**Joint Programming Regional Workshop**

**for Latin America and the Caribbean**

**Bogota, Colombia, 11 October 2017**

**SUMMARY**

*In line with 2016 Council Conclusions on stepping-up Joint Programming (JP) and the follow-up letter of HRVP Mogherini and Cssrs Mimica and Hahn to the EU Delegations to make Joint Programming the preferred approach to programming external development assistance, Joint Programming workshops are organised back-to-back with EU regional seminars.*

*The Joint Programming Regional Workshop for Latin America and the Caribbean showed that exchanges on the concepts of JP are relevant, thereby highlighting that JP is entirely country-driven and flexible with a process which is as important as the product. With several Joint Programming Strategies in place including results frameworks as a basis for a policy dialogue with the partner country government, the generic challenges of JP remain in terms of partner country engagement, division of labour based on country-level priorities and needs in view of the time needed to anticipate eventual changes in sectors, following the sector definition of the partner country, return on investment in JP versus just working together better in selected areas, the inclusion of regional and thematic funds in a JP Strategy, rotation of staff and synchronisation. The opportunity of capitalising on the dynamics of joint efforts in CSO roadmaps, GAP and Human Rights and Democracy strategies should be seized to enhance collaboration.*

*As most countries are moving up the income ladder, reflection is required on what role JP may play in accompanying them in the transformation processes and consolidation of the middle-income status, economic growth and democratic governance. Strengthening the development policy dialogue with these countries should be pursued in connection with the overall political dialogue – and framed around the achievement of the SDGs.*

**REPORT**

This regional JP workshop brought together EU colleagues working in Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru, as well as Member States representatives based in Colombia from France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden. Switzerland, a like-minded partner currently participating in a significant number of EU Joint Programming processes also joined through their representation in Colombia.

JP has a good history in certain countries of the region with Guatemala as a pilot partner country for the JP exercise in 2012-13, which resulted in the "Joint European Union – Member States Strategy for Guatemala 2014-2020" by the end of 2013. In Bolivia, Nicaragua and Paraguay JP Strategies have been developed as well, while other countries have roadmaps in pace (El Salvador, incl. a joint analysis, Haiti, and Honduras).

The **first session** of the workshop provided an overview of the state of play of JP and emerging issues, notably highlighting:

* A reminder of the core of JP: a joint analysis and a joint response to the national development strategy. JP is a flexible, pragmatic tool which is tailored to country contexts and realities by in-country representations. There is not a templated approach, but JP must provide benefit and added value to EU objectives in a specific country.
* An overview of JP in current policy documents: the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy and its emphasis on a joined up approach; the New EU Consensus on Development and its emphasis on working better together; the 2016 Council Conclusions on Stepping up JP which confirm that JP is the right track but call for more to be done.
* A global state of play of the 59 countries working on JP (at different stages) and the experiences gathered so far taken from Heads of Mission reports on JP. These have shown overall good results, including greater trust and greater burden sharing within the EU family and increasingly shared messages and values, translating into greater leverage and visibility for EU.
* Ongoing challenges in JP globally include difficulties to coordinate with bilateral priorities which can sometimes override joint interests, limited partner country ownership and improvements in synchronisation.
* The results of the evaluation of JP which was published early this year: overall the assessment is that we are doing well but should and could do better.
* A review of the tools available to support JP processes including: 2015 Guidance pack, Capacity4Dev website which includes training videos, JP tracker, JP experts contract that can mobilise an experts mission, an operational manual to be launched next month, more specific guidance on approval and endorsement procedures for Joint responses (for the EU part) currently being finalised with Commission central services, useful links such as d-portal to assist with mapping of support in country. These tools focus on sharing experiences, gathering knowledge of country level approaches since JP is not a templated exercise but is more about a closer way of working together.
* Contact details for the DEVCO and EEAS JP teams who can provide support remotely.

There was a positive response to the support available although questions showed there is value in re-publicising these to both EU Delegations and EU MS representations and to provide information quickly to EUD on replacement and endorsement procedures.

Exchanges highlighted that:

* Process of working more closely with the MS is as important as the final 'product'.
* Importance of flexibility and finding country appropriate solutions in contexts of limited or absent Government –development partner coordination.
* Challenges in division of labour and synchronisation are best addressed through pragmatic actions over time with an emphasis on self-discipline by participating members.
* More could be done to reach out to potential like-minded actors such as the UN and to other non-traditional ones such as China and Korea to participate in JP processes.
* Joint implementation is already happening in the region through a number of different modalities – Trust Fund Colombia; joint policy objectives developed in the past in Peru; Delegated Cooperation.
* The replacement of bilateral programmes by JP documents was unlikely to be common in the region seen the declining bilateral envelopes.
* Possibility to capitalise more on JP and other joint processes such as the CSO roadmap, Gender Action plan, Human Rights and Democracy Strategies.
* Mixed experiences on leverage for EU visibility through joint programming and return on investment in joint programming versus just working together better in selected areas.
* Should JP only reflect bilateral aid or can other instruments (thematic, blending) be included even if not so 'programmable' but with an emphasis of use in policy dialogue?

The **second session** of the workshop provided an overview by country of the state of play of Joint Programming with a focus on sharing good practices and challenges from each country context. A summary is provided in Annex 1.

As the Council Conclusions on Stepping up JP call upon finding "ways in which Joint Programming can accompany countries in transition to higher income levels as part of a wider relationship going beyond external assistance", the **third session** discussed specifically the case of Middle Income Countries and the potential role of JP. The New Consensus reaffirms this need for the EU and Member States "to engage with more advanced developing countries including and beyond financial cooperation to tackle poverty, and to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals". As an illustration, the recently developed Ghana Joint Strategy was presented. The Strategic objectives of JP in Ghana are to accompany Ghana’s transformation process and consolidation of its middle-income status, economic growth and democratic governance. The role of Joint Programming in the broader co-operation context is deemed essential in serving both Ghanaian and European common interests.

The exchange raised the following points:

* EU-MS Joint policy dialogue based on common objectives is the future of EU relationships with MICs and JP could provide a means to frame this.
* Examples of country level entry points through dialogue include the SDGs, common cooperation objectives encompassing areas such as scholarships, climate change, gender etc.
* Greater value in JP that can bring in a wide range of EU funded instruments to support defined and shared policy objectives than narrow focus on programming bilateral envelopes.

**Annexes:**

1. Country-by- Country State of Play of Joint Programming Latin America and the Caribbean

2. State of play of JP Worldwide

3. Support from Headquarters

4. Presentation by DEVCO, EEAS Joint Programming teams

5. List of participants

6. Agenda of the workshop

**ANNEX 1 : Country-by- Country State of Play of Joint Programming**

**Bolivia**

* JP has taken a considerable time since starting in 2012, but the government has been involved since the beginning as a member of the working group on JP.
* The JP document has been submitted with the Bolivia MIP; this action however took a long time and is therefore not recommended.
* In the absence of guidance when JP started, the rules of the game were note clear. For some participating MS they were restricted by decision-making processes that were required in capitals.
* Rotation of staff in country has an impact on the process - negotiations sometimes had to redone with new incoming colleagues.
* Grants versus loans was difficult to figure out in terms of financial representation in the joint response and discussions on using national terms to define sectors or other terminology (is gender a cross cutting issue or a sector?) took a lot of time.
* However the process increased coordination and with the expected endorsement Bolivia sees the potential for increased EU visibility.

**Guatemala**

* Despite being one of the first pilots, the repeated political crises took their toll.
* Limited interest form the Government and Member States (only Spain has a bilateral cooperation programme, other MS provide funds through regional cooperation).
* The structure of JP could be considered too complicated for the situation; it is easier to cooperate directly.
* In areas of support to civil society discrepancies between MS positions on human rights defenders and political defenders have surfaced.
* The degree of EU leverage in Guatemala is rather low. In many cases EU support is perceived as interference.

**Paraguay**

* The JP process is aligned to the Government 2030 strategy adopted in 2014 and the Joint response was finalised end 2015 (up to 2018).
* The process had good impact on the division labour: resulting in Spain changing sectors and extending the duration of its intervention.
* Focus now is on joint implementation in the private sector together with Germany.
* A new government in August 2018 might develop a new government programme.
* A strong impediment to JP is the absence of donor coordination: ministries are competing for cooperation relationships with different MS and donor coordination is overall weak.
* JP document is limited to bilateral aid and does not include currently regional and thematic programmes or blending.
* Current reflection is how can we make the JP document more relevant when it will be updated?

**Nicaragua**

* Focus was on the coherence of what EU is doing as a whole.
* Value is in the process more so than the document: emphasis on keeping joint response alive by regular updates to continue shaping programming. These updates have help solving synchronisation issues.
* The joint analysis was useful in order to build a joint position on the 6 SDGs that were considered vital for Nicaragua including a division of labour.
* Creation of a straightforward results framework (1 short page for each SDG drawing from EU results framework indicators, SDG indicators, national development plan indicators). Emphasis on existing indicators already being collected (including at project level which could be aggregated, requiring self-discipline by all). Accepted a 'good-enough' results framework.
* The JP is an instrument for policy dialogue with the government.

**Cuba**

* JP needs a good collective dialogue and a good government focal point.
* Using the SDGs as a basis for analysis can provide added value to country processes.
* Constant analysis is important and regular update of mapping of cooperation can be a challenge.

**Haiti**

* Challenging context with limited number of Member States: meetings on JP stopped in October 2016 due to hurricane Matthew.
* With the 2017 changes in Heads of Cooperation institutional memory on JP was lost. On the basis of the new roadmap, the planning is to more forward and integrating resilience issues much more systematically in JP, incl. relief, reconstruction and development.

**El Salvador**

* Joint analysis in 2015 suffered from high staff turnover. Dialogue with the government to start once new proposals are in place.
* A JP process increases visibility and is a way to amplify messages on EU common values: joint policy dialogue.
* It a challenge to better link sectoral and political dialogue through JP : in particular human rights and security sector discussions are relevant in El Salvador
* What happens when there are no shared policy lines with Member States for e.g. realpolitik vs certain principles. How to find a balance?


**Honduras**

* A Joint analysis was undertaken in 2016 and reviewed during a seminar in July 2017 with all Member States present. Subsequently a joint response was drafted and being assessed: rotations of staff have delayed the process.
* There are no clear incentives for JP for MS: attempts are made to add value through JP relevant to their work such as joint trainings, seminars, TA on aid effectiveness etc. but more ownership needs to be developed. What are the tools or resources to provide this value?
* JP can sometimes be perceived as a duplication of other donor coordination initiatives/platforms already in place.
* Although JP should align our results can at times be contradictory: for example the MTR can include substantial changes and can be challenging to manage in context of JP – this also happens with MS.
* We may gain aid effectiveness in long term, but in short term we need additional efforts and resources as JP is an extra layer of work for everyone in the Delegation.
* There is a clear need to be pragmatic and flexible: in Honduras the Platform of dialogue with civil society has an added value for all.

**Peru**

* The entry point for JP being programmable aid is a limitation of the exercise. Yet, several joint actions take place and common cooperation objectives have been developed.

**ANNEX 2: STATE OF PLAY OF JP WORLDWIDE**



**ANNEX 3: Support from Headquarters**

1. Demand driven short-term technical assistance for in-country missions. Missions can support:

* Consultations with MS to clarify what JP can achieve
* Analytical support such as mapping/country analysis
* Facilitating Workshops/retreats
* Support to drafting documents
* Support in producing communication material

2. Methodological advice and inputs to the process and draft documents from HQ JP team by teleconference /videoconference /email (could include local MS / NAO teams as appropriate)

3. Specific follow-up with MS JP focal points in EU Capitals if needed.

Support is mobilised through a simple email request to:

[DEVCO-Joint-Programming-Support@ec.europa.eu](mailto:DEVCO-Joint-Programming-Support@ec.europa.eu)

[JOINT-PROGRAMMING-SUPPORT@eeas.europa.eu](mailto:JOINT-PROGRAMMING-SUPPORT@eeas.europa.eu)

Additional info on Joint Programming can be found at:

<https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/>

<https://jptracker.capacity4dev.eu/>

**ANNEXE 4 – Presentation by DEVCO, EEAS Joint Programming Teams: shared by email**



**ANNEX 5 – List of participants**



**ANNEX 6 – Workshop programme**

**Joint Programming Workshop: EU Regional Seminar for Latin America and the Caribbean**

**Wednesday, 11 October 2017 – Bogota, Colombia (*Hotel W, room Estudio 1)***

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**09:30 – 09:45 Welcome Addresses**

* *Ambassador Kenneth Bell, Head of Delegation Nicaragua*

Tour de table: introductions

**09:45 – 10:25 Stepping-up Joint Programming: an update**

**Chair : Laurent Sillano, Head of Cooperation Nicaragua**

* Political/policy context: Global Strategy, 2030 Agenda and the new European Consensus
* Implementation of Joint Programming Council Conclusions on stepping-up Joint Programming
* Clarifications on HQ approval procedure
* Tools to enhance communication and HQ support for Joint Programming

Interventions from Member States and like minded

Open discussion

*Presenter: Fiona Ramsey (DEVCO A2) and Paul Gosselink (EEAS Global 5)*

**10:25 – 10:30 Video on Joint Programming by Cambodia**

**10:30 – 11:00 Coffee/Tea Break**

**11:00 – 11:45 Joint Programming in Latin America and the Caribbean (1)**

Sharing experiences on advancing Joint Programming

Interventions by Heads of Cooperation from Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay - 10' each

Nicaragua to refer to the Joint Monitoring/Results Framework (10')

Open discussion

**11:45 – 12:15 Joint Programming in Latin America and the Caribbean (2)**

Sharing experiences on starting the Joint Programming process

Interventions by Heads of Cooperation from El Salvador, Haiti and Honduras - 5' each

Open discussion

**12:15 – 12:45 Middle Income Countries: *what lessons can be drawn for Joint Programming?***

*Introduction Paul Gosselink (EEAS Global 5)*

*All participants invited to provide short interventions as to how Joint Programming could build future links and become relevant for these partner countries.*

*Interventions from Member States and like-minded*

**12.45 – 13.00 Wrap up:** *Fiona Ramsey (DEVCO A2)*