Break-out session Group 1:
What comes after the adoption of the Joint Programming document?

3 key areas of follow up to Joint Programming:

1. **Joint implementation** as the natural next step to joint programming (analyse where we can work together more closely, where it makes sense and brings added-value),

2. **Joint monitoring & evaluation** including:

   i.   Monitoring of results of joint strategy (joint cooperation results)

   ii. Monitoring of aid-effectiveness including reduction of fragmentation, increased number of joint actions, benefits of working together on officials in the field, sector concentration, transparency, predictability etc.

3. Improved and more coherent **policy dialogue**. Joint EU sector approaches should help reinforce policy dialogue and vice versa.

Break-out session Group 2:

How can JP contribute to reducing transaction Costs

- **Benefit**: Gov and Donors get to read only one strategy and makes programming easier,

- **Benefit**: Joint M&E, Joint Analysis at national and sector levels

- **Benefit**: Joint policy dialogue improves quality and increases political weight,

- **Benefit**: Enables better sector coordination& concentration. Better quality across the board.

- **Risks**: Harder to move forward and make decisions, more transaction costs for HoCs and for coordinating with other DPS.

- Value is contingent on sectors being congested

How can JP contribute to reducing transaction Costs – Contd.

- Use evaluation of joint programming to document how to save costs in JP,
- Proposed harmonised sector definitions, modalities, indicators, etc. for use by all EU and EU MS,
- Elaborate how to ensure joint statements at the sector level,
- Document and explain what to do to make DoL and Joint Programming to deliver better value at the sector level,
- Immediately prescribe joint analysis, monitoring and evaluation wherever possible regardless status of JP,
- Replace 'transaction cost' focus with 'return on investment' or cost/benefit.

Break-out session Group 3: How to involve the partner Government?

- Key insights & consensus points:
    - State the price tag
    - Present it as win win situation –it is in their interest to join
    - Minimum existing coordination with Govt/LMs that JS can built on
    - Positive slant to the discussion and the documents
    - Changing aid dynamic - Incentive for the coordination agency to stay in the prominent role vs MoF
- What questions remain?
    - How to transplant the process in the federal state with a strong sub-national authorities/governments (Pakistan)
    - Would it be better if we made it the partner government's show?

Breakout session 4: Incentives

Incentives, three levels:

- 1) HQ/field: perceived weak link between commitments at HQ on JP and the field, or viceversa, work in the field and recognition or support at HQ. JP could be better internalised in the management system. New EU leadership (HRVP, Commissioner) could publcly re-state support for JP.

- 2) Donor/partner: need to overcome suspicion towards donors "ganging up" by emphasising benefits for partner country innterms of increased ownership. Joint donor voice gives also partner countries the opportunity to agree positions at country-level before discussing them in international fora. Increased leverage vis-à-vis actors supported by alternative partners or int.l institutions (WB, ADB)

- 3) individual level: achievements on JP have not been properly noticed/valued by HQ, partly also due to lack of consensus at HQ between geo-desks and policy coordination on JP. JP is a long-term investment whose fruits might be difficult to grasp, especially in contexts with high staff turnover. JP achievements could be highlighted in annual HoD meetings or reporting exercises (AMP, EAMR), as well as staff appraisals.

Breakout session 5: Substituting programming documents with JP documents

Benefits	Challenges	Requirements
▪ Dealing with scarce capacities (e.g. joint analysis of challenges and sectors will enhance capacities).	▪ Different requirements by different DPs	▪ Still needs country specific tailor made documents.
▪ Creates visibility and leverage	▪ Possibility of habing a common template	▪ Not too diverse political interests ▪ Is a national strategy a requirement?
▪ Conributes to an effective/strong EU voice	▪ Who will be accountable for the realisation of the agreed results?	▪ Endorsement by capitals + partner country government
▪ Policy coherence towards more impact	▪ Lack of empowerement of the field offices	▪ Decentralised decision –making
▪ 1 process instead of 2 parallel processes	▪ Broad scope – potential lack of specificilty	
▪ Gives DP an entire picture of all EU DP presence + ECHO	▪ Risk of being diluted for small MS & big donors	
	▪ Risk of non-agreement. Challenge to define level of « concreteness »	