




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# Study on Governance Challenges for Education in Fragile Situations

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Somalia Country  
Report

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## **Foreword and Acknowledgements**

The European Commission study management team, Brussels, consisted of representatives from the Social and Human Development and Migration Unit of DG, European Aid. The Study Reference Group consisted of representatives from the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, Education and Training Foundation, DFID, GTZ, CIDA, IIEP UNESCO, World Bank, Ulster University and the European Commission.

These groups and the consultancy team would like to thank various officials of the international community for their cooperation in facilitating the study and helping to arrange various teleconferences with the consultants. In particular, special thanks are accorded to Mr. Manfred Winnefeld of the European Commission Delegation in Nairobi, responsible for Somalia education. As a distance study, it was not possible to engage in consultation with officials and other stakeholders in Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central zones.

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It is hoped that this analysis will be a useful contribution to the development of education in Somalia in the coming years. It is also hoped that the analysis accurately reflects the views and analysis of those consulted and relevant documentation. The lead author of this report is Mr. Michael A. Ratcliffe, study team leader, with initial distance consultation and insights from Mr. Mark Todd. The Study and consultancy team has been managed by Euro-Trends.

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## Map of Somalia



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## Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

Acronym/Term	English
<b>AET</b>	African Educational Trust
<b>CF</b>	Catalytic Fund
<b>CfBT</b>	CfBT Education Trust
<b>CS</b>	Central South (Somalia)
<b>DFID</b>	UK Department for International Development
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EFA/FTI</b>	Education For All/Fast Track Initiative
<b>EPDF</b>	Education Program Development Fund
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FBO</b>	Faith-based organization
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>INEE</b>	Interagency Network on Education in Emergencies
<b>INGO</b>	International non-government organization
<b>JNA</b>	Joint needs assessment
<b>NGO</b>	Non-government organization
<b>ODA</b>	Official development assistance
<b>RDA</b>	Reconstruction and development plan
<b>SL</b>	Somaliland
<b>TA</b>	Technical assistance
<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b>TFG/AU</b>	Transitional Federal Government/ African Union
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development



# 1. Historical Perspectives: Sector Performance and Resilience

## 1.1 Analysis of Long-Term Sector Performance and Resilience

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa, bordering on Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, with land area of around 740,000 km<sup>2</sup>. Its total population is an estimated 7.7 million people across three zones of South-Central (SC) (4.9 million), Somaliland (SL) (1.1 million) and Puntland (PL) (1.7 million), with an overall low population density of around one person per 10.5 km<sup>2</sup>. Population growth is an estimated 3% per annum, with primary/secondary school age populations projected to grow from around 1.1 million in 2006, to 1.5 million by 2015, with significant implications for education provision. Life expectancy is around 46 years.

A large proportion of the population are rural and nomadic, itself making education service coverage problematic.<sup>1</sup> An estimated 400,000 - 700,000 people are internally displaced, with around 400,000 refugees. Poverty rates are high, with an indicative 43% and 74% living on less than US\$ 1 or US\$ 2 per day respectively. Per capita income is around \$ PPP 230 per annum, with only around one-quarter of the population having access to safe water and sanitation. Under-5 mortality rates are 225 per thousand. There is an extensive Somalia diaspora, with an estimated 1 million (frequently the better educated) living abroad. Remittances are an estimated US\$ 0.7-1.0 billion per annum, with roughly half going direct to parents.<sup>2</sup> A key feature is the clan-based system of loyalties, patronage and networks, which differ across the three zones.

The education sector fragility characteristics can be broadly defined over two periods : i) *conflict-affected deterioration phase over 1970/2000*, with both internal clan-driven conflict and external conflict with Ethiopia, including Somaliland declaration of independence in 1991 and Puntland federal autonomy declaration in 1998; and ii) *still conflict-affected early recovery phase over the period 2000/2009*, including setting up a very fragile transitional national government, establishing embryonic zonal administrations in Somaliland and Puntland, alongside comprehensive international community support for peace and state building and restoring public services. South-Central can be characterised as severely conflict-ridden; Puntland as fragile but stabilising; and Somaliland as comparatively peaceful.

Education is organised as 8 years of primary education and 4 years of junior/secondary education, with limited provision of technical vocational and higher education, which is mainly private and of uncertain quality. The teaching force is mainly hired post-secondary and post-university with an

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Support Committee, 2008. Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia, 2008/2013.

<sup>2</sup> Anna Lindley, 2007. Remittances in fragile Settings : A Somali Case Study


indicative 70% having graduate/diploma qualifications (only Somaliland has embryonic pre-service training), with a target of 100% certification of primary school teachers. School age entry regulation is uncertain and there is an expanding alternative and non-formal basic education provision, including by radio/other media. Somaliland and Puntland have evolving education policy/legislation, regulatory frameworks and education sector plans, although these are not aligned with the transitional federal government (TFG) White Paper on education in 2008.<sup>3</sup>

Since 2000, there has been growing donor support for education, reaching an indicative US\$ 25 million per annum, with EC and EC member states as predominant donors in the sector. It is estimated that there are 30-40 international NGOs working in the education sector, mainly as intermediaries for delivery of EC, UN and bilateral agency support in the sector. Sector coordination takes place through an education sector committee (ESC) and cluster group in Nairobi.

Education sector performance indicators broadly correlate with fragility features. Primary gross enrolment rates in 1980 were indicatively around 70%-80%, declining to less than 30% in 2000.<sup>4</sup> Age disaggregated enrolment data is problematic, but it is estimated that the recent primary school enrolment growth is not keeping pace with growing school age population (*see fig.1*).

For example, currently net enrolment is an indicative 20% (2006), with Somaliland (40%), Puntland (28%) and South-Central (10%), correlating with zonal fragility characteristics (GER 34%). Given the disruption in the nineties, youth literacy rates (15-24 year olds) are an indicative 20%. Enrolment gender parity rates for primary/secondary schools are only 0.55. Encouragingly the number of primary schools has tripled from around 600 to 1800 in the past decade, with the primary teaching service rising from 6,000 to 15,000 teachers.<sup>5</sup> Secondary education enrolment has not matched primary enrolment growth, with a very indicative 30,000-40,000 enrolled in 2007; a gross enrolment of only 6%-8%, with enrolment growth in Somaliland and Puntland. TVET provision is significant, with enrolment of around 4500 young people (70% gain employment), mainly from some donor/NGO and private operations in safer and better-off urban areas.<sup>6</sup> Despite these improvements, it is acknowledged that, especially in South-Central, sector performance is very sensitive to even small changes in the security situation.

**Figure 1: Primary Enrolment, by Zone: 1980/2007 ('000)**



<sup>3</sup> For example, Puntland education policy paper 2005 and Somaliland education policy paper 2006

<sup>4</sup> World Bank, 2008. Country Profiles : Somalia at a Glance

<sup>5</sup> Teachers are paid from school fees by community education councils (CECs), apart from in Somaliland, where government pay for around 2,000 teachers 50% of total).


<sup>6</sup> EC 2008. Identification Study for ESDSP Development Programme : Somalia

## 1.2 Analysis of Factors Affecting Sector Resilience and Fragility

A chronology of key events related to security, political and economic/governance are summarised in *figure 2* below. In broad terms, education sector development and governance features correlate with the broader governance features over the two periods 1970/2000 and 2000/2009, characterised above.

**Key Governance Features, Conflict-Affected Deterioration Phase, 1970/2000.** The key security/political governance features were i) setting up of the Somali Republic in 1960, with Barre Presidency in 1969 and introduction of the Somali language in schools in 1969; ii) overthrow of the Barre Government by opposing clans and subsequent warfare in 1990; iii) declaration of Somaliland independence in 1991; iv) Puntland and Somaliland territorial disputes in 1998, alongside declaration of Puntland autonomy; v) setting up of embryonic public administrations in Puntland and Somaliland, with efforts to introduce revenue/tax collection; and vi) establishment of Somalia aid coordination body in Nairobi in 1996, with uncertainties over legalities of international support for Somaliland.

**Figure 2: Chronology of Selected Key Events in Somalia**



The sources of sector fragility included i) destruction of much of school infrastructure and the teaching service, including growing internal displacement and refugee camps; ii) breakdown of public administration, especially in South-Central, with absence of state revenues for education nationwide; iii) out-migration of more experienced education managers, planners, teachers and university staff; iv) unwillingness of parents to send their children to school in the more insecure parts of the country, including hostile urban areas; v) growing inability of parents to pay school fees, with young men taking up employment, as part of clan militias; and vi) absence of a strategic

response for education provision for nomadic populations and IDPs/refugees. Reported sources of sector resilience included i) setting up community education committees (CECs), frequently under the patronage of individual clans and Islamic organisations; ii) willingness of better-off parents to pay fees for primary education in safer locations; iii) community and donor mobilisation of funds to restore schools and pay teachers, especially post-1996; and iv) growing levels of remittances from the Somali diaspora.

**Key Governance Features, Still Conflict-Affected Early Recovery Phase, 2000/2009.** The key features of continued education sector fragility include i) the continued uneven legitimacy and authority of the transitional federal government (TFG); ii) continued hostilities, especially in South-Central zone; iii) only slow progress on building up public administrations, even in Puntland and Somaliland, resulting in only limited state resources for education;<sup>7</sup> iv) severe district inequities in provision within zones due to a combination of variable state provision, limited non-formal education opportunities and limited attention to nomadic and IDP specific strategies; v) variable attention to ensuring inclusive clan participation in benefits of expanding education opportunities;<sup>8</sup> vi) insufficient attention to language of instruction issues, including English, Somali and Arabic, as a means of promoting social cohesion and inclusiveness;<sup>9</sup> and vii) limited post-primary education/skills training opportunities and employment, especially for younger militia members.

**Box 1: Primary Education Indicators in Puntland**

Primary education participation in Puntland is improving and regional equity in key indicators such as class size, and PTR is improving. Nevertheless, gender equity is a challenge, with a GPI of around 0.6. Nevertheless, it is estimated that only around 30% of primary school age are enrolled. Measures to improve participation of nomadic populations are a particular challenge.

Region	School Size	No of pupils	Class Size	PTR
Bari	180	21,280	25	34
Nugaal	183	4,877	33	33
Mudug	222	4,873	33	35
Sool	233	5,820	39	43
Sanaag	160	2,570	31	30
Cayn	136	680	30	28

The limited number of youth skills training and employment opportunities constitute a risk of both child labour and joining local militia. Donor strategy has been a combination of supply-side measures (e.g. new school construction, teacher training) and demand-side incentives such as school feeding and other financial support to households. Out of a total number of 451 schools in Puntland, 51,051 boys and 34,222 girls are currently enrolled in primary school education. According to UNICEF (August 2007), an estimated 60% of children of school age (including nomadic population) in Puntland are still out of school. In cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the construction of 58 and renovation of 20 classrooms were completed and 1300 teachers were trained during the year 2007. Different incentives for schooling (school feeding, learning material or other financial support) were also provided to about 25,000 children in need, with particular attention to girls.

Overall, the absence of an overarching political commitment from the three zonal ministers to engage in formulating and implementing a national education strategy and financing policy (accepting degrees of zonal autonomy/independence) constitutes a long-term source of fragility.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> A. Dewees (2007), estimates that public expenditure on education in Somaliland is only US\$ 1.4 million per annum, representing only 4.5% of public expenditure compared to indicative US\$ 1.9 million from private sources. In Puntland, the figure is US\$ 0.4 million, constituting less than US\$ 2 per inhabitant.

<sup>8</sup> World Bank, 2005. Conflict in Somalia : Drivers and Dynamics, highlight the importance of clan issues in support design

<sup>9</sup> Michael Brophy and Emma Page, 2007. Radio Literacy and Life Skills for Out of School Youth

<sup>10</sup> It is reported that the TFG White Paper has attracted limited political traction, although technical level engagement across the zones may be more promising.

Another source of fragility is the small size of zonal/district public education administrations and limited technical capacity of education planners and managers.<sup>11</sup>

Key factors in maintaining and restoring sector resilience, especially in Puntland and Somaliland, include i) increased legitimacy and authority of education policy and legislation, through clan inclusive zonal parliaments;<sup>12</sup> ii) growing attention and donor technical support for strengthening public revenue and financial management systems, including allocations for education; iii) embryonic policies for decentralisation of education service management to districts;<sup>13</sup> iv) growing community education council commitment and management capacity, including revenue mobilisation for contributing to school operations and teachers' salaries; v) better defined education sector plans and targets and embryonic financing strategies; vi) increased and better coordinated donor support mobilisation for maintaining/increasing primary education provision, less so for sector governance, capacity development and post-primary education provision; and vii) continued support from the Somalia diaspora to family members to cover the private costs of schooling.

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<sup>11</sup> For example, in the education ministry in Somaliland, the best developed, the number of senior technical staff is only 14, with no middle managers.

<sup>12</sup> Timothy Othieno, 2008. A New Donor Approach to Fragile Societies, points to the importance of clan inclusiveness and upper house of elders in parliamentary legitimacy/authority building.

<sup>13</sup> State building priorities are well articulated in the Somalia Joint Strategy Paper 2008/13.

## 2. Education Sector Fragility Assessment: Status and Outlook


### 2.1 Key Features of Sector Resilience and Fragility

A number of features suggest a fair degree of sector resilience, even in South-Central, where primary enrolment has more than doubled in the past decade. Despite varying degrees of security/political instability, demand for schooling has continued to grow, due mainly to the high value accorded to education in Somalia. The strong sense of volunteerism within this culture has ensured schools running and teachers attending in often difficult circumstances. The continued ingenuity of Somalis in raising money and 'making do' with limited facilities is another testimony. The extensive donor/NGO support in the last decade has also helped to stem declines in social services, help mobilise grassroots support and capacity.

Another encouraging feature for sector resilience is the growing political commitment to education, though yet to be translated into viable resource allocation. The increased delegated authority to district education offices, especially in Puntland and Somaliland, also helps to increase the visible

presence, legitimacy and authority of the zonal 'states'. The sustained financial support of the Somali diaspora has been another resilience factor, though it may be undermined in the current global economic downturn.

**Figure 3: Primary & Secondary Enrolment, by Zone: 2006 ('000)**



Source: EC 2008, Identification Study: Education Sector Support

transition rates nationally are only about 10%-15% (see fig.3). The shortage of accelerated learning and non-formal education opportunities are a constraint on nomadic population and youth education access and carry a risk of creating tensions due to inequities and also joining militia as an income-generating opportunity.

The current donor support strategy, focusing primarily on grassroots delivery, also constitutes a potential medium-term risk unless helping to rebuild state capacity and accountability is accorded greater priority. Public expenditure on education is an indicative US\$ 3-4 million per annum (across


three zones), whilst private contributions are at least double this figure. In contrast, international community assistance is 8-10 times than that of public expenditure and 4-5 times that of private contributions. More needs to be done to restore a social compact between the state, clients and frontline providers, as well as measures to help govern and regulate the flourishing private/community education providers.

## 2.2 Overall Education Fragility Status Assessment

Somalia as a whole is probably best characterised as in a state of early recovery (especially South-Central), with Puntland and Somaliland further down the path towards reconstruction. In South-Central, the overall current fragility strategy is more about supporting grassroots service delivery; in the other two zones, focusing on ensuring 'quick wins', in terms of particularly primary education enrolment growth and a slowly growing focus on building up (not rebuilding) a degree of state capacity and accountability. The development partner initiatives in Puntland and more so in Somaliland, are maintaining support for local community level initiatives, but starting to build up a degree of state credibility (i.e. some public budget provision, preliminary legal frameworks) for service delivery.

As shown in *figure 4*, the number of organisations focusing on service delivery for primary education provision (PEP), school construction (SC) and alternative/NFE approaches is much higher than for key governance areas such as teacher incentives (TI) and exams (EX). Key field informants also expressed disappointment at the limited attention paid to building up local education NGO capacity (e.g. a formal coalition of community education councils) or using local rather than international NGOs as intermediaries and local managers of external assistance.

**Figure 4: Organisational Focus, Selected Areas (ESC, 2008)**



It was reported that even existing capacity, especially in zonal capitals, is being undermined by a drain of more experienced personnel into international NGO agencies. The limited in-country presence of coordination groups (e.g. the education cluster) exacerbates these difficulties. On a more positive note, willingness for inter-zonal cooperation in some areas (e.g. examination standardisation and management, higher education institution cooperation) is a sign of optimism.

## 2.3 Sectoral Fragility and Resilience Outlook, Opportunities and Risks

The overall outlook is quite variable across the three zones, presenting different opportunities and risks. In Puntland and particularly Somaliland, the implementation of education policies and embryonic strategies is now underway, presenting potential opportunities for stimulating development of implementation monitoring systems (e.g. EMIS) and stakeholder participatory monitoring (e.g. education summits, joint sector reviews). In these two zones, the embryonic development of tax/revenue raising, medium-term expenditure plans and civil service reform plans also provides an opportunity to integrate sector reform plans into broader macroeconomic policy.

The increased focus in Puntland and Somaliland on decentralised service management, also presents an opportunity for stimulating formulation of district education operational plans and targets and looking at more performance-based financing mechanisms. The increasing results orientation of education sector plans, especially in Somaliland, also potentially provides opportunities for promoting local oversight and watchdog bodies (e.g. parliamentary select committees, civil society education coalitions). In some ways, promoting more inclusive dialogue with civil society groups (e.g. mosques, CEC associations) is even more pressing in South-Central where a state presence in education is negligible.

Nevertheless, a number of very significant potential risks can be identified. Firstly, unless a 'quantum leap' in education participation can be implemented, especially reducing urban/rural and poverty related access disparities (a source of tension back in the eighties/nineties), political tensions may resurface. Paradoxically, a positive legacy of current recovery (i.e. parental willingness to pay fees) may become a negative legacy as education services expand and the less well-offs find themselves excluded. Equally, unless the education service needs of nomads, young combatants and ex-combatants and the internally displaced and refugees are quickly addressed, current improved political capital for education reform may diminish.

Secondly, unless key sector and crosscutting governance issues are addressed, other current sources of sector resilience may be undermined. A continued reliance on communities to pay or supplement teacher salaries may delay the perceived need for increased government spending, maintain access barriers for the poor and delay the need for appropriate state provided teacher remuneration arrangements. A related risk is that the predominance of private/community education providers may make it difficult to introduce national/zonal regulatory and quality assurance systems.

There is also a related risk of insufficient demarcation of conflict related and poverty related factors on sector performance. For example, in Puntland and Somaliland, 6 districts have annual per capita income of between US\$ 250 and US\$ 350, only 2 districts in the US\$ 150-US\$250 range. In contrast, in South-Central, 5 of the 9 districts have annual per capita incomes below US\$ 250, only 3 districts in the US\$250-US\$350 range. Similarly, there is a risk of an ineffective education response to different population categories, given that the proportions are nomadic pastoralists (52%), sedentary rural and urban (24% each), with implications for accessible service delivery approaches.<sup>14</sup>

**Box 2: The Circularity of School Community Financing**

In Omar Samatar secondary school in Galkayo district, most of the teachers used to pay and still pay school fees for one or two poor students. The head teacher used to pay school fees for about three students. Even the regional education officer used to pay school fees for some of the students and schools use the biggest share of their funding in paying fees for these poorer students.

Sometimes, this investment is worthwhile. For example, in 2004, the number one student in Puntland Form IV, secondary school leaving exams, was a student from Omar Samatar, who had never paid school fees over the four years of study in secondary school and went on to university.

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<sup>14</sup> World Bank, 2008. Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme : Deepening Peace and Reducing Poverty

Thirdly, there are signs that external assistance, is even after a decade, focusing on the quick wins and targeted interventions, associated with the early stages of emergency relief/recovery. If this relief/recovery mentality predominates for too long, especially using parallel service delivery systems (e.g. through international NGOs), it can fundamentally drain any national/zonal capacity that currently exists (e.g. experienced staff moving to NGO posts, crowding out community groups).

There is also a risk that donor/NGO financed projects become non-sustainable 'islands of excellence' (e.g. overly ambitious standards of school construction and in-service teacher training) and sector priorities are externally determined. For example, as a ballpark figure, there are probably no more than 0.5 million current beneficiaries of education donor support, meaning per beneficiary cost of US\$ 50 per annum for external assistance. This compares to around US\$ 5 per beneficiary from public expenditure on education. In other words, there is a risk that donor/NGO support could crowd out public expenditure on education and help rationalise the high shares of public expenditure on defence/security (e.g. reported to be around half of public spending in Somaliland).

### 3. Education Sector Governance Assessment: Status and Outlook


#### 3.1 Summary of Overall Macro and Sectoral Governance Environment

**Broad Political and Macroeconomic Features.** The political governance in Somalia is diversified with a transitional federal government (TFG), based in South-Central, with more established government and public administration systems in Puntland and Somaliland. These two latter zones have functioning parliaments that have recently passed education policies; in Somaliland in 2006; and Puntland in 2005. The effort of the TFG to issue a White Paper on education in 2008 did not gain much traction within these other two zones, and was ignored in Somaliland which treats South-Central Somalia as a foreign country. The Somaliland zonal parliament is also responsible for passing an annual budget law, setting out agreed public expenditure on education, through a consultative process; less so, in Puntland.<sup>15</sup>

There is also a growing commitment to decentralisation in these two zones, though as yet, it is not fully translated into legislation, or well defined fiscal decentralisation. Traditional parliamentary select committees for education, acting as watchdogs, are also reported as at best embryonic. Similarly, civil society watchdogs (e.g. local education NGO coalitions) are also embryonic. More positively, there is what appears to be a growing commitment in these two zones to begin to improve the public accountability of the budget process. A distinct difference between Somaliland and Puntland is that in the former parliamentary representatives are democratically elected, whilst in the latter, appointments are primarily clan-based.

Limited governance systems exist, although in Somaliland, a public financial management system is evolving, less so in Puntland. In the latter, internal financial controls do not appear to exist and those in Somaliland are only just beginning. It is reported that the alignment between sector plans, targets and budgets is very limited, making transparency and accountability systems problematic. Nevertheless, the recent education strategic plan and targets

Figure 5: Post Conflict Performance Indicators, 2006




Source: World Bank, 2007. Interim Strategy Note

<sup>15</sup> World Bank, 2007. Interim Strategy Note for Somalia

in Somaliland in 2007 and Puntland education policy paper in 2005 have formed a basis for education summits and reviews in 2008 (Somaliland) and 2009 (Somaliland and Puntland), including government and international community.

Various assessments indicate that education PFM reforms in Somaliland/Puntland will be a challenge, not only because of a limited legislative and regulatory framework, but also due to limited technical and financial management/planning capacity in central education ministries. In the transitional federal institutions (TFIs), there is no real civil service or PFM and overall, there is a proliferation of ministries with unclear mandates, mainly allocated by clan representation (*see fig.5*).

**Figure 6: Government Expenditure Patterns, 2005, Shs. Million (Somaliland and Puntland)**



Source: World Bank, 2008. *Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme*

Nevertheless, given the extensive, though still insufficient donor support in the three zones, a very limited start could be to formulate a preliminary education medium term expenditure plan, showing local and donor sources of funding (the latter on budget, off Treasury).<sup>16</sup>

It is acknowledged that district level PFM capacities are very limited, due in part, to very little predictable education funding in the past two decades.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, school principals and community education committees in all three zones, have

extensive hands-on PFM experience and constitute an initial opportunity for decentralised PFM systems, related to improved transparency and accountability for the parental fees needed for schools to operate. An early entry point could be for principals/CECs to begin to account for consolidated fees/donor support in a consolidated budget, building on the current revenue/budget process (*see fig.6*).

**National Education Governance Context.** The education policy papers and reviews with other stakeholders in Puntland and Somaliland constitute a useful start for sector governance in these two zones. It is acknowledged that the traction of any financial legislation/regulation that might evolve will be limited until there are more predictable on budget financial flows to districts and schools.

Beginning to record donor support, through centre/district/school channels, could begin to initiate embryonic PFM systems and governance, alongside more transparent reporting and accountability for the recent zonal state support for teacher salaries. Overall, civil service reform is only just beginning and lines of accountability to parliament, ministers and other stakeholders, especially parents is very limited.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> A. Dewees, 2007. These finance studies in Puntland and Somaliland, constitute a very useful start for education MTEPs.

<sup>17</sup> It is reported that World Bank have been promoting preliminary PFM action plans in Somaliland and Puntland, with potential TA support for revenue and Treasury operations.

<sup>18</sup> For example, in Somaliland and Puntland, governments have committed to beginning to pay at least part of teacher salaries.

There are no formal national standards setting or monitoring arrangements, apart from the Somali national examination system, which is highly valued in all three zones. Regulatory arrangements for higher education and private sector TVET and even CEC run schools (which are essentially private) are only just beginning. Nevertheless, some of the recent finance studies (e.g. trying to formulate cost standards for schools and school building) could usefully be built on for Puntland and Somaliland. The university rector consultations which have started in 2009 also constitute a potential useful entry point into a degree of university self regulation and quality assurance, especially if these university qualifications begin to accrue value externally (e.g. within Kenya).<sup>19</sup>

Public dissemination of comparative national, district and school performance results is virtually non-existent, due in part, to ill-defined expected standards/results. Nevertheless, much of this data (e.g. enrolments, enrolment rates, exam results) is readily available and could be consolidated if education management information systems were accorded priority in education ministry development plans, building on extensive UNICEF support. The institutionalisation of these zonal education summits (even in South-Central) could provide an incentive for education data analysis and promote accountability/dialogue.

### **3.2 Analysis of Stakeholder Participation and Interests**

Development planning processes within the three zones are in their infancy, better developed in Somaliland and Puntland, frequently driven by donors rather than national stakeholders. For the existing education policies/strategies for Puntland and Somaliland, it is reported that although improving, stakeholder consultation was somehow restricted and the alignment between policies, results and expenditure plans was limited. Nevertheless, the growing involvement of parliamentary groups in education policy debate is a useful first step. However, a key challenge, especially in the context of increased decentralisation in Puntland/Somaliland will be stronger participation of district officials and school/parent committees in sector development and governance.

Similarly, governance arrangements for sector resource planning and management are insufficiently transparent, especially at central and district levels; transparency is greater between school principals and parents' committees. Governance arrangements for sector performance monitoring are slowly developing, through government/donor strategic planning processes and recent education summits. The involvement of districts, school management and parents in these processes is reportedly insufficient, somewhat undermining the legitimacy and authority of these processes when parents are major stakeholders through fee paying. The strategic planning processes and education summits have helped make a start on more inclusive sector performance monitoring and information sharing. However, better disaggregated district performance data could provide an entry point for district level education officials and community groups engagement. In addition, there may be scope for more strategic use of local community-based organisations such as the Somalia private education network, Islamic social organisations, Somalia women's grassroots organisations and any Somalia-based centres for research and development.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> The vocational skills profiles acknowledged in the Somali labour code also constitute an embryonic TVET regulatory framework.

<sup>20</sup> For example, these organisations, based in Somalia, played a lead role in the preparation of the World Bank reconstruction strategy, through provision of technical assistance and conductive field surveys.

More broadly, formal organisational arrangements for other potential interest groups to participate in sector reform planning and monitoring are under-developed. For example, formal national professional associations of provincial/district education officers, head-teachers and school/parent committees and specialist teaching groups are not in place. Similarly, the organisation of private education sector providers to have a voice is only limited. The role and voice of local NGOs, even in formal associations of community education committees, is also limited. However, several donor projects promote informal networking and there is scope and benefit in formalising some of these arrangements, including promoting NGO education watchdog arrangements.

### **3.3 Education Sector Governance Outlook, Opportunities and Risks**

The start made on sector performance monitoring, sector planning and strengthening education results information systems constitutes the best opportunity for systematic education sector governance development, including in South-Central, where it might be led by a non-government arrangement. Nevertheless, the fact that broader public administration reforms are only at an early stage means that short term sector governance priorities are better focused on i) improving the results orientation of monitoring systems, including for excluded groups; ii) a limited approach to sector PFM development, at least getting government, donor and community contributions on budget; and iii) broadening the range of stakeholder participation in sector planning and decision making, incorporating development of parliamentary select committees for education (at least in Puntland and Somaliland).

Another opportunity is to build on the earlier efforts to put in place education census arrangements in all three zones, through translating education statistics into more focused performance results indicators, including for finance/budget, personnel and information coverage/dissemination. Another opportunity is to build on the current efforts to strengthen public examinations, as a means of not only standards/quality monitoring, but also as a basis for policy/strategy debate. In the longer term, another opportunity is to make greater use of disaggregated zonal, district and school performance information.

This could strengthen governance in a number of ways, especially i) moving towards equalisation and performance based district/school block grants to help reduce current performance inequities; ii) use of such information as a vehicle for greater consultation within zonal/district administrations, civil society groups and school committees; and iii) promoting the role of local parliamentarians and establishment of other independent watchdogs. There is a risk that without these governance arrangements, current planning/monitoring efforts may become routine. Some of these risks could be mitigated through incorporating explicit, but selective, governance targets in upcoming programme designs and their implementation.



## 4. Main Findings: Scope and Diversity of Local and Donor Supported Initiatives

### 4.1 Summary of Findings: Local Initiatives

Despite the difficult circumstances, there have been a number of important internally-driven local initiatives that have assisted the recovery and resilience of the education system, covering i) restoring state education administration and management systems, including staffing at central and district levels; ii) contributions to the salaries of the teaching service; iii) community mobilisation for the running of primary and secondary education; iv) an emerging private sector, especially for post-primary education provision; and v) extensive cost-sharing between Somali residents and the diaspora.

***Restoration of Education Administration.*** Especially in Puntland and Somaliland, education administrations, including district education offices, have been restored over a number of years. This initiative begins to restore a visible presence for the role of the state in education provision and the beginnings of a network of information and communication. These administrative bodies, though having limited capacity, are involved in the overall sector planning, management and monitoring process, including playing a key role in the annual education census over recent years. The challenge will be to formulate and implement a systematic education administration capacity development programme, including more comprehensive legislative/regulatory frameworks, information systems and quality assurance mechanisms for the education private sector.<sup>21</sup>

***Emerging Public Education Teaching Service.*** In the past few years, the public education service, including teachers paid by the state, has begun to expand, especially in Somaliland and Puntland, where several thousand teachers are receiving salaries. This is critical in that it has begun to address the operating budget differentials between public and private schools, especially in urban areas. For example, in some public schools, fees are limited to around US\$ 1 per term, compared to US\$ 30-50 per term in private schools, meaning that public schools were unable to pay teachers transparently.<sup>22</sup> A challenge will be to ensure that in the medium to long term, public school teacher salaries are adequate, especially if the system expands and teaching service grows. A related challenge will be to begin to examine ways of better formalising this public/private partnership for the teaching service, with transparent contributions to teachers' pay from public and community sources.

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<sup>21</sup> These priorities are identified in the recent EC education support identification study of 2008.

<sup>22</sup> It is estimated that in some cases, teachers receive US\$ 50 per month from Government and US\$ 40 per month from fees, compared to a consensus minimum requirement of around US\$ 150 per month.

**Community Mobilisation of Primary and Secondary Education Provision.** The number of primary and secondary schools is estimated at around 1800 primary and 150 secondary schools.<sup>23</sup> The vast proportions operate through community education councils, with fee paying for teacher salaries and running costs and classroom construction. Local community based organisations both secular and Islamic ones are responsible for organisation and management, including principals and staff recruitment. However, in the current context, the distinction between public/community run schools and private schools is blurred, in the absence of a well defined legislative and regulatory framework.

**Emerging Private Sector.** It is reported that there is a growing private sector, especially for secondary and post secondary education, including TVET and higher education. For example, around two-fifths of secondary schools are defined as private schools and most of the post-secondary institutions also. Such provision is located primarily in the better-off zonal capitals. While these initiatives have contributed to education service provision, medium-term challenges remain especially better definition of public/private operations and the limited accessibility for poorer families unable to pay fees. A strategic challenge for zonal governments will be to maintain private capacity (e.g. possibly through scholarships for the poor) and avoid public/private competition as the public sector expands.

**Extensive Cost Sharing.** Public spending on education is an indicative US\$ 2.0 - US\$ 2.5 million per annum across the three zones, constituting only 5% of public expenditure. It is estimated that private contributions constitute at least 2-3 times public expenditure. A large proportion of this private cost sharing of education services delivery originates from the diaspora remittances to families amounting to around US\$ 1 billion per annum. One challenge will be to ensure that, if public expenditure increases, these private contributions are not inordinately crowded out. Another challenge will be to ensure that organisations such as the private education network have a substantial voice in the policy/planning, monitoring and quality assurance of education sector development.

**Accessing Non-Formal Education Opportunities.** Individuals and communities have taken the initiative, giving up time and income generating opportunities, to access a range of non-formal education/information opportunities, including i) radio-based education/literacy/socialisation programmes; ii) attendance at non-formal education centres; iii) child to child clubs; and iv) informal skills training opportunities. Especially in the context of a predominantly nomadic population and the pressure for family income generation, there is a strong argument for expansion of these opportunities, alongside ensuring programme equivalency/quality assurance (compared to the formal system) and measures to ensure formal education re-entry if and when perceived opportunity costs diminish.

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<sup>23</sup> Based on UNESCO/UNICEF 2005/2007 estimates

## 4.2 Summary of Findings: Donor Supported Initiatives

The main finding is that the donor supported activities are best characterised as those appropriate to a combination of emergency relief, early recovery and aspects of post-conflict reconstruction, focusing on maintaining grassroots service delivery, stemming potential declines in education services (especially in more conflict affected districts) and ensuring 'quick wins' to maintain political and public support.


### *Proliferation of Small Diversified Projects.*

One finding is that there is wide district coverage of external assistance. For example, on average, there are at least 7-9 NGOs working in each of 18 districts. There are 6 international agencies, including UNICEF and Mogadishu University, who reportedly operate in all 18 districts. In other words, there are around 250 sub-projects operating at any one time.<sup>24</sup> One benefit is that of a degree of equitable coverage of beneficiaries. On the other hand, with an estimated external assistance of US\$ 20-25 million per annum, the average value of each sub-project is comparatively small at around US\$ 100,000 per annum. As a result, there are difficulties of coordination, significant duplication of effort, potential losses of economies of scale and potential fragmentation of policy/strategic focus.

More positively, lead donors such as the European Commission, are rationalising management and coordination of their support (amounting to around Euros 30 million over 2005/2010, around Euros 5-6 million per annum), through a small number of NGOs and other agencies.<sup>25</sup> This amounts to around Euros 4.5 million per agency, which helps economies of scale in oversight and management (see fig.7 above). Nevertheless, there are a reported 35 international agencies/NGOs operating in education, making coordination problematic, especially on the ground where many agencies have only limited field presence. The judgement of existing coordination arrangements through the education sector committee (ESC) is mixed, reportedly more valued by the donor agencies than the NGO managers and field operatives.<sup>26</sup>

***Limited Attention to Governance Development.*** A recent mapping of capacity building programmes has a number of features ; i) the primary focus is on school level operations, especially pupils, teachers, principals and community education committees; ii) there is growing attention to building up the capacity of central and district education office staff; and iii) except in Somaliland, there is

**Figure 7: Key Implementing Agencies, EC Support (Euros Million)**



Source: EC Education Identification Study, 2008


<sup>24</sup> UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2009. Mapping of Education Projects in Somalia.

<sup>25</sup> Reported in EC identification study for education support, 2008

<sup>26</sup> Reported to study team through telephone discussions with key informants in mid-2009

limited attention to key aspects of sector governance, such as legislative/regulatory reform, sector PFM and results oriented sector planning, management and monitoring (see fig.8).<sup>27</sup>

**Figure 8: Education Capacity Building, By Target Group (US\$ Million)**



There are a number of related findings. Firstly, there are a number of projects, targeting the same group of beneficiaries (e.g. school level (14 projects); regional/district education offices (12 projects); higher education institutions (1 project)). Secondly, there are a number of projects, reportedly working at a number of levels and target groups from schools to education offices to NGO managers. A potential consequence is a lack of programme results coherence, fragmentation of effort and potential overlap and duplication, alongside stretching the capacity of these beneficiary groups/organisations to coordinate implementation. A related finding is that the focus on building capacity of regional/district offices to regulate and assure the quality of extensive private provision is also limited.

Another finding is that the primary focus of support is restoration/maintenance of primary education, with only limited support for alternative/non-formal primary education opportunities, secondary/TVET and higher education. A rough estimate would be that around two-thirds of donor support is directed at primary education, as evidenced by both the low transition rates into post-primary and slow growth of public secondary education places. A related finding is that the focus on stimulating demand side approaches (e.g. helping to reduce school fees for the poorest, providing low cost NFE for nomadic groups/young ex-militia, scholarships for the poor) is also limited. Given the focus on supply-side approaches, support is best characterised as more traditional emergency relief projects, as opposed to more policy led, other support modalities (e.g. sector budget support).

<sup>27</sup> ESC, 2009. Mapping of Education Capacity Building Support, Somalia.



## 5. Main Findings: Lessons Learned and Good Practice

### 5.1 Analysis of Local Initiative Good Practice: Lessons Learned

**Leading Sector Planning/Monitoring Processes.** Since 2005, Somaliland and Puntland authorities have led encouraging sector planning and monitoring processes, leading to publication and parliamentary approval of education policy documents and education summits/sector reviews over 2008/2009. These frameworks have begun to provide opportunities to better align local and external support for education, with better defined policy/strategy priorities and targets. The situation in South-Central is less clear due to the absence of legitimate and authoritative government.

**Box 3: Laying the Sectoral Planning Foundations in Somaliland**

In 2005 EC had identified (supported by DFID and Danida) the potential to move towards a sector-wide approach in Somaliland and the objective of its Support to Improved Education in Somaliland (2006-08) was to enhance government capacity for education sector development and coordination, focusing on policy and planning, sector financing, partnership and longer-term capacity planning. In late 2006 the Ministry of Education's Director General identified the need to include legislation and a regulatory framework in order to have a 'three-legged stool' held up by an act, policy and strategic plan. The programme design was sufficiently flexible for this and by the end of 2008 Somaliland had its education policy, act and its first ever sector strategic plan.

Key lessons learned and success conditions include i) willingness of education ministers, senior technical staff and parliamentarians to engage in the process; ii) these strategic frameworks and targets provide an entry point for negotiating with finance ministry/parliament and donors on more results oriented expenditure planning; iii) sector plans and reviews provide a vehicle for better communication with stakeholders and beneficiaries; iv) sector performance target setting provides a vehicle for promoting more systematic performance monitoring and stakeholder participation; v) confidence in such processes can be undermined if increased resources for education are not subsequently mobilised; and vi) systematic technical advisory support (e.g. for sector financing strategy, as provided by donors in 2007), is critical for enabling and supporting these processes.

Nevertheless, the challenge still remains to ensure these processes are inclusive across clans, private sector representatives and local civil society groups if these processes are to have legitimacy and authority. Another challenge will be to more robustly address inclusive education strategies, especially for the large proportion of nomadic people for whom urban-based formal schooling may be inappropriate and less valued.

**Restoration and Decentralisation of Education Administration/Management.** Significant progress has been made in establishing a network of zonal and district education offices, with some delegated authority in staff recruitment and appointment within the relevant civil service. Nevertheless, much of the public expenditure funding has been devoted to staff salaries, including teachers, less so for operational costs.

Key lessons learned include i) zonal education ministries in Puntland and Somaliland have difficulty in recruiting senior technical/middle management staff, due in part, to attrition of better qualified staff to international NGO projects that are better paid; ii) staff recruitment, both managers and teachers needs to take careful account of clan loyalties, while maintaining merit and transparency; iii) off-budget NGO/donor support is substituting for sustained local financing of operational expenditures (e.g. school supervision, staff development), potentially leading to long-term distortion of Puntland/Somaliland education budget allocations; and iv) geography and logistics make information dissemination and communication problematic and ICT based approaches are needed.

**Box 4: Strengthening Capacity of Teacher Training (SCOTT)**

The EC-funded SCOTT programme has addressed an immediate need across all three zones: the training of the largely untrained cadre of primary teachers. It has done so by utilising existing structures (the education departments of the universities) and using school holiday periods for in-service training, and has achieved considerable success in terms of putting teacher education issues firmly on the Ministries' agenda. There have been serious implementation problems, mostly a result of an over-optimistic assumption of the services that could be provided by the universities which were themselves in an early stage of development. But all partners have persevered and the foundations of a fully comprehensive teacher development programme can be visualized.

**Emerging Public Education Teaching Service.** In Puntland and Somaliland, zonal public administrations provide salaries of a reported US\$ 40-50 per month for an increasing number of teachers; this is not the case in South-Central. It is also reported<sup>28</sup> that in some cases, these salaries are being topped up from community raised funds, meaning potential salaries of around US\$ 1000 per annum. The teacher performance requirements are reportedly ill-defined.

Key lessons learned and success conditions include i) provision of salaries begins to raise the visibility and commitment of the state for education provision; ii) engagement with parliamentarians is critical in advocating for and implementing state paid teaching service reforms; iii) stronger regulation of teacher payments, including top-up policies, may assist in ensuring long-term sustainability of teacher salary reforms (e.g. US\$ 1000 per year is five times per capita income, which is a high ratio by international standards); and iv) public support for state paid teacher salaries would be potentially enhanced if transparent teacher performance criteria were adopted.

**Community Mobilisation of Primary and Secondary Education Provision.** With community support, primary schools and enrolment have been restored quickly, less so for senior secondary and post-secondary provision, where the level of fees for community and privately run operations is

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<sup>28</sup> DfID, 2007. Alternative Approaches to Basic Education in East African Countries (C. Dennis and A. Fentiman)

significantly. Nevertheless, the provision between urban and rural/remote areas remains inequitable.

Key lessons learned and success conditions include i) even in difficult circumstances, primary education is accorded high value, reinforced by use of national languages in public schools; ii) committed leadership through school principals and CECs is a key success condition; iii) a mix of secular and Islamic value schooling helps mobilisation of communities; iv) demand side issues need to be addressed if there is to be a 'quantum leap' in enrolments, alongside alternative/NFE strategies; v) potentially high growth enrolments; vi) there is potential (already partly evident) that primary education enrolments could stagnate without a clear pathway into secondary education, currently constrained by both supply and demand-side factors.

**Emerging Private Sector.** The private sector has been pivotal in helping primary education provision to be restored and recover due to a willingness, especially amongst better-off urban populations, to pay fees and committed community education councils and school principals. As a result, there is strong 'short route accountability' between providers and clients, although competitive tensions may emerge as hopefully public provision grows.

Key lessons learned and success conditions include i) willingness to pay fees has helped primary education sector resilience, less so in post-primary, where higher fees may be prohibitive for equitable access; ii) if public provision increases, robust legislation and regulation and quality assurance of public/private partnership, including an enabling role for government in private post-primary (e.g. scholarships to attend private schools) will be critical; and iii) in the context of limited public resources for education, in the short to medium term, public policy priority may have to be for equitable and high quality primary provision and a private sector enabling role in post-primary (e.g. academic merit-driven scholarships to secondary schools, based on primary school exams).

**Uneven Political Commitment Constitutes a Major Risk.** Political commitment, as demonstrated by shares of public expenditure on education, even in more peaceful Somaliland and Puntland, appears to be uneven. For example in 2006/2007, public expenditure on education was respectively US\$ 1.3 million and US\$ 0.4 million in these two zones, constituting 4.0% and 4.5% share respectively (2% and 6% respectively for the 2008/9 period). At the same time, the external assistance in these two zones is around US\$ 8-10 million per annum, which is not recorded in zonal public expenditure budgets.

Key lessons learned and success conditions include i) private sector and external assistance contributions may be substituting for public expenditure and through fungibility, allowing sustained security/defence expenditures; ii) greater transparency of community/donor contributions on budget will provide a basis for well informed public expenditure policy debate; and iii) a necessary condition for such policy debate is a move towards community/donor contributions being recorded 'on budget', even if in the short term off treasury.

## 5.2 Analysis of Donor Supported Initiatives: Lessons Learned and Good Practice

**Overview.** Analysis of donor supported initiatives in Somalia needs to be viewed in historical context. Prior to the mid-nineties, external assistance was largely restricted to occasional humanitarian relief, due in part, to the uncertain status of the national government and zonal administrations in Puntland, Somaliland and South-Central (see fig.2).<sup>29</sup> Historically, most donor assistance has tended to focus on a few districts, with few nationwide initiatives; a situation that still exists today. The lack of international legitimacy of the separate Puntland and Somaliland governments, largely limit the external assistance to humanitarian emergency relief. Partly as a result, it has taken nearly 20 years (since Somaliland declared independence) and 15 years (since Puntland declared autonomy) to formulate broad development and education sector policies/strategies considered legitimate by the international community.

In the case of Puntland and Somaliland, it is only recently that donors have begun to adopt what might be best characterised as a post-conflict strategy, consisting of i) supporting zonal provincial leadership and security, governance and economic stabilisation and development; ii) specifically supporting zonal leadership of post-fragility sector development reforms; and iii) supporting aspects of zonal/district/school development planning and management development. In the case of South-Central, the focus, perhaps understandably has been on adopting a strategy that helps stem declines in education services. Overall, support for more results oriented planning, resource management and monitoring and related sector governance development, which is a key aspect of post-conflict development transition have been limited.

**Harmonised Support for Post-Fragility Macroeconomic and Governance Planning.** One example of good practice has been the harmonised donor support for the reconstruction and development programme in Somalia in 2008. Key features included i) inclusive consultation with political and community stakeholders, facilitated by Somali community-based organisations; ii) a recognition that an integrated approach to security stabilisation, public sector reforms and accelerating social service provision was needed; iii) according high priority to macroeconomic reforms, including treasury, revenue and expenditure planning/management; and iv) adopting a community-based approach to social service delivery recognising that accelerated education sector development and productivity is contingent upon improved health/sanitation and water supply improvements.<sup>30</sup>

**Increasingly Harmonised Approach to Puntland / Somaliland Sector Planning and Monitoring.** Key features of good practice have included i) multi-donor support for facilitating education sector policy analysis and engagement with zonal parliaments; ii) multi-donor support for education sector financial analysis and policy development, with strong engagement with finance/education ministries; iii) joint donor support for promoting greater stakeholder participation in recent education summits and joint reviews; and iv) multi-donor support for more results oriented education information systems and associated staff development.

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<sup>29</sup> The Somalia Aid Coordination Body was not established until 1996, based in Nairobi.

<sup>30</sup> A number of donors, including World Bank, DfID, EC and UN agencies, participated in the programme development process

Nevertheless, the focus on formulating well defined sector performance results, sector governance targets and strategies and sector PFM targets and strategies has been more limited, compared to expanding education service delivery. A notable example of good practice has been the systematic analysis of primary education financing in Puntland and Somaliland, as a basis for public expenditure planning and regulating public/private partnerships.<sup>31</sup> However, it is recognised that the difficulties in providing embedded policy and strategic advisory services constitutes a constraint and various forms of 'distance TA' may have value.

**Insufficient Attention to Nationwide Systematic Governance / Capacity Assessment.** The large number of so-called capacity building programmes are best characterised as being driven by district level service delivery concerns, with limited attention to prior capacity assessment. The zonal education policy and strategy papers accord only limited attention to setting strategies/targets for legislative/regulatory and quality assurance reforms, sector level PFM development targets, results oriented information systems and strengthening stakeholder accountability mechanisms.

**Box 5: Alternative Basic Education approaches**

In 40 sites across 3 regions of Somaliland Save the Children has been addressing the very low enrolment rates in formal primary education by piloting five different modes of delivery of alternative approaches. These offer a number of advantages over 'formal' schools: attendance is initially free, although after the first year the communities make a progressively greater contribution to the costs; they are closer to the communities and in the case of the mobile schools the school moves with the population; teaching takes place at a time which suits the community; teachers mostly come from the community; there is a condensed curriculum; the methodology is more active and stimulating. The proportion of girls enrolled in the sites is higher than in the formal schools. The projects have built the capacity of Regional Education Officers (REOs) and some Ministry staff and there is clearly now a commitment to address the issue of children out of school, especially in nomadic communities, as part of efforts to achieve EFA.

However, examples of better practice appear to be i) capacity assessments related to implementing radio-based adult literacy/NFE and secondary teacher training programme implementation; ii) assessing Somali higher education capacity and zonal/district capacity development needs, related to building up education management capacity; iii) capacity assessments related to implementation of a radio-based secondary teacher training programme; and iv) prior capacity assessments of teacher training and TVET service delivery capacity. It is notable that when these better practice initiatives are nationwide (e.g. for higher education networking, national exams implementation), strategies for sharing knowledge across all three zones, including South-Central is more predominant. The EC strategy of limiting its range of selected NGO implementing agencies also helps to concentrate sector/programme lessons learned and knowledge within a small number of NGOs/international agencies (see fig.7 above).

**Limited Attention to Demand-Side Strategy Development.** Donor support initiatives are best characterised by supply-side approaches, with only scant attention paid to fundamental demand-side issues such as i) information/advocacy campaigns on legal/regulatory rights and responsibilities (e.g. equitable access to quality education); ii) addressing poverty/cultural related factors for access through targeted subsidies (e.g. scholarships for the poor and girls); iii) publication of national exam

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<sup>31</sup> A. Dewees, 2007. Education Policy and Finance (Puntland and Somaliland)

results to stimulate public demand for better and more equitable quality across schools/institutions; and iv) regulatory measures to contain growth in fee levels, linked to provision of school operational budgets to meet any potential school running cost shortfalls. The recent education financing studies are a notable example of good practice in beginning to raise some of these demand-side issues and raising awareness of education standards/cost issues.



## 6. Country Report: Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

### 6.1 Conclusions and Key Issues

A key conclusion is that Somalia, even in the two more stable zones, is only just embarking on the path towards high quality Education for All (EFA). A related conclusion is that Somalia's current EFA status is due as much to intrinsic demographic, population density, agricultural practices, economic diversification constraints as political/security governance issues. The current international time horizons for EFA by 2015 appear to be inappropriate and not feasible and a much longer time from government and the international community is needed.

A related conclusion is that education sector reform planning needs to adopt a longer time horizon, alongside moving out of an emergency relief and service restoration perspective to one of a better balance between sustainable system development and improved service delivery. Insufficient attention is being paid to sector governance and capacity development improvements within sector reforms, which could easily exacerbate long term potentially negative legacies of emergency relief (e.g. over reliance on parental fees, which are an access barrier for the poor).

A more positive conclusion is that there are signs of growing attention to education sector reform. A key factor has been the growing legitimacy and authority of zonal parliaments and governments and advocacy from the international community. The challenge will be to transform this commitment into increased public expenditure on education. Greater transparency in external assistance, even if 'on budget off-treasury' will help avoid the risk of donor substitution and enhance credible education budget development.

Another conclusion is that post-conflict restoration and reconstruction can create operational legacies that take time to overcome, including informal payments by parents to teachers and schools and high cost project interventions that may not be sustainable. A key factor in overcoming these constraints will be to strengthen zonal education ministry and donor programme appraisal and poverty impact monitoring processes.

A further conclusion is that there are significant disparities in urban/rural/remote district education service provision and a very limited pathway for transition to higher, but more costly levels of education. A key factor is the heavy reliance on fee paying at all levels, which undermines access for the less well-off. A greater focus on demand-side interventions, linked to targeted subsidies for the poorest, is needed to accelerate access expansion and better regulate public/private partnerships in sector financing. A related factor is the absence of a financing strategy that helps address district performance inequities, exacerbated by the lack of district disaggregated performance indicators.

Another conclusion is that education sector reforms are insufficiently located within broader public financial management and civil service reforms. A priority is to begin to channel publicly-funded school operational budgets through even embryonic PFM systems, as part of transforming accountability mechanisms into a tripartite state/provider/client arrangement. Another priority is to begin to regulate public/private funding of the teaching service.

A further conclusion is that the proliferation of district targeted support, through a diverse range of NGOs/CBOs is making programme coordination problematic and potentially undermining economies of scale and programme impact. The emerging zonal education policies and strategies, alongside financing plans, are a potential opportunity to adopt a more results oriented, programme-based approaches and help rationalise zonal government/education cluster coordination arrangements.

Another conclusion is that given the current balance of public expenditure and external assistance for education, there is a risk of Somalia education development becoming very aid dependent and distorting national/zonal accountability mechanisms between state, provider and client. In order to avoid such a risk, it is critical that independent local accountability mechanisms are strengthened, through a greater focus on Somali civil society watchdogs and parliamentary oversight groups.

**Box 6: Networking of Higher Education and Capacity Development**

In 2008 the EC provided a grant for the first significant support to the strengthening of higher education since the collapse of the Barre regime. The project, managed by CfBT Education Trust and Kenyatta University, Kenya, is enabling universities across Somalia to strengthen their management, governance and quality assurance systems, to address gender issues and to develop a distance training programme for education administrators in the ministries and district offices. Each zone will set up its own commission for higher education, but the university presidents decided that they would also use the project to establish their own coordinating body across the three zones.

A final conclusion is that a genuinely national education strategy across all three zones may be some way off. Nevertheless, there are a number of common strategic themes and targets in the various zonal policy and strategy papers. One key factor in these commonalities is growing opportunities for senior education planners and technical staff to share their experiences and knowledge, especially for the small number of nationwide programmes (e.g. higher education, exams, EMIS). Any opportunity to capitalise on bottom-up national policy, strategy and programme developments needs to be grasped.

## 6.2 Key Recommendations: Improved Education Programme Planning / Design

Specific recommendations to the transitional federal government (TFG), the TFG education ministry, zonal parliaments and zonal education ministries would be:

- i) To use the annual education summits and joint zonal government/donor reviews to conduct a comprehensive progress review of education policy/strategy and target implementation, focusing on a) the extent to which sector targets are being met and the need for a better balance of supply/demand side initiatives; b) setting more specific sector governance and financing strategies and targets, aligned with better defined sector PFM, sector civil service and teaching service and decentralisation/deconcentration reforms; and c) consider the introduction of publicly financed school/institution operational block grants, with differential financing formulas for better-off and less well-off schools.
- ii) As part of (i), give priority to the following : a) design specific measures to address wide urban/rural disparities in service provision, linked to different forms of public/private partnership in urban and rural areas, based on a realistic assessment of cost load bearing; and b) expand customised strategies for alternative and non-formal basic education and skills training opportunities for young people, ex-militia and the current work force, taking account of diverse demographic, economic and cultural circumstances.
- iii) As part of (i) and (ii) and in each of the three zones, to examine the prospects for long-term sector financing strategy and its sustainability, especially related to a) measures that strengthen the transparency and accountability of various sources of education financing, including from Government, parents and the private sector; b) measures to ensure that external assistance is increasingly on-budget, with a long term perspective on putting selected external assistance on treasury as PFM systems improve; and c) review options for more performance oriented remuneration structures for education personnel and teachers.
- iv) To undertake a comprehensive provincial and district education organisation capacity assessment and formulate forward action plan, especially for a) upgrading strategic/financial planning and results oriented information and monitoring systems; b) upgrading school management, school supervision and school governance capabilities; and c) increasing the operational support on zonal/district budgets for these key functions.
- v) To initiate extensive dialogue with the international community on short/medium and long-term donor support modalities, with a medium-term view for a) moving to a mix of project, sector and general budget support, linked to targeted capacity development technical assistance; b) examining ways of providing continuous strategic and capacity development advisory services, possibly through a mix of embedded TA and 'distance TA', linked to ICT based systems between zonal administrations and the Nairobi-based education sector committee.

### 6.3 Key Recommendations: Enabling Aid Effectiveness and Sector Governance

Specific recommendations to the international education donor community for Somalia would be:

- i) To provide harmonised technical assistance, through the Somalia ESC, to support the proposed sector reviews and joint performance reviews, increasingly using Somalia based groups as facilitators of consultations within zonal parliaments and governments and other stakeholder groups on the review findings and recommendations (the joint reconstruction strategy preparation 2008 may be a good practice model).
- ii) To provide specific technical assistance from one or a number of donors, to help implement recommendations 6.2 (ii), 6.2 (iii) and 6.2 (iv) specified above. This support could be derived from realigning and reprioritising existing donor advisory support funds, based on the proposed sector review processes under 6.2 (i).
- iii) In the medium term, to rebalance and reorganise the priorities of current external assistance, including a) greater focus on demand side approaches to access and quality improvement; b) use more results focused sector strategies and targets to rationalise current and future assistance within a restricted number of programme-based approaches; and c) give priority to sector PFM and sector governance reforms, linked to consideration of a pooled fund approach to selective sector budget support initially managed 'on budget but off treasury'.
- iv) As a priority, to begin to ensure that external assistance in the three zones are recorded 'on budget' in order to a) achieve greater transparency in the funding of public education; and b) promote policy dialogue on increased zonal public expenditure on education and help reduce current donor substitution.
- v) As a further priority, to acknowledge that current international targets for EFA in Somalia are unrealistic and promote a longer-term EFA time horizon, including a) a critical analysis of what might be a realistic time horizon; and b) adopting a longer-term perspective on education assistance and a commitment to support a longer term time horizon, as part of alleviating reported national perceptions of donor/NGO 'short -termism'.

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