EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AID
Regional Support Office for East and Southern Africa (Nairobi)

MISSION REPORT

Subject : **Pilar 2: Basics service in conflicts/ North East Nigeria: Boko Haram affected population/ Support to IDPs in Borno State.**

Author: **Damien BLANC *(WASH Expert, West Africa Regional Office, Dakar)***

Date: **From the 2nd to the 7th of July 2017**

Defaulting ECHO supported solar powered water supply facility in Muna, MMC

Actors Met:

UNICEF

Salihu Lonis ABDU, WASH Specialist Maiduguri, met in UNICEF office on the 4th of July; email: lsalihu@unicef.org; phone: +234 703 293 33 87/813 48;7 47 17; address: Borno Field Office, UN House, By NUJ D25 Dalori Street, New GRA, Maiduguri, Borno

Noor BAKHSH, WASH Specialist, met in UNICEF office on the 4th of July; email: nbakhsh@unicef.org ; phone: +234 810 065 76 47; address: UNICEF Nigeria Country Office, UN House, Plot 617/618, Diplomatic Drive, Central Business District, PMB 2851, Garki, Abuja.

Kabuka BANDA, WASH Team Manager Maiduguri, met in UNICEF office on the 4th of July; email: kbanda@unicef.org; address: Borno Field Office, UN House, By NUJ D25 Dalori Street, New GRA, Maiduguri, Borno.

Arwal BAPPA, WASH Officer Maiduguri, met in UNICEF office on the 4th of July; email: abappa@unicef.org; address: Borno Field Office, UN House, By NUJ D25 Dalori Street, New GRA, Maiduguri, Borno.

Christine GUINOT, RRM Coordinator UNICEF, met in Solidarités Internationales office on the 5th of July; email: cguinot@unicef.org; phone: +234 908 784 92 52.

Souleymane SOW, WASH Cluster Coordinator, met in Solidarités Internationales office on the 5th of July; email: ssow@unicef.org; phone: +234 908 784 92 49.

Global WASH Cluster (UNICEF)

John FITZGERALD, Senior WASH Cluster Coordinator, Global WASH Cluster, met in Solidarités Internationales office on the 5th of July; email: jfitzgerald@un.org.

Solidarités Internationales (SI)

Sojib ASHFAGUR RAHMAN, WASH Advisor, met in Solidarités Office in MAiduguri on the 4th of July; email: wash.advisor@solidarités-nigeria.org.

Kathleen HAMON, Grant Manager, met in Solidarités Office in Maiduguri on the 4th of July; email: grant.manager@solidarités-nigeria.org.; phone: +234 907 25 85 627.

Carolyn MEYER, Multi-sector Programme Manager for Maiduguri and Dikwa, who followed on sites visit on the 4th of July; email: mdg.wash.pm@solidarites-nigeria.org; phone : +234 907 29 69 660.

Fabien CASSAN, Deputy Country Director met in Solidarités Office in Maiduguri on the 4th of July; email: hom.prog.dep@solidarites-nigeria.org .

Julien BARBIER, Field Coordinator; who followed on sites visit on the 4th of July; email mdg.field.coo@solidarites-nigeria.org; Phone: +234 9060674012, +870776123799 (Sat Phone).

NRC

Silvia BECCACECE, Global Emergency Response Shelter/ WASH specialist, met in NRC office on the 5th of July; email: silvia.beccacece@nrc.no.

Filip LOZINSKI, Global Emergency Response Team Leader, met in NRC office on the 5th of July; email: filip.lozinski@nrc.no.

Rosalyn VELDS, Grant Coordinator, met in NRC office on the 5th of July, email: Rosalyn.velds@nrc.no; phone: +234 902 434 08 26/908 303 80 23, Address: Plot 69 1st Avenue, Opp. Margaret Ekpo Close, Gwarimpa Phase II, Abuja.

Erasm B. Mutanga, Head of Programmes, met in NRC office on the 5th of July; email: ernest.mutanga@nrc.no.

DRC

Crystal WHITAKER, Emergency Coordinator, met in NRC office on the 5th of July; email: emergency.coordinator@drc-nigeria.org; phone :+234 706 975 37 95, Address: Danish Refugee Council, N°5 Azar Road Off Damboa, Road, Maiduguri.



Visited sites during the mission in Maiduguri (Muna ward)

Executive summary.

Since 2015, most of the WASH actors involved in the response to Boko Haram unrests have shown internal weaknesses which resulted in little monitoring of the processing of the onsite work and limited monitoring of the performances of the services they provided. Although it is acknowledged that working in such volatile and insecure environment is challenging, the response so far has not been able to reach the last and only steps IDPs will be able to acknowledge: quality and sustainability of the provided services. In terms of coordination, the existing mechanism is still rather unproductive if not counterproductive as actors cannot rely on the existing tools (5W matrix) and must develop their own data collection system to secure the accuracy of their database.

Most of DG-ECHO supported partners in the WASH sector in 2016-2017 (Solidarités, UNICEF, and NRC) are not excluded from this conclusion. Nevertheless, some of DG-ECHO partners (Solidarités, UNICEF/WASH Cluster) have recently started to strengthen their technical skill (May-June 2017).

Although it is too early to notice any improvements, meetings held during the mission with the technical experts of those organizations suggests that the technical know-how is in place. The coming months will show if it translates in effective improvement in the coordination and the implementation of WASH activities aiming at supporting Boko Haram unrests affected populations.

Mission held between the 2nd and the 7th of July included the monitoring of Solidarités 2016/01373 action referenced starting activities, a review of the Cash for rent approach developed by DG-ECHO supported NRC 2016/01330 referenced action and a review of UNICEF's strategy and ongoing DG-ECHO supported 2016/0134 referenced actions.

Operational conclusions and onsite observations made in Muno area are reflected in the upper comments on lack of quality of service processing & monitoring. On a more strategic lens, and with the increasing presence of emergency actors, the involvement of UNICEF in activities those actors can perform is of limited added value. Focus on areas and technicalities those other actors are not willing or not able to address (urban network repair & rehabilitation, areas accessible only through armed escorts) would underline the added value of UNICEF in the operations.

Most of the technical recommendations made in 2015 and 2016 are still valid and are reported in the section of this report completed with the ones related to the specific issues related to this very mission.

DG-ECHO support in terms of WASH related actions should be more demanding in terms of quality control. Supported partners should be able to present the guaranties that they have the kwow-how and the setting to insure it.

CONTENT TABLE

1 Context

1.1 Displacement problematic in North East Nigeria

The massive influx of IDPs in North East Nigeria fleeing Boko Haram exactions in 2014 led to a massive influx of IDPs.

In 2015, total number of IDPs linked Boko Haral insurgency was 1.8 million mainly located in Borno State (79% of the total IDPs caseload[1]).

Since 2016, the caseload of IDPs has stabilized around 1.5 million.

In April 2017, the estimation of the total IDPs caseload in Borno State was 1.4 million, 49% of whom (0.7 million) were located in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere LGAs[2].

Those figures need to be consolidated as they are issued from IOM DTM data which not only rely on community based assessment but do not cover the entire state (some LGAs are still not accessible)



Upper Right: number of Estimated IDPs per LGAs in Borno State [Source: OCHA based on IOM DTM XV figures]

Lower Right: : Evolution of the IDPs caseload in Nigeria and in the three North East States (Borno, Adamawa & Yobe) [Source : IOM DTM I to XVII]

1.2 Humanitarian response in Borno State

1.2.1 Humanitarian access

Although the security situation is still volatile with ongoing threats affecting the state on a regular basis, humanitarian access to outreach LGAS is improving since 2016. Access is nevertheless limited to the main towns. The deployment of humanitarian aid in outreach LGAs has to be seen more as a set of “islands” (the major towns) where support can be

[1] IOM DTM round VII, Dec. 2015: 2 151 979 IDPs, Nation wide, 1 818 469 people displaced due to Boko Haram, 1 434 149 located in Borno State.

[2] OCHA, 19/04/2017 based on IOM, DTM XV.

provided rather than a full geographical coverage of the LGAs.

1.2.2 Humanitarian coverage

1.2.2.1 MMC & JERE LGAS

In 2015-2016 most of the humanitarian support was concentrated in MMC and Jere. It covered only a very small fraction of the population affected though. Based on IOM DTM round XVII, the number of people whom needs have been assessed is less than 21% of the estimated caseload[3].

1.2.2.1 OUTREACH LGAS

In the outreach LGAs this ratio is approximately 66% although some LGAs have not yet been assessed and the monitoring made in the accessible ones remains limited.



Ratio between identified site and estimated people in need in MMC & Jere LGAs (left) and outreach LGAs [Source: IOM]

1.2.2.2 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN THE WASH & SHELTER & SETLEMENTS SECTORS.

Water & Sanitation

Comparison between outreach LGAs and MMC & Jere shows similar trends as far as access is concerned, a better availability of water in the outreach but of a lesser quality (unprotected water sources). IOM assessments tend to consider that access and quantities of water available are rather satisfying in the sites they assessed.

As far as sanitation is concerned, the coverage is much more worrisome with great environmental health issues in both urban Maiduguri and outreach LGAs.

Shelter & Settlements

As far as shelter is concerned, main difference between urban Maiduguri (Jere & MMC LGAs) and outreach LGAs resides in the greater use of public buildings (health centers & schools) in outreach when tents and collective buildings are usually the alternative in Jere & MMC LGAs. The number of people without shelter remains extremely limited.

The settlements component would consists in monitoring the access to basics services and IOM's data shows rather optimistic figures with no real difference between outreach and urban Maiduguri in terms of access to health services, with the main difference related to the frequency of access to food distribution in the outreach.

IOM DTM quality data.

Although IOM data shows a rather good coverage in terms of water supply, shelters and access to basic services, it cannot be taken for granted that this coverage is effective as data are collected on a rather subjective manner.

[3] 145 978 people identified in Jere & MMC in DTM round XVI (May 2017) out of a total of 702 415 [Source : *Op. Cit.*]



Comparison of sectors coverage in MMC & Jere LGAs with outreach LGAs [Source: IOM DTM Round XVII]

On the contrary, actors intervening in outreach LGAs report a much more worrisome situation than the one in urban Maiduguri. Moreover it does not encompass the fact that those assessments are based on a limited fraction of the total estimated caseloads.

Although the IOM DTM has proven to be a very effective tools in order to highlights areas of needs and guide humanitarian support as access widens, as of now, there is no solid data collection system which could allow an objective quantification of gaps and allow a proper needs prioritization.

1.3 ECHO response in the WASH & Shelter sector

As of July 2017, there are twelve ongoing contracts with a WASH &/or Shelter & Settlements components, with:

- The WASH component appearing in 8 of them (one being purely hygiene related, two hygiene & sanitation, and the five remaining ones mixing the three subcomponents of the sector);
- The S&S component appearing in 4 of them, two of which are purely NFI distribution related and the two others include both components (one of which includes hygiene and sanitation components too); and
- There are four ongoing projects including a WASH'NUT component[4], three of which includes WASH subcomponents.



Number of ongoing contract with a WASH &/or a S&S subcomponent in ongoing project in Nigeria as of July 2017 [Source: HOPE]

In terms of funds allocation:

- 4.5 M€ is dedicated to the WASH sector;
- 4.3 M€ to the S&S sector;
- 1 M€ to WASH'NUT activities; and
- 0.3 M€ are dedicated to DRR related WASH problematics (main cholera preparedness).

The main subsectors is NFI with 3.6 M€ representing 33% of the total amount dedicated to WASH and S&S sectors (84% of the S&S sector alone). Similar amount are dedicated to the three WASH subcomponent (between 1.6 and 1.8 M€).



Amount allocation for WASH & S&S subsectors in ongoing project in Nigeria [Source: HOPE].

[4] Which is incorrectly labelled as it falls under a WASH in Health strategy.

Main organizations supported are ICRC (S&S), ACF (WASH & WASH'NUT) and Solidarités (mainly WASH).

This analysis is based on the nature of the activities included in the single forms. A result based analysis would have produced a different view as some WASH & S&S related activities fall under other results such as Food Assistance (for an estimated amount of 3.9 M€), Nutrition (exclusively for WASH'NUT activities and an estimated amount of 0.4 M€), Support to operation (0.2 M€) and Education in Emergency (0.02 M€). The amount of WASH & S&S activities hosted in a different sector result represents 42% of the total allocation to the WASH and S&S activities in ongoing projects in Nigeria.



Supported organizations per sector in ongoing project [Source: HOPE]

The objective of the mission aimed at •providing technical and strategic support to the ongoing WASH & Shelter & Settlements actions DG ECHO supports. It included:

- The participation to the monitoring of Solidarités' ongoing supported actions (in Maiduguri, and Monguno, projects reference number 2016/01373 and 2017/00821);
- The review of implementation modalities (Cash for rent) of NRC ongoing supported action (Maiduguri, project reference number 2016/01330); and
- Strategic & technical meeting with UNICEF related to ongoing and scheduled supported actions (project reference number 2016/01342).

2 Comments & Observations

2.1 Contribution to Solidarités ongoing supported action (reference number 2016/01373)

2.1.1 Dates & participant to the monitoring

Monitoring was conducted on the 4th of July. The monitoring of the mission aimed at reviewing Solidarités' technical capacities to implement WASH related activities as part of their ongoing projects referenced 2016/01373 and 2017/00821.

The initial monitoring included the monitoring of Solidarités activities in Monguno. Due to the presence of two suicide bombers in the town, activities in the field were interrupted and security constraints did not allow on site access. The movement to Monguno was therefore cancelled.

With projects 2016/01373 and 2017/00821 starting in April & June 2017 respectively, little was initiated for both[5]. The monitoring focused therefore on activities either scheduled in the ongoing 2016/01373 project or implemented in previous projects in Muna areas.

Participants in the monitoring from Solidarités were Sojib ASHFAGUR RAHMAN, WASH Advisor, Carolyn MEYER, Multi-sector Programme Manager for Maiduguri and Dikwa, and Julien BARBIER, Field Coordinator; who followed us during on sites visit on the 4th of July.

[5] Only prepositioning of 1 400 hygiene kits in case of cholera outbreak (Result 4 of 2016/01373 project) was reported completed.

2.1.2 Main findings of the monitoring visit

Solidarités has not yet started most of the activities. It will possible to complete all the outputs scheduled in the timeframe of the project if no unforeseen events compromises the schedule progress rate. On the other hand, it will not be possible for Solidarités to properly monitor the services set at the end of the action (end of December). This monitoring will have to be reported in the second DG ECHO supported action Solidarités is implementing until the end of February 2018.

Based on observations made on previous Solidarités' project, it was highlighted the lack of technical expertise in the designs and quality control of the processing of the work by subcontractors. The recent arrival of a WASH is likely to address this gap although proper protocols and designs plan should be provided in order to ascertain that highlighted issues will be addressed.

2.1.3 Operational

The project referenced 2016/01373 includes the following outputs:

- Five water system boreholes rehabilitation in Bollori II and 3 new water system in Monguno (Result 3/Activity 1);
- The distribution of 3 000 WASH kits for SAM affected children through Alima's Clinic in Muna (R3/A2);
- 250 household latrines in Bolori II (R3/A3) and 550 emergency latrines & 275 emergency bathing facilities in Monguno (R3/A4);
- The distribution of one collective bin of 100 litres per 200 persons in Moguno (R3/A5)[6];
- The hygiene promotion for 50 600 people (12 600 in Bollori II, 14 000 as part of the SAM kits distribution in Muna and 24 000 people in Monguno)[7]; and
- The prepositioning of 1 400 hygiene kits in case of cholera outbreak (R4);

2.1.3.1 PROGRESS

So far the implementation of the facilities scheduled in the proposal has not yet started (R3/A1; A2; A3, A4). KAP survey included in hygiene promotion activities has started (R3/A5) and the prepositioning of household cholera kits (R4) is completed.

2.1.3.2 TIMEFRAME

Solidarités intends to complete the rehabilitation of latrines affected by storms (75 in total see below) by the end of the July and will be able to start the scheduled activities by August. They have a capacity of implementation of 300 emergency latrines per month (plus two weeks of onsite installation) and 100 household latrines per month (plus two weeks). End of the work is scheduled by November (at best) leaving only two months for monitoring purposes. Exceptionally, the monitoring activities can be reported to the other ECHO supported action (ref 2017/0822) ending in February 2018 which completes this one (2016/01373).

[6] 70 bins in total based on the number people targeted in hygiene promotion in Monguno (14 000 people).

[7] Remark : Figures in the appraisal are not rcoherent

Site assessment in Goni Kachallari

Solidarités intends to rehabilitate a borehole connected to a water tower delivering water to a network of five half buried tank

Goni Kachallari site: Main reservoir (left in the picture) and borehole (right).



Goni Kachallari :Main flaws identified at the reservoir site

Although set by RUWASA, the system has internal flaws:

- There is no on-line chlorination system to secure water quality in the distribution lines;
- There is no accessible by-pass between the supply and delivery lines at tank level nor accessible control valve;
- Inner tank has a reported metallic pedestal in the inner structure hallway to the top. Coating the internal structure of the tank in order to chlorinate water from the tank is therefore unlikely
- The borehole superstructure is not equipped with minimum requirements in terms of equipment.

The borehole electrical pump is connected to a 100 KVA generator with limited breakdowns (one breakdown recorded six month ago after 10 years of service) but with limited repairing capacities (it took two weeks to fix the generator).

The operation & maintenance seems to have gaps (shortage of petrol supply for the generator).

In terms of distribution, the reservoir fills five half buried tanks in which users pour their own buckets to collect drinkingwater. Although it makes water collection fast and easy, it is likely to result in water reservoir contamination with an aggravated risk linked to the absence of online chlorination.

Two out of the five half buried tanks are out of use.

Half buried tank of Goni Kachallari network

Goni Kachallari Half buried tank unprotected lid

Goni Kachallari Half buried tank inner structure

Solidarités' scheduled intervention includes a possible shift to solar power energy, tank rehabilitation (including online chlorination) and secures the water quality at its point of collection.

Main challenge will be the decommissioning of the half-buried tanks as they cannot secure safe water collection. The top cannot be sealed and the edge equipped with taps as water stored below the tap line will not be accessible. Main solutions would be to set a parallel line of ramps with the inconvenience of not being as friendly user as the tanks. It will involve an important sensitization component with the communities to have them accepting the loss of ease of water access the half buried tanks allowed them previously.

Lack of Supervision in the processing of water facility and the monitoring of its service

Aside one of the half buried tank in Goni Kachallari water network was located a Save the Children hand pump. The facility revealed extremely limited if any capacities in the processing of a simple water supply facility

Unaligned hand pump with the upper structure slope

Latrine located aside the water point site

Dry hand pump and missing connexions (bolt & nuts)

- The hand pump upper structure was not aligned with the apron slope;
- The upper structure was poorly processed and was missing basic equipment (fence, signboards); and
- The hand pump was functional but not delivering any water suggesting that the borehole was not dug deep enough to secure access to the aquifer the whole year; and
- The hand pump was aside a latrine a nearby household compound.

The facility was suspected to be done less than 6 months ago (2017 writing visible on the apron cement).

Such compilation of flaws illustrates the absence of professionalism of some actors and potentially ECHO partners in the processing and montitoring of WASH activities and highlights the incapacity of the coordination to detect and confront this trend which in the long term challenges the legitimacy of the presence of humanitarian aid organisations.

Latrine design flaws and challenges in Asheri community and nearby Alima Clinic in Muna

300 latrines are expected to be processed in Monguno & Maiduguri (in total) as part of 2016/01373 actions and 150 latrines scheduled in Dikwa as part of 2017/00821 action.

During the month of June, storms affected 75 latrines in Maiduguri (55) and Moguno (20) Solidarités build in previous projects. 66 of those latrines were completely destroyed.

The observed latrine design is an upgraded model from the original ones some of which were affected by the storms. The upgrading consisted in the strengthening of the thickness of the poles holding the zinc sheets.

Such improvements are unlikely to preserve the integrity of the structure for the next storms (or next rainy season one) as the wind is likely to bend the structure, with the nails progressively turned loose and eventually unable to hold the structure.

Latrine superstructure



Non-storm resistant implemented latrine upper structure behaviour under strong winds

Solution is a combination of several interventions:

- Secure the foundations in order to anchor the upper structure to the ground; and
- Strengthen the wall frames with diagonal posts and secure the articulations between posts in order to preserve the integrity of the upper frame







Left to right : interventions to strengthen latrine storm resistance (foundations & wall frames & fittings)

The setting of the ventilation pipe inside the cabin required the pipe to pass through the zinc

sheet roof. Observations showed that the ouverture was not waterproof allowing an estimated 20% of the rains falling on the roof top penetrating inside the cabin and to the pit, reducing the comfort and the lifespan of the facility.

Improper ventilation pipe setting design

Observations made in the processing of the upper structure by local teams showed dysfunctionalities in the coordination between masonry and carpentry works. The carpenters were led to partially destroy the apron set by the masons in order to set the upper structure. This absence of anticipation in the coordination of the work between masons and carpenters resulted in the weakening of the overall structure in a context were the solidity of the structure is an issue to address seasonal storms potential damages.

Improper onsite work coordination resulting in structural weaknesses

Counterproductive coordination mechanism due to limited technical knowledge.

The design of the latrine was based on the recommendations made by the WASH cluster. It presented basic flaw such as the location of the ventilation pipe within the cabin instead which does not allow the proper circulation of air from the pit to the top of the pipe.

Lack of supervision & monitoring of WASH services at Alima Clinic site in Muna

In order to secure water supply to Alima Clinic in Muna, Solidarités secured a water connection from a nearby reservoir NRC rehabilitated under ECHO funds (action reference number 2015/01235).

NRC processed a borehole and equipped it with a solar powered pump, a 5m^3 capacity water tower and two lines of distributions for the communities. It was competed in April after 4 months of construction.

- The facility equipment is extremely basic and lacks most of the elementary items:
- The borehole is not equipped with non-return valve, water meter, or air valve;
- No online chlorination system observed on the system; and
- The water tower is equipped with pipes of extremely poor quality, without by pass, nor the basic equipment in terms of control valve (setting similar to Goni Kachallari

NRC solar panel array reported to have been fixed by NRC. The arrays alignment is not respected limiting energy production.



Left: basic requirements in terms of borehole equipment upper structure for. Right: NRC's

It was reported that the recent storms affected the overall performance of the system. But with limited supervision of the processing and the monitoring of the delivered service, the performances of the system remain very weak:

- The reservoir is only filled once per day[8]. The whole tank is emptied in 30 minutes once opened; and
- Two of the 4 taps of the delivery ramps are out of order and the water is constantly flowing through without possibilities of control when service is opened;

Connection from the borehole to Alima clinic is 250m long max.

In Alima clinic, a 5 m3 drum stores the water to supply a small network of one tap and a line of two tap at washing area.

NRC water tower with damaged solar panel frame at the top of the 5 m3 reservoir

Alima clinic was not properly supplied by the borehole as it could only fill 50% of the drum capacity. Alima had to purchase an extra 600 litres of water from streets vendors to secure its need .

Beside the lack of water quantity available, main concern is the absence proper chlorination system to secure water quality for the needs of a clinic.

[8] A hand pump would have produced more water per day.

Left: 5 m3 reservoir in Alima's Clinic set by Solidarités, 50% used due to the poor performance of the NRC water network it is connected to.

Right: Inner water network in Alina's clinic set by Solidarités: a washing equipped with two taps (up) and a single line shared by the rest of the services of the clinic. No water was available from the network at the time of the visit.

The fact that none of the main operator onsite has been able to detect (NRC) or relay (Alima) the limited performance of the water system underlines the little added value of the existing coordination mechanism has so far;

Lack of supervision & Monitoring of WASH services Muna Koreri

Under previous ECHO supported project (project reference 2016/01212, result 3, activity 1), Solidarités replaced the fuel powered production unit by a solar powered one a Muna Koreri borehole. Solidarités reported installing fourteen solar panels (210 watts) and an inverter providing water to an estimated 5 500 people.

Onsite visit allowed to note that two of the fourteen had been removed as it was producing "too much energy" for the recently changed inverter. Little was effectively known about the rationale behind the reported change although it is unlikely that the removal of solar panels will result in more water production capacity.

Moreover it was discovered that one of the distribution ramp had been pre-empted by the school director where the ramp is set forbidding any other users but the pupils to have access to it.

Same issues applies for water point rehabilitations (7 sites identified) and construction (3 sites identified) which requires 4 months with four subcontractors (two for rehabilitation and two for new facilities) none of whom have been identified yet. Onsite work is scheduled to be completed between November (rehabilitation) and December (new facilities) It will not leave sufficient time for proper monitoring which must be reported in the next action.

2.1.3.3 BENEFICIARY SELECTION MECHANISM:

Security protocols during onsite visit did not allow covering both site inspections and households' interviews. It was therefore not possible to collect any feedback from the beneficiaries as the time allowed onsite (45 minutes) does not allow a proper exchange with communities.

2.1.3.4 OPERATIONAL CHANGES

The recent series of three to four storms affected 55 household latrines in Muna area, 46 of which have their upper structures destroyed. Solidarités prioritized the rehabilitation of those latrines and has not yet started the implementation of latrines scheduled in their ongoing actions. Since the damaged latrines are unusable if not rehabilitated, it is relevant to report the inherent costs of the latrine repairs to the ongoing projects (projects were signed before the storm). The action will eventually include 250 latrines in MMC/Bolori II (55 rehabilitations and 195 new ones).

In Monguno, four blocks of five emergency latrines (20 latrines in total) were also destroyed by the storms. The 550 emergency latrines scheduled in Monguno (R3/A3) will be reduced to 400 with a dispatch between Monguno (300 among which are the 20 destroyed) & Maiduguri (100). The initial 550 figures wrongly included 150 latrines in Dikwa which should not appear in this appraisal.

No reported change from the appraisal with regard to beneficiaries' selection criteria.

2.1.4 Capacity of the partner (and of implementing partners if applicable)

As highlighted above, there is little room for maneuver in terms of time and although implementation timeframe integrates context specific delay hazards (mainly linked to security), a close analysis of the consequences of any unforeseen or exceptional delays is required as they occur in order to secure the completion of the expected outputs before the end of the project.

As for of technical capacities, the monitoring highlighted some gaps in terms of onsite work processing supervision and service performances follow up once the services are opened. The recent arrival of a WASH specialist will certainly cover some of these gaps provided that his workload will still allow him to inspect sites and services at certain key moments of the implementation of the related activities.

Solidarités seems to have a rather coherent security management protocol with an information network in Monguno and Maiduguri which allow a security check before and during onsite activities deployment.
So far, Solidarités has not been able to secure a presence of expatriate staff for a duration exceeding 6 months. The recent separation of the guesthouse from the office building and the upgrading of living conditions may contribute to the limitation of the human resources turn over.

2.1.5 Financial (budget execution)

Budget execution is close to 0 (1%) although budget expenditure will rise once subcontractors will be paid.

2.1.6 Policy coherence (including RSO comments - if applicable)

The action is coherent with existing policies in the WASH sector as part of full-fledged WASH operation conceived as a response to an acute crisis due to a sudden loss of access to existing WASH services to ensure timely and dignified access to sufficient and safe WASH services to all the intended population (Option 1 i), Annex 1 of DG ECHO Thematic Policy Paper n°2 (Water, Sanitation & Hygiene).

2.1.7 Communication, visibility and information activities

Although not observable for the outputs of the action of reference as they were not completed, it was observed limited if any visibility materials in DG ECHO previously funded actions.

2.1.8 Issues for action / for follow-up

Copies of contracts with sub-contractors in charge of water points, water reticulation systems and latrine construction should be included as annexes in the next modification request or interim report.

Copies of construction schemes for water and sanitation facilities (including improvement related to storms hazards for both latrines and water point equipment). should be included as annexes in the next modification request or interim report

Modalities of monitoring of onsite construction and use of water and sanitation services should be included as annexes in the next modification request or interim report.

The protocol used to monitor the hygiene promotion outcomes should be included as annexes in the next modification request or interim report.

The coherency of the calculation figures for hygiene promotion should be reviewed in the next modification request or interim report.

Detailed implementation timeframe should be included as annexes in the next modification request or interim report.

2.1.9 Quality markers

With no or limited onsite progress, quality markers are at a similar stage of the ones reported in the appraisal of the single forms (Gender & Age: 2, and Résilience: 1).

2.2 Review of implementation modalities (Cash for rent) of NRC ongoing supported action (Maiduguri, project reference number 2016/01330)

2.2.1 Methodology

Targeted areas include four wards (Galtimari, Shwari, Madina II and Mouna Ethiopia) in urban Maiduguri.

The methodology implies the setting of one beneficiaries selection committee per wards. Each committee is composed of 5 people including IDPs representative and local leaders in charge of identifying the most vulnerable areas. Once the relevancy of those areas is checked by NRC, door to door visits are implemented to identify IDPs eligible to support according to vulnerability criteria. Once the beneficiary is identified, he is tasked to seek for accommodation. Once done, NRC assesses the relevancy of the beneficiary's targeted accommodation and verifies if it fits to quality standards. Once property documents are duly certified, the beneficiaries receive then four-month cash voucher based on a tenancy agreement with the property owner. The property owner collects then the rent at NRC level.

2.2.2 Progress

So far 900 household have been selected to receive support. Objectives are 1 430 including 930 under OFDA support and 500 under ECHO. Project appraisal mentions 1 000 households.

2.2.3 Review

2.2.3.1 RENT ALLOWANCE CALCULATION

The monthly average rent targeted beneficiaries negotiates is 2 500 naira. It is much less than initially envisaged 167£ yearly allowance representing a monthly rent of approximately 5 600 naira. *S*uch a difference in the scheduled and effective rent costs raises two issues:

- The capacity of NRC to properly design its proposals when foreseen costs represent more than the double of the real one. Since such an information can be collected from IDPs already renting their accommodation from host, it tends to question NRC

modalities in terms of context assesment; and

- Such a low renting fee raises the need for a better analysis of the livelihood economy of the targeted beneficiaries. Considering the added value in terms of security and wellbeing of having his own accommodation, it would be expected to have most of the IDPs able to secure 15 € per month to have access to it. The gaps that prevent poor households to secure this amount may need to be better understood.

2.2.3.2 ACCESS TO SERVICE

DG ECHO policy considers Shelter & Settlements as a whole and the notion of settlements embeds the access to basic services which NRC has completely neglected in their methodology.

Although they do check the availability of some services (sanitation for instance), NRC does not monitor the quality of the services the beneficiaries have access to. The only criterion measured by NRC is the minimal surface available per person (>3.5m²/p). The Cash for rent activity does not include the monitoring and documentation of their access to basics services (WASH, Health, Food, etc.).

Moreover, most if not all of the humanitarian support provided in urban Maiduguri targets populations living in informal or formal settlements. Removing IDPs from such sites to a better accommodated location may deprive them from the humanitarian support they previously received. Although hypothetical, such loss of access to basic service is not unlikely and is not monitord by NRC.

2.2.3.3 UNDOCUMENTED CASELOAD MODIFICATION

The initial beneficiaries target is expected to be divided by two to strengthen the kit content dedicated to Rapid Response Mechanism (RMM) which costs raised significantly. It is difficult to understand why the initial number of beneficiaries of cash for rent activities is divided by two considering that:

- The reduction of renting costs would have suggested increasing the cash for rent beneficiaries figure;
- The absence of knowledge of the total caseload of people eligible to cash for rent activities (see § 2.2.3.4 below) tends to question the opportunity of decreasing the targeted number of beneficiaries of this activity;
- The amount allocated to the kit provided through the MRR mechanism already benefitted from the availability of 70 000 Euros due to the cancelling of the Sensei activity (R4/A1);
- The fact that the final unit cost of such kit may become unaffordable to most humanitarian actors. The related risks of creating a discrepancy of response within humanitarian actors or to limit their coverage capacities needs to be been documented; and
- The analysis which can ascertain that needs are more acute for people living in the outreach areas than those of the people identified in the cash for rent activity needs to be done prior to any caseload modification.

Without such, the number of cash for rent beneficiaries should be kept to its initial figure or expanded in the limit of its initial budget.

2.2.3.4 PRIORITIZATION FLAW

NRC does not know the total caseload of eligible beneficiaries in the 5 wards they have targeted. They select beneficiaries as they process the sites identified by the committees. Such approach allow a quick start of the activities as beneficiaries can be identified from the first site visit but it also presents the risk that the activity ends without having targeted the most vulnerable populations as they were settled in areas not yet visited by NRC teams.

2.3 Strategic & technical meeting with UNICEF related to ongoing and scheduled supported action (project reference number 2016/01342).

2.3.1 Operational consideration

On an operational basis, previous sites observations[9] have shown that UNICEF had little if any capacity to monitor the processing and the use of the service they implement through DG-ECHO supported actions. The location of the sites of intervention is an issue as it does appear in the single forms or in its annexes.

UNICEF tends to mix interventions such as repairs, rehabilitation, upgrading and new facility in a single figure. The distinction is necessary as each of them has different implication in terms of strategy (existing service improvement Vs service coverage extension), costs (a few dollars –basic repair- against up to more than hundreds of thousands –deep borehole processing & equipment) and operation (two to three hours up to one to two months).

UNICEF is basing its beneficiaries on SPHERE standards specifications but not on effective monitoring of the water points attendance or latrines number of users. Little is provided as far as the effectiveness of the performances of their hygiene sensitization sessions which represents the majority of the direct beneficiaries in their appraisal.

2.3.2 Strategy modification

Now that NGOs capacities have strengthened, UNICEF has little added value to pursue activities NGOs are now capable to address at a much lower cost. There is a need to reorient UNICEF operational strategy in domain of expertise or operations, NGOs are unwilling or incapable to insure.

RUWASA is the main counterpart of UNICEF when other WASH partners documented the existence of private companies with the same technical capacities, much more pro-activeness and reliability during onsite work processing for a much cheaper price.

2.3.3 WASH cluster review

2.3.3.1 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION

Recently arrived WASH Cluster Coordinator acknowledged that beside three years of ongoing crisis, technical capacities in terms of quality of service delivery is poor. Priority is on technical expertise, strategic approach & capacities deployment.

In terms of coordination mechanism, the existing sector meetings have limited added value in terms of operation as the attendance to these meeting is too high, the meeting too long, the frequency too low and the area covered too big to address sector specific issues.

The 5W matrix the WASH cluster has developed has become an extremely heavy tool unable to update with the required frequency and to produce relevant analysis. A simplified tool has been introduced by the WASH cluster coordinator in order to allow the sector to produce response analysis which resumes the DTM matrix and completes it with the ongoing WASH response (document is called “WASH gap analysis”).

2.3.3.2 CLUSTER PRIORITIZATION STRATEGY

In terms of operational prioritization, the WASH cluster tends to consider that, based on the existing coverage of the informal and formal settlement so far identified, needs in urban Maiduguri are covered and that support to outreach LGAs should be the priority. Prioritized LGAs are in that order Monguno (where Solidarités Internationales & Alima work), Dikwa (Solidarités Internationales), N’Gala (UNICEF) and Ran (ICRC, Oxfam, MSF, UNICEF). Such an approach does not take into account that humanitarian response in urban Maiduguri only addresses 21% of the total estimated caseload in MMC and Jere LGAs. The status of four out of five IDPs in Maiduguri remains unknown. Based on the movements existing in and out settlements, it can be assumed that IDPs living in host communities have

[9] See 2015 & 2016 WASH RSO mission reports in Nigeria.

a better status than those living in settlements[10], it needs to be documented though.

2.3.3.3 OVERALL REVIEW

The WASH cluster is still an unproductive and time consuming mechanism. As of now, some NGOs if not most, work with their own set of data as the one produced by the cluster are not reliable.

On the other hand the recent arrival of an experienced WASH cluster coordinator is an encouraging sign that the WASH coordination will become the expected support platform rather than the regretted burden that it has been since the beginning, and still is as of now.

3 Expert recommendations

Some of the recommendations made in 2015 and 2016 are still valid for 2017 and 2018 although the deployment of international NGOs and the strengthening of their technical capacities may translate in effective changes in the near future. They are reminded here in the narrative of this section alongside with the ones specific to the outcomes of this mission.

3.1 Enhancing design expertise

3.1.1 Water Supply

Once needs are accurately known, the best solution to cover the water related needs of the IDPs in the camps and among the community is to have a proper diagnosis of the water networks of the cities in order to repair/improve production and repair/extend the water network. Only the vulnerable population out of the reach of the water network should be supported with an autonomous system. It can be done through:

- NGOs or Organization who have the required knowledge (ICRC & UNICEF mainly); or
- Through externalized skill embedded with a WASH partner (city technical services in the Nigerian context or La Fondation Véolia for instance).

As for new facilities, the processing and equipment of new boreholes, solar, fuel or manually powered encompass minimum requirements such as:

- Motorized boreholes should be equipped with the minimum standard equipment such as air valves, non-return valves, control valves, piezometric data logger, strengthened stands and protection box/cap;
- Proper bypassing of equipment in order to be able to maintain and repair it without affecting the water supply. They should be completed by control intake/taps in order to monitor the quality of the water ;
- Online chlorination system (either manual or automatized) for piped and/or stored water;
- Proper water metering in order to assess the quantities produced, delivered and to detect leakages or misuses along the supply and distribution lines;
- All network valves should be set in secured control boxes in order to isolate, protect and operate them;
- Solar panel control box should respect minimum standard in terms of weather hazard (IP54);
- Water ddistribution stands and hand pump sites should be equipped with proper drainage system including drainage channels to remove spillage from the stand/apron and soak away[11] pit to prevent any stagnant water; and
- All water distribution sites should be properly delimited (ideally with fence or wall) and hygiene and proper use related messages displayed.

3.1.2 Sanitation

As for water supply, waste water network is the best solution in urban context. The coverage of this network in Maiduguri is not documented. It is believed to be very small (if any). As a

[10] In 2015-2016; Some IDPs reported to go to settlement (the formal ones mainly) when they did not have any more sufficient cash to pay the rent of their accommodation in horst.

[11] Crop garden irrigated by the drained water can be envisaged if space, pedology and topography allow it.

waste water network cannot be set in an emergency context, the best solution consists in monitoring and supporting the use of autonomous facilities (pit latrine). In host communities new emergency public latrines should not be considered as an option as it is likely to trigger public health issues if not properly maintained.

Latrine designs should encompass the following requirements:

- Reinforced pit wall if soil is unstable;
- Latrines entrance should be facing the winds with air circulation opening (below the door at entrance, upper small window at the back);
- Defecation holes should be always equipped with a tapping device;
- Pit edge should be above the runoff water levels and always distant more than 30 meters from any boreholes (more if located higher);
- Ventilation pipe should always be taped with metallic fly nets, their bases strengthened in order to resist against storms;
- Pit apron should always be air tight, accessible from the outside in order to facilitate its desludging and flood isolated;
- Public latrines should be gender separated and design adapted to all users (children and disabled people);
- Public latrines should always be equipped with light for use at night and never distant more than 50 meters from the households of the users;
- Latrines should be storm resistant with foundations properly anchored, posts connections and wall frames secured; and
- In the short terms there should not be more than 50 users per emergency latrine (20 in the mid-term).

Solid waste management activities should only be prioritized in area of great concentration of people (IDPs Camp and Informal settlement type of camp). A proper solid waste storage system should encompass the following requirements:

- A 100 liters capacity storage devices for every 10 households;
- Maximum distance between household and storage device is less than 100 meters;
- Storage devices should be climate hazard proof (water and wind tight);
- A secured removal capacity of 1m3 per 1,000 households;
- A burying site located minimum 500 m from the nearest household (host or IDPs); and
- Minimum burying site capacity should be 104 m^3/year per 1 000 household.

Surface water drainage should only be conceived in camps site. It should be mainstreamed with the settlement design. A proper surface water drainage system should encompass the following requirements:

- Drainage should address two type of hazards: water runoffs (protection of shelter) and stagnant water (floods);
- Drainage channels should have a slope between 1% and 5 %;
- Drainage channels can be made of sealed half pipe or ditches (lesser privileged option);
- Considering the nature of the soil in Maiduguri (sand & clay) its setting should be strengthened to avoid erosion/collapsing;
- Crossover for car and trucks should be done using for instance reinforced concrete (450Kg/m^3 cement content with 8mm iron bars 20 cm spaced) frames;
- Drainage channel should be covered with grid type of apron as soon as its depth represents an accident hazard; and
- All drainage channels should lead to the lowest point of the area and then evacuated (through buried pipes) out of the site by gravity (or through pumping if gravity forbids).

3.1.3 Shelter & NFI

Shelter design should be able to isolate the beneficiaries from weather related hazards and designed according to the household size. It implies the following minimum requirements:

- Minimum surface per person is 30m2 without taking into account the collective services' needs;

- Elevated and isolated floor (with gravels and tarpolin cover for instance with specific requirements for cooking areas if set inside (gravel only for instance);
- Drainage channels and small dykes to divert water runoffs from shelter entrance;
- Located in a non-flooded area; and
- Shelter should be storm resistant with foundations properly anchored, posts connections and wall frames secured.

In an urban context where most IDPs are hosted in communities or have access to the markets of a major town, the provision of in-kind items is questionable when the market would be more likely to absorb the demand at a lesser cost than the humanitarian actors'.

- An Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) is recommended in order to assess if this assumption is correct;
- Based on the results of this EMMA, the opportunity to switch to a cash & voucher approach should be analyzed and set if relevant;
- One of the core expenses for the IDPs in host communities is the accommodation rent. Such problematic should be integrated in the design of the response to some extent. IDPs targeting for High Intensity Manpower Activities (HIMA) could be envisaged (from camps & communities based on their vulnerability/income generating capacities) to address the issue; and
- NFI, Coupon or cash amount should be provided according to the real status of the targeted households (number of people, family composition). It requires a different approach in the designing of the response[12].

When distributed, all household hygiene related items should be designed, quantified and consumables renewed according to the household size: Following standards could apply:

- 20 l volume uPVC Jerry can/ 3 people for water transportation and storage;
- 20 l volume PVC bucket with lid & tap/ household for water storage;
- 1 l capacity plastic kettle/household for handwashing;
- 20l capacity Household water treatment sachet/p/day;
- 250g bathing soap/p/month; and
- 200g washing soap/p/month.

3.2 Enhancing onsite work supervision

Once designs are agreed and understood, local contractors and promotors should agree on validation steps processing which could record:

- The inventory and quality validation of all material and equipment dedicated to the facility;
- Progress validation steps during on site work at key moments of its processing (aquifer catchment, borehole equipment design, pit digging completion, pit lining completion, surface equipment completion, etc) in accordance with its scheduled design;
- Inventory of all equipment expected in the facility (including proper setting);
- Test of the performance of the provided facility (specific yields, water tightness of equipment, etc.);
- Temporary reception of the facility; completed by
- Definitive reception and final payment 3 to 6 months after its opening (pending on the type of facility built) to amend hidden flaws.

All those steps and procedure should be mentioned in the contract linking both parties.

As for already processed water facilities, it is recommended:

- To assess the capacities (borehole specific yield assessment) of all the boreholes processed and/or used to cover the need of the IDPs according to their ongoing and foreseen caseload;
- Once the borehole capacity is documented, it is recommended to equip them with the

[12] Focusing on a person needs according to the household he/she lives in rather than focussing on a household kit which content does not necessarily fit to the family characteristic.

pump which will allow the best performance and thus reducing the number of equipment required. Solar pumping can be considered as an option provided repair and maintenance capacities are available[13] and that it meets the water supply requirements; and

- To amend all ineffective facilities according to the upper recommendations on design §3.1.

3.3 Enhancing service monitoring

Opportunities to uses local capacities to participate to the supported WASH services should be promoted where relevant. It encompasses:

- The use of local supplier for basic items consumptions and locally available equipment renewal; and
- The use of local human resource to insure petty job other people may be reluctant to do (solid waste removal for instance). Such activities should be paid on a volume basis rather than on an hour based remuneration.

3.3.1 Water Supply

A proper monitoring of the performance of the equipment, process and people in charge of them should be systematically set for all type of water supply services.

- The maximum number of users per facility (based on a survey and not on a fictive ratio population/number of facilities);
- A monthly monitoring system of the performance of the water supply should be set (aquifer levels, service demand, leakages detection, users pressure at distribution, users 'satisfaction, operation, maintenance & repair costs follow up);
- Water quality should be monitored on daily basis for network (free residual content), on a monthly basis for hand pumps (bacteriological content) and physical parameter (pH and turbidity) and twice a year for chemical ones (at the end of the dry and rainy seasons);
- The water committees should be exclusively composed of users[14] at all levels of management. They should have access to a user's-led complaint mechanism[15] with a voice at camp/community coordination meetings;
- Some camp (Bakassi for instance) have an area dedicated to agriculture/cropping. It is likely that water may be used for crop watering. Such use should be monitored alongside with any use dedicated to economic purposes. A cost recovery mechanism should be set for this use. The collected money should contribute to the repair & maintenance costs of the water committees;

3.3.2 Sanitation

As for water supply, a proper monitoring of the status of the facilities, of the performance of the services and a complain mechanism should be set for all facilities. Such monitoring should focus on:

- The maximum number of users per latrine/public waste bin (based on a survey and not on a fictive ratio population/number of facilities);
- The availability of soap and water at latrine levels (both public and private/household latrine) for hand washing;
- The filling status of the latrine/bins and desludging/removal needs;
- The cleanness of the latrine and proper equipment (tap for defecation hole);
- The absence of solid waste in the environment and its safe disposal ;
- The presence of long lasting hygiene related messages signboards; and
- The proper protection equipment for teams in charge of maintenance of latrine and

[13] It should be the case as solar pumping is reported to be supported at state and/or federal level.

[14] Mainly women. Men are usually not in charge of the household water supply and less sensitive to its burden, thus less likely to seek for its reduction.

[15] See upper remark.

collection/removal of solid waste.

Some activities such as drainage cleaning or latrine emptying in urban Maiduguri hosts require an integrated approach with relevant authorities (BoSEPA). Such could be envisaged with the following requirements:

- Clear memorandum of understanding and tasks based contracting in order to avoid the payment of inexistent/irrelevant tasks and to seek for local contractors if more competitive than the institution; and
- A comprehensive understanding of the scope of the related workload in order to achieve the expected result (starting from upstream to downstream when cleaning drainage channels for instance).

3.3.3 Shelter & NFIs

As for Shelter & NFIs, the minimum requirements are:

- To monitor that the shelters allocated to each IDPs in camps and informal settlements respect the minimum service access and space standards according to the number of people per households;
- To monitor that the targeted beneficiaries did receive the expected type, quantities and consumables renewal frequency;
- To assess whether the quantity received are enough and used for the initially targeted purpose;
- A monitoring of the use of the NFI/Voucher/Cash will be necessary if used. A great attention should be paid for fraud detection (local seller with coupons, cash among the humanitarian staff) and protection of the beneficiaries (mainly with cash distribution);
- The assessment of the access to the other basic services (WASH, Health, Protection, Food); and
- As for the WASH sector, a complain mechanism should be accessible to the people entitled to receive the related NFI/Voucher/Cash support.

3.3.4 WASH'NUT & WASH in Health

As part of the problematic linked to populations affected by conflicts, the strategic approach is mainly of a WASH in Health nature than a WASH'NUT since the entry point of all interventions is the presence of IDPs.

As such, all interventions in health facilities aiming at securing WASH services overwhelmed by the increase of attendance due to the presence of IDPs are eligible.

On the other hand, if support to the ambulatory treatment of SAM includes the delivery of WASH package aiming at securing access to safe water and hygiene at home, the deliverable should be the same as in the WASH 'NUT strategy. It should include household water treatment, soaps, jerrycans and buckets in quantities adapted to the duration of the treatment and the size of the households if such are not provided through other humanitarian activities.

3.4 Interventions in Borno outreach

Considering the difficulties of access due to insecurity, it is recommended to design intervention focusing on distribution and facilities IDPs could build themselves with the support of local organization. Related activities may include:

- Distribution of WASH NFIs;
- Distribution of Shelter items and NFIs;
- Distribution of tools to set the expected facilities (defecation trenches, drainage); and
- Diagnosis and repair and support to local water supply system (hand pump repair, fuel and consumables delivery, etc.).

Nevertheless, ONGs working with local organization must be able to insure that the activities processed by their partner reaches the minimum standards in terms of targeting and quality.

The role of the recently created rapid response mechanism (RRM) regrouping actors such as ACF, DRC, NRC, MSF, Oxfam, UNICEF & WFP should be clarified according to the

typologies of interventions:

- As a first respondent if no actor a present on site and access is not granted;
- As a last respondent if actors are present and access secured; and
- On a case by case basis if access is granted but no actors are already operational on site, pending on other actors deployment capacities.

3.5 Enhancing targeting

As of now, the response is expanding its targeting to the outreach without having being able to document the conditions of the IDPs hosted in urban Maiduguri (more than 550 000 people of concern in MMC and Jere LGAs)

- A proper mapping of the areas of concentration of IDPs should be done in the urban LGAs of Borno state in order to have a proper overview of the problematic and allow a coherent coordination of the response;
- This mapping should be combined with an assessment of the impact of the IDPs on the access to existing public (health, water and sanitation, protection) and private sector led (shelter, informal businesses) services; and
- Those data combined with a proper typology of the population (IDPs and host communities) will define a vulnerability map which will allow a proper targeting of the area and populations to prioritize.

3.6 Enhancing coordination

As of now, the existing coordination is not able to allow a pro-active and cost effective coordination of the response. For the WASH sector, the existing tool (5W table) needs to be reviewed. Recommendations to WASH coordination includes the followings:

- Response should not be designed on the basis of each implementing partners' capacities but on the most cost effective and performant setting to address the population's needs (including specific gender, disabled, cultural needs);
- Assessment, programmatic & monitoring tool should be disaggregated per area (camp or community unit) and updated on a weekly basis;
- Monitoring of WASH related services should not be calculated on the sole basis of theoretical SPHERE standards but based on the performance (access quantity and quality) and status (capacity, delivery and lifespan) of existing WASH outputs (including NFIs);
- Minimum design standards should be agreed between the WASH stakeholder in the design of outputs and monitoring of their performance;
- Considering the limited added value of the SEMA led coordination, a more flexible and less institutional sector dedicated meetings set up is needed on a more frequent basis to address coordination challenges; and
- Since the quality of data collected by IOM DTM is extremely useful to orient the response but is too volatile to properly design the response. A feedback mechanism from the operating cluster/actors on the ground is necessary to correct data the DTM does not have the resources to refine. Clear mention of the source of data (DTM or other organizations) will allow a better analysis of the quality of data reported in the DTM; and
- Update and aggregation of programmed or ongoing activities should be down through a coordination web platform facilitated by UNICEF (implementing partners providing the updates and UNICEF verifying and aggregating them). Coordination meeting should be focused on programming of new activities and securing coherence in the design/quality of the proposed outputs.

3.7 Specific recommendations to Solidarités's action 2016/01373

In order to secure that Solidarités has the proper technical design, quality control mechanism and monitoring protocol, a certain number of documents is necessary. The content of those document are reported in §2.1.7 (Action for follow up).

Most of the WASH related technical recommendations reminded above apply to Solidarités' action (§3.1 to §3.3).

Based on the observations made in the field and on the top of the above mentioned, a special attention must be paid on the following recommendations:

- A close analysis of the consequences of any unforeseen or exceptional delays is required as they occur in order to secure the completion of the expected outputs before the end of the project;
- Seasonal hazard: the improvements Solidarités envisaged (thicker poles) may not be sufficient to secure the integrity of the structure. Strengthening of poles linkages and setting of diagonal bars, and to some extent, securing the anchorage of the foundations as illustrated in the case studies following §2.1.2.4 should be envisaged;
- Better expertise is required in terms of solar powered water system. Linkage with the existing Solar Initiative Project is recommended as they have scheduled an intervention in September in Nigeria;
- As mentioned in § 2.1.3, it is recommended that the WASH specialist set the proper designs and protocols in terms of quality control during onsite work processing and once the service is accessible (performance monitoring). It is important that inspections of site and services at key moments of the implementation of the activities of the action are prioritized in the organisation of his workload.

3.8 Specific recommendations to UNICEF's action 2016/01342

3.8.1 Operational consideration

§2.1.7 sets of recommendations made for Solidarités applies as well for UNICEF.

Most of the WASH related technical recommendations reminded above apply to UNICEF's action (§3.1 to §3.3).

Based on the observations made in the field and on the top of the above mentioned, a special attention must be paid on the following recommendations:

- Provide ECHO with the exact locations of the targeted sites for both completed (Ref 2015/01214, ending 30th of June), ongoing (Ref 2016/01342) and soon to be signed (2017/00812) projects. For each location, the number and type of intervention should be included;
- The protocol used to monitor the hygiene promotion outcomes should be provided as part of the annexes of the next reports for each of the above-mentioned projects;
- With the ongoing outbreak of Hepatite E in Borno state (2 cases recorded in Monguno, 3 in Ngala and 2 in Molbar), UNICEF should inspire the ongoing design of its strategy with already existing lesson learnt from recent outbreak (for instance in Diffa, Niger); and
- UNICEF should document the technical and financial added value of the RUWASA as a counterpart compared to other existing (private) service providers.

3.8.2 Strategic consideration

3.8.2.1 WASH'NUT

If WASH complementary package to the SAM ambulatory treatment aim in reality to enhance the tracking/monitoring of SAM cases, then related indicators should not be WASH but related to track/monitoring improvements (% of defaulting cases).

Considering their cost, the use of those kits for that purpose may not be extremely relevant. On the other hand if the aim is to strengthen the nutrition treatment efficiency, than quantities and monitoring should be done according to ECHO guidance & recommendations.

3.8.2.2 POPULATION AFFECTED BY CONFLICT

UNICEF has limited if any added value in processing the same activities as NGOs. It should tackle technical challenge NGOS are unwilling to address such as:

- Outreach areas accessible only under escorts army NGOs are unwilling to use; and

- The strengthening of the urban city water network. Such intervention will address not only crisis related issue (among which are the 550 000 IDPs not benefiting from support in urban Maiduguri) but will contribute to the limitation of a cholera outbreak expansion. The intervention should focus on quick wins (repairs) which will enhance the water production, quality security and service reliability and/or coverage.

3.9 2018 Technical Annexe for Nigeria:

3.9.1 General sector recommendation for the overall region

The following narrative is a translation of the general sector recommendations for WASH & Shelter & Settlements sector for the Population affected by conflicts axis of West Africa HIP and could be use at the same level in the Central Africa HIP.

3.9.1.1 WASH

The quality of the procession of the facilities and the related services should be guaranteed by an inhouse expertise of the holder of the action whatever the context considered. In acute phase, all three sub sectors should be integrated in the action aiming at covering vitals needs (medical & domestics). In stabilised phase, priorities will include the sustainability and the accessibility of the service with a possible extension to other uses but domestic (brick making, agriculture). The autonomy of the services will be based on the sole performances of their managers.

3.9.1.2 SHELTER & SETTLEMENT

Support is not limited to Shelter but encompasses the analysis of access to basic services (health, WASH, protection, etc.). In acute phase, hazard (fire, floods, and epidemics) and constraints (sanitary corridors, proximity to conflict zones, availability of natural resources) should be integrated in the first stages of the designs of site settlements. The individualization and adaptation of shelters and NFIs supplied to beneficiaries, to the market capacities and local practices will be privileged in stabilized phases.

3.9.2 Nigeria specific sector recommendation

For both WASH & Shelter & Settlements sectors priority should be given to the documentation of the expected process, outputs and monitoring protocols. All WASH & Shelter & Settlements related activities should be documented in annex reporting precise location of targeted sites (when known), technical schemes of the targeted outputs, bills of quantities, implementation rates with detailed timeframe schedule, team charts & human resources dedicated per activities and monitoring protocols for both processing & service performances.

4 Sector policy compliance[16]

They are similar to November 2015 and June 2016 mission and reported below with small changes.

4.1 Limited WASH capacities of humanitarian actors for urban area

With now more than 550 000 IDPs scattered in the urban host community of Mauiduguri (Borno State), the technical response is challenging as it is out of the usual camp-type autonomous WASH service response. It requires mainly assessing the capacities of the existing network and key interventions which could improve its production improve and extend its distribution.

Most of DG-ECHO WASH partners are institutionally reluctant to engage in such type of support as they do not have the internal knowledge to provide it. If some partner may have some of their expatriate experienced in WASH urban setting, one of the only institution for which this knowledge is institutionalized is ICRC or UNICEF to a lesser extend.

[16] The following section is an addendum to the mission report template dedicated to sector policy issues (C1).

Though the technique involved is not very different from usual camp type response (only the scale is changed), there is a gap to address this type of WASH intervention among the WASH actors.

In the context of more and more populations in the third world living in urban areas, the strengthening of related technical knowledge will allow some pinball interventions (valve changing, supply of consumable, pipe replacement) which can be a game changer in terms of swift improvement of access to WASH services.

4.2 Lack of quality control

As it is more and more observed in DG-ECHO funded WASH programs, the quality of the implementation is more and more worrying. It has already been reported in previous reports and the outputs observed during the mission in Maiduguri illustrate this trend.

As of now, this lack of quality control cannot be acknowledged as there is no technical specification in the WASH sector.

If some worldwide use tool such as SPHERE standards provide some guidelines they are often use for what they are not meant to be (programmatic tools instead monitoring tools[17]).

It is like if, in the health sector, ECHO would not bother to have medicine purchased either through Humanitarian Procurement Centre or from the local shop in the nearby village. There are no WASH minimum requirements which absence would allow ECHO not to fund a WASH project.

As reported in previous report, ECHO should have its own WASH Technical Specification in order to secure quality setting and control. Those are not difficult to produce as most donors use similar documents in the technical specifications of their tender.

Feed-back Request Box

None

[17] To a certain extent, they are not even enough as monitoring tools as it does not contain any indication on where, how often and how accurate (coverage wise) this monitoring should be done. Sad enough, SPHERE standards reports on maximum capacity of service delivery while WASH actors use it as a dimensioning tool. Their programmatic approach consists in setting services that are considered to be overstretched according to SPHERE standards. It results in the designing service of poor quality from the very programmatic stage.