EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AID
Regional Support Office for East and Southern Africa (Nairobi)

MISSION REPORT

Subject : **Pilar 2: Basics service in conflicts/ North East Nigeria: Boko Haram affected population/ Support to IDPs in Borno State.**

Author: **Damien BLANC *(WASH Expert, West Africa Regional Office, Dakar)***

Date: **From the 26th of June to 1st of July 2016**

Actors Met:

UNICEF

SALIHOU Lonis; WASH Specialist Maiduguri,met in Maiduguri from 27th to 29th of June, lsalihou@unicef.org, *UNICEF, UN House, D25 Dalori Street, New GRA Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria.*

AJIBADE Olokun, *WASH Specialist, met in Abuja on 30th of June, solokun@unicef.org, +234 (0)803 402 0878, UNICEF Nigeria, UN House, Plot 617/618 Diplomatic Drive, Central Business District, PMB 2851, Garki, Abuja.*

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ICRC

PIERREHUMBERT Guillaume; Water Habitat Coordinator, met in ICRC office Abuja on 30th of June ,gpierrehumbert@icrc.org, *+234 903 727 1089, ICRC, 5 Queen Elizabeth Street, Off Yakubu Gowon Crescent, By Aso Villa Gate, Abuja, Nigeria.*

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IRC

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SIYFA Irvine, *WASH Coordinator,* met in Maiduguri from 27th to 29th of June, Irvine.siyafa@irscue.org, +234 (0)816 277 2623

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IMC

UNAEZE Chizoba., *Program Manager;* met in Maiduguri from 27th to 29th of June, cunuaeze@internationalmedicalcorps.org, +234 706 855 83 28, IMC Nigeria, Plot 882, Olu Awotesu Street, off Idris Ibrahim Crescent, Jabi, Abuja.

Global WASH Cluster (Solidarités)

KRAMER Corrie., *WASH Cluster Coordinator Field Support Team,* met in Maiduguri on 29th of June, ckramer@solidarites.org, ckramer@unicef.org +41 (0)77 453 7389, UNICEF 5-7 avenue de la paix, CH1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland.

SAVE the CHILDREN

Details not provided.



Visited sites during the mission in Maiduguri

Executive summary.

With the access extending areas previously out of reach for security reasons, an extra caseload of an estimated 800 000 people in need is estimated on the top of the existing 1,4 million IDPs in Maiduguri urban LGAs.

Taking into consideration the scope of the gaps in Maiduguri urban and the difficulties of a permanent presence in outreach areas, the main operational recommendation in the WASH and Shelter sectors would be in a nutshell: “Consolidate in Maiduguri, Distribute in Outreach”.

In Maiduguri urban areas, the situations is very similar to the one observed in November 2015. Although the number of humanitarian actors has slightly increase, the response remains very patchy with little global overview of the need and analysis of the site by site response.

Coordination, although strengthened at federal level, needs a better leadership and response monitoring at Borno state level. Partners still have little technical expertise and limited monitoring capacities. It creates rather weak services (WASH) unable to mitigate or address the hazards linked to water related diseases in a cholera prone environment (latest outbreak in September-November affected more than 1 000 people). It is recommended that ECHO partners strengthen their expertise in order to deliver reliable WASH & Shelter services.

Support to UNICEF should focus on strengthening WASH coordination in Borno rather than on UNICEF’s programmes which quality is not guaranteed as they have little capacities to improve the monitoring of the organizations they subcontract.

As for outreach areas, some of the WASH actors intend to deploy beyond Maiduguri urban mainly in Monguno and Biu LGAs in 2016-2017. UNICEF and ICRC have a greater coverage, UNICEF having little capacities to monitor their actions and ICRC focussing on urban network which is their core added value in the WASH sector.

With little presence capacity due to insecurity, WASH & Shelter actors will rely on local NGOs to deliver their support. Considering their limited technical capacities and the limited remote control they will benefit from, it is recommended to focus on facilities repairs, NFIs & tools distribution to mitigate the WASH & Shelter related needs rather than to set new services.

CONTENT TABLE

1 Context

1.1 Displacement problematic in North East Nigeria

Nigeria population is frequently affected by conflicts (ethnical & pastoral), natural disaster which result in population movements. But since 2014 the violence committed by Boko Haram represents the major IDPs caseload in North East Nigeria and Borno state in particular.



Number of IDPs per LGA in North East Nigeria [Source : From IOM, DTM, June 2016]



Number of IDPs per States & IDPs trends until June 2016 [Source: IOM, DTM, June 2016]

2 066 783 IDPs (344 564 households) have been identified in Nigeria, 87.48% of whom (1 767 124 people) are due to Boko Haram insurgency mainly located in Borno, Adamawa & Yobe States. From December to 2015 to June 2016, the number of IDPs identified by partners has stabilized.

In total 106 camps and informal settlements have been identified, 63 of which are located in Borno (49), Adama (9) and Yobe (5).Only a fraction of identified IDPs are living in camps or informal settlement (12%), the majority of them being hosted by local communities[1].

1.1 Displacement problematic in Maiduguri (Borno State)

1.1.1 Borno displacement Context

The majority of IDPs in North Nigeria are located in Borno state (68% of the total caseload, see upper chart). As of now, the IDPs identified in Borno state are located in 14 camps and 35 informal sites, which represent 20% of the state total caseload. Almost all IDPs in Borno are originated from the state (99.42%).

1.1.2 Humanitarian response

From IOM sites assessments done in Borno in June 2016, humanitarian response in camps and settlements highlights a difference in terms of response coverage where camps needs are reported covered (from 75% to 100% for all sectors but livelihood) and informal settlement needs coverage barely reaches 50% in most sectors. Lack of coverage affects mainly settlements of small size.

All type of settlements considered, needs reported in surveyed sites shows a coverage of 72% or more in most sector but livelihood (47%).



Needs coverage per type of camps and in total [Source : IOM, June 2016]

Those figures do not encompass the quality of the service nor its accessibility in terms of number of user nor does it reflects the effective coverage per sub-sector.

[1] IOM DTM assessment, Round X, June 2016..

1.1.2.1 WATER SUPPLY



Site walking distance to water point & % of population per water sources per type of sites

In terms of distance to water points there is a rather significant difference between formal camps and informal settlement (respectively 93% of camps and 54% of settlement have access within the site in less than a ten minute walking distance). It affects mainly small settlements[2].

Type of water point are reported to be similarly secure (safe water is used in 92% of formal camps and 98% in informal settlements) but varies significantly in terms of facility (piped water is predominant in camps whereas hand are in settlements).

Main difference between camps and settlements resides in the daily water consumption which is higher in camps (72% of the population having access to more than 10l/p/d) rather than in informal settlement (35% only with important settlements with limited access to water). Considering the limited distances the pressure over the existing facilities is certainly the main restricting factor.



Average daily water consumption per person per type of site

1.1.2.2 SANITATION



Status of latrines on site and average number of users of latrine per type of site

On the other hand sanitation needs remains mainly unaddressed in both types of sites. The number of users exceeds minimum standards of twenty users per latrine (90% in camps and 95% in settlements do not respect this standard) with more than 100 users in more than 50 % of the cases (66% for camps and 77% for settlements).

[2] If the data treatment is done by number of people (and not by site as upper shown), coverage becomes similar (93% and 98% respectively).

Not surprisingly, the existing facilities are overused and most of them are not hygienic enough to insure the expected sanitation (respectively 93% and 91% of the latrines are unhygienic).

As a consequences of that, open defecation is a practise observed in 100% of the formal camps and in almost two third (60%) of the informal settlements.

Solid waste management is an issue as well as in 64% of the camps and 40% at least of the settlements.

1.1.2.3 HYGIENE



% of population having access to hygiene campaign and handwashing station

As for hygiene campaigns, most of the population have been reached (74% in formal camps and 89% in informal settlements). The majority of small settlements did not receive any though (only 60% of the settlements have been targeted). The rather satisfying coverage of hygiene related session and the poor sanitation results highlight the limit of such exercise when populations are not in capacity to adopt the promoted messages due to lack of proper facilities.

As per access to handwashing station, almost all of the sites have been equipped with such devices[3] but lack of proper management makes them useless from 49% (camps) to 88% (settlements) of the population due to absence of water and/or soap.

1.1.2.4 SHELTER



Predominant type of shelters and most needed of NFI per type of site

Indoor is the most frequent predominant type of shelter in camps or settlements. On the other hand tent is seldom the most frequent type of shelter in informal settlements (6% of the sites) where it is twice as much frequent in formal camps suggesting a higher coverage in formal camps.

As far as NFI are concerned people living in informal settlements express mainly the needs for blankets and mattresses (83% of the population) when needs in formal camps vary from blanket (41%) to plastic sheeting (39%) or kitchen sets (23%) from one camp to another.

Needs of IDPs hosted in communities remain mainly undocumented.

[3] Only two informal settlement representing 0.3% of the total population surveyed did not have any.

1.2 ECHO response in the WASH & Shelter sector

1.2.1 Number and amounts

From 2014 to 2016 ECHO has been supporting a constantly increasing number of WASH and shelter projects. Allocated amount for 2016 budget as of beginning of June represent 90% of the total WASH budget allocation of 2015 (64% for shelter).

1.2.2 Main Actors

ACF, IMC, IRC, Save the Children, ICRC and UNICEF are the main actors involved in the WASH & Shelter sectors.

ECHO has supported all of them but ICRC.

Others actors, such as Solidarités are in the process of starting WASH activities in the sector (assessments have started in Muna garage/Maiduguri).

Right: ECHO support to WASH & Shelter sectors from 2014 to June 2016 [Source Hope]









Number and budget allocated to ECHO's partners in the WASH & Shelter sectors from 2014 to June 2016 [Source: Hope]

1.3 New humanitarian assessments outside Maiduguri

1.3.1 Extended Access outside Maiduguri town



Humanitarian access in Borno States between November 2015 and June 2016 [Source : From UNICEF/UNDSS]

Since November 2015 the number of LGAs accessible with or without escort has significantly increased from 15 to 23 (out of 27 LGAs in Borno state) allowing deployment of humanitarian aid in previously unreachable areas.

1.3.2 Detection of acute humanitarian needs in newly accessed area.

On 21st of June MSF accessed Bama (130 km south east of Maiduguri) and assessed an IDPs camps of 24 000 people leaving in dire conditions: 19 % SAM rate among the children of the camp, little access to WASH facilities, and ongoing outbreak of diarrhoea (unconfirmed whether it was cholera or shigellosis). Over 1,200 graves were dug during the year and 188 people died for the sole month of May due to diarrhoea and malnutrition.

On 27th of June, the Health Minister declared a nutrition emergency in Borno state.

On 28th of June, OCHA released an assessment in Banki done on May the 20th, a city located 2.5 km off the Cameroun boarder (180 km south east of Maiduguri). The city hosts an estimated 15 000 IDPs living in abandoned houses in conditions similar to Banki: 20 % SAM rates and limited access to food or livestock.

There is a number of new sites alike Bama although no formal assessment have been conducted there yet. Figures fluctuate among actors (15 new sites according to OCHA, 24 according to IOM). Total estimated caseload varies from 750 000 (UNICEF) to minimum 800 000 (OCHA/IOM).

Figures from UNICEF in April highlight that SAM rates in Dikwa and Monguno exceeds by far the emergency thresholds (20.9% and 12.8% respectively).



Right: Level of Food insecurity in Borno State [UNICEF]

People from the area are moving to Maiduguri town with 60 to 80 incoming people per day in four informal settlements of the city. Those informal settings have SAM rates over 8%, and are in need of WASH, food, health/nut and shelterHighlighted needs in assessed areas are nutrition, food, WASH, Shelter and health.

1.3.3 Humanitarian response in newly accessed area.



IDPs location & Access constraints in Borno State [Source: From UNICEF & IOM]

At the time of reporting, response was organizing itself with contradictory statements among agencies (President office announced 10,000 MT of food available while NEMA reports 7,500 MT distributed and no distribution made since February).

On 27th of June, the top United Nations relief official released $13 million for a CERF to provide life-saving assistance to 250,000 people in areas of north-east Nigeria.

INGOs are designing response modalities according to access capacities (assessment of local NGOs capacities to deliver support to the related sites).

ICRC intends to work in Bama pending on the deployment of other actors. In the WASH

sector, they look forward to work with the RUWASA through equipment supply so as rehabilitation or implemention of new water points in outreach areas. Food distribution and setting of TFC is also part of their schedule in Monguno, Dikwa, Kala Balge & Damboa LGAs). Support to primary health care clinics is also scheduled.

Solidarités intends to work in Monguno in the Nutrition & Food Aids sectors (incl. some WASH in Health) and with ICRC for the WASH sector.

ACF is scheduling food distribution, CMAM, WASH & NFI activities in outreach areas. Sites targeting will be done by mid-July.

2 Comments & Observations

Terms of reference of the mission focused on the ongoing WASH response in Maiduguri town. Although the number of WASH actors has increased, main gaps highlighted in November 2015 still persist in June 2016 with new needs arising with increased humanitarian access in Borno state.

2.1 Limited Coordination

The presence of a newly appointed WASH coordinator at federal level has significantly improved the level of awareness in terms of Borno State WASH needs coverage. Nevertheless, it has not yet translated in an effective coordination mechanism on site.

The existing 5Ws has been updated and compiles the interventions of each actor involved in the WASH sector. It still does not allow a proper understanding of the WASH related needs in each of the sites targeted by those partners yet.

Although sector leadership has been appointed in camps, it does not always translate in proper coordination.

WASH Partners are not always aware of the existence or the performance of other WASH actors working in their own area.

2.2 Lack of quality control / Design & work processing

Local capacities exist in Maiduguri to set the facilities required in the WASH sectors (water supply & sanitation mainly). Most of ECHO partners relied on those capacities to implement their activities. Unfortunately, the externalization of the implementation resulted in lesser (if any) supervision of the quality and related performance of the processed outputs.

2.3 Water Sanitation & Hygiene

2.3.1 Water Supply

Observations made during this mission are similar to the ones observed during November 2015 mission:

- Most of the partners do not have the technical know-how to secure water delivery. They rely on local contractors with little (if any) supervision of the quality and performance of the subcontracted outputs;
- Facilities are operational but their capacities unknown (maximum yield). The service is extremely fragile as in most cases, maintenance or repair along the network or at production and storages sites cannot be done without service disruption. Such is of particular concern with widely promoted, low yield solar pumping, which maintenance requires a 48 hours service disruption (one day to repair, another to refill the tanks).
- Chlorination is not set in most water network and the distributed water is not secured. Observed leakage along pipelines suggest high risks of water contamination;
- The quality of the water is not monitored either. The only analysis made is at the opening of the water point in most cases, but not on a regular basis;
- The quantity of water distributed in camps remain unknown due to absence of proper equipment (water meter) and monitoring; and

Lack of expertise and monitoring in the WASH response: Case studies in Maiduguri

IRC in Sulumburi quarter (Host Maiduguri)

Up Right: Drainage channel oriented against the slope of the terrain resulting in stagnant water around the water point.

Middle Left:. Absence of proper drainage system leading to the same result.

Middle Right: improper design of the slope of the apron and its concrete mix resulting in flooded water point area.

Bottom left: improper stabilization of the apron on the ground jeopardizing its stability.

Bottom right: Improper sealing of the body of the hand pump resulting in water infiltration into the catchment aquifer.

Absence of quality control resulted in facilities likely to contaminate the water and to generate water related disease dissemination spots in a cholera prone environment

UNICEF in Bakassi IDPs (Camp Maiduguri)

Left absence of surface infrastructure at water distribution resulting in extensive flooding of the camps corridors. Middle and Right: water leakage along the network (middle); presence of grass (right) along the line suggests leakages which have not been addressed since quite some time

Poorly designed and maintained water networks result in the creation of a water related disease prone environment in cholera/malaria prone areas.

Lack of expertise and monitoring in the WASH response: Case studies in Maiduguri

UNICEF in Galtimari (Host Maiduguri)

Right: UNICEF has settled a solar pumping system supplying four elevated tanks and a network of 10 taps stands. No bypass system clearly identified with no chlorination system in place.

Below left: Borehole not equipped with minimum requirements (water meter, anti-return valve, air valve and unconsolidated base).

Below right: Water exposed control panel corrected with plastic sheets creating an overheating hazard.

Bottom: the tank supply line does not fill one of the tanks, the absence of control valve genrates overflows and none of the tanks can be isolated for maintenance due to absence of control valve.



Absence of WASH expertise does not allow a proper designing of the required facilities and results in poor (unprotected) and fragile (maintenance wise) water supply services.

Lack of expertise and monitoring in the WASH response: Case studies in Maiduguri

IMC in Bakassi (Camp Maiduguri)

Up Left: poorly built apron results in leakage at the base of the structure.

Up Right: poor maintenance of water supply services results in water losses at distribution point.

Right: Absence of proper drainage combined with poorly conceived surface equipment and losses of water result in flooding in the camp site.

Remark: IMC pumping system is the same as UNICEF and present similar design flaws (absence of bypass, no on line chlorination, insufficient control valves at tank level)

Poorly designed and maintained water networks results in the creation of a water related disease prone environment in cholera/ malaria prone areas

Left : IMC latrines with no gender segregation signs. Middle: The absence of defecation hole cover does not allow the trapping of flies which can circulate in and out the pit. Right: with the absence of defecation hole cover, the ventilation pipe are useless: they do not trap the flies nor do they allow the creation of an air depression which would evacuate the smell.

Poor expertise in sanitation results in limited performances of the infrastructures.

Lack of expertise and monitoring in the WASH response: Case studies in Maiduguri

UNICEF & IRC in Bakassi (Camp Maiduguri)

Left (UNICEF) and right (IRC), stagnant water alongside the latrine combined with absence of monitoring of waste management result in health hazards as the surface water may be contaminated by the effluent of the pit they are likely to be in contact with through the pit and soil surface.

Poor monitoring of the sanitation results results in health related hazard in a cholera/malaria prone environment.

NRC in Bololo/Galtimari (Host Maiduguri)

Right: shelter design does not include plastic sheeting for the floor which would isolate the structure from the ground.

No external drainage is visible either which exposes the tents to floods hazard.

Limited designs and support result in hazard exposition

ACF in Bolori (Host Maiduguri)

Left: Drainage Channels blocked by waste in Maiduguri (upstream ACF area of intervention)

Middle: Drainage channel cleaned by ACF intervention

Right: Drainage channel cleaned by ACF intervention but refilled by waste coming from upstream.

Limited scale of intervention results in limited if not ineffective results.

Lack of expertise and monitoring in the WASH response: Case studies in Maiduguri

Save the Children in Dalori II (Host Maiduguri)

Save the Children was supported by ECHO for a nutrition project[4] which included a strengthening of the WASH services in the seven targeted facilities (motorized boreholes and latrines).

Right: The water supply system is shared between the health centre and the nearby community. It suffers from the same weaknesses as presented previously (absence of by pass, no maintenance without disrupting the service).

More concerning is the absence of secured supply for the health centres. There is a risk that the community will empty the waters tanks in the evening leaving the health centre without water in the morning.

Total storage capacity is 6 m^3 (2 tanks of 3 m^3) when maximum frequentation of the health structure is 50 children per days needing maximum 250l/d of storage capacity. The design is not cost effective as 96% of the storage capacity is dedicated to the community)

Below: absence of consolidated base of the pit of the latrine Save the Children built in a health centre. The absence of pit in a clay and sand soil may result in the destabilization of the whole structure. Lack of monitoring and local contractor follow up did not allow save the Children to insure that the facility was made according to their own design.

Lack of design expertise and follow up of local contractors result in poorly designed structures

And as for visibility

Limited and unsustainable as already observed in November 2015 (below: UNICEF in Galtimari Host)

[4] Project Reference ECHO/AF-EDF/2015/01003, 13 months starting May 2015, 1 199 970 € (100% ECHO/UE Funded).

- None of the WASH actors has a complete overview of the existing resources in Maiduguri. Little is known about the urban water network and its related performance. Only ICRC has started to work with RUWASA to improve city water supply (electrification of the water treatment plant and strengthening of West Maiduguri water network in Alamduri). On site work is scheduled by end of July. A second phase is scheduled for 2017 (automatization of the treatments processes, equipment of laboratory for water analysis, network diagnosis and institutional capacity building).

2.3.2 Sanitation

Here too, observations made during this mission are similar to the ones observed during November 2015. Same lack of supervision of local contractor results in same faulty structures.

- The construction of some latrine has been done without pit consolidation which presents a risk of collapsing;
- None of the observed latrine is equipped with taped defecation holes resulting in useless ventilation pipes;
- Access to pit for desludging is often impossible without damaging the upper apron or its sealed equipment (ventilation pipes);
- Most of the water supply facilities do not have a proper drainage system which creates a health related hazard in a cholera prone environment; and
- Gender distinction is not visible so are absent any sensitization boards.

Some interesting initiatives such as ACF's activity to clean drainage channels in cholera prone environment using an integrated approach with BoSEPA[5] allowed the cleaning of 5.3 km of channels (comprising the removal of 3 200 m3 of waste), 2.9 of which were done by the state agency itself. Unfortunately, the scope of the activity was insignificant compared to the scope of the needs (487 km of drainage channel in Maiduguri). And the cleaned areas is now clogged with wastes from upstream.

2.3.3 Hygiene

Here too, observations made during this mission are similar to the ones observed during November 2015. Same lack of supervision of hygiene related activities results in poor results performances:

- The hand washing facilities nearby the latrine are not properly functioning either because of lack of water or soap. It suggests that the maintenance system (water/hygiene committees) is ineffective; and
- When sensitization signboards have been displayed, it was poorly set limiting their lifespan and suggesting limited concern on hygiene related sensitization activities.

2.4 Shelter & NFIs

2.4.1 Shelter

Left Private sponsor's properly isolated shelter design and Right: Against all odds, it is not an IDPs makeshift but a resident's

Shift between camps and communities are still ongoing among IDPs when they cannot afrod

[5] Borno Safe Environment & Protection Agency

their daily expenses while in the communities.

In some areas, it remains very difficult to distinguish IDPs makeshifts from local residents'.

The concentration process in camps is still on going as shelter capacities strengthen in or close to unsuitable areas due to flood hazards.

Main weaknesses observed during the mission in the informal settlements are the absence of drainage around the newly built shelters and proper shelter isolation from the ground which expose the IDPs to flooding

2.4.2 NFIs

Observations made for NFIs do not differ from those made in November 2015 :

- Quantities and contents of NFI provided to IDPs vary from one partner to another with little rationale but budget constraint to define the quantities distributed (only ACF had a logic approach between items, quantities and expected duration of consumables).

Main Hygiene items		IRC	IMC	UNICEF	ACF
20l Jerry cans		?	2	1	2
10 l bucket		?	2	1	0
Bathing soap	Weight	200 g	250 g	190 g	200g
	Quantity	8	6	11 or 15*	21
	Renewal frequency	Monthly	Once (4 soaps)	3 or 2 months ago*	Once for 3 months
Washing soap	Weight	250g	200g	None	250g
	Quantity	8	6		21
	Renewal frequency	Monthly	Once (4 soaps)		Once for 3 months
HWT sachet	Volume Treated	NA	10l	NA	20l
	Quantity	0	7	0	315
Kettle		?	1	1	0
Other		?	8 cups	0	1 potty

*: According to IDPs and UNICEF respectively.

Main quantities and frequency of NFI distributed reported from partners in Maiduguri.

- None of the interviewed households had any remaining soap supplied through NFI distribution. When they cannot afford soap, they use alternatives method to insure minimum, although insufficient, hygiene; and
- Another concern is the absence of mosquito net distribution in a flood prone environment which related hazard is increased due to the absence of proper drainage system in the areas the IDPs live in.

2.5 Interventions in Borno outreach

As reported in the context section, some of ECHO WASH partners intend to deploy their activities in newly accessible areas; Existing coverage in 2016 and targeted LGAs as foreseen for 2016-2017 are reported in the following page).

2.6 Conclusion

Maidugri is a cholera prone area as it had already shown in September to November 2015 outbreak affecting 1039 people and caused 18 deaths.



2015 cholera outbreak in Maiduguri, number of cases per type of sites and per LGAs (left) and ratio of affected camps in LGAs of concern (right)

With fragile WASH services delivering unsecured piped water, extensive presence of stagnant water in the environment due to absence of drainage, some which likely to be contaminated by nearby pit latrines, concentration of population in flood prone areas and humanitarian actors capacities limited to anticipate any hazard, all the conditions are met to trigger water related disease outbreaks of great magnitude, notably, cholera.



2016 ECHO Partners WASH coverage (Left) and foreseen deployment for the mid-2016-2017 period.[Source: ECHO Mission]

3 Expert recommendations

Recommendations made in November 2015 are still valid and are reported below updated with the ones highlighted in this mission.

3.1 Enhancing targeting

As of now, the response is only addressing a limited fraction of the problematic. Little is known about the conditions of the IDPs hosted in urban Maiduguri

- A proper mapping of the areas of concentration of IDPs should be done in the urban LGAs of Borno state in order to have a proper overview of the problematic and allow a coherent coordination of the response;
- This mapping should be combined with an assessment of the impact of the IDPs on the access to existing public (health, water and sanitation, protection) and private sector led (shelter, informal businesses) services; and
- Those data combined with a proper typology of the population (IDPs and host communities) will define a vulnerability map which will allow a proper targeting of the area and populations to prioritize.

3.2 Enhancing coordination

As of now, the existing coordination is not able to allow a pro-active and cost effective coordination of the response. For the WASH sector, the existing tool (5W table) needs to be enhanced. Recommendations to WASH coordination includes the followings:

- Response should not be designed on the basis of each implementing partners' capacities but on the most cost effective and performant setting to address the population's needs (including specific gender, disabled, cultural needs);
- Assessment, programmatic & monitoring tool (5W) should be disaggregated per area (camp or community unit) and updated on a weekly basis;
- Monitoring of WASH related services should not be calculated on the sole basis of theoretical SPHERE standards but based on the performance (access quantity and quality) and status (capacity, delivery and lifespan) of existing WASH outputs (including NFIs);
- Minimum design standards should be agreed between the WASH stakeholder in the design of outputs and monitoring of their performance;
- Considering the limited number of WASH NGOs, it is advised that NGOs insure coordination of activities between themselves and report to UNICEF for aggregation and updates to be presented to the SEMA coordination; and
- If number of WASH NGOs is to increase, update and aggregation of programmed or ongoing activities should be down through a coordination web platform facilitated by UNICEF (implementing partners providing the updates and UNICEF verifying and aggregating them). Coordination meeting should be focused on programming of new activities and securing coherence in the design/quality of the proposed outputs.

In terms of support, UNICEF has been able to strengthen coordination at federal level with a dedicated and skilled person. Such strengthening is still required on a permanent basis for Borno State in order to implement the upper recommendations. On the other hand, the support to UNICEF for field outputs does not have a real added value as the agency has little capacity and know how to supervise the work they subcontract to local operators.

3.3 Enhancing design expertise

3.3.1 Water Supply

Once needs are accurately known, the best solution to cover the water related needs of the IDPs in the camps and among the community is to have a proper diagnosis of the water networks of the cities in order to repair/improve production and repair/extend the water network. Only the vulnerable population out of the reach of the water network should be supported with an autonomous system. It can be done through:

- NGOs or Organization who have the required knowledge (ICRC mainly); or
- Through externalized skill embedded with a WASH partner (city technical services in the Nigerian context or La Fondation Véolia for instance).

As for new facilities, the processing and equipment of new boreholes, solar, fuel or manually powered encompass minimum requirements such as:

- Motorized boreholes should be equipped with the minimum standard equipment such as air valves, non-return valves, control valves, piezometric data logger, strengthened stands and protection box/cap;
- Proper bypassing of equipment in order to be able to maintain and repair it without affecting the water supply. They should be completed by control intake/taps in order to monitor the quality of the water ;
- Online chlorination system (either manual or automatized) for piped and/or stored water;
- Proper water metering in order to assess the quantities produced, delivered and to detect leakages or misuses along the supply and distribution lines;
- All network valves should be set in secured control boxes in order to isolate, protect and operate them;
- Solar panel control box should respect minimum standard in terms of weather hazard (IP54);
- Water distribution stands and hand pump sites should be equipped with proper drainage system including drainage channels to remove spillage from the stand/apron and soak away[6] pit to prevent any stagnant water; and
- All water distribution sites should be properly delimited (ideally with fence or wall) and hygiene and proper use related messages displayed.

3.3.2 Sanitation

As for water supply, waste water network is the best solution in urban context. The coverage of this network in Maiduguri is not documented. It is believed to be very small (if any). As a waste water network cannot be set in an emergency context, the best solution consists in monitoring and supporting the use of autonomous facilities (pit latrine). In host communities new emergency public latrines should not be considered as an option as it is likely to trigger public health issues if not properly maintained.

Latrine designs should encompass the following requirements:

- Reinforced pit wall if soil is unstable;
- Latrines entrance should be facing the winds with air circulation opening (below the door at entrance, upper small window at the back);
- Defecation holes should be always equipped with a tapping device;
- Pit edge should be above the runoff water levels and always distant more than 30 meters from any boreholes (more if located higher);
- Ventilation pipe should always be taped with metallic fly nets, their bases strengthened in order to resist against storms;
- Pit apron should always be air tight and accessible from the outside in order to facilitate its desludging;
- Public latrines should be gender separated and design adapted to all users (children and disabled people);
- Public latrines should always be equipped with light for use at night and never distant more than 50 meters from the households of the users; and
- In the short terms there should not be more than 50 users per latrine (20 in the mid-term).

Solid waste management activities should only be prioritized in area of great concentration of people (IDPs Camp and Informal settlement type of camp). A proper solid waste storage system should encompass the following requirements:

[6] Crop garden irrigated by the drained water can be envisaged if space, pedology and topography allow it.

- A 100 liters capacity storage devices for every 10 households;
- Maximum distance between household and storage device is less than 100 meters;
- Storage devices should be climate hazard proof (water tight);
- A secured removal capacity of 1m3 per 1,000 households;
- A burying site located minimum 500 m from the nearest household (host or IDPs); and
- Minimum burying site capacity should be 104 m^3/year per 1 000 household.

Surface water drainage should only be conceived in camps site. It should be mainstreamed with the settlement design. A proper surface water drainage system should encompass the following requirements:

- Drainage should address two type of hazards: water runoffs (protection of shelter) and stagnant water (floods);
- Drainage channels should have a slope between 1% and 5 %;
- Drainage channels can be made of sealed half pipe or ditches (lesser privileged option);
- Considering the nature of the soil in Maiduguri (sand & clay) its setting should be strengthened to avoid erosion/collapsing;
- Crossover for car and trucks should be done using for instance reinforced concrete (450Kg/m^3 cement content with 8mm iron bars 20 cm spaced) frames;
- Drainage channel should be covered with grid type of apron as soon as its depth represents an accident hazard; and
- All drainage channels should lead to the lowest point of the camp and then evacuated (through buried pipes) out of the camp site by gravity (or through pumping if gravity forbids).

3.3.3 Shelter & NFI

Shelter design should be able to isolate the beneficiaries from weather related hazards and designed according to the household size. It implies the following minimum requirements:

- Minimum surface per person is 30m2 without taking into account the collective services' needs;
- Elevated and isolated floor (with gravels and tarpolin cover for instance with specific requirements for cooking areas if set inside (gravel only for instance); and
- Drainage channels and small dykes to divert water runoffs from shelter entrance.

In an urban context where most IDPs are hosted in communities or have access to the markets of a major town, the provision of in-kind items is questionable when the market would be more likely to absorb the demand at a lesser costs than the humanitarian actors'.

- An Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) is recommended in order to assess if this assumption is correct;
- Based on the results of this EMMA, the opportunity to switch to a cash & voucher approach should be analyzed and set if relevant;
- One of the core expenses for the IDPs in host communities is the accommodation rent. Such problematic should be integrated in the design of the response to some extent. IDPs targeting for High Intensity Manpower Activities (HIMA) could be envisaged (from camps & communities based on their vulnerability/income generating capacities) to address the issue; and
- NFI, Coupon or cash amount should be provided according to the real status of the targeted households (number of people, family composition). It requires a different approach in the designing of the response[7].

When distributed, all household hygiene related items should be designed, quantified and consumables renewed according to the household size: Following standards could apply:

- 20 l volume uPVC Jerry can/ 3 people for water transportation and storage;
- 20 l volume PVC bucket with lid & tap/ household for water storage;

[7] Focusing on a person needs according to the household he/she lives in rather than focussing on a household kit which content does not necessarily fit to the family characteristic.

- 1 l capacity plastic kettle/household for handwashing;
- 20l capacity Household water treatment sachet/p/day;
- 250g bathing soap/p/month; and
- 200g washing soap/p/month.

3.4 Enhancing onsite work supervision

Once designs are agreed and understood, local contractors and promotors should agree on validation steps processing which could record:

- The inventory and quality validation of all material and equipment dedicated to the facility;
- Progress validation steps during on site work at key moments of its processing (aquifer catchment, borehole equipment design, pit digging completion, pit lining completion, surface equipment completion, etc) in accordance with its scheduled design;
- Inventory of all equipment expected in the facility (including proper setting);
- Test of the performance of the provided facility (specific yields, water tightness of equipment, etc.);
- Temporary reception of the facility; completed by
- Definitive reception and final payment 3 to 6 months after its opening (pending on the type of facility built) to amend hidden flaws.

All those steps and procedure should be mentioned in the contract linking both parties.

As for already processed water facilities, it is recommended:

- To assess the capacities (borehole specific yield assessment) of all the boreholes processed and/or used to cover the need of the IDPs according to their ongoing and foreseen caseload;
- Once the borehole capacity is documented, it is recommended to equip them with the pump which will allow the best performance and thus reducing the number of equipment required. Solar pumping can be considered as an option provided repair and maintenance capacities are available[8] and that it meets the water supply requirements; and
- To amend all ineffective facilities according to the upper recommendations on design §3.3.

3.5 Enhancing service monitoring

Opportunities to uses local capacities to participate to the supported WASH services should be promoted where relevant. It encompasses:

- The use of local supplier for basic items consumptions and locally available equipment renewal; and
- The use of local human resource to insure petty job other people may be reluctant to do (solid waste removal for instance). Such activities should be paid on a volume basis rather than on an hour based remuneration.

3.5.1 Water Supply

A proper monitoring of the performance of the equipment, process and people in charge of them should be systematically set for all type of water supply services.

- A monthly monitoring system of the performance of the water supply should be set (aquifer levels, service demand, leakages detection, users pressure at distribution, users 'satisfaction, operation, maintenance & repair costs follow up);
- The water committees should be exclusively composed of users[9] at all levels of management. They should have access to a user's-led complaint mechanism[10] with a

[8] It should be the case as solar pumping is reported to be supported at state and/or federal level.

[9] Mainly women. Men are usually not in charge of the household water supply and less sensitive to its burden, thus less likely to seek for its reduction.

[10] See upper remark.

voice at camp/community coordination meetings;

- Some camp (Bakassi for instance) have an area dedicated to agriculture/cropping. It is likely that water may be used for crop watering. Such use should be monitored alongside with any use dedicated to economic purposes. A cost recovery mechanism should be set for this use. The collected money should contribute to the repair & maintenance costs of the water committees;

3.5.2 Sanitation

As for water supply, a proper monitoring of the status of the facilities, of the performance of the services and a complain mechanism should be set for all facilities. Such monitoring should focus on:

- The maximum number of users per latrine/public waste bin (based on a survey and not on a fictive ratio population/number of facilities);
- The availability of soap and water at latrine levels (both public and private/household latrine) for hand washing;
- The filling status of the latrine/bins and desludging/removal needs;
- The cleanness of the latrine and proper equipment (tap for defecation hole);
- The absence of solid waste in the environment and its safe disposal ;
- The presence of long lasting hygiene related messages signboards; and
- The proper protection equipment for teams in charge of maintenance of latrine and collection/removal of solid waste.

Some activities such as drainage cleaning or latrine emptying in urban Maiduguri hosts require an integrated approach with relevant authorities (BoSEPA). Such could be envisaged with the following requirements:

- Clear memorandum of understanding and tasks based contracting in order to avoid the payment of inexistent/irrelevant tasks and to seek for local contractors if more competitive than the institution; and
- A comprehensive understanding of the scope of the related workload in order to achieve the expected result (starting from upstream to downstream when cleaning drainage channels for instance).

3.5.3 Shelter & NFIs

As for Shelter & NFIs, the minimum requirements are:

- To monitor that the shelters allocated to each IDPs in camps and informal settlements respect the minimum service access and space standards according to the number of people per households;
- To monitor that the targeted beneficiaries did receive the expected type, quantities and consumables renewal frequency;
- To assess whether the quantity received are enough and used for the initially targeted purpose;
- A monitoring of the use of the NFI/Voucher/Cash will be necessary if used. A great attention should be paid for fraud detection (local seller with coupons, cash among the humanitarian staff) and protection of the beneficiaries (mainly with cash distribution); and
- As for the WASH sector, a complain mechanism should be accessible to the people entitled to receive the related NFI/Voucher/Cash support.

3.5.4 WASH'NUT

As for support to the WASH services as part of nutrition led project, the priority is to secure access to safe water and minimum hygiene standards for the household during the duration of their SAM affected child. Main items are household water treatment, soaps, jerrycans and buckets in quantities reported in §3.3.3.

Support to the health structure itself should be envisaged mainly if it hosts SAM children inpatients and designed according to the need of the structure. If it only deals with SAM

outpatients, provided support should be similar to the one provided to SAM affected household.

3.6 Interventions in Borno outreach

Considering the difficulties of access due to insecurity, it is recommended to design intervention focusing on distribution and facilities IDPs could buld themselves with the support of local organization. Related activities may include:

- Distribution of WASH NFIs;
- Distribution of Shelter items and NFIs
- Distribution of tools to set the expected facilities (defecation trenches, drainage); and
- Diagnosis and repair and support to local water supply system (hand pump repair, fuel and consumables delivery, etc.).

Nevertheless, ONGs working with local organization must be able to insure that the activities processed by their partner reaches the minimum standards in terms of targeting and quality.

4 Sector policy compliance[11]

They are identical to November 2015 mission and reported verbatim below.

4.1 Limited WASH capacities of humanitarian actors for urban area

With more than 1.4 M IDPs scattered in the urban host community of Mauiduguri (Borno State), the technical response is challenging as it is out of the usual camp-type autonomous WASH service response. It requires mainly assessing the capacities of the existing network and key interventions which could improve its production improve and extend its distribution.

Most of DG-ECHO WASH partners are institutionally reluctant to engage in such type of support as they do not have the internal knowledge to provide it. If some partner may have some of their expatriate experienced in WASH urban setting, one of the only institution for which this knowledge is institutionalized is ICRC.

Though the technique involved is not very different from usual camp type response (only the scale is changed), there is a gap to address this type of WASH intervention among the WASH actors.

In the context of more and more populations in the third world living in urban areas, the strengthening of related technical knowledge will allow some pinball interventions (valve changing, supply of consumable, pipe replacement) which can be a game changer in terms of swift improvement of access to WASH services.

4.2 Lack of quality control

As it is more and more observed in DG-ECHO funded WASH programs, the quality of the implementation is more and more worrying. It has already been reported in previous reports and the outputs observed during the mission in Maiduguri illustrate this trend.

As of now, this lack of quality control cannot be acknowledged as there is no technical specification in the WASH sector.

If some worldwide use tool such as SPHERE standards provide some guidelines they are often use for what they are not meant to be (programmatic tools instead monitoring tools[12]).

It is like if, in the health sector, ECHO would not bother to have medicine purchased either through Humanitarian Procurement Centre or from the local shop in the nearby village. There are no WASH minimum requirements which absence would allow ECHO not to fund a WASH project.

As reported in previous report, ECHO should have its own WASH Technical Specification in order to secure quality setting and control. Those are not difficult to produce as most donors

[11] The following section is an addendum to the mission report template dedicated to sector policy issues (A4).

[12] And to a certain extent, they are not even enough as monitoring tools as it does not contain any indication on where, how often and how acurate (coverage wise) this monitoring should be done.

use similar documents in the technical specifications of their tender.

4.3 Lack of rocking mechanism within the European Commission

The Maiduguri context is no different from most contexts whenever a crisis is affecting a country usually supported throughout development program. Even when the crisis is acknowledged by the development community (which is not yet the case for Maiduguri though), the response is conceived through a development lens which targets the strengthening of national institution.

Unfortunately, it is not when the house is on fire that you start to train firemen.You look for those available, wherever they can be. This rationale is not yet understood in the development community. The Ebola epidemic management is the main example over the past two years. Maiduguri is eligible too as the UN was designed and led by development focused resources to address the issue.

A sudden onset crisis has to be addressed by humanitarian actors specialized in emergency, whatever unsatisfying it can be for national authorities and diplomatic community.

Within the European Commission, the external services are too tightened to their diplomatic agenda or EDF programming to provide a significant response to sudden onset crisis. Even the mobilization of the B envelop (EDF non programmatic funds) is not easily accessible to address an unforeseen crisis. Assumption is that it is usually informally earmarked or kept as a flexible tool to complete the A-Envelop programmes and/or diplomatic leverage/attention.

There should be a DG to DG mechanism within the institution to allow the pre-empting of B-envelop funds when available if no top up is available from any other funding tools of DG-ECHO.

Feed-back Request Box

None