

**EUROPEAN COMMISSION**

DIRECTION GENERALE POUR L'AIDE HUMANITAIRE & LA PROTECTION CIVILE  
Regional Support Office for East and Southern Africa (Nairobi)

**RAPPORT DE MISSION**

**Subject:** SOMALIA WASH RO Mission (Hargeisa, Emergency drought response)  
**Auteur:** Jerome BURLLOT (WASH Adviser/RO Nairobi)  
**Date:** 29<sup>th</sup> of August to 2<sup>nd</sup> of September. 2016

**Main partners list:**

- GRCS<sup>1</sup>/SRCS<sup>2</sup>: Kamwati Wango (GRCS WASH delegate) and SRCS team with WASH officer and the Somaliland team leader
- SCI<sup>3</sup>: Knud Andersson (Emergency Coordinator); Mukhtar Muhumed (Area manager) and their team

**Visited sites list:**

- Day 1: Geed Abeera; Har Adaad; X. Dahir
- Day 2: Weerar; Jir jir
- Day 3: Afcas; Duudwayne; Wacays Dhukur; Tulli

**Appendices list:**

- ❖ 1: Field monitoring report SCI
- ❖ 2: Field monitoring report 2 SCI
- ❖ 3: Water trucking monitoring matrix SRCS/GRCS
- ❖ 4: Heather Blackwell FAO meeting note

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<sup>1</sup> German Red Cross Society

<sup>2</sup> Somalian Red Crescent Society

<sup>3</sup> Save the Children International

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## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

The mission was accompanied by Heather Blackwell (TA Somalia/Eritrea) and Irene Bosire (PA Somalia). The objective of the mission was to monitor the Emergency drought response implement in the region of Boorama in Somaliland. This present report is focusing only on the WASH component of the response. The partners monitored were Save the Children and German Red Cross/Somali Red Crescent Societies.

Both projects were focusing on water trucking, Berka and shallow well rehabilitation, capacity building and hygiene promotion. The area of intervention is very wide with very small and scattered communities.

The lack of rain has been noticed in the region for the last 3 years and last was the most acute drought for years and years. The populations are mainly constituted by pastoralist and agro pastoralist and have been particularly affected by the drought. In the lead up to the Gu rain, agro-pastoralist have started to plant and begin the recovery, the pastoralist are still struggling as they lost most of their livestock which was their only asset. The level of rainfall during the next expected rain in September- October will be crucial to ensure recovery for those populations as well as to mitigate impact of the next dry season.

Most of the water supply in this region is ensured by rain harvesting stored in Berka structure (traditional water pond) and more or less temporary remote shallow well located in river bank or bed. Given the importance of water in such a dry environment, the populations were already quite sensitive to the topics and already had some kind of organization to manage the resources and the equipment.

Based on the proposal and the sites visited, there is no major concern regarding the intervention undertook by both partners, apart the absence of any water quality monitoring/control. There are some question of more strategic thinking and relevancy in the action plan, the overall performance of the partners in such context can be considered acceptable based on the visit.

The main issues highlighted by the visit and address by the recommendations from this report are:

- ❖ The hardware part could have integrated some elements of the “building better/safer” approach. Few improvements on the top of what has been done by the partners could have been achieved by the partners (*see main findings section on hardware*).
- ❖ The roof surface fitted with iron sheet should be more exploited for rain harvesting. Thereby incorporating some risk reduction approaches within an emergency response from the outset.
- ❖ The capacity building component should be clearly improved to ensure a continuous training mechanism: refreshing, coaching, mentoring, promotion as focal point of the strongest trainees.
- ❖ The capacity building component is focusing only on establishment of water committee and maintenance of the Berka, when it should also have linked with hygiene promotion supported the communities to better manage their water resources (*see recommendations section*).
- ❖ The hygiene promotion component is too standard and holistic and focuses mainly on public health concept when it should have much more targeted towards water resources management and water uses link with capacity building.

- ❖ The way to use and implement the PHAST should be reviewed by GRCS/SRCS
- ❖ The use and limit of performance of ceramic filter should be much more monitored.

## 2. HIGHLIGHT FROM MEETING:

**Meeting with UNICEF** (OIC and chief of health section, Dr Shahid; Mohamed Amin WASH Officer; M&E Officer; Emergency Coordinator):

- UNICEF is no longer promoting ceramic filter as a householder water treatment solution (while the Red Crescent does) but biocifer (which equivalent as PUR: coagulant and chlorine in a sachet). The use of biocifer is more of a constraint to the beneficiaries, as it takes time and you need 2 buckets and a clean tissue. The biocifer is supposed to be easily found in pharmacies all around the country. In the meantime most of the affected communities were living in scattered and remote locations where it might be hard to find such product after the UNICEF donation is terminated. UNICEF was training community leader on how to use biocifer.
- UNICEF has implemented a VOUCHER approach for water trucking during the emergency. UNICEF negotiated a unit price for water with water suppliers at the beginning of the drought and individuals purchased the water at this negotiated price using vouchers throughout the drought. This countered the large price increase of water during the drought meant that targeted vulnerable individuals/HH were able to receive the intended amount of water per day. . At the beginning of the drought UNICEF and IOM submit a joint proposal to CERF and got the funding. Within the framework of the proposal IOM and UNICEF were in charge of the same package of activities in different geographical areas.
- The monitoring of UNICEF project was mainly undertook by the government. The explanation of UNICEF was based on the security issues in the targeted area (Sool and Sanaag) which has some merit as restricted areas.
- One of the main coordination problems reported was the involvement of many private sector bodies and private donation to the government to support affected communities. Their interventions were not really coordinating with others traditional actors which led to some overlap.
- UNICEF mentioned that an integrated WASH and nutrition emergency response plan for 2014-2016 exists. In the meantime they mentioned that discussion is still on going for further integration, notably in targeting and in definition of a minimum package. From the monitoring, it does not seem that this plan has been in used by our partners (?).
- UNICEF WASH officer mentioned that they face a gap in terms of funding for specific WASH supplies such as submerged pump. Actually, in some location the submerged pump were not protected from running out of water (water table dropped down) and in some place where it was protected some operators under the pressure of the communities needed water access, were by passing the protection of the pump which led to breakdown. No repair capacity is present in Somaliland.

***Meeting with FAO (see Heather Blackwell note in appendice)******Meetings with partners (SCI; SRCS/GRCS; NRC; Concern, DRC):***

- 2 types of beneficiaries: agro pastoralist (who start to recover after the GU rain) and the pastoralist (who still struggle to recover as they lost their asset: livestock).
- The situation of the affected communities and their capacity to recover will be highly impact by the quantity of rain expected in September and October.
- The price of a goat has evolved from 70USD to 30-40USD
- The time of recovery will last until next year for most of communities and if the expected rain is coming: time to ensure the Berkad to be filled up before the next dry season and time for the crops to grow and be harvested.
- The partners highlight the impact of fund delay in the implementation and efficiency of the response
- Concern mentioned that it should more cost effective to work on saving lives of livestock instead of to re stocking it once communities have lost it. Apparently, people lost goat not only from the drought but also from the heavy rains as the livestock was not strong enough to withstand the heavy rain and cold temperature and from flooding.
- The partners mentioned that they would need more budget flexibility to easily shift the project from emergency to recovery to adapt the action to the evolving of the situation location per location. There is a need to develop more preparedness action. The WASH intervention in terms of recovery is mainly focusing on structural problem such as maintenance of Berka, lack of water equipment. ECHO responded that the actions are flexible and if the situation changes partners should be talking with ECHO to see how they adjust their actions to address the emerging context etc.
- In terms of strategic thinking the partners consider that it should be relevant to define a minimum package of activities for emergency, recovery and preparedness, and what should be the criteria/parameter to shift from one to another.

**3. CAPACITY OF THE PARTNERS:****3.1 Save the children:**

The capacity of the staff meet on the ground seems to be adequate to the type of activities implemented. The WASH engineer wasn't part of the mission but it seems that the system of quality control for the hardware component of the intervention is relevant and adequate.

The emergency coordinator was quite relevant and demonstrates good commitment to the work and understanding of the context.

The main issue comes from the strategic thinking of the partner about how to address the issues raised by the drought. Most of the activities are quite standard and aim to rebuild existing equipment but there is little trying to build better and to better support the population in terms of water resources management.

The overall level of performance can be considered as acceptable. No major concern apart the water quality monitoring has been highlighted by the visit.

### **3.2. GRCS/SRCS:**

The SRCS capacity is mainly related to the rehabilitation of Berka and there is not much strategic thinking beyond that regarding improvement of water access and water resources management.

The monitoring capacity of the SRCS is mainly coming from its network of volunteers and the presence of the delegate from the GRCS. The processing of monitoring information/findings is very limited at the level of SRCS. Most of this aspect of the action is ensured by the GRCS delegate.

The GRCS delegate seems to be pretty relevant and committed to the work, but with limited capacity to orient the action led by SRCS. Most of the project management actually is ensured by the GRCS.

Apparently, the SRCS has a good skill and experience in implementation of the PHAST method. Although, some issues have been identified regarding the modalities of implementation. The capacity and legitimacy for the SRCS to engage more with community should be quite high and should be much more optimized. It should enable the SRCS to raise the understanding of the various dynamic in terms of water access, community organization and coping mechanism of the various communities benefitting from the project. Then, they could better target the response at level of community rather than to implement a kind of a standard holistic approach (with low cost effectiveness) notably for part of the soft component of the project. However SRCS seems to be more top-down and imposing a standard action with communities.

The overall level of performance given the context of intervention (emergency response in a very wide and scatter locations) is acceptable.

## **4. QUALITY OF ACHIEVEMENT**

### **4.1. Save the children:**

The quality of achievement notably for the hardware component is limited to the available construction materials in the area (type of stone, hydrophobic component non available ...).

In addition to that, the hygiene promotion component of the project is also quite standard and holistic. It should be much more targeted.

The training part should also integrate more continuous training approach with coaching or mentoring system to ensure better impact and sustainability to this activity

The capacity building component is too focus on operation and maintenance of the water equipment, when it should have support the communities as well to improve the way they manage their various water resources (see section on main findings and issue discussed).

In terms of hardware, the partners' involvement could be improved by a building better/safer approach, rather than just basic rehabilitation. Although, it seems that the selection criteria to select the Berka for rehabilitation are relevant.

Most of the project hasn't been implemented during the emergency stage. Then, the level of inquiries to better understand the dynamic and needs of the targeted communities can be considered as quite weak and should be more improved.

#### **4.2. GRCS/SRCS**

As mentioned for SCI, one of the main concerns in terms of quality of achievement is related to the water quality monitoring, as it is not done at all.

Again as for SCI, SRCS/GRCS should promote much more any roof surface for rain water harvesting and storing.

Whether the use of short version of PHAST method (7 steps) to aware the communities about the needs of maintenance can be relevant, the modalities of implementation are sometime a bit incoherent (see main findings and issue discussed section).

The capacity building based on training for operation and maintenance of water equipment is more or less adequate but more effort should be delivered to ensure sustainability of this training by developing a continuous training strategy using coaching or mentoring system and promoting the strongest trainees, as mentioned for SCI.

Most of the project hasn't been implemented during the emergency stage (*the fund from ECHO arrived late*). Then, the level of inquiries to better understand the dynamic and needs of the targeted communities can be considered as quite weak and should be improved, especially given the strength of the Red Crescent volunteer network. No KAP survey has been provided.

### **5. MAIN FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION HELD**

#### **5.1. Capacity building and hygiene promotion:**

The capacity building for both GRCS/SRCS and SCI focus on constitution of Water Committee and maintenance of the Berka: cleaning, avoid source of pollution on the harvesting surface, fencing of the equipment, presence of watcher. Finalizing a constitution for the Water committee including the aspect

of financial contribution from the user (to pay the watcher and some eventual small rehabilitation) is also tackled by the training. In all the visited location, the Water committees were established and all integrate women (from 50 to 25%). In the meantime, the power of decision of women remained weak compared to men, the distribution of task among the member of the committee reflected this situation.

In some locations the communities already had the same/similar training some years ago within the framework of former humanitarian or development project.

The training last 6 days for SCI and combined maintenance, water committee and hygiene promotion. For the GRCS/SRCS the training for maintenance last 3 days and then 3 days are focusing on training of facilitator of the short version of the PHAST method.

Given the importance of water in such a dry environment, the populations are already pretty sensitive and organized with regard to water supply. The point is that the impact of unusual acute drought (as the one faced in 2015 and 2016 with ongoing impact) oblige the population to review their coping mechanism and humanitarian actors to improve the water access, as well as to support communities in better management of their various water resources.

In most of the cases, it seems that the communities did not have pre-drought Water committees, which is a bit weird in such an environment. Actually, by engaging discussion with several communities, it seems that despite they did not have existing Water committees', they were already organized regarding the management of their water resource. For instance in most of the locations the way to save water was the same: each HH can fetch 4\*20L every two days. Also, when some communities collect some fees from the users to pay the watcher (80USD/month) of the Berka, some communities are organized by turnover among the users to ensure the presence of a watcher.

Some incoherence has been identified in the modalities to implement the PHAST method, for instance:

- ❖ If the objective of the PHAST approach is to develop a community action plan in a participatory manner and that way raise the ownership of the population in order to promote appropriate maintenance by the users. Normally, using PHAST for such objectives, none of the hardware activities or training planned in the project should start before the completion of the community plan.
- ❖ Then, the facilitator trained in PHAST should all get a tool box to implement their activities in timely manner (several months after the training some facilitator met did not get any tool box, and were barely implemented few awareness activities with the population).
- ❖ In addition to that, it seems that the PHAST training and tools are, apart from the module about maintenance, is too oriented to public health concepts and routes of transmission of disease, which can always be relevant but with such holistic approach very little impact at the end.
- ❖ Within the framework of emergency response to drought in small scattered rural communities, the focus of awareness approach (PHAST) should be much more related to aspects like water uses and water resources management.



The capacity building of the project for both SCI and GRCS/SRCS focus mainly in maintenance of the equipment. The hygiene promotion topics are too standard and holistic addressing hygiene practices and sanitation situation in general. As already mentioned in the capacity of partner section, the capacity building for such project should have support the communities to better manage their water resource at time of drought in particular. The hygiene promotion as well should be more targeted on water uses and water resource management.

For instance in a participatory manner (eventually using tools or activity from PHAST or others participatory method) a water resources management matrix could have been developed with the various communities to make the inventory of the various water resources according the type of use, the seasonal variation of their capacity of supply, etc. In addition to that, a means to measure the level of water in a Berka could help the community to understand that with this level of water they have to use during this duration and assumed usage and then, they could develop a plan to ensure saving of water at crucial time.

One of the issue identified during the mission is related to a problem of harmonization between SCI and GRCS/SRCS in the way the modalities of implementation of hygiene promotion. Actually, SCI pay the hygiene promoter 50USD/month, when GRCS/SRCS does not pay them (less dependency and more sustainability).

## **5.2. Water supply**

### **Background:**

In some location of the area of intervention, the communities had encountered very low rain fall for the last 3 years before the drought. Some communities and not only the pastoralist had to immigrate to look for water at the worst time of the drought. Others communities had to travel over 10 to 15km to get water for themselves and their livestock on a daily basis.

In the area of intervention, most of the water resource uses by the population are constituted by rain water harvesting and storing in a Berka (cistern) and by groundwater in shallow well frequently located in river bed or river bank. In most of the visited communities we found Berka used by human beings, and shallow wells (some permanent and some just constitute by temporary dug hole in the river bed) usually used by the livestock during the dry season and located between 10 to 15 km from the communities visited.

The groundwater resource is pretty complex in the region and the knowledge about its local dynamic quite poor. Although, it should constitute one of the main source of water to plan sustainable long term safe water supply.

There's a data base implement by FAO about the Somaliland groundwater and hydrological situation: <https://www.dropbox.com/sh/etxhhja5dmwrv78/AADHfKd46SkQnUQxulqaxMNVa?dl=0>.

This data base has not been updated for the last 3 years, but it is quite of relevant source of information even limited. Normally, partners are supposed to send their data to the governmental water authority,

who is supposed to forward it to FAO for data entry and update of the data base. Apparently, the gap is located between Government and FAO. There is very little groundwater homogenous and continuous system in the region. Most of the ground water resources are constitutes by deep discontinuous fracture with potentially huge variation of yield and water quality (salinity) along the time.

The only positive point of the last acute drought would have been to use this opportunity at least to monitor the capacity of the main water resources of the region. Then, we could better understand the limit of those resources and that way improve the strategy of water resource management.

The quality of water is of a high concern with such limited access to water. The harvesting surface is constituted by ground and then the water stored in the Berka can be quite turbid. Berka are not a permanent sustainable safe water resource. However, it could constitute in the future a very good alternative resource notably for livestock or for human being combined with ceramic filter if feasible (level of turbidity), socially accepted and mainly for remote scattered communities.

GRCS/SRCS distributed numerous ceramic filters (*ceramic pot in a plastic bucket fitted with tap, see pic below*) during this intervention. Actually, SRCS own a workshop to produce those filters that has been implemented with the German Red Cross, some years ago. The problem



is related to the quality of the production and the risk of micro split in the filter by inappropriate control of rising up of temperature (*about 50% of the production is dumped because of default*).

*Turbid water after use of ceramic filter*



According the interview of ceramic filter users, selected in a random manner from walking within the communities, those filters seemed to be used and cleaned by most of the beneficiaries. Some have been broken, and some had lasted more than 5 years with the same ceramic pot but numerous ones were broken after 2 years. The problem is there is no clear monitoring at field level to better understand the limit of performance of the equipment (turbidity, porosity, flow rate evolving, need of regeneration, etc...), the impact on public health (after several years of use) and the social acceptance.

The problem is also coming from the fact that those ceramic pots are not available on the market and need to be directly ordered from the Red Crescent. The price of filter (*bucket plus the ceramic pot*) is at 18USD. So, if it can last 3-5 years, the cost should be quite affordable. However, the filters will need regeneration from time to time. To date, there is no enough information about this approach to be able to scale it up. No households reported being able to replace the ceramic filters by their own means once broken. They reverted to previous methods of boiling water (which has an environmental impact), straining the water through cloth or no cleaning methods.

Unlike GRCS/SRCS, SCI did not implement water trucking during the drought with ECHO fund but with CERF funding, as the ECHO money arrived too late. Appropriately, they kept this budget line (2months of water trucking) as a contingency for the 2 first months of the next dry season which coincide with the 2 last month of the project.

The monitoring matrix for water trucking under CERF funding seems to be ok. Nevertheless, some gaps have been identified notably in Weerar. Actually, discussing with representative of the population we found that unlike others visited communities; this community explained that there were no restrictions on the quantity of water that each HH could fetch in their village. We found out that the water trucks used for the project were based in this village and then the contractor was giving more water to this community (water paid by SCI). The problem is that given the level of needs during the drought in this region; such issue limits the capacity to serve more people in need.

The water trucking activities has been affected by the lack of coordination of private actor and government using private donation and delivering water truck without coordination in ad hoc manner. This situation led to overlap and then waste of resources in a context of limited funding and resources.

As already mentioned the main concern is the lack of water quality monitoring at the Berkad, at the Shallow well level nor for water trucking and at HH level.

#### **Hardware part of the action:**

In Geed Abeera, SRCS inform us that they had drilled a borehole some time ago and build a water network in the village. The borehole had too low yield and then another humanitarian actor (Concern) tried to increase the depth of the borehole, but as a result the BH collapsed. Then, Concern drilled another BH 3km from the village. This BH was supposed to be connected to the water network but during our visit it was not connected to the water system. SRCS could not explain why (???), and whether the system has already been handed over to the communities.

*Iron sheet on rehabilitated Berka roof*



Regarding the hardware part, the quality control mechanism seems to be adequate. One SCI engineer is controlling the main stages of the construction as well as the construction materials used. The problem is that in the area of intervention several sites needed to start in parallel and this made is very difficult for the engineer to ensure presence at each site at critical points of construction. To mitigate the risk



*Sand/silt trap in a Berka*

linked to work progress and the capacity of contractor used, SCI and GRCS/SRCS awarded no more than two sites to one contractor.

Most of the rehabilitation for both SCI and GRCS/SRCS focused mainly on Berkad with repair of cracks on the wall structure as well as replacement of the plastering and installation of sand trap and roofing.

The criteria of selection for the Berkad to be rehabilitate/reconstruct seemed relevant. Several shallow wells located in wadi bed and river bank have been rehabilitated by

the project. Some of them had to be moved from their initial position on the river bank to the river bed because of erosion. As much as possible SCI tried to mitigate the risk of future erosion for the wells rehabilitated. Manholes fitted with access trap have also been installed and some hand pump replaced.

Apparently, most of the Berka to be rehabilitated should be completed before the end of the next rainy season to enable available reserve of water before the next dry season. The rehabilitation of some Berka has been delayed as some of them were in use (*filled up by water trucking or by the first Gu rain*).

In X. Dahir, the Berka was a new reconstruction and not rehabilitation, *see pic in front*.

In some locations partners like Concern during the emergency implement quick temporary storage structure: just a hole and geotextile membrane (adapted plastic sheeting), *see pic in below*.



One of the problem in terms of sustainability of the rehabilitation is coming from the fact that hydrophobic component (like sycalite) are apparently not available in Somaliland. This product is normally mixed with mortar cement to ensure better waterproofing. Lime could also be used. Most of the leakage in the Berka occurs at the level of the joint.

The construction part of the project seems to be adequate. None of the shallow wells were visited on this mission as they are reportedly far from the

communities (10 to 15km). However, very comprehensive and relevant field monitoring report with numerous picture help us to get an idea of the level of quality and relevancy of the intervention. Those shallow well are especially used during the drought/dry season for the livestock unless the usual source of water of the communities has also dried up.

The main issue in this activity is that the partners could have tried to build a bit better the existing Berka structure. In addition to that, the partners should promote more the exploitation of roof surface wherever it is available (school, health center, berka) to improve the rain water harvesting.

For instance, regarding the Berka as well the iron sheet roof surface could has been used also to increase the harvesting surface of rain water and store it in the Berka. The Berka could have been fitted with a gauge. Thus, a strategy to save water according the time of year and the volume of water remaining in the Berkad could has been developed with the community (they could from that know for instance that when the level of water is at 1m in a given Berka the population can still have access to water during this time with this consumption, etc...). As well, the bottom of the Berka could have been



fitted with trap hole/chamber and build with slop to improve water quality and availability (see scheme in recommendation section).

Actually, the user of those Berka fetch water with a bucket tied to a robe to lift water up to the surface. Fetching water that way in a flat structure at some point the level of water will be too low to efficiently fetch it.

This low level of water multiply by the surface of the Berka constitutes a reasonable quantity of water that might be wasted. The access door could have also been fitted with net to reduce the risk of insects and vermin invading the equipment.



## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ISSUE TO FOLLOW UP

### 6.1. Common recommendations


#### Water supply:

- ⇒ Develop a water quality monitoring plan adapted to the different type of water resources targeted within the project: Berka, shallow well, water trucking etc. Ensure that the water quality is tested at least bacteriological and FRC (if chlorination) for all the resources; TDS, conductivity, iron and mangan, pH for the ground water.
- ⇒ Improve the level of support on water resource management. For instance:
  - develop in a participatory manner a water resources management matrix/strategy with the inventory of the resources with estimation of their sustainability and when applicable (berka) measure of the remaining quantity of water, estimation of the needs and definition of different way to use the different resources according the use and the period of the year (early warning of dry season and/or drought ...).
  - In the Berka, the partners could have implemented a gauge to measure the level of water in the Berka (to be able to estimate the remaining capacity base on surface of the Berka and water level). Such system will enable the population to plan different level of supply/consumption according the remaining water quantity and the period of the year
- ⇒ Improve the “building better approach”, especially regarding the rehabilitation of Berka.
 

*For instance:*

  - Ensure presence of silt/sand trap and its appropriate functioning.
  - Implement insect proof net on the access door
  - Improve the way to fetch water: one dedicated bucket and robe, or one hand pump.
  - As people fetch water with bucket and robe: ensure presence of slop in the Berka down to the place use to fetch water to mitigate the risk to harvest dust/sand/silt when the level of water become low in the Berka (1a: mean less water loss but less water quality;

2b: more working as a static decanter playing on the ate of climb of water to separate water and dust/sand); or implement a trap as well in the Berka straight down to the place to fetch water (2)



- ⇒ Promote as much as possible use of roofing surface to harvest rain water (school, roofed berka, health center etc.). Implement a by-pass between storage and roof gutter to ensure disposal of the first minutes of rain (load of dust after washing the roof). Such equipment will contribute to improve water quality (and capacity to store it for longer time).
- ⇒ Improve the level of monitoring of water trucking (to avoid the waste of resources and ensure fair supply among the communities) and control of the water sources used in the project.
- ⇒ Ensure as much as relevant feedback about the water resources data base managed by FAO

#### **Capacity building:**

- ⇒ Improve the capacity building component in general, notably in terms of sustainability, efficiency/relevancy to the context and impact.
- ⇒ Improve the assessment and impact evaluation of the capacity building component of the project based on expected result and outcome from the project
- ⇒ Training component: Develop appropriate module, method and tools to ensure respect of the principle of adult education: practical, interactive, visual, etc. Most of the training should be based on practice on site and/or in workshop. Visual tools should be promoted, such as video (or audio), photos, presentation of spare apart, tools, etc. Sharing experience among communities through video/interviews, presentation of good and bad practices also through video or photos can be relevant according the context.
- ⇒ Ensure a continuous training mechanism and appropriate dissemination in time, by for instance:
  - a coaching or mentoring approach;
  - plan of several refreshing on site;
  - Identification of the strongest trainees and promotion as focal point to ensure memory and dissemination in time of the content of the training (those focal points being stronger could benefit from higher level training).

**Hygiene promotion**

- ⇒ The approach on incentive should be harmonized
- ⇒ Improve the hygiene promotion approach in general and specifically in terms of targeting (topics), tools and activities (method/strategy), sustainability (use of incentive).
- ⇒ Ensure that hygiene promotion is adapted to the context (method and tools/activities adapted in a participatory manner and tested with a representative sample of the targeted population) dynamic (ensure that the approach evolve in accordance with lesson learnt from the project implementation and interaction with the targeted communities); creative (not too repetitive to avoid loss of interest); innovative (when relevant integrate new approach based on contextual and needs analyze); interactive (everybody learn from everybody; promoting findings and input of the targeted population...).
- ⇒ Improve the link and complementarity between capacity building component and hygiene promotion
- ⇒ The use of posters is encouraged to keep memory of main messages (water resource management, protection of water point,). Laminated or vinyl (for the sake of sustainability) posters could be implemented in strategic location.
- ⇒ Improve the use of hygiene promotion capacity to improve the level of knowledge and understanding of the needs to be addressed and population to be served. As they often be the one interacting the most with the targeted population being themselves most of the time from the targeted population, hygiene promoter could be used to
  1. disseminate various message not only related to hygiene but also to water use/water management; for instance if a an issue in terms of fire risk is identified or others they could be used to raise the awareness of the population at risk, etc...
  2. perform inquiries or/and survey
  3. data collection, for instance: measurement of the potential roof survice, water quality monitoring, measure distance with various source of water, etc.....

**6.2. Specific to GRCS/SRCS:**

- ⇒ The different steps of PHAST must be implemented in a timely manner with appropriate tools (facilitator get training but no tools box to implement activities) and coaching.
- ⇒ The follow up and monitoring of the PHAST activities implementation by trained facilitator should be improved
- ⇒ The way to use PHAST and the modalities of implementation of the method should be reviewed to be more coherent with the expected objectives. For instance:
  1. if you mean to raise the ownership and develop a community action/development plan you should not start hardware activities prior to completion of the plan otherwise you artificially direct the thinking of the population;
  2. you cannot ask the community to plan/decide which type of training they would need and in parallel implement a training for operation and maintenance of water

equipment,). The attendees of the PHAST activities should be influenced from the method and not from what is done or going on around the method...).