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Author(s): Dankwart A. Rustow

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Transitions to Democracy

Toward a Dynamic Model

Dankwart A. Rustow*

I

What conditions make democracy possible and what conditions make it thrive? Thinkers from Locke to Tocqueville and A. D. Lindsay have given many answers. Democracy, we are told, is rooted in man's innate capacity for self-government or in the Christian ethical or the Teutonic legal tradition. Its birthplace was the field at Putney where Cromwell's angry young privates debated their officers, or the more sedate House at Westminster, or the rock at Plymouth, or the forest cantons above Lake Lucerne, or the fevered brain of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Its natural champions are sturdy yeomen, or industrious merchants, or a prosperous middle class. It must be combined with strong local government, with a two-party system, with a vigorous tradition of civil rights, or with a multitude of private associations.

Recent writings of American sociologists and political scientists favor three types of explanation. One of these, proposed by Seymour Martin Lipset, Philips Cutright, and others, connects stable democracy with certain economic and social background conditions, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residence. A second type of explanation dwells on the need for certain beliefs or psychological attitudes among the citizens. A long line of authors from Walter Bagehot to Ernest Barker has stressed the need for consensus as the basis of democracy—either in the form of a common belief in certain fundamentals or of procedural consensus on the rules of the game, which Barker calls “the Agreement to Differ.” Among civic attitudes

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required for the successful working of a democratic system, Daniel Lerner has proposed a capacity for empathy and a willingness to participate. To Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, on the other hand, the ideal "civic culture" of a democracy suggests not only such participant but also other traditional or parochial attitudes.¹

A third type of explanation looks at certain features of social and political structure. In contrast to the prevailing consensus theory, authors such as Carl J. Friedrich, E. E. Schattschneider, Bernard Crick, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Arend Lijphart have insisted that conflict and reconciliation are essential to democracy.² Starting with a similar assumption, David B. Truman has attributed the vitality of American institutions to the citizens' "multiple membership in potential groups"—a relationship which Lipset has called one of "crosscutting politically relevant associations."³ Robert A. Dahl and Herbert McClosky, among others, have argued that democratic stability requires a commitment to democratic values or rules, not among the electorate at large but among the professional politicians—each of these presumably linked to the other through effective ties of political organization.⁴ Harry Eckstein, finally, has proposed a rather subtle theory of "congruence": to make democracy stable, the structures of authority throughout society, such as family, church, business, and trade unions, must prove the more democratic the more directly they impinge on processes of government.⁵

Some of these hypotheses are compatible with each other, though they may also be held independently—for example, those

¹ Ernest Barker, *Reflections on Government* (Oxford, 1942), p. 63; Daniel Lerner et al., *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, 1958), pp. 49ff., 60ff.; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963).

² Carl J. Friedrich, *The New Belief in the Common Man* (Boston, 1942); E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960); Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics*, rev. ed. (Penguin Books, 1964); Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, 1959); Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968).

³ David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), p. 514; S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960), pp. 88ff. Already A. Lawrence Lowell had spoken of the need for a party alignment where "the line of division is vertical," cutting across the horizontal division of classes. *Government and Parties in Continental Europe* (Boston, 1896), vol. 2, pp. 65ff.

⁴ Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961); Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (June 1964); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, XXII (May 1960).

⁵ Harry Eckstein, *The Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton, 1961) and *Division and Cohesion in a Democracy* (Princeton, 1965).

about prosperity, literacy, and consensus. Others—such as those about consensus and conflict—are contradictory unless carefully restricted or reconciled. Precisely such a synthesis has been the import of a large body of writing. Dahl, for instance, has proposed that in polyarchy (or “minorities rule,” the closest real-life approximation to democracy) the policies of successive governments tend to fall within a broad range of majority consensus.⁶ Indeed, after an intense preoccupation with consensus in the World War II years, it is now widely accepted that democracy is indeed a process of “accommodation” involving a combination of “division and cohesion” and of “conflict and consent”—to quote the key terms from a number of recent book titles.⁷

The scholarly debate thus continues, and answers diverge. Yet there are two notable points of agreement. Nearly all the authors ask the same sort of question and support their answers with the same sort of evidence. The question is not how a democratic system comes into existence. Rather it is how a democracy, assumed to be already in existence, can best preserve or enhance its health and stability. The evidence adduced generally consists of contemporary information, whether in the form of comparative statistics, interviews, surveys, or other types of data. This remains true even of authors who spend considerable time discussing the historical background of the phenomena that concern them—Almond and Verba of the civic culture, Eckstein of congruence among Norwegian social structures, and Dahl of the ruling minorities of New Haven and of oppositions in Western countries.⁸ Their key propositions are couched in the present tense.

There may be a third feature of similarity underlying the current American literature of democracy. All scientific inquiry starts with the conscious or unconscious perception of a puzzle.⁹ What has puzzled the more influential authors evidently has been the contrast between the relatively smooth functioning of democracy in the English-speaking and Scandinavian countries and the recurrent crises and final collapse of democracy in the French Third and Fourth Republics and in the Weimar Republic of Germany.

This curiosity is of course wholly legitimate. The growing litera-

⁶ Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956).

⁷ Lijphart; Eckstein; Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago, 1967).

⁸ Almond and Verba; Eckstein; Dahl, *Who Governs?* and ed. *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven, 1966).

⁹ See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 1962).

ture and the increasingly subtle theorizing on the bases of democracy indicate how fruitful it has been. The initial curiosity leads logically enough to the functional, as opposed to the genetic, question. And that question, in turn, is most readily answered by an examination of contemporary data about functioning democracies—perhaps with badly functioning democracies and nondemocracies thrown in for contrast. The functional curiosity also comes naturally to scholars of a country that took its crucial steps toward democracy as far back as the days of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. It accords, moreover, with some of the characteristic trends in American social science in the last generation or two—with the interest in systematic equilibria, in quantitative correlations, and in survey data engendered by the researcher's own questions. Above all, it accords with a deep-seated prejudice against causality. As Herbert A. Simon has strikingly put it, “. . . we are wary, in the social sciences, of asymmetrical relations. They remind us of pre-Humeian and pre-Newtonian notions of causality. By whip and sword we have been converted to the doctrine that there is no causation, only functional interrelation, and that functional relations are perfectly symmetrical. We may even have taken over, as a very persuasive analogy, the proposition ‘for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.’ ”¹⁰

Students of developing regions, such as the Middle East, Southern Asia, tropical Africa, or Latin America, naturally enough have a somewhat different curiosity about democracy. The contrast that is likely to puzzle them is that between mature democracies, such as the United States, Britain, or Sweden today, and countries that are struggling on the verge of democracy, such as Ceylon, Lebanon, Turkey, Peru, or Venezuela. This will lead them to the genetic question of how a democracy comes into being in the first place.¹¹ The question is (or at least was, until the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) of almost equal interest in Eastern Europe. The genesis of democracy, thus, has not only considerable intrinsic interest for most of the world; it has greater pragmatic relevance than further panegyrics about the virtues of Anglo-American democracy or laments over the fatal illnesses of democracy in Weimar or in several of the French Republics.

¹⁰ Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man: Social and Rational* (New York, 1957), p. 65.

¹¹ For a general discussion of the question of democracy in the context of recent modernizing countries, see Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, 1967), Ch. 7, which states some of the present argument in summary form.

In the following sections of this article I should like to examine some of the methodological problems involved in the shift from functional to genetic inquiry and then proceed to outline one possible model of the transition to democracy.

II

What changes in concept or method does the shift from functional to genetic inquiry imply? The simplest answer would be, "None at all." The temptation is to make the functional theories do double duty as genetic theories, to extend the perspective of Westminster and Washington versus Weimar and Paris to Ankara, Caracas, and Bucharest as well. If conditions such as consensus or prosperity will help to preserve a functioning democracy, it may be argued, surely they will be all the more needful to bring it into existence.

Alas, the simple equation of function and genesis is a little too simple, and the argument *a fortiori* is, in fact, rather weak.¹² The equation certainly does not seem to hold for most other types of political regimes. Military dictatorships, for instance, typically originate in secret plotting and armed revolt but perpetuate themselves by massive publicity and by alliances with civilian supporters. Charismatic leaders, according to Max Weber, establish their claim to legitimacy by performing seeming miracles but preserve it through routinization. A hereditary monarchy rests most securely on the subjects' unquestioning acceptance of immemorial tradition; it evidently cannot be erected on such a principle. Communist regimes have been installed by revolutionary elites or through foreign conquest but consolidated through the growth of domestic mass parties and their bureaucracies. From physics and chemistry, too, the distinction between the energy required to initiate and to sustain a given reaction is familiar. These arguments from analogy of course are just as inconclusive as the supposedly *a fortiori* one. Still, they shift the burden of proof to those who assert that the circumstances which sustain a mature democracy also favor its birth.

The best known attempts to apply a single world-wide perspective to democracy, whether nascent or mature, are the statistical correlations compiled by Lipset and by Cutright.¹³ But Lipset's

¹² ". . . a political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that form" (Lipset, p. 46).

¹³ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Eco-

article well illustrates the difficulty of applying the functional perspective to the genetic question. Strictly interpreted, his data bear only on function. His statistical findings all take the form of correlations at a given single point in time. In the 1950s his "stable democracies" generally had substantially higher per capita incomes and literacy rates than did his "unstable democracies," or his unstable and stable authoritarianisms. Now, correlation evidently is not the same as causation—it provides at best a clue to some sort of causal connection without indicating its direction. Lipset's data leave it entirely open, for example, whether affluent and literate citizens make the better democrats; whether democracies provide superior schools and a more bracing climate for economic growth; whether there is some sort of reciprocal connection so that a given increase in affluence or literacy and in democracy will produce a corresponding increment in the other; or whether there is some further set of factors, such as the industrial economy perhaps, that causes both democracy and affluence and literacy. A corresponding objection can be urged against the findings of Almond, Verba, and others that are based mainly on contemporary opinion or attitude surveys. Only further investigation could show whether such attitudes as "civic culture," an eagerness to participate, a consensus on fundamentals, or an agreement on procedures are cause or effect of democracy, or both, or neither.

Lipset's title is true to his functional concern. He is careful to speak of "Some Social Requisites," not prerequisites, "of Democracy," and thus to acknowledge the difference between correlation and cause. But the subtlety has escaped many readers who unthinkingly translate "requisites" into "preconditions."¹⁴ The text of the article, moreover, encourages the same substitution, for it repeatedly slips from the language of correlation into the language of causality. Significantly, on all those occasions economic and social conditions become the independent, and democracy the dependent, variable.

conomic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (March 1959); idem, *Political Man*; Philips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (April 1963).

¹⁴ Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, 1960), p. 278, paraphrases Lipset to this effect. M. Rejai, in his useful anthology and commentary, *Democracy: The Contemporary Theories* (New York, 1967), includes an excerpt from the article under the heading, "Socioeconomic Preconditions" (pp. 242-247).

A genetic theory will have to be explicit about distinguishing correlate from cause. This does not commit us to any old-fashioned or simple-minded view of causality, whereby every effect has but one cause and every cause but one effect. It does not preclude the "probabilistic" view recently argued by Almond and, indeed, espoused by every social statistician since Emile Durkheim and before.¹⁵ It does not rule out somewhat more sophisticated causal concepts such as Gunnar Myrdal's spiral, Karl W. Deutsch's quorum of prerequisites, Hayward R. Alker's nonlinear correlations, or the notion of a threshold which Deane Neubauer recently applied to Lipset's and Cutright's propositions.¹⁶ Above all, a concern for causality is compatible with—indeed is indispensable to—a sceptical view that attributes human events to a mixture of law and chance. Such semideterminism is tantamount to an admission that the social scientist will never know enough to furnish a complete explanation, that he is at least as unlikely as the natural scientist to rival Laplace's Demon. Nor do scholars who would theorize about the genesis of democracy need to concur in all their epistemology and metaphysics. But to be geneticists at all they do have to inquire into causes. Only by such inquiry, I would add, can the social scientist accomplish his proper task of exploring the margins of human choice and of clarifying the consequences of the choices in that margin.¹⁷

It probably is no simple confusion between correlate and cause that leads Lipset's readers astray, and, on occasion, the author as well. Rather it seems to be a tacit assumption that social and economic conditions are somehow more basic, and that we must look for the significant relations in this deeper layer rather than in the "superstructure" of political epiphenomena. Our current emphasis in political science on economic and social factors is a most necessary corrective to the sterile legalism of an earlier generation. But, as Lipset (together with Bendix) has himself warned in another

¹⁵ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds. *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), Introduction.

¹⁶ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), Appendix; Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "The Long Road to International Relations Theory: Problems of Statistical Non-Additivity," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966); Deane Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1967).

¹⁷ This statement of the function of the social scientist is taken from Rustow, *A World of Nations*, p. 17; the next two paragraphs paraphrase *ibid.*, pp. 142ff.

context, it can easily "explain away the very facts of political life."¹⁸ We have been in danger of throwing away the political baby with the institutional bathwater.

Note that this widespread American economicism goes considerably beyond Marx and Engels, who saw the state as created by military conquest, economic regimes defined by their legal relations of property, and changes from one to the next brought about through political revolution. If they proclaimed themselves materialists or talked like economic determinists, it was mainly in protest against the wilder flights of Hegelian "idealism."

Any genetic theory of democracy would do well to assume a two-way flow of causality, or some form of circular interaction, between politics on the one hand and economic and social conditions on the other. Wherever social or economic background conditions enter the theory, it must seek to specify the mechanisms, presumably in part political, by which these penetrate to the democratic foreground. The political scientist, moreover, is entitled to his rights within the general division of labor and may wish to concentrate on some of the political factors without denying the significance of the social or economic ones. With Truman, Dahl, and others, I would tend to see the patterns of conflict and of recurrent or changing alignments as one of the central features of any political system. With Apter, I would consider choice as one of the central concerns of the political process.¹⁹

What goes for economics and sociology goes for psychology as well. Here, too, the relationship with politics is one of interaction and interdependence, so that political phenomena may have psychological consequences as well as vice versa. In explaining the origins of democracy we need not assume—as does much of the current survey research literature—that beliefs unilaterally influence actions. Rather, we may recognize with Leon Festinger and other social psychologists of the "cognitive dissonance" school that there are reciprocal influences between beliefs and actions.²⁰ Many of the current theories about democracy seem to imply that to promote democracy you must first foster democrats—perhaps by preachment, propaganda, education, or perhaps as an automatic byproduct of growing prosperity. Instead, we should allow for the possibility that circumstances may force, trick, lure, or cajole non-

¹⁸ Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Political Sociology," *Current Sociology*, VI, No. 2 (1957), 85.

¹⁹ David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago, 1965).

²⁰ Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, 1957).

democrats into democratic behavior and that their beliefs may adjust in due course by some process of rationalization or adaptation.

To seek causal explanations, as I insisted earlier, does not imply simple-mindedness. Specifically, we need not assume that the transition to democracy is a world-wide uniform process, that it always involves the same social classes, the same types of political issues, or even the same methods of solution. On the contrary, it may be well to assume with Harry Eckstein that a wide variety of social conflicts and of political contents can be combined with democracy.²¹ This is, of course, in line with the general recognition that democracy is a matter primarily of procedure rather than of substance. It also implies that, as among various countries that have made the transition, there may be many roads to democracy.

Nor does a model of transition need to maintain that democratic evolution is a steady process that is homogeneous over time. Such a notion of temporal continuity and presumably of linear correlation seems to lurk behind much of the literature of the Lipset-Cutright genre. Temporal discontinuity, on the contrary, is implicit in the basic distinction drawn earlier in this article between the functional and genetic questions. The same discontinuity may be carried into the genetic scheme itself. For instance, it may be useful to single out certain circumstances as background factors and to proceed step-by-step to other factors that may become crucial in the preparation, decision, and consolidation phases of the process.

Even in the same country and during the same phase of the process, political attitudes are not likely to be spread evenly through the population. Dahl, McClosky, and others have found that in mature democracies there are marked differences in the attitudes of professional politicians and of common citizens.²² Nor can we take it for granted that the politicians will all share the same attitudes. In so far as democracy is based on conflict, it may take two attitudes to make a quarrel. All these differences are likely, moreover, to be compounded during the formative period when part of the quarrel must *ex hypothesi* be between democrats and nondemocrats. Finally, a dynamic model of the transition must allow for the possibility that different groups—e.g., now the citizens and now the rulers, now the forces in favor of change and now those eager to preserve the past—may furnish the crucial impulse toward democracy.

²¹ Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion*, pp. 183-85.

²² Dahl, *Who Governs?*; McClosky; Prothro and Grigg.

III

The methodological argument I have been advancing may be condensed into a number of succinct propositions.

1. The factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis.
2. Correlation is not the same as causation: a genetic theory must concentrate on the latter.
3. Not all causal links run from social and economic to political factors.
4. Not all causal links run from beliefs and attitudes to actions.
5. The genesis of democracy need not be geographically uniform: there may be many roads to democracy.
6. The genesis of democracy need not be temporally uniform: different factors may become crucial during successive phases.
7. The genesis of democracy need not be socially uniform: even in the same place and time the attitudes that promote it may not be the same for politicians and for common citizens.

My refrain, like Sportin' Life's, has been, "It ain't necessarily so." Each proposition pleads for the lifting of some conventional restriction, for the dropping of some simplifying assumption made in the previous literature, for the introduction of complicating, diversifying factors. If the argument were to conclude on this sceptical note, it would set the researcher completely adrift and make the task of constructing a theory of democratic genesis well-nigh unmanageable.

Fortunately, the genetic perspective requires or makes possible a number of new restrictions that more than compensate for the loss of the seven others. We may continue the listing of summary propositions before elaborating this second part of the methodological argument.

8. Empirical data in support of a genetic theory must cover, for any given country, a time period from just before until just after the advent of democracy.
9. To examine the logic of transformation *within* political systems, we may leave aside countries where a major impetus came from abroad.

10. A model or ideal type of the transition may be derived from a close examination of two or three empirical cases and tested by application to the rest.

That diachronic data, covering more than a single point in time, are essential to any genetic theory should be obvious. Such a theory, moreover, must be based on cases where the process is substantially complete. Although control data on nondemocracies and on abortive and incipient cases may become important at a later stage of theorizing, it is more convenient to start out by studying a phenomenon where it actually has come into existence. The "advent" of democracy must not, of course, be understood as occurring in a single year. Since the emergence of new social groups and the formation of new habits are involved, one generation is probably the minimum period of transition. In countries that had no earlier models to emulate, the transition is likely to have come even more slowly. In Britain, for example, it may be argued that it began before 1640 and was not accomplished until 1918. For an initial set of hypotheses, however, it may be best to turn to countries where the process occurred relatively rapidly.

The study of democratic transitions will take the political scientist deeper into history than he has commonly been willing to go. This implies many changes in method—beginning with suitable substitutions for survey data and for interviews. Even reliable statistics are harder to come by early in any democratic experiment. The United States Constitution (Article 1, Section 2) reminds us that our decennial census was introduced at that very time so that we might begin to govern ourselves by an accurate count of noses.

Whatever the difficulties in the vastly increased use of historical data by social scientists, at least three arguments can be made in extenuation and encouragement. Man did not become a political animal in 1960 or in 1945, as much of our recent literature pretends to suppose. History, to paraphrase Georges Clemenceau, is far too important a topic to be left just to historians. And recently scholars in comparative politics have turned with increasing zest to historical themes. The list includes Almond, Leonard Binder, Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington, Lipset, Robert E. Ward, and Myron Weiner—not to speak of those like Friedrich and Deutsch to whom a political-historical perspective was natural to start with.²³

²³ Almond, current study on nineteenth-century Britain; Leonard Binder, ed. *Politics in Lebanon* (New York, 1966); Dahl, see nn. 4, 7, and 8; Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953) and Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton,

The next restriction—the omission early in the inquiry of cases where the major impulse to democratization came from the outside—is in accord with the conventional division of labor between the subfields of comparative politics and international relations. There are topics such as the theory of modernization where that division should be transcended from the start.²⁴ In tracing the origins of democracy, too, both perspectives may be applied at once, as witness the suggestive work of Louis Hartz, the masterly synthesis by Robert Palmer, and the current research by Robert Ward on Japanese-American interaction in the shaping of the 1947 constitution.²⁵ But for a first attempt at a general theory it may be preferable to stick to countries where the transition occurred mainly within a single system.

To speak of “major impulses from outside” or transitions “mainly within the system” acknowledges that foreign influences are almost always present. Throughout history, warfare has been a major democratizing force, because it has made necessary the marshalling of additional human resources.²⁶ Democratic ideas, moreover, have proved infectious whether in the days of Rousseau or of John F. Kennedy. And the violent overthrow of one oligarchy (e.g., France in 1830, Germany in 1918) has often frightened another into peaceful surrender (e.g., Britain in 1832, Sweden in 1918). From such ever present international influences we may distinguish situations where people arriving from abroad took an active part in the internal political process of democratization. A theory of democratic origins, that is to say, should leave aside at the beginning those countries where military occupation played a major role (postwar Germany and Japan), where democratic institutions or attitudes were brought along by immigrants (Australia and New Zealand), or where in these and other ways immigration played a major role (Canada, the United States, and Israel).

1957); Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1950); Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Modernization: America vs. Europe,” *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966); S. M. Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York, 1963), and Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York, 1967); Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, eds. *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964); Myron Weiner, current study on nineteenth-century social history of the Balkans.

²⁴ In this combination lies the strength of Cyril E. Black’s *Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, 1966) compared to most of the other literature on the subject.

²⁵ Louis Hartz et al., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York, 1964); R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1959-64).

²⁶ See, e.g., Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power* (New York, 1948).

The preference expressed earlier for relatively rapid instances of transition and the omission of immigrant countries amount to a very serious restriction, for they leave out of account, at this first stage of theorizing, all the English-speaking democracies. The reasons, however, seem cogent. Indeed, it may well be that American social scientists have added to their difficulties in understanding transitions to democracy by paying undue attention to Britain and the United States, which for the reasons just suggested prove to be among the hardest instances to analyze in genetic terms. The total of eight provisional exclusions still leaves (among extant democracies) about twenty-three cases on which to base a comparative analysis, thirteen of which are in Europe: Austria, Belgium, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, India, Italy, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.²⁷

Among these twenty-odd democracies, the last methodological proposition urges an even narrower selection at this preliminary stage of theorizing. What is here involved is a choice between three research strategies: inclusion of all relevant cases, concentration on a single country, or some intermediate course.

Completeness is of course desirable, and all the more so where the "universe" consists of no more than twenty or thirty cases. But the more nearly complete the coverage, the shallower it will have to be. The number of possible variables is so enormous (economic conditions, social cleavages, political alignments, psychological attitudes) that they could be handled only by means of the kind of simplifying assumptions that we rejected earlier on logical grounds. A test, no matter how complete, of a fallacious set of propositions would hardly yield convincing results.

The country monograph would avoid this danger. Nor does it deliberately have to be antitheoretical or "merely descriptive." Any country study nevertheless sacrifices the advantages of comparison, the social scientist's nearest substitute for a laboratory.

²⁷ This list, together with the eight omissions noted (Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States), corresponds to the one I gave in *A World of Nations*, pp. 290ff., with the following exceptions: Greece has been omitted because democracy was superseded by a military coup in 1967; Mexico was omitted because, on second thought, I do not believe that it meets the criterion of a government based on "three or more consecutive, popular, and competitive elections"—the problems of course being the severe de facto restrictions on competition; Turkey and Venezuela have been added because they now have begun to meet the criterion.

No such study can tell us which strands in a tangle of empirical factors represent the development of democracy and which the national idiosyncrasies of Monographistan.

The middle course avoids the twin dangers of inconclusive scholasticism and of fact-grubbing. Instead, it can offer a more balanced and hence more fruitful blend of theory and empiricism. The many possible variables that can affect the origins of democracy and the even more complex relations among them can best be sorted out by looking at their total configuration in a limited number of cases—perhaps no more than two or three at the start. What will emerge from this exercise is a model, or as Weber used to call it, an “ideal type,” of the transition from oligarchy to democracy. Being an ideal type, it deliberately highlights certain features of empirical reality and deliberately distorts, simplifies, or omits others. Like any such construct, it must be judged initially by its internal coherence and plausibility but ultimately by its fruitfulness in suggesting hypotheses applicable to a wide variety of other empirical cases.²⁸ It is at this further stage of testing that the demand for completeness comes once again into its own.

The model I should like to sketch in the next few pages is based in large part on my studies of Sweden, a Western country that made the transition to democracy in the period from 1890 to 1920, and of Turkey, a Westernizing country where that process began about 1945 and is still underway. The choice of these two is accidental—except in terms of an autobiographical account for which this is not the occasion. I am now in the early stages of a study that will seek to refine the same set of hypotheses in the light of materials from a slightly larger and less arbitrary selection of countries.

IV

A. Background Condition The model starts with a single background condition—national unity. This implies nothing mysterious about *Blut und Boden* or daily pledges of allegiance, about personal identity in the psychoanalyst's sense, or about a grand political purpose pursued by the citizenry as a whole. It simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to. This excludes situations of latent secession, as in the

²⁸ For a recent, lucid restatement of the rationale for such models or ideal types, see T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Societies* (New York, 1965), p. 32.

late Habsburg and Ottoman Empires or in many African states today, and, conversely, situations of serious aspirations for merger as in many Arab states. Democracy is a system of rule by temporary majorities. In order that rulers and policies may freely change, the boundaries must endure, the composition of the citizenry be continuous. As Ivor Jennings phrased it tersely, "the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people."²⁹

National unity is listed as a background condition in the sense that it must precede all the other phases of democratization but that otherwise its timing is irrelevant. It may have been achieved in prehistoric times, as in Japan or Sweden; or it may have preceded the other phases by centuries, as in France, or by decades, as in Turkey.

Nor does it matter by what means national unity has been established. The geographic situation may be such that no serious alternative has ever arisen—Japan once again being the best example. Or a sense of nationality may be the product of a sudden intensification of social communication in a new idiom developed for the purpose. On the other hand, it may be the legacy of some dynastic or administrative process of unification. The various hypotheses proposed by Deutsch clearly become relevant here.³⁰

I have argued elsewhere that in an age of modernization men are unlikely to feel a preponderant sense of loyalty except to a political community large enough to achieve some considerable degree of modernity in its social and economic life.³¹ This sort of hypothesis must be examined as part of a theory of nationhood, not of one of democratic development. What matters in the present context is only the result.

I hesitate to call this result a consensus, for at least two reasons. First, national unity, as Deutsch argues, is the product less of shared attitudes and opinions than of responsiveness and complementarity. Second, "consensus" connotes consciously held opinion and deliberate agreement. The background condition, however, is best fulfilled when national unity is accepted unthinkingly, is silently taken for granted. Any vocal consensus about national unity, in fact, should make us wary. Most of the rhetoric of na-

²⁹ W. Ivor Jennings, *The Approach to Self-Government* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 56.

³⁰ Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*; Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*.

³¹ Rustow, *A World of Nations*, pp. 30ff. and *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, s.v. "Nation."

tionalism has poured from the lips of people who felt least secure in their sense of national identity—Germans and Italians in the past century and Arabs and Africans in the present, never Englishmen, Swedes, or Japanese.

To single out national unity as the sole background condition implies that no minimal level of economic development or social differentiation is necessary as a prerequisite to democracy. These social and economic factors enter the model only indirectly as one of several alternative bases for national unity or for entrenched conflict (see B below). Those social and economic indicators that authors are fond of citing as “background conditions” seem somewhat implausible at any rate. There are always nondemocracies that rank suspiciously high, such as Kuwait, Nazi Germany, Cuba, or Congo-Kinshasa. Conversely, the United States in 1820, France in 1870, and Sweden in 1890 would have been sure to fail one or another of the proposed tests of urbanization or per capita income—not to speak of newspaper copies in circulation, or doctors, movies, and telephones available to each one thousand inhabitants.

The model thus deliberately leaves open the possibility of democracies (properly so called) in premodern, prenationalist times and at low levels of economic development. To find a meaningful definition of democracy that would cover modern parliamentary systems along with medieval forest cantons, ancient city states (the ones where slavery and metics were absent), and some of the pre-Colombian Indians may prove difficult. It is not a task that forms part of the present project; still, I should not like to foreclose the attempt.

B. Preparatory Phase I hypothesize that, against this single background condition, the dynamic process of democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. To give it those qualities, the protagonists must represent well-entrenched forces (typically social classes), and the issues must have profound meaning to them. Such a struggle is likely to begin as the result of the emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action. Yet the particular social composition of the contending forces, both leaders and followers, and the specific nature of the issues will vary widely from one country to the next and in the same country from period to period.

In Sweden at the turn of the century, it was a struggle first of

farmers and then of an urban lower-middle and working class against a conservative alliance of bureaucrats, large landowners, and industrialists; and the issues were tariffs, taxation, military service, and suffrage. In Turkey in the last twenty years it has mainly been a contest of countryside versus city, more precisely of large and middling-size farmers (supported by most of the peasant electorate) against the heirs of the Kemalist bureaucratic-military establishment; the central issue has been industrialization versus agricultural development. In both these examples, economic factors have been of prime importance, yet the direction of causality has varied. In Sweden, it was a period of intense economic development that created new political tensions; at one crucial point, rising wages enabled the Stockholm workers to overcome the existing tax barrier for the franchise. In Turkey, conversely, the demand for rural development was the consequence, not the cause, of beginning democratization.³²

There may be situations where economic factors have played a much lesser role. In India and in the Philippines the prolonged contest between nationalist forces and an imperial bureaucracy over the issue of self-government may have served the same preparatory function as did class conflict elsewhere. In Lebanon the continuing struggle is mainly between denominational groups and the stakes are mainly government offices. Although political struggles of this sort naturally have their economic dimensions, only a doctrinaire economic determinist would derive colonialism or religious divisions from solely economic causes.

James Bryce found in his classic comparative study that, "One road only has in the past led into democracy, viz., the wish to be rid of tangible evils."³³ Democracy was not the original or primary aim; it was sought as a means to some other end or it came as a fortuitous byproduct of the struggle. But, since the tangible evils

³² For developments in Sweden see Rustow, *The Politics of Compromise: A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden* (Princeton, 1955), Chs. 1-3, and Douglas A. Verney, *Parliamentary Reform in Sweden, 1866-1921* (Oxford, 1957). On Turkey see Ward and Rustow and the following essays by Rustow: "Politics and Islam in Turkey," in R. N. Frye, ed. *Islam and the West* (The Hague, 1957), pp. 69-107; "Turkey: The Tradition of Modernity," in Lucian W. Pye and Verba, eds. *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 171-198; "The Development of Parties in Turkey," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 107-133; and "Politics and Development Policy," in F. C. Shorter, ed. *Four Studies in the Economic Development of Turkey* (London, 1967), pp. 5-31.

³³ James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (London, 1921), vol. 2, p. 602.

that befall human societies are legion, Bryce's single road dissolves into many separate paths. No two existing democracies have gone through a struggle between the very same forces over the same issues and with the same institutional outcome. Hence, it seems unlikely that any future democracy will follow in the precise footsteps of any of its predecessors. As Albert Hirschman has warned in his discussion of economic development, the search for ever more numerous preconditions or prerequisites may end up by proving conclusively that development always will be impossible—and always has been.³⁴

More positively, Hirschman and other economists have argued that a country can best launch into a phase of growth not by slavishly imitating the example of nations already industrialized, but rather by making the most of its particular natural and human resources and by fitting these accurately into the international division of labor.³⁵ Similarly, a country is likely to attain democracy not by copying the constitutional laws or parliamentary practices of some previous democracy, but rather by honestly facing up to its particular conflicts and by devising or adapting effective procedures for their accommodation.

The serious and prolonged nature of the struggle is likely to force the protagonists to rally around two banners. Hence polarization, rather than pluralism, is the hallmark of this preparatory phase. Yet there are limitations implicit in the requirement of national unity—which, of course, must not only preexist but also continue. If the division is on sharply regional lines, secession rather than democracy is likely to result. Even among contestants geographically interspersed there must be some sense of community or some even balance of forces that makes wholesale expulsion or genocide impossible. The Turks are beginning to develop a set of democratic practices among themselves, but fifty years ago they did not deal democratically with Armenians or Greeks. Crosscutting cleavages have their place in this preparatory phase as a possible means of strengthening or preserving that sense of community.

Dahl notes wistfully that "one perennial problem of opposition is that there is either too much or too little."³⁶ The first two ele-

³⁴ Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York, 1963), pp. 6ff.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, and Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven, 1958), and Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XIII (July 1965), 385-393.

³⁶ Dahl et al., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, p. 397.

ments of the model between them will ensure that there is the right amount. But struggle and national unity cannot simply be averaged out, since they cannot be measured along the same scale. Strong doses of both must be combined, just as it may be possible to combine sharp polarization with crosscutting cleavages. Furthermore, as Mary Parker Follett, Lewis A. Coser, and others have insisted, certain types of conflict in themselves constitute creative processes of integration.³⁷ What infant democracy requires is not a lukewarm struggle but a hot family feud.

This delicate combination implies, of course, that many things can go wrong during the preparatory phase. The fight may go on and on till the protagonists weary and the issues fade away without the emergence of any democratic solution along the way. Or one group may find a way of crushing the opponents after all. In these and other ways an apparent evolution toward democracy may be deflected, and at no time more easily than during the preparatory phase.

C. Decision Phase Robert Dahl has written that, "Legal party opposition . . . is a recent and unplanned invention."³⁸ This accords with Bryce's emphasis on the redress of specific grievances as democracy's vehicle and with the assumption here that the transition to democracy is a complex process stretching over many decades. But it does not rule out suffrage or freedom of opposition as conscious goals in the preparatory struggle. Nor does it suggest that a country ever becomes a democracy in a fit of absentmindedness. On the contrary, what concludes the preparatory phase is a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure. Such was the decision in 1907, which I have called the "Great Compromise" of Swedish politics, to adopt universal suffrage combined with pro-

³⁷ Mary Parker Follett, *The New State* (New York, 1918), and *Creative Experience* (New York, 1924); Lewis A. Coser, *The Function of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, 1956), p. 121 and passim. A widespread contrary position has recently been restated by Edward Shils, who writes in reference to Lebanon: "Civility will not be strengthened by crisis. It can only grow slowly and in a calm atmosphere. The growth of civility is a necessary condition for Lebanon's development . . . into a genuinely democratic system" (in Binder et al., *Politics in Lebanon*, p. 10). I find it hard to think of situations where there have been any notable advances in either civility or democracy except as the result of crisis.

³⁸ Dahl et al., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, p. xi.

portional representation.³⁹ Instead of a single decision there may be several. In Britain, as is well-known, the principle of limited government was laid down in the compromise of 1688, cabinet government evolved in the eighteenth century, and suffrage reform was launched as late as 1832. Even in Sweden, the dramatic change of 1907 was followed by the further suffrage reform of 1918 which also confirmed the principle of cabinet government.

Whether democracy is purchased wholesale as in Sweden in 1907 or on the installment plan as in Britain, it is acquired by a process of conscious decision at least on the part of the top political leadership. Politicians are specialists in power, and a fundamental power shift such as that from oligarchy to democracy will not escape their notice.

Decision means choice, and while the choice of democracy does not arise until the background and preparatory conditions are in hand, it is a genuine choice and does not flow automatically from those two conditions. The history of Lebanon illustrates the possibilities of benevolent autocracy or of foreign rule as alternative solutions to entrenched struggles within a political community.⁴⁰ And of course a decision in favor of democracy, or some crucial ingredient of it, may be proposed and rejected—thus leading to a continuation of the preparatory phase or to some sort of abortive outcome.

The decision in favor of democracy results from the interplay of a number of forces. Since precise terms must be negotiated and heavy risks with regard to the future taken, a small circle of leaders is likely to play a disproportionate role. Among the negotiating groups and their leaders may be the protagonists of the preparatory struggle. Other participants may include groups that split off from one or the other side or new arrivals on the political stage. In Sweden these new and intermediate groups played a crucial role. Conservatives and Radicals (led by industrialists on one side and intellectuals on the other) had sharpened and crystallized the issues throughout the 1890s. Then came a period of stalemate when discipline in all the recently formed parliamentary parties broke down—a sort of randomization process in which many compromises, combinations, and permutations were devised and explored. The formula that carried the day in 1907 included crucial contributions from a moderately conservative bishop and a moderately

³⁹ Rustow, *The Politics of Compromise*, p. 69.

⁴⁰ Binder, ed. *Politics in Lebanon*.

liberal farmer, neither of whom played a very prominent role in politics before or after this decision phase.

Just as there can be different types of sponsors and different contents of the decision, so the motives from which it is proposed and accepted will vary from case to case. The forces of conservatism may yield from fear that continued resistance may lose them even more ground in the end. (Such thoughts were on the minds of British Whigs in 1832 and of Swedish conservatives in 1907.) Or they may belatedly wish to live up to principles long proclaimed; such was the Turkish transition to a multiparty system announced by President İnönü in 1945. The radicals may accept the compromise as a first installment, confident that time is on their side and that future installments are bound to follow. Both conservatives and radicals may feel exhausted from a long struggle or fearful of a civil war. This consideration is likely to loom large if they have been through such a war in recent memory. As Barrington Moore has aptly proposed, the English civil war was a crucial "contribution of early violence to later gradualism."⁴¹ In short, democracy, like any collective human action, is likely to stem from a large variety of mixed motives.

The decision phase may well be considered an act of deliberate, explicit consensus. But, once again, this somewhat nebulous term should be carefully considered and perhaps replaced with less ambiguous synonyms. First of all, as Bryce suggests, the democratic content of the decision may be incidental to other substantive issues. Second, in so far as it is a genuine compromise it will seem second-best to all major parties involved—it certainly will not represent any agreement on fundamentals. Third, even on procedures there are likely to be continuing differences of preference. Universal suffrage with proportional representation, the content of the Swedish compromise of 1907, was about equally distasteful to the conservatives (who would rather have continued the old plutocratic voting system) and to the liberals and socialists (who wanted majority rule undiluted by proportional representation). What matters at the decision stage is not what values the leaders hold dear in the abstract, but what concrete steps they are willing to take. Fourth, the agreement worked out by the leaders is far from universal. It must be transmitted to the professional politicians and to the citizenry at large. These are two aspects of the final, or habituation, phase of the model.

⁴¹ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966), p. 3.

D. Habituation Phase A distasteful decision, once made, is likely to seem more palatable as one is forced to live with it. Everyday experience can supply concrete illustrations of this probability for each of us. Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance" supplies a technical explanation and experimental support.⁴² Democracy, moreover, is by definition a competitive process, and this competition gives an edge to those who can rationalize their commitment to it, and an even greater edge to those who sincerely believe in it. The transformation of the Swedish Conservative Party from 1918 to 1936 vividly illustrates the point. After two decades those leaders who had grudgingly put up with democracy or pragmatically accepted it retired or died and were replaced by others who sincerely believed in it. Similarly, in Turkey there is a remarkable change from the leadership of Ismet İnönü, who promoted democracy out of a sense of duty, and Adnan Menderes, who saw in it an unprecedented vehicle for his ambition, to younger leaders in each of their parties who understand democracy more fully and embrace it more wholeheartedly. In short, the very process of democracy institutes a double process of Darwinian selectivity in favor of convinced democrats: one among parties in general elections and the other among politicians vying for leadership within these parties.

But politics consists not only of competition for office. It is, above all, a process for resolving conflicts within human groups—whether these arise from the clash of interests or from uncertainty about the future. A new political regime is a novel prescription for taking joint chances on the unknown. With its basic practice of multilateral debate, democracy in particular involves a process of trial and error, a joint learning experience. The first grand compromise that establishes democracy, if it proves at all viable, is in itself a proof of the efficacy of the principle of conciliation and accommodation. The first success, therefore, may encourage contending political forces and their leaders to submit other major questions to resolution by democratic procedures.

In Sweden, for instance, there had been a general political stalemate in the last third of the nineteenth century over the prime issues of the day—the taxation and conscription systems inherited from the sixteenth century. But in the two decades after 1918, when democracy was fully adopted by the Swedes, a whole host of thorny

⁴² Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*.

questions was wittingly or unwittingly resolved. The Social Democrats surrendered their earlier pacifism, anticlericalism, and republicanism, as well as the demand for nationalization of industry (although they found it hard to admit this last point). The conservatives, once staunchly nationalist, endorsed Swedish participation in international organizations. Above all, conservatives and liberals fully accepted government intervention in the economy and the social welfare state.

Of course, the spiral that in Sweden went upward to greater and greater successes for the democratic process may also go downward. A conspicuous failure to resolve some urgent political question will damage the prospects of democracy; if such a failure comes early in the habituation phase, it may prove fatal.

Surveying the evolution of political debate and conflict in the Western democracies over the last century, it is striking to observe the difference between social and economic issues, which democracies handled with comparative ease, and issues of community, which have proved far more troublesome.⁴³ With the advantage of a century's hindsight, it is easy to see that Marx's estimate was wrong at crucial points. In nationality he saw a cloak for bourgeois class interests. He denounced religion as the opiate of the masses. In economics, by contrast, he foresaw very real and increasingly bitter struggles that would end by bringing bourgeois democracy crashing down. But in fact democracy has proved most effective in resolving political questions where the major divisions have been social and economic, as in Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian countries. It has been the fight among religious, national, and racial groups, instead, that has proved most tenacious and has caused recurrent bitterness, as in Belgium, Holland, Canada, and the United States.

The reasons are not hard to find. On the socioeconomic front Marxism itself became a sufficient force in Europe to serve to some extent as a self-disconfirming prophecy. But beyond this there is a fundamental difference in the nature of the issues. On matters of economic policy and social expenditures you can always split the difference. In an expanding economy, you can even have it both ways: the contest for higher wages, profits, consumer savings, and social welfare payments can be turned into a positive-sum game. But there is no middle position between Flemish and French as

⁴³ The contrast emerges implicitly from the country studies in Dahl, ed. *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*.

official languages, or between Calvinism, Catholicism, and secularism as principles of education. The best you can get here is an "inclusive compromise"⁴⁴—a log-rolling deal whereby some government offices speak French and some Flemish, or some children are taught according to Aquinas, some, Calvin, and some, Voltaire. Such a solution may partly depoliticize the question. Yet it also entrenches the differences instead of removing them, and accordingly it may convert political conflict into a form of trench warfare.

The difficulty that democracy finds in resolving issues of community emphasizes the importance of national unity as the background condition of the democratization process. The hardest struggles in a democracy are those against the birth defects of the political community.

The transition to democracy, it was suggested earlier, may require some common attitudes and some distinct attitudes on the part of the politician and of the common citizen. The distinction is already apparent during the decision phase when the leaders search for compromise while their followers wearily uphold the banners of the old struggle. It becomes even more readily apparent during the habituation phase, when three sorts of process are at work. First, both politicians and citizens learn from the successful resolution of some issues to place their faith in the new rules and to apply them to new issues. Their trust will grow more quickly if, in the early decades of the new regime, a wide variety of political tendencies can participate in the conduct of affairs, either by joining various coalitions or by taking turns as government and opposition. Second, as we just saw, experience with democratic techniques and competitive recruitment will confirm the politicians in their democratic practices and beliefs. Third, the population at large will become firmly fitted into the new structure by the forging of effective links of party organization that connect the politicians in the capital with the mass electorate throughout the country.

These party organizations may be a direct continuation of those that were active during the preparatory, or conflict, phase of democratization, and a suffrage extension at the time of the democratic "decision" may now have given them a free field. It is possible, on the other hand, that no parties with a broad popular base emerged during the conflict phase and that the suffrage extension

⁴⁴ Rustow, *Politics of Compromise*, p. 231.

was very limited. Even under such conditions of partial democratization of the political structure, a competitive dynamic that completes the process may have been set off. The parliamentary parties will seek support from constituency organizations to insure a steady supply of members for their group in future parliaments. Now this and now that political group may see a chance to steal a march on its opponents by enlarging the electorate or by removing other obstacles to majority control. This, roughly, would seem to have been the nature of British developments between 1832 and 1918. Complete democratization, of course, is the only logical stopping point for such a dynamic.

V

The model here presented makes three broad assertions. First, it says that certain ingredients are indispensable to the genesis of democracy. For one thing, there must be a sense of national unity. For another, there must be entrenched and serious conflict. For a third, there must be a conscious adoption of democratic rules. And, finally, both politicians and electorate must be habituated to these rules.

Secondly, the model asserts that these ingredients must be assembled one at a time. Each task has its own logic and each has its natural protagonists—a network of administrators or a group of nationalist literati for the task of unification, a mass movement of the lower class, perhaps led by upper class dissidents, for the task of preparatory struggle, a small circle of political leaders skilled at negotiation and compromise for the formulation of democratic rules, and a variety of organization men and their organizations for the task of habituation. The model thus abandons the quest for “functional requisites” of democracy; for such a quest heaps all these tasks together and thus makes the total job of democratization quite unmanageable. The argument here is analogous to that which has been made by Hirschman and others against the theory of balanced economic growth. These economists do not deny that the transition from a primitive subsistence economy to a mature industrial society involves changes on all fronts—in working skills, in capital formation, in the distribution system, in consumption habits, in the monetary system, and so forth. But they insist that any country that attempted all these tasks at once would in practice find itself totally paralysed—that the stablest balance is that of stagnation. Hence the economic developer’s

problem, in their view, becomes one of finding backward and forward "linkages," that is, of devising a manageable sequence of tasks.

Thirdly, the model does suggest one such sequence from national unity as background, through struggle, compromise, and habituation, to democracy. The cogency of this sequence is brought home by a deviant development in Turkey in the years after 1945. The Turkish commitment to democracy was made in the absence of prior overt conflict between major social groups or their leading elites. In 1950 there was the first change of government as the result of a new electoral majority, but in the next decade there was a drift back into authoritarian practices on the part of this newly elected party, and in 1960–1961 the democratic experiment was interrupted by a military coup. These developments are not unconnected: Turkey paid the price in 1960 for having received its first democratic regime as a free gift from the hands of a dictator. But after 1961 there was a further evolution in the more appropriate sequence. The crisis of 1960–1961 had made social and political conflict far more acceptable, and a full range of social and economic issues was debated for the first time. The conflict that shaped up was between the military on one side and the spokesmen of the agrarian majority on the other—and the compromise between these two allowed the resumption of the democratic experiment on a more secure basis by 1965.

In the interests of parsimony, the basic ingredients of the model have been kept to four, and the social circumstances or psychological motivations that may furnish each of them have been left wide open. Specifically, the model rejects what are sometimes proposed as preconditions of democracy, e.g., high levels of economic and social development or a prior consensus either on fundamentals or on the rules. Economic growth may be one of the circumstances that produces the tensions essential to the preparatory or conflict phase—but there are other circumstances that might also serve. Mass education and social welfare services are more likely to be the result of democratization.

Consensus on fundamentals is an implausible precondition. A people who were not in conflict about some rather fundamental matters would have little need to devise democracy's elaborate rules for conflict resolution. And the acceptance of those rules is logically a part of the transition process rather than its prerequisite. The present model transfers various aspects of consensus from the quiescent state of preconditions to that of active elements in the

process. I here follow the lead of Bernard Crick, who has strikingly written:

. . . It is often thought that for this "master science" [i.e., democratic politics] to function, there must already be in existence some shared idea of a "common good," some "consensus" or *consensus juris*. But this common good is itself the process of practical reconciliation of the interests of the various . . . aggregates, or groups which compose a state; it is not some external and intangible spiritual adhesive. . . . Diverse groups hold together, firstly, because they have a common interest in sheer survival, and, secondly, because they practise politics—not because they agree about 'fundamentals,' or some such concept too vague, too personal, or too divine ever to do the job of politics for it. The moral consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior to or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics itself.⁴⁵

The basis of democracy is not maximum consensus. It is the tenuous middle ground between imposed uniformity (such as would lead to some sort of tyranny) and implacable hostility (of a kind that would disrupt the community in civil war or secession). In the process of genesis of democracy, an element of what might be termed consensus enters at three points at least. There must be a prior sense of community, preferably a sense of community quietly taken for granted that is above mere opinion and mere agreement. There must be a conscious adoption of democratic rules, but they must not be so much believed in as applied, first perhaps from necessity and gradually from habit. The very operation of these rules will enlarge the area of consensus step-by-step as democracy moves down its crowded agenda.

But new issues will always emerge and new conflicts threaten the newly won agreements. The characteristic procedures of democracy include campaign oratory, the election of candidates, parliamentary divisions, votes of confidence and of censure—a host of devices, in short, for expressing conflict and thereby resolving it. The essence of democracy is the habit of dissension and conciliation over ever-changing issues and amidst ever-changing alignments. Totalitarian rulers must enforce unanimity on fundamentals and on procedures before they can get down to other business. By contrast, democracy is that form of government that derives its just powers from the dissent of up to one half of the governed.

⁴⁵ Crick, *In Defence of Politics*, p. 24.