versus Scholarships of Refugees: Expanding the Refugee Voice on Scholarships in Refugee Higher Education

Eva Marie Wang, Seoul National University

Email: wangevamarie@gmail.com

Keywords: Scholarships; Refugees; Refugee Higher Education

Summary: Scholarships are commonly discussed within the limited themes of refugee access and success from the provider's perspective. The article critiques the lack of alternative discourses on scholarships, especially of those refugee voices from the margins.

Expansion of Scholarships in Refugee Higher Education

Refugee higher education has been long perceived as a 'luxury', making scholarships in refugee education biased towards primary and secondary education. Yet as higher education finally becomes a priority agenda under the UNHCR's Education Strategy (2012-2016), there is an expansion of scholarships for refugees through partnerships with donors and higher education institutions (HEIs). One known scholarship is the Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative (DAFI). It is considered to be the largest higher education scholarship program for refugees administered by UNHCR. There have been approximately 7,000 DAFI scholarships awarded since 1992. But in 2014 alone, DAFI scholarships were awarded to 2,240 refugees in 41 host countries (UNHCR, 2014). More so with the recent refugee crisis, various HEIs from the Global North have actively opened new scholarship opportunities on their own accord or as a response to petitions signed by students and staff concerning scholarship provision for refugees.

Scholarship for to Scholarship of Refugees: Expanding Refugee Voices on Scholarships

Along with this expansion of scholarships, there also comes a need for reflection concerning the nature and processes of scholarships. Intriguingly, scholarships are generally unquestioned, normalized and perceived as simply good in themselves. Scholarships are easily overlooked to be sites of power/knowledge. For instance, scholarships are commonly discussed in terms of "scholarship for refugees" – a scholarship provider framework focusing on access-success / provision-completion. This makes our common understanding of scholarships myopic, lacking plural voices and knowledge surrounding scholarship.

If scholarships are not only about provision and completion, what remain unheard are alternative refugee narratives such as scholarship rejections, politics of pedagogy, scholarship dropouts and other hidden facets of refugees' lived experiences surrounding scholarships. For instance, let's take a closer look at scholarship application. Scholarship programs commonly face 'huge demand-low supply' realities. DAAD's "Leadership for Syria" had 5,000 applications for the approximately 200 scholarship slots (Malley, 2015), while DAFI has a mere 2% acceptance rate (Drysden-Peterson & Giles, 2010; UNHCR, 2012). But what we are only used to is hearing the voices of the 'successful few'. What about the others? And to those scholarship awardees, what did they learn? Scholarships are not merely education funding but also a site of North-South/South-South learning dynamics. How are they taught? How do they respond? How do they negotiate/resist learning? These uncommon refugee voices from the margins serve as an epistemological shift from 'refugees as passive recipients' to 'refugees as agents/sources of alternative knowledge'. This is a reflection for us - academics, donors, policy makers, and refugees to challenge our assumptions about scholarships and rethink how scholarships in refugee higher education can evolve in the future.

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Refugees' Higher Education Access in Germany and Italy: Different Contexts, Similar Challenges?

Antonina Levatino, Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED), Paris

Email: antonina.levatino@ined.fr

Keywords: Refugees; higher education access; Germany; Italy.

Summary: Three main encounter types are making refugees' access to higher education in Germany and Italy particularly challenging: the acquisition of high levels of linguistic proficiency, the evaluation and recognition of previous credentials, and the problem of how they will finance their studies. The resulting periods of uncertainty and waiting could result in discouragement and frustration.

Refugees' access to higher education represents an important albeit challenging objective for host countries. Enrolment in higher education is increasingly perceived by host governments as key to facilitating better integration, as well as a way to turn the reception of young refugees into a "profit", fulfilling their interest in attracting and retaining qualified incomers. The right to access or continue their own educational trajectory is furthermore a fundamental premise for personal development and the pursuit of life goals for many young refugees. Looking at policies and initiatives on refugees' higher education insertion in two European countries, Germany and Italy, three common challenges can be identified, and deserve critical examination and discussion.

The first challenge relates to refugees' acquisition of language competence required to enter higher education, which is understandably quite high, usually a C1 level. In Germany and Italy, initiatives at several universities, often on a voluntary basis, are emerging to accompany refugee students to achieve linguistic proficiency. In Germany, several foundations are funding refugees to help them acquire the C1 certificate needed to be admitted to higher education institutions. Obviously, these initiatives are directed at people who already have some knowledge of the language and/or hold a B1 certificate, acquired previously. In Germany and Italy free basic language courses are offered to refugees. However, these are often insufficient. In Italy, courses offered by CPIAs (Provincial Centres for Adults' Education) are scarce. In Germany, the particularly high demand for German courses in the last years, due to an increased number of refugees, has resulted in a scarcity of qualified teaching staff, especially because teachers of these "integration courses" have to obtain a special permission by BAMF (German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees). Bureaucratic complexity, together with the high number of applications of potential teachers, has resulted in long waiting periods to obtain permission, and paradoxically leads to an insufficiency of courses. In both countries, a basic step to facilitate refugees' insertion into higher level education should therefore concern a search for ways to facilitate teachers' recruitment, increase participation, and decrease the waiting time for admission of refugees into basic language courses.

The language courses offered at universities also tend to exclusively address people who have already been officially admitted into higher education. In this regard, the second obstacle facing access to higher education is the recognition of previous qualifications, which in the case of refugees often cannot be proven with documentation. Although the Lisbon Recognition Convention (1997) recognises the necessity to develop and design procedures to address this issue, it does not provide practical suggestions. In Germany and Italy, the recognition of foreign qualifications is particularly complex due to a lack of a central deliberative body. The definitive decision is often thus left to individual universities. As the legislation is frequently difficult to interpret, and information is scarce and often contradictory, the analysis of a case can last months, and when involving different actors, can result in conflicting decisions. In contrast to Italy, the recognition of refugees' qualifications in Germany has recently taken centre stage of the debate. Several universities and

Länder are trying to find and introduce alternative ways to assess refugees' eligibility to access or continue higher education. These include, for example, the acceptance of educational biographies or secondary documents instead of official educational certificates and/or the introduction of placement examinations and aptitude tests. There is however, much to improve. Due to the complexity of the task, and the high number of applications to be examined, refugees still face long waiting times, the costs for document production and official translations, as well as the psychological cost of uncertainty awaiting the outcome of the recognition process.

The third, and perhaps biggest problem related to refugees' access to higher education, is funding. Scholarships for refugees are increasingly offered by universities in Italy, and by a number of private and public foundations in Germany. Another way to financially support refugees is to exonerate them from paying tuition taxes. Nevertheless, there is often no certainty with respect to the duration of exoneration, and this makes people uncertain about their capacity to finance the full duration of their degree. Several universities in Germany and Italy are increasingly giving refugees the opportunity to attend single courses as guest students without paying relative taxes. While on the one hand, these initiatives enable people to have, at least, *some access* to higher education, on the other, it is difficult to understand what meaning and practical utility these single courses can have in the educational trajectories of people who are not allowed, and perhaps will not be allowed, to study an entire degree. Furthermore, it should be remarked that scholarships and tax-exonerations are normally only granted to "recognised refugees." In Germany, people granted international protection and those entitled to subsidiary protection can apply for the state study grant (BAfög), while people with other kinds of humanitarian protection statuses and asylum-seekers have to evidence minimum stay duration in Germany respectively of several months (15 since January 2016) and several years, before having the right to apply.

The plurality of actors involved and complexity of legislation furthermore make it difficult for refugees to quickly get the information they require, and to understand it correctly. Regulations can even be inconsistent, as sometimes seen in Germany where university admission is guaranteed for a specific university, but the place of residence cannot be changed as asylum-seekers have the requirement of "mandatory residence". Consulting support therefore seems fundamental. While this feature is almost absent in Italy, many entities in Germany offer advice and guidance. Psychological support also seems to be indispensable to help this already vulnerable population to face the intricate bureaucratic impediments, and serenely endure long periods of uncertainty.

It is indeed clear that refugees, who want to pursue higher education, have to face long waiting periods marked by doubt and insecurity, which can be demotivating and frustrating. There is therefore much to be done, suggesting that there are several issues that require reflection: In which ways can good practices be exchanged and diffused more effectively? How can simpler and quicker ways for refugees to access higher education be guaranteed? How can refugees be adequately supported in their acquisition of information? How can they be encouraged and helped and how can their uncertainty be reduced?

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EDUCATION, SKILLS AND FORCED MIGRATION: THEMATIC PRIORITIES

SECOND CHANCE EDUCATION FOR REFUGEES

Seeking a Second Chance: Regaining Educational Opportunities Lost in Conflict and its Potential Implications for Peacebuilding

Sachiko Goto Kamidohzono, Research Institute of the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA-RI), Tokyo

Email: Goto.Sachiko@jica.go.jp

Keywords: Education and conflict; lost education; second chance education; lost generation; youth; conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Summary: This article raises a relatively neglected issue in growing debates over education and conflict - second chance education for youths and adults who missed out education due to violent conflict. Paying more attention to the issue is significant not only for protecting fundamental human rights but also for peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies. A new research project recently launched by JICA-RI is expected to reveal why and how those who once lost educational opportunities regain second chance for education.

Violent conflict poses huge challenges and restrictions on people's lives and fundamental rights including rights to education. Although it is an international consensus that education must be ensured for everyone as a part of their basic human rights, conflict disrupts it in multiple ways. One of the most commonly observed problems is an interrupted access to education by conflict. This is apparent in the fact that a major part of the world's out-of-school population is in conflict-affected areas as highlighted in the Incheon Declaration. It is estimated that 28 million children of primary school age are out of school due to violent conflict (UNESCO 2015: 119). They account for 42% of the total population of out-of-school children at the same age in the world, disproportionately high as the primary school age population in conflict-affected countries only constitutes 18% of the world's total. Intake ratios to the last grade of primary education in poorer conflict-affected countries is 65% in contrast to 86% in other poor countries, and gross enrolment ratios of secondary education in conflict-affected countries is 48%, significantly lower than 67% in other countries (UNESCO 2011: 132).

Although how to secure access to education even in conflict has been widely explored in growing debates over "education in emergencies", the figures above demonstrate that it is almost inevitable that substantial numbers of people will lose their opportunities for education in violent conflict despite various efforts to prevent such interruptions. As contemporary conflicts tend to last for years, or sometimes for decades, this means that many conflict-affected countries come to face emerging generations of people, generally young adults, who have grown older than school age without education.

How to provide this "lost generation" of people with a second chance of education requires special attention for two reasons. Firstly, education is a part of basic human rights and its protection holds a universal and inviolable value in itself. Furthermore, it is particularly important since it also functions as an "enabling right" that forms a foundation to realize other inalienable rights of human beings (UNHCR 2011: 9; Dryden-Peterson 2011: 2).

Secondly, having them regain access to education could also have significant implications for peacebuilding in war-torn societies. UNESCO indicates that insufficient and unequal access to education can be one of the instigators of violent conflict (UNESCO 2011: 160-161). While this is a general statement on the relationship between education and conflict and does not specifically focus on the people of the "lost generation", second chances for them to access education seem to be of particular importance given the fact that those who belong to the "lost generation" are predominantly youth.

Youth or young adults have recently been receiving much attention both as a source of violence and as an "agent of peace" (Schwartz 2010: xiii). Drawing on the literature analyzing the roles of youth in violent conflict, there are mainly three mechanisms

through which youth become a destabilizing factor in a society: grievances caused by a lack of socio-economic opportunities for them due to the "youth bulge", or a disproportionately large population of youth in the demographic structure; the low opportunity cost for youth to join armed groups because of their limited social engagement; and a perception of youth that conflict is more beneficial than peace as power given to them in the latter is limited (Schwartz 2010: 12-14). In other words, young people who "are uprooted, unemployed, and with few opportunities for positive engagement" tend to become a "pool of recruits for groups seeking to activate violence" (Del-Felica and Wisler 2007: 10). Meanwhile, though the positive roles of youth in peacebuilding have been far less studied than the negative ones just described above, a study on the topic shows that responding to youth's needs for "reintegration" and "empowerment" can be notably effective in realizing their potential to contribute to peace instead of resorting to violence (Schwartz 2010: 23).

What these existing studies suggest is that providing youth with opportunities, social engagement, and empowerment is significant for transforming them not into combatants but into peacebuilders, and therefore for preventing (the relapse of) violent conflict and promoting successful post-conflict transition and reconstruction. This leads us to the importance of second chance education for young adults who have become a "lost generation". Education in itself forms a crucial part of fundamental opportunities as its absence and/or uneven distribution are often raised as a source of resentment. At the same time, it is also one of the major ways to empower people, and thus plays a central role for realizing other opportunities such as employment. Besides, since another key element of education is socializing young population as citizens (Wiseman et al.: 2011), giving the "lost generation" a second chance to access education can help them to be (re)integrated and positively engaged into society .

Despite such significance for peacebuilding as well as for protecting the universal value of human rights, approaches to address the lost education of youth and adults have received little attention, both in research and practice. Most of the scholarly discussions in the emerging area of conflict and education are directed to the education of school-age children. Meanwhile, in the reports by practitioner institutions such as UNESCO and the World Bank the issue of lost education and the need for providing a second chance are sometimes indicated (UNESCO 2011; World Bank 2005). There have also been some concrete efforts on the ground to address the issue, such as a part of so-called "catch-up programs" implemented by some aid agencies and NGOs. Little is known, however, about their details, including what types of programs have been provided and how well they have (or have not) been responding to the needs of those youth and adults who missed out on education, since research specifically focusing on the topic is rarely conducted. Furthermore, and maybe partly because of the lack of knowledge and evidence caused by this dearth of research, many aid agencies invest a large portion of their resources for education in conflict-affected societies in the programs targeted on formal education for school-age children, resulting in a disregard for second chance provision for youth and adults (World Bank 2005: 68; Buckland 2006: 7). Even if a small portion of resources are spent for youth and adults, they are mostly limited to literacy and vocational training, which are often short of the functions expected for education in difficulties faced in conflict, such as "portable and durable solution" to forced displacement (Dryden-Peterson 2011: 3, 5).

Against the backdrop, the Research Institute of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA-RI) has recently launched a new research project that sheds light on the "neglected issue" of second chance education for youth and adults who missed out on education due to violent conflict. The project aims to identify the concrete processes and conditions in which those who once lost their access to education obtain second chances, as well as to explore the motivations that drove them to seek regaining education. For this purpose, life stories of the people with such experiences will be collected and analysed. Five cases of conflict, namely Rwanda, northern Uganda, Timor-Leste, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Palestine, have been selected for the research. The knowledge to be acquired through collecting those life stories is expected to reveal why and how people seek education even under the most difficult situations, including forced displacement, caused by violent conflict. The research findings will come out in 2017.

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Why the Recognition of Non-Formal Education (NFE) and Learning of Refugee Youth and Young Adults in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Turkey Matters

Madhu Singh, UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning

Email: m.singh@unesco.org

Keywords: Syrian refugees; youth and young adults; non-formal education (NFE); recognition, validation and accreditation of non-formal and informal learning

Summary: This article highlights the importance of recognition, validation and accreditation of non-formal education (NFE) and learning of refugee youth and young adults in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Turkey, given that a vast majority of refugees remain outside the formal education system. The article ends with a set of forward-looking policy recommendations for governments and other stakeholders.

Syrian youth in the age group 12-18, and young adults in the age groups 19-25, require access to several sub-systems of formal and non-formal education as well as community-based educational and psychosocial services. It is important to discuss NFE alongside formal school provision, as host governments whose public systems are overburdened are called upon to coordinate opportunities for NFE with the help of NGOs and international organizations. A mapping exercise undertaken by the UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning (UIL) addresses the problems of recognizing NFE and learning programmes for Syrian refugees in five host countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and Turkey.

Previous studies have highlighted challenges to the integration and enrolment of refugee youth and young adults into formal public schools (UNICEF, 2015). Beyond curriculum and language barriers, there are other important socio-cultural challenges resulting in low enrolment[1] and high early school leaving[2] rates in public school systems, as well as huge numbers of out-of-school youth (UNHCR, 2015a and b; MoNE, 2015; UNICEF, 2015) including those of secondary school age (BRIC, 2013; UNFPA et al., 2014).

Where formal education is failing to meet the learning needs of Syrian refugees, NFE and alternative learning programmes may be able to provide the critical support system and positive environment that can help this population to continue learning and developing outside school (UNHCR, 2015a and b). An example is the accelerated and condensed courses in Lebanon that help those who have interrupted their schooling. Another example is in Egypt where young adults are able to register in public school, but attend classes in schools run by NGOs or community centres. The complementary nature of NFE programmes such as the Drop-Out Education programme and UNICEF's Alternative Learning Centres (ALCs) in Jordan, and the Temporary Education Centres (TECs) in Turkey, renders strength to NFE efforts. Working together, they can adjust curriculum and language to the learning needs of the refugee pupils and young people.

Despite all these efforts, a great deal of NFE remains marginalized and there are no overall accreditation frameworks to assess quality of the programmes or support the awarding of full or partial qualifications (credits). Another problem is the lack of harmonization and coordination among the providers. Although many refugees come with prior learning and qualifications, as well as work and life experiences, there are no mechanisms in place to make their competencies formally acceptable. In the absence of the accreditation of non-formal education and recognized competencies and qual-

1 Only 30 per cent of Syrian youth have access to formal and public schools (UNESCO, 2015)..

2 In Jordan, approximately 70 per cent of Syrian children living in host communities attend primary school, while just 51 per cent attend secondary school, with the rate dropping to 47.5 per cent among boys (REACH, 2014).

ifications, refugees face severe disadvantages in finding decent jobs, migrating to other regions, and accessing further education.

Instead of focusing only on the existing gaps, the UIL mapping exercise proposes forward-looking policy recommendations. These recommendations should be a high priority for governments given that a substantial proportion of refugees remains outside the formal system and needs opportunities for further training through second-chance and alternative pathways.

First, governments, with the involvement of all stakeholders, should move from projects and ad hoc NFE programmes to a coherent policy framework and system for regularizing and certifying non-formal education programmes, as well as recognizing and validating knowledge, skills and competencies of individuals. The re-evaluation of past experiences of refugees, particularly of those who have been through traumatic experiences, can be a healing and reassuring event that encourages them to start anew.

Second, prior education and degrees and certificates of refugees should be made visible through documentation for placement and equivalence with the certificates, degrees and diplomas in the host countries. If necessary, guidance and counselling should be provided to help refugees access bridging and supplementary courses to compensate for the gaps. Since many certificates are lost in war and conflict zones, it will be necessary to recognize what the refugees already know, can do and demonstrate in practice.

Third, legal foundations for recognizing NFE programmes and individual competencies should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the development of a coordinated national structure to oversee the design, implementation and quality assurance of the NFE recognition system.

Fourth, recognition and validation mechanisms for the assessment of the refugees' individual competencies should be integrated and added to the existing education and training system (both formal education and NFE) of the host countries. Synergies should be created between formal education and NFE at all levels of the education and training system.

Fifth, the host countries should recognize all learning outcomes of refugees against standards in a national curriculum or learning outcomes-based standards in a national qualifications framework, taking into account the design of flexible curriculum linked to the learning needs of the refugees.

Sixth, national authorities with the help of employers and educational providers should see the urgency of building work-related non-formal courses or pathway programmes to employment for the growing bulge of youth without education.

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EDUCATION, SKILLS AND FORCED MIGRATION: THEMATIC PRIORITIES

EDUCATION WITHOUT PARENTS

Children "Left Behind": The Potential Impact on their Development and Education

Sheldon Shaeffer, consultant, Bangkok, formerly UNESCO Bangkok

Email: s_shaeffer@hotmail.com

Keywords: Migration; children of migrants; grandparent caregiving.

Summary: The impact of parent migration on the wellbeing of their children – especially if grandparents or other members of an older generation become the primary caregivers – is potentially profound in terms of the children's health and nutrition status, cognitive development, and educational achievement. But more research on the extent of this impact and suggestions concerning what schools might do to help mitigate it are needed.

The literature on the social-economic impact of migration – both internal, within countries, and external, across countries - is largely limited to the financial benefits of remittances: how these remittances are used (or not) to enhance family welfare - buying land, generating income, building houses, and paying for the costs of education. Research on the impact of migration on education is usually focused on the fate of children, in terms of both their early childhood development and late schooling, who move with their families when they migrate either to urban areas or across borders to more developed economies. Where such migration is relatively permanent, the risks to early development are severe and schooling opportunities – at urban construction sites or in foreign education systems - often very limited. Where the migration is more seasonal, the impact can be seriously interrupted schooling and the subsequent likelihood of, at best, grade repetition, and, at worst, school failure.

More recently, research has begun to shift to the phenomenon of "left behind" children – those being raised not by their parents but rather by their grandparents or other extended family members. The extent of this phenomenon is still unclear; estimates indicate three million such children in Thailand (UNICEF Thailand, 2012), eight million in the Philippines (in 2008) (Reyes, 2008), up to 60 million in China,[1] and others in sending countries (at least in Southeast Asia) such as Myanmar, Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia. On a recent visit to two disadvantaged rural primary schools in Cambodia, for example, I was told that up to 40% of the students in each class were not living with their parents.

Circumstances for such children, of course, vary – whether both parents have migrated, whether the migration is seasonal and short-term or (eventually becomes) longer-term and even permanent; whether and to what extent remittances are returned to the caregivers (and continue to be or are reduced or even stop over time); and the quality of the care provided by the substitute caregivers.

Largely anecdotal evidence indicates that the nature of this care presents a serious problem. Among other factors, the following seem important in regard to the characteristics of these caregivers, especially of grandparents or other elderly caregivers of a generation different from that of parents. They may be:

- less healthy and less energetic
- less educated and even less literate – in general, less "modern" - and perhaps more under the sway of superstition and religious - and ethnic-based fundamentalism
- less likely to speak the (often dominant, national) language used in the school
- less knowledgeable about, and less concerned with, child health, nutrition, stimulation, and protection

1 Private communication, China Development Research Foundation

- less interested in the education of their grandchildren and therefore less motivated to support and encourage them to enrol, remain, and success in school.

The irony, of course, is the fact that so much government and development agency concern and financing over the last few decades have been directed at girls' and women's' education, especially of adolescents and young mothers, in the expectation that they will become more literate, independent, educated, and motivating mothers – many of whom use their education instead to migrate. This may help the financial status of the family while at the same time affecting the wellbeing of their children.

Children raised in such a context, even if remittances continue which enable them to remain enrolled in school, may have poorer health and nutrition, be less motivated to remain and succeed in school, and suffer more stress as a result of the absence of their parents who should be their primary caregivers.

The resulting challenges for school and education systems include the need to assess the extent of the problem (i.e. how many children are, in fact, "left behind"), the severity of its impact on the education and general wellbeing of their students (especially those facing other barriers of gender, disability, poverty, and/or ethnic/linguist status), and the new roles which schools may have to undertake – literally "in loco parentis" – to mitigate the worst of these impacts. These roles might include the following:

- ensuring that programmes aimed at parents (e.g., in regard to early childhood development, involvement in school affairs, and general support to their children's education) are explicitly open to (and, if needed, adapted for) their actual caregivers;

- sensitising teachers to the special needs of such students, especially if compounded by other barriers to education mentioned above;

- providing some kind of counselling for such students to mitigate some of the stress they may suffer from being "left behind".

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REGIONAL LENSES ON THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

IDPs and Education in North-East Nigeria after Boko Haram

Adam Higazi, Modibbo Adama University of Technology – Yola,
and University of Cambridge

Email: ah652@cam.ac.uk

Keywords: Nigeria; Boko Haram; school attacks; two million IDPs.

Summary: The Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria and border areas of the Lake Chad Basin has generated one of the most severe humanitarian crises in the world today, with more than 2 million people displaced as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. Schools and colleges have been systematically attacked by Boko Haram and thousands of children were forcibly conscripted into the movement, destroying what was already a weak educational system in the northeast Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe and part of Adamawa.

According to the Displacement Tracking Matrix of the International Organisation for Migration, there are currently about 2 million IDPs in north-east Nigeria. In addition, in 2014-15, some 200,000 refugees fled across the borders from north-east Nigeria into Cameroon, Niger and Chad, many of whom have since been repatriated and are now among the IDPs in Nigeria. The displacement crisis in the Lake Chad Basin has received comparatively little attention compared to the Middle East, where refugee flows are affecting not only the region but also Europe. In contrast the Boko Haram conflict has not generated large refugee flows outside the region. Nonetheless, the population there is suffering a large scale humanitarian catastrophe and conditions for many of those who have been displaced are atrocious. The conflict has claimed tens or possibly hundreds of thousands of lives. Recorded deaths are over 20,000, but field research makes it clear that most deaths have not been recorded.

'Boko Haram' is the nickname for the jihadist group with its origins in Borno and Yobe States of north-east Nigeria. The sect has launched terrorist attacks across northern Nigeria and across porous borders into neighbouring Niger, Cameroon and Chad. Boko Haram means 'western education is forbidden' in Hausa, the regional language of northern Nigeria. The name was ascribed to the sect due to its doctrine that western-type education contradicts Islamic teachings and piety. They also preach that working for a secular state and its civil service is 'haram' and they condemn Muslims who work for state institutions (including educational ones) in Nigeria and its neighbours as apostates. The grand corruption, injustice and abuse of power by the Nigerian political class over the years added fuel to Boko Haram's incendiary message. Boko Haram is also violently opposed to Christianity and other Islamic sects.

The Boko Haram insurgency has been through several stages. The first was proselytization (*da'wa*), whereby Muhammad Yusuf, the founder of the movement, preached openly against western education from his base in Maiduguri – the Borno State capital and a city of some 2 million people. This lasted from around 2003-2009, with most followers from among the youth in Borno and Yobe States, and a minority from other parts of northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Some who were radicalised had completed school or even university but on joining Boko Haram they tore up or burned their certificates. Most were either school dropouts or illiterates who may have had a rudimentary Qur'anic education, but insufficient to critique the Boko Haram doctrine. The second phase was in July 2009 when the sect launched a violent uprising, attacking police stations, government buildings, and churches in co-ordinated attacks across the north-east. The uprising was crushed by the Nigerian army and Muhammad Yusuf was executed in police custody in Maiduguri. In the third phase Boko Haram reorganised as a clandestine movement and re-launched its insurgency in October 2010, led by Abubakar Shekau. The violence spiralled over the following years and by 2014 Boko Haram was the most deadly terrorist organisation in the world, killing entire communi-

ties which opposed them or which they opposed. They gained sophisticated weapons from the regional arms trade and by attacking military bases, and money from bank robberies, control of trade and smuggling, and extortion. From 2012 they controlled a growing area of territory in Borno State and in 2014 they declared an "Islamic State", carved out of a section of north-east Nigeria, including large towns such as Dikwa, Bama, Gwoza, and Mubi.

All schools in Boko Haram-controlled areas were destroyed. Even in parts of Borno and Yobe States not under the direct control of Boko Haram, schools were often targeted in hit and run attacks. This led to the closure of nearly all schools in those states from 2013 to 2015. Some are just starting to reopen, but many are still closed. A 2016 UNICEF report indicates that "in Yobe state a total of 57 schools were attacked, made up of 33 primary schools, fifteen secondary schools, four combined primary and secondary schools in the same compound, two vocational training centres and three higher institutions. The fatalities stand at 129 students, with one teacher killed. In Borno state, where most school attacks took place, at least 88 primary schools comprising of 828 classrooms, 28 secondary schools with 8,540 classrooms were burnt between 2012 and 2015. In these attacks two school administrators, nineteen teachers and ten students had lost their lives." In northern Adamawa State, "Boko Haram attacks led to the destruction of 115 schools in 8 local government areas thereby forcing 285,632 students and 8,150 teachers to stop attending schools." Since 2013 Boko Haram has been abducting school age youths – boys and girls and young adults. Some are indoctrinated and forced to fight or carry out suicide bombings, and girls are "married" to Boko Haram fighters. The most notorious case was the abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls from Chibok village in southern Borno State in April 2014, but this represents the tip of the iceberg.

More than 90% of IDPs are in host communities in areas of north-east Nigeria that were not controlled by Boko Haram, and about 8% are in camps set up by the Nigerian National and State Emergency Management Agencies. Conditions in the camps vary and basic education is provided to children in some of them. In general, the IDP camps are not conducive to educational development and there are serious protection issues in some of the camps. In addition, many of the IDPs are traumatised, including some of the children. The IDPs include people who fled from Boko Haram and others who were captured or held in Boko Haram controlled territory for some months or years before escaping or being liberated by the military. There is an international donor and NGO presence in the camps in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, and in some of the host communities. They are making a difference but their resources are too meagre to help everybody, especially in the host communities.

The Nigerian military, having been unprepared for counter-insurgency, badly led, and responsible for systemic abuses of the civilian population during the era of President Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), is now being reformed under a more effective new leadership since Muhammadu Buhari's election as Nigerian president in April 2015. As a fighting force Boko Haram are very much weakened now and the Nigerian state, with the help of military interventions from Chad, Niger and Cameroon, has retaken most of the territory that Boko Haram seized in 2014. Boko Haram have little or no remaining popular support and they are now being defeated by the Nigerian army. In 2016-17 the Nigerian federal government, state governments in the north east and donors are looking towards reconstruction and rehabilitation and the eventual return of IDPs. There is a risk of premature, forced return to some areas. The rebuilding of the educational system in the region will have to be an essential component of reconstruction and future development. Paradoxically in north-east Nigeria there may well be increased grassroots demand for education in the wake of Boko Haram. [see also Chijioke and Okoye. Ed]

Educational Recovery of IDPs: Bridging the Educational Gap Created by the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

Chijioke J. Evoh, UNDP, New York and Chinenye C. Okoye, Disability Aid, Abuja

Emails: chijioke.evoh@undp.org ; cokoye@disaid.org

Keywords: Educational Recovery; Northeastern Nigeria; Boko Haram.

Summary: In addition to the unprecedented loss of lives and property, the violent extremism of the Boko Haram group in Northeastern Nigeria has drastically reduced educational attainment in that part of the country. Therefore, educational development, particularly among the IDPs, must be part of the recovery process in the region.

Background and Situational Analysis

The emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has disproportionately affected educational development among some Northeastern states in Nigeria, including Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States have suffered the most by experiencing the largest percentage of internally displaced persons (IDPs) alongside the destruction of lives and property. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that there are over 3.1 million IDPs, representing 264,688 households in six states of Northeastern Nigeria.

The disaggregation of the IDP figures in the region shows that females constitute about 52 percent while males are 48 percent. In the same vein, children under 18 years constitute 56 percent, while more than 28 percent are less than 5 years old. It is common knowledge that in times of crisis, childhood and basic education become a secondary concern and in some instances may be completely neglected (IOM, 2015).

Educational Gaps and Poverty in Northeastern Nigeria

There is something of a paradox in the Boko Haram's attack on Western education in Northeastern Nigeria since the region is one of the most backward in the country in terms of formal education.

Even prior to the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency, educational development in Northeastern Nigeria lagged behind when compared with the rest of the country. Over the years, different interventions such as the nomadic education system (Aderinoye et al, 2007) have sought to expand access and improve quality of education among Northern states in Nigeria. Yet, the 2012/13 General Household Survey (GHS), shows that while about 46 percent of the population in the Northern region has never attended school, only 12 percent have even attained primary education. When further broken down by states within the Northeastern region, the highest percentages of out of school children are found in the state of Borno (73.4 per cent). This shows a remarkable variation between the Northeastern region and the rest of the country in the percentage of primary-aged children who are out of school prior to the Boko Haram assault on education.

After Boko Haram's attack on education, access to secondary and higher education has become significantly lower in the North East, with the attendance rate at 8 percent and 3 percent respectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Even with these extraordinarily low participation rates in formal education, Boko Haram has had a major impact in reducing further these low participation rates (see also Higazi, NN53).

Formal education that is generally expected to provide literary and numerical skills has failed to impact human development and poverty reduction needed in Northeastern Nigeria. Unsurprisingly, poverty reduction in Northeastern Nigeria has remained elusive despite recent economic growth experienced in the rest of the country. For instance, as the rest of the country experienced a measur-

able reduction in the absolute poverty rate from 2003 to 2013 from 45.3 to 33.3 percent, the poverty rate in Northeastern Nigeria actually increased from 43.2 to 50.4 percent. Generally, the region accounts for 52 percent of the poor in Nigeria (World Bank, 2014). Above all, the damage and destruction of the local economy by Boko Haram attacks have reduced total government revenue in the six most affected states and increased public spending at the states and local government levels.

Planning the Future Rehabilitation of IDPs through Vocational Educational Development

The increasing population of out-of-school, unemployed and unskilled youths in the Northeastern Nigeria underscores the urgency for educational and training development in the region (See Higazi NN53 for an estimate of 2 million IDPs in the region). The lack of education and socio-economic conditions of these youths, make them vulnerable and hence targets for the insurgent recruitments. The provision of basic education services for the IDPs, ex-insurgents and their collaborators is a crucial part of the reintegration and recovery process. Therefore, it has become imperative to adopt an integrated and multifaceted approach for educational development of IDPs in Northeastern Nigeria.

Alongside the provision of formal basic education, the working curriculum should be inclusive of vocational and non-formal educational opportunities. This should be made available to IDPs in refugee camps and their host communities across the Northeastern Nigeria. Technical and vocational education aimed at skill acquisition should focus on skills that are in high demand, which include areas such as bakery, metal fabrication, shoe making and leatherwork. Others include, for example, plumbing, borehole maintenance, carpentry, tailoring and dressmaking, masonry and building construction. Attention must also be paid to ensure that educational and training facilities have an adequate reflection of gender equality and are made accessible to individuals with disabilities.

By providing different levels of functional literacy, especially in basic financial management, entrepreneurial skills and productive community engagement, the IDPs and the youth population will begin to develop a robust sense of belonging in their communities. Vocational training centers should be established in select local government areas that are secured. In addition, technical and vocational training instructors should be hired to complement existing displaced staff from schools in affected communities. The reinforcement of existing and overstretched educational resources in many host communities in cities like Maiduguri and its environs will go a long way to cushion the effects of the migrants in such communities. Part of the education programs for the IDPs in Northeastern Nigeria should include the reorientation and counseling programs for the youth and ex-insurgents. However, these tasks are far beyond the capacity of the six northeastern states and the Federal government of Nigeria. Through international development agencies, the international community can play a crucial role in this process.

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Population Displacement and Prevailing Security Conditions in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa

Lydia Wambugu, Independent consultant, Nairobi

Email: wawaki@gmail.com

Keywords: Population displacement; Security conditions; Great Lakes Region; Horn of Africa.

Summary: The Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions are at a crossroads as a widespread deterioration of the security situation may undermine regional efforts aimed at addressing the fundamental drivers of displacement.

The Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa are arguably the most unstable sub-regions in Africa considering the protracted violent conflicts and instability in the two areas. The escalating violence in Burundi has already displaced more than 79,200 internally (IDMC, 2015) and forced 100,000 to seek asylum especially in western Tanzania (UNHCR, 2015). The civil war in South Sudan, Africa's youngest nation, has created one of the world's largest humanitarian crises outside the conflict in Syria as people continue to flee their homes and seek refuge in the neighboring countries as a result of fighting between government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement faction (SPLM-10) led by Rieck Machar.[1] In Somalia the rise of violent extremism inside and beyond the country poses a real threat to the region as mass population movements continue to introduce disruptive dynamics in both humanitarian and security spaces. By the end of 2014, Somalia had an estimated total of 1,107,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNHCR, 2015) with an equal number of refugees in Kenya and other countries. In light of the surging crisis, refugees and IDP numbers are expected to increase due to unresolved political contestation and struggle for power in Burundi, South Sudan and Somalia.

The conditions for hosting refugees and IDPs in the region, and ensuring their protection and safety, have been negatively affected by the deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation. An increase in population movements into overstretched humanitarian infrastructure has impacted on life-saving activities such as protection, health, shelter, water and sanitation, as well as food security and nutrition in the host countries. Vulnerability among refugees and IDPs is compounded by patterns of human rights violations including incidents of sexual violence, increased enforced disappearance and torture (African Union, 2014). Given the worsening security and humanitarian situation, the influx of refugees and IDPs is expected to grow and strain the limited responses and programs. For instance, if Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya which hosts mostly Somali and South Sudanese refugees is closed and relocated to inside Somalia's borders, as has been proposed by the Kenya government due to alleged increasing evidence that some of the terrorist attacks in that country were planned within the camps, this may have unknown consequences for refugee protection. In addition, if outflows from Burundi continue into Tanzania, the latter, which has always had an open door policy to refugees may be forced to roll back on its generosity. Moreover, the humanitarian crisis engulfing Burundi, which provides 25% (or approximately 5,400 out of 22,100) of the troops in the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia, could also negatively affect Burundi's contribution to the Somalia mission as well as undermine regional efforts towards peace building, development and state building.

This is a critical time for the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa as the widespread deterioration of the security situation may undermine security and development gains as well as regional efforts that aim to address the fundamental drivers of displacement. It can be argued that the regional and international bodies have failed to show a consistent and principled stand in addressing the situation in these countries. At the same time the

1 In 2015, at least 1,690,000 people had been internally displaced within the country and about 744,000 had sought refuge in neighboring countries.

internal dynamics in these three countries seem to be going from bad to worse. For Somalia, the fractious leadership and the failure to be accountable in dealings with collaborating partners and the troop-contributing countries, coupled with the fact that the regional troops under AMISOM are not sufficient, suggest that the conflict in Somalia and the menace posed by Al Shaabab might continue for some time; it is, consequently, likely that the humanitarian crises and the forced displacement of people in the two Regions will continue.

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Resilience in Exile: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda, 1959-1994

Jude Murison, University of Antwerp

Email: jude.murison@gmail.com

Keywords: Rwanda; refugee; Uganda; resilience.

Summary: This article takes a historical look at Rwandan refugees in Uganda, highlighting their educational achievements, and illustrating ways in which they demonstrated their resilience.

With any mass influx of refugees, it is unknown when their country of origin will be safe to return to. What can be seen as a temporary displacement, can extend to 30+ years. In these instances, children are born in exile and might never have seen the country from which their citizenship derives. One of the longest protracted refugee situations was the Rwandan refugees in exile from 1959-1994. When these refugees left Rwanda in the period 1959-1961, they believed their exile was temporary. Refugees crossed into the neighbouring countries of Tanzania, Uganda, Congo and Burundi. For those who arrived over the border into Uganda, they were dispersed to the refugee settlements of Oruchinga, Nakivale, Kyaka I, Rwamwanja, Kyangwali, Kahunge, and in the 1980s Kyaka II. At the time, these areas were largely barren, and it was up to the refugees to clear the allocated area to enable them to live there. Primary schools were quickly established within the settlements, with some teachers themselves being refugees. It has often been said that Rwandan refugees felt they had nothing, and that the only way to escape the poverty of the refugees camps, was to educate themselves, to move out, and move on. Soon after the refugees arrived in the settlements, they prioritised education. This was initially informal classes by voluntary teachers in the open air as since no buildings existed. Initially the teachers worked voluntarily, but later the Ministry of Education and the Church of Uganda paid them.

In Uganda, primary schools in the refugee settlements followed the Ugandan curriculum, and the pupils sat the national Primary Leaving Exam (PLE) in the last year of primary school. The extent of refugee children's achievement in Primary Leaving Exams was clear. In Kahunge in 1970, ninety pupils sat the primary leaving exam. No student failed. Sixty-one pupils received the first grade, and twenty five received the second grade. Similarly in 1978 in Oruchinga, two hundred pupils sat the primary leaving exam. No student failed. 118 had first grade. In 1970, 6 of the top 10 PLE performing students in Kabarole District of Uganda came from Kahunge. The top performing pupil was Peter Bayingana, who went on to study medicine at Makerere University – and later was a major in the Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army when they invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990. Retired teachers from these refugee settlements conveyed to me the passion of the pupils for their studies, students revising by moonlight, assisted by teachers who were committed to helping them.

Scoring top grades at PLEs determined which secondary school pupils would be admitted to. In the refugee settlements, children knew as early as primary school which of Uganda's most prestigious secondary schools they wanted to study at. Applications for secondary schools from children in the settlements always had Ntare, Budo and Mbarara High top of the list (incidentally both the current presidents of Uganda and Rwanda attended Ntare Secondary School). Once in secondary schools outside of the refugee settlements, it was possible for students to 'shake off' their refugee identity, and many students changed their names. Studying at a secondary school not only meant a way to get out of the settlement, it was also a way for students to clandestinely obtain identification cards and 'assume' Ugandan citizenship. Being able to portray themselves as Ugandan, also meant they could obtain scholarships to go to Makerere University – something that was not available for them as refugees. The UNHCR Representative to Uganda tells the story of how in in 1982 he was visited by 10 Rwandan Makerere University students, "Some of the students have always pretended to

be Ugandan and are, as it were, benefiting from scholarships (reserved for Ugandan nationals) under false pretences" (Unwin, 1982). Being displaced, whether internally within your own country, or externally as a refugee, means needing survival strategies to get through your quandary. It requires endurance, perseverance, and resilience in exile.

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Africa's Rapid Population Growth and Migratory Pressures

John F. May, Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC
Gérard-François Dumont, University of Paris-Sorbonne, Paris

Emails: j.may@prb.org; gerard-francois.dumont@wanadoo.fr

Keywords: Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; fertility; job creation; migration push and pull factors; governance

Summary: Rapid population growth in Africa, and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, will fuel migratory movements toward Europe. Migration push factors will be aggravated by the poor governance that continues to plague many African states.

In mid-2015, Africa had 1.2 billion people. The continent is expected to reach the 2.5 billion mark in 2050 and, according to the United Nations Population Division's 2015 projections, Africa could have 4.4 billion inhabitants at the end of the century assuming a sharp decrease in the fertility levels.

Africa had historically experienced a stagnant population. Between 1500 and 1900, the continent's population was estimated at about 85 million or less. With the beginning of the demographic transition, however, Africa's population was multiplied by a factor of seven during the 20th century alone. The 21st century will bring another quadrupling of the African population, this time from a much larger base. Indeed, the 21st century will be the century of African demography and this will have far-reaching consequences not only for the continent itself but also for the rest of the world.

To a large extent, this situation is explained by rapid improvements of mortality conditions, especially of infant and child mortality levels in contrast to the slow erosion of high levels of fertility. Moreover, many African countries have experienced protracted fertility stalls (when fertility does not decline for several years or decades). To the mortality and fertility components, one should add the phenomenon of the population momentum, namely the effect that young age structures will have on future demographic growth. Even if young couples have less children than their parents, there are so many couples in the reproductive age range that the number of births will remain large for decades to come.

The main challenge for Africa will be to create jobs for its ever expanding youth. The International Monetary Fund has estimated that the sub-Saharan region will need to create 18 million new jobs per year between 2010 and 2035—an astonishing 450 million new jobs in just a quarter of a century. As Africa is urbanizing at a rapid pace, a large portion of these new workers will need to find job opportunities in the cities. However, most workers will have to find employment either in the agricultural sector or the informal sector. Nonetheless, not all workers will find decent jobs. Hence, the emergence of migration push factors for increased emigration to other countries in the continent and/or to other countries on the fringe of the African region, namely in Europe. Other migration push factors include the still deficient governance in many African countries. Migration pull factors comprise the need of some European economies for workers to fill low-paid jobs requiring minimal qualifications.

Currently, Europe is receiving a relatively large influx of immigrants. In 2015 alone, Germany had to accommodate about one million immigrants. This is in addition to the one million immigrants that the European Union receives already on average every year. These 2015 immigrants are mostly refugees coming from countries at war, namely Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Citizens from other repressive regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, e.g., Eritrea, have also emigrated in large numbers. However, it is estimated that about 20 percent of immigrants to Europe are economic migrants and many come from Sub-Saharan countries. With the rapid population growth to take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is probable that the number of economic migrants

from Africa will increase dramatically in the coming decades. The number of refugees coming from Africa could also increase rapidly should poor governance continue to plague a number of African countries.

Mass Irregular and Involuntary Migration in Sudan: An Education and Training Response by the European Union

Nick Waterman, Independent Consultant, London

Email: waterman.nick@gmail.com

Keywords: Migration; Horn of Africa; Education and training

Summary: The EU's Valletta Summit Action Plan seeks to address mass irregular migration in Sudan through education and training interventions, but is unlikely to result in any "quick-wins".

Background

The Horn of Africa (HOA) faces challenges of extreme poverty, internal tensions, institutional weaknesses, poor governance, and weak social and economic infrastructure which have in some places resulted in conflict, displacement, irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. With highly porous borders and weak migration management mechanisms, it is difficult to provide accurate figures regarding the scale of migration in Sudan. However it is estimated that there are 170,000 refugees in the country, mainly from Eritrea and South Sudan, but also from Middle Eastern countries including Syria and Yemen. Sudan also has over two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Sudan is both a destination country for migrants, such as those from neighbouring countries, and a transit country for refugees from Eritrea, Somalia and other parts of the HOA towards Libya, Egypt, and onwards to Europe. It is also a country of origin of Sudanese migrants travelling to other parts of Africa, and Europe.

European Union Response

The "European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa" was established in late 2015. It has financial resources of 1.8 billion Euros, comprising contributions from the European Commission and most Member States, plus Norway and Switzerland. The Trust Fund is intended to benefit a wide range of countries across Africa which encompasses the major migration routes to Europe. This includes Sudan and other countries in the HOA that are among the most fragile and most affected by migration. It will fund the establishment of economic programmes that create employment opportunities, especially for young people and women, with a focus on vocational training and the creation of micro and small enterprises. It also supports projects in basic services for local populations including education, and actions to support the reintegration of returnees into their communities .

Priority Interventions

The Valletta Summit Action Plan agreed in Malta in late 2015 by EU Member States governments is based on the aforementioned European Union Trust Fund. It identifies 16 priority initiatives all of which directly relate to migration. A summary of the main points related to education and training are stated below:

- Fostering greater economic and employment opportunities, especially for young people and women in local communities, with a focus on vocational training and creation of micro and small enterprises. This includes greater assistance to youth to acquire labour market-relevant skills through education, vocational training, and access to digital technologies
- Strengthening resilience of communities, including refugees and IDPs through provision of basic services, such as education
- Developing networks between European and African vocational training institutions, with a view to ensuring that vocational training matches labour market needs
- Integrating migration in development and poverty eradication strategies and programmes, in particular in the areas such as

labour markets, employment, and education

- Ensuring policy coherence within the education and training sector, and between the sector and other areas of basic services, such as health

As may be discerned from the above, the proposed interventions tend to be aimed at economic development, employment growth and poverty reduction. Given their long-term and rather ambitious nature, they are unlikely to provide any "quick-wins" and the extent to which they will address mass, irregular and involuntary migration is highly questionable.

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REGIONAL LENSES ON THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION

ASIA: SOUTH, SOUTH-EAST AND EAST

Involuntary and Illegal Migration to India: The Case of Bangladesh

Binod Khadria, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Email: bkhadria@mail.jnu.ac.in

Keywords: India; Bangladesh; Illegal migrants; Involuntary migrants; Refugees; Human capital.

Summary: Bangladeshi immigrants in India comprise the first single largest "bilateral stock" of international migrants in the Global South. Most are involuntary and illegal migrants. Upholding its own economic self-interest, India ought to innovate policy that would differentiate their stocks of immigrants in the country from the further flow of immigrants to the country, and invest in the human capital of the former while regulating the latter.

Although Indian estimates have been much higher, according to the United Nation's latest International Migration Report, as of 2015 India is the country of origin of the world's largest diaspora of 16 million (United Nations 2016). It is well-known as a leading 'hinterland' for sourcing highly skilled migrants by most of the developed world. What is less-known is about India being a destination 'hub' too, hosting a large number of semi-skilled and unskilled migrants, particularly from its neighbouring country, Bangladesh. Whereas the 3 million Bangladeshi migrants comprise 60 per cent of overall 5 million immigrants in India, they also count as the largest 43 per cent chunk of the 7 million emigrant Bangladeshi diaspora spread across all countries. It thus makes the first single largest "bilateral stock" of international migrants in the Global South, as the UN had termed it, at least in 2012.

Despite this dominant presence, however, an unspecified majority of these Bangladeshi migrants in India are illegal entrants, often derogatively referred to as "refugees" by the local population. Most of them would have crossed the borders over a period of time, voluntarily in the sense that they are not the conventional "forced migrants" displaced by strife or persecution per se in their own country. But the push of the economic and other uncertainties at home and the pull by the local vote bank politics in nearby Indian states would perhaps justify its being called "involuntary" or "refugee" migration. In this sense, it fits well with the integrative explanation of "refugee movement" that was first provided by Zolberg in 1983, rejecting the traditional dichotomization of economic migrants and refugees.

However, India's policy stance in relation to its treatment of the issues relating to immigration of foreigners, including Bangladeshi refugees, into India on the one hand and emigration of its own nationals on the other is skewed. During the last two or three decades, India has shown a consistent enchantment towards the Indian emigrant professionals, especially those going to the developed countries, and has been celebrating back home their success stories abroad. Justifiably, immigration policy changes in the US, the UK and elsewhere, where Indian migrants constitute significant stocks and flows, frequently draw attention of the Indian government, media, business and industry.

In sharp contrast, India lacks a comprehensive policy framework on immigration despite being a preferred destination for large numbers of migrants from various countries and the most from its neighbour in the east, viz., Bangladesh. Rather than having a well-crafted immigration policy, India deals with immigration-related issues in a perfunctory manner. Despite creating tension in some parts of the society and becoming a focal point of debate among the policy makers, the academia and the security forces, immigration has failed to generate a healthy and constructive debate on the issue, not to speak of an amicable policy stance.

I have argued elsewhere (Khadria, 2009a & c); Khadria and Kumar, 2015) that Indian policy needs to differentiate between the stocks and flows of

immigrants in the country. It would no doubt be in the larger interest of India as a sovereign country to put an effective control on the unabated flows of illegal immigrants from across the borders and minimize them. At the same time, there are avenues for creating enough space to integrate their accumulated stocks and tap the potential contribution of involuntary immigrants in the social and economic development of the country. This would come through long-term and consistent investment in their human capital, provided the policy makers are ready for some fresh thinking on policy innovation. It would be quite apt to mention that, besides adding to the social and cultural diversity, these involuntary migrants have been contributing to the Indian economy by putting their hard labour in various roles, particularly in the informal sector as construction workers, domestic helpers, cleaners, bar and restaurant workers, petty traders and so on. Unfortunately, these have been overshadowed by the negativity of the criminal elements among those immigrants, and therefore their positive contributions have not been assessed or measured in terms of their quantitative share in the gross domestic product (GDP) of India. Primarily because of the parallel nature of the economy where they operate, mostly in the informal sector, with payment of wages and salaries made through cash and unaccounted transactions rather than the banking channels, there is a need to facilitate evidence-based research and assessment of the immigrants' contribution in the economy.

Notwithstanding the large stocks of these "illegal" or involuntary Bangladeshi immigrants in the country, it would be impossible to wish them away, whether one likes it or not. Apart from the difficulty of not being able to distinguish between a citizen and an illegal Bangladeshi immigrant because of common ethnicity, language and culture, the fact remains that they have lived in this country for decades, often over two or three generations, and will continue to stay. The flows too cannot be reversed, but can at most be minimized and regulated to optimum levels of legal immigration. As a destination country it would be in India's self-interest to nurture the adopted stocks of these cross-border involuntary immigrants by investing in their potential human capital - their education - not distinguishing between legitimate citizens and illegitimate expatriates. In other words, *economic integration* rather than deportation must be the *mantra* of the immigration policy objective. This would help in the *optimization* of human capital formation in India and *maximization* of the contribution of immigrants to India's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - both resulting in higher average productivity of the pan-Indian labour force – on an efficiency rationale, and not a charity or philanthropy-based welfare rationale. The bottom-line, therefore, for India would be to derive a lesson from the basic dictum of "self-interest" that the father of economics Adam Smith (1776) gave the world as the basic driver of individual human activity some two and a half centuries ago, and apply it in crafting an innovative cross-border immigration policy in dealing with involuntary and/or illegal migration from Bangladesh.

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The Web of Migration - Neglected Dimensions of Children's Education and Protection

Manzoor Ahmed, BRAC University, Dhaka

Email: amahmed40@yahoo.com

Keywords: Involuntary and economic migrants; common migration issues; refugee children's protection and education.

Summary: The line between involuntary migrants and economic migrants is thin and blurred. Regardless of the origin of the problem and their specific features, refugee children's education, health care and protection are obligations of states by international treaties, but are not being respected.

In 2015, the estimate is that about 500,000 males and 100,000 females went abroad as migrant workers from Bangladesh. Some 15 million or about 10 percent of the population of Bangladesh are temporary or permanent residents abroad. Remittances that migrant workers sent home topped 15 billion US dollars in 2015 and helped build a solid foreign currency reserve in the central bank. These workers abroad would not be labelled as involuntary migrants, but the line between voluntary and involuntary migration is thin indeed. The majority of the migrant workers, with little skills and education, are employed abroad at survival wages, in hard working conditions, and with little protection of their rights and dignity.

These notionally 'economic migrant' workers leave to escape deep poverty, lack of employment and meagre chances of improving their condition at home, often facing great risks of exploitation, cruel treatment and even threat to life. This situation was graphically portrayed in the media in early 2015 when ramshackle boats crammed with children, women and adults from Bangladesh and Rohingyas from Myanmar, some from Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, were seen adrift in the Indian Ocean and mass graves of trafficked people were discovered in southern Thailand. How different is this really from the wave of "involuntary migrants," crossing dangerous seas by any means possible to land on the shores of Europe?

The wave of migration to Europe has arisen from vicious and multi-pronged wars in West Asia and North Africa, subjecting millions to horrendous violence, starvation, disease and displacement from their homes and communities. Its difference, not to be minimized, from migration originating from lingering misery is in its scale, its intensity, its spread across many national borders, and the fact that a plausible end is not in sight.

There are, however, common issues between these two groups of protecting basic human rights and dignity, sanctity of life, and the commitment and obligation of nations and the international community to protect the most innocent of the victims, children. Children have to be protected from inhuman suffering and trauma and a semblance of normalcy has to be created for them by providing food, shelter, healthcare, and basic educational services.

Two specific situations in Bangladesh illustrate the complexity and web of issues and their intractability.

Communal tension in the Rakhine state of Myanmar in 1979 resulted in a wave of Rakhine refugees – who are ethnically close to the people in Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh - entering Bangladesh. At that time, most of the refugees were sent back to Myanmar through successful negotiation between the two countries. When communal violence broke out again in the Rakhine state in 1991, the military rulers of Myanmar baulked at taking back the Muslim Rohingyas, under pressure from the hard-line Buddhist majority. Rather, communal riots in 2012 and continuing violence and discrimination against the Rohingyas pushed intermittently more of them across the

border. Bangladesh found it difficult to take care of the refugees or to allow the estimated half a million people to be absorbed into Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the refugees including the children remain in difficult circumstances, often deprived of basic services including education. Aung San Suu Kyi, the icon of democratic transition in Myanmar, has cautiously distanced herself from the Rohingya situation.

Bangladesh's Urdu-speaking minority community is known as Biharis, because they had migrated from the Bihar state of India after religion-based partition of India in 1947, when the British colonial rulers left India. The Biharis sided with Pakistan during the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971. They were consigned to live in camps for 'stranded Pakistanis'. The largest of these in the capital city Dhaka is known as the Geneva Camp, named after the locations of the headquarters of the UN High Commission for Refugees. Bangladesh granted the camp residents the option to apply for Bangladesh citizenship and integrate into Bangladesh society. Some chose this option, which did not often go smoothly. Others, about 300,000, harbour the hope of returning to Pakistan, though Pakistan refuses to take responsibility for the Biharis. The majority of them live in dire conditions, deprived of basic services, and often facing discrimination from mainstream society.

In both short and longer term emergencies, education ultimately saves children's lives and offers them protection. Out-of-school refugee children are at greater risk of violence, rape, recruitment into fighting, prostitution, and other life-threatening situations. **Education provides the return route to familiar routines – creating hope** about the future and mitigating the emotional impact of violence and displacement, so argues the International Network of Education in Emergencies (INEE) in many of its reports.

Regardless of the origin of the problem and their specific features, children's education, health care and protection are obligations of states by international treaties which are being widely flouted. This is evident in the wealthy countries – Australia and much of Europe, with the exception of Germany – as well as the poor countries such as Bangladesh. Others have failed to take the steps to mitigate the problem, such as Myanmar and Pakistan, as in the situations noted above.

The inter-agency Global Migration Group (GMG) argues that when human and workers' rights of migrants are respected and migration is well governed through access to affordable, safe and regular migration channels, substantial gains in human development outcomes result for migrants and for countries both sending and receiving migrants.

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Myanmar's Political Transition and Educational Aspirations of Refugees in Thailand

Pia Jolliffe, University of Oxford

Email: pia.jolliffe@bfriars.ox.ac.uk

Keywords: Education; refugees; Myanmar; Thailand.

Summary: In the overall context of Myanmar's political transition, the ongoing need to provide quality education for refugees in Thailand is highlighted. There exists serious concern that donors are limiting funding for early education in the camps because their focus is shifting to projects within Myanmar itself. Refugees' individual educational aspirations depend on whether or not they plan to return to Myanmar in the near future.

The political transition in Myanmar (since the elections of Nov. 2015) affects the educational aspirations of refugees in Thailand. According to The Border Consortium, in March 2016 there were still 104,229 refugees in nine camps along the Thai-Myanmar border. A recent spot check among Karen camp resident teacher trainers in Mae La und Umphiem camps, suggests that the majority of Karen refugees prefer to stay in camps, rather than to return to Myanmar where shelter, food or job opportunities are not secure, particularly in areas with different ethnic nationalities.

In the refugee camps, there has been a noted reduction in food ration and school supplies. Basic education seems not to be on the 2016/2017 agenda for big donors whose focus seems to be shifting from the situation at the border towards programmes inside Myanmar itself. These developments affect large education programmes, such as The Basic Education Support Towards Transition (BEST) project, funded by the European Union (EU) through the international NGO, Save the Children. According to Bob Anderson, Director of Mobile Education Partnerships, funding for the early years BEST programme in Thai refugee camps ceases in May 2016 and it remains uncertain how early education for refugee children in Thailand will develop afterwards.

Concerning aspirations for secondary and post-secondary education, preparedness for repatriation and reintegration into communities in Myanmar are recurring themes, both through specific activities and also built into programme approaches. Karen refugees are concerned about the accreditation of their degrees and whether these can be recognized for further studies or employment in Myanmar or another country. Language is an additional concern. The extent to which refugees aspire for mother tongue based education varies depending on their political stance and expectations towards the peace process. In order to return to Myanmar, parents say their children need more language skills, especially in the majority national language, Myanmar, in English for job opportunities, and their mother tongue, the Karen language. Job aspirations include working for NGOs who go inside Myanmar, working for businesses that use English as lingua franca or working in education which is in Myanmar frequently delivered in English. Others aspire to continue their education at English speaking colleges or universities. The desire for tertiary education is often coupled with occupational aspirations such as medical doctor, politician and translator. Yet, in order to access tertiary education, refugee students need to pass standardized tests for which they would feel better prepared if there was more camp-based teaching of subjects like English, Science and Mathematics.

Of course, it is important to bear in mind that in addition to the Karen, there are also other ethnic groups, such as the Muslim Rohingya. Within Myanmar's Rhakine State, the Rohingya continue to suffer from lack of education and access to citizenship and political participation. According to a young man interviewed for the documentary *Michael's (2015)*, Umphiem camp schools are largely teaching Karen, but fail to provide for Rohingyas' particular educational needs. Rather than going to school, Rohingya children learn their mother tongue at home and Arabic at the mosque.

Access to formal education is also difficult for Rohingyas who live without any formal status outside camps in border towns like in Mae Sot. Indeed, the protracted statelessness of the Rohingya impedes their enjoyment of rights, including the right to education, whether in Myanmar or in Thailand. In spite of these difficulties, young Rohingya adults in Thailand have educational aspirations for themselves and their children. They hope to obtain refugee status which in turn would enable them to apply for resettlement to third countries where they hope to study subjects like law or international development.

To conclude, for most refugees and stateless persons in Thailand the future is still uncertain. Therefore, continuous investment in camp-based education for all age groups and ethnic groups is necessary. Precisely at this moment of transition, education is an invaluable gift that enables refugees and stateless persons to discern their options for the future and to prepare well either for reintegration in Myanmar or life in another country.

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Changing Educational Narratives of Myanmar Refugees in Malaysia?

Lucy Bailey, University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus, Selangor

Email: Lucy.Bailey@nottingham.edu.my

Keywords: Learning centres; education; refugee children; Malaysia.

Summary: This article highlights the lack of legal status for refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia, and the consequent discontinuities and uncertainties in education provision. It suggests that students and their families in this situation view education as central to both stability and mobility. However, it is also noted that the experiences of refugee students in Malaysia remains chronically under-researched.

The predominantly Myanmar refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia have no legal status, since Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees nor to its 1967 Protocol. Living dispersed in mostly urban settings, rather than in camps, they are unable to seek legal employment, and have no access to government education. The 30,000 refugee children living in Malaysia therefore either receive no formal schooling, or are educated in poorly-resourced learning centres established by the UNHCR, NGOs and/ or the refugee communities themselves. There is a dearth of systematic research into these learning centres and the education the children within them are receiving. Much of the research conducted into refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia has been at policy level (Bailey, 2013), and the empirical work that exists has been largely centred on the lives of adults. Working with refugee children in this context undoubtedly raises a range of practical, financial and ethical challenges, but the lack of research means that the academic community has failed to empower this marginalized and disempowered group.

The limited research that has been conducted into the educational narratives of refugee children in this context identifies common features in their accounts of their education (Bailey, 2015). Whilst they have experienced numerous discontinuities and interruptions to their education, they continue to be highly motivated to learn and view education as a priority for themselves and their families, despite limited resources, and a source of stability in their lives. When looking ahead, three features of their future education are identified by students as crucial in enabling them to meet their dreams: firstly, acquiring English is more important to them than any other subject; secondly, they hope for an education system that can be flexible enough to allow them to study during the hours and at the age at which they are actually available to study; lastly, they need the cultural resources to enable them to understand and navigate the education system in whichever country they find themselves living. In these ways, they hope their education will facilitate social mobility. The narratives of these young people therefore conceptualize education as transformational, but the extent to which the disparate learning centres address their priorities remains unexplored. Moreover, the broader social meaning attached to learning centres by their communities deserves detailed study.

Alongside these research gaps, it should be noted that the composition of the refugee community in Malaysia is rapidly changing. There are currently just over 150,000 refugees and asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR in Malaysia (UNHCR, 2015a); of these, over 140,000 are from different ethnicities within Myanmar. However, with recent political changes in Myanmar, the UNHCR anticipates the return of many thousands of Burmese displaced people in Thailand to Myanmar, in place of their journeying south to Malaysia (UNHCR, 2015b). The prospect of return rather than resettlement may impact on the priority given to certain subjects and skills in learning centres. In addition, the Malaysian government has announced that it will accept 3000 Syrian refugees over the next three years (BBC News, 2015). This move marks a public recognition of the plight of displaced people, despite their continued lack of legal recognition.

In summary, it is not at this stage possible to say whether and how the educational priorities of refugees in Malaysia will change. At an anecdotal level, the Myanmar community leaders with whom I have worked are watching political developments before they make plans to return, and feel that optimism about their country is premature. Meanwhile, it is unclear whether there will be a measure of integration for the Syrian refugees, and whether they will be permitted to attend Malaysian schools. Of the common features of the young people's educational narratives identified above, then, it seems that at least one is likely to continue – the prospect of discontinuity and change. It is therefore to be hoped that the lack of academic attention to giving voice to their perspectives will be redressed.

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Independent and Autonomous School Management by Afghan Refugees in Iran

Mei Asakuma, Private Sector, Nagoya

Email: asakuma.may5@gmail.com

Keywords: Afghan refugees; Iran; exclusion and inclusion of refugees in public schools

Summary: Afghan refugees in Iran establish and operate their own schools for their children without any external assistance. These schools play unique roles, though still face challenges.

Two-thirds of refugees in the world are said not to be any longer in emergency situations, but trapped in protracted refugee situations (PRS). International agencies and stakeholders tend to pay little attention to PRS because they are not under imminent danger or emergency situations. Therefore some researchers describe people of PRS as refugees trapped in forgotten situations. The number of Afghans in PRS is approximately 2.6 million and they represent along with Palestinians, one of the largest groups of refugees in such a situation. 950 thousand Afghans live in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Afghans have been staying as refugees in Iran for over 30 years and the majority of them live in urban areas. In recent years, the number of undocumented refugees who do not get residence permission has increased, and there are no data about the exact size of this population.

Refugees are suffering from various restrictions on their lives in Iran and education is no exception. Undocumented Afghan children were not able to go to Iranian public schools until 2015 and even documented Afghans could not go there without school fees, although Iranian students went to public schools for free. Historically, refugees started independent and autonomous school management in Iran in the 1990s. They have established and operated their own schools for their children without any external assistance. However, the schools that the refugees manage are generally unlicensed, as refugees are not legally permitted to undertake such activities, and they face the risk that they would be closed forcibly by the Iranian authority. Apparently, there were around 40 schools managed by Afghans in 2000; yet we cannot get more up to date information about the current number and situation of these autonomous refugee schools.

Afghan refugees in these schools have been frequently discriminated against and have encountered difficulties in their lives. They appear to have been often excluded from Iranian society. Through the research, three roles of these schools were identified: (1) They offer alternative learning opportunities for many Afghan children; (2) They function as one of a few places of work for Afghan women; (3) They are places where Afghan mothers can meet with each other. This might be of importance in understanding more inclusive strategies for refugees in new social contexts.

On the other hand, international organizations recognize the schools managed by Afghans; however they ignore the roles and meanings of them because these schools do not have legal status and most of students are undocumented Afghans. Not only international actors but also some Afghan refugees criticize these Afghan schools; some Afghans who have studied in Iranian public schools argue that the self-reliant refugee schools simply allow the school principals to make money from undocumented Afghan children.

The educational situation for Afghans has been changing gradually. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ordered that all Afghan children in Iran be permitted schooling regardless of their residency status by mid- 2015. The change of attitude of Iranian government would make it easier to access public schools for undocumented Afghans.

However, the schools managed by Afghans have been playing an important part of education of refugees. There are Afghans who have not been to Iranian schools because many such schools are so overcrowded that they cannot accept Afghans. Therefore some Afghan children are forced to leave school. These students studied at the Afghan schools as an alternative measure. It is important that these Afghan schools are not just condemned as being illegal and suspicious, but the government, international actors and refugees should build a relationship with each other around them. What is necessary for us is to understand better the possibility and the challenges of refugees' self-reliance and resilience at the same time.

The Key Role of Education in Hong Kong in the Flight from Mainland China

Sandra Lo, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Email: 128sandralo@gmail.com

Keywords: Stepping stone; Rennie's Mill; Kaifong Association; Native English teachers

Summary: The combined effort of a community to tackle a never ending uphill task, the migration from Mainland China to Hong Kong.

For the past 150 years Hong Kong was "a stepping stone for opportunity and escape, a bridge between China and the West…" (p 74 Yee 1989). In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, the population was sixty thousand. By 1950 the number tripled. In the subsequent years, a tremendous mass of distressed people fled to Hong Kong from Mainland China. About 200,000 to 500,000 arrived in Hong Kong annually. By 1961 Hong Kong hosted over three million inhabitants.

The newcomers of 1950 were mostly ex-servicemen, government officials and their families who had to leave everything behind due to political reasons. In order to cope with the huge influx and for easy governance, six thousand refugees were ferried to Rennie's Mill at Junk Bay, north east of Kowloon Peninsula (now Tiu Keng Leng) on 26 June 1950. Among them were several Mandarin speaking foreign missionaries who were expelled from China.

The Chinese philosophy of "Academic pursuit is far superior than anything else" 萬般皆下品 唯有讀書高 is heavily embedded in the society and thus influenced the development. The first class of the "Hong Kong Government Social Welfare Office Rennie's Mill Camp School for Children" was held on 14 November 1950. Within a few months the missionaries set up several other schools. These were staffed by refugees who were formerly teachers. As more and more people moved into the area, the demand grew. At its peak, in this enclave alone, were 5 secondary schools and 9 primary schools, with over 3 thousand pupils. The resources for the operations of these were mainly local and overseas donations in response to the unprecedented population crisis.

More and more disillusioned and discontented citizens came to Hong Kong during the 50s and 60s. One future academic commented: "Hong Kong was a city in crisis when I arrived in June of 1967" (P38 Hayhoe 2004). She further illustrated "HK was also a city of refugees- layers of them, including those who had come in the fifties, those escaping the famine of the early sixties and those finding their way out during the grim days of the cultural revolution…."

In December 1966 there was a riot in Macau and the Portuguese Government decided to give the city back to China. Those Macau citizens who had the means, fled. The nearest asylum was Hong Kong, and my family was among those who left. But by May 1967 Hong Kong had its own share of the same trouble, and it was then I returned to Macau to finish my secondary education.

In addition to the number of non-stop migrants, the birthrate was very high. "It was a city bursting with people struggling for survival. They worked in factories for radio parts, toys, plastic flowers, wigs", Hayhoe continued.

To cope with the huge demand in all aspects of daily life, the government could only deal with the more crucial ones, like housing. The Secretariat for Chinese Affairs (SCA) promoted the setting up of the Kaifong Association (neighbourhood/district association) to help with the acute need for services in education and healthcare, among others (P152 Chiu & Wong 2012). Resettlement estates were built. "The roof tops were given over to schools for refugee children established by

various missionary and charitable organisations" (ibid). The government schools could not cater for the ever increasing need. Private schools were run in every available space, commercial buildings, residential flats and even in temporary squatter-sites. Classes of different modes were held, morning, afternoon, twilight and evening sessions. As for children "most, managed to get some years of primary education through such schools; they often went into factories to work as early as 12 or 13 years of age"(ibid). In the 1970s nine-year compulsory education was provided for all children.

"Female members were compelled by the obligation to help earn a living for their families or pay the educational expenses of their male siblings" (P7 Lee 2003). These young women being financially independent were able to attend evening classes and Sunday schools, "situated at the crossroad of Western Christianity and Chinese traditions, found for themselves a new space for personal growth and development" (Ibid. P 157). Unknowingly, they became the strong workforce that acted as a catalyst for the economic success of Hong Kong in later years.

In the summer of 1970 equipped with a GCE certificate I decided to settle in Hong Kong for further education and better prospects. In less than a month, instead of finding a place for my own education, I was offered a post as a full-time English teacher in a secondary school, and another part-time one in the St. Augustine English Evening School. Untrained teachers were given the status "permitted teachers" until they got the required training and become "registered teachers". Pre-service and in-service teacher training were provided in order to speed up the number required to cope with the huge school-age population.

Most who had settled, realised English would give them the head start for upward mobility. English schools, especially evening classes, bloomed profusely. The one I taught at operated in a kindergarten with the last session ending at 11pm. However there were never enough English teachers because anyone with good proficiency in the language could make more money in the business sector. In the mid-70s different measures were introduced including the Native English Teacher Scheme (NET) employing English teachers from English speaking countries.

In the early 50s, the dockyards were the most popular training site for the early teenagers. There, apprentices got training and an allowance. The Hong Kong government opened its Victoria Technical School in 1951. Many other institutions were run by the missionaries where subjects like mechanics, metal work, printing, shoe-making, tailoring and carpentry etc. were offered. The trainees, if up to the standard, obtained accreditations from the City and Guilds, UK. During the 50s and 60s, vocational education was based on needs and largely left to the devices of individual organisations. In 1982, the Vocational Training Council was formally established as a vocational education provider.

Until the formation of the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1963, the Hong Kong University was the only one in the whole territory. In the early days of the Chinese University the teaching staff were mostly academics from the mainland. They were some of the most learned educators of the Chinese culture. From 1994 onwards seven other polytechnics and colleges were granted university status.

Migration to Hong Kong is a continuous phenomenon. In 2015, no less than thirty eight thousand one-way permit holders came to Hong Kong from the mainland and stayed. They themselves and their offspring will enter into the Hong Kong education system. Historically, motives for migration have shifted dramatically over almost 70 years.

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A SPECIAL FOCUS ON SYRIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

No Lost Generation: The Search for Quality Education

Dawn Chatty, University of Oxford

Email: dawn.chatty@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Keywords: Syrian refugee children; quality education; accreditation; curriculum; unsustainable livelihoods.

Summary: Displaced Syrian families are increasingly concerned that their children are not able to access quality education to reach the level of skills and professional statuses of their parents. To prevent their children becoming a 'lost generation', many Syrian families are encouraging them to set off for Europe seeking asylum, education, and opportunities to work.

'No Lost Generation' was one of the first slogans adopted by the UN Humanitarian Aid regime as early as 2012 in terms of the fallout from the Syrian refugee crisis. Education for young Syrians was supposed to remain at the top of the international assistance agenda. But perhaps because the numbers grew so large, and many Syrians refused to be placed in refugee camps, quality education largely slipped out of focus and off many government and international aid agencies' achievable list.

Syrian families with children and youth are struggling to keep their children in quality education. The two shift school system in host communities in Lebanon and Jordan - and to which some international assistance has been directed – is perceived by Syrians as inadequate to prepare youth to pass the official 'tawjihi' - end of high school – examination. Thus many youth are dropping out of the two shift system, feeling that they will not be able to get certification or accreditation for their years of study.

In Turkey, language is a barrier and education provision is more complex as many Syrian children and youth need to first master the Turkish language before they can enrol in Turkish government schools. The lack of adequate language training means that few are able to access public education. Once the language is mastered, Syrian youth may enter Turkish schools. Enrolment at university level is open to Syrian students and is tuition-free. Curriculum is also an issue as many Syrian youth juggle studying the various - Turkish, Syrian, Syrian Opposition, and Libyan – curricula keeping an eye out on whether their studies can eventually be certified or accredited.

In Lebanon, where the national education system is under the greatest pressure, there are nearly 500,000 Syrian refugee children out of education. Significant efforts have been made to open previously closed schools, build new schools and enrol more children through a double shift system. But so far only 19% of refugee school-aged children and youth in Lebanon have accessed formal education. A large proportion of refugees from Syria remain unregistered in Lebanon for fear that their data might fall into the hands of Syrian internal security forces. Lack of registration prevents students from accessing education and sitting for official examinations.

In Jordan, refugee youth from Syria have overwhelmed the state school system. Free access to state schools and the expansion of pupil spaces through double shift systems have still been unable to supply formal education services in line with demand. The inability of refugee families to cover basic living costs has meant that many young refugees work in the informal sector to provide financial assistance to their families; and so many drop out of school.

Without a concerted effort to create viable **quality** education for Syria's youth in the region, there will be a lost generation. Many families are now looking to send their youth to Europe, sometimes unaccompanied, in order to give them a future. As the humanitarian crisis in Syria enters its 6th year,

many families despair that their children - many whom have been out of school for 3-4 years – are becoming a lost generation. Without education, they will not be able to equal the skilled and professional statuses of their parents. Increasingly greater numbers of families are pooling the last of their savings or going into debt in order to pay smugglers to take their children to Europe where they have a chance of applying for asylum or humanitarian leave to remain – to remain long enough to access Western education and to develop skills which they will one day be able to use when conditions permit a return to rebuild Syria.

Researching Syrian Schools in Turkey: Meeting the Needs of Non-camp Students and Teachers at Refugee-run Schools

Kaoru Yamamoto, Osaka University

Email: kaoru_y@hus.osaka-u.ac.jp

Keywords: Syrian schools in Turkey; refugee-run schools; non-camp settings.

Summary: It is important to raise awareness of refugee-run schools because they are relatively responsive to the stakeholders' diverse needs and they provide sustainable educational opportunities for non-camp refugee children. This research reveals three key roles of the Syrian-run schools in Turkey which supplement and motivate their Syrian students and teachers: (1) A strong relationship among teachers and students; (2) Freedom attained at the secured place of refuge; (3) Shared intention of repatriation and big expectations of Syria's reconciliation through education.

Syria has produced the largest population of refugees; as of 2016 there are approximately five million Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2016). Most (85%) Syrian refugees in Turkey are not in refugee camps. Rather, the majority live in cities and towns in their host country. The school enrolment ratio of non-camp refugee children in primary education is estimated to be 64% worldwide in 2008 (UNHCR 2009, p.12), which is relatively lower than the average of refugees as a whole (76%: Dryden-Peterson 2011). Although providing education for those populations is critical to achieve the education Sustainable Development Goal, the educational situation in non-camp settings remains effectively invisible due to the lack of empirical data.

Almost 60% of all Syrian refugees (approximately 2.7m out of 4.8m) have sought asylum in Turkey (UNHCR 2016). Syrian children are entitled to be enrolled in either Turkish local schools or Syrian schools even if they are not in refugee camps. The school enrolment ratio (both camp and non-camp), however, is estimated to be only 40% in Turkey (UNICEF MENA Regional Office 2015). The number of those Syrian-run schools are said to be around 500 all over Turkey. They are supposed to contribute in the expansion of education for non-camp Syrian children. The medium of instruction in those schools is Arabic and the teachers and students are mostly from Syria. They also use a curriculum and textbooks which are almost identical to those in Syria.

The Syrian schools had been operated independently until 2013, but the Turkish authorities began to bring them under their control since the middle of 2014. They started to send a Turkish coordinator from the regional education office to each Syrian school. The coordinators collect educational data from those schools, and observe and sometimes supervise their school management. This strengthened intervention is internationally regarded as a generous support for Syrian schools by the Turkish government because they allow Syrian schools to be opened in the territory and do not force them to close down. From the Syrians' perspective, however, it can be a fatal restriction on their activities which used to be autonomously managed. The educational situation at the Syrian-run schools is therefore dynamically changing since the Turkish intervention took place.

Syrian schools play the essential roles for their students and teachers because they are operated by displaced Syrians themselves. There are three key features which were analyzed in this research.[1]

(1) The strong relationship among students and teachers: Teachers' rapport with their students is one of the reasons why the students keep going to these schools. Some of the boys in 6th grade at a Syrian school referred to this as follows: "We are being treated well in this school as if we were the

1 The following data were collected by the author in the fieldwork conducted at nine refugee-run schools in Hatay, Sanliurfa and Gaziantep provinces in Turkey during 2013-2015, employing semi-structured interviews and questionnaire surveys.

teachers' children." Another said that "what I like at this school is the brotherly behavior among students."

(2) The freedom attained at the secured place of refuge: Even though they are suffering from homesickness and nostalgia being away from home, some of the teachers and students are aware of a certain advantage to be away from their country. "There was no room for expressing one's opinion (at school in Syria). This school (in Turkey) is much better" (Mathematics secondary teacher), "There is more freedom of expressing one's opinion (at the school in Turkey) than at the school in Syria" (boy student in 12th grade).

(3) The shared intention of repatriation and big expectations on Syria's reconciliation through education: The ambition to contribute to Syria's reconciliation in the future greatly promotes the teachers and the students to work harder. A boy student in 12th grade mentioned that "I want to (continue to) study and benefit my society."

The Syrian schools have a special function because their stakeholders consider them to be a unified Syrian community at the place of refuge, consisting of those who share the same experiences as refugees. The students and the teachers admire the roles of the school while they are isolated and divided in Turkey. These Syrian schools provide them with not only the sustainable educational opportunities but the particular supplements and motivations which no other supporters are able to do.

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Staying in School: A Challenging Reality for Syrian Refugee Children in Jordan

Hiba Salem, University of Cambridge

Email: hiba_salem@hotmail.com

Keywords: Syrian refugees; lost generation; Education 2030; Syria Donors' Conference.

Summary: Recent aid plans aim to address the needs of Syrian refugee children as realities within refugee-hosting nations neighbouring Syria reveal the critical challenges.

Today, the world bears witness to the unfolding of destruction and the global implications of conflict. The Syrian conflict has now marked its 5th anniversary and the prospect of a "lost generation" continues to threaten the futures of Syrian refugee children.[1] The UNHCR estimates that over 2.8 million Syrian children are still out of school within Syria and its neighbouring countries including Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Syrian refugee families face devastating living conditions, relying on depleting humanitarian aid and lack of formal work opportunities. Children have become the greatest victims of these realities, with the heightening of illiteracy, child marriage, child labour, and recruitment by armed forces establishing new norms within these contexts. Yet, recent global collaborations, including the *Education 2030 Framework for Action* (UNESCO, 2015) and the Syria Donors' Conference,[2] aim to respond to these alarming ramifications.

Jordan: big challenges in a small country

Syrian refugees today make up more than 10% of the Jordanian population.[3] The country has now become the country with the second highest refugee-to-citizen ratio in the world, as it has generously hosted a high number of displaced people fleeing major conflicts such as in Palestine and Iraq. However, the influx of Syrian refugees has resulted in major repercussions for the country's economic and educational systems. The Government of Jordan has committed to respond to these demands and provide humanitarian aid, including free education and healthcare, for all Syrian refugees.

The country has developed the Jordan Response Plan,[4] which aims to improve the livelihoods of Syrian families and children. In addition, it is hoped that these short-term and long-term plans reduce pressures placed on the country's resources and improve the overall living conditions within the country. As a result, Jordan has constructed new schools within host communities and camps, employed new teachers, increased teacher training, and implemented a double-shift system. Over 99 public schools now run double-shift systems, doubling the capacity of student intake. Prior to the Syrian conflict, one of Jordan's key priorities was improving the quality of education. However, such efforts have actually diminished as the double-shift system undermines the country's quality of education. With shorter school hours in the double-shift schools, only basic subjects, such mathematics, Arabic, English and science, are currently taught.

The influx of students has also resulted in an overcrowding in over 41 percent of public schools in the major cities of Jordan. Yet, today, over 40 percent of Syrian refugee children are still not attending formal education. Children continue to drop out of school due to numerous factors. As Syrian refugees are not allowed to access formal employment opportunities, children have often become the ones to carry the burden and seek informal work. Additionally, tensions between the two communities have impacted children's ability to remain safe and move freely. Due to the deteriorating living conditions, including the rise of unemployment, impact of housing costs, and reduced

1 http://nolostgeneration.org/
2 https://www.supportingsyria2016.com/
3 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107
4 http://www.jrpsc.org/

quality of education, unsettling pressures have affected social cohesion within the country. Reports thus state that Syrian refugee children continue to drop-out of school due to exposures to violence, discrimination and lack of safety.[5]

Education 2030, the Syria Donors Conference, and pledges for the next school year

The Syria Donors' Conference, held in London on the 4th of February 2016, has promised to reshape the short-term and long-term plans and expectations in addressing the needs of Syrian refugees. The conference was hosted by the United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait and the United Nations. Invitations were extended to major world leaders, including leaders of refugee-hosting nations in the Arab region. By the end of the one-day conference, over $10bn were pledged to support those displaced within Syria and its neighbouring countries.

Leaders of refugee-hosting nations at this conference described the numerous challenges standing in the way of providing refugees with quality education and living conditions. They warned that failing to respond to these issues heightens the risk of a lost generation, contributes to further global vulnerabilities, and threatens the stabilities of their countries. The purpose of the conference was thus to collaborate to adopt a new approach in responding to this humanitarian crisis, meeting the needs of both children and older individuals. The pledges targeted two key objectives: ensuring that all Syrian refugee children access quality education by the end of the 2016-2017 school year, and encouraging over 1.1 million job opportunities to be created by 2018.

Leaders at this conference recognised the need to provide refugees with independence and the power to regain a sense of normalcy. Providing new job opportunities within refugee-hosting nations aims to allow countries to develop their economic prospects, bettering the livelihoods of both refugees and citizens of the hosting nation. Terms such as "resilience" were used at the conference, which reiterates the Sustainable Development Goals and Education 2030 approach. Moving towards "equity", "inclusion", and "resilience" requires a comprehensive plan that addresses the needs of all, allowing refugees to access work permits, children to engage in quality education, and residents of the country to continue to receive quality access to education, healthcare, and job opportunities. It is hoped that the outcome of this conference will support refugee-hosting nations in immediately initiating a response to these needs.

A key pledging session was also dedicating to supporting Syrians within the country. These pledges will be used to support internally displaced persons in accessing water, healthcare, and education. However, it is important to note that the uncertain and critical political situation in the country poses a great threat to the success of such plans. While the Syria Donors' Conference promises hope and change, the Syrian conflict shows no near end in sight, and displacement and violence continue to reshape the lives of millions.

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Maintaining Quality and Integrity of Education in Refugee Contexts: Balancing System and Refugee Needs

Paul Fean and Laura Marshall, Norwegian Refugee Council Jordan, Amman

Emails: Paul.Fean@nrc.no; laura.marshall@nrc.no

Keywords: Refugee; access; quality; civil documentation; trauma; formal education system; vulnerability; Jordan; Syria.

Summary: Access to quality education is mainly ensured by the education system's flexibility and adaptability. However, the presence of the refugees can challenge the system's perception of quality. This must be taken into consideration in refugee response as well as the challenges that relate specifically to the experience of displacement.

In the context of large scale refugee response, host country education systems are expected to massively expand, supported by donor investment.[1] Educating large numbers of refugee or internally displaced children, adolescents and youth can create pressure on quality by increasing class sizes, employing new and poorly trained teachers, limiting learning materials and resources, and double-shifting schools. Efforts to maintain (or increase) the *quality* of education under these circumstances require understanding the measures to maintain the *integrity* of the education system. In order to respond, all actors must understand the need to work with the flexibility and the rigidity of the existing system. In addition, the pressure on refugees means that it is not enough to simply open existing systems. Instead the education system must proactively engage and support refugees to access quality.

System adaptability and rigidity

The high-stakes of formal education (symbolic and otherwise), particularly qualifications, mean systems maintain quality through maintaining their integrity. However, it is the elements of education systems intended to maintain integrity that can act as insurmountable challenges to access to education by refugees.

Refugees face **challenges to both access and complete basic schooling.** Systemic challenges faced by Syrian refugee children in Jordan include being unable to begin where they left off their education; when students have missed three years or more of education and/or are three years older than the grade standard, they are no longer eligible for formal education. Currently 50-60% of Syrian refugee children are in school, but many of the remainder have missed so much school that they can't catch up without specifically designed programmes. In order to be functional these programmes of accelerated education or **catch-up education must be linked with recognised pathways into the system.** At the time of writing, this flexibility is perceived as challenging to the integrity of the formal system. Students are unable to register throughout the school year; so vulnerable students, who have to relocate (for their families to find cheaper living circumstances or support), will be unable to re-register in another school but must wait for the next year.

Lack of basic civil documentation, such as birth certificates, can have critical consequences for refugees, in terms of registration, residency or future return to Syria (Norwegian Refugee Council and the International Human Rights Clinic, 2015). Refugees may be unable to access basic or secondary education services without relevant registration documents. Refugee youth in Jordan hoping to pursue higher education, including those whose university studies were interrupted by the conflict in Syria, face administrative barriers as they are required to produce their original secondary examination certificate and transcripts of prior university study. Due to **displacement and protection risks associated with interaction**

1 Although donor funding of Education in Emergencies is significantly below the levels required (see Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children, 2015).

with Syrian authorities, large numbers of Syrian refugee youth are therefore currently unable to access higher education.

While the education system in Jordan is expanding to enrol Syrian students, barriers of entry remain. As one female Syrian youth observed, *"only a few students study the Tawjihi because they have to repeat two grades due to the different curriculum. Students feel that even if they pass the Tawjihi there are no opportunities."*[2] The requirement for Syrian students to sit two years of study to be eligible to sit the secondary school certificate acts as a barrier, particularly for those who were close to completion of secondary education in Syria.

"I don't do anything here…I have the curriculum for the Tawjihi – the scientific stream- and I study at home alone. But now I've given up hope. I've been to the Ministry of Education over 50 times, but every time they refuse me."

Many restrictions placed on refugees are symptoms of the system trying to maintain its own definition of quality. There is a tension between trying to expand the system and the desire to maintain the quality of the system. While quality is frequently used in relation to learning outcomes, it can also relate to the integrity of the system itself, such as administrative procedures and certificates.

In responding to refugee and host community education needs, stakeholders must ask: What is the quality level the system is trying to maintain? What is an alternative way to maintain the quality? Rather than offering a clearly defined but rigid definition of quality, negotiation and adaptation are required, while maintaining the integrity of the system. Such negotiation and adaptation rest on understanding that the refugee situation is different and that the refugees should proactively be engaged in the education system rather than passively waiting for the system to accommodate them.

Refugee perspective

Macro level policy analysis sometimes fails to understand the specific needs of refugees as qualitatively different from host communities. Even when refugees appear to have access to education services, they still face multiple challenges that act as barriers to participation.

Most refugees in the Middle East have scarce financial and material resources, and face restrictions on legal livelihoods activities that limit ability to provide for themselves and diminish motivation to continue education. As mentioned by one female refugee youth, *"We want to work but there are no opportunities", she explains. "If life stays as hard as it is now we think to return to Syria, even if there is still conflict…when we were brought here we thought the situation would be better but we were surprised by the high costs and the restrictions. In Syria there was water and electricity but now we have to fetch water."* Financial concerns can lead to negative coping measures, such as child labour, as well as insecure tenure and inadequate housing, outside of camp contexts.

In addition to their socio-economic situation, refugees' experience of conflict and trauma can impact on their education and cognition. Educators require greater understanding of the ongoing impact of trauma on learning. One female Syrian refugee highlighted the continuing nature of trauma, *"I am afraid that the war will come here, and I will be separated from my parents."* She said, *"I'm frightened of everything, about losing people close to me."*

In displacement, gender roles are often threatened and disturbed, meaning that some girls will experience more restrictions, *"I don't do anything other than stay in the house with my family",* she says. *"The main difference here is that my parents now fear for me going out alone; so a family member always comes with me wherever I go."*

In order to make education systems more accessible and facilitate quality learning of refugees, a holistic approach is required to actively address the social, economic and psychological barriers to learning.

Concluding Thoughts

Education is more than simply being able to gain certificates. Particularly for refugees and those

2 Quotations from Syrian students taken from Norwegian Refugee Council (2016)

affected by displacement, quality education has a strong role in community cohesion, social development and psychosocial recovery. Quality of education provision is not absolute; rather it is the negotiation of systemic requirements and adaptability to the needs of students and stakeholders. It is the role of governments, donors and civil society organisations to hold dialogue to identify mutually beneficial concepts of quality and system integrity as well as to proactively engage and support refugees.

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The Estimated Loss of Human Capital Formation to Syria Through the Crisis

Mizunoya Suguru, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Email: suguru@cuhk.edu.hk

Keywords: Returns to Education; Syria Crisis; Refugee Education .

Summary: The estimated cost of the loss of human capital formation due to the ongoing crisis in Syria is much larger than previously thought i.e., US$10.7 billion, or about 17.7 percent of the Syrian gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010. The long-term economic impact of emergencies on children is not well recognized by stakeholders and donors. Estimation and advocacy of long-term consequences are critical for resource mobilization and provision of education to children affected by emergencies.

Health, nutrition, water and shelter are essential in keeping children alive during emergencies. But education helps children to live during emergencies and thereafter. However, funding for the education cluster is often not prioritized among the humanitarian communities. It is not an exception in the Syria crisis i.e., only 20 percent of the 2015 Sector Response Plan, which is the education cluster plan that complements Syrian government's efforts, was funded. There is a global necessity to build evidence to highlight the importance of education as a life-saving sector during emergencies as the benefit of bringing children back to school might be seriously underestimated by donors and stakeholders.

One of the areas that requires more investigation is the field of economics of education in relation to emergencies. Provision of education to children during emergencies is not merely a moral imperative, but also an economic consideration as educational failure to do so exacts tremendous costs on society in terms of losing economic productivity. Estimating forgone economic loss due to school dropout is a widely accepted analysis in the field of economics of education, but we could hardly find analysis that justifies education intervention during emergencies. Using data provided by the Ministry of Education, UNHCR and other institutions, a recent paper published by UNICEF (2015) titled "Economic Loss from School Dropout due to the Syria Crisis" aimed to quantify the magnitude of economics loss *through* the education sector whereas some other analysis focuses on the magnitude of economic loss *in* the education sector, such as estimating the damage costs of education infrastructures.

The study analysed the wage differentials of workers with different education background and the number of dropouts due to the Syria crisis, because such differentials represent forgone income in the future for those children who dropped out from school due to the crisis. Assuming children who dropped out from school would not return to school, the study concluded that the estimated economic loss due to dropout is US$10.7 billion, or 17.6% of the 2010 GDP of Syria. The magnitude of the loss is much larger than previously estimated i.e., the previous estimates were between 2 to 6 per cent of GDP (Save the Children, 2015). The study also revealed that the economic loss due to dropout from primary education is about US$ 5,844 per person for a boy and US$4,766 per person for a girl, and the figures are much higher for those who dropped out from secondary school. The findings, at the same time, suggest that such economic loss can be significantly reduced if we could bring children back to school and close the wage differentials.

The findings not only emphasize the importance of providing access to quality education for children during emergencies and transitional periods of war and conflict, but also help us to evaluate the relative size of funding the education cluster requires. What can we say about the size of resources available to Syria today? The Syria education cluster received only US$28 million in 2015 to address a problem with a scale of US$10.7 billion. With insufficient resources, donors and implemen-

tation agencies (including the UN organizations) in Syria would not able to deliver quality education to children affected by the conflicts. The methodology of this analysis needs to be applied to other emergencies to the extent that the importance of education would then be more recognized quantitatively among stakeholders and donors.

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Giving Fish or Teaching Fishing in Syria?

Lara Elsayed, Private Sector, Andover, UK,
formerly Chamber of Industry, Aleppo

Email: elsayed.lara@yahoo.com

Keywords: Refugees; vocational education; training; employability; relief programs and organizations.

Summary: Based on the importance of human resources in developing a stable society with high competency to face the competitiveness of global challenges, the need to improve youth skills has become one of the urgent tasks of communities. In conflicts and crises many relief programs and organizations would argue whether we should first provide refugees and displaced people with food or help them to win their own bread. This article highlights the importance of vocational education and using the skills of the refugees themselves in promoting both formal and non-formal training programs which can equip people with skills, could improve their employability chances, and help them to earn an income to improve their quality of life.

Syria's civil war has led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of our time. With more than 11 million people displaced, the U.N. predicts there could be 4.7 million registered Syrian refugees by the end of 2016. The Syrian refugee population has been classified as one of the largest, according to the United Nation High Commission of Refugees.

As a result of the recent conflict, the majority of refugees' basic needs are only met from relief organizations or the hosting counties, Lebanon and Jordan, in which they now live. By the beginning of the sixth year of the conflict, living and coping with reality of this disaster have become urgent necessities. Within this discussion we are going to explore how developing vocational skills will be beneficial for these individuals. With the collapse of most of the education services, millions of students have become unable to gain the relevant skills and knowledge needed to face this reality. In turn this has directly affected their living standard, as well as creating an uncertain future for the youth.

In the last decade a number of studies have revealed how relief aid and development programs have targeted the basic needs of food, shelter and schooling for primary stage children with very little spent on training and vocational education for adults and children over 12, except limited training activities in hair dressing and sewing that aim to secure women with skills that can help them to earn their bread.

When talking about the Syrian refugees' community and skills a different case should be investigated, as Syria used to have a relatively strong industrial background when compared to other countries that have gone through civil war such as Liberia, Uganda and Sudan, due to the fact that Syria was self-supporting in different industrial areas. The main interest should, therefore, be focused on how to develop a program for training, covering technical services based on the skills available within the refugee societies and with the limited funds available.

In 2013, a few months before I left Syria, a family moved into the building where I used to live in Aleppo. The last floor of the building was unfinished and the owners allowed the family to move in temporarily after the destruction of their houses in the Salah Eldin area. As a result of the continuous battles in Aleppo a large number of people, like Ibrahim and his family, were displaced.

Ibrahim and his family, comprising his wife and two children, two younger brothers and parents, utilized the top floor of the building as a flat. With only basic facilities, the family has used temporary windows and doors to protect themselves from the changing temperatures. During this period,

Ibrahim's oldest brother moved to Lebanon to pursue work opportunities, whilst Ibrahim stayed behind to look after his family. With previous experience at a mechanic, over a short duration Ibrahim was able to build up a good reputation in the surrounding neighbourhood as a car mechanic.

It took only five months for his brother in Lebanon to invite him and the family to move to Lebanon as he had managed to establish a small garage for fixing cars with his limited resources, and rent a proper house with much better facilities, so his youngest brother and nephews can continue their schooling and live in a safe place.

With the skill Ibrahim and his brother have, it was much easier for them to survive the difficult conditions they faced. This is not the case for most refugees.

Feelings of uncertainty for the future and low self-worth can only be faced by equipping these individuals with the relevant skills that help them to earn a decent living rather than forcing them to be reliant upon hand-outs. Such skills will prepare them for their return to Syria, whilst preventing them from turning to crime and helping them to integrate within society.

It is important to highlight vocational education for refugees and urge the international aid organizations to get involved and provide courses such as training in technical areas like electricity, solar systems, building, carpentry and many other rebuilding skills depending on the available skills within the camps and the limited funds on offer. This will help them earn their living in the asylum countries and prepare the required human resources for the post-conflict rebuilding phase.

To conclude, there is a Chinese proverb that seems appropriate: "You give a poor man a fish and you feed him for a day. You teach him to fish and you give him an occupation that will feed him for a lifetime."

The Loss of Skilled Workers to Syrian Industry

Anton Al-Jouni, Formerly Chamber of Commerce, Aleppo, Syria
Currently consultant, Bucharest

Email: Antonaljouni@gmail.com

Keywords: Syria; skilled workers; industry; Syrian donors conference; rebuilding.

Summary: The loss of skilled workers to Syrian industry is one of the very bad consequences of the Syrian crisis which has to be resolved before/during the rebuilding phase in Syria

The impact of the crisis on skilled workers in Syrian industry

Before the crisis, until 2011-2012, all types of industries in Syria employed Syrian workers only (the number of workers in industry from the Aleppo governorate alone was about 650,000).

During the last five years of crisis, more than 50% of factories and tourism companies and other economic activities have closed due to direct damage as a result of conflict and associated clashes. In Aleppo, the factors resulting in closure include:

- Property being totally or partially destroyed.
- Stock being totally or partially stolen.
- Damage to, or collapse of, essential infrastructure (electric power, water, security of the roads and transportation, etc.).
- Difficulty to supply fuel for factories -some of these difficulties are due to US and EU sanctions on Syria.

This forced employers to close their activities and/or transfer to other places, which also led more than 60% of workers (most of them skilled) to travel from conflict areas to safe places inside Syria or to neighboring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq) seeking safety and jobs. For example, most skilled workers in Aleppo traveled to Turkey and worked there for very low wages (a Syrian worker's wage is approximately half of a Turkish worker's salary for the same job and skills), mostly in informal employment.

Future prospects

When safety in Syria is re-established and all the factors that forced employers and workers to move to new places have gone, then it is expected that most employers and workers will return to Syria. However, the rebuilding phase will need more workers of different levels of skills and will also need new jobs too.

According to the Syrian donors conference in London in February 2016, and what was mentioned above, Syria needs to create over a million jobs and this requires vocational training for workers. In this regard the following suggestions may be useful:

- Support industry to rebuild damaged factories.
- Build new factories to serve the demands of rebuilding (e.g. construction, telecommunications etc).
- Support the government's TVET schools and institutes and private training centers.
- Encourage private sector to invest in TVET through loans from donors -especially in industrial cities (Damascus, Aleppo, Homs).
- Support the apprenticeship scheme in Syria which was established in 3 governorates (Damascus, Aleppo, Homs), by cooperation with EU and ETF during 2003-2006.
- Support capacity building in factories, so they will be able to provide high quality on-the-job training, as in Japan or EU. This would include the training of trainers in industry.

- Support capacity building in all economic activities - in management in general, and especially in human resource management and quality management.

Accompanying the Schooling of the Syrian Refugee Children in Urban Areas

Julia Tran Thanh,
Institut Européen de Coopération et de Développement, Paris

Email: julia.tran-thanh@iecd.org

Keywords: Syrian crisis; Refugees; Education in emergency; Lebanon; IECD.

Summary: This contribution discusses the guidance for education in emergency in light of field experience in Lebanon.

Institut Européen de Coopération et de Développement (IECD) is an international solidarity organisation, active in Lebanon since 1989 in the field of education and vocational training. Since 2013, our centres in Beirut and Tripoli have received Syrian children and youth and accompanied them during or towards schooling, through remedial education programmes, extra-curricular and recreational activities, and psycho-social activities and follow-up.

A vast majority of the Syrian refugee children in neighbouring countries are not attending school: some have dropped out for several years, some others have never set foot in a classroom. The social and economic impacts of descholarisation are important: Syrian refugees are affected by social and economic alienation, which leads them to chronic and long-lasting impoverishment, and upholds the cleavage between local populations and the refugees. There is also an impact on the psychological, emotional and cognitive development of the children, as their ability to socialize, to develop a sense of cultural belonging and citizenship, forms during childhood and adolescence.

The UNHCR sets three main objectives regarding education for the refugees: increase access, improve quality and enhance protection (UNHCR, 2011). Other UN agencies underline the importance of including the refugees in the national education system, by creating linkages and synergies with on-going and planned national programmes, and by engaging with a variety of education service providers (ibid), and even more so in urban areas.

In terms of **access** the Lebanese government has opened regular classes to Syrian children (200,000 new places opened in public schools in the second semester 2015), and double-shift schooling was authorized to welcome children who had no place in the official system. The "afternoon classes" are focused mainly on remedial education to accompany the children in the formal system. Yet in some large urban areas, public schools run out of space and many children are still being left out of the public system. Non-formal education programmes then also need to be implemented by private organisations, NGOs and CSOs, in order to enable a greater number of children to go to school.

Regarding the **quality** of the education services provided, the key focus is the relevance of the curriculum. Indeed, one of the norms set by the INEE for education in emergency (INEE, 2010) is that the school programmes used in formal and non-formal education actions are relevant, at the cultural, social and linguistic levels, to the country and context where they are implemented. Thus to align with official national programmes is positive and may be a guarantee of quality to some extent. Yet there is also a necessity for other contents to target issues specific to displacement and trauma. Education for peace, for democratic citizenship and human rights, are a necessity in the programs for IDPs and refugees. Contents and packages allowing for psychosocial support and follow-up, community outreach and inclusion of the parents, are also necessary. Programmes targeting personal growth, imagination and creativity should be integrated into national systems and also be accompanied by specific and relevant pedagogical methods.

Enhancing **protection**, of course, encompasses the physical safety of the children and is included

in the curriculum – for instance addition of courses on security, safety rules and procedures, first aid, hygiene. Yet protecting the youth also needs to be considered from a longer-term perspective. Thus cooperation and aid programmes should work towards more global social and economic protection through empowerment and education to children's rights.

As the UNHCR underlines it, "there are dramatic consequences of […] not [dedicating], or immediately deploying, […] education staff when an emergency strikes, and of the lack of systematic incorporation of education into […] emergency response". Education needs to be considered in the event of an emergency situation. Yet in the case of the Syrian crisis, where more than half the country's population has been displaced or fled outside its borders, education planning should be more dissociated from the specific timeframe and priorities of the emergency aid, and also be put into the long-term perspective.

Millions of youth have no or limited access to schooling, and it is a necessity to go beyond the basic competencies shaping the requirements for most aid education programmes. In Lebanon, the majority of refugees live outside camps. This impacts the way we address the issue of planning and providing education and training. Syrians cannot be considered only as provisional asylum seekers; they need also to be given opportunities for long-term projects and high skill-development, by public institutions and not only international agencies. In the prospect of the displaced population going back to Syria, there will indeed be a need for highly qualified human resource(s) in order to ensure reconstruction at various levels of the country. Thus, it is important to integrate the refugees into the systems of education and training past the junior secondary level, as well as to the systems of recognition and accreditation of skills and experience, in the various host countries.

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Integration of Syrian Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Austria: the Role of Education and Skills

Pia Jolliffe, University of Oxford

Email: pia.jolliffe@bfriars.ox.ac.uk

Keywords: Syria; Austria; education; skills.

Summary: Syrians arriving in Austria are on the whole educated but fail to use their skills because of language barriers and lack of social networks. Recent research about education among Syrian asylum seekers and refugees in Austria highlights the importance of governmental and non-governmental programmes and initiatives that help Syrians use their skills in Austrian society.

In 2015, 90,000 people applied for asylum in Austria, 24,720 of whom held Syrian citizenship (BFA 2016; Eurostat 2016). A recent spot check revealed that 25% of asylum seekers from Syria completed lower secondary school, 29% upper secondary school and 26% finished university education before arriving in Austria (AMS 2016). Do education and skills help Syrian asylum seekers and refugees integrate in Austria?

Children of school age are enrolled in Austrian government schools. However, the government only demands those up to 14 to attend and complete lower secondary school. Those over that age have the right to attend high school if they wish. Nevertheless, many barriers exist for young Syrian asylum seekers and refugees. For example, in Austria completing lower secondary school is a requirement to access upper secondary schools. Lack of German language skills often prevents young Syrians from completing lower secondary school and making the transition to upper secondary school.

Poorly educated asylum seekers have the chance to attend language courses offered by private initiatives and NGOs such as CARITAS, who offer German language classes within the context of parish communities. According to CARITAS programme managers, teaching literacy is the biggest challenge in these courses. This is particularly so of people from rural areas, such as the northeast of Syria where education is still not guaranteed for all men and women. Moreover, there is real concern regarding educational discrimination against elderly asylum seekers, e.g. they may be excluded from free government sponsored German - language classes because the Austrian government does not consider them employable.

Even highly educated asylum-seekers face particular challenges. They lack language skills, have difficulties with the accreditation of their academic certificates and can only rarely rely on social networks to help finding a job. The Austrian government only supports language training for men and women who have had their refugee status formally confirmed. In the absence of any governmental help, volunteers help facilitating places for internships, practicing specialized vocabulary and confirming peoples ' expertise. For example, through the Sovereign Order of Malta[1], Austrian doctors explain refugee doctors' abilities. In addition, the Austrian universities' MORE initiative offers fee waivers to asylum seekers and refugees for academic and artistic courses, seminars and German language classes. The MORE initiative is called after the English word 'more' so as to highlight refugees' need for more than food and medical care:

> People forced to leave their home territory first of all need secure housing, food and medical care. **More than that,** they need the opportunity to develop plans for the future. Young people, who lose ac-

1 The Sovereign Order of Malta - like the Order of St John – originates from the Roman Catholic Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem, a hospice founded in Jerusalem around 1070 to care for pilgrims, which was dedicated to St John the Baptist. Today, around the world volunteers and members of the Orders of Malta and St John care for the sick and elderly regardless of religion. (https://www.orderofmalta.int/sovereign-order-of-malta/mission)

> cess to education through war and exile, are at risk of becoming a lost generation. These people's potential - their knowledge and skills - are an asset for universities and societies who welcome them.

However, for asylum seekers the cost of public transport is a major obstacle to participation in these university courses. Once people's applications for asylum status in Austria have been approved, the government offers more possibilities for language and skill training as well as academic internships, for example at the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

To conclude, although it is praiseworthy that civil society is making efforts to assist refugees using their skills in Austria, programme managers hope to see more government initiative to provide these basic services to asylum - seekers.

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From Books to Bytes: Education for Displaced Syrian Children

Tania Hossain, Rumie Initiative, Toronto

Email: Tania@rumie.org

Keywords: Syria; education; emergency; war; displaced; refugee; technology; innovation; ICT.

Summary: Resources are extremely limited in many emergency education spaces leading to barriers in accessing quality education. This article looks at an example of one organization - The Rumie Initiative, and how it is delivering quality education through the means of innovative technology to the displaced Syrian children at the Al Salam School, near the Turkish border in Syria.

Time and Money –these are two of our finest commodities, yet we have been inefficiently exhausting these resources on a massive scale in the form of humanitarian aid. However, the outpouring of aid has not been enough to alleviate the destruction in the war-affected regions of Syria and elsewhere. What is even more striking is that only 2% of the humanitarian aid is actually going to education, even though there is a growing proportion of out-of-school children living in conflict-affected countries (UNESCO, 2015).

The Case of Syria

Globally, we are experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. From the media headlines to global leaders pressuring governments and non-profits to do more, to date many countries have committed to millions of dollars in humanitarian, development and security assistance in response to the Syrian crisis.

In Syria, more than 6 million people are displaced (UNHCR, 2014). At the brink of losing a generation of young talented people, using time and money in the most efficient ways can provide education to those in the midst of this colossally protracted conflict. Here is just one example of an organization that is using an innovative way of providing education that could substantially improve human development in emergency spaces.

The Rumie Initiative

The Rumie Initiative (Rumie) is a non-profit organization whose mission is to deliver the latest and best free digital learning content to under-privileged, isolated communities on low-cost Rumie Tablets. Rumie has a strong volunteer base of skilled professionals and educators from around the world who curate and rate free digital content from the internet through Rumie's online open repository and crowdsourcing platform called the LearnCloud. The curated and customized digital content is loaded onto Rumie Tablets and shipped to partner NGOs, who then implement the tablets in their programs on the ground.

In 2015, Rumie launched a campaign called #LearnSyria which equips young people in Syrian refugee camps with access to digital educational materials. Rumie partnered with the Syrian Kids Foundation to provide offline Rumie Tablets to Syrian refugee children at the Al Salam School located near the Turkish borders. Through this partnership, Rumie was able to disrupt the digital divide in this isolated community and deliver education in an innovative, cost-effective and potentially scalable way to Syrian refugee children.

Shifting from a books to bytes' model, there are four key trends that are making it possible for Rumie to explore a leapfrog movement in education for refugee children in Syria and neighbouring regions:

i. Today content is available in abundance online and furthermore educational content for children under 18 is readily available for free on the internet. Rumie recognized this early on and used technology as a vehicle to facil-

itate the delivery of the best quality content from the internet to the world's most underprivileged communities.

ii. Curation of the large amount of content online is difficult and end communities need localized content created in their language, relevant to their culture, and mapped to their curriculum. Rumie through its LearnCloud, an open crowdsourcing platform, engages thousands of volunteers (skilled professionals, local educators etc.) from around the world to take on this laborious task and help curate content that can be integrated into the current Syrian curriculum easily.

iii. Hardware costs are plummeting; basic Android tablets are capable of storing large amounts of content and have reached an affordable price point. A library's worth of content can be stored onto each of the Rumie tablets that would otherwise cost upwards of $5,000 in paper alternatives.

iv. It is fast and cheap to update digital content on a periodic basis. Furthermore, offline tablets allow for interactivity, personalized learning, and automatically collect impact data through its built-in silent data trackers - all things that are impossible with paper alternatives.

With the help of the local NGO partner - the Syrian Kids Foundation, and the large volunteer base on the LearnCloud platform, Rumie has been able to curate from open-source English literacy learning material to Syrian education commission e-textbooks, and apps in Arabic that teach vocational or life skills – all of which has been an enrichment to the current Syrian curriculum.

Early results from this pilot project at the Al Salam School have shown that these tablets help students adopt an entrepreneurial approach to learning. Furthermore, it allows schools to accommodate more students with existing capacity, without exhausting resources. It allows for students to still go to work if they need to and also make up for missed school time by being able to use the tablets at home that has a library's worth of content. Lastly, the results have shown significant positive impacts on children's mental health and confidence. Students with a tendency to isolate now socialize when using the tablets with peers in group or pair activities and language learning apps address students' fear of speaking foreign languages. The tablets have become a part of the classroom setting to ultimately help children integrate into the Syrian education system. Though there appear to have been some really positive impacts at Al Salam school as a pilot project, it is still considered by many a far-fetched idea to use technology as a means to provide education in resource-strained emergency spaces.

Our Future

It is clear that one of the key strategic approaches to creating access to education and opportunities is to expand information and communication technology (ICT) in education in emergency spaces (UNHCR, pg. 38); yet education to this date is on the lower end of priorities for humanitarian aid, let alone ICT in education. State governments, media and the many decision makers need to take note. ICT in education should not be considered a luxury, but a key affordable and potentially scalable solution to providing education in emergency spaces. Humanitarian crises and the complex problems that come with it require a new way of thinking where traditional means of providing education may not be the answer; instead we need to focus on affordable ways of providing education via technology. It is time that we take action to make education accessible to the most vulnerable in war-affected regions or be faced with a loss of our valuable commodities: *Time, Money, and soon Talent.*

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REFUGEES AND EDUCATION: EVIDENCE, WHAT WORKS, AND PLANNING

Access, Quality, and Wellbeing in the Refugee Education Literature: What Do We Know?

Ozen Guven and Dana Burde, New York University

Emails: dana.burde@nyu.edu ; ozen.guven@nyu.edu

Keywords: Evidence; refugee education; access; quality; wellbeing; conflict and crisis.

Summary: Notwithstanding the expanding attention to refugee education, scarce robust evidence shows what works and what does not with regard to interventions or practices of refugee education. Rigorous research is necessary to show whether programs achieve their goals, identify how variations in programming affect diverse children and youth, and explain the role of types of conflict and environments.

Although massive displacement and the scale of ensuing issues have long been a source of concern in countries with large refugee populations such as Pakistan, Lebanon, and Jordan, the current war in Syria has focused unprecedented attention on the education of refugees. This upsurge in Western media and political attention to the crisis has started to translate into the expansion of funding to the education of displaced populations. Although these new funding commitments may help alleviate some of the challenges facing refugee families seeking education, practitioners lack a well-documented mapping of education interventions or practices that exist for refugees. Robust evidence showing what works and what does not with regard to existing refugee education programs is also scarce.

Last year we conducted a rigorous review of research with a team from New York University. Our results show the scarcity of evidence on effective programs and program components in the refugee education literature. Commissioned by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the review, *What Works to Promote Children's Educational Access, Quality of Learning, and Wellbeing in Crisis-Affected Contexts* (Burde, D., O. Guven, J. Kelcey, H. Lahmann, and K. Al-Abaddi, 2015), is a systematic assessment of the existing evidence that shows which interventions and practices promote educational access, quality of learning, and wellbeing among children living in areas affected by conflict and crisis. We synthesized evidence based on population type versus crisis context; in other words, in addition to other groups, we looked at what works and what does not for the education of the displaced, divided as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (other focus areas included early childhood, primary education, secondary education, gender, youth, marginalized/minority groups, and special needs). We identified the most robust evidence gathered through experimental, quasi-experimental, and observational empirical research on access, quality, and wellbeing in the refugee/IDP education programs. We also examined the effect of contextual factors such as setting (camp or non-camp) or type of conflict (acute, protracted, or post-conflict). Our findings indicated the absence of robust evidence for all population groups in crisis-affected contexts, but this is particularly striking among refugees and IDPs. Where evidence is available, it relates to wellbeing; with regard to education, it comes primarily from observational studies (qualitative or survey research) and with the exception of the leading work of Dryden-Peterson, Mendenhall, and colleagues, it rarely takes into account setting or country contexts.

For decades, refugees and IDPs have received education in a variety of environments; for example, if they were not able to access regular classes in the public education system of the host country, they studied in double shifts at existing schools in urban settings, or they attended schools within camps or tent settlements. They have also received education if they have been resettled in high income, developed countries. A wide spectrum of actors has been involved in their education, such as host country governments, local and international NGOs, and foundations whose diverging policy decisions affect the access and quality of refugee

education in unknown ways. Although some evidence supports the use of creative arts and play therapies to improve wellbeing among refugee and conflict-affected children, more research is necessary to understand how variations in programming affect diverse children and youth. Education interventions for refugees are not new, but to date we know little about the extent to which they achieve their goals. Rigorous research could and should test both standard and innovative interventions and explain the role of types of conflict and urban or rural camp environments.

Education: A Lifeline, Not a Luxury

Sarah Smith, International Rescue Committee, London

Email: Sarah.Smith@rescue.org

Keywords: Humanitarian Investment; Evidence; Conflict; Flexible Policies

Summary: : At the World Humanitarian Summit (May 2016), international leaders are expected to consider sustainable solutions for out of school children in conflict and crisis-affected countries. Increasing resources for education to the most vulnerable is critical, but a more comprehensive approach needs to consider where investments are made, producing more evidence on what works in these contexts, as well as supporting alternatives to formal schooling.

As the World Humanitarian Summit, international leaders should seize the global momentum gathering this year around delivering education in crisis contexts. Half of the 59 million children who are out of school globally are living in conflict and crisis-affected countries, yet resources for them remain low. Less than 2% of humanitarian assistance is going to education and there is a disturbing downward trend in aid to education overall. It is critical to consider sustainable solutions for these children whose lives are uprooted by conflict and disaster. The following changes are needed if we are to ensure that the basic right of quality education is available to all children, especially the most vulnerable.

Changing where we invest to focus on what is needed

First, we need to change where we invest. Right now, we make choices about which countries receive resources based on a flawed humanitarian–development paradigm: some of us have a mandate for education for refugees and others for IDPs and host populations; some of us only invest in education in so-called humanitarian settings, and others will only invest in education because it's a path for sustainable development.

We need a new paradigm—one that drives commitment to the countries and places where need is greatest. Need should be defined by a combination of education metrics, such as the out-of-school population; state capacity and will to provide education; as well as exposure to the perfect storm of violence, poverty, mass migration, and environmental shocks.

Using this combination, we would end up with some countries which are already getting serious attention—like Syria and some of its neighbours—but we'd also end up with many others that are nearly invisible among the world's investments in education. Countries like Niger, Chad and Mali have nearly a million out-of-school children, surrounded by violence and poverty and in a region where 60% of children will never even enter school. We'll end up with countries with pockets of instability and poverty, like Nigeria, where 8.7 million children are out of school, and Pakistan, where 5.4 million children are out of school.

Identifying what works and creating an evidence base

Secondly, we need to identify which education investments in these settings will allow us to achieve real outcomes for children. Generating evidence is increasingly seen as the answer: we simply need to figure out what works and then invest there. But we are at risk of wasting time and resources generating fragmented knowledge and carrying out poorly designed research that doesn't credibly answer the questions that will drive us to solutions. We must come together around a shared, lasting research agenda for education in emergencies.

The agenda must start by building on evidence that already exists, whether from hard sciences or stable settings. A global research agenda must commit to investigating solutions rather than con-

tinuing to describe problems. The global community's investment in measuring illiteracy has made painfully clear how weak children's most basic skills are, which can stimulate interest and shock people into engaging, but does not provide solutions.

With scarce resources we're making a trade-off between continuing to describe the problem and investing in finding the solution. Our shared research agenda needs to focus on the latter—to answer what works, and how, why and for whom; and importantly, at what cost. Only then will we have an evidence base that is genuinely useful for policy-makers, practitioners, teachers and parents alike.

Supporting alternatives to formal school and creating flexible policies

Thirdly, we need to focus on removing the policy barriers that too often stand in the way of children's education. Right now, there is strong support for state-led solutions, such as the double shift policies that the Lebanese education system has put in place. This kind of policy is essential in enabling tens of thousands of Syrian refugee children to enrol in school.

But public schools are often out of reach for children affected by emergencies, and families need alternatives. In Afghanistan, community-based schools are one such alternative that have made education possible for hundreds of thousands of children, especially girls. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, small learning groups and radio education allowed children to continue their education despite the Ebola crisis and a complete shutdown of the school system.

Those with influence must come together to push for flexible policies about who can teach and be paid to teach; curriculum and language of instruction; and even to support accessible, low-cost, quality private schools. And then to test which of these alternatives is most effective.

In conclusion, more resources for education in emergencies are necessary, but insufficient to meet our education goals. We must consider what else is needed most—changing where we invest to the places where need is greatest; generating evidence, not just about the problem, but about what works, how, why and at what cost; and using our influence to create flexible policies and alternatives for families—in order to allow all children in crisis to realize their right to a quality education.

This article has been adapted from remarks given by Sarah Smith at a high-level discussion on September 28th, 2015 at the Harvard Club in New York City.

Challenges and Opportunities when Planning Education for Refugees

Leonora MacEwen, IIEP, Paris and Lyndsay Bird, London, formerly IIEP

Emails: l.macewen@iiep.unesco.org; lyndsay.bird@gmail.com

Keywords: Planning; refugees; national capacities; humanitarian; education in emergencies.

Summary: : Educational planning for refugees has specific challenges but also opportunities for ministries of education as well as development and humanitarian actors. This article presents some of these issues.

In a context where over half of the world's refugees are children, governments have the responsibility to ensure that all future generations have equitable access to quality education. Careful educational planning both with a host government and the government of the country of origin, as well as with UNHCR, enables national governments, NGOs or UN agencies to ensure that refugees receive the education they are entitled to.

Current educational planning rarely includes issues related to refugees, and there are specific challenges involved. Educational planning for refugees also presents opportunities for ministries of education as well as development and humanitarian actors. We discuss some of these challenges and opportunities below.

Include refugee movements in education sector analysis and projections of needs for the education system.

Refugee movements add a layer of complexity to projection modelling that is used to determine educational needs. This is in part because such movements are often influenced by policy and/or political expediency (as in the current Syrian crisis). The unpredictable nature of refugee migration causes additional difficulties in estimating the quantitative needs of the education system. These data and specifically the expected number of school-age children are the basis upon which projections are made for education needs. Influxes of refugee populations can make the calculation of such data more difficult.

Although not yet a common practice, including refugee data in projections of population and for education provides a unique opportunity to bridge the humanitarian-development divide. Projections for the education system should draw on national education data and data from UNHCR and other organizations that provide for refugees. It is also an opportunity to ensure that education management information systems (EMIS) are updated to include information on refugees and fully reflect the educational needs in a given country. These data can provide the basis for analysing the education provision for refugees and/or for potential influxes in the future.

Review language and curriculum policy

When refugees flee their homes, they take with them their language, culture and curricula. In their host country, they must acquire new languages, understand new cultures and perhaps even embrace a new curriculum. This will of course depend on whether they are integrated in host communities or live in refugee camps. This linguistic and cultural diversity can be an opportunity for host populations to deepen their understanding of new cultures and perspectives. However, it can also be a source of tension between host and refugee communities; particularly where existing education systems are overwhelmed or services weakened. This again requires careful planning to ensure that adequate resources are in place to cater for additional influxes of students.

Reinforce national capacities and avoid parallel systems

Host governments often shy away from providing social services such as education for refugee populations. They rarely consider all of "the costs and benefits of accepting international assistance, relations with the sending country, political calculations about the local community's absorption capacity, and national security considerations" (Jacobsen, 1996). This is particularly the case if refugees are in camps and not integrated into local communities. If host governments do not accept accountability, parallel systems may be created. This can lead to inequitable access to education and ultimately give rise to social tensions. Accepting accountability for refugees is an opportunity for host governments to assert their sovereignty and benefit directly from the refugees living in their country. For example, they can bring increased economic development, as "refugees and IDPs may make positive contributions to the local economy by bringing new skills and resources, as well as increasing production capacity and consumption demand, which can stimulate the expansion of the host economy" (World Bank, 2012).

Provide certification for learning attainments

Another challenge for refugee learners is to acquire proof of their learning achievements during exile. This is critical in order to seek employment or continue with further studies. However, sitting exams may be difficult or even impossible for refugee students for many reasons (See Kirk, 2009). Planning for certification is essential when addressing education needs for refugee populations. It also offers an opportunity to develop cross-border examination entities, and to improve examination procedures that help their reintegration in their home country. A good example of this is the West Africa Examinations Council (WAEC), which delivers examinations and awards certificates across English-speaking West African nations.

Plan for refugee return

The transition from a refugee/host country education system back to the country of origin must be planned. In the Tanzanian refugee programme in the '90s for example, tripartite efforts were made between the Burundian authorities, UNHCR and the Tanzanian government concerning the timing of repatriation in order not to interrupt the academic year. Similar efforts were made to ensure the transition of children immediately back into schools when they returned to Burundi. Frequently however, the political nature of organizing and agreeing upon refugee repatriation makes it difficult to anticipate the timing or the number of potential returnees to the education system. However with political will and expert educational planning on both sides, a smooth transition is possible.

In summary, refugee populations must be included as part of the regular educational planning and projection modelling of a host country/sub-region anticipating or already receiving refugees. This includes analysis of the demand for education, as well as review/reform of existing policies related to refugees, both in terms of access and equity, as well as language and curriculum. It also implies that through the planning process capacities and resources are sufficient to provide access to quality education for both host and refugee communities. Finally, educational planning must cater for the effective transition of refugees to schools in their place of origin. This includes ensuring that the certification awarded while in exile will contribute towards further education or employment.

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