SOMALIA

EU COUNTRY ROADMAP FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

2017 – 2020

Approved by: EU MS

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The background

Conceived as a joint initiative between the European Union and its Member States, the EU Country Roadmap for Somalia aims to support civil society in Somalia play a key role in peace and state building. This updated road map takes cognizance of the lessons learnt during the period (2014 -16) as well as the rapidly evolving context to improve the common strategic framework for the European Union and the EU Member States in its engagement with civil society in Somalia.

The Roadmap is a guide for enhancing effective engagement with civil society by the EU and EU Member States (EUMS) in programming and policy making, as well as for promoting more effective dialogue between civil society and government authorities.

The Roadmap builds on the cumulated experience of the EU supporting CSOs (including the Roadmap for engagement 2014-2106) as well as on the Somali Compact which aims to provide a strategic framework for coordinating political, security and development efforts through 5 peace-building and state-building goals.

The process

The Road Map is based on a wide range of consultations conducted during the months of April - June 2016. Specific consultations around the Roadmap process have been held with staff of the EU Delegation, EU Member States, and a wide range of CSOs. At the end of April 2016, a questionnaire was sent to different key stakeholders: Civil Society Organizations, International NGOs and EU Member States to capture their views, analysis and proposals on how to reinforce the EU/CSOs partnership on a long term perspective.

The percentage of participation was as follows:-

	Mail sent to	No sent out	Responses	Percentages
1	EU Member States	18	3	16%
2	CSOs	155	34	21%
	Total	173	37	21%

At the same time, a participatory meeting took place on the 3rd of June 2016 to gather inputs from a wide range of civil society organizations involved in different domains of action on priorities for the engagement of the EU with civil society in the period 2014-2017.The workshop, which was attended by more than 44 stakeholders - ranging from national, local and international NGOs, EU Delegation and EU Member States' officials led to fruitful and interesting reflections.

During the consultative meeting, the priorities for future EU engagement with civil society were set, and possible actions defined. As a result, 3 main priorities each with two expected results were chosen for the Roadmap 2017-2020, the basis upon which this document has been produced.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The context

Somalia is officially divided into 8 regions. The northern part of the country is shared between Somaliland (SL) and Puntland (PL). Puntland is situated in the north-east of Somalia and a semi-autonomous administration and Somaliland lies in the north-west and declared itself independent. However, Somaliland is not recognised internationally as an independent state. Since 2012 the state formation process has advanced with the new regional administrations: Jubaland, South West, Galmudug in place and additional ones: Mogadishu/ Benadir, Hiraan and Middle Shabelle still to be formed. With Somalia on route to restoring democracy back into the country, the Federal Government has a mandate that will require for elections to take place in 2016.

The process has however not been without its challenges as key tasks in the 2013 Somali New Deal Compact – including establishing sub-national administrations and finalizing the constitution – are significantly delayed. In 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) rolled out Vision 2016 in an attempt to translate the Provisional Constitution into an achievable and broadly acceptable framework for completion of the Constitution, development of the federal system, and election of a new parliament before the end of its term of office. It also proposed milestones and a timeline that would allow the transitional tasks to move forward in parallel and without delay, while at the same time respecting the need for formal consultation with the yet-to-be-established FMS. Progress however has been slow, and it is increasingly clear that some of these critical objectives may not be met before elections are undertaken[1].

Given the protracted conflict since 1991, the state collapse and the fragile political situation, Somalia faces significant development challenges. Life expectancy is extremely low, infant and child mortality is extremely high, and the number of internally displaced persons is over 1 million with nearly 80% in South Central Somalia many of whom have been displaced for more than ten years; a result of recurrent disasters and widespread conflict which have sparked repeated waves of large and small scale internal displacement.[2] The insecurity in the country continues to limit access to the provision of aid, which coupled with the long absence of a central government, **has prompted Somali citizens have used their own resources, including traditional conflict resolution processes**, to re-establish security, political and administrative arrangements in many locations, most notably in Somaliland[3]

Somaliland, which declared independence in 1991 but is not recognized internationally, **has been relatively successful in bringing stability, maintain a certain level of peace and hold a series of elections that have brought smooth transition of power** The government faces significant challenges, including the prevalence of a weak economy and widespread unemployment. On the positive side, with international assistance, the government is succeeding in constructing a set of stable governing

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[1] A discussion paper by the Sahan State building Team - Somalia's troubled transition: Vision 2016 revisited. The research project was funded by a grant from the Government of Denmark

[2] IDMC 2015 http://www.internal-displacement.org/

[3] The Accord Policy Brief 21 on "What peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peace making" draws on the Interpeace Peace Mapping Study, edited by Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy. It contains over 30 articles including interviews with Somali elders and senior diplomats with the African Union, the UN and IGAD, and contributions from Somali and international peacemaking practitioners, academics, involved parties, civil society and women's organizations. The Interpeace Peace Mapping Study was an EU joint donors' funded programme under the Dialogue for Peace I & II.

bodies rooted in traditional Somali concepts of governance by consultation and consent. Social service delivery is growing and the private sector is progressively emerging. By integrating traditional ways of governance - including customary norms, values, and relationships - within a modern state apparatus, Somaliland has achieved greater cohesion and legitimacy while creating greater room for competitive elections and public criticism than in Puntland or South Central. However recent responses to dissent have raised increasing concern. Al Shabaab, while under increased pressure, is in control of large, rural areas in South Central Somalia.

1.2. Somali civil society

The long-standing conflict and lack of a functioning government have triggered the development of a wide variety of civil society organizations in Somalia. From urban based NGOs, respected think tanks and research bodies, to self-help groups at village level. During the war, most civil society organisations have been recipient of international support, mainly humanitarian and development at local level in the area of social sector development: health and education

Civil society has played a significant role in the democratisation, peace building and reconciliation of Somalia; it has worked in the fields of civic education, outreach and women empowerment and has also been critical for service delivery. Moreover, advocacy and dialogue between CSOs and the Somali Government has been initiated particularly in the framework of the New Deal coordinating mechanisms.

Clan identity in Somalia is a profound force and clan elders and religious leaders have historically played a **central role in arbitration and reconciliation**, and formed a bridge between the political administration and the citizens. Next to traditional and religious leaders a wide range of civic actors and civil society groups exist in Somalia, including e.g. professional associations and women's networks. The civil society landscape in Somalia is a reflection of the divided Somali society that is deeply fragmented. A challenge in regard to civil society is the fact that the establishment and strengthening of issue based associations and networks remain slow due to the dominance of clan politics, also within the civic sector. Local NGOs are concentrated in the major cities; rural pastoral areas are underserved by both local and international NGOs. Most rely on international support to finance their activities.

Due to the fact that government structures are constantly revised, working relations and dialogue channels between government authorities and civil society are complicated. CSO perceive a lack of access to information of the government about public planning and programming as well as about external funding and projects, whereas the government has the same perspective on civil society.

The **private sector in Somalia** is often cited as an example of how Somali citizens are by nature industrious and enterprising and how the social networks inherent in clan structures and Islam can provide foundations for development within and also between groups. In Somaliland in particular the private sector has played a central role in delivering services such as health, education, electricity and water. However, it is also important to recognize the multi-layered commercial interests vested in the status quo across the country, including in the conflicts that are most pronounced in the South.

The Diaspora has played an important role in remitting resources to Somalia and have increasingly returned to Somalia bringing a much needed wealth of education and experience. However the Diaspora often remained divided along clan lines while abroad and there are many cases of Diaspora providing essential resources to armed groups to

prolong conflicts. The steady re-integration of Diaspora is an important part of the ongoing development of Somali civil society.

2. THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

Freedoms of association and assembly are guaranteed by the Constitution and there is a high number of civil society organizations (e.g. groups for women and youth, occupational associations etc.) operating throughout the territory. However, effective and principled programming and operations of both local CSOs and international NGOs is hindered by a lack of **an effective legal, regulatory and institutional framework** in all regions of Somalia. Though Somali civil society can be registered by Authorities in the different regions of Somalia, many do not have a defined legal status, and those created by Somali Diaspora groups are often registered abroad, particularly in Kenya, the USA, Canada, the UK and Italy.

At the **Federal Level**, the Provisional Federal Constitution, adopted on 1 August 2012, provides for Freedom of association in article 16 that 'every person has the right to associate with other individuals and groups. This includes the right to form and belong to organizations, including trade unions and political parties. It also includes the right not to associate with others, and a person cannot be forced to associate with any other individual or group.' This is reinforced by article 18 on Freedoms of expression and article 22 on Freedom of Assembly, Demonstration, Protest, and Petition, which states that "every person has the right to organize and participate in meetings, and to demonstrate and protest peacefully, without requiring prior authorization". However, this has not always been effectively enforced and prior to the adoption of the provisional constitution, the previous government had limited the right of assembly. It is also important to mention limitations to freedom of association for "faith based organizations" other than Islamic organizations.

The Provisional Constitution also guarantees freedom of the press and independent media and the right of every person to freely express his/her own opinion in any manner subject to limitations prescribed by law for the purpose of safeguarding morals and public security. The FGS has instructed its security forces to ensure that journalists are protected, though under the current circumstances this is not always the case. A new Somalia Media Law was signed by the president in 2015. However, this legal framework has been termed 'controversial' as some of its provisions seek to insulate public officials from public scrutiny, significant government controls, criminalises media freedom, and creates harsh sanctions which excessively limit media freedom.

In Somaliland, the Presidential elections in June 2010 marked the **first ever peaceful democratic political transition in the Horn of Africa**, and only the third in the wider region (Sudan 1986, Kenya 2002). The Somaliland Constitution, Article 23 recognizes Freedom of Movement and Association, with some limitations based on national interest or military or armed nature of the association. These limitations are very general and so far no interpretation has been given which may cause some arbitrary application.

2.1 The legal and institutional framework for CSOs in Somaliland

The constitution of Somaliland provides in article 23 for Freedom of movement and association. On 10 November 2010 an NGO Act was signed by the President (Presidential Decree No. 82/112010) to ensure the activities of all non-governmental

associations are in line with the government's development priorities and to improve accountability and transparency. However, until now it has mainly served as a registration mechanism (registration fees are now requested on yearly basis) though there are some provisions that have given rise to concern[4] and prompted high-level exchanges with Somaliland authorities involving not only NGOs but also donors and the UN5. In 2015, efforts to operationalise the alignment of NGO activities and Government priorities were initiated through the creation of coordination sectors during the Eighth High Level Aid Coordination Forum6 in alignment to the 5 PSGs under the Compact Somaliland Special Arrangement (SSA).[78]

Continued confidence building measures are needed to improve coordination and regulation of the sector, whilst building government recognition of the important role played by civil society and the knowledge and experience available in the sector. Capacity building support, state - non state dialogue and increased public awareness are needed. The Press Law (27/2004) and the attached Press Code of Conduct (added as a compromise) was based on an Ethiopian law and was initially proposed by the Government in 1999 and has been vigorously opposed by many organizations and individuals. On the promulgation of the Law, it was recommended that the Law be reviewed within three years. Many private terrestrial and satellite television stations operate in Somaliland, but as yet no licensees have been issued to private radio stations. The Government has announced that this will be done as soon as the appropriate legislation is in place.

2.2 The legal and institutional framework for CSOs in Somalia

In Puntland a peaceful transfer of power took place in January 2014. Article 14 of the Puntland Constitution reads that: "Any person shall have the right to form or join organizations pursuing socio-economic, sport, cultural, or scientific objectives. The formation of an association shall be consistent with the Law and the interest of the Puntland people. Associations of clan or military nature are forbidden". The reference to the clan system is quite important and its implementation ground breaking. However, the democratization process, which has seen the gradual emergence of political associations, remains dominated by clan politics.

An NGO Act for regulating both international and national NGOs is in the process of being developed at the time of writing and aims to ensure that NGO activities are in line with the government development priorities and improve accountability and transparency. It requires a fee for registration by national authorities and regular reporting to the ministry. An NGO Desk was created at the Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation with the intention of launching a database of Local Active NGOs. The registration certificate was revoked for 273 organizations and only few dozen CSOs are now recognized by the Puntland authorities. There are concerns that the fee might

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[4] (=i.e. art. 35 referring to international organizations

[5] http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=92715, http://www.iccsl.org/news/news.html

[6] http://www.slministryofplanning.org/index.php/coordination/128-eight-high-level-aid-coordination-forum

[7] 8 sectors were created to include: i) Governance with the Ministry of Interior as chair; ii) Health Sector under the Ministry of Health, iii) Water and Sanitation under Ministry of Water Resources iv) Education with the Ministry of Education as Chair; v) Infrastructure under Public Works, Housing and Transport vi) Production with chairs Ministries of Fishery, Livestock, Agriculture vii) Environment chaired by the Ministry of Environment and viii) Economic by the Ministry of Commerce.

[8] The SSA is the sole framework for engaging with Somaliland's development process under the New Deal Partnership.

become an obstacle for young and new civil society actors or a limitation to the plurality and diversity of the sector. However this challenge could be countered by the new NGO Law, which seeks to harmonize the registration of the INGOs and LNGOs in Somalia.

3. CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION AND ROLES

The formation of the FGS and the formal end of the 'transition' has stimulated renewed international support for Somalia, bu**t the voice of Somali civil society has been very limited,** presenting a missed opportunity to expand dialogue and ownership of peace and state-building processes.[9]

The dialogue that led to the signing of the **Somali Compact** included some consultation with civil society representatives but it is **not clear the extent to which wider issues were systematically addressed nor consultation and feedback mechanisms active within civil society**. Both the Compact text and the Brussels conference communiqué emphasized that the Compact is a 'living document' and Somali civil society should be engaged in implementing the priorities set out. Effective civil society engagement in the New Deal mechanisms (including the High level partnership forum and Peace-building and State Building working Groups) requires greater efforts from civil society through coordination to prepare their inputs and agree on their representatives to.

On a more positive note, the engagement of CSOs has resulted in some significant improvements in the **representation of marginalized groups**. In Somaliland for instance, an amendment of the Electoral Law led to the lowering of the age of elected representatives and provides for the inclusion of women in political bodies (including a 25% quota in Parliament) and the formulation of the Child Protection and People with Disabilities Acts. The 2012 local elections saw almost 40% of youth elected in the local councils.

Also the strengthening of CS platforms has contributed to a more structured dialogue with the Somali authorities. Existent since 2008 and heavily supported by the EU, CS platforms such as SOSCENSA, SONSAF or PUNSAA, even if to a varying degree, are progressively becoming reliable interlocutors for the authorities and the international community. To mention a number of examples:

- SOSCENSA has engaged in generating policy positions with its member organization and feeding these into policy dialogue processes, mainly working in trying to set a relationship with the public authorities and institutions and to influence the constitutional process.

- SONSAF has been actively engaged in electoral observation and in policy discussion on the state budget (including the money from the oil and gas exploration contracts). It has also been involved in the discussions around the NGO Act as a member of the "NGO Consultative Committee", set up by the Somaliland Ministry of Planning.

- PUNSAA has worked with the Puntland Ministry of Planning in the mapping of CSOs and in holding consultation meetings related to the process. It also actively engaged in the political dialogue in Puntland, and in the democratization process and mediated the debate between the media outlets and the authorities.

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[9] There continues to be a perception among many Somalis that decisions which directly affect their lives are driven by an international agenda and involve little local consultation. The resulting lack of ownership contributes to a sense of alienation from decision-making processes, which serves to perpetuate conflicts in Somalia. See: Safer world: listening to Somali civil society voices.

Yet, despite these positive developments to improve representation, coordination and the influence of the civil society voice, there remains a significant need for further appropriate support to enhance civil society's role and effectiveness. Key challenges include:

- **Government structures are under constant revision**, which complicates working relations and dialogue channels with civil society.

- Civil society actors perceive a **lack of access to information from the government** about public planning and programming, external funding and projects, and the government has the same perspective of civil society (i.e. absence of transparent information on what they do). This results **in lack of trust**.

- There is a need to avoid parallel and competing structures between civil society actors and the emerging public sector. A relationship of trust and collaboration needs to be built based on **recognition that civil society actions can complement institutional support to government by ensuring citizen participation and local context specific initiatives**.

- The establishment and strengthening of issue-based associations and networks remains slow due **to the dominance of clan politics even within the civic sector**, though some issue based networks are emerging, such as on human rights, women's political participation, addressing sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) as well as regional umbrella networks.

- **Local civil society organizations** (bolstered by their greater access to external assistance for service delivery than many local authorities) are perceived as a **threat by local authorities (**the threat of mobilising people at grassroots level has been referred by some informants as an important tool used by women organisations for influencing politicians).

- The CSO/NSA platforms exist at regional level but lack formal structures at local level for engagement with local CS which has proven difficult over time.

4. CAPACITY

Over the years, the civil society, media and other non-state actors have developed structures and capacities. **They however also face challenges including, at organizational level, human and financial resource mobilization, planning, monitoring and evaluation[10]**. At sector level (i.e. organizations' inter relations), **Somali civil society is also a reflection of the diverse, complex and fragmented Somali context and society**.

The EU has a long history of capacity building interventions with civil society aimed at improving representation and legitimacy, and strengthening CS voice through CSOs coalitions and Non State Actor (NSA) platforms. To date, the EU has supported the development of three regional NSA platforms: SOSCENSA in South and Central Somalia, PUNSAA in Puntland and SONSAF in Somaliland with the primary objective of

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[10] Until recently the EU was funding civil society indirectly through programmes of International NGOs. However since 2015 this has changed and Somali local NGOs can now apply directly for EU funding. Some challenges identified include limited project and financial management capacity, language and communication skills, and limited technical skills. Somaliland CS would welcome calls and tenders to be published in Somali. CSOs also tend to struggle to report results and outcomes rather than activities. The capacity challenges identified have included variable quality, efficiency, innovation and coordination among local CSO partners. Local research and advocacy capacity is limited. Donor coordination could also be further enhanced to ensure no double funding of local CSO initiatives.

ensuring that civil society is able to speak with a united voice so as to strengthen their participation in the peace processes at local and regional levels.[11]

Also, CSO capacity has developed through several **donor-funded capacity building programs over the last twenty years** and a large number of organizations are experienced in project implementation and service delivery (as this is what they have been mostly involved in). CSOs today in Somalia run schools, universities and other educational institutions. They also run hospitals and health care centers, and are very much involved in reconciliation activities, human rights monitoring, civic education and the provision of support to IDPs and vulnerable groups (often without using external resources).[12]

However, CSOs are much less acquainted with **policy analysis, evidence based advocacy and, in general, monitoring tasks.** These are all roles and tasks that CSOs will be increasingly called to play in a changing institution building landscape, with an emerging public sector.

5. CURRENT EU ENGAGEMENT

The EU is engaged in Somalia through a comprehensive approach based on active diplomacy and support to the political process, security support, development assistance and humanitarian aid. The EU maintains a regular dialogue with the Federal institutions as well as with the regional authorities. The EU is Somalia's main development partner, the main donor to AMISOM and has deployed three CSDP missions in the region. More than half of the EU's total assistance focuses on state-building and peace-building, education, resilience and food security. Through this set of instruments that constitute a wide and comprehensive approach, the EU is the largest donor to Somalia.

The EU is contributing to enhancing Somali civil society to play a meaningful role in the peace building process and good governance. The EU is also through thematic programmes providing targeted support to human rights organizations, culture, women's rights and capacity building of media to promote free and independent media.[13] The EU tries to maintain a broad approach and work with all segments of the Somali civil society from well-established Somali NGOs to community based organizations, to professional associations, traditional and religious leaders, and the private sector, in particular the small and medium enterprises.

The EU developed a Somalia Strategy for civil society in 2003 (reviewed in 2011). In 2008, the EU conducted an external evaluation: "*How the EU channels aid through and*

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[11] Coalitions of CSOs in local and sector platforms and networks emerged all over Somalia (over 130 networks were documented by Safer world in 2008, and currently more than 133 participate in NSA Platforms). Many local and sector networks have been created as a way to have an easier access to international resources and information, as a way to facilitate capacity building and transfer, and as a way to have a greater influence on local authorities and on policies at local and sub-national level, particularly concerning women and youth. The existence of these many networks was the basis for setting NSA platforms in the framework of the EU program

[12] Abdulle, J.I., "Civil Society in the absence of a Somali State", in *Somalia. Current Conflicts and New Chances for State Building*, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2008.

[13] Thematic programmes include, among others, programs under the Development Cooperation Instrument such as the thematic programs "Investing in People", "Non State Actors In Development", as well as actions funded from other instruments such as the Instrument for Stability, the Africa Peace Facility, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

for civil society" which found that support to Somali civil society was establishing best practice in fragile situations.[14]

EU engagement with civil society is now framed by the Somali Compact. The EU played a lead role in the formulation and finalization of the Somali Compact. Citizens, civil society and parliament were consulted in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Galkayo and Garowe, and Mogadishu. The Compact explicitly recognizes the need for citizen and civil society engagement including 'sound civic dialogue' and the 'dynamism of the Somali people and the linkages between the different layers of Somali society, the government and its international partners' and 'recognizes the role women have played and will continue to play in community mobilization and peacebuilding in Somali society.' Current EU engagement aims to advance progress of Compact implementation,

- *Inclusive Politics (PSG 1):* the EU has supported a wide range of civil society engagement in democratization processes and local peace initiatives (that aim to widen the population's sense of shared identity, interests and mutual obligations at local, provincial and national levels). For meaningful participation of civil society in policy making and development programming in Somalia, further support to capacity building and opportunities for participation will be required. Where civil society has a strong track record of engagement such as its support to inclusive local peace initiatives,[15] or elections process, further support will be prioritized.

- *Security (PSG 2):* the EU has supported civil society to promote community safety and security initiatives at community and district levels as well as continuing their monitoring role with regard to police and security forces. Further engagement is needed especially in newly accessible areas.

- *Justice (PSG 3):* civil society has a key role to play in the elaboration of reform strategies in the justice sectors and in monitoring their implementation which is mostly attributable to government and academia. The EU has supported a wide range of human rights groups and legal aid providers to increase access to justice and further support is required.

- *Economic Foundations (PSG 4)* the EU has supported civil society to play a key role in livelihoods and resilience programmes, and further support is required, including an expansion of engagement with the private sector at the local level.

- *Revenue and Services (PSG 5)* the EU has supported civil society to play an essential role in service delivery (education, health) and future support is needed to support civil society's role in making local institutions more accountable, improving the quality and accessibility of public services, and deepening public involvement in influencing development policies and programmes.

6. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE EU AND EU MEMBER STATES

Coordination takes place mainly through Heads of Missions (HoMs) or Heads of Cooperation (EUDC) meetings which cover political dialogue and programme issues which may feature a civil society angle; civil society matters are rather rarely an agenda

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[14] The evaluation emphasized that creating an enabling environment for civil society development was expected to lead to better growth, the expansion of employment and the reduction of poverty.
[15] Relevance has, however, been sometime lowered by the lack of direct access to the policy and decision makers, including at international level

item in their own right.

The EU and Member States occasionally exchange information on the support to CSOs on a bilateral basis but there is no regular exchange on supported projects, partners or good practices. The EU and MS currently coordinate through the following forums:

- All the New Deal structures including the Peace building and State building Goals Working Groups (PSG WGs), the High-level Coordination Forum (HLCF) and the Somalia development and Reconstruction Fund Steering Committee (SDRF SC)EUPC/EUDC meetings

- Somalia Development Partners Forum (EU, MS, UN, Japan, US, Switzerland, INGOs)

- Somalia Donor Group (SDG)

- Democratization Steering Committee (DSC) has been since 2005 mainly focused on Somaliland and Puntland and meets once a month: members are: the EU, the UK, Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, the US, Switzerland, Norway, the UK. The supporting Democratization Coordination Committee acts as a secretariat and is composed of Interpeace, NDI, Saferworld, Progessio and Somali counterparts.

- Human Rights Working Group (EU MSs, Switzerland, Norway and the US), - The Working Group on Human Rights coordinates human rights actions such as dialogues with Somali authorities, parliamentary committees, human rights organizations and civil society, press statements, letters to the Federal and regional governments and ministries expressing concern about human rights situations and promoting human rights policies in Somalia.

- Humanitarian Country Team - Donor meetings (coordination on humanitarian aid) - A major part of MS engagement with CS is through humanitarian aid and coordinated through the HCT - donor meetings.

- Somali NGO Consortium and Pillars of Peace working group

7. LESSONS LEARNED

7.1. General lessons drawn from EU support to CSOs

After more than ten years of experience in implementing the dedicated strategy in support of civil society, the EU has drawn a number of key lessons including:

- **Civil society interventions should not be conceived in a vacuum**, but there is the need to identify the links **with important governance initiatives** and this relationship become key to the success of both;

- **Long-term interventions** are needed, as results take time to be realized. It is therefore important that the EU remains involved and commits adequate funding for a considerably longer period of time;

- Regular dialogue is also key, considering the rapid evolutions in the context, with periodic interactions, allowing opportunity for *the issues of the day* to be discussed.

7.2 Lessons drawn from the EU programmes in support to CSOs:

A number of lessons also emerge, more specifically linked to the use of EU programmes in support to CSOs:

- The use of local studies and conflict analysis is essential to better understand and respond to the local contexts and better understand actors and their dynamics. The EU should support and mentor local research-based institutions

- More inclusive approaches to local peace-building / participatory processes can broaden inclusion to emerging civil society actors. Consequently, specific resources should be earmarked within projects and programmes for participatory approaches.

- Better definition of programme and project results and outcomes can improve effectiveness, and competitive tendering processes and more transparency can improve efficiency.

- Independent evaluations should be launched and their outcomes be used to inform improved designs and better results and value for money. This would involve larger and better use of indicators.

- More coherence, division of labour and coordination with other EU programmes and also with member states programmes is required to improve effectiveness.

- The relationships between different CSOs can be improved by clarifying their respective roles, interests, competencies and constituencies.

- Legitimacy of actors should be built and supported by political action, not just funding (funding may in many cases risks to generate dependency, while political support can increase impact of CSO actions), especially regarding the protection of civil society space.

- Emerging local civil society actors need to be supported (beyond established organizations).

7.3. Lessons drawn from the consultations on the Roadmap

Through the dialogue with CSOs a number of lessons were also put forward by CSOs themselves. They include:

- CSO's progressive transitioning role away from service provision to include advocacy to influence policies is the result of **increased capacity through training and exposure[16] as well as existence of structures/collations/platforms that support this engagement[17].** It is also relevant to underline the existence of an emerging group of **professional civil society organizations** (i.e. academia, think-tanks, service delivery, and advocacy) which have contributed to and are vital to drive the development agenda. This groups continue to support evidence based advocacy and have the potential to the reduce clan interference in CS groups. The Diaspora also plays key role, which needs to be better acknowledged into the bigger scheme for CSOs.

- **As the state formation process evolves, the newly formed Regional Administrations and emerging Federal Member States represent a growing challenge to coordination within the CSO/ NSA platforms – particularly South Central owing to its vastness and related political ambiguity in the processes.** A fully fledged federal state system may also mean that a national level forum with adequate representation of all regions is absent, and therefore engagement with Government and representation at national level may not be effective.

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[16] EPRD CSO survey 9th May 2016
[17] The case of Somaliland where coordination has been aligned to Government development priorities.

- **The strengthening and advancement of CS thematic coalitions and platforms has contributed to a more structured dialogue with the Somali authorities as well as dialogue with the international community but needs improvement** to positively influence public policies. Often, platforms and coalitions lack formal structures and capacity to engage downward- a missed opportunity for enhanced citizen participation and increased legitimacy which would come from the inclusion of a wider range of geographical, clan, and sectoral representatives, and their consultative approach to policy formation. More effective CS platforms have the potential to reduce clan dynamics within CS.

- Supporting the development of a relevant civil society legal framework can include political support to CSO and NSA platforms to advocate for a reform of the regulative framework and provision of expertise both to governments and to CSOs platforms for drafting regulations based on international best practices.

- Complementary to the legal framework; a deliberate well defined structure of engagement including mechanisms is essential to improve coordination, reduce competition in mandate and ensure complementary engagement, validate legitimacy of CSO's and for improved relations.

- The strengthening of a **self-regulatory system/mechanism** within the CS platforms/coalitions has the potential to increase CSO credibility with government and subsequent relations. This could ensure a more structured engagement process, and better CSO representation in Public debates.

- CSOs have been benefitting for decades from foreign funding for service provision and to a greater extent have no clarity in gaps on Government plans and so may be ill-placed today to monitor the insufficient use of public resources for the delivery of health, education or other services of general interest, as doing it and arguing for more State intervention would be for CSOs self displacement in a context that is not ready. This transition will take time but needs to gradually begin to take place starting with the larger CSO/NGOs with a trickledown effect along the CS chain.

- CS reliance on external funding is not sustainable; more strategies to "look inwardly" in addition to membership fees for umbrella organizations e.g. Private Public Partnerships should be encouraged. Some Private entities such as Hormud and Telesom Telephone companies, Coca Cola, Dahabshiil are already working with CSOs particularly during crisis to respond to emerging needs. Such opportunities could be explored for development goals.

- There has been a harnessing of regional collaboration which has contributed to learning by CSOs in Somalia, cross fertilization e.g. with Ethiopia, Kenya etc with positive development and needs to be encouraged.

- Media civil societies need further training and exposure, to ensure a free media. As a result, the populace is better informed. Whilst media is considered free in Somalia, there are still steps that can be taken to further make media freer and more accessible.

As to donor coordination:

- Overall, the EU is seen positively for being a development partner willing to engage with relevant CS actors for example through formal and informal consultations (e.g. the recent training on the Program cycle management and the joint consultative forum

in addition to adaptation of programming decisions and processes to fit the context such as the recent decision to directly fund CS groups).

- Donor coordination and joint donor funding mechanisms is essential in reducing CSO duplication of efforts and competition in mandate with Government.

- Consultations between the EU and EU Member States with the CSOs are seen as important and should become more predictable, more structured and more open to suggestions from the CSOs themselves on items for discussion.

- Funding (and the way it is channeled) is considered a relevant issue. While the EU is open to funding directly Somali CSOs, most of the EU funding makes use of larger NGOs as intermediary bodies, which limits programming decisions. The requirement for co-funding is also considered an impediment for smaller CSO's with limited financial capacity.

- What's more, CSO's perceive donor funding as biased to the urban-focused civil society organizations that are attractive as they are upwardly accountable. Arguably, International donors don't generally work with rural-based NGOs, as they are more difficult to interact with: geographical distances are more challenging, and have more difficulty to relate to the donor requirements, for example in terms of accounting. The rural based CSO's have the access capacity and are often ill prepared to support humanitarian and development efforts in areas with limited access.

8 ROADMAP PRIORITIES AND ACTIONS

This draft Roadmap for Somalia has contextualized the three priorities of the 2012 Communication to the realities of Somalia, drawing on the analysis put forward in sections 1 and 2. Consultations were held at different levels: within the EU Delegation, with Member States, the host country, other international actors and with civil society itself[18]. The priorities have been formulated in a long-term perspective and as Somalia is a fragile state, they evolve around state building and peace building. The corresponding indicators will measure the desired change.

PRIORITIES	Outcome Indicators
Pillar 1: ENABLING ENVIRONMENT	
1.1 Establish closer partnerships between EU, EU MS and CSOs to promote an improved and conducive enabling environment	Number of actions supporting CSO through which the EU and it MS improve the legislative and regulatory framework of CS, with a particular emphasis on political and civic rights Target: the number is stable or increasing during the period 2017-2020 EU and MS development partners' coordination expanded to accommodate CSOs.
1.2 To improve the legal and institutional framework for a conducive enabling environment.	Steps taken towards the establishment and passing into law of a legal and institutional framework for the CS in Somalia and Somaliland, addressing: - the human rights situation - capacity building of rights holders and duty bearers - coordination among Government actors and CSO's in the implementation of the legal framework. Number of Policies and strategies developed with CSO participation.
Pillar 2: CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC POLICIES	
2.1 Strengthening of CS platforms to contribute to more structured dialogue with the authorities	Number of actions targeting reformed CSO/NSA platforms with adequate capacity for self regulation, coordination capacity, policy engagement, advocacy, networking, information-sharing, and research including devolved structures to better represent the constituencies.

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[18] At the end of April 2016, a questionnaire was sent to different key stakeholders: Civil Society Organizations including INGOS (155); and 18 Member States (realizing a 21% response rate); to capture their views, analysis and proposals on how to reinforce the EU/CSOs partnership on a long term perspective. At the same time, a participatory meeting took place on the 3rd of June 2016 to gather inputs from a wide range of civil society organizations involved in different domains of action on priorities for the engagement of the EU with civil society in the period 2014-2017.The workshop, which was attended by more than 47 stakeholders - ranging from national, local and international NGOs, EU Delegation and EU Member States' officials led to fruitful and interesting reflections

2.2 Promotion of Effective Civil Society engagement as identified in the National Development Programme and building on the New Deal mechanisms	Progress made towards the establishment of a coordination mechanism between the platforms and Government within the Federal and Regional level. Number of strengthened and/or established thematic coalitions, supported by the EU/MS, championing evidence-based advocacy at sector level having as a focus to positively influence public policies.
Pillar 3: CAPACITY BUILDING	
3.1 Support CSOs in improving policy engagement, evidence based advocacy and monitoring tasks	Number of actions targeting the improvement of capacity within Platforms and CSO actors on non adversarial policy engagement and evidence advocacy
3.2 Increase coordination between local CSOs and INGOs and platforms that are active in advocacy, monitoring and research.	Number of actions supporting the establishment of network alliances/coordination among partners both regionally, and externally to support learning and experience sharing.

ACTION TABLE

Priority one
1.1 Establish closer partnerships between EU, EU MS and CSOs to promote an improved and conducive enabling environment
Indicator
Number of actions supporting CSO through which the EU and it's MS improve the legislative and regulatory framework of CS, with a particular emphasis on political and civic rights Target: the number is stable or increasing during the period 2017-2020 EU and MS development partners' coordination expanded to accommodate CSOs.
Actions
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research
Map out key priority areas for EU and MS on support to CSO to improve legislative and regulatory framework to enhance donor synergy.
B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation
Bi annual coordination meetings between CSO's with the EU and its MS held to discuss geographic and thematic synergies and collaboration.
C. Funding: Operational support including mainstreaming
Coordinated approach by the EU and its MS towards CSO capacity building initiatives including direct support. Implementers: Technical assistance funded through the delegation Funding: CSO/LA; EIDHR; MS bilateral funding.

Priority two
1.2 To improve the legal and institutional framework for a conducive enabling environment.
Indicator
Steps taken towards the establishment and passing into law of a legal and institutional framework for the CS in Somalia and Somaliland, addressing: - the human rights situation - capacity building of rights holders and duty bearers - coordination among Government actors and CSO's in the implementation of the legal framework. Number of Policies and strategies developed with CSO participation.
Actions
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research
Technical assistance provided to bring together CSO's to improve their capacity to engage

Government and deepen their voices along key thematic issues.

B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation
Linkages of expertise both to governments and to CSO /NSA platforms for drafting regulations based on international best practices. Promotion of dialogue with relevant stakeholders that can advocate for reform of the regulative framework.
C. Funding: Operational support including mainstreaming
Support to CSO and NSA platforms to advocate for a reform of the regulative framework and provision of expertise both to governments and to CSOs platforms for drafting regulations based on international best practices. Consider future support for sustainability strategies (improved organizational as well as advocacy capacity) in grants to CSOs Implementing actors: CSO/NSA Platforms. Technical assistance Funding instrument : CSO/LA EIDHR / EDF

Priority three
2.1 Strengthening of CS platforms to contribute to more structured dialogue with the authorities
Indicator
Number of actions targeting reformed CSO/NSA platforms with adequate capacity for self regulation, coordination capacity, policy engagement, advocacy, networking, information-sharing, and research including devolved structures to better represent the constituencies.
Actions
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research
Identify gaps in coordination between CSO's and Governments including the identification of effective mechanisms for coordination.
B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation
i. NSA/CSO platform consultation with Government on strategies to align CSO working groups with Government along thematic areas ii. NSA/ CSO led dialogue for increased visibility on the role of CSO's and the platforms functions to CSO and Government through thematic working groups.
C. Funding: Operational support including mainstreaming
i. Technical support to enhance capacity of existing platforms to strengthen their coordination capacity, policy engagement, advocacy, networking, information-sharing, and research and policy analysis. ii. Support to increased Government capacity for improved coordination. iii. Support for improved organizational capacity particularly among local level CSO's. Implementing actors: CSO/NSA Platforms. EU Technical assistance Funding instrument : CSO/LA EIDHR / EDF

Priority Four
2.2 Promotion of Effective Civil Society engagement as identified in the National Development Programme and building on the New Deal mechanisms
Indicator
Progress made towards the establishment of a coordination mechanism between the platforms and Government within the Federal and Regional level. Number of strengthened and/or established thematic coalitions, supported by the EU/MS, championing evidence-based advocacy at sector level having as a focus to positively influence public policies.
Actions
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research
i. Identifying current strategies for CSO's engagement within the framework of the National Development Plan for Somaliland and Somalia ii. Mapping out of key thematic areas in CSO functions and identification of focal points within Government and CSO platforms on each thematic area.
B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation
Establish information-sharing/collaboration mechanism between the CSO/NSA platforms and Government within the Federal and Regional level.
C. Funding: Operational support including mainstreaming
i. Support to platforms capacity for engagement in public policy. ii. Promote forums where leaders of the different coalitions/ networks can meet, exchange experiences and identify common ground to deepen their voices in influencing public policy. Implementing actors: CSO/NSA Platforms. Funding instrument : CSO/LA EIDHR

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Priority five
3.1 Support CSOs in improving policy engagement, evidence based advocacy and monitoring tasks
Indicator
Number of actions targeting the improvement of capacity within Platforms and CSO actors on non adversarial policy engagement and evidence advocacy
Actions
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research
Mapping existing capacities within institutions for policy engagement and evidence based advocacy.

B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation
Promote the linkages between CSO alliances that can support capacity building initiatives on policy engagement and evidence based advocacy.
C. Funding: Operational support including mainstreaming
Support initiatives for policy and technical engagement between key CSOs.
Implementing partners: A TOT approach among CSO for enhanced capacity
Funding instrument : CSO/LA EIDHR

Priority six
3.2 Increase coordination between local CSOs and INGOs and platforms that are active in advocacy, monitoring and research.
Indicator
Number of actions supporting the establishment of network alliances/coordination among partners both regionally, and externally to support learning and experience sharing.
Actions
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research
Mapping of existing networks and potential coordination opportunities regionally and externally
B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation
Facilitate dialogue among pre - identified CSOs on thematic/sectoral level at local, national and regional levels, through platforms with the view to promote learning that could contribute to policy formulation and advocacy around thematic areas.
C. Funding: Operational support including mainstreaming
Support capacity development initiatives targeting networks and platforms, focusing particularly on networking, knowledge management and knowledge-based advocacy Implementing partners: CSO thematic forums
Funding instrument : CSO/ LA