EVALUATION

Evaluating the Effectiveness of Livelihoods Programs for Returned Refugees in Burundi

August 2015

This publication was produced at the request of the United States Department of State. It was prepared independently by Erica A. Holzaepfel and Kimberly Howe through Social Impact, Inc.

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMS FOR RETURNED REFUGEES IN BURUNDI

August 2015

IDIQ Contract Number: S-AQMMA-12-D-0086
Technical and Advisory Services for Program Evaluation Requirements
Task Order Number: S-AQMMA-14-F-2515

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
CORD	Christian Outreach for Relief and Development
DoS	United States Department of State
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FB	Burundian Franc
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FH	Food for the Hungry International
FIC	Feinstein International Center
GBV	Gender-based violence
GoB	Government of Burundi
HH	Household
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGA	Income Generating Associations
IP	Implementing Partner
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PARESI	Project Public d'Appui au Rapatriement et à la Réintégration des Sinistrés
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
SI	Social Impact, Inc.
SLF	Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
SOW	Statement of Work
USD	United States Dollar
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VRI	Rural Integrated Villages
VSLA	Village Savings and Loan Associations
WRC	Women's Refugee Commission
WR	World Relief

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Purpose and Questions

This performance evaluation examines the appropriateness and effectiveness of livelihoods programs for refugee returnees in Burundi funded by DOS/PRM (PRM) during fiscal years 2009-2013 and implemented by three implementing partners (IPs). The purpose of this evaluation is to provide PRM with guidance and learning to improve PRM's livelihoods programming strategy as well as its capacity to support the design and implementation of livelihoods projects that contribute to helping refugees and returned refugees become self-reliant.

The evaluation seeks to answer the following overarching questions, each of which included several sub-questions that have been thoroughly addressed in the body of this report.

1. What types of assistance/programs were provided?
2. Who are the recipients of assistance/programs?
3. Were PRM-supported programs designed and implemented using best practices?
4. What was the impact of the programs/assistance?

PRM Livelihoods Strategy

Building sustainable livelihoods is believed to facilitate achievement of PRM's goal of durable solutions and supporting self-reliance for refugees. In May 2014, PRM adopted an internal livelihoods strategy, which outlines the following three goals:

1. Improve design and implementation of livelihoods programming;
2. Develop and disseminate tools and guidance for program officers and refugee coordinators; and
3. Exert diplomatic efforts to improve livelihoods prospects for populations of concern.

Program Response

World Relief (WR) began programming in the Makamba and Rutana Provinces of Burundi in 2005 however, the projects for which it received PRM funding and that were evaluated as part of this contract began in 2009. WR's livelihood activities included the distribution of seeds and chickens as well as the establishment of village savings and loans associations (VSLAs). **Christian Outreach for Relief and Development (CORD)** has worked with PRM funding in Burundi since 2009 with a focus on peacebuilding. CORD's livelihoods activities targeted HHs with assistance including seeds, tools, animals, and cuttings as well as training in animal husbandry, agricultural production, and composting. **Food for the Hungry (FH)** also began implementing livelihoods activities with PRM funding in 2009. FH's main activities included seed and tool distribution, goat distribution, and training in animal husbandry, stable construction, and improved agriculture techniques.

Evaluation Design, Data Collection Methods, and Limitations

This mixed-methods evaluation employed the standard rapid appraisal methods of document review, preliminary interviews, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and site visits within Ruyigi, Rutana, and Makamba provinces. The two-person evaluation team interviewed various stakeholders, including PRM staff members, IP staff members, UNHCR, communal authorities, program beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local partner organizations. Several limitations affected the data collection and analysis, including lack of baseline and monitoring data, selection and response bias, restricted fieldwork timeframe, and the absence of baseline and robust monitoring data, among others.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Evaluation Question 1: What types of assistance/programs were provided?

IPs in Burundi included livelihoods activities as part of a larger package of interventions for returned refugees, IDPs, and "stayees" (individuals who remained in Burundi during the conflicts). In most cases, livelihoods activities constituted the smallest component of IPs' annual budgets. Most livelihoods activities were designed as a one-time distribution of goods rather than a long-term intervention with on-going services. A small number of activities included training components for certain participants, while other activities focused on the creation of income-generating and savings and loans activities. It was difficult for the team to assess the extent to which IPs' activities were able to meet beneficiary needs and preferences due to the lack of useful baseline data. Needs assessment data, as well as systematic information gathered on individual and HH situations, community and market contexts, as well as ethnic and gender dynamics would have greatly facilitated this evaluation and enabled the team to feasibly answer this evaluation question. The substantial time lapse between the end of the programs and the evaluation made it very problematic for participants to recall their experiences; identify changes over the course of the programming; and differentiate between the inputs and activities they received from FH, CORD, or WR in light of the many other organizations also providing nearly identical support, distributions, and training.

Evaluation Question 2: Who are the recipients of assistance/programs?

All IPs discussed targeting criteria in the implementation of their livelihoods activities, however criteria were loosely defined and clear policies and procedures for applying and following the criteria were lacking. Feedback from village leaders and association members underscores the ad-hoc nature in which many activities were targeted and participants were selected. The team found a range among interviewed participants regarding levels of vulnerability, with some participants in need of assistance to meet basic needs and others who appeared well off and not in need of assistance. Several activities were not designed to assist the most vulnerable due to requirements of either a financial or asset-based contribution such as land, while the targeting and selection processes of other activities were not accessible to all eligible community members due to the way in which the process was executed at the village level.

The team found an overwhelming lack of sustainability due to the one-time nature of activities and the absence of sufficient, on-going support, particularly for individuals who are more vulnerable.

Evaluation Question 3: Were PRM-supported programs designed and implemented using best practices?

The team found the activities to be poorly designed and poorly implemented with minimal sustainability and few tangible outcomes. In addition to the weaknesses in activity design and implementation, the team found a widespread deficiency of technical knowledge and experience among IP program staff about livelihoods and livelihoods interventions. Moreover, the evaluation team found that IPs were not engaged in routine, systematic monitoring of their activities during the period of implementation. In some cases where monitoring data was collected by the IPs, this data was found to be quite accurate, although insufficient for the purposes of determining if a livelihoods program effected a change in the self-sufficiency of the beneficiaries. In particular, the absence of outcome-level indicators limits the depth of learning about these programs that can be achieved.

Evaluation Question 4: What was the impact of the programs/assistance?

Due to the lack of baseline data, the team is not able to determine the impact of the activities or attribute changes in beneficiaries' livelihoods to the IPs' interventions. All aspects of the activities for which the team was able to collect information are discussed in the other sections of this report.

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS

For IPs

IPs need to ensure that their field-based staff members in charge of implementing and overseeing livelihoods programs are properly trained and skilled in the field/discipline of livelihoods. HQ staff need to develop systems and tools to provide their field-based colleagues with stronger technical guidance and support to do their jobs, as field-based staff lack education and training in livelihoods.

IPs should include, at a minimum, one full staff position dedicated to monitoring livelihoods programs. Requiring existing staff members and refugee social worker assistants to undertake program monitoring is not feasible. Including M&E directly in budgets, both in terms of staff time and additional, needed resources, will help to ensure that program monitoring is given the necessary attention and dedication. While having a staff person for each project may not be feasible or necessary, a country-level or regional coordinator may be well-suited for such work.

IPs need to place more importance on developing livelihoods activities that are appealing to the needs of women and girls. Activities should be based on sound evidence as collected through a gender analysis with a focus on livelihoods capacities and gaps. Activities should not only demonstrate a nuanced and informed design, but also an implementation approach that considers how best to recruit and support women and girls to maintain their participation in activities as well as to find success following the termination and/or completion of activities.

For PRM

PRM should consider its capacity for supporting IPs working on livelihoods assistance. This includes the presence of a clear strategy with well-articulated priorities and operational procedures. This framework should be used as the basis for how awards are made and how IPs are monitored and evaluated over time.

PRM should ensure that needs assessments are conducted by each IP prior to program design and implementation. Needs assessments should also seek to understand the community context in terms of land ownership and use, markets, politics, ethnicity, gender, social structures and networks, wealth, and religion, among others.

PRM should insist on proper M&E of its programs and should require sufficient M&E budget lines in all proposals for livelihoods programs. Specifically, PRM should require all IPs to develop project logical frameworks that clearly state their program or activity objectives and the series of activities that will produce the required outputs, outcomes, and intermediate results to those objectives. The project logical framework should include the necessary custom and standard indicators (as offered by PRM) to monitor program or activity implementation over time. Indicator targets can also be set where necessary. The logical framework should be designed in a way that demonstrates careful consideration of the pre-design and implementation assessments that have been conducted of the needs and context.

PRM should review its vulnerability criteria for livelihoods programs vis-à-vis the types of activities IPs are proposing to implement. This review should be made in consideration that program participants will be well-placed to find success and ultimately to benefit from the activity or program being implemented and that proposed activities are appropriately designed for inclusion of vulnerable populations.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation Purpose

This performance evaluation examines the appropriateness and effectiveness of livelihoods programs for returned refugees in Burundi funded by The United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DOS/PRM) during fiscal years 2009-2013 and implemented by three implementing partner organizations (IPs): World Relief (WR), Christian Outreach for Relief and Development (CORD), and Food for the Hungry (FH). The purpose of this evaluation is to provide PRM with guidance and learning to improve PRM's livelihoods programming strategy as well as its capacity to support the design and implementation of livelihoods projects that contribute to helping refugees and returned refugees become self-reliant. This evaluation will also provide PRM, multilateral organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and IPs with guidance about conducting livelihoods activities and programs for camp-based refugees, monitoring field-based livelihoods programs for returned refugees and refugees living in camps, and engaging host country, international, and local IPs in best practices for livelihoods security and the promotion of self-reliance.

Evaluation Questions

This evaluation seeks to answer the following questions posed by PRM:

1. What types of assistance/programs were provided?
    a. What were the types of livelihoods assistance provided? (e.g. technical/vocational training; business training; access to finance; cash grants; in-kind items)
    b. To what extent did these meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?
2. Who are the recipients of assistance/programs?
    a. What are the characteristics of returned refugees who received livelihoods assistance?
    b. How well did partners reach vulnerable groups with livelihoods assistance?
    c. How many beneficiaries are continuing in the livelihoods activities for which they received assistance?
3. Were PRM-supported programs designed and implemented using best practices?
    a. Did IPs conduct baseline assessments such as market and livelihoods assessments?
    b. Were any external evaluations or internal M&E conducted?
    c. What indicators should PRM use to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the livelihoods programming it supports?
    d. Based upon the available evidence and the literature review, what are the qualities of successful refugee/returnee livelihoods programs? What are recommendations to PRM and other donors for future camp-based and returnee livelihoods programs?
4. What was the impact of the programs/assistance?
    a. Did beneficiaries' asset base change after participating in the programs? In what ways? How long were changes sustained?
    b. Where beneficiary incomes/assets did not noticeably improve, what are reasons for this lack of improvement?
    c. What factors influenced the success or failure of the livelihoods programs?
    d. Did PRM-supported programs promote self-reliance?
        i. Were beneficiaries able to meet more of their basic needs?
        ii. What percentage did and for how long?

e. How many beneficiaries were employed in the formal sector vs the informal sector?
f. What were the secondary benefits/costs of participation in livelihoods programs, if any? For example, did participants feel they were more/less vulnerable to abuse and exploitation and/or gender-based violence (GBV)?

PRM Livelihoods Strategy

By the end of 2014, the global population of displaced people – refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) – neared 60 million, largely due to new or recent displacements in and out of Syria, Central African Republic, and South Sudan.[1,2] PRM is keenly aware of the need to move beyond providing life-saving assistance and to support longer-term approaches to self-reliance.[3] Building sustainable livelihoods is believed to facilitate achievement of PRM's goals of durable solutions and supporting self-reliance for refugees and returned refugees. Self-reliance, as defined by UNHCR, occurs when individuals, households, or communities "are able to meet basic needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) and to enjoy social and economic rights in a sustainable manner and with dignity."[4]

There are significant challenges to implementing livelihoods programming for refugees. A Danish Refugee Council study conveyed the consensus among 60 practitioners on the difficulty of livelihoods programming and called for improved performance and research on livelihoods support programs for displaced populations.[5] This call echoes the view of UNHCR's Global Strategy for Livelihoods (2014-2018), which identified *learning* as one of four strategic objectives for livelihoods programming.[6] PRM also recognized the need for further developing its livelihoods work, and in May 2014, PRM adopted an internal livelihoods strategy seeking to accomplish three broad goals:

1. Improve design and implementation of livelihoods programming;
2. Develop and disseminate tools and guidance for program officers and refugee coordinators; and
3. Exert diplomatic efforts to improve livelihoods prospects for populations of concern.

Overview of Livelihoods Frameworks

This evaluation uses the widely accepted definition of livelihoods coined by Chambers and Conroy:

> *"A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including material and social resources), and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base."*[7]

Many organizations have adapted this definition for their own livelihoods programming, including CARE International and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.[8] UNHCR's livelihoods approach focuses on basic necessities and the means to secure them.[9] A comprehensive livelihoods approach for refugees must be based on *components* (capabilities, assets, and activities) and *sustainability* over the long term. Much of the relevant livelihoods literature references short-, medium-, and long-term, but these are rarely defined. UNHCR's operational guidelines (2012) specify that short-term generally refers to three months or less. However, any period under one-year can generally be considered short-term. The most widely used analysis tool for livelihoods programming is the *Sustainable Livelihoods Framework* (SLF), developed in the 1990s.[10] The framework explores the complex relationships among four elements affecting the status of livelihoods:[11]

- Vulnerability context (including shocks or seasonal trends);
- Assets (including human, natural, financial, social, and physical capital);
- Policies, institutions (government and private sector) and processes (laws, culture, or institutions); and

- Individual and household strategies.

According to the SLF, household assets are accessed through livelihoods strategies to achieve specific outcomes. This access, however, depends on structures, context, and processes, and asset transfers alone are insufficient for sustainable change.[12] The SLF is the foundation for developing a theory of change, and outlines how livelihoods can be affected by programs and measured in a specific development situation. It emphasizes the importance of participatory approaches to livelihoods planning.[13]

Burundi Country Background

Since the country's independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has experienced several waves of violence including a handful of large massacres that have killed tens of thousands and left hundreds of thousands displaced both internally and beyond its borders to neighboring countries. In 2000, the *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi* effectively ended the country's most recent civil war, although fighting and civilian casualties continued into the mid to late 2000s. The Agreement included provisions for the resettlement of displaced people and created a framework for the return of over 500,000 refugees, primarily from Tanzania, between 2002 and 2011.[14] The evolving political situation in Burundi has affected the rates of repatriation however, with large numbers of Burundians returning in some years, and fewer in others, particularly surrounding elections and other periods of uncertainty or insecurity.[15] Consequently, many have chosen to stay in Tanzania when possible, aided by the Tanzanian government's move to grant citizenship to more than 160,000 Burundian refugees from the 1972 period of massacres– a program that was finalized in 2014/2015.[16]

The return of refugees who have been in protracted refugee situations for years, even generations, poses unique challenges in Burundi given its already high population density. Land is a scarce resource, which is valuable not only because of its relevance for livelihoods in a predominantly agricultural economy, but also due to its role in local culture and family identity.[17] This is a particularly salient issue for reintegration of returned refugees who may feel entitled to ancestral land, while those currently occupying that land may feel that the returnees should occupy government-issued land.[18] When the Government of Burundi (GoB) offered a land-sharing solution to the conflict over ancestral land, neither returnees nor those who had remained in Burundi were satisfied. Land disputes have been prevalent in Burundi since the 1970s and have sometimes been a barrier to successful reintegration of returnee populations.[19] Land disputes are the most common cases in Burundian courts.

One strategy used by the GoB, in coordination with several international aid organizations including UNHCR and UNDP, to mitigate land-sharing issues is Burundi's Rural Integrated Villages (VRI) Initiative, which started in 2008.[20] Also known as "peace villages," the VRI initiative aims to reintegrate the landless displaced people of Burundi by populating the less populated rural areas around collines[121] Due to high levels of poverty in the VRIs, the success of the initiative is widely debated. In addition to managing the return of its citizens from Tanzania, Burundi hosts more than 60,000 Congolese refugees and asylum-seekers who have fled violence in the DRC.[22] The GoB has remained hospitable to refugees from neighboring nations, and it collaborates with UNHCR to ensure the basic needs of refugees within its borders are met. In particular, UNHCR in Burundi has focused on livelihoods activities as a key input for its strategy to promote self-reliance. With support from UNHCR the Government of Burundi is

[1] Colline is a French term that means "hill". Burundi is divided into 2,639 collines, which are unofficially referred to as villages.

revising its policies and procedures for registering refugees and determining the status of asylum-seekers.[23] Additionally, the GoB is working with UNHCR to extend the country's mandatory health and social security insurance scheme to refugees in protracted situations.

Despite the last years of relative stability, Burundi's peace remains tenuous in the face of political upheaval. Given President Nkurunziza's insistence on running for a third term, coupled with an unsuccessful coup attempt in May 2015, wide-scale protests and outbreaks of violence, more than 100,000 Burundians have left for neighboring countries.[2] As well, regional insecurity—particularly the situation of the Kivu provinces in DRC—affects Burundi and the rest of the Great Lakes countries.

Program Response

World Relief (WR) began programming in the Makamba and Rutana Provinces of Burundi in 2005 however, the projects for which it received PRM funding and that were evaluated as part of this contract began in 2009. Three iterations of a "resettlement assistance" project in Makamba focused on construction of shelters, pit latrines, primary schools, public latrines, and the distribution of seeds and chickens for livelihoods development. **Christian Outreach for Relief and Development (CORD)** began exploratory visits to Burundi in 2005 and programming for refugee returnees in 2009. Their initiatives in Burundi took place in the Bukemba and Giharo communes in the Rutana province, and included the Gitanga commune the first year and also Mpinga Kayove in the last year. CORD's activities included improvements to shelter and malaria prevention, to improve water, sanitation and hygiene, to increase food security, and to increase access to primary education. **Food for the Hungry (FH)** began work in Burundi in 2009 in the Cankuzo Province (at different times, the Gisagara, Cendajuru, Mishiha, Kigamba, Giharo, and Bukemba Communes) and Ruyigi Province (at different times, the Gisuru, Kinyinya, and Butaganzwa Communes). FH's objectives were to improve food security and livelihoods, expand education opportunities, protect and enhance the environment, and, reduce the incidence of sexual and gender-based violence. Main activities included seed and tool distribution, goat distribution, and training in livestock husbandry, stable construction, and improved agriculture techniques.

EVALUTION DESIGN, METHODS, AND LIMITATIONS

Evaluation Design and Data Sources

This evaluation relies primarily on qualitative methods to answer the proposed evaluation questions. Primary data were generated through group interviews (UNHCR, representatives of IPs and sub-contracted organizations), and interviews with participants and non-participants in field locations where programs had been implemented. Secondary data sources were reviewed and include IP program documents such as internal and external evaluations, proposals and agreements with PRM. The evaluation builds on findings from the Final Desk Review Report on Evaluating the Effectiveness of Livelihoods Programs (January 2015), and is supported by technical expertise from the Feinstein International Center (FIC) at Tufts University. Below is a list of data sources utilized for the evaluation:

- Livelihood and Refugee Technical Experts: DoS/PRM; Tufts University Feinstein Center;

[2] http://www.unhcr.org/558d4e086.html

- Donor/US Government Partners: Dos/PRM; UNHCR
- Implementing Partners; Food for the Hungry (FH); World Relief (WR); and Christian Outreach for Relief and Development (CORD)
- Sub-contracted Partners: Dutabarane; Floresta
- NGO Actors: Project Public d'Appui au Rapatriement et à la Réintégration des Sinistrés (PARESI).
- Members of Local Administration: Communal Heads, Village Chiefs, Sub-Village Chiefs
- Participants and Non-Participants of IP Programs including individuals, members of Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) and members of Income Generation Associations (IGAs)

Sampling Strategy

Two interview schedules were created for primary data collection. The group interview schedule was designed for IPs and their partners, and focused on questions related to: conceptions of livelihoods, program design, targeting processes and selection criteria, M&E, impact, and overall successes and challenges. The second interview schedule was designed for participants and non-participants and included a series of questions related to migration history, livelihoods strategies (assets, income sources, savings and credit), challenges and risks to the household (HH), coping strategies, and communal relations. Participants were asked a further set of questions related to program participation (See Annex II for Instruments). In order to generate a comparative dimension to the findings, participants and non-participants were included in the interview pool in each sample location.

Samples were ultimately drawn from information provided by IPs. Keeping program design in mind, simple randomization techniques were used to select firstly communes and secondly villages where interviews would be conducted. Due to inconsistencies in information provided between *and* within organizations, the sampling unit varied by IP. As well, the sampling strategy was periodically adjusted in the field to account for the lack of available data such as participant names and locations as well as colline names in which activities were implemented. While there was an element of randomization for drawing each IP sample, at the field level the team was often obliged to engage in convenience sampling to locate associations and participants due to the aforementioned lack of data.

FH implemented PRM supported programs in Cankuzo, Ruyigi, and Rutana provinces. Due to concerns about security and long distances between program locations and lodging facilities, the team ultimately excluded Cankuzo Province from the sample. FH field staff reported there was minimal difference in participants and programs implemented between the three provinces.FH provided the majority of livelihoods assistance to associations and their members. For the team, FH generated a list of associations by commune and village from which a random sample was drawn. FH initially assisted the team in locating members of the randomly selected associations. However, due to concerns about bias that was observed during the initial data collection period, the team adapted the strategy and conducted interviews independently of FH. The team asked village chiefs and knowledgeable residents to assist in locating interviewees.

CORD provided livelihoods assistance to individual households in Rutana Province. With CORD participant list and location records, the team randomly selected a sample of communes and villages to conduct interviews. As with FH, the team traveled to selected *collines* and asked village chiefs or knowledgeable residents to help locate those participants.

WR provided livelihoods assistance primarily through two sub-contracting organizations in Rutana and Makamba provinces: Dutabarane and Floresta. WR presented the team with a list of communes and villages where Floresta implemented programs. After randomly selecting communes and villages in Rutana province, the team traveled to the sites and relied on village chiefs and residents to locate

participants. For Makamba Province, the SI team faced significant difficulty locating beneficiaries of LH programs due to the belief that PRM shelter recipients had also received livelihood inputs. This was likely a misunderstanding between SI and WR related to complex data about multiple projects, overlapping beneficiaries, and locations. For WR's local partner Dutabarane, the team was provided with a list of associations that had received PRM support. The team drew a random sample of associations, but Dutabarane and WR had difficulty providing the locations of these selected associations in a timely fashion. As such, the team engaged in a convenience sampling strategy whereby Dutabarane arranged meetings with known members of associations. (See section below on Limitations).

Research Process

The evaluation began with a systematic review of program documents including funding proposals, quarterly reports, annual reports, and a limited number of internal evaluations and market assessments. Ahead of fieldwork, the team held phone interviews with all three IPs to explain the purpose of the evaluation, to pose clarifying questions on PRM programs focused on livelihoods, and to solicit information to assist in the sampling process. The team conducted fieldwork during 17 days in March 2015. The fieldwork began in Bujumbura where interviews were held with the three IPs, UNHCR, and PARESI—a Burundian NGO concerned with assisting returnee populations. UNHCR and PARESI were interviewed to gather information on the historical context, the return process and recent developments. IPs were interviewed following the key informant schedule. During these meetings, the team requested additional information including M&E documentation, internal and external evaluations, and program specific information to facilitate the sampling process.

Fieldwork was conducted with rural Burundians in Ruyigi, Rutana, and Makamba provinces in Eastern Burundi along the Tanzanian border. The time devoted to each IP for field interviews was divided evenly (five days each). There was limited opportunity to interview field staff members who had been involved with PRM funded livelihoods programs due to the multi-year gap between the cessation of PRM funding and the evaluation. FH was the only organization of the three IPs reviewed that continues to have a sub-office in the Eastern provinces. However, a staff member from one of WR's (former) local partners—Floresta-- was available for an interview. A former staff person of Dutabarane—also a former partner of WR-- was also available for interview. Following the sampling strategy described above, the team conducted interviews with participants and non-participants of programs in randomly selected villages. Due to the long distances between villages and curfew imposed on the UNHCR vehicle, the team conducted interviews in only one village per day.

Following fieldwork, the team conducted debriefing meetings with all three IPs and one of WR's partners in Bujumbura. At this time, the team specifically requested of FH—but did not receive—additional information about their programming. Key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with members of the three IPs, WR's local partners, UNHCR, PARESI, and one communal administrator. Interviews were conducted with 53 rural Burundians. Two thirds of the overall sample was female (n=35) and one-third male (n=18). For additional summary statistics on people interviewed, see Annex III.

Limitations

Evaluation Design

Several limitations during the course of the study—from the design of the evaluation through the fieldwork—affected the overall evaluation. First, the questions presented by PRM for the Burundi evaluation were premised on several assumptions that did not hold true. For example, the RFP suggested that livelihoods were a significant or even majority component of the program design for all three IPs. Once the evaluation started, it became clear that livelihoods were a secondary or even tertiary

element. The evaluation thus focused on a very limited scope of IP work, and work they did not believe to be representative of what they accomplished with PRM funding.

Second, several evaluation questions focused on measuring impact and change over time. Such questions can only be answered when baseline and monitoring data are available. None of the IPs collected systematic baseline data. WR provided the team with a baseline assessment report from their BPRM7 funding however, the team found this report lacking in the number of indicators it measured among those WR listed in its proposal. The evaluation team found the monitoring data it did receive, such as WR/Dutabarane's VSLA earnings data, to be largely output focused and of little utility in understanding whether program objectives have been reached. Furthermore, monitoring and baseline data were insufficient for the team to utilize in answering impact and longitudinal questions.

Third, the design of the evaluation assumed that programs were conducted recently enough to access IP staff and participants. PRM stopped funding all three IPs three years before this evaluation was conducted. Two of the three IPs had closed their sub-offices in the areas where programs were conducted, and the majority of upper level staff, and only a few field staff had been working during the PRM funding period. Low levels of institutional memory made it difficult for the team to gather comprehensive information to complete the evaluation. In addition, the multi-year gap between implementation and evaluation also hindered participant recall.

Information Gaps and Logistical Difficulties

Selection bias, particularly in relation to sampling, was a significant limitation of this study. As mentioned above, IPs had limited or erroneous information on the locations of programs and types of assistance that was provided. This affected the team's ability to properly sample locations and work efficiently, and resulted in significant loss of time. This was compounded by the lack of baseline and monitoring data available.

Respondent bias is a limitation that is inherent to the evaluation research process. IP involvement in the study at times appeared to increase bias, as they often "prepared" participants in advance of the interviews (even though the team had asked them not to). In order to avoid this, the team asked the IPs not to be involved in locating participants, and instead adapted its strategy to rely on local informants, including the village chiefs. Unfortunately, the village chiefs also had an interest in presenting the team with the "best off" participants. The interests of local power holders will be discussed in more depth in the recommendations section. When possible, the team attempted to locate participants independently. However, this required significant time investments and ultimately resulted in smaller sample sizes.

This evaluation was conducted in a pre-election period characterized by high tension. President Nkurunziza was expected to announce his candidacy for a third presidential term–in conflict with the term limits outlined in the Arusha Peace Accords and 2005 constitution—during the field visit, and a military coup or violent conflict were widely anticipated. Fear of war was prevalent amongst study participants. While this environment did not appear to impact the willingness of individuals to participate in the study, it might have influenced their openness when responding to questions related to security, difficulties within associations, and communal relationships.

Logistical difficulties also affected the evaluation. One significant limitation was the amount of time allocated in the contract for fieldwork. The geographical spread of programs (over four provinces) kept the sample size small and methodology basic. In addition, the team relied on the support of UNHCR in the field, and as such, was bound to UNHCR rules and regulations. The vehicle and driver could only leave the base at 8 a.m., and were required to return before 5 p.m. Distances between approved lodging

and field sites were substantial, and the team spent three to seven hours in the vehicle each day, severely limiting the number of possible interviews that could be conducted.

The **small sample size** generated for interviews with IPs' participants may pose limitations to the strength of evaluation findings. For example, the team conducted in-depth interviews with 12 of CORD's 700 program participants. As such, findings cannot be generalized to the wider population of program participants and must be understood and considered entirely within the parameters of the sample.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Given the difficulties and limitations for conducting the evaluation as described above, the team broadened the scope of the study to solicit information about the past and current livelihoods situation of returned refugees and those who remained in Burundi during the conflict ("stayees"). Through interviews with participants and non-participants of PRM supported programs, the team was able to generate a holistic picture of the local context as it relates to migration patterns, daily activities, household sources of income, assets and decision-making, risks and challenges, and adaptive behaviors of returnees and stayees living in Burundi's Eastern provinces. This type of information is essential for informing livelihoods programs and project design. This information will be presented in Section A, while the answers to specific pre-defined evaluation questions will be presented in Section B.

SECTION A

Livelihoods in Eastern Burundi

Findings from this section are based on interviews with 53 Burundians living in three provinces that border Tanzania (Rutana, Makamba, and Ruyigi). Three-quarters of the sample had been direct participants of a PRM supported program, and two-thirds were returned refugees. Given the lack of access to an accurate sampling frame, limited time and logistical difficulties, the team cannot draw conclusions based on statistical inference between these groups, nor generalize to the broader population.

Daily Life

The majority of Burundians living in the Eastern Provinces—as in most of Burundi—are agriculturalists. They are subsistence farmers first, and their daily lives revolve around cultivation of small plots of land, either owned or rented. Livestock holdings are a function of wealth, and are small and mainly kept to increase agricultural yield through the use of manure. Very few study participants possessed more than a few goats and chickens. HH income beyond subsistence was generated primarily through the sale of excess agricultural production.

Reliance on agriculture necessarily positions land as central to survival. The "better off" rural Burundians are generally characterized as those with larger plots (and more animals), and are capable of paying day laborers to plant, till and cultivate on their behalf. The poorest and therefore the most vulnerable are those without access to land. They either do not own land or possess infertile or low-yielding plots. They are more likely to rent land, and work as day laborers (for other landowners) to cover this cost. Women who are in polygamous relationships and those who are not legally married face constraints related to land access. Twenty percent of the interviewees were in a polygamous or unofficial marriage, but this figure likely suffers from underreporting. Persons with disabilities, widows, and orphans are consistently the poorest segments of society. Disabled people are physically unable to cultivate for themselves or others, while orphans and widows do not have access to land because customary land tenure laws stipulate that ownership is passed through male bloodlines. This situation is well-articulated by a widow:

"I have experienced hardship [since becoming a widow]. My husband had another wife and children with her. They are causing me problems….they say I do not belong here, that the plot of land and house belong to their mother and father. They say that the children I had with my husband can stay, but I must go. I was a co-wife."

In the study locations, women generally spend their days working on their land or as day laborers for others. They are responsible for all HH duties including food preparation, cooking and cleaning, and all aspects of childcare. Men are also involved in land cultivation, but generally work fewer hours per day than women. For HHs with income generating activities such as sale of excess agricultural production or trade, men tended to be more involved in these activities than women—in other words, women are more likely to cultivate the HH's plot of land, while the husband engages in activities outside of the home. The physical demands on women engaged in agriculture are enormous. Many described the difficulties of being pregnant, breastfeeding, and carrying children (on their backs) while cultivating. This 23-year old returnee and mother of two described: "*As a mother, my baby cries and prevents me from cultivating. Then there is a loss because there is no production. I carry the baby on my back, but when I bend over, he cries and I can't go on cultivating*."

Education levels are low, particularly amongst the stayees, as school systems in Burundi were predominantly closed for multiple years during the conflict. It was only in 2005 that primary education became free and therefore universal, but there are still associated costs including uniforms, supplies, and long distances between schools. In the sample, refugees had a slightly higher education level—in terms of average years of completed schooling—than stayees (4.1 vs. 2.75). Refugees completed primary school (6 years) and some years of secondary school (within refugee camps) at higher rates than stayees.

While children's access to education is important to families, agricultural production plays a more central role and related skills are prioritized. Most do not have long-term access to education and are struggling with meeting daily needs, requiring the focus to be on agricultural production. Two female respondents believed that they were barred from leadership positions in associations because they were uneducated. When asked about what would help them to improve their lives, the majority of respondents focused on skill building relating to modern farming techniques. Vocational skills were rarely mentioned as a need. This might be explained by the general absence of such activities in this part of the country, or because the market does not seem to demand such skills due to the low levels of cash flow in the local economy. What is not clear is whether more educated refugees chose to settle in urban areas—where their skills would be in higher demand and more lucrative—over the predominantly agricultural based countryside.

It is thus unsurprising that the majority of programming for returnees and vulnerable populations is based on increasing access to land and agricultural production. This includes GoB interventions such as peace villages and conflict resolution initiatives related to land tenure. As well, most NGOs focus on agricultural training and inputs, and supporting associations focused on farming and joint use of land. In terms of daily activities, access to land, and agricultural identity, marriage and gender roles, there were few differences if any between returnees and stayees in the sample.

Migration Patterns & Return

The majority of returned refugees interviewed for this study fled to Tanzania as a result of direct threats or fighting during the conflicts in 1972, 1993, and early 2000s. The refugee outflow was almost exclusively Hutu. The average length of stay in the Tanzanian camps was 14 years, a time period

significant enough to establish a life—children were born and raised and educated, people married and worked, others passed away.

Tutsis tended to remain inside Burundi, but displaced within their own village or communes, where they sought protection from local government or military installations. Interviewees explained that displacement tended to be temporary—one night, three weeks, or a few months at a time. Some joined family in other communes for longer periods. IDPs were often able to access their land for cultivation, although such access was intermittent as security was tenuous. Unlike the camps, life was highly unpredictable. Schools were closed and health services were largely inaccessible. While there is thus an ethnic dimension to historical migration patterns, participants minimized ethnic differences when discussing contemporary issues.

The refugees who left Burundi in 1972 are referred to as the "sans reference" (without reference), because they often lost contact with their original land or place of birth, or had been born in Tanzanian refugee camps with little to no linkages with Burundi. Thus, during repatriation they literally often had no place to return. The peace villages with plots of cultivatable land were established to help facilitate reintegration for the *sans references* and other landless people such as widows, orphans, or ex-combatants. Returnees from the 1972 exodus were also found outside of peace villages, and were present in most villages where interviews were conducted. Many erroneously assume that peace villages are comprised entirely of returnees from the 1972 exodus, *or* that these individuals do not live amongst other returnees/IDPs in non-peace villages.

Returnees in the study described that they fled with their immediate families, and often their (Hutu) neighbors on foot to Tanzania. When asked their reasons for return, most explained that they had either heard that peace had come from other community members, or that UNHCR or the Tanzanian government encouraged voluntary return. A few participants described that they were forcibly repatriated. As with the exodus, refugees most often came back with their families, and returned to their home villages. There were only a few instances of family members remaining in Tanzania or relocating to another part of Burundi, almost exclusively for marriage.[24] Interestingly, several study participants were returnees who had come to the Eastern provinces from other parts of Burundi. These returnees had also left Burundi for Tanzania during the various periods of conflict (1972, 1993, early-2000s), but returned home and either found their land occupied, too small or in poor condition, or anticipated this to be the case.[25] The Eastern provinces are known for being fertile and less densely populated than the rest of the country, and as a result, some returnees chose to resettle there. Some explained that they purchased land in the area by selling the items in the return packages that they received by UNHCR. While this decision allowed returnees access to land, it did leave them without any transitional support or assistance during the repatriation phase.

Upon return, most returnees described that their houses had been either looted or destroyed, and their animals stolen. Land was overgrown and largely unused and unoccupied. The only exception to this was in Makamba Province—more densely populated than other provinces—where there are still many disputes over stayees occupying returned refugee lands.[26] Aside from this particular location, returnees described being "welcomed back" by their neighbors. The younger generation—particularly those raised in Tanzania—described great difficulty in adjusting to life in Burundi such as captured by a young male refugee:

> *"Life was totally changed because in Tanzania we had a good standard of living, things were easy…we were used to receiving things in Tanzania, and we didn't receive them in Burundi. In Tanzania, we had something to do and we had many types of ways to earn a living. Also…we*

were getting vocational training. Here we didn't find anywhere to work. When we arrived we found that the majority of people lives off of agriculture. But as I wasn't used to this, it became a problem for me, because there was nothing to do."

Household Income, Expenditures and Decision Making

There were few noticeable differences between returnees and stayees in relation to HH incomes, main expenditures, and decision making related to spending. The majority of participants reported that they have little regular HH income. Depending on the season and climatic conditions, several participants did report a small amount of earned income from the sale of surplus agricultural production. Crops such as beans, maize, avocado, cassava, or tomatoes are either sold at the market or traded for HH necessities such as soap, salt, and clothing, or for educational or health fees. Some participants planted particular crops for their high yield value, either on their own plots of land, or through IGA schemes (including those supported by PRM). These are most often bananas (sold for brewing beer), palm (for pressing oil), and cassava. However, few participants reported that these were stable sources of income. Erratic climate conditions, crop disease, poor soil quality without access to fertilizer, and lack of access to sufficiently sized plots, were described as the main reasons for unstable income from agriculture.

Few participants held salaried positions, and those exceptions were men who worked on a large local sugar plantation. A few NGOs had recently implemented short-term cash for work programs in the sample locations. These included planting trees (one PRM funded IP), as well as building houses and latrines for peace villages. Both men and women participated in these activities.

The most consistent form of HH income for refugees and stayees in the sample was selling labor to landowners. Several men traveled to Tanzania once or twice a year to work as seasonal migrant laborers for one to two months at a time. Wages in Tanzania are reportedly higher than in Burundi, and men described they relied on the same networks as when they were refugees. Women reported regularly working on the land of neighbors or fellow villagers—either several days per week or several days per month—depending on the season and their need. In HHs where both men and women sold their labor locally, women worked more days on average than men. The average daily yield was reported at 1,000 to 2,000 Burundian Francs (FB) per day (0.64 to 1.25 United States Dollars [USD]/day). Working as a laborer increased during the lean period, or when a HH experienced specific shocks (see section on Risks and Adaptations). Related to income generation, there were few differences identified between returnees and stayees in the study.

HH expenditures were similar across the sample, the majority of which were related to agricultural inputs and food. During lean periods, food was purchased at the market or from neighbors. Elsewise, main expenditures were reported as salt, cooking oil, and soap. Clothing was most often described as an annual purchase. Educational fees and health related expenses were a significant expenditure as well.

In terms of decision making within the HH, men were more likely to make decisions regarding sale of assets and income expenditures. Many women submitted their earnings to the man who decided how it should be spent, although some reported that it was a more shared decision making process. Without exception, men made exclusive decisions over their own earnings.

Savings, Access to Credit

"We do not have any savings because everything we get is for daily subsistence. I do not take loans for making projects because I do not want to risk losing my property if I fail to repay the loans. I know a person who failed to pay and his land was taken and he went back to Tanzania."

The majority of participants in the study reported that their HH had no savings. This reality was echoed in the following quote by a 40-year old female returnee: "*If you lack things to eat, how will you be able to save anything for later*?" There were, however, two main exceptions to this trend. First, some refugees and stayees explained that they engaged in short term savings. In anticipation of the yearly lean period, they would keep earnings from their trading activities or the sale of agricultural surplus in order to purchase food when needed.

Second, eight respondents belonged to local associations that engaged in savings and loans activities (VSLAs). PRM supported VSLAs through WR, but this savings model was a component of many non-PRM supported associations. It is unclear how many rural Burundians are members of associations involved in savings schemes, but associations are a popular and governmentally sanctioned form of social organization. Many of the study participants, for example, were members of multiple associations—VSLA or otherwise. VSLAs require a weekly contribution—known as a share—to a savings account (usually kept in a strong box under the supervision of the leadership). After members have saved a certain amount, they can borrow from the cache and repay with interest. Members of VSLAs that were interviewed reported that they saved between 500 and 2,000 FB (0.30 to 1.25 USD) per week. Interest rates were usually between 10 and 25% with an expectation the loan be paid back within three months. The savings and earnings from loans are generally split amongst members after a 10-12 month period. Within this savings scheme is a "social fund," which is an interest free "gift" available to members who experience hardships where costs are accrued such as illness or funerals. This was viewed as the only insurance available to rural Burundians. Those who want to borrow a larger sum for medical reasons or educational fees for school generally do not pay interest. The rules for savings, borrowing and interest rates are unique to each association, but the process is generally the same.

There were a few respondents who borrowed on credit from their association or VSLA. Borrowing was predominantly in support of business endeavors and included purchasing bananas for brewing beer, goats to increase access to fertilizer and improve vegetable yield (for sale), and renting land to generate agricultural surplus. Respondents reported that many had difficulty paying back loans, especially larger ones. Defaults not only put the VSLA members' savings at risk, but required those who defaulted to sell or have their assets repossessed. Seized assets were most frequently housing material—such as iron sheets (and land.

Aside from the eight respondents involved in VSLA schemes, access to credit was at minimal levels across the sample of refugees and stayees. About half the sample responded that they had no access to credit. Of those remaining, the largest proportion described relying on informal mechanisms such as borrowing from (or trading goods with) neighbors, family, or friends. In emergency situations, many reported that they would seek an advance on selling labor from someone for whom they had previously worked. Differences between returnees and stayees in terms of access to savings and credit were minimal.

Risks and Adaptations

> *"I notice that my children fall sick because they are weak from not eating."*

Participants in the study said the main challenge faced by their HH was related to food security. Reasons given were several, and included decreasing agricultural yields due to land degradation and a lack of access to fertilizers (animal or chemical), as well as crop disease. Participants described climate change as a factor, which they defined as unpredictable and erratic weather patterns including frequent droughts, heavy rain, or hail was frequently cited as a factor for poor harvests. Respondents with smaller plots of land face more risk as they use their smaller plots more intensively and deplete their soil more

quickly. Those without access to land were most frequently at risk for food insecurity. There is a general belief on the part of Burundians that "improved seeds" —which are drought and disease resistant—as well as increased access to fertilizer, will help improve production, but most lack the resources to access these inputs.

In terms of coping mechanisms families described that they skip meals in order to manage food shortages. During these periods, parents reported trying to protect the rations for their children, while reducing their own intake. Nevertheless, poor harvests lead to food shortages, hunger and illness, which are exacerbated by the lack of savings and access to credit.

Both returnees and stayees described the devastating consequences of illness. Illness or disability means that adults are unable to work the land. Men and women report that women's pregnancies also increase food insecurity, as many are unable to engage in the physically demanding task of cultivation during the last months of pregnancy and following the birth of a child. In the absence of an affordable health care system, illness can quickly plunge a family into debt. In the absence of any real safety net, HHs with sick family members face hunger. The following quote exemplifies the intersection of land, disability and gender in the Eastern provinces:

> *"As a woman, my experience is that we have little to say in the life of the community because we have no means and little decision making power. Poverty affects us more than men. Women do all kinds of work to support our families. We have the capacity to trade, but we lack the start-up capital. Especially for me, I have a man with disabilities at home. He can't help me. Supporting a family when you are alone and a woman is not very easy. We are on a small plot of land, and we have 4 sons. It is not enough for us to eat. I consider that I have big problems."*

There were several reported ways of managing HH shocks related to illness or food shortage. The most common adaptation reported was to cultivate on someone else's land for pay. As mentioned above, women were more likely to sell their labor than men, but the frequency of this practice increases amongst both sexes during emergencies. A second strategy is to sell assets. As will be discussed in Section B, participants often sold the chickens, goats, or seeds they received from IPs when in need. A few respondents reported borrowing on credit from neighbors or family members. Those who belonged to associations reported that they borrowed through the social fund to help manage shocks. As with other findings, there did not appear to be significant differences between returnees and stayees with regard to the risks they faced or adaptive strategies utilized.

Community Relations

Aside from one location (Nyanza-Lac in Makamba province), respondents overwhelmingly reported that the relationships were positive between returnees and stayees. Given that there was an ethnic dimension to displacement patterns during the war—with Hutus becoming refugees and Tutsis staying and/or displacing internally—this positive relationship suggests that current ethnic relations in the Eastern provinces are generally good, with some exceptions. Some returnees maintained that relations have been positive with stayees from the moment they returned. Others reported that tensions related to land occupation were high—with threats and killings—when refugees returned en masse, but government and NGO initiatives helped to resolve these tensions. In Nyanza Lac, one respondent described that ten people had been killed during land disputes in the area, and described that conflict over land continued.

Returnees and stayees were asked to give examples of the "good relations" they described during interviews. They mentioned sharing land, drinking and dancing together during social events, asking for

advice or help in resolving family disputes, borrowing goods or money from each other, and children of stayees and returnees sharing food.

While relationships between returnees and stayees were largely described in positive terms, there were a few notable instances of conflict within associations. Some members described corrupt practices by leaders—such as the disappearance of shared resources including crops and money. Others said they were required to conduct work they had not agreed to. Associations are often led by village chiefs, sub-chiefs, or other influential members of the community, and members have little recourse when they have been exploited. For example, in an interview with a young female stayee who had belonged to an association supported by PRM funds, we were told that the leaders repeatedly stole goods grown by the association, and embezzled profits of members' labor. The leaders then bribed members to quit the association by giving goats in exchange for silence. When asked whom she could approach for help, the young woman replied, "*You can't be bitten by a small snake and seek justice from a boa constrictor*."

SECTION B
Evaluation Question 1: What types of assistance/programs were provided?

1a. What were the types of livelihoods assistance provided?
IPs in Burundi included livelihoods activities as part of a larger package of interventions for returned refugees, IDPs, and stayees. In most cases, livelihoods activities constituted the smallest component of IPs' annual budgets CORD's livelihoods activities received the second highest level funding among their package of interventions, but was substantially lower than their primary activity of shelter—$36,000 USD for livelihoods as compared to $129,000 USD for shelter activities. Most livelihoods activities were designed as a one-time distribution of goods rather than a long-term intervention with on-going services. A small number of activities included training components for certain participants, while other activities focused on the creation of income-generating and savings and loans activities.

FH – Ruyigi, Cankuzo, Rutana:
FH's livelihoods activities targeted refugees and stayees. According to interviews with FH staff members in Bujumbura, the goal of FH's livelihoods programs is child-focused community transformation, which is composed of four sectors: livelihoods, health, education, and disaster risk reduction. This package of interventions is designed to increase the well-being of the family primarily with regard to food security. To achieve this goal, FH supported IGAs such as livestock production, soap making, tailoring, palm oil production, and agricultural production by working with village-level associations and provided inputs such as goats, cows, seeds, and tools. In addition to supporting associations, FH also provided training on how to apply these inputs towards improved agricultural production, and enhance the environment through reforestation, agro-forestry and terracing initiatives.

The majority of FH's livelihoods activities are targeted to HHs. HHs received seeds, cuttings, goats, and cultivating tools like hoes, as well as trainings on how to utilize these inputs. Associations, which typically comprise 25 members, were targeted for IGAs. FH did not support the establishment of new associations, but rather, selected existing associations with which to work.

FH Bujumbura staff explained that they apply a training of trainers methodology where ten individual leaders of associations receive the initial training and then are expected to each train another ten individuals members of associations. According to FH Bujumbura staff, the initial training focuses on writing a business plan and managing a budget. FH Ruyigi staff reported that approximately 200 associations were selected to receive the initial training. Following the initial training, each association submitted an IGA proposal and budget plan to FH including the details about their chosen IGA. The FH

regional coordinator reviewed the proposals and selected those that were "good enough" to receive funding. According to FH Ruyigi staff members, approximately 55 associations received grants of roughly $1,700 USD to start their businesses.

To receive the grants, associations are asked to open a bank account with the Cooperative for Savings and Credit, a local micro-finance institution that has been in existence for more than 30 years. FH deposited the money into the accounts and created a surveillance committee, composed of the village chief, the community development committee, and FH staff. FH Ruyigi staff reported that during implementation, they monitored the associations' progress, provided support with any challenges, and helped to solve conflicts that arose. In addition to working with associations in a selection of villages, FH also supported two VRIs in Rutana, one in Ruyigi, and another in Cankuzo.

CORD – Rutana:

CORD's livelihoods activities targeted refugees and stayees. CORD's program goal in Burundi was focused on peacebuilding. CORD believes there are four pillars for building peace—economic (which includes livelihoods, livestock, agriculture, and micro-credit) literacy, advocacy around women's rights, and organizational capacity development. CORD's livelihoods activities targeted HHs, which each received the same package of assistance including seeds, tools, animals, and cuttings as well as training in animal husbandry, agricultural production, and composting. CORD's technical team was composed of an agronomist, a hygiene officer, and a veterinarian, who provided each HH with training pertaining to their technical expertise. CORD reported that their technical staff provided formal training during a two to three day period for each discipline. Typically the HH head or another representative participated in the training and subsequently the HHs received follow up visits from each of the three staff members.

WR – Makamba, Rutana:

WR's livelihoods activities targeted both refugees and stayees. WR subcontracted their livelihoods activities to two local partners, Floresta and Dutabarane. Floresta is a locally-registered organization focusing on agriculture and the environment affiliated with a US-based organization located in San Diego called Plant with Purpose. Dutabarane is a network of 28 Protestant church denominations that was formed in 2007 by WR, the Danish Baptist Union, and the Burundian National Council of Churches to combat HIV/AIDS. Dutabarane started forming VSLAs in 2009 and, according to WR, have become the most effective implementer of VSLAs in Burundi.

Floresta: Floresta was in charge of the food security component of WR's program. Working with ten associations, each composed of 25 members of whom 70% were returnees and 30% were stayees, in Bukemba commune in Rutana province as well as Kayogoro Commune in Makamba Province, Floresta distributed cassava cuttings and banana tress as well as chickens and agroforestry trees. In 2010, Floresta also implemented a small activity on improved cooking stoves using PRM funding in select locations within Bukemba and Makamba. In addition to inputs such as seeds and cuttings, Floresta also trained associations in improved agricultural practices. Floresta chose to work with cassava and bananas due to their experience with the disease resistant varieties of these plants.

Dutabarane: The start-up and implementation of VSLAs is broken into four principle phases. The first phase is focused on sensitization, which involves meeting with the community leaders, religious leaders, and people of influence in the community to explain the purpose of the activity. They are asked to gather their residents to identify individuals who are interested in starting a VSLA. The second phase lasts for 12 weeks with a meeting once each week to teach the members about the VSLA methodology including how to develop shares and maintain record keeping and accounting. Each association decides on the value of one share. According to a Dutabarane staff member, shares can range in value anywhere

from 200 FB to 2,000 FB. Members decide the amount of shares they are to buy on a weekly basis. The only obligatory contribution is the social fund, which members must contribute to on a weekly basis, typically at a rate of 50-200 FB. While members are able to skip savings contributions periodically, in order to remain a member of the association, all members must contribute to the social fund each week at the established rate. The third phase of establishing a VSLA is also a 12-week period in which Dutabarane staff members and village agents teach the members how to make loans and reimbursements. Following the third phase, Dutabarane staff members begin to reduce their support, attending association meetings once every few weeks to review record keeping and accounting. The fourth phase involves teaching the VSLA members how the sharing out is done at the end of the year. At the end of the first year, village agents continue to support and help run the VSLA. Village agents are typically men who are selected from the community based on their interest in the program and their ability to meet minimum education requirements.

1b. To what extent did these meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?

It was difficult for the team to assess the extent to which IPs' activities were able to meet beneficiary needs and preferences. The primary factor complicating the team's ability to examine the activities' effects on beneficiary needs and preferences was the lack of useful baseline data. Needs assessment data, as well as systematic information gathered on individual and HH situations, community and market contexts, as well as ethnic and gender dynamics would have greatly facilitated this evaluation and enabled the team to feasibly answer this evaluation question. The absence of this information prevented the team from determining whether any changes occurred between the intervention and the present time. As mentioned in the limitations section, the substantial time lapse between the end of the programs and the evaluation made it very problematic for participants to recall their experiences; identify changes over the course of the programming; and differentiate between the inputs and activities they received from FH, CORD, or WR in light of the many other organizations also providing nearly identical support, distributions, and training.

In addition, program designs were reportedly based on participant preferences, rather than systematic assessments of market needs. Articulation of preferences may be biased due to limited information or the manner in which that data are gathered—for example, IPs informed the team that in some instances, returnee and stayees' needs were first captured by local authorities and village leaders, who then shared them and/or passed them along to the IPs for their use, which—given concerns about manipulation related to selection/targeting—may undermine the reliability of the information.

Although preferences are an important dimension of market assessments, exclusive reliance on such information may be problematic insofar as it may not consider other important factors, e.g market forces. As an example, CORD's provision of goats was well-appreciated by several participants despite reporting that the goats had died shortly after delivery. Although the goats did not appear to yield any economic benefit and indeed, became a liability in some cases, various interviewees expressed a desire to receive more goats in the future.

In addition to the challenges outlined above, several participants received only part of the planned activity or input from the IPs. One FH participant lamented, *"I didn't receive any training about agriculture because…the trainings were given to people who were working in the plantations for the associations and sometimes I couldn't participate because I lived far from there."* The team learned that many associations and all VSLAs require contributions and membership fees that make participation difficult for individuals without access to land and disposable income. In this way, the team was able to determine that these particular activities did not meet the needs and preferences of the majority of respondents, who shared that they were unable or not participating in these activities.

Despite the limited effect most IPs' activities had on sustainably meeting beneficiary needs, approximately 5respondents who participated in WR's activities expressed appreciation for the improved cassava and banana varieties they received from Floresta. Bananas are the most important cash crop in the Great Lakes region. As it is not as seasonal as other crops, it can provide a steady cash flow. Cassava is an important vehicle for caloric intake and is one of the most important staples in Burundi and much of the region. Floresta reported that when they came to Rutana province, cassava plants suffered from the mosaic disease. A similar disease was also harming banana trees. Floresta spent three years multiplying mosaic and disease-resistant cassava and banana seed varieties, which they later distributed as cuttings to WR association members. The team is unable to assess whether these varieties led to any changes in agricultural production, economic well-being, or household food security, as many of the activities sought to produce, due to the lack of a baseline assessment.

The activities the team evaluated were principally one-time distributions of goods or short-term infusions of training or support, as opposed to an integrated set of activities with a clear series of steps and processes and well-articulated intended results or outcomes. The likelihood that activities of this nature could meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance is extremely low. Oftentimes, programs and activities that rely entirely on self-reported needs fall short of producing lasting, meaningful changes in participants' lives. A systematic assessment of context and needs (such as presented in Section A) is necessary to develop an effective livelihoods program. The majority of respondents the team interviewed continue to struggle on a daily basis to meet their basic needs. The only individuals the team interviewed who were in a position to meet their basic needs were the village leaders and community authorities who had been included in the programs.

Critically poor people, particularly recent returnees, many of whom have little to no assets, often need of a range of different types of assistance to meet basic needs. A one-time distribution of seeds can be helpful, but lacks sustainability. The distribution of animals can provide longer-term assistance to individuals under certain circumstances, such as when the animals are healthy and the breed is appropriate for the environment and where the population knows how to care for them. Success depends on the recipient's knowledge, skills, and resources to properly care for animals. The provision of animals to vulnerable individuals can further degrade their livelihoods if they lack the means to support the livestock. Similarly, access to land will determine whether the provision of agricultural inputs—seeds, tools, and cuttings—can improve a HH's economic viability. Projects that were designed only around agricultural inputs precluded landless people from participating.

Evaluation Question 2: Who are the recipients of assistance/programs?

All IPs discussed targeting criteria in the implementation of their livelihoods activities, however criteria were loosely defined and clear policies and procedures for applying and following the criteria were lacking. Feedback from village leaders and association members underscores the ad-hoc nature in which many activities were targeted and participants were selected.

FH:

The team inquired with several staff members at FH about the selection process of associations for inclusion in their livelihoods activities. However, it was quite difficult to ascertain sufficient details and a clear explanation of the process. FH Bujumbura staff reported that they target associations that comprise returnees, IDPs, and stayees as well as youth, women, and vulnerable people. FH staff said the role of the local leader in the targeting process is very helpful and that FH staff members identify groups that are vulnerable based on criteria set by the UN and major NGOs, such as elders, orphans and HIV+ people. They explained that lists of vulnerable people were compiled and publically validated. However,

the SI team was unable to verify this process in the field. FH staff reported that when working in VRIs where IDPs and returnees were living together, activities were carried out on communal parcels of land where everyone presumably received and/or had access to the same inputs including seeds, cuttings, and tools. Certain activities targeted to specific groups required the application of additional selection criteria. For example, activities targeting forcibly repatriated individuals were under-resourced and thus, FH established an additional level of selection criteria including health problems, age, children with poor nutritional status, and people with disabilities, to implement these activities.

CORD:

According to CORD staff in Bujumbura, they target primarily returnees (70%) and subsequently other people residing in the area (30%). CORD verifies returnee status by requesting documentation papers showing the person was legally repatriated. The high number of returnees and limited resources meant CORD applied additional selection criteria including access to land and vulnerability. CORD defined vulnerability to include widows, child-headed HHs, year of return (with more recent being more vulnerable), and men/women without assets. CORD stated that the quota for non-returnee participation was based on their overarching program goal of sustainable and peaceful reintegration. Residents were selected based on their living conditions. These criteria were intended to prevent accusations of discrimination and raised tension in the community. CORD's selection process involved calling all people who met the criteria to a public meeting with the representatives of the commune, including the village leader and a representative elected by the returnee population. CORD facilitated the process, which concluded with approving a list of people selected from those who attended the meeting. CORD claimed that their participatory and transparent process meant everyone was satisfied with their targeting, and there were no complaints or reports of conflicts.

Several respondents informed the team that oftentimes village members were not informed of the specific day or time that an IP would be coming to conduct the participant selection for a particular activity and, therefore, were not included in the selection process. A female CORD participant in Rutana explained the selection process.

> *"We would receive a message that they would come on day x, but that day if they didn't come we would wait and some people went back to Tanzania to get a living and when CORD would come and when those people were not here they were skipped. There were no returnee representatives, only the village leader to tell people what day the organization would come to give the services."*

WR:

WR's livelihoods activities targeted participants in different ways based on the local partner's approaches. Agriculture activities implemented by Floresta were principally carried out via associations. Floresta reported that selected associations needed to comprise 25 members with 70% returnees and 30% stayees. Floresta reported that due to the difficulty in identifying pre-established associations with these demographics, they often worked with the local authorities and churches to help them establish the associations. Floresta also reported that they applied vulnerability criteria to participant selection, but they did not explain specific criteria details.

> *"We worked together with the local associations and churches to choose the most vulnerable people among repatriated and residing people. Then we chose a number exceeding 25 and then it was up to the total number of chosen people to decide who is more vulnerable than others following a participatory process."*

The focus of Floresta's programs on agriculture required associations to procure large plots of land for cultivation. Floresta reported that association members with large plots of land often contributed land to the association free of charge. When none of the members could donate land, association members had to find a solution. When queried about the challenges vulnerable association members would likely face in procuring sufficient land on which to cultivate, Floresta reported that sometimes an association could identify a widow who possessed a large plot that she could no longer cultivate. Association members could convince her to give them the land with the agreement that following harvest she would receive one tenth of the production.

Dutabarane's savings and loans activities were implemented in Kibago, Makamba, and Gitanga Provinces using what they call a demand-driven approach. Dutabarane's program policy, including those receiving PRM funding, is that they do not provide handouts. When asked to explain how VSLAs are formed, Dutabarane staff explained that the first phase focuses on community mobilization and behavior change, in which Dutabarane seeks to change the mindset of community members to bring about their own development without the injection of funds or inputs. Once the local leaders understand Dutabarane's approach, they share the message with the community and then Dutabarane provides community members with an orientation to the VSLA methodology. All interested groups attend a meeting, and VSLAs are then chosen. Dutabarane reported that they do not adhere to any criteria regarding VSLA composition. Members select each other based on trust, ability to save a minimum of one share per week, respect, and being well known within the community.

A village leader who participated in WR's activities implemented by Floresta attempted to describe how participant and activity targeting and selection took place. The team learned that the targeting and selection process is unorganized, often manipulated by village leaders, and also includes individuals with moderate to high levels of income and assets.

> *"Normally when the international NGOs come, they come through us and ask us to choose vulnerable people, so we convene a meeting and people help to select, through a participatory process, the most vulnerable among themselves. Floresta did not use that process."*

An association member from the same location described that it was a first come first served process for joining. The team found that in addition to assisting returnees, Floresta also came to these villages with an interest in supporting their cassava flour processing business.

> *"They told us that they wanted to work particularly with cassava growers because they had in their mandate to establish a cassava flour processing company and they needed cassava. That company had already started functioning and they came to see if there was cassava that they could buy and process in their company. Floresta had not offered a good price and they didn't agree in the end and they didn't buy from us."*

2a. What are the characteristics of refugees who received livelihoods assistance?

Please refer to sub-section d, for details on the characteristics of program beneficiaries.

2b. How well did partners reach vulnerable populations?

The team found IPs' targeting and selection processes lacking structure and adherence to routinely applied criteria. Furthermore, the team found that most outreach and participant selection was conducted through village leadership. Some partners reported that they followed a "participatory process" in which village members decided among themselves who was most vulnerable and should be allowed to join an association or receive a distribution. However, the team was unable to verify this

process through field interviews with beneficiaries. Across all IP activities, the team found a range among interviewed participants regarding levels of vulnerability, with some participants in need of assistance to meet basic needs and others who appeared well off and not in need of assistance. Several participants were village leaders or wealthy livestock and land-owners who had been included in the program due to their status in the community. Several activities were not designed to assist the most vulnerable, such as WR's VSLA activity and FH's IGAs for associations. When queried about the restrictive design of their activities, IPs and their local partners were unable to see the barriers of access for vulnerable groups. Some targeting and selection processes were not accessible to all eligible community members due to the way in which the process was executed at the village level. Finally, many returnees most in need of assistance were never selected due to the use of repatriation year as a targeting criterion.

The range in participants' levels of vulnerability included those who were extremely vulnerable, such as an elderly, female participant of CORD who fled Burundi for Tanzania in 1993 and returned in 2007. Widowed two times, almost entirely blind, and unable to walk well, she lives alone with her 21 year old grandson who cultivates her small plot of land. Similarly, CORD provided assistance to a woman who had lost her house and a child in a fire. WR supported another quite vulnerable individual with assistance. Her HH, which is composed of nine individuals including her husband, seven children, and a grandchild, owns less than a hectare of land on which they are unable to produce enough food to meet HH needs. HH members subsist on one meal a day. She fled to Tanzania in 1972 with her parents, where she married her husband and returned to Burundi. After losing their eldest child in the conflict that began in the mid-1990s, she and her husband again fled with their small children to Tanzania during the conflict in 1997. Her husband abuses alcohol, and does not contribute to the HH financially, and buys alcohol with what little his wife makes selling small quantities of palm oil or laboring on other peoples' land.

At the same time, the team interviewed other participants who did not meet any of the targeting criteria laid out by the IPs. In many instances the team spoke with village leaders and chiefs who ensured their own inclusion or that of their family members, in activities and distributions. Numerous individuals shared concerns about the lack of transparency and presence of corruption in the targeting/selection process due to the prominent role of village leaders and sub-leaders.

A male ex-combatant from Ruyigi province who participated in FH activities described the corrupt practices among village leaders involved in IP activities. In explaining the process by which IPs seek to establish lists of poor and vulnerable village members for participation in various assistance activities reported, *"some associations have attempted to make such a classification and when they made the list it was submitted to the village leader but because of corruption, the leaders did not accept the list as such but sometimes changed and replaced the most vulnerable with those who are not vulnerable at all."* When asked whether the village leaders' practice of selecting participants created tension in the community, our interviewee said, *"They say…that this chief is a very bad person…Of course he is corrupt. If you have no money they don't register you on the list of those who will benefit from support."*

One participant of WR/Floresta's activities in Rutana was the village chief who had maintained this position since 2005. He reportedly owns one hectare of land and rents another where he employs two people on a regular basis to cultivate the land for him. In addition to meeting his HH consumption needs, he produces and sells banana beer and plantains in the market. As the village leader, he earns a monthly income of 17,000 FB and also owns two cows, two goats, approximately 25 chickens and a pig. While it is uncommon for most villagers to belong to multiple associations, the village leader belonged to four including a VSLA, a rice cultivation association, and aqua-culture association, and the cassava

cultivation association through which he participated in activities with WR/Floresta. When asked about his membership in four different associations, he responded:

> *"…it depends on how much time to you have to actively participate in these associations… it's also about the schedule that we have in those associations. There are days when I go in one association and we plan accordingly. When I have time I go, but otherwise I send either my wife or an employee. Or they work per day when there is much work, and I ask how much I can pay to the association for the work I haven't done so I can continue to have a share in everything they do."*

A second WR/Floresta participant in Rutana was also found to be a village leader. When asked whether he considers himself to be vulnerable and therefore eligible for participation in the activity, he responded:

> *"Yes – I'm going to tell you honestly, I was the chief of the village and I was informed that there are some cassava cuttings that are new – resistant to mosaic. I could not, not be on that list. One cassava cutting from which you can make 3 or 4 smaller ones to plant - the cost was 20 FB and then if you are informed that there are cassava cuttings resistant to mosaic, you could not, not be written on the list if you have that position."*

When asked about the number of other association members who were not truly vulnerable, the leader explained that he instructed his deputy leaders to identify people who were vulnerable but still strong enough to cultivate. In his opinion, the individuals selected for participation in the association were "deserving" because they were poor and vulnerable, but they were strong enough to work. The main objective was to multiply the cassava cuttings in order to distribute them to other people.

The team interviewed two female participants in Ruyigi who reported needing to pay 5,000 FB to join the association supported by FH. Asked how they were selected to join the association, the women reported, *"there are many other people living here who were not in the association. It was voluntary – people who wanted. But also, people among us who had money to contribute. They asked us to have at least 5,000 to have a share and open an account to make movement of money on the account."*

The team found significant limitations for vulnerable groups to participate in all of the IP activities including the IGAs, VSLAs, and associations. Each of the activities requires either a financial or asset-based contribution such as land. Dutabarane, in charge of working with returnees, IDPs, and stayees to establish VSLAs, requires participants to contribute three unique payments, some weekly and some monthly, to secure their membership. These payments include a weekly contribution to a social fund, an amount that is typically no less than 50 FB, but which is ultimately determined by the VSLA group members; a weekly share purchase of at least one share, which is typically no less than 200 FB; and a monthly payment to the Village Agent, typically in the amount of 200 FB. When queried about the limitations these required payments present to the participation of poor individuals with vulnerabilities, the Dutabarane Director responded:

> *"This is a program that attracts everyone – for us it is supposed to reach the very poor. We tell people that you are beautifully made and if you say you are poor you will keep being poor, but when you change your mind about your own value and wanting to have self-esteem then you can become something. It's about denying yourself something to save for the next day. We don't teach people to convert, our approach is more general on how God created people, that everyone was made with a purpose and there is something that God expects from everyone.*

Whether you are poor or rich – God has given you a talent and you are supposed to pursue that talent. I normally say that I can be cured by VSLAs because I have seen the beauty of it."

IP targeting and participant selection based on repatriation year often meant that the most vulnerable members of a community were not considered for participation. This issue raised particular concern with the team as well as among some of the IPs, who expressed confusion over the requirement to target individuals based on their year of repatriation. In particular, some returnees who received IP assistance had already received support from UNHCR, while others received none. A female CORD participant from Rutana who reported moderate income and land-holdings explained the weakness of IP's targeting criteria.

An organization would come with assistants and say the year of repatriation as criteria – year x only – these are the people who will get support. There are also people who repatriated long ago before 2009 who did not receive anything. We are advocating for other repatriated people who still do not have a place to stay and they are many. My husband and I are very lucky because we were able to be repatriated with facilitation of UNHCR, but others, 1972 former refugees, were repatriated by force. Those repatriated from '72 have no houses, they work in the fields to make money and sometimes when they don't have money to pay they are chased out and they wander to find a sensitive person to let them live and work to pay...

2c. How many beneficiaries are continuing in the livelihood activities for which they received assistance?

As the majority of assistance provided by IPs was a one-time distribution of goods, the team examined this question primarily with a focus on individuals who received animals, belonged to associations, IGAs, or VSLAs, or received training. Most respondents who received animals said they had either died shortly after receiving them or had been sold due to the need for HH income. Respondents who participated in associations and IGAs reported a range of outcomes: some were continuing in the same IGA, others had started new IGAs, and many IGAs had not succeeded. A similar range in outcomes was observed among association members. The two VSLA participants the team interviewed were both continuing to participate in VSLA activities.

Two female participants in FH's IGA activities from Ruyigi who were originally supported to develop a sewing business reported that they were unable to sustain the sewing business due to a lack of demand. Instead, they decided to pursue a cassava cultivating business and are renting land where they plant and cultivate cassava. According to the respondents, the association is still composed of the original 15 members. *"There was money left over from the grant to buy the sewing machine, so when we saw that the sewing business was not going well we just took the rest of the money and that is the money we used to rent the land."*

A male participant in FH's IGA activities in Ruyigi was not only a very prominent commune leader, but also the leader of a coalition of five associations, each of which had received significant assistance from FH. Most of FH's IGA grants were made in the amount of $1,500-$2,500 USD. The village leader explained that the five associations developed and submitted their IGA proposals to FH as a coalition and shared the assistance among the five associations. While they originally focused their IGAs on raising cows to generate manure for soil enhancement, the associations sold their cows and started a new business making soap. The commune leader explained their decision to switch from cows to soap:

"We have seen that in this region…there are no people who make soap so we said to ourselves if we do soaps we will be the only ones and we will have people to buy and we will be rich. We buy the raw material and FH has given us a machine that you use to grind those materials. FH also

asked us to avail 4 people to be sent to Bujumbura to learn how to make soaps. So when they came back they trained other people in the association to do it."

While the respondents quoted above were resourceful and perhaps at least in the case of the commune leader, better positioned due to their wealth status to turn their troubled IGAs into a more lucrative operations, other respondents experienced greater challenges keeping their IGAs up and running. The commune leader's IGA was also the only instance in which the team found FH to be providing on-going material support. Not only did this IGA receive a substantial grant from FH to purchase their cows, but also they received a soap processing machine and special training for several of their members who were sent to Bujumbura. Several additional respondents who participated in FH IGA activities reported that their IGAs disbanded due to a lack of support from FH staff members.

Two female participants of FH IGA activities in Rutana explained that they worked together with four associations to submit a consolidated business plan to FH to start a small shop selling beans, palm oil, soap, and other HH articles. The four associations each received 1,500,000 FB (approximately $1,000 USD) with which each association purchased one commodity to sell at the shop. The respondents reported that the business did not go well and they terminated it several years ago. *"When we heard that Leonard (FH staff member) was dead those in charge of making the activity said we have lost, and even the start-up capital was not recovered."* When asked about whether they were continuing with the other FH activities in which they participated, the respondents shared: *"It brought a great change. It has raised our agricultural production, but still the fact that because of poverty we have sold our goats and we don't have enough organic manure to fertilize our fields."*

This data underscores the importance of designing activities with sufficient support to enable long-term sustainability as well as the need to consider providing additional support and assistance to those members and IGAs who are determined to be more vulnerable. As highlighted above, among all IGA participants, the commune leader was least likely to be in need of additional support from FH to ensure the success of his IGA.

Nearly all recipients of CORD's goat distribution and agriculture training activity in Rutana who the team interviewed reported that while they received support and assistance from CORD to care for their goats, they still died after a very short time of owning them. Respondents shared that CORD staff members provided them with training on how to care for the goats, medicine to put in their eyes, and one respondent even received an iron sheet to cover the goat stable. Nevertheless, the support was insufficient for keeping most of the goats alive. One respondent who received two goats from CORD said that until recently he had managed to keep his goat alive and they had reproduced giving him three offspring. He shared that he sold one because he urgently needed the money and one recently died, leaving him with three goats at the present moment. He reported that he uses the goats for manure, which he mixes with other waste to make compost.

The evaluation team spoke with two participants in WR/Dutabrane's VSLA activity in Rutana province. One female participant reported that after three years of membership, she continues to participate in the VSLA and saves between 1,500 to 2,500 FB each week. She reported that last year at the time of the "share-out" she received 150,000 FB. The second participant had borrowed 100,000 FB to buy a pig and rent land for cassava production. He had defaulted on the loan but was hoping to pay it back. (See Section 3 *Savings, Access to Credit)*

Evaluation Question 3: Were PRM-supported programs designed and implemented using best practices?

The team examined this question in terms of IPs' stated activity goals, which included peaceful and sustainable reintegration and increased HH food security for returnees and vulnerable populations. As such, the team found the activities to be poorly designed and poorly implemented with minimal sustainability and few tangible outcomes. One exception to this is data from a WR evaluation of VSLAs that reports increased savings resulting from participation. The SI team was not able to verify, nor confirm that an increase in savings is directly related to improved food security or peaceful reintegration. As discussed in prior sections of this report, the majority of activities were one-time distributions of seeds, animals, tools, and cuttings with very little training. This "truck and chuck" model of development is not reflective of a thoughtfully designed livelihoods intervention. While distributions of inputs are very much needed upon returnees' immediate reintegration, such one-off distributions are not capable of producing long-term outcomes such as peaceful reintegration or increased HH food security. Complex and sophisticated goals such as these require long-term planning, significant resources, and on-going support from integrated implementation teams composed of peacebuilding and livelihoods experts. In a livelihoods context such as Burundi's, in which population density is among the highest in the world, the majority of the population depends on subsistence agriculture, and customary land tenure laws govern land ownership and inheritance in which fewer and fewer people have access to sufficient land for cultivation—providing people with rudimentary farming implements such as shorthanded hoes—is in not reflective of best practices.

The requirements related to the IPs' other activities, including IGAs, VSLAs, and associations, implemented by FH as well as WR's local partners Dutabarane and Floresta, demonstrated that truly needy and vulnerable populations were either not included or actively excluded from participation. Furthermore, the SI team was concerned by sub-contractor practices and values. For example, Floresta widely distributed cassava cuttings and informed beneficiaries that these cuttings would be bought and processed in their plant. They subsequently did not return due to lake of market demand. The interview with the executive director of Dutabarane was concerning due to the deeply religious tone that pervaded the discourse, not only in terms of the rationale for the program, but also regarding the reported way of interacting with community members. This raised questions with the team regarding their level of unbiased practice, commitment to sustainable development, and working with the most vulnerable members of a community.

The team was also surprised to learn the size of grants distributed by FH to IGAs. $1,500 to $2,500 USD is a significant amount of money to distribute to a group of 15-25 members in a country where the average per capita income is 0.71 cents per day.[27] The provision of one-time cash grants in such large amounts, and in a model that is devoid of participant accountability raised significant concerns with the team. The lack of attention placed on the design and implementation of FH's IGA activity reflects poor attention to sound program strategy.

Underscoring the weaknesses in activity design and implementation, the team found a widespread deficiency of technical knowledge and experience among IP program staff about livelihoods and livelihoods interventions. Meetings with IP staff members in headquarters in Bujumbura revealed at best a moderate understanding of the livelihoods needs of returnees, and among field staff members there was a widespread deficiency of experience and technical knowledge of livelihoods. Not one IP reported the presence of a livelihoods or food security specialist among their staff members.

IPs seeking to achieve high-level outcomes like peaceful reintegration and HH food security will forever be challenged to design effective livelihoods activities when they are an add-on to, or afterthought in,

an unintegrated program of disparate activities such as education, health care, and shelter construction. Livelihoods activities with outcome-level goals require significant resources, long-term strategic planning, skilled implementation and follow up, and greater focus and attention on assessments, routine program monitoring, and evaluation.

3a. Did NGOs conduct baseline assessments such as market and livelihoods assessments?
Overall, the team found the IPs to be very weak with regard to designing and implementing baseline and livelihoods assessments. WR was the only IP that conducted an assessment within the timeframe of PRM funding (2009-2012), which was a baseline assessment conducted during 2011. The baseline assessment was poorly designed and rife with logical and methodological errors including:

- Program objectives improperly structured as activities, lacking definitions and including targets, for example: "500 recent returnees and the most vulnerable households are re-integrated through improved access to human, natural, social, physical and financial capital in Makamba and Rutana provinces. These beneficiaries receive assistance with house and latrine construction as well crop and livestock inputs." Best practice evaluation underscores the separation of targets from both activities and indicators. Terms such as "recent returnees", "most vulnerable", "re-integrated", "improved access", "beneficiaries", and "crop and livestock inputs" require clear definitions in order to be effectively measured and monitored.[28]
- Indicators improperly structured as activities, seeking to measure composite rather than unique activities, and including targets. For example: "500 households each receive 1,000 cassava cuttings, 10 banana plants, 2 fruit trees, and 2 agro-forestry trees." Best practice evaluation underscores the importance of separating targets from indicators.
- The program lacked a logical framework, or theory of change, detailing the means by which the objectives would be achieved. In the absence of a strong logical framework or program methodology, it is impossible to accurately assess program or activity performance.

CORD reported that they conducted needs assessments in collaboration with the local administration. The local administration compiled a list of returnees' reported needs, which CORD sought to verify by speaking with selected returnees. The team was unable to obtain any data from CORD regarding their baseline assessment. Nonetheless, the number of meals per day is only one dimension of how HH food security should be measured. Furthermore, access to food is an entirely different indicator than HH food security. In this way, the team found IPs to be greatly struggling not only with appropriate program design, but also in understanding the appropriate methods to use in assessing complex indicators such as HH food security and access to food.

In the same way that WR's program design and baseline assessment lacked methodological and logical understanding, CORD's assumption that their one-time distributions of seeds, cuttings, and animals could affect change in a HH's access to food was entirely inaccurate. Outcomes related to changes in HH access to food require much more sophisticated interventions than to which CORD's activities could claim contribution. In other words, HH access to food was outside CORD's manageable interest with regard to the design of their activities.

FH reported that their "assessments" were based on reports they received from the local administration in the communities where they worked as well as discussions with HH members.

> *"We normally worked with the local administration in charge of agriculture, so before we went to the field we got information from the administration about the annual production in the area where we were going, so when we started to implement we were able to see the changes. From home visits and discussions with the HH we would ask them how much production they normally*

would get from a certain plot and then after they cultivate we would come back at the day of harvest and they would tell us this is what they have received compared to last time. This is how we were able know if there was a change."

The above quote from an FH staff member reflects the weak methodology used to measure program change. Self-reported agricultural production data is highly unreliable. Moreover, FH stated that they attributed any changes in production entirely to their program activities, which demonstrates a lack of understanding for the many other uncontrollable factors that also affect agricultural production both positively and negatively. In the absence of an experimental or quasi-experimental design, in which outside factors are controlled using complex statistical models, attribution of outcome-level change to program activities is entirely implausible.

The lack of methodologically sound and reliable needs assessments focusing on refugee livelihoods or baseline assessments undermines the learning potential of PRM-funded programs in Burundi. Information on livelihoods remains largely anecdotal and there is no accurate characterization of the challenges and opportunities within the communities in general, or capabilities and gaps among the returnee communities in particular. IPs have a poor understanding of the types of activities and programs necessary to achieve their stated results and outcomes. This threatens the development and implementation of effective programs and hinders understanding of livelihoods. The lack of reliable assessment data results in a failure to translate knowledge into practical livelihoods strategies and reduces the effectiveness of ongoing livelihoods programs. Comprehensive mapping of markets, and value chains; opportunities and challenges; and capabilities and gaps, is important to designing effective and appropriate programs.

3b. Were any external evaluations conducted? Any internal M&E?

FH reported conducting several external program evaluations, which they shared with the team. WR shared one external evaluation with the team conducted in 2011. After careful review, however, the team discovered the same methodological and logical weaknesses as described above regarding livelihoods and baseline assessments. CORD shared that they had never conducted an evaluation of their PRM-funded activities.

Overwhelmingly, the evaluation team found that IPs are not engaged in routine, systematic monitoring of their activities during the period of performance The only data IPs seemed to collect—and this was not universal-- was the names of beneficiaries and their status (repatriated/stayee), and the total number of program participants by location. In some cases, this data was found to be quite accurate, such as CORD's records listing the names, village-level locations, and specific items received by each of the participants. In other cases, participant data was much less reliable, such as Dutabarane's VSLA data, which did not include participant names or their village-level locations, and FH's which described the types of activities conducted in various locations and the number of participants in each location, but lacked participant names, village-level locations, and the specific activities or items individuals participated in or received. Data about activity performance was almost entirely anecdotal notwithstanding Dutabarane, which collected savings data for each of their participants.

IPs struggle with M&E and could not effectively demonstrate livelihoods outcomes or learning from PRM-funded programs. In particular, the absence of outcome-level indicators limits the depth of learning about these programs that can be achieved.

Evaluation Question 4: What was the impact of the programs/assistance?

All aspects of the activities for which the team was able to collect information have already been described in the above sections of the report. Due to the lack of baseline data, the team is not able to determine the impact of the activities. Sub-questions under Question 4 are not addressed here for the following reasons:

- Two respondents participated in VSLA activities in which their asset bases and savings changed; those changes are described in the above sections of the report.
- Few respondents participated in associations, none of whom reported a change in assets or income.
- Reasons for the lack of change in participants' assets and finances are enumerated in the discussion of program design in the above sections of the report.
- Factors that influenced the success or failure of activities have been explained above under Question 3 regarding best practices.
- PRM programs did not promote self-reliance; the reasons for which are detailed in the above section of the report under Questions 2 and 3.
- The team did not obtain data on secondary costs or benefits of participation in livelihood activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For IPs

IPs should be much more involved in the targeting and selection of program participants to ensure a transparent and unbiased approach. Following submission of a participant list from the selection committee, IPs should conduct a short interview with proposed participants to ascertain their capacity to successfully participate in and benefit from the program or activity. Further, they must ensure the selection criteria are clear and agreed on by the communities in which they work.

IPs need to enforce participation criteria that limits advantaged individuals from the community, such as camp committee members, from participating in limited livelihoods programs. These programs should be designed and implemented with the goal of assisting less-privileged and vulnerable members of the community. Vulnerability manifests in many different ways. It is unlikely that every vulnerable person or HH will also be challenged with meeting basic needs and thus facing a tradeoff between successful participation and demands of securing those basic needs. Vulnerability should very much remain a prominent selection criteria for participation, however it must be assessed with more nuance in terms of the extra kinds of supports, incentives, and assistance that vulnerable people may need in order to successfully participate in a given program or activity.

IPs need to ensure that their field-based staff members in charge of implementing and overseeing livelihoods programs are properly trained and skilled in the field/discipline of livelihoods. HQ staff need to develop systems and tools to provide their field-based colleagues with stronger technical guidance and support to do their jobs, as field-based staff lack education and training in livelihoods.

FH should discontinue implementing income-generating activities (IGAs). Aid agencies and NGOs that do not specialize in micro-grants should not try to implement poorly-designed, one-off business programs, but instead should sub-contract to organizations that are experts in this domain of livelihoods and development.

UNHCR and IPs should dedicate time to internal staff trainings on livelihoods for all levels of staff members (from national headquarters down to the field level) in basic M&E as well as the development of indicators for outcome monitoring.

IPs should include, at a minimum, one full staff position dedicated to monitoring livelihoods programs. Requiring existing staff members and refugee social worker assistants to undertake program monitoring is not feasible. Including M&E directly in budgets, both in terms of staff time and additional, needed resources, will help to ensure that program monitoring is given the necessary attention and dedication. While having a staff person for each project may not be feasible or necessary, a country-level or regional coordinator may be well-suited for such work.

IPs need to place more importance on developing livelihoods activities that are appealing to the needs of women and girls. Activities should be based on sound evidence as collected through a gender analysis with a focus on livelihoods capacities and gaps among the returnee women and girls. The assessment should make special considerations for any differences between women and girls rather than developing a set of activities that are designed to address the needs and preferences of all women and girls. Activities should not only demonstrate a nuanced and informed design, but also an implementation approach that considers how best to recruit and support women and girls to maintain their participation in activities as well as to find success following the termination and/or completion of activities.

For PRM

PRM should invest resources in more frequent and thorough visits to project sites. It is critical that visits include unscheduled time with unannounced tours and interviews with random program participants in addition to, or rather than, conducting highly programmed tours that include attending carefully orchestrated graduation ceremonies, observing selected, high-performing training sessions, and meeting with community and village leaders and program participants who are hand-selected by the IP well in advance of the visit. Seeing the projects and activities without the lens of pre-planning may yield a more realistic picture and thorough understanding of the projects' performance, successes, and challenges and likewise, may help to inform more useful and answerable evaluation questions.

PRM should require IPs to be more heavily involved in selecting program participants and to produce beneficiary criteria for review. Participant selection that relies too heavily on village leaders and local authorities, carries too much bias, and has been shown through this evaluation to be prone to manipulation. With such limited resources and spaces for a select few participants, it is critical that program resources reach the right people based on targeting criteria.

PRM should review its vulnerability criteria for livelihoods programs vis-à-vis the types of activities IPs are proposing to implement. This review should be made in consideration that program participants will be well-placed to find success and ultimately to benefit from the activity or program being implemented and that proposed activities are appropriately designed for inclusion of vulnerable populations.

PRM should ensure that needs assessments are conducted by each IP prior to program design and implementation and that they do not only rely on gathering individuals' preferences and stated needs, but also on more systematic methods (e.g. HH Food Security Index; multi-stage HH surveys with quantitative indices and composite proxy indicators) that collect data on widely substantiated indicators capable of measuring HH food security, HH members' nutritional status, agricultural production, and HH wealth, poverty, and assets, to name a few.[29] Needs assessments should also seek

to understand the community context in terms of land ownership and use, markets, politics, ethnicity, gender, social structures and networks, wealth, and religion, among others.

PRM should insist on proper M&E of its programs and should require sufficient M&E budget lines in all proposals for livelihoods programs. Specifically, PRM should require all IPs to develop project logical frameworks that clearly state their program or activity objectives and the series of activities that will produce the required outputs, outcomes, and intermediate results to those objectives. The project logical framework should include the necessary custom and standard indicators (as offered by PRM) to monitor program or activity implementation over time. Indicator targets can also be set where necessary. The logical framework should be designed in a way that demonstrates careful consideration of the pre-design and implementation assessments that have been conducted of the needs and context. Additionally, it should reflect appropriate consideration of the available financial and staff resources and the timeline. The logical framework should be supported with a comprehensive program workplan and standardized reporting templates that encourage implementers to use monitoring data for management, decision-making, and improvements to projects and programs.

PRM should ensure that livelihoods programs are implemented by IPs best positioned for the work. PRM, through its requests for proposals, should request detailed information about the IP's expertise in livelihoods including how they define it, programs they have implemented in the past (past performance), and the skills/qualifications of their staff who are in charge of implementing and overseeing the programs.

PRM should develop an internal results-based management system to support the implementation of its Functional Bureau Strategy, including a logic model that demonstrates the sequence of cause-and-effect relationships between activities it funds and objectives and goals it seeks to achieve. The logic model could explicitly cover livelihoods programs for returned refugees as well as demonstrate how livelihoods activities should be integrated into all PRM interventions.

PRM, in consultation with UNHCR, should disseminate required livelihoods M&E methodologies to IPs. The methodologies should allow flexibility related to context while supporting the need for standardization of livelihoods indicators, timeframes, tracking of unintended positive and negative consequences, and staff accountability in humanitarian settings. Use of common methodologies will enable PRM to make comparisons across settings about the impact of livelihoods support programs.

PRM should encourage UNHCR and IPs to build capacity in required M&E methodologies. NGO implementers use multiple methods for M&E as well as diverse livelihoods indicators within and across countries. M&E capacity building workshops would provide NGO staff with increased understanding of required M&E methodologies and important tools to collect and report evidence about the successes of livelihoods programs in humanitarian settings.

PRM should require IPs to develop logic models that link program goals to indicators and data collection methods (at the process, output, and outcome levels) as part of all proposals. PRM should require IPs to report on all indicators specified in logic models, including on outcome measures.

PRM, UNHCR, and IPs should work together to utilize information collected for M&E purposes to inform routine program management and decision-making. Monitoring data should be used to guide decisions on funding priorities, continuation or termination of funding for various programs and activities already in place, trigger field visits by Refcoords, and many other important management

decisions. PRM should develop a plan for how to utilize monitoring data and apply it methodically to these types of decisions and actions.

PRM should consider their capacity for supporting IPs working on livelihoods assistance. This includes the presence of a clear strategy with well-articulated priorities and operational procedures. This framework should be used as the basis for how awards are made and how IPs are monitored and evaluated over time.

PRM should recognize the difference between short-term and longer-term livelihoods assistance and communicate expectations to IPs. Short-term interventions are less likely to positively contribute to self-reliance and sustainability. However, PRM should consider that their funding cycles and other modes of operation may not be compatible with longer-term assistance. Short-term assistance is unlikely to lead to changes in HH food security.

PRM should more clearly define what is meant by vulnerability, and how this group should be prioritized. This evaluation showed that despite what was recorded in official program documents, vulnerable groups were often not targeted or able to engage in projects. Some projects required physical strength (to repair houses) and others required initial financial contributions (to join the VSLAs). PRM should clarify which segment of society it hopes to assist with livelihoods interventions—e.g. support the middle classes as drivers of economic change? Or to provide a safety net to the worst off? Relatedly, PRM should determine how local governance structures should be included in programs. This evaluation revealed that the most powerful and influential members of communities were the first to receive assistance. PRM should be aware of the inherent tensions in both including and excluding local authorities from programs.

PRM should have clear guidelines on monitoring and evaluation of IPs *as well as* IP local partners. This includes a framework for systematically assessing organizations that receive sub-contracts from IPs. PRM should devise a standardized set of M&E requirements to guarantee a certain level of quality across programs.

PRM should ensure that they follow Federal Regulations when working with non-Secular organizations. This evaluation raised concerns about the degree of religiosity for one IP sub-contractor, both in terms of how the Director described the motivations behind the program, as well as how she reported communicating with beneficiaries.

PRM should consider how procurement of goods could positively (or negatively) influence local markets and livelihoods. This is particularly the case in settings where procurement of goods is significant. For example, thousands of goats, chickens, hoes and seeds were distributed under PRM funding, and most of these goods were imported from neighboring countries. The local economy could have been boosted by procuring locally, and could have improved the livelihoods situation of returnees and stayees. As well, procuring locally has the potential to reduce cost and decrease corruption.

PRM should require that the IP's gender analysis should inform their action plan for proposals involving livelihoods programs. The gender action plan should include evidence of a systematic gender analysis used to inform the development of livelihoods programs and activities that appropriately and comprehensively address the livelihoods needs of men, women, youth, and the elderly.

ANNEXES

Annex I: Evaluation Statement of Work

Evaluating the Effectiveness of Livelihoods Programs for Refugees and Refugee Returnees in Burundi and Ethiopia

NATURE AND PURPOSE

The purpose of this solicitation is to obtain the services of a contractor to carry out an evaluation, lasting up to 10 months, of livelihoods programming supported by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) for refugee populations in targeted countries. The evaluation will consist of: (1) a comprehensive desk review and analysis of best practices and recurring issues regarding the implementation of livelihoods programming for refugees, global in scope, including but not limited to Africa; (2) field-based evaluations in two countries (Burundi and Ethiopia) where PRM has made significant investments in refugee livelihoods programs; and (3) elaboration of guidance that can be used in future evaluations of livelihoods proposals and programmatic outcomes . Both the desk review and the field-based evaluations should prioritize identifying: (1) the qualities of successful refugee livelihoods programs; (2) whether PRM-supported programs were designed and implemented using best practices; (3) whether PRM-supported livelihoods programs promoted self-sufficiency; (4) whether self-sufficiency was a realistic objective; and (5) the secondary benefits/impact, if any, of participation in livelihoods programs. The evaluation will also analyze the economic, social and legal factors that influence the success or failure of livelihoods programs in refugee settings. Recommendations should be concrete, actionable, and provide guidance, checklists, and indicators for PRM to consider when: (1) writing requests for proposals that include livelihoods components; (2) reviewing proposals with livelihoods components; (3) monitoring livelihoods programming in the field; and (4) engaging host governments, multilateral partners and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on refugee livelihoods. The contractor will coordinate with PRM, UNHCR, and NGOs.

BACKGROUND

PRM's mission is to provide protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people around the world on behalf of the American people by providing life-sustaining assistance, working through multilateral systems to build global partnerships, promoting best practices in humanitarian response, and ensuring that humanitarian principles are thoroughly integrated into U.S. foreign and national security policy. The United States government, through PRM, is the largest bilateral donor to UNHCR as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and among the largest bilateral donors for the International Organization for Migration (IOM). PRM funds NGOs to fill critical gaps in programming by international organizations and host governments. It is important to note that the Bureau considers its humanitarian diplomacy to be as important as its programming.

Securing durable solutions for refugees is a PRM priority. It is generally accepted that there are three durable solutions for refugee populations: (1) safe and voluntary return to country of origin; (2) local integration in country of asylum; and (3) resettlement to a third country. Refugees are often outside of their country for many years before safe, voluntary return is possible. Further resettlement is possible only for a limited number of refugees. It is generally believed that refugees with access to livelihoods are better able to care for and protect themselves and their families. Therefore, promoting livelihoods, and thus self-sufficiency/self-reliance to the extent possible, is important for both refugee protection

and assistance. From a legal perspective, the 1951 Refugee Convention/1967 Protocol confer on refugees the right to seek employment, to engage in other income-generating activities, to own and dispose of property, to enjoy freedom of movement and to have access to public services such as education (though these may be constrained in practice by host governments even when those governments are a party to the Convention). From an economic perspective, if refugees are able to exercise these rights, they are better able to establish sustainable livelihoods, to become more self-sufficient, and to become less dependent on humanitarian assistance.

Approaches to promoting livelihoods may vary dramatically upon whether a refugee is residing in a camp or a city. In camps, livelihoods are often impeded by restrictions the host government has placed on travel, denial of ability to work in the formal sector, and/or use of available land for farming. In camp settings, refugees are often more dependent on the international humanitarian community for food, shelter, and other basic necessities of life. While refugees in cities may face formal restrictions on their ability to work, many still find livelihoods in the informal sector allowing them to be more self-sufficient than they otherwise would be in camps. However, commodities are often more expensive in urban areas and poverty for urban refugees is an enormous challenge. Research commissioned by PRM indicates that the ability of urban refugees to become more self-sufficient is strongly influenced by their integration into surrounding host communities over time. This includes research conducted by Church World Service on promoting access to protection and basic services for urban refugees and the Women's Refugee Commission research on promoting access to livelihoods in cities with large populations of urban refugees. Links and summaries of these and other research projects and evaluations, including an impact evaluation of PRM humanitarian assistance for the repatriation and reintegration of Burundi refugees, are available at: http://www.state.gov/j/prm/...

The contractor will:

- **Conduct a global desk review**; analyzing best practices/recurring mistakes in implementing livelihoods programs for refugees worldwide in order to contextualize the evaluation. The evaluation will include but not be limited to Africa and should take into account gender dynamics. The evaluation team should draw from both grey and white literature, discussions with key stakeholders, and research to determine where livelihoods promotion with refugees in Africa and the rest of the world has and has not been successful and reasons why. The review should take into account how limitations imposed by various host governments on the ability of refugees to work, farm, or travel affects livelihood interventions.

- **Carry out field-based evaluations in Burundi and Ethiopia,** where PRM has supported livelihoods programming with refugee populations. Field evaluations will assist in determining to what extent PRM-supported programming has been successful in promoting livelihoods over the long term. The evaluations should answer the following questions with an emphasis on developing best practices, lessons learned, and actionable recommendations to inform the programming and diplomacy of PRM and its partners.
- Were PRM-supported programs designed and implemented using best practices? How, for example by conducting market and livelihoods assessments?
- What were the types of livelihoods assistance provided (e.g. technical/vocational training; business training; access to finance; cash grants; in-kind items)? To what extent did these meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?

- What were the characteristics of refugees received livelihoods assistance? How well did partners reach members of vulnerable groups (e.g. women; female heads of household; older persons; youth; persons with disabilities) with livelihoods assistance?
- What percentages of beneficiaries are still continuing in the livelihoods activities for which they received assistance? In other words, if someone was trained as a tailor in 2009, is s/he a tailor at present?
- Did beneficiary incomes or asset holdings increase after receiving livelihoods assistance? If so, what is the range of percentage increases, and what is the average amount of time it took to improve self-reliance? For how long were increases sustained?
- Is there is a difference in the success of the livelihoods programs according to the year/period of the beneficiaries' repatriation?
- Where beneficiary incomes/assets did not noticeably improve, what are potential reasons for this lack of improvement? Are there demographic differences (e.g., by gender) in the outcomes of livelihoods programming? Elaborate.
- Did PRM-supported livelihood programs promote self-sufficiency? In other words, did PRM livelihoods programs enable beneficiaries to meet more of their basic needs then would have been able to otherwise possible? If so, how? What percentage did and for how long?
- How many graduates of the livelihoods programs are employed in the formal sector v. the informal sector?
- What indicators should PRM use to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the livelihoods programming it supports?
- What were the secondary benefits/impact of participation in livelihoods programs, if any? For example, did refugee livelihoods participants feel they were less vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation and/or gender-based violence?
- Based upon the available evidence as well as the literature review, what are the qualities of successful refugee livelihoods programs? What are recommendations to PRM and other donors for future livelihoods programs?

Annex II: Data Collection Instruments

Burundi Returnee General KII Guide

Begin with an introduction to the respondent about purpose of the interview, length of the interview, voluntary, confidentiality, anonymity, right to abstain from answering any questions, right to terminate interview at any time.

---

1. Refugee Respondent Characteristics:
    a. Sex of respondent:
    b. Are you married (*prompt:* unofficially/officially)?
    c. If male, how many wives?
    d. If female, are you a co-wife?
    e. How many children do you have?
    f. How old are you?
    g. Where are you from originally?
    h. When did you leave Burundi?
    i. Who did you leave with?
    j. When did you return?
    k. Where did you return to?
    l. (If it is not current location, ask migration history since returned including reasons for movement)
    m. Who did you return with?
2. Program Beneficiary Questions:
    a. What (IP or partner) programs have you been involved in?
    b. For how long? (*prompt*: start/finish)
    c. How did you become involved? (voluntary, selected, required, etc.)
    d. What kind of assistance did you receive?
    e. Did the program help you in any way? If so how? (*prompt:* basic needs, long term, self-sustainability, etc.)
    f. Did you face any challenges as a result of the program?
    g. How do you think the program could have been improved? (*here we are looking for alignment of preferences—and prompt for fair targeting/corruption)*
    h. Did your income change after participating in the program? How so and for how long?
    i. How is your life different *today* b/c of your participation in the program? (*Prompt*: economic, social, psychological, health)
3. General Livelihood Questions About Respondent's HH:
    a. Note what type of materials house is made from and assets respondent has (if interviewed at home).
    b. What are the main challenges you face here? Could you please rank in order the top three?

c. Could you please walk us through a typical day? *(Get a sense of main activities, level of effort, and time required)*
d. *If married*, How are these daily activities different from your husband/wife?
e. *If children,* How are these daily activities different from your sons—daughters?
f. What are the main sources of income (cash and non-cash) for your HH?
g. Who in the family obtains this income?
h. What do you do when you have a shortage of income? (*List all strategies and then prompt for the ones most relied on)*
i. Does your HH have any savings?
j. Is your HH able to borrow food or credit when necessary? If so, from whom/where?
k. Do you have family members who have left this location? Where did they go? Why? Do they support you in any way?
l. Are any members of your HH disabled? If yes, what special consideration are they given?
m. How many meals do you eat per day? (*prompt: rainy season, dry season)*
n. Who eats first? (*Prompt, and then who? And then who?)*
o. What do you do when your HH does not have enough food to eat?
p. What is the highest level of education you have attained? (Ask location)
q. Have you attended any trainings since you've returned to this location? (When, type, sponsored by whom).
r. How have these trainings impacted your life? (*prompt: economic, social, educational-skills, etc.).*
s. What skills are you missing that would make your life easier?
t. What are the main risks that your household faces? (environment, social, health, family, etc.).
u. Which of these has happened before?
v. What did your HH do when these things happened?
w. Please describe the type of relationship that exists between the returnees and the people who stayed during the war. *Prompt for challenges, list all and rank.*
x. *If difficulties described:* Have there been initiatives that have improved this relationship? What do you think would improve this?
y. At the start of the interview, you described the main challenges you faced here. Do you have ideas about what would help with those problems?

IP Question Guide

IP Name:_____

Funding from PRM or UNHCR?_____

Locations working in:_____

Date started receiving support from PRM:_____

1. How do you define a livelihood program/activity?
2. Which formal definition of livelihoods do you follow, if any?
3. What is your organization's approach to livelihoods?
4. What is the history of livelihood programming within your IP (compared with other technical areas?)
5. Which livelihood activities are you currently implementing in which region of the country? (ask them to list the activities they consider to be livelihood oriented)
6. On what basis did you choose to provide these livelihood services and activities?
    a. Have you conducted needs assessments and baseline studies to inform these programs?
    b. Has the program been designed and implemented using best practices? If so, what are they?
7. What are the goals of your livelihood programs/activities?
8. How do you target your livelihood programs?
9. Are there any special considerations you must observe for livelihoods programs for returnees? (compared with urban or camp settings?)
10. What are the pressing needs in terms of livelihoods in the various regions of the country?
11. What are some of the biggest challenges in terms of implementing livelihoods programs in Burundi/various regions of the country?
12. What are some of the biggest opportunities in terms of implementing livelihoods programs in Burundi/various regions of the country?
13. Do your project objectives clearly state a proposed effect on refugees' livelihoods?
14. Do you have the necessary institutional arrangement and resources to carry out project activities?

15. Do you have internal M&E system?

    a. If yes, what indicators do you keep track of so as to measure project impact?
    b. What kind of evidence of activity success or challenges has been generated?
    c. How does this evidence help project decision making and revisions?

16. Have you ever conducted internal or externally commissioned evaluation of the program? If yes what was the main finding and how does is help to revisit the program?

17. To what extent have your livelihood activities met beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?

18. What changes have there been in the community since you started implementing your livelihood activities?

    a. Which of these changes are attributable/contributable to the project?

19. In your opinion, how well did the program reach members of vulnerable groups (e.g. women; female heads of household; older persons; youth; persons with disabilities) with livelihoods assistance?

20. Did beneficiary incomes or asset holdings change after participating in your livelihood activities?

    a. If so, what is the range of percentage increases, and what is the average amount of time it took to improve self-reliance?
    b. For how long were increases sustained?

21. In your opinion what are the main issues/challenges that returned refugees are facing in Burundi?

22. From your experience, what is your general observation/knowledge of current livelihood programs for refugees?

23. What types of livelihoods programs are most effective among returned refugees in bringing about positive, sustainable changes?

Annex III: People Interviewed

Implementing Partner and Stakeholder Staff Members

Date	Location	Name	Title	Organization
3/18/15	Bujumbura	John J. Ivanska	National Director	World Relief
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Gaston	Hygiene Program Manager	CORD
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Serge Ntabikiyoboka	Country Director	CORD
3/31/15	Bujumbura	Cesalie Nicimpaye	National Director	Dutabarne
3/31/15	Bujumbura	Emmanuel Niyongabo	Project Officer	Dutabarne
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Evariste Habiyambere	Country Director	Food for the Hungry
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Jean Nibayubahe	M&E Coordinator	Food for the Hungry
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Tommy Bruce	Field Security Advisor	UNHCR
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Madani Tall	Deputy Representative	UNHCR
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Abel Mbilinyi	Representative	UNHCR
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Yannick Georges Mbengue	Protection Officer	UNHCR
3/17/15	Bujumbura	Fabien Yamuremye	Director	PARESI
3/19/15	Rutana	Gaddy Bukuru	Regional Coordinator	Food for the Hungry
3/19/15	Rutana	Bede Mbayahaga	Supervisor of PRM Projects	Food for the Hungry
3/19/15	Rutana	Cyriaque Bizimana	Agronomist	Food for the Hungry
3/19/15	Rutana	Philbert Nyangusu	Agronomist	Food for the Hungry
3/26/15	Rutana	Emmanuel	Regional Director	Floresta
3/28/15	Makamba	Joel	Former staff member	Dutabarane

Program Participants

Date	Province	Commune	Sex	Organization
3/26/15	Rutana	Bukemba	M	WR/Floresta
3/26/15	Rutana	Gitanga	M	WR/Floresta
3/26/15	Rutana	Bukemba	M	WR/Floresta
3/26/15	Rutana	Bukemba	M	WR/Floresta
3/27/15	Rutana	Bukemba	M	WR/Floresta
3/27/15	Rutana	Bukemba	M	WR/Floresta
3/28/15	Makamba	Kigaro	M	WR/Floresta
3/28/15	Rutana	Kibago	F	WR/Dutabarane
3/29/15	Rutana	Gitanga	F	Non-beneficiary
3/29/15	Rutana	Gitanga	F	Non-beneficiary
3/30/15	Makamba	Nyanza Lac	F	WR/Floresta
3/30/15	Makamba	Nyanza Lac	F	WR/Floresta
3/30/15	Makamba	Kabonga	F	WR
3/30/15	Makamba	Kabonga	F	WR
3/23/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	M	CORD
3/23/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	F	CORD
3/23/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	M	CORD
3/23/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	M	CORD
3/23/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	F	CORD

3/24/15	Rutana	Giharo	F	CORD
3/24/15	Rutana	Giharo	F	CORD
3/24/15	Rutana	Giharo	F	CORD
3/24/15	Rutana	Giharo	F	CORD
3/24/15	Rutana	Giharo	F	CORD
3/24/15	Rutana	Giharo	F	CORD
3/24/15	Rutana	Giharo	M	CORD
3/25/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	F	CORD
3/25/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	F	CORD
3/25/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	F	CORD
3/25/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	F	CORD
3/25/15	Rutana	Mpinga-Kayove	F	CORD
3/19/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	3 M	FH
3/19/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	2 F	FH
3/20/15	Ruyigi	Kininya	F	FH
3/20/15	Ruyigi	Kininya	F	FH
3/20/15	Ruyigi	Kininya	F	FH
3/20/15	Ruyigi	Kininya	F	Non-Beneficiary
3/20/15	Ruyigi	Kininya	M	FH
3/20/15	Ruyigi	Nabiginya	M	FH
3/21/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	M	FH
3/21/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	F	FH
3/21/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	F	FH
3/21/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	F	FH
3/21/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	F	FH
3/21/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	F	FH
3/21/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	M	FH
3/21/15	Ruyigi	Gisuru	F	FH
3/22/15	Rutana	Giharo	F	FH
3/22/15	Rutana	Giharo	1M, 1F	Non-Beneficiaries
3/22/15	Rutana	Murembera	2 F	FH
3/22/15	Rutana	Murembera	F	FH

Summary Characteristics of Interviewees:

Key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with members of the three IPs, WR's local partners, UNHCR, PARESI, and one communal administrator. Interviews were conducted with 53 rural Burundians, of whom 75% were direct participants (n=40) and 25% were non-participants (n=13). Two thirds of the overall sample was female (n=35) and one-third male (n=18). The age range of interviewees was 18 to 77 with a mean age of 40. Two-thirds of the sample was returned refugees (n=35), and one-third had been internally displaced during the conflict (n=18). All of the refugees in the sample had fled to Tanzania. The average length of stay was 14 years, with a range of 1 to 39 years. Education levels were low. For those who reported their educational history, nearly two-thirds either had some religious schooling focusing on basic literacy or some years of primary school. Twenty percent reported never having any form of education, and the remaining 17% reported having completed one or two years of secondary school. In terms of marriage, the majority of the sample was legally married. Ten percent reported being involved in a polygamous marriage, and twelve percent reported being in an "unofficial" but non-polygamous marriage.[30]

For FH, KIIs were conducted with 7 employees. In the field, a total of 25 interviews were conducted, including 17 FH participants (68%) and 8 non-participants (32%). For CORD, KIIs were conducted with two staff people and one communal administrator. In the field, a total of 16 interviews were conducted, including 12 (75%) CORD participants and 4 non-participants (25%). For WR, 4 KIIs were conducted with representatives of WR and two of their local partners. In the field, a total of 13 KIIs were conducted, including 11 WR participants (85%) and 2 non-participants (15%). Note that 4 of the participants listed here as WR participants had received shelter support from PRM, but not livelihoods interventions. Differences in the sample size between IPs are explained below.

Annex IV: Map of Sites Visited

[1] "World Refugee Day: Global Forced Displacement Tops 50 Million for the first Time in Post-World War II Era." UNHCR 2014. http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html

[2] "Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase." UNHCR 2015. http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html

[3] "About PRM." http://www.state.gov/j/prm/about/index.htm

[4] "Promoting Livelihoods and Self-Reliance: Operational Guidance on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas." UNHCR, 2011. p. 15

[5] The study sought to identify areas of current consensus on effective approaches to the design, implementation and monitoring of livelihood support programs among displacement affected populations. World Bank & Danish Refugee Council, *Livelihoods Support Projects for Displaced Persons: Global Expertise and Lessons Learnt. Draft* April 2014, p.3

[6] UNHCR. "UNHCR Global Strategy for Livelihoods: 2014-2018." http://www.unhcr.org/530f107b6.html

[7] Chambers, R. and G.R. Conway. "Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century." Institute of Development Studies, 1991.

[8] According to the IFRC, "Livelihoods comprise the capabilities, assets and activities required for generating income and securing a means of living. Sustainable livelihoods refer to people's capacity to generate and maintain their means of living, and enhance their own well-being as well as that of future generations." (IFRC guidelines for livelihoods programming, 2011)

[9] UNHCR defines livelihoods as "activities that allow people to secure the basic necessities of life, such as food, water, shelter and clothing. Engaging in livelihoods activities means acquiring the knowledge, skills, social network, raw materials, and other resources to meet individual or collective needs on a sustainable basis with dignity." UNHCR. "Global Strategy for Livelihoods 2014-2018." 2014. p.7

[10] For a useful overview of the SLF, see Guidance Note on Recovery: Livelihood http://www.unisdr.org/files/16771_16771guidancenoteonrecoveryliveliho.pdf Accessed December 23, 2014.

[11] DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets, pg. 1

[12] The framework identifies "natural resources, technologies, their skills, knowledge and capacity, their health, access to education, sources of credit, or their networks of social support" as the poor's assets from which they can build livelihoods. It goes on to note that "The extent of their access to these assets is strongly influenced by their *vulnerability context*, which takes account of trends (for example, economic, political, technological), shocks (for example, epidemics, natural disasters, civil strife) and seasonality (for example, prices, production, employment opportunities). Access is also influenced by the prevailing social, institutional and political environment, which affects the ways in which people combine and use their assets to achieve their goals. These are their *livelihood strategies*." IFAD, http://www.ifad.org/sla/

[13] UNDP. (2013). "Livelihoods & Economic Recovery in Crisis Situations." http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/20130215_UNDP%20LER_guide.pdf

[14] UNHCR, Statistiques Démographiques du Rapatriement, Bujumbura, UNHCR Burundi Data Unit/ Protection, 2011.

[15] Fransen, Sonja, and Katie Kuschminder. "Lessons Learned from Refugee Return Settlement Policies: A Case Study on Burundi's Rural Integrated Villages." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 33.1 (2014): 59-76. p 67

[16] Ibid; http://www.unhcr.org/5441246f6.html

[17] Fransen, Sonja, and Katie Kuschminder. "Lessons Learned from Refugee Return Settlement Policies: A Case Study on Burundi's Rural Integrated Villages." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 33.1 (2014): 59-76. p 72

[18] Ibid

[19] Ibid, 15

[20] Fransen, Sonja, and Katie Kuschminder. "Lessons Learned from Refugee Return Settlement Policies: A Case Study on Burundi's Rural Integrated Villages." Refugee Survey Quarterly 33.1 (2014): 59-76. p 60

[21] Ibid, 12

[22] "2015 UNHCR subregional operations profile - Central Africa and the Great Lakes" (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a6c6.html)
[23] Ibid
[24] Burundian cultural norms dictate that wives live with the husband's family.
[25] In Burundi, plots of land are divided between males in a family, and thus become sub-divided and smaller with each new generation.
[26] There is a specific government entity—CNTB— responsible for mediating land disputes between refugees and stayees.
[27] World Bank Data, Accessed May 25, 2015 at http://data.worldbank.org/country/burundi
[28] The evaluation team understands that PRM guidance advises NGO partners to construct indicators in this fashion.
[29] See USAID's Feed the Future Indicator Handbook for a wide selection of internationally validated indicators http://www.usaid.gov/opengov/developer/datasets/ftf_handbook_indicators_sept2013_2_0.pdf
[30] This is likely an underestimation as both practices are considered widespread but carry a certain level of negative social stigma.