Joint Programming Technical Seminar

Brussels, 14 November 2016

DEVCO/A2 Aid and Development Effectiveness and Financing

EEAS/GLOBAL 5 Development Cooperation Coordination Division

NEAR/A4 Financial Assistance Policy and Strategy

2016 HoMs Reports - Process

- <u>May 2016</u> Council Conclusions: Council invitation for regular reporting

- <u>July 2016</u>: HRVP, Commissioners Hahn & Mimica request for HoMs reports

- <u>October 2016</u>: ca. 50 HoMs reports from 3 continents

- <u>November 2016</u>: Preliminary analysis

Joint Programming - State of Play by country**

Prep steps

14
- **Feasibility and Scoping**
- **Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, CAR, DRC, Guinea Conakry, Jordan, Madagascar, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Ukraine, Zambia**

41
- **Countries with Roadmaps**
- Armenia, **Azerbaijan**, Benin, El Salvador, Georgia, Haiti, Honduras, **Kyrgyzstan**, **Lebanon**, Malawi, Mauritania, **Morocco**, Nepal, **Pakistan,** Philippines, Tunisia

Joint Strategy

25
- **Countries with Joint Analysis**
- **Belarus***, **Burkina Faso***, **Egypt**, **Moldova, Morocco***

20
- **Countries with Joint Response**
- **Bolivia (2016),** Cambodia (2014), Chad (2014), Comoros (2015), Ethiopia (2013), Ghana (2014), Guatemala (2013), Kenya (2015), **Laos (2016),** Mali (2014), Myanmar (2014), Namibia (2014), **Nicaragua***, Niger*, **Palestine*, Paraguay (2015),** Rwanda (2014), Senegal (2014), **Togo (2016),** Uganda (2015)

55 Active countries

11
- **Joint Monitoring / Results Framework**
- Cambodia, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Laos, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Palestine, Rwanda

7
- **Replacement**
- FR in Comoros, FR in Kenya, EU in Laos, DE and FR in Mali, EU in Palestine, EU in Senegal

7
- **Second cycle of Joint Programming**
- Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Laos, Mali, Namibia, Senegal

*drafts

** This state of play is not static and definite, since new reports are still coming in, while the status of other countries might need to be revised. Therefore, please find some methodological remarks on the next slide, which clarify the making of this momentary state of play.

Methodological Remarks

- The Joint Strategy consists of the Joint Analysis and the Joint Response together. This means that only the countries which have a Joint Response can be considered to have a Joint Strategy.

- Countries with a Joint Response are assumed to have developed the previous steps (Joint Analysis, Roadmaps). Therefore, figures on Roadmaps and Joint Analysis also include those countries that feature in a subsequent step. However, some very few examples exist of countries which feature in the third or fourth step, which skipped one of the previous steps. However, since this number is very limited, these cases were disregarded here.

- "Total # active countries" are countries active in at least one of the four stages. This number is constantly being revised, as new information comes in.

- Some countries are involved in a form of JP which does not fit the formal requirements used here. These are not taken up here, but will be discussed later in the PPT under 'diverging approaches'.

2016 HoMs reports - key messages (1)

- Two dimensions of JP:
  - o Aid Effectiveness (DoL)
  - o Political tool beyond development cooperation
    => joint messages to partner countries
- JP requires investments in building trust and good relationships
- Alignment as the default approach, synchronisation and government ownership remain difficult

2016 HoMs reports - key messages (2)

- Reconfirmation of country-specific pathways required (for clarity)

- Joint initiatives numerous beyond JP itself

- Continued trend towards joint monitoring / joint results frameworks (tool for dialogue with PC)

SUCCESSES and BENEFITS

- Increased political leverage, with common messages
- EU donors perceived as 'European family'
  - EU DPs start gaining importance/visibility in Governments' eyes
  - Increased visibility and leverage within donor-wide coordination mechanisms
- Strengthened sectoral division of labour
- Facilitates joint implementation of programmes

CHALLENGES

- Partner Country involvement
- Synchronising programming cycles
- Replacement
- Conflicting messages from HQs
- Staff turnover
- "New" fields of cooperation render coordination complex
- JP difficult in unstable political environments

DONOR-WIDE COORDINATION

- Difficult to define EU JP added-value within well-functioning donor-wide coordination mechanisms
  Example: Tanzania

- Positive examples of JP facilitating:

  - Coordinated EU offer to partner countries;

  - Increased EU leverage towards other development partners
    Examples: Comoros, Mozambique, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo

- JP potential to establishing (EU) coordination structures where coordination on development cooperation is less developed
  Example: Jordan

WORKING TOGETHER (1)

HoMs Reports refer to plentiful joint exercices between EU&MS (examples not exhaustive)

- **Human Rights and Democracy Strategies**

Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Comoros, Egypt, El Salvador, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Togo, Zimbabwe

- **Gender Action Plans**

Algeria, Bolivia, Botswana, Comoros, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe (2017)

- **Civil Society Roadmaps**

Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, El Salvador, Kenya, Mali, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Togo, Zimbabwe

WORKING TOGETHER (2)

- <u>Climate Change</u>

Bolivia, Morocco, Pakistan, Togo

- <u>Migration</u>

Ethiopia, Kenya, Pakistan, Togo

- <u>Trade</u>

El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, Togo

- <u>Security</u>

Cameroon, El Salvador, Togo

JOINT ACTION EXAMPLES (1)

- Delegated Cooperation
  - **Rwanda** (del coop energy w/ DE, NL and DRC) + (NELSAP w/ African Deve Bank);
  - **Zimbabwe** (del coop human rights w/ DE-GIZ);
  - **Ethiopia** (del coop resilience w/ EU, NL, AT);
  - **Honduras** (del coop natural resources w/ DE and governance w/ ES);
  - **Ukraine** (del coop anti-corruption w/ DK)

- Blending
  - **Kenya** (with EIB, KfW, AFD); Cameroon; El Salvador

JOINT ACTION EXAMPLES (2)

- Other Joint Actions

  Kenya (Joint Framework on Water and Sanitation w/ EU, DK, FI, DE, SE) + (Joint Transformation Initiative w/ EU, DE, SE); **Somalia (**multi-donor channels w/ UN MPTF, w/ WB SSF, w/ EU's JPLG; **Eritrea** (EU Trust Fund for Africa w/ DE); **Rwanda** (Capacity Building w/ EU, BE) + (Technical Assistance w/ DFiD) + (Agricultural Management Information Systems w/ UK and World Bank) + (Joint Missions on Decentralisation w/ BE, NL and DE) + (Joint Messaging on Refugees w/ EU, UK, US, CH); **Zimbabwe** (Trust Funds w/ UNICEF, w/ WB, w/ UNDP); **Zambia** (Joint Declaration energy w/ 11 Cooperating Partners); **Ethiopia** (Joint Action Framework, incl, planning, action, accountability w/ EU + 14 MS) + (EU TF Partnership Agreements on migration w/ EU, NL, DK, UK, IT); **Bolivia** (Joint Visibility and Communication) + (common Performance Assessment Frameworks); **Comoros** (Joint Missions w/ EU, AfD, Government); **El Salvador** (Budget Support Basket Fund); **Honduras** (Joint Evaluation forest w/ DE); **Senegal** (EU TF); **Togo** (Joint Declarations); **Ukraine** (Technical Assistant w/ EU, DE, DK, PL)

PROSPECTS

- **Prospect for synchronisation**
  - in Comoros, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Senegal (*in Honduras, all EU programmes to be synchronised with govt cycle in 2018*)

- **Prospects for Results Frameworks**

- **Upcoming Mid-term Review an opportunity to:**
  - Update Joint Strategy / address gaps / look into finance beyond ODA (Cambodia)
  - Begin drafting of roadmap towards Joint Strategy (Cameroon)
  - Revise Joint Strategy based on changing circumstances/new challenges (Mali)

DIVERSE APPROACHES

o <u>"Traditional" process</u>: Joint Analysis followed by Joint Response – e.g. Palestine

o <u>"Conflict-oriented"</u>: starting by a Conflict Analysis/follow-up to the stabilisation report – e.g Libya, Lebanon.

➢ Conflict Analysis operationalised through conflict sensitive programming.

o <u>"Sectoral" / Joint Action</u>: based on a strategic analysis + response in one strategic area – e.g. Azerbaijan, Haiti, Jordan, Zambia

EARLY PROGRESS ON THE CCs BASED ON HoMs REPORTS (1)

- Expansion to new countries (*beyond 55*)
  - Algeria, <u>Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, CAR, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan,</u> Pakistan, Somalia, <u>Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine,</u> Zambia

- Fragile situation & conflict-affected countries
  - CAR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Ukraine

- Implementation of the 2030 Agenda
  - Mali, Nicaragua, Tanzania (*only general intentions*)

EARLY PROGRESS ON THE CCs BASED ON HoMs REPORTS (2)

- Comprehensive Approach / strategic issues
  - o Ethiopia, Jordan (situational analysis), Morocco, Senegal (migration), Tunisia

- Improved political and policy dialogue
  - o Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Kenya, Namibia, Rwanda, Zambia

EARLY PROGRESS ON THE CCs BASED ON HoMs REPORTS (3)

- **Joint Monitoring / Results Framework**
  - Afghanistan (RF), Cambodia (RF), Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Zambia

- **Joint Implementation**
  - Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

  (*see previous point on Joint Actions*)

Next steps

Short-term: finalising the analysis

- Immediate reactions now

- Possible written inputs by November 2016

- Complete analysis by end of 2016 and way forward

Medium-term: improving guidance & peer-learning

- Operational Manual

- Regional Seminars

Long-term: streamlining communication & monitoring progress

Thank you for your attention!