

Session 1.4: Political Decentralisation and Political Economy Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this session is to explore how a political economy approach can be useful in your work. You will first be introduced to the key features of political economy analysis and learn how political economy diagnostics can be useful to understanding decentralisation and local governance processes. You will then receive some operational guidance on how to use political economy analysis in practice.

The second part of the session will provide you with a theoretical basis to understand the concepts of political decentralisation, local governance and domestic accountability. You will learn how domestic accountability works in decentralised contexts. We will look into the challenges faced by donors promoting domestic accountability in decentralised contexts and what can be done to address these challenges.

The session will end with a group exercise on how to commission and manage political economy analysis in practice in the field of decentralisation at country level.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Part 1: A political economy framework for analysing decentralisation

The first part of the session will be dedicated to understanding what we mean by political economy analysis and how it can be applied to decentralized contexts.

A number of donors have developed political economy tools for country and sector levels. A political economy analysis is not simply an add-on to the existing governance assessments. The underlying premise is that more systematic attention and analysis of political economy issues can help understand much better the limits and merits of the still dominant technocratic and prescriptive assessments.

Box 1.4.1: What is political economy?

Political economy is understood to mean “the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time.”
(*How to note*, DFID, 2009)

- Political economy analysis tools emphasise the central role of politics: it focuses on state-society relations, on how power is distributed and exercised, who shares similar interests.
- Political economy approaches focus on country or context realities: how a country's history, geography and society determine the make-up of political process and how real-life stakeholders incentives are shaped by formal institutions, but also by informal – often less visible – institutions.
- The political economy approach recognizes that donors are political animals. They influence the context in which they operate, they have their own geostrategic, commercial and developmental objectives.
- The political economy approach emphasizes domestic politics, it informs nuanced issues such as corruption, taxation, state-building, decentralization....

There is also growing interest in applying a political economy analysis to decentralisation processes and at the level of local governance. The Chief Economist of the Africa Region at the World Bank puts political economy analysis or approaches clearly on the map when he introduces the WB publication on the *Political Economy of Decentralisation Reforms* (World Bank, 2010): “For too long, decentralization has been considered a technical issue. This volume calls a spade a spade. Decentralization is a political act. It is driven by political considerations, and its outcome will depend on how the political forces that stand to gain stack up against those that may lose.”

Guidance on political economy approaches for sub-national levels of governance is not yet well rooted or developed. The World Bank, DANIDA and USAID have been active in this field. The World Bank publication presents a helpful diagnostic framework for analysing political economy dimensions in decentralisation processes: **the Political Economy of Decentralisation Country Assessment** (PEDCA).

Box 1.4.2: What is PEDCA?

PEDCA is a pragmatic exercise that can be commissioned by a donor and carried out in a couple of months (with up to 3 weeks of expert in-country work). It covers political and institutional dynamics, with a focus on process aspects. It provides guidance on how to design and commission political economy studies at country level or for analysing more problem specific issues. It also pays attention to questions related to using and operationalising the findings of such political economy diagnostics. It asks three fundamental questions:

- What is the initial context and motivation for decentralization?
- Who are the key actors, and what are their incentives or motives?
- What are the roles and incentives of donors?

Box 1.4.3: “Decentralisation in Madagascar is so weak that it is difficult to weaken it further”

Francois Vaillancourt’s paper on *Decentralization in Madagascar: A string of unfinished races* follows a political economy approach to explain on how a strongly centralising political tradition hampers decentralisation in Madagascar. This box summarises his main findings:

Madagascar’s institutional framework has been in permanent restructuring since independence. Responsibility for leading decentralisation has fluctuated from one Ministry to the other over the years². Since 2008 the decentralisation reform is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, which does not have the necessary power to mainstream decentralisation policies in other sector ministries.

Despite several constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening decentralised tiers of government, power remains largely at the central level. Autonomy to provinces³ has been blocked by informal alliances between central government bureaucrats and politicians who feared the creation of an emerging regional elite that could challenge their power.

Only the municipalities have survived through the different administrative reforms, but their autonomy is compromised by control exerted from the central level. Municipalities have no control over the grants allocated by Madagascar’s single treasury system. Sector ministries have access to information on budget allocations to the municipalities that municipalities do not have. On the other hand, municipalities are threatened by the implementation of regions which in fact are deconcentrated authorities directly appointed by the government (Conseil des ministres) and which attempt to take over municipal functions. Finally, municipalities are also weakened by fokotanis (village associations) which occupy part of the communal territory and who de facto operate as representatives of the president at the municipal level.

Source: Francois Vaillancourt. 2008. *Decentralization in Madagascar: A string of unfinished races*. Working paper 08-37 International Studies Program, Andrew young School of Policy studies.

Box 1.4.4: The politics of decentralization in Ghana: the paradox of power

The case of Ghana illustrates a sort of ‘paradox of power’ where those who have the power to stimulate the decentralisation process have no interest in doing so.

"Neither the ruling NDC nor the opposition NPP has strong interest in it (...) "the NDC fears political decentralisation for the same reason the NPP does, loss of political control over certain parts of the country".

Similarly, "many elected municipal councilors do not want chiefs to have a greater role in local politics", seeing it as " a threat to their own political power". (...) For the aforementioned reasons, NDC leaders, NPP ones, and many elected municipal councillors are not pressing for quick action on political decentralisation and it is likely that no moves on it will occur before the 2012 election".

Source: Hoffman, B. and Metzroth. K.M. 2010. *The Political Economy of Decentralization in Ghana*. Paper of the Center for Democracy and Civil Society, Georgetown University.

² The Ministry of Interior was once responsible for decentralisation, then the responsibility switched to the Ministry of Budget in 1992. Since 2005, decentralization moves to the MDAT (Ministère de la Décentralisation et de l’Aménagement du Territoire) which was later put under the responsibility of the President’s Office (MPRDAT) in 2006 and under the ministry of interior since 2008.

³ The role of the provinces, an intermediary entity between the central government and the municipalities, has evolved significantly throughout constitutional history of Madagascar: existed from 1960-1992, abolished in 1992, restored from 1998 to 2007, abolished again in 2007 and replaced by regions in 2008.

Part Two: Political decentralisation, local governance and domestic accountability

The second part of this session will provide you with the conceptual and theoretical framework needed to understand these three very important concepts, which in many ways overlap, and which are mutually reinforcing.

- *Political decentralisation* needs to be understood in the context of administrative and fiscal decentralization. It is closely associated with the notion of devolution. There are different degrees of political decentralisation as well as different administrative traditions (Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone). Political decentralisation can be extended and withdrawn by central government.
- *Local Governance* is an important concept because of the emphasis given to the relationship between elected local government and its constituencies. It distinguishes the more limited notion of local government from that of local governance, making the case for multi-actor engagement through country-based participation and accountability mechanisms.
- *Domestic Accountability* – Political decentralisation or devolution introduces new dimensions to the discussion of domestic accountability. In theory, it brings government closer to the population and should therefore strengthen vertical accountability ie the ability of citizens to hold their government to account. In practice, there are many factors inhibiting this ambition. These have to do with the degree of genuine political decentralisation, the relationship between central government and local government (so-called horizontal accountability) and the extent to which local governance arrangements facilitate direct and indirect participation of stakeholders. Moreover, it can create opportunities for financial mismanagement, abuse of office by duty bearers including corruption.

The box below demonstrates the importance of working on two fronts, ensuring compliance with established financial management and audit rules and procedures, building capacity of legislative bodies to hold local government to account, as well as promoting participation of civil society and the community at large in planning, budgeting and monitoring of public expenditures.

Box 1.4.5: Protection Basic Services Programme in Ethiopia

Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has experienced successive rounds of reforms for decentralised governance by devolving powers and mandates to Regional states as well as to Woreda (local authorities). It is also a country which has received substantial amounts of international assistance through budget support.

In 2005, due to the political crisis that followed the federal elections, donors decided to suspend Budget Support temporarily. However, they were concerned about the possible impact the cut of aid could have on service provision at the local level. Indeed, regional and local authorities risked being starved of the block grants they had been receiving for social service delivery and consequently would find themselves unable to maintain service levels.

Against this background, an innovative mechanism the so-called Protection Basic Services Programme (PBS) was initiated by the World Bank, other donors and the Government of Ethiopia in order to protect the provision of basic services through regional and district level government structures. Donors agreed

to provide financial support to the government on the condition that the full amount would be transferred to the regions through federal block grants. This meant an increase of financial resource flows to regional and district (woreda) levels, which would safeguard service delivery and, in turn, allow the decentralisation process to continue in a fragile situation.

To protect financial flows, partners agreed on a set of components, one of which aimed at promoting downward accountability of public sector services providers at regional and woreda levels to the communities they served. This “social accountability” component included disclosing budget information at regional and district level; providing information on targets achieved; promoting transparency of budget allocation and use; citizen involvement in budget tracking using Citizens and Community Report Cards; and capacity development of experienced CSOs to strengthen their role in development planning and monitoring results.

A mid-term review pointed out that some advances have been made on the development of mechanisms through which citizens can hold local authorities to account. The PBS mechanism seems to have provided incentives for citizens’ collective action towards local authorities, enhanced political involvement of stakeholders, strengthened citizens’ voice and social accountability, and increased transparency of budget as well as of budget processes.

The dialogue between sub-national governments, citizens and CSOs around service delivery has also improved and spaces between citizens, their organisations and local governments seem to be opening up across the regions.

The PBS experience has also highlighted the importance of addressing horizontal accountability mechanisms and processes that reinforce the social (or vertical) accountability mechanisms described above. PFM reforms have been tackling weaknesses in the budget preparation process, expenditure tracking and management and financial reporting including audit. Key issues arising during the reform process include clarifying the role of sub-national tiers of government in the budget preparation process and the critical role elected leaders at regional and woreda level need to play in approving budgets and in the scrutiny of external audit reports.

Source: Adapted from Case 2 “Strengthening citizens and CSOs voice and accountability in decentralized services delivery” in Engaging Non-State actors in New aid modalities for a better development outcomes and governance, EC Reference Document N.12, forthcoming.

Domestic accountability in decentralised contexts. What can decentralised governments be legitimately held accountable for? This question is important for at least two reasons. First, there is often confusion and or lack of clarity/ knowledge regarding the services that a local government is responsible for delivering. They can easily be held accountable for things for which central government or other government agencies are fully or partially responsible. Second, even where the roles and responsibilities are clear, there can be many factors that constrain a local government from exercising their responsibilities and over which they have little control. It is important to make the distinction between (i) **Horizontal accountability** and (ii) **Vertical Accountability**

(i) **Horizontal accountability** includes both the accountabilities between local government and central government as well as accountabilities across local government. These emphasise aspects of compliance and control, as well as performance monitoring. It is important to consider not only accountability of local government to central government but vice-versa. Decentralised local government can only be effective if

supported appropriately by central government. But how is central government held to account by local government?

(ii) Vertical accountability addresses the accountabilities of devolved local government (as a discrete sphere/ tier of government) to citizens. A basic distinction can be made between **direct** (direct involvement on design, delivery and monitoring of projects and programmes (whether country or donor financed), and **indirect** participation (ballot box). The different mechanisms of accountability should be considered. The effectiveness of any of these mechanisms is a function of various factors, and should not be assumed. Much donor support particularly capacity development is aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of these various mechanisms.

The role of donors in strengthening domestic accountability in a decentralising context. In order to provide effective support, and in view of the political nature of any decentralisation process, external partners need to make a special effort to understand and appreciate context. This is especially critical if the purpose is to strengthen systems of domestic accountability. External partners shape and influence domestic accountability arrangements by virtue of their very presence. Care is needed to avoid distortion of domestic accountability arrangements, or insisting on M&E frameworks or delivery modalities that can actually undermine the decentralisation process. In the spirit of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, donors have developed a set of general and specific guidelines that address the implications of the Paris Declaration on supporting decentralisation processes. The last two slides highlight a number of principles drawn from the specific guidelines that address issues related to political decentralisation, local governance and domestic accountability.

Box 1.4.6: Promoting local government accountability – possible roles of external partners

- Assist in the development—through technical support and training—of citizen-engagement mechanisms for planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, and providing feedback on local government decisions.
- Assist sub-national governments to institutionalize a calendar for hearings on budgets and other major functions to increase the likelihood of community interaction.
- Conduct workshops and training on public outreach and citizen interaction for subnational government staff.
- Conduct an inventory of sub-national government facilities, assets, and land available for use by the population, along with rules for their use. Make this information publicly available.
- Foster public access to sub-national government information, budgets, and tendering documents through support efforts to develop e.g. Bulletins, Relationships between local government and local media (e.g. regular announcement on council sessions, interviews with council members and head of technical services of local government, announcement of tenders in local newspapers and on the radio), Permanent display boards with information on subnational government activities; Electronic materials for public use, such as bulletins and events calendars, discussion forums, and a reference service with “frequently asked questions”.
- Provide assistance to develop and implement the use of referenda, other special decision-making mechanisms, ombudsmen, oversight committees, and accountability mechanisms, such as citizen complaint boards.

Source: Adapted from USAID 2009. Democratic Decentralisation Programming Handbook. Chapter 5, Washington D. C., p. 61.

Part Three: Group Exercise

The session will end with a group exercise with the purpose of raising your appetite for political economy of decentralisation diagnostics. We will provide you with some pointers on how to operationalise such work. This links with two useful documents that provide useful guidance for this exercise: one is the World Bank publication (see Annex 1.4), and the second is the two pager of the DAC GOVNET on *Guiding principles for enhanced impact, usage and harmonization of donor approaches to governance assessments* (2008).

KEY READINGS AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON A POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING DECENTRALISATION

1. Political economy analysis – decentralisation

1. Eaton, Kent, Kai Kaiser and Paul Smoke (2010). *The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms. Implications for Aid Effectiveness*. The World Bank, Washington D.C.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDSRE/Resources/DecentralizationReforms.pdf>

This document offers a framework for aid practitioners to understand better the broader context in which they design and implement decentralisation programs. Pointing at electoral, partisan, institutional, coalitional, and bureaucratic incentives that shape decentralization, the framework shows that decentralisation frequently leads to unintended consequences, particularly including changes in power dynamics and relationships. Chapter 6 contains a set of country case studies used to test and demonstrate the utility of the framework, including Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Uganda. The main conclusion is that systematic political economy and institutional analysis can complement the more technical diagnostic and advisory work that is typically carried out by development agencies supporting decentralization programs.

2. DANIDA (2010). *Political Economy and Governance Analyses of Decentralisation: Overview of approaches and tools for political economy and governance analyses and guidance for their application to decentralisation reforms*. First draft.

DANIDA developed this tool to improve the quality of Danish support to decentralisation reforms. It reviews existing analytical tools of politics of reform processes at both general and sectoral levels, including decentralisation reforms. It also explores the question of the operationalisation of political economy analysis, and identifies how such analysis can inform prioritisation and sequencing of reforms as well as general programming interventions of development partners.

3. Hoffmann Barak D. and Katherine M. Metzroth (2010) 'The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Ghana'. Paper prepared for the World Bank.

www.dpwg-lgd.org/cms/upload/pdf/PoliticalEconomy-Decentralization_Ghana2010.pdf

For the first time in twenty years a review of the decentralisation policy is being carried out in Ghana and a new policy will be put in place. Although this is likely to provide local governments with greater administrative, financial, and political authority, the extent of the decentralisation is

likely to be small, especially in the eyes of the average Ghanaian. On the other hand, a limited decentralisation might be more sensible than a more extensive one. The country faces major challenges in making local government more capable and accountable.

4. USAID, Democratic Decentralisation Programming Handbook.

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/DDPH_09_22_09_508c.pdf

Chapter 4 of this handbook is about how successful programming can be designed and implemented based on a sound assessment of the environment for decentralization reform. It provides guidance about how to assess the national, subnational, and civil society environment in a given country. The assessment framework is designed to help programmers define a country-appropriate program for the goal(s) selected and subsequently to select specific interventions. The framework can be used to develop programmatic recommendations that target the critical decentralization deficits in a country and that identify primary actors and rules in each of decentralization's three arenas (national, subnational, and civil society). A decentralisation assessment may follow upon and deepen the findings of a democracy and governance (DG) assessment that may have been carried out in the development of mission strategies.

5. EC (2008) "Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations", November 2008 (Reference Document No 4).

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/149a_en.pdf

This EC reference document explains how to analyse governance dimensions, and actors institutions for sector operations. It integrates a 'how-to approach' with some conceptual work, and includes a tool that helps visualise key actors – including public authorities, citizens, and civil society organisations which may be active at local level.

2. Measuring local governance

6. UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (n.d.). A Users' Guide to Measuring Local Governance.

<http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs09/LGGuide2July.pdf> .

The guide provides guidance to practitioners on the field on the multiplicity of tools and methods that are being used by different donor institutions to measure, assess and monitor governance at the local level. The first part is a discussion of theoretical/conceptual issues relating to local governance and outlines what is meant by local governance and describes the kinds of issues, concepts and priorities for local governance that existing measurement and assessment tools tend to focus on. This first part also provides guidance on challenges and opportunities for assessing local governance. The guidance is based on direct feedback from users of assessment tools, a distillation of good practices, and four illustrative case study examples.

The second part, or Source Guide, is an inventory of 22 existing assessment tools and methodologies produced by different institutions specifically for the local and decentralised level. Detailed information is provided on each tool, including: history, objectives, applicability, the types and sources of data used, methodology used, key actors/stakeholders involved, the results reporting format, the gender and poverty focus (if it has one), strengths and weaknesses, the coverage, timeline, the assumptions in the method, contact details and any supplementary tools/guidelines related to the particular instrument.

OTHER LITERATURE: POLITICAL ECONOMY

DFID (2007). Understanding the Politics of the Budget: What Drives Change in the Budget Process? DFID Briefing, [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/JBRN-6Z3M2Y/\\$file/DFID-funding-Jan07.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/JBRN-6Z3M2Y/$file/DFID-funding-Jan07.pdf?openelement)

Informal Development Partners Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralisation (2010). "What makes Decentralisation work?" in Global Forum on Local Development Report: 5-7. www.dpwg-lgd.org/cms/nl/pdf/GlobalForumReport.pdf

Steffensen, J, Tidemand, P et al (2004) A Comparative Analysis of Decentralisation in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Final Synthesis Report, Copenhagen, Nordic Consulting Group.

United Nations Capital Development Fund (2010) "What makes decentralization work? The political economy of decentralization: Implications for approaching reform and empowering local governments" Note for Session 8 - Global Forum on Local Development, Kampala, October 4-6. www.unCDF.org/gfld/docs/session_8.pdf

Weller, P. (2001). "Moving the state: the politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre." *Politics and Society* 29(1): 131-63.

World Bank (n.d.). Empowerment Case Studies: Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPowerment/Resources/15109_PETS_Case_Study.pdf

World Bank (2010). Mali Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review, Washington: World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/05/03/000333037_20100503234830/Rendered/PDF/468260v10ESW0P1disclosed0May0202010.pdf

Wunsch, J. (1998). "Decentralization, local governance and the democratic transition in Southern Africa: a comparative analysis." *African Studies Quarterly* 2(1).

Wunsch, J. (2001). "Decentralization, local governance and 'recentralization' in Africa." *Public Administration and Development* 21(4): 277-88.

OTHER GUIDELINES AND HANDBOOKS

Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008): Framework for Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA), The Hague: MINBUZA.

DFID (2009). How to Note: Political Economy Analysis, DFID Practise Paper.
www.odi.org.uk/.../2009/07/.../1929-dfid-note-political-economy-analysis.pdf

EuropeAid (2007). Supporting Decentralisation and Local Governance in Third Countries. Tools and Methods Series, Reference Document n.2.
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/138a_en.htm

OECD/ DAC (2008). Survey of Donor Approaches to Governance Assessment.
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/32/42258487.pdf>

OECD/ DAC (2009). Sourcebook on Governance Assessments, Part II Governance definitions and overview of governance assessment tools used by aid agencies
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/12/42472200.pdf>

WEB SOURCES

Governance Assessment Portal / Assessing Local Governance and Decentralisation:
www.gaportal.org

Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), Topic guide on Political Economy Analysis: <http://139.184.194.47/go/topic-guides/political-economy-analysis>
GSDRC manages a user friendly website which also features longer contributions on topics that are considered of relevance to development and developing partners. Readers can suggest such topics, which are then considered by a core team of researchers and often result in very appropriate web based responses.

Local Integrity Initiative of Global Integrity: www.globalintegrity.org

The Policy Practice, leading think tank providing all sorts of support on political economy approaches and analysis: www.thepolicypractice.com

Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessment reports,
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PEFA/0,,contentMDK:22687152~menuPK:7313203~pagePK:7313176~piPK:7327442~theSitePK:7327438,00.html>

KEY READINGS AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON POLITICAL DECENTRALISATION LOCAL GOVERNANCE, DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Hudson, A. and the GOVNET Secretariat 2009. Aid and domestic accountability. DAC Network on Governance (GOVNET)
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/26/42811639.pdf>

Jackson, P., and Scott, Z. 2007. Local Government in Post-Conflict Environments, Paper prepared for the UNDP Workshop on Local Government in Post-Conflict Situations, Oslo Governance Centre, Oslo 28-29 November 2007

http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/oslo1107/Annex_4_%20PaperGovernment_in_Post_Conflict.pdf

Lutz, G. and Linder, W., 2004, 'Traditional Structures in Local Governance for Local Development', University of Berne, Switzerland

http://www1.worldbank.org/sp/ldconference/Materials/Parallel/PS1/PS1_S8_bm1.pdf

This study analyses the existing literature and research on decentralization and traditional authorities. It argues that decentralization does not automatically strength local governance and that the success of political decentralisation crucially depends on how traditional authorities and structures are involved. The paper emphasizes that in many countries traditional institutions play an important role in people's day-to-day life, control access to land, mediate disputes and are often more legitimate than modern state institutions and elected representatives.

World Bank 2009. Local Government Discretion and Accountability: Application of a Local Governance Framework. Washington D. C.,

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/3182370164201144397/31870941173195121091/SD_Working_Paper_113.pdf?resourceurlname=SD_Working_Paper_113.pdf

This report critically reviews the potential of decentralisation reforms have for strengthening different lines of public accountability. It argues that decenralisation is a multi-faceted process which includes giving discretion to local governments and establishing accountability mechanisms at different levels. Using a case study approach, the authors illustrate how different design elements of decentralisation processes that can help to build or hinder vertical and horizontal accountability. Chapter 2 of the report analyses the political dimensions of decentralization focusing on components of political discretion and accountability.

OTHER LITERATURE

Bell, E. 2009. Society in state-building Lessons for improving democratic governance. Synthesis report. The Dilemma of Devolving Power to Provinces. Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP).

http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Synthesis_society_in_statebuilding.pdf

Bierschenk, T. and Olivier de Sardan, J-P. (2003), "Powers in the Village: Rural Benin Between Democratisation and Decentralisation", Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 73(2): 145-173

Booth, D. 2010. Towards a theory of local governance and public goods' provision in sub-Saharan Africa, Africa Power & Politics Working Paper no. 13. London: ODI, Irish Aid, DFID

<http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20100812-appp-working-paper-13-towards-a-theory-of-local-governance-and-public-goods-provision-in-sub-saharan-africa-david-booth-aug-2010>

Bossuyt, J. et al., 2009. Supporting domestic accountability. Exploring conceptual dimensions and operational challenges. European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper No. 93

[http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/71430BDFD96DC0C5C12576500032B5B1/\\$FILE/09-93-e.pdf](http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/71430BDFD96DC0C5C12576500032B5B1/$FILE/09-93-e.pdf)

Bardhan, P. 2002. Decentralization of Governance and Development. Journal of Economic Perspectives <http://people.bu.edu/dilipm/ec722/papers/28-s05bardhan.pdf>.

Cammack, D. et. al. 2007. Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and Malawi. Working Paper 2. Research project (RP-05-GG) of the Advisory Board for Irish Aid <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4746.pdf>

EuropeAid 2011. "Engaging Non-State actors in New aid modalities for a better development outcomes and governance", Case 2- Strengthening citizens and CSOs voice and accountability in decentralized services delivery – the Protection of Basic Services Project: Ethiopia. EC Reference Document (Draft Version, October 2010)

Gaventa, J. 2002. Towards Participatory Local Governance: Six propositions for Discussion, Institute of Development Studies. <http://www2.ids.ac.uk/logolink/resources/downloads/Towards%20Participatory%20Governance-Manchesterfinal.pdf>

Gaventa, J. and Barret, G. 2010. Citizens, Participation and Accountability. So what difference does it make? Mapping the outcomes of citizens engagement, Development Research Centre http://www.drc-citizenship.org/publications/CDRC_Outcomes_Paper.pdf

Holland, J. et al. 2009. Measuring change and results in voice and accountability work. DFID Report. <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/meas-chge-res-voice-acc-wk.pdf>

Jackson, P., 2005, 'Chiefs, Money and Politicians: Rebuilding Local Government in Post-War Sierra Leone', Public Administration and Development, vol. 25, no 1., pp. 49- 58 <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/109884064/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0>

Nixon, H., 2007, 'Some Considerations on Local Democracy and Traditional Societies', in Bennett, J. (ed.), 2007, 'Scratching the Surface: Democracy, Traditions, Gender', Heinrich Boll Foundation, Pakistan http://www.boell.de/downloads/nahost/scratching_the_surface_commentary.pdf

Venning, P. 2009. Impact of budget support on accountabilities at the local level in Indonesia. Volume 2009/1. OECD Journal on Budgeting. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/43410364.pdf>

GUIDELINES AND HANDBOOKS

DFID, Ministerie voor Buitenlandse Zaken, ODI 2002. Decentralisation and Political Accountability, Key Sheets for Sustainable Livelihoods. <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=2314&title=decentralisation-political-accountability>.

EuropeAid 2007. Supporting Decentralisation and Local Governance in Third Countries. Tools and Methods Series: Reference Document n. 2, chapter 2

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/governance-democracy/documents/decentralisation_local_governance_refdoc_final_en.pdf

USAID 2009. Democratic Decentralisation Programming Handbook. Chapter 5, Washington

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/DDPH_09_22_09_508c.pdf

OTHER INTERESTING MATERIAL SUGGESTED DURING THE SEMINAR

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....