**JOINT PROGRAMMING**

**Concept Paper for a Joint Programming Workshop on LATIN AMERICA and the CARIBBEAN:**

**Nicaragua – Bolivia – Colombia – Peru – Ecuador – Guatemala - Honduras – Paraguay - El Salvador**

**Haiti – Dominican Republic – Cuba – Jamaica – Belize – Bahamas - Barbados**

**Bogota, Colombia – 11 October 2017** *(part of EU Regional Seminar 9-11 October 2017)*

**Purpose of JP Regional Workshop for LA&Caribbean (co-organised with the EEAS):**

* Target discussion with Heads of Delegations/Cooperation, as well as Member States,to identify opportunities and challenges, exchange experiences and lessons learned and share practices on Joint Programming in the two regions; including on engaging with MS, other like-minded partners and national stakeholders;
* Create a joint understanding of Joint Programming by sharing the overall analysis of the [Head of Mission reports](https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/private-joint-programming/documents/analysis-heads-mission-reports-joint-programming-2016)[[1]](#footnote-1) and the [independent evaluation of Joint Programming](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-eu-joint-programming-process-development-cooperation-2011-2015_en) – and by bringing to LA & the Caribbean the experience of Joint Programming built in other countries/regions;
* Better integrate global / strategic issue (i.e. SDGs, trade, energy, migration) into Joint Programming and in leveraging broader EU influence, especially in countries transitioning to Middle Income level;
* Bridge the communication gap between HQ and field, improve networking of field actors.

**Content of the JP Regional Workshop for SA-IO:**

* The core of the workshop will be on country presentations and discussions, plus update on state of play of JP and way forward (2016 HoM Report analysis; factoring in MTRs; evaluation report; joint monitoring and results frameworks);
* Following-up on [Council Conclusions on stepping-up Joint Programming](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/12-conclusions-on-stepping-up-joint-programming/), and on [HRVP/Commissioners note](https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/private-joint-programming/documents/commissionershrvp-note-implementation-council-conclusions-stepping-joint-programming-2016)1 for their implementation;
* To identify ways in which Joint Programming can take into account recent policy/political trends (ie. the Consensus, trade, investments); role of joint implementation; how an expanding agenda can better serve EU joined-up engagement with more advanced countries; and how Agenda 2030/SDGs can offer either an entry point to JP or function as incentive to progress/review Joint Strategies;
* Information on new tools in support of JP: the new "Operational Manual for Joint Programming", new communication means ([website](https://jptracker.capacity4dev.eu/)/[cap4dev](https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming)/[brochures](https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/documents?text=brochure)) and technical assistance/helpdesk support.

**STATE OF PLAY OF JP IN PARTNER COUNTRIES IN SA-IO**

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| **COUNTRY** | **JP STATE OF PLAY** | **NATIONAL PLANNING CYCLE** | **COMMENTS**  *(Based on HoM reports 2016 and recently received documents)* |
| **NICARAGUA**  (LMIC) | Joint Strategy  (updated for 2018-2020) | 2017-2020 | *Participating partners: Germany, Luxemburg, Spain + Canada and Switzerland (France and Italy participate in joint analysis, not programming)*  The European Union and its MS in Nicaragua, together with that of Switzerland and Canada, have been developing a JP process since February 2012. Its formal launch, in 2018, will allow better alignment of the participating countries among themselves and with the national development strategy.  Policy dialogue is limited.  In this context, partners in this joint programming exercise have decided to organise their efforts on the basis of the universally adopted 2030 Agenda. This is meant to strengthen the coherence and division of labour between them, in full respect of national priorities. |
| **GUATEMALA**  (LMIC) | Joint Analysis (frozen) |  | *Participating partners: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK*  Guatemala was a pilot Delegation for the Joint Programming Exercise. Annex 2 of the MIP contains the Joint Analysis. However, these documents have become obsolete because of the 2015 events, the formation of the Jimmy Morales government and the Member States' degree of achievement with their respective cooperation strategies. The Joint Analysis is being revised with the help of the German embassy who volunteered to draft a new document.  Taking into consideration the type and volume of the Member States' cooperation in Guatemala, the EUDEL does not see an advantage in pulling together a consolidated programming document to replace our MIP. |
| **BOLIVIA**  (LMIC) | Joint Strategy  2017-2020 |  | *Participating partners: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK + Switzerland*  After the publication of the EU Joint Response in 2014, the JP process continued in 2015 and the first half of 2016 with the formulation of a draft Joint Programming Document for the period 2017-20, which saw the involvement of the EU Delegation, the Member States present in the country plus Switzerland (hereafter EU+) and the government, represented by the Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Financing.  It currently is in the approval process in Brussels (to be finalised very soon).  It needs to be noted that the Document will not yet replace single country strategies or the MIP 2017-2020, as it will rather accompany them providing a general framework. It is foreseen to proceed to full substitution as of 2021. |
| **PARAGUAY**  (UMIC) | Joint Strategy | National Development Plan 2030  with a 2014-2018 Plan currently | *Participating partners: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK*  The EU and MS are the largest donors of non-reimbursable aid.  The Joint Strategy contains a joint analysis of development challenges with particular focus on the social and environmental situation, a chapter on the EU's strategic objectives in Paraguay and a definition of focal sectors of EU intervention.  The stated priorities are in agreement with EU objectives and the EU has aligned its cooperation strategy with the government's plan. A significant by-product of the EU’s efforts during the JP exercise is that the process has strengthened EU-MS division of labour.  Intra-EU coordination has been efficient and effective all along, but donors’  coordination has not received equal attention from the Government side.  Opportunity of a new round of JP is probably best examined in the second semester of 2018 when a new government with its government programme is in place. |
| **EL SALVADOR**  (LMIC) | Roadmap |  | *Participating partners: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK*  MS and EU DEL decided to pursue concrete common objectives in the field of cooperation, in the form of a common dialogue with the country, a better visibility of the EU, and a better knowledge /exchange of information about our activities instead of a complete and formal JP. Others dimensions of the EU action in El Salvador (security, migration, trade, climate change) are not formally contemplated in the "light" joint programming underway.  MS are not considering changing their current national programming documents (when they exist). Their replacement by a unique EU strategy document is envisaged for the next programming period.  The prospects in terms of joint cooperation are to: (i) deepen our programme coordination and dialogue on social and security issues, fiscal reform, climate change sectors, (ii) enhance initiatives to make EU more visible and better communicate on EU cooperation, (iii) identify new areas where joint action represents high value added. |
| **HAITI**  (LDC) | Roadmap |  | *Participating partners: France, Germany, UK*  In 2015, a pragmatic approach was favoured foreseeing a kind of “parallel” approach: (i) progress in JP for the different sectors depending on the operationalisation of the 11th EDF and (ii) to achieve a more general analysis leading to a coherent strategy covering all different sectors.  In 2017, three development cooperation plans to revise the intervention strategies were set out in the programming documents (ES, Switzerland and EU). |
| **HONDURAS**  (LMIC) | Roadmap |  | *Participating partners: France, Germany, Spain*  JP has been discussed at the levels of Heads of Cooperation and Heads of Missions on several occasions since May 2012.  It is considered that JP is both feasible and appropriate in Honduras in the short and medium term (2018).  A mission providing technical assistance was held during the month of July 2017. As a result, a proposal of joint response was delivered to the EU and Member States' representations and approved. A draft of a Joint Strategy is currently under review.  The development context in Honduras is complex and challenging. Official development cooperation is important to the country and the EU plays a major role among donors.  Switzerland was invited to the last JP seminar, but was unable to participate due to agenda problems. However, they remain committed to join the EU JP process and the EU Del counts on them for the next steps. |
| *NO ONGOING JP PROCESS:*  **CUBA – JAMAICA – BELIZE – BAHAMAS - ECUADOR – PERU – COLOMBIA – DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – BARBADOS - OCTs** | | | **JP State of Play**  Based on Heads of Mission Reports and Notes:   * **Peru (UMIC)**: There is very limited scope to implement a joint programming process, since the MIP (2014-2017) is in fact only "half a MIP", i.e. phasing-out of bilateral cooperation after 2017. At this moment, EU Delegation is already pretty advanced in formulating the last two bilateral projects.   The EU plays an active role in donor coordination:  - For example, EU Delegation co-presides the round tables on human rights, public finance management and green growth.  - EU Delegation has fully implemented the roadmap exercise with Member States.  In sum, for the bilateral portfolio, the EU Delegation does not see any scope to do joint programming, since there is not much on offer in terms of bilateral aid after 2017.   * **Ecuador (UMIC)**: *Main donors: EU, ES, DE, IT. Funds (non-programmable bilateral aid) also by FR, BE, UK, NL and, to a lesser extent, FI and SE*   Despite the EU intention to graduate upper middle income countries, Ecuador currently continues to receive development cooperation from the EU & MS due to the need to further improve on issues underpinning sustainable development, incl. poverty reduction, inclusive growth and stability, democracy/human rights, good governance, climate change,etc.  Progress on a fully-fledged JP was however hampered by several factors including: (i) uncertainty in 2012/2013 over the future of EU bilateral aid to Ecuador given the focus on a phasing-out strategy whereby the normal programming period was reduced from seven to four years (2014-2017); (ii) non-synchronicity with programming cycles of MS and in some cases, equal uncertainty over future MS cooperation portfolios; (iii) decreasing number of active MS donors with decreasing sums of bilateral aid.  Germany, like other MS, has confirmed that it is ready to participate in future EU JP schemes should the opportunity arise and is open for co-financing activities with the EU & MS. Germany actively encourages the EU to maintain and strengthen its efforts for a strong EU coordination in Ecuador.   * **Jamaica (UMIC)**: 5 MS are represented with a diplomatic mission. 4 of them (Belgium, France, Germany, Spain) do not have any cooperation programme in Jamaica, apart from very small ad hoc measures managed by the respective Embassy. Only the UK has a sizable cooperation programme. In view of the uncertain future of the UK in the Union, the prospects for a JP exercise in the foreseeable future appear remote. The British High Commissioner told me that while the UK High Commission & DfiD are prepared to continue coordinating with the EU on development cooperation, any arrangement going beyond that, such as JP, is not realistic at this stage. * **Belize (UMIC)**: Only one MS is present with a diplomatic mission (UK). JP is not an option under the present circumstances. Other MS (i.e. Germany, Spain) have limited cooperation activities managed from other countries (i.e Guatemala) or from their respective capitals. However, these are fairly limited in nature and often cover regional more than national aspects. * **Bahamas (MAdC)**: The national cooperation with Bahamas under the EDF has been phased out, due to the country's high per capita income. The Bahamas no longer has a national allocation, yet can still apply for resources from the regional cooperation programme. * **OCTs (Turks & Caicos, Cayman)**: As a result of a high per capita income, Cayman no longer receives a territorial (national) allocation. Turks & Caicos received an allocation under the 11th EDF OCT Programme. Due to its status as OCT attached to the UK and the prevailing situation with the UK, the option of JP is currently not realistic.   Based on recent communication:   * **Colombia (UMIC)**: Joint Programming has to be considered in Colombia. Out of the 15 MS with presence in the country only 4 have a structured cooperation programme. Donor coordination focuses more on "political" meetings, often at HoMs level, but issues like DoL and aid effectiveness, are absent from the debate. However, at MS level, the EU Trust Fund for peace in Colombia has offered the opportunity to coordinate the EU action. Under this TF, 19 MS contribute to the EU efforts to support the Colombian peace process, which is the main area of our support, financially and politically. Under this fund, strong coordination takes place and the TF Operational Committee provides most of the results that one could expect from a JP process (joint EU action, single strategy, donor coordination, common dialogue with GoC, DoL, etc) * **Cuba (UMIC)**: *18 MS and 2 deve agencies (AECID, AFD)*   The national planning cycle is "*Lineamientos –actualización 2016-2021*". A formal mechanism of donor coordination does not exist, hence the Cuban Government negotiates bilaterally with each partner (unclear if this is strategically or resource-constrained).  In Cuba, there are different programming cycles of EU vs MS vs Government. There is a convergence of priority areas and appetite for joint assessment of these areas exists. Also, there is interest in joint efforts in experts´ exchange programme linked to sector policy dialogues.  Discussions are taking place towards a joint strategy, a CSO Roadmap and a GAP.  Furthermore, there is ongoing mapping of EU collective action. EU-Cuba NIPs of 2011-2013 (€ 20 m) and the present one of 2014-2020 (€ 50 m) include three main focal sectors: (i) food security, (ii) environment and adaptation to climate change, and (iii) expertise exchange, training and studies. |

1. Access to Capacity4Dev.eu is reserved to EU and EU MS staff and requires membership: please write to [DEVCO-Joint-Programming-Support@ec.europa.eu](mailto:DEVCO-Joint-Programming-Support@ec.europa.eu) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)