



# Tools and Methods Series

## Reference Document No 17

# Operating in situations of **conflict and fragility**

*An EU staff handbook*

*December 2014*



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Operating in situations of  
conflict and fragility

An EU staff handbook

Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid  
European Commission

Brussels • Luxembourg, December 2014

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# Foreword

While in recent years many countries have moved out of poverty, it is striking that one in three of the world's poor are living in a fragile or conflict-affected situation. Consider this: if we fail to act, and act decisively, by 2018 that figure will be one in two. The Arab Spring, setbacks in Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic and, most recently, renewed conflict in the Middle East show that the legacy of conflict and fragility cannot be erased overnight. Long-term, targeted engagement is the only solution in these situations.

The European Union will continue to be part of that solution. To that end, it has a special role to play on three fronts:

- first, as a development partner with a proven, positive track record of long-term engagement, able to mobilise Member States and other like-minded development partners;
- second, as a development partner with the capacity for politically smart, potentially game-changing engagement across policy issues, such as diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, development, security, trade, investment, capital flight, environment and regional integration;
- third, as a development partner willing to listen and adapt its business model to the specific challenges of fragility and conflict — recent examples of this include the introduction of state-building contracts, EU trust funds and flexible procurement procedures for countries in crisis.

In line with our drive for development policy to target support to those countries where the needs are greatest, the EU has set aside considerable funding to make this triple role work. With over EUR 6 billion spent in 2013 in aid, we are the world's second-largest provider of assistance in fragile situations. More than two thirds of funding under the 11th European Development Fund and over half from the Development Cooperation Instrument for 2014–2020 will be used to help people in such situations.

This is a handbook written **by** staff. It recounts staff experience as told in the first person and documented in evaluations. As such, it seeks to reap the benefits of the EU's rich experience in situations of conflict and fragility.

It is also a handbook written **for** staff. As such, it hopes to provide staff newly deployed to such situations with a useful overview of current concepts, policies, instruments and good practices. It does not set out new policies or procedures at length; instead, it summarises them in a single document and points to where more detailed guidance and documentation can be obtained.

Last but not least, it is a **living** handbook. As new challenges emerge — be they related to demography, new technologies, climate change or identity politics — the business model for engaging in situations of conflict and fragility will evolve. This handbook will reflect the new developments and lessons learned.

All in all, this handbook constitutes a valuable summary of what we have learned so far and the instruments we have created and applied to date. We hope it will help staff to further draw on and enrich the vast knowledge and resource base that we have amassed in order to address the challenges of conflict and fragility effectively, be they entrenched and chronic, or emerging and unfamiliar.

Fernando FRUTUOSO DE MELO  
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid



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Over 80 EuropeAid, ECHO, EEAS and Delegation staff in 18 European Union (EU) Delegations and at Headquarters were closely involved in all stages of the handbook, and took a leading part in the development of the case studies in Part II. Major contributions were made by Rafael Aguirre Unceta, Dominique Albert, Claes Andersson, Timothy Baines, Guy Banim, Guillaume Barraut, Roger Bellers, Sarah Bernhardt, Beatrice Bussi, Sonia Godinho, Peter Hazdra, Karolina Hedstrom, Frank Hess, Patrick Illing, Thijn Ingeborg, Rima Joujou Deljkic, Nadim Karkutli, Jérôme Le Roy, Raniero Leto, Peter Maher, Marina Marchetti, Willem Olthof, Roxana Osiac, Andreea Pavel, Cedric Pierard, Erik Ponsard, Micha Ramakers, Manuel De Rivera Lamo De Espinosa, Chloé Robert, Jorge Rodriguez Bilbao, Vaclav Svejda, Chantal Symoens, Piero Valabrega, Heino Van Houwelingen, Juan Villa Chacon, Vincent Vire and Birgit Vleugels.

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The handbook was designed and laid out by Nita Congress under the coordination of Arnaud de Vanssay and Aziza Taourirt. It was developed within the Methodological Support and Training for Project and Programme Management service contract managed by the DEVCO Quality and Results Unit headed by Jan Ten Bloemendal.

# Abbreviations and acronyms

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	civil society organisation
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid
DFID	Department for International Development
ECHO	Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IfS	Instrument for Stability
JHDF	Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework
LRRD	linking relief, rehabilitation and development
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
TMAF	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
TRM	transitional results matrix
UN	United Nations



# Table of contents

FOREWORD	III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	V
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	VI
 PART I: CONCEPTS, POLICIES AND THE EU APPROACH	 1
Introduction: The EU's engagement in situations of conflict and fragility	3
1 Concepts	5
1.1 What is a situation of conflict and fragility?	5
1.2 Why and how do I need to engage differently in a situation of conflict and fragility?	9
2 The EU approach to conflict and fragility	13
2.1 What lessons have we learned?	13
2.2 What is the EU approach?	16
2.3 What are the relevant policies?	20
2.4 What EU financial instruments are available?	25
2.5 What EU tools are available?	28
 PART II: PRACTICAL GUIDANCE NOTES	 33
No 1 Analysing context to tailor support in situations of conflict and fragility	35
No 2 Programming flexibly for situations of conflict and fragility	47
No 3 Promoting democratic governance and human rights in situations of conflict and fragility	53
No 4 Promoting resilience in situations of conflict and fragility	61
No 5 Identifying and implementing EU modalities and instruments in situations of conflict and fragility	69
No 6 Using flexible procedures in situations of conflict and fragility	81
No 7 Engaging with national counterparts in situations of conflict and fragility	87
No 8 Working with international actors in situations of conflict and fragility	97
No 9 Promoting inclusive and sustainable growth in situations of conflict and fragility	107
 ANNEXES	 111
1 Glossary	113
2 Bibliography	114
3 EU responsibilities for fragility and conflict	120
4 Online knowledge sharing and collaboration platform: Capacity4dev.eu	122
5 Useful distinctions of situations of conflict and fragility	123
6 Recipients of EU development assistance considered by the OECD to be in situations of fragility (2009–12)	124

## LIST OF BOXES

1.2.1	Conflict-sensitivity in brick-and-mortar projects	10
1.2.2	Conflict-sensitivity in education	10
1.2.3	Guidance for adopting a comprehensive approach	10
1.2.4	Agreeing on priorities across sectors	11
1.2.5	Agreeing on priorities across actors	11
2.2.1	Typical peacebuilding support measures for longer-term development	16
2.2.2	Good practices in enhancing resilience	17
2.2.3	The value of shared approaches in enhancing resilience: Ethiopia	18
2.2.4	Staff development for situations of conflict and fragility	18
2.3.1	The OECD Fragile States Engagement Principles	20
2.3.2	The Busan commitments that most relate to fragility	22
2.4.1	Conflict-sensitive programming in the Occupied Palestinian Territories	25
2.4.2	Flexibility in practice: Somalia	25
2.4.3	Good procurement practice in situations of conflict and fragility: Voice from the field	27
2.5.1	The EU Conflict Early Warning System	28

## LIST OF GRAPHS

0.1	A wide range of interventions	3
0.2	EU CSDP missions as of July 2014	4
1.1.1	Poverty and fragility	5
1.1.2	Percentage of fragile and non-fragile countries expected to reach MDG indicator targets by 2015	5
1.1.3	Three dimensions of fragility and country examples from 2010	6
2.1.1	Comprehensive approach to support situations of conflict and fragility	14
2.2.1	Who does what at EU Headquarters on operating in situations of conflict and fragility?	19
2.3.1	EU policy documents relevant to situations of fragility	21
2.3.2	New Deal endorsing organisations and countries	23
2.3.3	The three pillars of the New Deal	23

## LIST OF TABLES

1.1.1	Possible responses to different situations of conflict and fragility	7
2.4.1	EU instruments	26
2.5.1	A selection of EU tools available to staff: strategic, core and specialised	30

PART I

# Concepts, policies and the EU approach



## INTRODUCTION

# The EU's engagement in situations of conflict and fragility


The European Union (EU) engages with over 50 countries affected by conflict and fragility.

- The EU has Delegations in the 50 or so countries that can be considered in situations of conflict or fragility. Beyond the Delegations, there are 12 EU Special Representatives (as of January 2014). Nearly all Special Representatives work in fragile and conflict-affected countries or regions, or on fragility-related themes.
- The EU's engagement in situations of conflict and fragility spans a wide range of interventions (Graph 0.1). The engagement also involves other issues that can directly affect fragility and conflict, such as trade, investment, global economic governance and financial regulation, energy, the environment and regional integration.

## SUMMARY

- The EU engages with over 50 countries affected by conflict and fragility.
- The EU has a track record of contributing to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation.
- EU evaluations point to strengths arising from the EU's comparative advantages but also to areas for improvement.

GRAPH 0.1 A wide range of interventions



**Note:** CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; LRRD = linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

**Source:** Adapted from J.P. Lederach, as cited in EEAS and EC (no date).


- In 2012, the EU's development cooperation with countries in situations of conflict and fragility represented EUR 4.9 billion (a budget managed by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid, or 59 % of total EU assistance. This makes EU institutions the second-largest provider of assistance in situations of conflict and fragility — after the United States and before the World Bank. The top three recipients of such assistance in 2012 were Egypt, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 6). Taking a longer view, over 2000–12, the top three recipients were the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan and Ethiopia <sup>(1)</sup>.
- The EU is also engaged in situations of conflict and fragility through electoral observation missions and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. There were 16 CSDP missions in July 2014, civilian and military, representing over 7 000 personnel (Graph 0.2).

The EU has a track record of contributing to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. For example, it has made 'significant contributions to development, peace and stability' in Ethiopia (2012); it has 'succeeded in implementing the support to the Palestinian Authority in difficult circumstances' (2013); and in the East and South Neighbourhood Policy Regions, 'EU support stimulated regional policy dialogue and contributed to stability' (2013). Regarding justice and security reform, the EU 'has substantially increased its engagement globally though funding, development of its concept and utilisation of a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments' (2011). With regard to integrated border management and organised crime, one of the EU's 'major successes was the contribution to fostering international border management policy exchange and inclusive cooperation between countries that until recently had been involved in conflict or dispute' (2013). And, in the EU's support of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 'evidence of results and positive impacts has been identified in relation to both the promotion and protection of human rights' (2011).

Evaluations point to recurrent strengths arising from the EU's comparative advantages, but also to areas for improvement.

These strengths include the high relevance of EU support, respect for national ownership and a multi-sector/holistic approach. The EU's comparative advantages include (i) its long presence, making it a reliable partner, (ii) its critical mass in terms of financial support, (iii) its wide range of instruments and (iv) its recognised thematic experience in sectors. However, evaluations also point to areas for improvement — notably increasing low efficiency, improving the quality of political dialogue and setting more realistic time frames (see Section 2.1).

GRAPH 0.2 EU CSDP missions as of July 2014



Source: EEAS website, [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm).

<sup>(1)</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development statistics on official development assistance, available at <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>. These data do not include military common security and defence policy missions, which are not funded by development assistance.

## CHAPTER 1

## Concepts

## 1.1 What is a situation of conflict and fragility?


Situations of conflict and fragility include high levels of poverty, low development and low security, creating significant challenges for attaining the EU's overarching objectives of 'poverty elimination in the context of sustainable development' (EC, 2011).

- Situations of conflict and fragility host a growing number of the world's poor. The number of people who survive on less than USD 2.00 a day has fallen sharply in global terms, but their number in fragile states is expected to remain the same in 1990 and 2025 (Graph 1.1.1). In 2005, 20 % of the global poor lived in situations of conflict and fragility; by 2010, this proportion had doubled to 40 % and is expected to exceed 50 % by 2015. Today, about 280 million poor people live in just five countries in situations of conflict and fragility. In descending order, these are Nigeria, the Democratic Republic Congo, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Kenya.
- Other measures of development besides poverty set situations of conflict and fragility apart: these countries host 77 % of school-age children not enrolled in primary school, 70 % children dying before their fifth birthday, and 40 % of tuberculosis and HIV-AIDS cases. Compared with non-fragile situations, there is little or no progress to date on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) such as infant mortality, poverty, undernourishment and sanitation (Graph 1.1.2).

## SUMMARY


- Situations of conflict and fragility include high levels of poverty, low development and low security, creating serious challenges to the EU's goal of poverty elimination.
- There are distinguishable types of situations of conflict and fragility, each calling for a different set of responses. Besides countries, sub- and transnational areas can be in fragile or conflict-affected situations.
- Situations of conflict and fragility are influenced by a range of local and global factors.

GRAPH 1.1.1 Poverty and fragility



Source: Adapted from Kharas and Rogerson (2012), as cited in DAC INCAF (2012).

GRAPH 1.1.2 Percentage of fragile and non-fragile countries expected to reach MDG indicator targets by 2015



Source: OECD (2013), based on World Bank Global Monitoring Report estimates (2013).

- Fragility often correlates with violence — whether acute, such as in armed conflict and war, or low-level but chronic and pervasive.
  - In 2012, there were 32 armed conflicts (defined as causing 25 battle-related deaths or more), of which six caused 1 000 battle-related deaths or more. In total, armed conflicts caused about 37 000 casualties; in descending order, these were in Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen and Sudan.
  - Countries with high homicide rates could also be considered as having a degree of fragility; in 2010, the countries with the highest homicide rates were, in descending order, El Salvador, Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Belize and Guatemala.
- Fragility constrains development. Conversely, addressing fragility is a powerful development multiplier. Peace and stability lead to the resumption of economic activities and therefore stimulate jobs and growth (e.g. post-war Mozambique experienced double-digit growth). Peace also leads to human development — in post-war Mozambique, 83 % of children completed primary school in 2012, up from 73 % in 2009. And in most cases, peace brings positive spill-over effects beyond national borders.

'[Fragile and conflict-affected] situations [are] where the social contract is broken due to the State's incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable access to power, security and safety of the populace and protection and promotion of citizens' rights and freedoms.'


*Commission of the European Communities (2007)*

There are distinguishable types of situations of conflict and fragility, each calling for a different set of responses. There are many ways to distinguish such types (see Annex 5), but one of the most useful is the security-capacity-legitimacy model proposed by Charles Call (2010), which classifies country fragility according to deficiencies or gaps involving three sets of issues (Graph 1.1.3).

- **Security issues.** The state has a good degree of capacity and legitimacy, but has limited reach and suffers from illegal trafficking and/or chronic violence;
- **Capacity issues.** The state has legitimacy (e.g. through regular elections), but low capacity to deliver services;
- **Legitimacy issues.** The state has some capacity to deliver services but suffers from weak legitimacy, resulting from, for example, the violation of agreed rules, poor public service delivery, beliefs shaped by tradition and religion, or international action undermining national sovereignty.

Countries can have gaps in one, two or all of these areas.

**GRAPH 1.1.3** Three dimensions of fragility and country examples from 2010



Source: Adapted from Call (2010), as cited in Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012).



This model is authoritative because it recognises that strength in one or two of these areas does not make up for weakness in the other(s). A country with security issues requires a different set of responses than for one with capacity issues, legitimacy issues or multiple issues. Table 1.1.1 gives examples of the type of responses that may suit each general situation — bearing in mind that nothing will, or should, replace a strategic country-specific analysis.

**TABLE 1.1.1 Possible responses to different situations of conflict and fragility**

Situation and example			Response	Comment
Security issues, e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Analyse the nature (political? criminal?) and causes of violence (grievances? opportunities?).</li><li>Invest in economic, social and political inclusion</li><li>Support meaningful dialogue between state and citizens and across social groups</li><li>Develop or reform the security and justice system</li></ul>	Political economy analysis and international coordination are vital
Low security	Medium capacity	Medium legitimacy		
Capacity issues, e.g. Sierra Leone in 2010			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Develop human, organisational and institutional capacity for the State to deliver services, thereby also improving legitimacy</li><li>Invest in the business climate, including the rule of law</li><li>Increase domestic revenue mobilisation</li></ul>	Apply the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, especially use of country systems
Medium security	Low capacity	Medium legitimacy		
Legitimacy issues, e.g. Guinea-Bissau in 1999, 2003, 2012			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Carefully weigh the probable impact of international support and watch for opportunities to engage more decisively</li><li>Support civil society and the media in their checks-and-balance function</li><li>Support the complete electoral cycle (beyond election day), and political parties</li></ul>	Political economy analysis and international coordination are vital
Medium security	Medium capacity	Low legitimacy		
Multiple issues, e.g. Somalia in the 2000s			Holistic and sequenced approach: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>Focus on humanitarian assistance and security</li><li>Quick socioeconomic gains (including from the bottom up)</li><li>Establish the basis for legitimate politics, whether through support to an inclusive peace process, a transitional government during a ‘cool-off’ period or credible elections</li></ol>	
Low security	Low capacity	Low legitimacy		

**Source:** Authors, based on interviews; Call (2010); Carment and Yiagadeesen (2012); and Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012).

**Besides countries, sub-national and transnational areas can be in fragile or conflict-affected situations.** Some countries that are not usually thought of as being fragile contain large swaths of territory that exhibit all the attributes of fragility; examples include Northern Uganda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, Mindanao in the Philippines, North-East Nigeria and Southern Thailand. In [Asia](#), sub-national conflict is considered the most deadly, widespread and enduring form of violent conflict, affecting more than 131 million people (Parks, Colletta and Oppenheim, 2013).

Fragility and conflict can also affect territories beyond national borders — for example, the belt of instability that stretches from the Horn of Africa to the Sahel, due to Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab and related groups.

**Situations of conflict and fragility are influenced by local, national and global factors.** Local factors of conflict and fragility include weak or exclusionary local governance; limited or unequal access to land and water; etc. National factors include tense social relations; unequal access to jobs and services; and weak rule of law; etc. Global factors include the following:

- international trade (e.g. barriers to export and vulnerability to shocks);
- transnational organised crime and illicit trade;
- the existence of a global and poorly regulated market for private security services;
- economic and financial liberalisation processes;
- migration to and from fragile states and the spread of radicalism through new technologies;
- internationally networked non-state armed groups;
- climate change.

These global factors are often ignored in political economy analysis, yet globalisation makes them a central set of forces to take account of — especially in contexts of weak institutions, high poverty, high levels of violence and structural exclusion. Additionally, local, national and global factors interact, as the spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the explosion of drug-related violence in several Central American countries illustrate.

## 1.2 Why and how do I need to engage differently in a situation of conflict and fragility?

**Sensitivity to context is required in all fragile situations, not just those in crisis.** The case of Rwanda, where the international community was claiming progress in economic and development terms just months before the 1994 genocide was unleashed, is evidence of the need to gain greater awareness of the political forces, social dynamics and fundamental beliefs and values that exist in society. As the [study](#) on lessons learned from CSDP missions and operations states: ‘Post-conflict settings require political savvy.’ Ethnic-, clan- or regional-based exclusion; gender-based violence and discrimination; and youth exclusion are often acute in situations of conflict and fragility and require special attention.

Although it is easier to infer causal relations in hindsight than to guess them as events unfold, all programming in a fragile or conflict-affected situation needs to be informed by context analysis and anticipation of what might be the impact — intended and unintended — of the programme and its components. This analysis is often readily available in well-documented contexts such as Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

When such documentation is not available, various tools exist for rapid, ‘light’ analysis — for example, the [Guidance note on the use of conflict analysis in support of EU external action](#) (EEAS and EC, no date).

**Sensitivity to context is required in all programmes, not just those involving governance and security.** While it may be tempting to think that only governance and security colleagues need to worry about doing no harm and addressing fragility, roads, food security and agriculture, education and energy programmes also have a direct bearing on fragility and conflict (Boxes 1.2.1 and 1.2.2) and thus must be programmed with a conflict lens.

**Sensitivity to context may require adapting some of the principles of aid effectiveness,** notably ownership and alignment, as recognised in the [Accra Agenda for Action](#). As stated in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, endorsed by the EU:

Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments — such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds — can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long-term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these (OECD, 2007).

**A comprehensive approach is more conducive to transformation.** In stable contexts, a lack of coherence across policies and related interventions can lead to limited results. In a fragile or conflict-affected situation, lack of coherence can easily lead to no results at all — or even do harm. And a lack of progress in one area — be it political, security, economic or social — risks reversing the whole transition process. For example, in Niger, improving livelihoods in the

### SUMMARY

- Sensitivity to context is required in all fragile situations, not just those in crisis.
- Sensitivity to context is required in all programmes, not just those focused on governance and security.
- Sensitivity to context may require adapting some of the principles of aid effectiveness.
- A comprehensive approach to conflict and fragility is more conducive to helping countries graduate from conflict and fragility.
- A comprehensive approach does not mean that everything must be done. Critical path thinking is needed.
- Risk (i.e. the possibility of harm) has to be acknowledged, calculated and managed.

### BOX 1.2.1 Conflict-sensitivity in brick-and-mortar projects

After Operation Artemis in the Ituri province of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, one donor-funded programme supported job creation through road works. However, it unintentionally employed only one of the two ethnic groups that were in conflict at the time. A smarter, more sensitive programme — aimed at creating jobs, rebuilding roads *and* rebuilding peace across groups — would have employed both, fostering their cooperation and mutual trust.

Similarly, agricultural development projects have the potential to rebuild social capital through cooperative efforts (e.g. by sharing irrigation water and infrastructure across social divides), but can make things worse if benefits are unevenly distributed or unwittingly increase conflict (e.g. by reducing the amount of water available for certain groups).

short term was a condition for restoring security, and at the same time security was needed to improve livelihoods. By considering all the relevant and interconnected aspects of diplomacy, security, defence, finance, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, a comprehensive approach is conducive to both effectiveness and efficiency. Guidance to adopt a comprehensive approach is available globally and in the EU (Box 1.2.3), and can be applied to

### BOX 1.2.2 Conflict-sensitivity in education

Education in conflict-affected and fragile contexts is an acute challenge. Out of the 57 million primary school-aged children not in school in 2011, half lived in conflict-affected countries. And of the 69 million adolescents of lower secondary school age not in school in 2011, 20 million lived in conflict-affected countries (UNESCO, ‘[Children still battling to go to school](#)’, 2013).

Education can play a critical role in social transformation and long-term sustainable peacebuilding, but it can also perpetuate or even exacerbate the source of conflict and risks. There has been a growing recognition that education policy and programming focused only on technical solutions is not sufficient to address the challenges of conflict-affected and fragile contexts.

Staff should recognise the complex role that education plays and systematically integrate conflict-sensitive measures into their education sector planning, policies and implementation processes to minimise negative impacts that contribute to conflict and maximise positive impacts. A good resource in this regard is the [Conflict Sensitive Education Pack](#) from the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (available in English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and the associated [training module](#) (in English, French and Arabic).

### BOX 1.2.3 Guidance for adopting a comprehensive approach

- The OECD’s [Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations](#) include the need to ‘recognise the links between political, security and development objectives’ and highlight the fact that ‘there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives’. For example, the urgent need to deliver essential services may trump the important need to develop local capacity to do so; the urgent need to re-establish security can undermine longer-term stability, for example, if it requires recourse to non-state armed groups; and there can be a trade-off between focusing on poverty reduction versus addressing inequality, often a root cause of conflict. The 10 principles call for ‘joined-up strategies’ across the departments of each administration while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid.
- Joined-up analysis frameworks and mechanisms facilitate common and coherent understandings of fragile, conflict and post-conflict situations; see, for example, [post-conflict needs assessments](#) and [post-disaster needs assessments](#) and the [UN Integrated Mission Planning Process](#).
- ‘[The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises](#)’ sets out several practical steps in carrying out a comprehensive approach: (i) develop a shared analysis, (ii) define a common strategic vision, (iii) focus on crisis prevention, (iv) mobilise the various strengths and capacities of the EU, (v) commit to the long term, (vi) link policies and internal and external actions, (vii) make better use of EU Delegations and (viii) work in partnership with other international and regional actors.

jointly analyse the context, agree on a strategic approach across these policy areas and identify practical coordination mechanisms.

**A comprehensive approach does not mean that everything must be done. Critical path thinking is needed.** This assessment needs to answer the question of ‘what is a priority when everything is a priority?’ and resist the temptation to overburden national counterparts with too many agendas in the face of limited capacity and narrow political space. Prioritisation and concentration are also in line with EU programming instructions for the 2014–20 period.

**Transitional results matrices** (TRMs) are a tool that can help to identify priorities for the short term (first 12 months), medium term (one to three years) and long term (three years and more). TRMs can be used in the following circumstances.

- If **priorities are agreed upon across sectors** — diplomacy, defence and development, etc. (Box 1.2.4).
- If **priorities are agreed upon across actors**, including among international partners and with national counterparts. In this way, TRMs can (i) serve as a catalyst for harmonisation among donors, allowing for improved donor coordination and articulating a compact between national and international actors; (ii) explicitly help to identify the links between political-security matters and economic-social issues; (iii) articulate a compact between national authorities and the population and provide a framework for demonstrating gains achieved and (iv) provide a management tool for national leadership and international actors to focus on critical actions. The greatest gains are achieved when TRMs are negotiated around the budget planning, voting and execution process; this helps to strengthen domestic accountability (Box 1.2.5).
- If **flexibility is built in** to respond to challenges and opportunity. For example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) annually reviews and adjusts its operational plans in countries that are fragile or conflict-affected.

**Risk (i.e. the possibility of harm) has to be acknowledged, calculated and managed.** Specifically, this entails the following.

- **Acknowledging risk.** ‘Dealing effectively with fragility involves taking risks and requires rapidity and flexibility in adopting political decisions and making them operational in the field, while dealing simultaneously with partner countries’ constraints, often in terms of limited capacities’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). Risks in situations of conflict and fragility are (i) contextual, ranging from corruption, weak governance and lack of aid absorption capacity to political and security risks; leading to (ii) programmatic risks (failure to achieve programme goals and the risk of doing harm) and ultimately to (iii) fiduciary and reputational risks for the institution providing support.

#### BOX 1.2.4 Agreeing on priorities across sectors

Liberia’s Results-Focused Transition Framework identified the full range of essential actions needed to safeguard the transition; for each priority outcome, it identified the critical results required in each time period. For example, in order to produce government functions implemented through a merit-based public service, the first step was a census of civil servants, followed by public safety and security for government workers in key rural areas, removal of persons absent from the payroll, the development of new regulations and the piloting of a new system of oversight and transparency. This framework helped in effectively identifying lags in both government action and donor support, facilitating a structural discussion of actions to fix these problems.

**Source:** UNDG and World Bank (2005).


#### BOX 1.2.5 Agreeing on priorities across actors

In Timor-Leste’s post-crisis phase, 30 % of the recurrent budget was supported by a multi-donor trust fund that was guided by the Transition Support Programme, a TRM. Individual donor countries participated fully in review missions; while individual viewpoints and input often differ, stakeholder consensus ensures continuing support even when opinions differ on individual items.

**Source:** UNDG and World Bank (2005).

- Calculating risk.** Situations of conflict and fragility are usually higher risk than more stable contexts, but taking a zero-risk or low-risk approach could lead to strategic failure (zero impact). Rather, the calculation should (i) weigh the risk of action vis-à-vis the risk of inaction and the potential benefits of engaging, and (ii) compare the risks involved with several courses of action. In calculating risk, there is a need for greater realism (most recent evaluations identify overly optimistic objectives and/or timelines in EU support to situations of conflict and fragility) and greater honesty about risk exposure between donors and receiving partners, and within donor administrations between programme managers and financial controllers.
- Managing risk.** Risk in situations of conflict and fragility can be managed by being more proactive than in more stable contexts. If there is a high fiduciary risk, it might be both safer and have more of an impact to invest in strengthening the financial management of receiving partners than to state conditions that will probably not be met. For another example, 'combating corruption ought to be done within the framework of broader support to strengthen good governance and democratisation processes' (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). Risks in situations of conflict and fragility can also be managed through multi-donor efforts, including pooled funding; and/or by using special instruments, such as the EU [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#) (IcSP; formerly the Instrument for Stability (IFS)), for which there is higher tolerance (within agreed limits) than for regular instruments if innovation and untested approaches are not fruitful.

### 1.2.1 Resources on situations of conflict and fragility




***The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*** asserts that 50 failed states — home to the world's poorest 1 billion people — pose the central challenge to the developing world in the 21st century. It suggests a number of relatively inexpensive but institutionally difficult changes; notably, that aid agencies should increasingly be concentrated in the most difficult environments and accept more risk (Paul Collier, Oxford University Press, 2007).



***European Report on Development 2009: Overcoming Fragility in Africa*** aims to stimulate debate and research on development issues and amplifying the EU's voice internationally. It bridges expertise in development-related issues in research and academic institutions and policy-making throughout Europe (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Brussels, 2009).



***Fragile States 2013: Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World*** is an annual report that serves as a tool to monitor the levels, timing and composition of resource flows to fragile states. This edition (i) takes stock of the evolution of fragility as a concept, (ii) analyses financial flows to and within fragile states between 2000 and 2010, and (iii) identifies trends and issues that are likely to shape fragility in the years to come (DAC INCAF, OECD, 2012).



***Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*** is a highly accessible book that attempts to explain why similarly endowed countries diverge so dramatically. It integrates the best of economics, history and political theory to answer the question of why some nations are rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine (Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Crown Publishers, 2012).



## CHAPTER 2

# The EU approach to conflict and fragility

## 2.1 What lessons have we learned?

This section outlines the lessons learned from earlier EU support to fragile and conflict-affected states gathered from a series of recent evaluations as well as from other sources, including interviews with Delegations that are working in situations of conflict and fragility. These and other lessons learned are a source of reflection and have provided some of the context and rationale for recent adjustments and improvements in the EU approach.

### 2.1.1 Relevance of EU support

Evaluations generally find EU support as being highly relevant to situations of conflict and fragility, with high respect for national ownership. The EU is recognised

as having made a positive

contribution to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation in countries including Angola, Bolivia, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.

*'In emergencies, the theories and policies are the first to be lost. There is not enough time to adopt complex coordination arrangements or undertake detailed studies. These are needed but they have to be done before and continuously if they are to be effective.'*

*Discussion with Benoist Bazin and Zoe Leffler, Pakistan Delegation*

#### SUMMARY

- EU support is most relevant when objectives are realistic and shared across actors.
- EU support is most effective when it is tailored to the specific context — the analysis of which can be continuous — and when it is rooted in a comprehensive approach.
- EU support is most efficient when it builds on proactivity, creativity and coordination, and when it leverages the EU's recognised comparative advantages.

**EU support is most relevant when objectives are realistic and shared across actors.**

Defining what is meant by 'success' in situations of conflict and fragility helps to ensure that the goals of EU support, and its modalities, are suitable to the purpose. Evaluations of both the EU and other major actors that engage in situations of conflict and fragility almost always find that objectives were overly ambitious in too short a time frame. Objectives and time horizons are better defined in conjunction with the local stakeholders — state, non-state, national and local, and when societies are divided, preferably all of these if possible — and with other international actors. It is also best to factor in from the start the constraints associated with fragility and conflict — notably security, which limits fieldwork and adds to overhead costs — and limited national capacities. Expectations regarding timeliness and disbursement of funds need to be realistic.

### 2.1.2 Effectiveness of EU support

**EU support is most effective when it is tailored to the specific context, the analysis of which can be continuous.**


Pathways to recovery are rarely obvious, especially when the context is fast changing. For example, there are often trade-offs between the need to manage the effects of an ongoing crisis and the need to address the root causes of conflict: doing both can prove difficult when security, capacity and trust are in short supply. There are cases, however, where the EU has managed to do both. For instance, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, evaluations indicate that stakeholders generally recognised that on top of providing life-saving humanitarian assistance, the EU made the right choice of priorities to support towards preparing a two-state solution (2006) and that its contribution had been critical. Where the EU has been able to foresee crisis situations, it has been able to undertake analysis in advance.

In this way, when the time came for action, it was ready — for example, in Niger in 2012 where fighters from Libya threatened to destabilise large parts of the country.

Analysis does not need to hinder action if it is continuous from design to implementation. On the contrary, monitoring can serve as a management tool to correct the course as and when needed. Analysis that feeds into programme implementation is particularly important in the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, which remains a challenge for the EU.

**EU support is also most effective when it is rooted in a comprehensive approach**, integrating different activities, actors, time and geographical dimensions (Graph 2.1.1). The EU increasingly applies it, for example, in supporting the Occupied Palestinian Territories where efforts were made to continuously adjust approaches according to the latest information on the conflict situation, implement support through a multi-sector approach, involve all the major actors concerned and target geographically vulnerable areas. The EU has also made progress in taking a systemic approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, justice and security, and human rights, working through multiple sectors, with state and non-state actors, and using a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments. EU programmes increasingly focus on the security and justice system as a whole, rather than supporting individual parts, and increasingly anchor them in national security and justice strategies. Commission assistance helped in many cases to enhance institutional capacities within state security and justice bodies to deliver public services. For instance, the Commission's support to the criminal justice reform process in Georgia through the Sector Policy Support Programme (2009–13) has contributed to a shift in Georgia's criminal system from a punitive to a more liberal one. These and other experiences, however, reveal two issues that need constant attention.

**GRAPH 2.1.1 Comprehensive approach to support situations of conflict and fragility**



Source: ADE (2011).

- **Planning:** coordination between actors needs to go beyond the exchange of information and begin at the planning stage: What are the shared goals? What are the unique strengths of each actor?
- **Programming and implementation:** the concept of a comprehensive approach can easily get lost in operational translation: What are the activities best carried out jointly? Independently? What level of operational coordination is required?

While in some cases, the costs of operational coordination can outweigh its benefits (for example if slowing down response to an emergency situation), coordination at the planning stage is essential to effectiveness.

### 2.1.3 Efficiency of EU support

**EU support is most efficient when it builds on proactivity, creativity and coordination.** Evaluations generally rate the efficiency of EU support in situations of conflict and fragility as low, with much room for improvement. Improving support efficiency requires first and foremost a recognition that each situation is different. Also, creativity is needed in seeking solutions. A good starting point is for staff to put coordination arrangements in place that bridge the fragmented responsibilities among donors — and even within EU institutions — in responding to fragility and conflict. Situations of conflict and fragility also demand thinking 'outside of the box'; in this regard, good practices among EU Delegations note the following.



- Harnessing both financial and non-financial support (e.g. political and policy dialogue; technical assistance) can be valuable.
- There is value in engaging at different geographical levels of intervention (local, national, regional) — sometimes, the best entry points are not necessarily within the central government.
- Engaging with both state and non-state actors, preferably together, can provide opportunities for change.

Situations of conflict and fragility require additional resources and continuous development of more appropriate tools for support. The EU at Headquarters is investing in knowledge management, notably through training and [Capacity4dev](#) (see [Annex 4](#)), and is developing monitoring frameworks with indicators for operating in fragile contexts.

**EU support is most efficient when it leverages the EU's recognised comparative advantages.** The EU's comparative advantages enable it to add value to the efforts of others by drawing on its:

- credibility as an intergovernmental entity, with a negligible political profile and no tie to national interests;
- reliability, in terms of its continued presence and capacity to establish of long-term partnerships;
- representation of a critical mass of financial support;
- wide array of policies and instruments, including as a major trading partner with many fragile states;
- in-depth thematic experience in a range of fields that are pertinent to fragility and conflict-related issues.

The EU can add considerable value by emphasising these strengths, notably by playing a greater role than currently as a convener or co-convener in liaising with Member States to engage with one voice in political and policy dialogue with government, setting the policy agenda and/or coordinating priority sectors.

## 2.2 What is the EU approach?

The 2007 [Lisbon Treaty](#) and the 2011 [Agenda for Change](#) (EC, 2011) sharpened the EU's focus on situations of conflict and fragility. The Lisbon Treaty directs the EU to 'preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security'. The Agenda for Change charges it to 'allocate more funds than in the past to the countries most in need, including fragile states'. And a 2013 communication sets out the case for a comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis (EC and High Representative, 2013). In response to this guidance, and based on the lessons learned presented in [Section 2.1](#), the EU has fashioned a successful and cogent approach to engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, the key elements of which are summarised here.

### SUMMARY

- Coordinate and cooperate broadly and appropriately to ensure a comprehensive response.
- Enhance resilience.
- Use the right mix of financial instruments and tools.
- Develop, safeguard and support human resources.
- Ensure consistent, integrated Headquarters support.
- Make best use of EU comparative advantages.

**Coordinate and cooperate broadly and appropriately to ensure a comprehensive approach.** Building on lessons from experience, recent EU guidance (EEAS and EC, 2013) identifies a full range of issues that comprehensively need to be addressed regarding conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security under external cooperation instruments

and the range of responses available (Box 2.2.1). As well as being based on a thorough conflict analysis, a comprehensive approach implies working and coordinating closely with other development, diplomatic and security actors, including EU Member States and key EU entities — namely, DEVCO for development, the European External Action Service (EEAS) regarding political and security crises and/or the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) regarding humanitarian crises. A comprehensive response requires coordination of activities and actors (Graph 2.2.1) so that actions are well sequenced in time and minimise geographic overlaps and gaps. Coordination within the EU and between the EU and its partners and other development agencies is most effective at the planning stage. It is never too late to improve coordination, but coordination is usually easier and more effective early on, before implementation rigidities set in and differences in approach become pronounced. Coordination is particularly difficult in extreme emergencies, as there is little time to plan complex coordination arrangements carefully. Each situation is different. In acute cases, the United Nations (UN) is the default coordination agency. The Union Civil Protection Mechanism, described in [Section 2.4](#), is also available to facilitate a coordinated and swift response from the EU and Member States.

*'The EU should ensure that its objectives in the fields of development policy, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and international security are mutually reinforcing.'*  
EC (2011)

Coordination within the EU and between the EU and its partners and other development agencies is most effective at the planning stage. It is never too late to improve coordination, but coordination is usually easier and more effective early on, before implementation rigidities set in and differences in approach become pronounced. Coordination is particularly difficult in extreme emergencies, as there is little time to plan complex coordination arrangements carefully. Each situation is different. In acute cases, the United Nations (UN) is the default coordination agency. The Union Civil Protection Mechanism, described in [Section 2.4](#), is also available to facilitate a coordinated and swift response from the EU and Member States.

The recent communication on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis (EC and High Representative, 2013) sets out the following measures for ensuring a comprehensive response to a conflict or crisis.

- Develop a shared analysis within the EU and Member States.
- Define a common strategic vision based on the shared analysis.
- Focus on prevention.
- Mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU.
- Commit to the long term.
- Link EU policies with internal and external action.
- Optimise use of EU Delegations.

### BOX 2.2.1 Typical peacebuilding support measures for longer-term development

- Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants
- Control of small arms and light weapons
- Mine action programmes
- Peace mediation and dialogue
- Transitional justice measures
- Support to parliaments
- Support for elections
- Security sector reform

Source: EEAS and EC (2013).

**Enhance resilience.** Conflict, vulnerability and poverty are mutually exacerbating. In recent years, the frequency and severity of natural and human-made disasters — including those that are conflict-related — have increased, affecting the poor disproportionately. This trend is likely to continue given the impacts of environmental degradation, climate change and other factors (e.g. the outbreak of disease) that exacerbate poverty, fragility and vulnerability. To enhance resilience, external support harnesses the local resources of the people involved and contributes to the mitigation of the current crisis and the prevention of future ones:

... the EU's resilience approach recognises the need to address the root causes of crises, especially recurrent crises, chronic poverty and vulnerability and to take a long-term perspective which is firmly embedded in local and national policies and linked to complementary action at regional level. The approach incorporates a number of key components including: the need to anticipate crises by assessing risks; a greater focus on risk reduction, prevention, mitigation and preparedness; further efforts to enhance swift response to and recovery from crises (EU Council, 2013).

Moreover, the EU's approach to building resilience 'provides an opportunity to bring together political dialogue, humanitarian and development work and priorities in a comprehensive, coherent and effective approach to achieve better results on the ground' (EU Council, 2013). Best practice principles to promote resilience are summarised in Box 2.2.2, and an example is given in Box 2.2.3.

*'Resilience is the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects... Building resilience not only reduces suffering and loss of life but is also more cost effective.'*

EU Council (2013)

**Use the right mix of financial instruments and tools.** The EU has a wide range of financial instruments (Section 2.4) and tools (Section 2.5) to address fragility and conflict. Typically, these instruments and tools manage an immediate crisis and prepare the way for longer-term development actions. For **short-term security-related crises**, available instruments and tools include the IcSP and the launching of civilian and military CSDP crisis management missions and operations. In Africa, the EU supports African-led military interventions through the African Peace Facility to bring about peace. In **humanitarian circumstances**, ECHO uses the Humanitarian Aid Instrument to deliver immediate relief. These crisis-related instruments are geared for short-term use; it is essential that they be replaced with the longer-term instruments available to development cooperation.

#### BOX 2.2.2 Good practices in enhancing resilience

- Recognise that it is primarily the national government's responsibility to build resilience and define priorities.
- Develop, jointly and on an ongoing basis, well-informed, context-specific analysis.
- Build on a shared understanding between humanitarian and development actors and between the EU and its Member States and work in close cooperation with other bilateral and multilateral partners.
- Take a medium- to long-term perspective when planning: aim to tackle the root causes of frequent crises in order to prevent their recurrence.
- Invest in capacity strengthening across all relevant sectors and ensure that analysis and solutions are rooted in local ownership and the experience of affected communities, countries and regions.
- Ensure a gender- and child-sensitive approach, recognising the distinct rights, needs, capacities and coping mechanisms of women, girls, boys and men.
- Within the regions and countries most in need, focus on the most vulnerable households and marginalised groups through a comprehensive rights-based approach.
- Support lasting solutions for internally displaced people and refugee populations, in recognition of the need to increase the resilience of these vulnerable groups and host communities.
- Promote accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, including through the development of robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks and related measurement tools.

Source: EU Council (2013).

### BOX 2.2.3 The value of shared approaches in enhancing resilience: Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, the EU is taking a new approach to enhancing resilience: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE). Within the SHARE framework, resilience is being built in selected geographical areas that, in the past, have been regularly affected by drought and where humanitarian assistance has been intermittently provided. EU assistance in these areas includes support to productive activities, water, sanitation and hygiene, and nutrition and health, as well as capacity building for local actors. A longer-term presence in these areas is foreseen, enabling a quick shift from a predominantly humanitarian aid mode to a development mode, and vice versa, as required.

Because of SHARE, EU efforts to respond to the Ethiopian drought of 2011 — which affected 13 million people — benefited from work aimed at developing shared policies and approaches. This enabled a more effective and better coordinated transition from humanitarian to development assistance than had been possible in earlier crises. Led by the Government of Ethiopia, efforts by the EU, DFID, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and others to work coherently to enhance a commonly shared concept of resilience resulted in the provision of more efficient and effective support.

Source: DEVCO, [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/press\\_corner/0-0-0-africa-horn.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/press_corner/0-0-0-africa-horn.htm).

As noted earlier, coordination must occur during the planning stage. If coordination arrangements are not set in advance of the implementation stage, it is, at worst, too late or at best, much more difficult to bring disparate processes together. Especially in crisis situations, it is essential (i) that those involved are familiar with the relevant instruments, tools and procedures and (ii) that there is good communication up the chain of responsibility to ensure that obstacles and unforeseen challenges are dealt with as they occur.

**Develop, safeguard and support human resources, which are always the most important asset.** Providing flexible and quality support in situations of conflict and fragility places a huge demand on Delegation staff. Fast-track actions require intimate knowledge of and familiarity in using flexible procedures. The demands not only entail the level of workload but also tolerance of stress and the wide range of requisite skills. The EU has a variety of initiatives to share knowledge and experiences across staff and with Member States. The EU also undertakes skill audits and provides training programmes to improve staff management at all levels; develops staff knowledge and skills; and provides timely, coordinated and qualified support from Headquarters (Box 2.2.4). It is increasingly recognised that the difficulty of operating in fragile countries demands that only the best staff be deployed in Delegations affected by conflict. Each Delegation is responsible for ensuring the security of its personnel, establishing codes of conduct, and issuing timely and updated advisory notices.

#### **Ensure consistent, integrated Headquarters support.**


Within the EU, DEVCO, ECHO, EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) combine to provide one of the most specialised and comprehensive sources of support for field operations in the world. Their respective areas of responsibility in this regard are summarised in Graph 2.2.1. Annex 3 provides a more detailed organisation chart.

#### **Make the best use of the EU's comparative advantages.**

As outlined in Section 2.1, the EU has a comparative advantage in a number of identified areas. Exploiting these advantages, along with context analysis, should be a starting point for programming.

### BOX 2.2.4 Staff development for situations of conflict and fragility

The EU has set up a staff development strategy in the area of fragility and crisis management, comprising a wide range of specialised training courses. Since 2012, more than 200 people from both EU Headquarters and Delegations have been trained to address specific fragile and crisis situations. Training is delivered in a variety of formats, including a joint course with the European Security and Defence College, as well as an inter-agency workshop conducted in partnership with other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. A significant amount of the training is aimed at increasing Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid staff expertise on external and operational aid delivery methods in support of fragility and conflict-affected countries and regions, and on tools for addressing situations of conflict and fragility. Key resource materials used in these trainings are disseminated through the fragility and crisis management groups at [capacity4dev](#) and [learn4dev](#).

**GRAPH 2.2.1 Who does what at EU Headquarters on operating in situations of conflict and fragility?**

Source: ADE (2014); organisation is as of 15 September 2014.

## 2.3 What are the relevant policies?

**Policies provide practitioners with a guide for how best to react in complex or unexpected situations.**

Prescriptive approaches are rarely useful, particularly in the fast-changing contexts common in situations of conflict and fragility. EU policies related to fragility aim to help practitioners to be in a position to identify strategic and innovative solutions to unfamiliar and challenging situations. But as each circumstance is different, it is up to Delegations to translate the available policy and guidance to fit the particular context. Headquarters aims to support Delegations in tailoring new interventions with confidence and effectiveness. Policies and strategies evolve as lessons from the field emerge and innovative approaches are tested. An example of this evolution is the move towards a broader concept of resilience away from the linear approach of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD).

### SUMMARY

- Policies provide practitioners with a guide for how best to react in complex or unexpected situations.
- The EU has issued a number of policies and communications in response to the complexity of operating in situations of conflict and fragility.
- EU policies and communications are closely aligned to global policies and commitments, which provide a common platform for action.

**The EU has issued a number of policies and communications in response to the complexity of operating in situations of conflict and fragility.** There are generic policies that provide a wider framework but highlight the specificities of situations of conflict and fragility — for example, the Agenda for Change and the Lisbon Treaty (see [Section 2.2](#)). Graph 2.3.1 shows the evolution of current EU policies and communications, focusing on those most relevant to situations of conflict and fragility. Some focus primarily on security, humanitarian assistance and development; others are cross-cutting or geographically specific.

**EU policies are closely aligned to global policies and commitments, providing a common platform for action.**

As a signatory to the [Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles](#), [Fragile States Principles](#), the [New Deal](#) and the [Paris Declaration-Accra-Busan](#) package, the EU has largely contributed to these policies and commitments, as well as shaping the forthcoming post-2015 framework. Close alignment with global policies helps the EU to work constructively and effectively with Member States, multilateral organisations and countries in situations of conflict and fragility. Shared commitments, concepts and strategies at the global level ease the burden of coordination at the country and regional levels — and are particularly valuable in times of crisis when urgent, coordinated action is needed.

The EU's various global policies and commitments are summarised in Annex 2, but this section highlights three.

- The 2007 OECD [Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations](#) was drafted at a 2005 Senior-Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States. It reflects a growing consensus that fragile states require responses that are different from those for better-performing countries (Box 2.3.1). In this sense, they complement and inform the commitments set out in the Paris Declaration. Operational guidance to

### BOX 2.3.1 The OECD Fragile States Engagement Principles

1. Take context as the starting point (guidance [here](#)).
2. Ensure that all activities do no harm (guidance [here](#)).
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective (guidance [here](#)).
4. Prioritise prevention.
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives (guidance [here](#)).
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies (guidance [here](#)).
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts (guidance [here](#)).
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors (guidance [here](#)).
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance (guidance [here](#)).
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion ('aid orphans').



GRAPH 2.3.1 EU policy documents relevant to situations of fragility

	Security agenda	Development agenda	Humanitarian agenda	Geographic focus
<b>Pre-2007</b>	European Security Strategy (2003) EU Strategy WMD (2003) EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflicts (2003) Headline Goal 2010 (2004) EU Concept for ESDP SSR (2005) EU Strategy on SALW (2006) EU Concept for DDR (2006)	EC COM LRRD (1996 & 2001) EC COM EU Election Assistance and Observation (2000) Göteborg EU Programme (2001) EC COM Conflict Prevention (2001) EC COM Governance and Development (2003) EU Consensus on Development (2006) EC COM Governance in the European Consensus on Development (2006)	Council Regulation Concerning Humanitarian Aid (1996)	EC COM CPPB in Africa (1996) EC COM Europe & Asia (2001) Cotonou Agreement (2005) EC COM EU & Latin America (2005) Council Common Position on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa (2005)
<b>2007</b>	CC on New Civilian Headline Goal 2010 CC on Security and Development	CC: An EU Response to Situations of Fragility	Council Decision on Establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism	Africa-EU Strategic Partnership
<b>2008</b>	Council: EU Approach to Implement UN Resolutions on Women, Peace & Security Report on Implementation of European Security Strategy EC/EU HR Paper on Climate Change and Security		European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid — Action Plan	
<b>2009</b>		CC on Policy Coherence for Development Council: Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities	EC COM: EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction	EC COM: EU & Latin America
<b>2010</b>			CC on Role of Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid	2nd Revision Cotonou Agreement
<b>2011</b>		CC on Conflict Prevention	Implementation Plan of EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction	CC on EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel CC on Horn of Africa
<b>2012</b>	CC on Common Security and Defence Policy	CC: An Agenda for Change	CC on Future Approach to EU Budget Support in Third Countries	Joint COM EU-Pacific Development Partnership
<b>2013</b>	Joint EC/EU HR COM: EU's Comprehensive Approach to Conflict and Crises	EC COM: A Decent Life for All CC on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies CC on EU Approach to Resilience Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries	Council and Parliament Decision on Establishing a Union Civil Protection Mechanism	CC on Great Lakes Region
<b>2014</b>				EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

**Note:** To eliminate repetition, only Council conclusions (CC) are listed where a policy is also cited in a communication. All items are hyperlinked to the source document.

**Source:** ADE (2014).

sharpen donor strategies and programmes in situations of conflict and fragility has been developed by different donors. The principles are also being used in evaluations (see e.g. the 2014 Burundi [evaluation](#)) and to review [collective donor engagement](#) in some countries.

- The 2011 [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation](#) reiterates some of the principles of aid effectiveness — notably national ownership, a focus on results, using partnerships for development, and transparency and shared responsibility. It also agreed on action points to accelerate progress (Box 2.3.2). It includes sub-sections on ‘Promoting sustainable development in situations of conflict and fragility’ and ‘Partnering to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability in the face of adversity’. See [EU Common Position for the HLF4, Council Conclusions](#).
- The 2011 [New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States](#) is a notable breakthrough in putting the voice of fragile states and their people at the heart of country-led peace- and state-building solutions. Participating in this New Deal are the [g7+](#) group of 20 countries in situations of conflict and fragility (Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and the Republic of Yemen) and their development partners (Graph 2.3.2).

#### BOX 2.3.2 The Busan commitments that most relate to fragility

1. Use results frameworks as a common tool, and use country-led coordination arrangements.
2. Use country public financial management systems as the default option for development financing, and support the strengthening of these systems where necessary.
3. Agree on principles to tackle the issue of countries that receive insufficient assistance ('aid orphans').
4. Provide recipient countries with indicative three- to five-year-forward expenditure plans.
5. Increase support to parliaments and local governments.
6. Step up efforts towards gender equality, including disaggregation of data by gender and establishing gender-specific goals.
7. Recognise the fundamental contribution of South-South and triangular cooperation to sustainable development.
8. Recognise the role of aid as a complement to other sources of development financing, since aid on its own cannot break the poverty cycle.

*'We as fragile states must define our own unique pathways out of fragility with support from our international partners. Country-owned and -led peacebuilding and state-building is at the heart of these transitions from fragility.'*

Amara Konneh, Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs, Liberia

The New Deal emphasises

tailoring responses to the individual country context. It builds on three interconnected pillars (Graph 2.3.3), a coherent and comprehensive set of actions that seek to address legitimacy, security, justice, employment and livelihoods as well supporting revenue management and capacity building for fair service delivery. In particular, the New Deal recognises the central role of jobs and growth — which are often seen as an agenda for 'later', after things are stabilised. The New Deal posits that jobs and growth are central to consolidating peace.

The New Deal is being piloted in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste. The EU has expressed its commitment to being a partner in New Deal implementation and to join Australia's efforts in Timor-Leste.

*'Without peace our nations cannot deliver services that are needed to rise from poverty, and without people building strong state institutions to deliver these services, we cannot maintain peace.'*

Mustafa Mastoor, Deputy Finance Minister, Afghanistan



GRAPH 2.3.2 New Deal endorsing organisations and countries




Source: New Deal, 2014.

GRAPH 2.3.3 The three pillars of the New Deal


THE **NEWDEAL** CREATES CHANGE BY...

Addressing what matters most for the 1.5 billion people affected by conflict and fragility



Source: New Deal, 2014.

### 2.3.1 Resources on EU policies



**The Agenda for Change** aims to adapt the way that the EU delivers aid in a fast-changing environment: it re-prioritises aid delivery to ensure maximum impact on poverty reduction. The document states two priorities on which the EU should concentrate its development cooperation: (i) human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance; and (ii) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. The EU must seek to target its resources where they are needed most to address poverty reduction and where they could have the greatest impact. In all regions, it should allocate more funds than in the past to countries most in need, including fragile states. A [short video](#) presents the Agenda for Change.



**Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation** is the outcome document of the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011. The result of an inclusive year-long process of consultation, it benefited from the support of a broad range of governmental, civil society, private and other actors. The document sets out principles, commitments and actions that offer a foundation for effective cooperation in supporting international development. Among the topics covered are promoting sustainable development in situations of conflict and fragility, and partnering to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability in the face of adversity. Key messages are summarised in the [EU Common Position for the HLF4, Council Conclusions](#).



**A Decent Life for All: Ending Poverty and Giving the World a Sustainable Future** sets out a common EU approach to the post-MDG framework (2016–30). This 2013 communication of the European Commission (EC) identifies five priorities that are seen as the building blocks of a decent life for all, one being peace and security. In this regard, the communication notes that, ‘Where there is physical insecurity, high levels of inequality, governance challenges and little or no institutional capacity, it is extremely difficult to make sustainable progress on the key MDG benchmarks’.



**The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States** summarises the agreement between the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding — comprised of the g7+ group of 20 countries in situations of conflict and fragility, development partners and international organisations. The New Deal defines a global approach that supports fragile and conflict-affected countries in preparing and taking the necessary steps that lead to transformation from fragility to development. The document frames implementation of the New Deal between 2012 and 2015 as a trial period. It provides details on the three pillars of commitment: (i) peacebuilding and state-building goals, (ii) a focus on engagement to support country-owned and -led pathways out of fragility and (iii) mutual trust and strong partnerships between countries and their international partners.

## 2.4 What EU financial instruments are available?

A variety of EU instruments channel finance. Each of these has its own regulations and procedures (Table 2.4.1).

**Traditional instruments should be used with a fragility and conflict-sensitive lens, where possible.** The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument include special measures and flexible procedures in case of declared crisis to allow for quick response. It is important that annual and multi-annual programming under these instruments takes full account of the opportunities to contribute constructively

in situations of conflict and fragility (see [programming instructions for situations of conflict and fragility](#)). An example from the Occupied Palestinian Territories is given in Box 2.4.1, and an example from Somalia is in Box 2.4.2.

### SUMMARY

- A variety of EU instruments channel finance.
- The traditional instruments can be used with a fragility and conflict-sensitive lens.
- There are specific instruments for situations of conflict and fragility.
- The mix of instruments available allows for a comprehensive, flexible and sequenced approach.

#### BOX 2.4.1 Conflict-sensitive programming in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

The EU supported the two-state solution mainly through (i) strengthening the Palestinian Authority, considered critical for its viability; (ii) support for rule of law (police, criminal justice), considered essential for ensuring security; and (iii) support for economic and social cohesion with a view to preventing violence. An independent evaluation found that:

- conflict sensitivity was mainstreamed into the programming: all support could be seen as aimed at contributing to conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
- the programming was flexible (a specific and innovative instrument was swiftly created to deal with a crisis situation) and was geared to the transition to the long term and supportive of regional stability through assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency;
- the programming succeeded in building in coordination from the start, by targeting geographically vulnerable areas characterised by acute need and a gap in support from other donors and by being sensitive to the requests of non-governmental organisations to extend support to other zones.

**Source:** Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building: Final Report.

#### BOX 2.4.2 Flexibility in practice: Somalia

The EDF is the largest funding source available to the EU Somalia Mission. It has been used, where possible, to fund the mission's operational needs (e.g. to hire staff through project funding, or to pay for staff security coverage when in Somalia) that were not otherwise covered by the mission's budget. The mission and ECHO jointly advocated for innovative rules in order to be able to explore synergies between their activities and to use funds allocated to Somalia beyond country borders — for example, for the EDF-funded education programme in the Dadaab refugee camp for Somalis in Kenya. The instrument's flexibility thus enabled responses to be adapted to circumstances.

**Source:** EC, 'Enhancing the contribution of EU external assistance to addressing the security-fragility-development nexus'.

**There are specific instruments available for situations of conflict and fragility.**

- The **IcSP** has a short-term component to contribute to stability in partner countries where there is an ongoing or emerging crisis and a long-term component to contribute to the prevention of conflicts; ensure crisis preparedness and build peace; and address global, transregional and emerging threats. The bulk of IcSP funds aim at financing short-term crisis response interventions that can be mobilised faster than under other instruments and can bridge the gap until longer-term actions can be put in place. Up to EUR20 million can be released without management

TABLE 2.4.1 EU instruments

Instrument	Main purpose	Coverage
<b>General geographically related instruments</b>		
European Development Fund (EDF)	Supports actions in three key areas for cooperation: economic development, social and human development, and regional cooperation and integration.	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and Overseas Countries and Territories
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	Increases the effectiveness of EU development cooperation as it replaces a wide range of geographic and thematic instruments. Covers three components: (i) geographic programmes; (ii) thematic programmes including food security, asylum and immigration; (iii) programme of accompanying measures for the EU sugar regime.	Latin America, Asia and Central Asia, the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq and Yemen) and South Africa; all developing countries; 18 African, Caribbean and Pacific Sugar Protocol countries
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)	Contributes to strengthening bilateral relations with partner countries in areas such as democracy and human rights, the rule of law, good governance and sustainable development. Builds on the achievements of the former European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).	European Neighbourhood
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)	Enhances the efficiency and coherence of aid via a single framework to strengthen institutional capacity, cross-border cooperation, economic and social development, and rural development.	EU candidate countries
<b>Others applied in situations of conflict and fragility</b>		
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)	Enables the EU to address the full spectrum of conflict, from conflict prevention and crisis response to the promotion of stability and post-conflict peacebuilding. Boosts the EU's own capacities for responding to conflict and for building the capacity of key partners such as the UN and CSOs.	Global
Humanitarian Aid Instrument	Provides emergency assistance to victims of natural disasters, outbreaks of fighting or other comparable exceptional circumstances.	Global
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	Helps civil society become an effective force for political reform and defence of human rights. Focuses on sensitive political issues and innovative approaches.	Global
<b>Other</b>		
Transition compact	Both an instrument and a process enabling agreement to be reached between national and international actors on priority action in a post-conflict situation. Has an explicit financing strategy through a mix of funding sources and instruments.	Global; first compact done in Somalia
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	Aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to act jointly through the development of civilian and military capabilities in conflict prevention and crisis management.	Global
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)	An integral part of CFSP, it offers a framework for cooperation within which the EU can conduct operational missions aimed at peacekeeping and strengthening international security. The missions rely on civil and military assets provided by Member States.	Global
Union Civil Protection Mechanism	Facilitates close coordination of the EU and Member States' response to disasters, with a focus on protection of people and environment.	Global; operates both within and outside the EU
Thematic programmes	Promote and test innovative thinking and provide fresh policy input into geographical cooperation. Serve as vehicle for approaches that do not fit within the historically determined boundaries of the EU's regional programmes and for global action.	Global

committee approval. Such short-term interventions may have a maximum duration of 18 months but can be extended up to 30 months. The IcSP is designed for urgent intervention to initiate and complement actions financed under humanitarian, development and security instruments. It is a powerful instrument requiring close coordination with other longer-term assistance programmes to ensure a smooth transition from the IcSP to those programmes.

- The **Humanitarian Aid Instrument** covers short-term relief, disaster prevention and recovery operations. Unlike the IcSP, there is no time limit for the duration of the instrument. The procedures are flexible, with emergency humanitarian decisions up to EUR3 million being delegated to ECHO.
- The **European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)** works with civil society organisations (CSOs) and intergovernmental organisations that implement international mechanisms for the protection of human rights. There are also other instruments and budget lines such as for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (non-military) and CSDP missions.
- The **Union Civil Protection Mechanism** facilitates close coordination of EU and Member State responses to disasters, with a focus on protection of people and the environment. It operates both within and outside the EU.

**The mix of instruments available allows for a comprehensive, flexible, sequenced approach.** Development-related instruments such as the DCI and the EDF rely on multi-year programmes, thus enabling a longer-term perspective. Where needed in acute situations of conflict and fragility, they are complemented by humanitarian and security instruments. Working closely with its partners, the EU can use its array of instruments to prevent conflict and humanitarian disaster and lead a process of transition to stability, security and lasting development. Each situation is different, and the appropriate response greatly depends on Delegation staff skills, knowledge and experience in using the available instruments to their full potential.

**Each instrument can be more flexible than it appears to staff.** Examples include the use of annual programming, or programming over two years (instead of the Multi-year Indicative Programme's seven), such as in Yemen (2013); changing focal sectors during implementation of Multi-year Indicative Programmes, as in Lebanon (2013); and reallocating programmed funds between focal areas.

**There is also the possibility of using specific, flexible procedures.** The longer-term development instruments such as the EDF and the DCI allow the use of flexible procedures to enable fast procurement and engagement of service providers. Although flexible procedures can be much swifter, they require clear justification and preparation. Experience in some countries shows that without great familiarity with normal procedures, flexible procedures can actually take longer. They also depend on flexible decision-making at higher levels. A risk-averse approach can work against the use of flexible procedures. Some points of good practice from the field are shown in Box 2.4.3. Part II provides some examples of where flexible procedures have worked as intended and some lessons learned on how to avoid problems. The 2013 [programming guidelines](#) encourage more flexibility, especially in situations of conflict and fragility. For example, the Delegation in Zimbabwe is using a two-year planning horizon to allow changes in the programme. While this introduces flexibility, it also increases the programming work.

#### BOX 2.4.3 Good procurement practice in situations of conflict and fragility: Voice from the field

- Don't be afraid to initiate any procurement procedure as per normal guidelines: maintain a professionally high standard.
- Never compromise on the basic principles: fair competition, full transparency, equal treatment: stay ethically 'top quality'.
- Ensure that your selection and award criteria are smart, objective and measurable: be crystal clear.
- Don't hesitate to organise explanatory sessions: keep smiling.
- Make sure that your required documentation to support the criteria's compliance match your local market: keep it simple.
- Always get a deal within a reasonable time frame: keep it speedy.



**Source:** Michel De Knoop, Afghanistan Delegation.

## 2.5 What EU tools are available?

There are a variety of EU tools specifically developed for use in situations of conflict and fragility. Table 2.5.1 lists several of these, along with other useful tools for assessing and responding to developments in situations of conflict and fragility. These include guidelines for ensuring that programming is responsive to fragile and conflict-affected situations, a conflict early warning system (under development), mediation and dialogue, and conflict analysis.

Tools for context and cross-cutting analysis can be used through a conflict lens. The Development and Cooperation in Actions guidelines point to a number of core tools that are obligatory or recommended for budget support and sector-based approaches such as policy analysis, risk management, stakeholder analysis, and capacity assessment and development. These are complemented by more specialised tools such as environmental and climate assessments, and gender assessments. The EU is also developing a conflict early warning system tool (Box 2.5.1). In all cases, these tools can be used with a

conflict-sensitive lens. For example, capacity assessments can examine which stakeholders in a conflict situation have the potential for making transformational change; gender assessments can determine how to provide best protection to women, who are usually most at risk in situations of conflict and fragility, and take advantage of their capacity to mobilise for peace. Beyond the EU there are a wide array of tools used by other development agencies and actors; these can be particularly valuable where the EU is harmonising its efforts with others.

Tools often need to be used under time and information constraints. The most common obstacles to the effective use of tools and ensuring a robust context analysis are severe time, resource and information constraints. Actions are often required urgently with limited time for in-depth context analysis. Additionally, context analysis in situations of conflict and fragility is usually more time consuming than in stable countries because information is scarce and the

### S U M M A R Y

- There are a variety of EU tools for use in situations of conflict and fragility.
- Tools for context and cross-cutting analysis can be used through a conflict lens.
- Tools often need to be used under time and information constraints.
- Conflict analysis is a key tool for improving the relevance and quality of EU support.
- Harmonise analysis with other development partners.
- Use the context analysis to design actions that are simple and robust.
- Adapt budget support modalities to the context.

### B O X 2.5.1 The EU Conflict Early Warning System

The EU is developing a Conflict Early Warning System to promote a common understanding of medium- to long-term risks and identify priority actions across relevant EU services — diplomacy, security, development and, when appropriate, humanitarian assistance, justice and migration — at Headquarters and on the ground. It will be rolled out by the end of 2014 and is envisaged as follows.

- A composite index will help the EU to identify and rank the countries most at risk of violent conflict in the next two years.
- EU Delegations around the world take the lead in assessing the risk for violent conflict to occur based along 10 broad categories ranging from human rights to the economic or regional situation, using a checklist of structural risks of violent conflict. EU Special Representatives, the EC, the EU's civilian and military missions and operations present in countries, as well as Member States are invited to contribute inputs and insights. The Conflict Early Warning System has been piloted in the Sahel and Central Asia, and is meant to be applied every six months to ensure that the analysis is current and the programming relevant.
- Following this initial, checklist-based assessment, Country Conflict Risk Reports analyse long- and short-term risks and identify options for action. A regional lens is also applied in most cases. This is led by EEAS, and involves the Commission and EU Delegations.



underlying circumstances are complex and subject to rapid change. Using analysis done by other development agencies or trusted partners can help where available. A more continuous approach with light analysis during programming and formulation is also sometimes possible, with more in-depth analysis being pursued during implementation. The EU has developed a light conflict analysis tool.

The EU has rich experience as an actor in mediation and dialogue, including positive contributions in Kosovo, the Philippines, Indonesia (Aceh), Kenya and Georgia. EU actors, especially EU Special Representatives, EU Delegations and CSDP missions, are frequently engaged in mediation efforts, engaging at a high political level and providing political facilitation and confidence building. The EU is also active in dialogue processes with CSOs at the grassroots level, in particular the IcSP. A dedicated Mediation Support Team within EEAS supports geographic services, EU Delegations, EU Special Representatives and EEAS senior management in taking decisions in these matters. It offers coaching and training in mediation, promotes knowledge sharing, supports the conception and implementation of EU mediation, and helps to deploy internal and external experts on a short-term basis.

**Conflict analysis is a key tool for improving the relevance and quality of EU support.** Conflict analysis can be initiated by the EU Delegation and head office structures and/or CSDP engagement. It helps the EU to understand what can be done within the constraints — even if in many cases the EU is not in a position to change the constraints and many of the underlying causes of conflict.

All engagement in a conflict setting is likely to have an effect on the conflict. Conflict analysis seeks to understand how negative impacts can be eliminated and positive impacts increased. Well-meaning support for reform can increase the dependency of some groups and the power and patronage of others. A late response — for example, because of concerns over fiduciary risk — can lead to missed opportunities for conflict transformation. Support will need to address the causes of conflict so that a transition from conflict to stability and lasting peace and development can take root. The EU can apply significant leverage with its combination of instruments that have a diplomatic, development, humanitarian and security nature (both civilian and military). But their use needs to be well coordinated and guided by an insightful conflict analysis. EEAS and DEVCO have developed a [Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis](#).

**Harmonise analysis with other development partners.** Many tools and types of analysis are available and have been developed and used by other partners. It is important that the EU and its partners (both government and non-state actors as well as other development partners) share and agree on the findings and implications of conflict and other analysis so that actions are compatible and can be coordinated. Given the difficulty, time delay and expense in carrying out context analysis, the EU is open to using the analysis of others or undertaking joint analysis where possible. A [useful reference guide](#) to different approaches to conflict analysis is available from the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium.

**Use context analysis to design actions that are simple and robust.** A surprising conclusion of some assessments (Hellman, 2013) is that projects in situations of conflict and fragility are often more successful than those in more stable countries. A major contributory reason is that in situations of conflict and fragility, more time and resources have to be spent on understanding the context, which in turn leads to better conceived and prepared projects. Another factor is that the difficulties of operating in situations of conflict and fragility lead to the design of projects that are simpler and have more realistic objectives.

**Adapt budget support modalities to the context.** The 2011 [Communication on Budget Support](#) acknowledges the specificities of situations of conflict and fragility, and the 2012 [Budget Support Guidelines](#) provide for an innovative form of budget support aimed at situations of conflict and fragility: state-building contracts. For many fragile states, national partners are unlikely to live up to all the requirements of normal budget support, but in some circumstances there is still a good case for providing budget support to build up key functions. Such functions could include the police and civil service so that security and essential services are delivered which serve to underpin a legitimate but still emerging government structure. The 2012 Budget Support Guidelines (see especially [Annex 9](#)) and examples in Part II give more details on the eligibility conditions and how state-building contracts can be used in an innovative and far-reaching modality for some, but by no means all, situations of conflict and fragility. As experience is gained on the use of state-building contracts, the EU will adjust and extend or restrict the modality accordingly.

TABLE 2.5.1 A selection of EU tools available to staff: strategic, core and specialised

Tool	Main purpose	Reference
Developed by the EU specifically for fragile states		
Conflict Analysis	Facilitates informed choice through articulating a comprehensive approach to the EU's objective of preserving peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security.	<a href="#">Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis</a>
Checklist for root causes of conflict	Supports the in-depth and continuous monitoring of conflict.	EC checklist (2001)*
EU Conflict Early Warning System	Promotes a common understanding of medium- to long-term risks. Identifies priority actions across relevant EU services: diplomacy, security, development and, when appropriate, humanitarian assistance, justice and migration, at Headquarters and on the ground (in development).	EC checklist (2001)*; <a href="#">Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention</a> (2011)
Core tools developed by the EU for context assessment identification and formulation		
Risk Management and Assessment	Analyses the risks and the risk level with regard to the achievement of objectives. Identifies and defines the means of mitigating and minimising risks and their potential impact. Actively monitors and reports changes in risk level and the advent of new risks and defining adjustment of related mitigation measures.	<a href="#">Project Cycle Management Guidelines</a> (2004) and <a href="#">Budget Support Guidelines</a> (2012)
Stakeholder Analysis	Identifies key stakeholders and target groups (notably those outside the government sphere) and their mandates, interests and roles. Provides elements of political economy analysis and possibility untapped capacities, allowing better understanding of opportunities for or constraints to change.	
Specialised tools developed by the EU for context assessment		
Gender Impact Assessment	Examines policy proposals to see whether they will affect women and men differently, with a view to adapting these proposals to ensure that discriminatory effects are neutralised and gender equality promoted.	<a href="#">EU Gender Toolkit</a> (2004)
Environmental and Climate Assessments	Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): identifies the key potential impacts on the environment and proposes mitigation measures to integrate in project design.  Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA): analyses the environmental and climate change aspects (potential risks and opportunities) associated with a government's policy, plan or programme.  Climate Risk Assessment (CRA): identifies climate risks that may affect the success of an intervention and develops appropriate responses.	<a href="#">Guidelines on the Integration of Environment and Climate Change in Development Cooperation</a> (2011)
Tools issued by or in partnership with others		
Fragility Assessment	Identifies drivers of fragility and priority actions for the New Deal's five peace-building and state-building goals. Informs the design of national development plans, as well as compacts with international partners to support plan implementation.	<a href="#">Progress Report on Fragility Assessments and Indicators</a>
Post-Conflict Needs Assessment	Maps the recovery and reconstruction priorities of a country emerging from conflict or facing conflict-related crises. A post-conflict needs assessment aims at stabilisation and transition towards peacebuilding and development; its components should both consolidate peace and mitigate against a return to conflict-related crises. The assessment usually includes both assessment of needs and prioritisation and costing of needs.	<a href="#">Post-Conflict Needs Assessment</a>
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment	Determines the needs of a country or territory after it has been affected by a natural disaster event. Maps the post-disaster economic, social, environmental and human development needs; and broadly encompasses the gap analysis between pre-existing and post-event conditions. Leads to a recovery strategy that enables the preparation of a post-disaster recovery framework addressing reconstruction of disaster-affected assets and recovery of economic and social flows.	<a href="#">Post-Disaster Needs Assessment</a>

\*Only available for internal staff.



## 2.5.1 Resources on the EU approach



**Addressing Conflict Prevention, Peace-Building and Security Issues Under External Cooperation Instruments: Guidance Note** seeks to raise awareness among the responsible EEAS (including EU Delegations) and EC staff about the need to ensure that building peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security are adequately included in EU external cooperation instruments. The document is structured around practical questions, including, ‘Are there specific policy documents or guidelines on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security issues?’ and ‘Whom should I contact if I need support?’ (EEAS and EC, 2013).



**The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises** sets out key policy principles for action to help vulnerable communities in crisis-prone areas to build resilience to future shocks. Drawing on experiences in addressing recurrent food crises — mainly in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel — and with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of EU responses, the communication recognises that strengthening resilience lies at the interface of humanitarian and development assistance. It proposes 10 steps to increase resilience, including focusing on more flexible funding and donor coordination. Although based on lessons drawn from food security crises, the approach is applicable to other types of vulnerability, notably disasters, climate change and conflict (EC, 2012).



**EU Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Challenges and Opportunities** analyses the strengths and weaknesses of current EU engagement in fragile states — particularly its support to conflict prevention and periods of transition within the broader international context. It examines the limitations of the instruments and methods implemented by the EU to address the problems of fragile states and identifies what could be done to improve them. The study concludes with seven recommendations (Directorate-General for External Studies, European Parliament, Brussels, 2013).



**Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action** seeks to analyse how EEAS and the EC can better work to preserve peace, prevent conflict and strengthen international security using a comprehensive approach. Conflict analysis contributes to making an informed choice in articulating the EU comprehensive approach across a wide range of mechanisms and tools. The document is structured around practical questions such as, ‘What constitutes EU conflict analysis?’ and provides key ‘who, when and how’ information (EEAS and EC, no date).



**Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, 2nd edition** supports the development of a common and shared European security culture. Designed for CSDP training purposes, it offers an overview of the CFSP/CSDP, specifically its current status, structures and policies. This second edition of the handbook was necessitated by the evolution of the CFSP/CSDP, especially after the Lisbon Treaty. An important addition is the relationship between international security and climate change (Jochen Rehrl and Hans-Bernhard Weissert, eds., Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, Vienna, 2012).



**Handbook for Decision Makers: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union** aims at supporting leadership training for staff involved in the decision-making process. This training material focuses on the CFSP/CSDP, recruitment and skills for leadership positions and the principles of EU engagement as well as geographical and horizontal approaches (Jochen Rehrl, ed., Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, Vienna, 2014).



**Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions (PRAG)** explains the contracting procedures that apply to all EU external aid contracts financed from the EU general budget and the EDF. For information on flexible procedures, see the negotiated procedure subsections for service, supply and works contracts (Subsections 3.2.4.1, 4.2.5.1 and 5.2.5.1, respectively).



PART II

# Practical guidance notes



## NOTE NO 1

# Analysing context to tailor support in situations of conflict and fragility

## Topic overview

**Doing business as usual won't deliver results** in any developing country, and in fragile and conflict-affected states, it can easily do harm — or backfire. On top of the in-depth country knowledge that staff should acquire, context analysis helps EU staff to:

- understand the causes of conflict and fragility;
- anticipate events unfolding on the ground in this light;
- identify priorities for EU support and opportunities for transformation;
- identify the modalities of EU support that best suit the context;
- when analysis is conducted jointly with partners (other donors, national counterparts, CSOs, etc.), share our understanding, approach and objectives.

**'You need to take a long-term and systemic approach to the situation you are trying to operate in to have any chance of success.'**

*Micha Ramakers, Geo-Desk Afghanistan*

**EU programmes and projects are all, in theory, underpinned by analysis** of the strategic context; the partner country's priorities; the EU's policy objectives, past experience and areas of strengths; and other donors' involvement; etc. (e.g. see the [Instructions for the Programming of the 11th EDF and the Development Cooperation Instrument 2014–2020](#), templates for annual action plans and templates for identification fiches and action fiches). However, it might be helpful to ask yourself the following at regular intervals.

### SUMMARY

- EU staff in situations of conflict and fragility often say that they have the instruments to do sound analysis, but not the time. However, even a quick desk review and annual one-day workshop can be hugely beneficial in recognising the main issues and opportunities for impact — and sharing this understanding across staff.
- Being clear and precise about what kind of analysis can best feed programme design and implementation can help transform this investment into development impact.
- Analysis is useful only if it is conducted in a participatory manner, involving heads of sections and project managers — rather than by a single champion or as an 'ivory tower' exercise.
- There is often good analysis available to draw from, and when it is not documented, people with some good knowledge can be brought in.
- Multiple sources and viewpoints will contribute to a more robust analysis.
- Ongoing light analysis is likely to deliver more value than a big one-off exercise.

at regular intervals.

1. Are the objectives and interventions in the multiannual indicative programmes (or of individual projects) critical for the country to transition out of fragility and conflict? (☐ Yes ☐ No)
2. Are the assumptions behind current programming explicit and still likely? (☐ Yes ☐ No)
3. Are the main risks and opportunities identified and taken into account? (☐ Yes ☐ No)
4. Are the objectives, assumptions, risks and opportunities shared across the Delegation staff and with Member States and like-minded donors? (☐ Yes ☐ No)

### BOX 1 How to detect fragility when everything seems 'normal': my experience in Mali



It is very important to identify fragility in order to be prepared. In Mali, donors did not want to see existing signs of fragility, such as the following.

- Shrinking control of the state over national territory. In Mali, between 2007 and 2012, the possibility of travel (both mission and tourism) was progressively reduced to less than 25 % of the national territory.
- Substantial, long-standing armed insurgency, combined with the State's lack of capability to counter it.
- Ineffective army and police.
- Ineffective, weak and corrupt government structures, including at the highest level, preventing effective and timely reactions against threats.
- Abnormal complacency and weakness at the top. In Bamako, three weeks before the coup, the president was molested in his own office by a group of unhappy soldiers' wives. Yet few people read this as a last warning before the putsch.
- Weak and divided civil society unable to unite and react over even a limited common agenda.

**Source:** Jérôme Le Roy, Head of Section Finance/Contracts, Delegation to Guinea, Former Head of Section Finance/Contracts, Delegation to Mali and Acting Head of Administration during the coup in Mali

If the answer to any of the above is no, then there is a need for analysis (either rapid or in-depth). Context analysis can also be triggered by specific events (Box 1).

This note aims to help EU staff **plan, conduct and use the analysis** that should help to tailor EU support to the particular dynamics at play, both positive (opportunities for reform, drivers of change) and negative (challenges, risks).

## Key issues

### Step 1. Plan the analysis

#### 1.1. Be clear about the internal purpose and parameters of the exercise

The idea is to ensure that the context is well understood, so that EU support is highly tailored to it, and therefore has the greatest impact. In other words, the idea is to 'think and act politically'. For this to happen, it might be useful to clarify the following:

- Why invest in analysis? Is this triggered by a particular challenge, or is it part of a quality control process? What are the politics around it?
- What analysis has already been done or is planned?
- Who is the champion or owner that will ensure that the analysis translates into programming?
- Can the time needed for analysis be carved out: i.e. is it, or is it not, a priority for staff, including the head of the Delegation and the head of cooperation?
- Who is the main audience for the findings?
- Is the timing right to feed into strategic thinking, planning and implementation?

- What partners should be brought in to maximise its impact?
- What is the level of effort to put into this? Should it be a light or in-depth analysis? The analysis can range from a small closed-door, one-day workshop to a longer process that includes a literature review, interviews, a survey and a multi-stakeholder workshop.
- Is there an agreed-upon process for follow-up once the analysis is complete? Should it be repeated every year, every other year, every four years?
- Where can resources (financial, intellectual, logistical, etc.) be found (Box 2)? For example, linkages can be made with the EU Conflict Early Warning System (under development).

#### BOX 2 Funding conflict analysis

Conflict analysis is not a costly exercise, but funding should nonetheless be set aside. Conflict analysis could be funded through current framework contracts, through mid-term or final reviews, through projects, through the IcSP or through EU Expert Facilities.

### 1.2. Identify the most appropriate process

- Is the region, the country, a district, a population group, a sector or a specific problem the focus of the analysis? Or, more likely, are several of these the focus? For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many analysts and donors find it difficult to know whether the primary focus should be on cross-border issues, on strengthening the state at the national level, or on micro-local governance issues. In a country as vast as this, resources cannot be dispersed on too many levels and sets of issues for too long.
- To what extent should the process involve Member States and other donors? There is much benefit to derive from analysis conducted jointly across development partners (which is not the same as analysis shared after the fact). Joint analysis can lead to a common understanding and agreement on the causes of conflict and fragility, and on the appropriate response.
- To what extent should the process involve national counterparts, civil society, the private sector, etc.? In fragile states, societies are often divided. Only by triangulating — i.e. combining multiple viewpoints and methods — can you hope to overcome the biases that come with a narrower approach. Therefore, the process is more robust if it is participatory, and makes a special effort to have a good sample of stakeholders across groups (government, parliament, civil society, local authorities, regional economic communities, economic elites and diasporas, etc.). Be sure to give voice to groups that are usually voiceless.
- Is the most useful framework to use elements of political economy analysis, [conflict analysis](#), [fragility assessments](#), scenario planning or the more traditional analysis of strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities (SWOT)? Multiple methods, when relevant, can help to overcome the bias of a single approach. Similarly, there are benefits in linking one of the above to a lighter monitoring system.

When 1.1 and 1.2 are clear, the terms of reference for the process can be drafted (see example in Box 3).

## Step 2. Conduct the analysis

### 2.1. Review existing material

At the outset of any analysis, there is generally a synthesis of the existing literature — which includes conflict analysis, elements of political economy analysis, academic studies, evaluations and scenario planning/outlook analysis. You do not have to start from scratch: there is often good analysis available to draw upon, and when it is not documented, people with good knowledge can be brought in. That said, multiple sources and multiple viewpoints will contribute to a more robust analysis. The ongoing research of PhD candidates can usefully complement that of more established go-to persons on a given country or theme.

### BOX 3 The Joint Peacebuilding Needs Assessment in Myanmar: a process that builds peace and is light and modular

In the context of the ongoing peace process, the Myanmar government requested support from the Peace Donor Support Group for a joint assessment of needs in armed conflict-affected border areas. Under the leadership of the Myanmar Peace Centre, a task force was established to develop the framework for such an assessment, which is to be carried out in cooperation with armed groups and other key stakeholders in ethnic areas. A desk review of existing information on activities, needs and gaps was undertaken in April 2013, subsequent to which the methodology for the assessment is being developed. To accommodate the complexity of the political process in Myanmar, the assessment will be modular, accommodating different time frames appropriate to different geographic areas. It will have a prime focus on peacebuilding, and aims to recognise the importance of assisting an equitable and inclusive planning process across former political divides.

## 2.2. Conduct interviews and group discussions

Ensuring that individual interviews and focus group discussions cover a wide spectrum of stakeholders (Box 4), sample questions (DFID, 2009) could include the following.

- Who are the key stakeholders? What are the formal/informal roles and mandates of different players? What are the relationships between these players, and the balance of power? To what extent is power — both economic and political — vested in the hands of specific individuals/groups? How do different interest groups outside government (e.g. private sector, NGOs, consumer groups, the media) seek to influence policy? How are decisions made?
- Once made, are decisions implemented? Where are the key bottlenecks in the system? Is failure to implement due to lack of capacity, lack of accountability or any other reason?
- What are the main sources of finance in this country/district/sector? How are they evolving over time?
- What is the past history of the country/district/sector, including previous reform initiatives? How does this influence current stakeholder perceptions, if at all?
- Is there significant corruption and rent seeking in the sector? Where is this most prevalent (e.g. at the point of delivery, procurement, allocation of jobs)? Who benefits most from this? How is patronage being used? Which are the actors with vested interests in reform and, conversely, in the status quo?
- Who are the primary beneficiaries of service delivery? Are particular social, regional or ethnic groups included/excluded? Are subsidies provided, and which groups benefit most from these?
- What are the dominant ideologies and values that shape views around the country/district/sector? To what extent may these serve to constrain change?
- Are there any key reform champions within the sector? Who is likely to resist reforms and why? Are there 'second best' reforms that might overcome this opposition?

### BOX 4 Analysing the context in the midst of crisis: the Central African Republic

At the height of the Central African Republic's renewed crisis in 2014, the EU (DEVCO, ECHO, EEAS) convened a workshop involving Member States, the World Bank and Central African Republic experts to conduct a joint analysis on humanitarian and development priorities and on fit-for-purpose support modalities. The workshop built on similar exercises (EU-Member States-OCHA and EU-UN) conducted a few weeks earlier. It helped in jointly identifying:

- priority needs, which are multi-sector, and cluster around job creation, food security and local development;
- priority geographic areas of focus (secondary cities);
- appropriate support modalities, chiefly the need to build the state — and the visibility of the state — in the provision of relief services, and the need for coordination in engaging with already saturated state administrations.




### 2.3. If needed, complement the interviews with a survey

This may provide less qualitative insights, but may allow for a greater sample of the population to be surveyed.

### 2.4. Make sure that the conclusions are clear and easy to understand

For example, represent causal relationships graphically as in Graph 1. Sometimes, analysis can remain very abstract, and it is hard to draw implications for EU support.

**GRAPH 1** A classic example of conflict analysis: the case of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda



Source: Homex-Dixon and Percival, 1998.

## Step 3. Use the analysis to shape EU support

Conducting the analysis is only half the challenge. Many context analyses are shelved and only marginally influence programme design or implementation. Here are some practical steps to ensure that analysis yields its intended value.

### 3.1. Input into programming


Armed with analysis, current or planned programmes and projects can be strengthened by the following.

- Validating (or revisiting) their objectives, checking to ensure the following:
  - ➔ They have the right level of ambition given the programme/project time scale and the country's present conditions. The EU is well positioned to address the root causes of conflict and fragility, and not only the symptoms thereof. The EU represents a critical mass financially and, through its ability to convene its Member States, is usually present for the long haul.
  - ➔ They are indeed critical to more resilient states and societies. For example, up to 2006, donors to Timor-Leste were focused on relations with the former occupying power, Indonesia. This was understandable as Timor-Leste

only restored its independence in 2002, but this led donors to miss the political and social tensions within the country, which boiled over and resulted in 30 people dead and 21 000 people fleeing the capital in 2006 and the return of UN peacekeepers (who had left in 2005).

- They have the right timing and sequencing. Staff in fragile situations often wonder: ‘What is the priority when everything is a priority?’ Needs can seem infinite and all are equally pressing. But, given the often volatile security and/or political situations and limited capacity, interventions frequently need to be sequenced to deliver results. For example, jobs and growth are always needed to sustain peace, especially when there is high population growth, as the cases of Burundi, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste illustrate, but the best way to contribute to that is generally through improving security, underpinned by a political settlement among former belligerents.
- Validating (or revisiting) their underlying assumptions, making them as explicit and precise as possible. Are they still reasonable and part of the most plausible scenario, given the newly gathered evidence? For example, in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the assumptions linking roads, work, security and poverty are made explicit and revised regularly (Graph 2).
- Has the analysis identified new areas of risk, as well as new opportunities on which to build? For example, what does the mix of population growth, unemployment and urbanisation mean for how to approach security in post-crisis countries such as Burundi, Sierra Leone or Timor-Leste? Does it mean a need to shift the focus from developing the army and police towards jobs and growth?

**GRAPH 2** An example of theory of change that is constantly revisited through recurrent analysis



Source: DFID, 2014.

### 3.2. Inform implementation of the programmes/projects

Analysis can not only inform what the EU can do, but also how the EU can provide support, i.e. budget support or project approach, use of country systems or an EU/internationally managed trust fund, etc. For example:

- Projects that target easy-to-access districts and employ trusted and educated local staff may contribute to increasing the gap between elites and excluded groups. This was summarised in Burundi by the local proverb: ‘it always rains in the same place first’.
- In Haiti, to boost private sector development, jobs and growth, it was recommended that support be given to creating a few islands of excellence in services and infrastructure rather than trying to systematically improve standards in every sector and province.
- In Timor-Leste, a sector reform contract for public financial management was deemed most appropriate to the context: governance foundations are in place, meaning that a state-building contract would not be appropriate; yet public financial management is a critical area for Timor-Leste to adopt pro-jobs and more pro-poor policies (see the Timor-Leste case study included in this note).

### 3.3. Plan how the analysis will be kept up to date

Situations of conflict and fragility usually evolve quickly, as the situation in Myanmar illustrates (see the Myanmar case study included in this note): a modest-scale analysis envisaged as an ongoing process is preferable to an ambitious one-off, tick-the-box exercise. Practical ways to ensure that analysis is an ongoing process include the following.

- Make analysis part of an annual team-building and/or strategic planning exercise, for example at the beginning of each year.
- Draw lessons from ongoing monitoring and regular evaluations. Every annual report or evaluation is an opportunity to take stock of whether EU support is on track to deliver its objectives — given fast-evolving situations.
- In fast-evolving, data-poor contexts, using innovative monitoring systems can also be very informative. For example, Internet- or SMS-based (short message service-based) systems are used to monitor electoral violence in Kenya, local governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and extreme poverty in Bangladesh.

## Additional resources

- EU, 2013, [Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action](#)
- g7+, 2012, [Fragility Assessment Methodology](#)
- EU, UNDP, World Bank, 2007. [Post-Conflict Needs Assessments](#)
- UK Department for International Development, 2010. [Analysing Conflict and Fragility](#)
- UK Department for International Development, 2009. [Political Economy Analysis](#)

## Case studies

### EU support tailored to the fast-evolving context of Myanmar

#### SOURCE

Manuel de Rivera and Vaclav Svejda, EU Delegation to Myanmar

EU support to the democratic transition in Myanmar since 2007 is an illustration of how a response can be tailored to a fast-evolving situation, seize windows of opportunity and support the fast pace of reform — while also upholding EU values.

It started with modest but targeted actions, using multiple angles, and gradually building trust with the government through solution-seeking dialogue. The use of available instruments has also evolved, from humanitarian aid to a 50-50 mix of country programming and thematic instruments, to a predominant use of country programming — and over time, increasing government involvement and leadership.

**The initial phase (1996–2006).** Until 2004, EC assistance to Myanmar was limited to humanitarian aid; then from 2004, it began to include development projects, based on strategic assessments and financed from a variety of budget lines. All development assistance was framed by the Common Position adopted in 1996 and strengthened and extended several times in view of the military regime's failure to make significant progress in areas of EU concern.

**The learning and piloting phase (2007–09).** The 2007–13 Country Strategy Paper focused on education and health. However, EIDHR funding was available to promote human rights and democratic participation through NGOs, although the terminology was adapted for the security of implementing partners. A first local call for proposals (EUR 600 000) was issued in 2009 as a 'good governance country-based support scheme' without reference to human rights, using 'fundamental freedoms' instead. Meetings were held with partners bilaterally, in trusted circles. Democratic governance and human rights work focused on sensitisation and documentation of rights abuse. EU support was provided remotely from Bangkok, with bi-weekly travel by EU officers and regular consultations with CSOs and local communities.

**Significant event: Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.** The international community responded with a massive aid effort, with the most significant contribution made by ECHO. The IfS (now IcSP) financed several comprehensive needs assessments and also supported the capacity development of journalists, future democratic and civil leaders, and NGOs in the areas of democracy, ethnic reconciliation, disarmament and demobilisation, and conflict-sensitive reporting. In addition, groups across ethnic nationalities were supported to discuss and overcome their differences and eventually stimulate dialogue with the central authorities and democratic opposition parties. Due to the political situation in Myanmar, many of those activities had to be conducted in Thailand.

**Scaling-up and sanctions lifted phase (2010–13).** While the country was still subject to sanctions, it embarked on a path of democratic transition. Following the 2010 elections, EU support scaled up significantly, but also became more proactive in the area of democratic governance and human rights. The EU worked with CSOs to help them work collaboratively with government, notably the National Commission for Human Rights and the Elections Commission, towards meeting international human rights and election standards. Particular emphasis was put on partnering with international NGOs to develop the capacities of local NGOs. The EU has also worked with the media, addressing discrimination issues, political parties and members of Parliament. Targeted actions were identified and financially supported in order to sustain the nascent democratic transition, as well as the peace process. By awarding direct contracts to key partners, the EU was able to respond quickly to emerging needs from various sides.

Based on the progress made in 2011–12, the EU Council suspended EU sanctions in April 2012. This was followed by increasing engagement at all levels in response to further political and economic reforms; in April 2013, EU sanctions were lifted altogether. The suspension of EU restrictive measures enabled the EU and Member States to engage directly with the government for the first time.

**Outlook (from 2014).** The 2013 Council Conclusions set out a Comprehensive Framework for the EU and Member States' policy and support to Myanmar for the next three years. With the lifting of sanctions in 2013, the 2007–13 Country Strategy paper is being relayed by a Joint Transitional Strategy Paper (joint with Member States) 2014–16 and a Multi-year Indicative Programme 2014–20, to take place in the context of normalised relations. These are underpinned by ongoing analysis, including elements of a political economy analysis conducted in 2012–13 and to be updated on a regular basis, given the fast pace of reform and ongoing challenges in the area of the peace process and discrimination. They are to focus on rural development, education, governance and rule of law, and peacebuilding. In the area of governance, the focus is likely to be on strengthening the capacity of key public institutions, the rule of law and access to justice, and the electoral cycle. The holding of general elections in 2015 will be another milestone in the democratic transition.

## Timor-Leste: a sector reform contract to support government ownership and public financial management

### SOURCE



Sonia Godinho and Vincent Vire, European Delegation to Timor-Leste; [Action Fiche](#), 2013

### CONTEXT

Since the restoration of its independence in 2002, and in spite of a major crisis in 2006, Timor-Leste has made substantial progress in setting up political, social and economic foundations for stability and economic growth. Since 2011, a Strategic Development Plan aimed at moving Timor-Leste towards upper-middle-income status by 2030 has been adopted and is primarily being financed through oil and gas domestic resources. Timor-Leste is also looking to strengthen regional integration and submitted a formal request to join the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in February 2011.

### CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

While governance frameworks are in place in the area of public financial management, policy implementation capacity is limited and budget execution remains low, hampering the country's ability to transform its current growth into development results for its fast-growing population.

### ACTIONS TAKEN

The EU aims to continue its support to the government's public financial management reform agenda but via an instrument more appropriate than a project approach: namely, a Sector Reform Contract to further strengthen country systems and ensure full national ownership.

The EUR 4 million, 2014–16 Sector Reform Contract focuses on improvement of taxation and customs systems in terms of their compliance with applicable regimes and maximisation of domestic revenue. It should also help in fulfilling the requirements needed for Timor-Leste's membership in ASEAN.

The contract is fully aligned with the country's public financial management action plan, as well as with the Budget Support financed by Australia, which is supporting implementation of the government's public financial management strategic plan through a performance-linked programme using country systems. It will also benefit from the World Bank's provision of analytic and advisory services to the Ministry of Finance.

The contract is expected to reinforce policy dialogue with the government in a vital sector for improvement of social service delivery and for achievement of the country's development objectives. The use of a Sector Reform Contract also confirms the EU's clear commitment to implementing the New Deal in Timor-Leste, joining efforts with Australia.

### LESSONS LEARNED

While it is too early to draw lessons, there is every indication that a Service Reform Contract is suited to the Timorese context: governance foundations are in place, making a state-building contract inappropriate; yet public financial management is a critical area for Timor-Leste to adopt pro-jobs and more pro-poor policies, execute its budget, and turn its current high growth into development results for ordinary citizens.

## Conflict analysis in Guatemala to inform new programming

### SOURCE



Birgit Vleugels, EU Delegation to Guatemala;  
Terms of Reference for the Conflict Analysis  
(2013); National Conflict Assessment (2014)

### COUNTRY CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Guatemala is a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual country with considerable economic potential. It has made progress since the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords, and its economic growth has been stable. Guatemala increased its social expenditure over the last decade, leading to progress on key indicators such as primary education coverage. Advances have been made towards a more accomplished democracy with free and fair elections and democratic change of power.

Nevertheless, important challenges remain. There are dramatic differences in income distribution between rural and urban areas. The country has not yet overcome its history of structural exclusion; and the state faces major institutional, social and economic challenges to achieve an equitable and inclusive society. Guatemala also features an extremely high — and growing — level of social conflicts. They are multi-dimensional, but often relate to questions of land tenure, natural resource management or labour conditions.

The justice system may not properly function to channel and resolve social conflicts. The country's existing dialogue, consultation and conflict resolution mechanisms have not been able to effectively address pressing social demands — a fact acknowledged by President Pérez Molina in the aftermath of the 2012 events in Totonicapán, when seven protesters were killed by the army during demonstrations.

### ACTIONS TAKEN

The EU-funded Programa de Fortalecimiento Institucional del Sector Juventud en Guatemala and the Project to Support Justice and security (SEJUST) address conflict transformation. However, on the eve of a new National Indicative Programme and Joint EU-Member States Strategy for Guatemala, more in-depth analysis is required to form a comprehensive picture of conflict mapping, nature and dynamics, and ensure that programming is conflict sensitive.

To this end, a conflict analysis was launched in October 2013 and delivered in December, involving the whole Delegation, EU ambassadors and experts. It produced a literature review, a national conflict analysis (main causes of conflicts, mapping of conflicts; analysis of the interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships of the main stakeholders; conflict dynamics; and policy implications), and proposals for conflict-sensitive engagement on the three proposed focal sectors for EU intervention.

The main outcomes were a common understanding across EU Ambassadors of the risks, and agreement on key principles and messages, and a fresh and up-to-date look on what is feasible and what is not.

## LESSONS LEARNED

- **People:** Substantive Delegation involvement and consultants with deep prior knowledge of country dynamics and access to the right stakeholders made the exercise valuable, and involving Member States compounded the value of the exercise.
- **Process:** Stakeholders wanted to influence the results. For this reason, the conflict analysis was not conducted with government or civil society, but independently and involving both. It was clear from the start which outputs would be public or confidential. Ideally, the analysis would be updated every 6–12 months.



## NOTE NO 2

# Programming flexibly for situations of conflict and fragility

## ADJUSTING, LEARNING, ADJUSTING

### Topic overview

Situations of conflict and fragility are subject to unstable and rapidly changing circumstances. As a consequence, programming has to allow for a higher degree of flexibility. The information base in fragile states is usually very weak. Programming needs to deal with a high degree of uncertainty. Consequently, it must make use of iterative analysis and assessment and be sufficiently flexible to deal with new information that can radically change the assumptions upon which the original programming was developed.

The mid-term review process provides a formal mechanism for changing a programme's direction, and this provides sufficient flexibility for most situations. But in other situations, the degree of instability is too great to rely on a mid-term review for adjusting the programming. Adaptation to change must be built in right from the start. The new EU programming guidelines allow for a shorter two-year programming period, which has been used in some countries such as Yemen and Zimbabwe (Box 1).

This topic note looks at the case of post-tsunami reconstruction assistance to Sri Lanka, which represented one of those situations where it was clear from the onset that a highly flexible approach to programming would be needed. In response, an innovative scenario approach was developed.

### SUMMARY

- Scenario planning can be used in programming and formulation documents to anticipate changes so the Delegation can respond more effectively in fluid conflict and fragile contexts.
- Programming should keep options open on the use and combination of different instruments — the swift use of the IfS (now the IcSP) can be particularly successful when facilitated by programming that foresees the potential need for combining various instruments.
- There is rarely enough information to make decisions and choices with full confidence. It is often necessary to engage in a more complex process whereby analysis and assessment is continuous to allow adjustment when circumstances change and/or new information and insight comes to light.
- Programming should set achievable targets and keep the level of ambition realistic.
- Programming under the Multiannual Financial Framework can facilitate EU support to established long-term objectives with the ability to change intervention strategies at short notice to best contribute to those objectives.

### Key issues

Issues and dilemmas that have arisen in trying to programme flexibly include the following.

- **Programming flexibly while keeping programmes simple.** Keeping programmes simple is key to their being flexible in practice, but it is not straightforward or easy to achieve this. Making programmes flexible often means leaving a number of options open — which usually tends to increase their complexity.
- **Seeking and making continual use of new information.** In areas that are fragile and affected by conflict, there is rarely enough time, information or insight to develop a full understanding of situations — or sometimes even to be confident about the choice of partners. The ideal of starting with a full assessment and then proceeding

### **BOX 1** Short-term programming in Zimbabwe: combining long-term programming objectives with short-term flexibility on intervention strategies

Aid programming for Zimbabwe up to now has been done on the basis of annual short-term strategies. This has allowed some space and flexibility for the Delegation to be able to change the strategy or adapt priorities to maximise the impact of its interventions. However, it was recognised that the short-term strategy concept should go further than simply putting the normal programming process on a shorter cycle — i.e. going through the lengthy programming process every year, including project identification, formulation and approval. It was also recognised that EU activities in Zimbabwe in most areas of engagement pursue long-term objectives that are unlikely to change on a yearly basis, although the modalities of engagement and intervention strategies may need to change, given the volatile political context.

There has been a gradual acknowledgement that a mixed short-term strategy and long-term National Indicative Programme approach is best suited for EU engagement in Zimbabwe in the present situation, i.e.: a longer-term strategy, with the built-in possibility of reviewing priorities, financial allocations and modalities on a yearly basis, if needed, or when circumstances require. The new Multiannual Financial Framework recently adopted by the EU has a number of innovations that could improve flexibility in programming and accelerate decision-making in crisis or post-crisis situations as and when needed.

**Source:** EC, 'Enhancing the contribution of EU external assistance to addressing the security-fragility-development nexus', Zimbabwe Mission report, 2013.

confidently towards programming is seldom possible in practice. It is instead often necessary to engage in a more complex process whereby analysis and assessment are iterative. These analyses must also take into account balanced assessments of the risks of responding where not enough is known and the risks of not responding at all.

- **Balancing a high degree of responsiveness with the pursuit of long-term development objectives.** Programming must be flexible enough to offer a high degree of responsiveness. Yet simply reacting to conflicts and turmoil is not enough. Programming is meant to provide the means of engaging in longer-term development aims and, where possible, mitigating root causes of fragility and conflict. It is not easy to achieve a balance between short-term needs and long-term development aims.

## Case study

### Sri Lanka: planning flexibly with the use of scenarios

#### SOURCE



Peter Maher, assisted by Karolina Hedstrom and Mariam Homayoun, EU Delegation to Sri Lanka

#### CONTEXT

In the post-tsunami context and at the time of programming, Sri Lanka's 25-year internal conflict was still ongoing. The country had suffered sporadic civil war since the early 1980s. Various national attempts failed to resolve the problem. After the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, conflict flared up again through the 1990s. A ceasefire agreement was signed in February 2002, but came under increasing duress from 2005 onwards.

A political settlement within a united Sri Lanka was the EU policy framework for all its aid, trade and political relations with the country. However, at the time of programming the ceasefire agreement looked unsustainable. There was an upsurge in violence, and the prospects for the peace process were gloomy. The years from 2002 to 2005 were known as the 'no peace — no war' period. The tsunami in late 2004 also had a devastating and destabilising impact on coastal communities. Full-scale war resumed in 2007 and ended with a violent government victory in 2009.

#### CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

One of the main challenges was how to programme support knowing that the situation of conflict was likely to vary considerably over the period. Conflict had been identified in earlier programmes as clearly the single most important obstacle to successful implementation of EC programmes and for the implementation of national development programmes. As a medium-income country, engagement in traditional development sectors was less relevant for Sri Lanka. The focus of EC assistance was on addressing conflict and conflict-affected communities from all three ethnic groups (Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim).

There was a difficult relationship with the government. Ceasefire violations by the government were documented by the international Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission as frequently exceeding that of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgents. Suicide bombing attacks by LTTE and government aerial bombardments ensured heavy civilian losses. Human rights violations soared. The murder by government forces of 16 aid workers of ACF — an international NGO — went unresolved. Criticism of the government was silenced by assassination, 'white-van' abductions and disappearances. Death squads reigned. In general, there was a lack of trust and it was difficult to work through official government agencies in much of the country. The use of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and later the IfS (now IcSP) was significant, as it allowed the Delegation to provide swift support to actors outside government institutions.

The conflict changed in 2006–07 as there was heavy fighting, particularly in the east while it was relatively calmer in insurgent-controlled areas in the north. But it was an uneasy calm, because all knew that if there was victory in the east, the conflict would turn to the north. From 2008, that is exactly what happened. The east became calmer and conflict became intense in the north. A geographic flexibility for delivery was thus needed to take advantages of periods of calm.

The listing of the LTTE by the EU as a terrorist group in 2007 made field-level implementation in LTTE-controlled areas more difficult. Subsequently, Sri Lanka's withdrawal from 'GSP+' — the enhanced generalised scheme of tariff preferences due to non-compliance with international conventions relating to human rights — deepened the animosity within the government towards the EU. The government believed that humanitarian, reconstruction and development aid resources had strengthened the LTTE. This had a further adverse impact on cooperation and added to the necessity of a flexible approach.

It was also considered important not to programme too pessimistically and find a means of responding to the opportunities offered by periods of relative peace where development work could be continued that might serve to mitigate if not address the root causes of the conflict. Close coordination with the ongoing work of ECHO was vigorously pursued for ensuring continuity of support throughout the cycle linking humanitarian, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction and through to development.

## ACTIONS TAKEN

- We first understood and took stock of lessons learned from earlier phases of cooperation.
  - ➔ Focusing support on stabilisation, peace and poverty reduction in the conflict-affected parts (north/east) — based on learning from earlier phases, it was decided to concentrate geographically instead of spreading too thinly.
  - ➔ Recognising that conflict moves over time — when one area is inaccessible due to conflict, another that might earlier have been under conflict may be relatively calm.
  - ➔ Being aware in the programming of how expensive and inefficient it can be to operate in a conflict zone — thus tempering the degree of ambition and the time scale for achievements.
  - ➔ Taking a flexible conflict-sensitive approach to delivery — recognising that ambitious integrated district development plans would not be feasible in all target districts and that the focus should be more on conflict-affected communities (see the [Sri Lanka case study](#) in Note No 5).
  - ➔ Recognising the particularly chronic needs of internally displaced persons — not only through short-term aid but also through medium-term aid to livelihoods, reconstruction and education across all three ethnic communities.
- We developed three scenarios to support flexible response:
  - ➔ Scenario 1: Positive Climate Towards Peace/Uneasy Peace
  - ➔ Scenario 2: Low-Intensity Conflict
  - ➔ Scenario 3: High-Intensity Conflict

Throughout 2005–09, all scenarios materialised — with low-intensity conflict intensifying during 2006 and 2007 — escalating to full-scale war over 2008 and 2009. We worked out in advance potential responses for our focal and non-focal area support for each of the identified scenarios.

- We worked with a realistic assessment of what could be achieved with three main objectives:
  - conflict-sensitive balance in post-tsunami assistance to all affected areas of the country — south and east and north;
  - reconstruction and stabilisation of the conflict-affected north and east;
  - support to good governance and conflict mitigation.

At the Delegation and among implementation partners, there was a fundamental recognition of the importance of conflict mitigation.

- We navigated and took full advantage of the available flexibility and the close operational relationship with ECHO — sharing a clear linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) approach — and by combining and sequencing all instruments — ECHO, IfS (now IcSP) and DCI. It was possible to use more flexibility in procurement procedures, as granted to Delegations operating in a conflict country in crisis. The LRRD approach was put into practice in several sectors, such as in mine action (from mine/unexploded ordnance clearance of areas linked to productive assets and mine risk education) and housing (from shelters to permanent houses).
- We teamed up and coordinated closely with other actors — in particular, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and UN Agencies, including the United Nations Office for Project Services. We developed other cooperation partnerships with other donors and Sri Lankan bodies with proven implementation capacity. All actions were accompanied with ensuring that the chosen partner had the capacity for implementation.

## LESSONS LEARNED

- Scenario planning may be under-utilised for programming in conflict-affected areas. Scenario planning at the programming and formulation stages allows all to anticipate changes and be ready for them in advance.
- Keeping the use of different instruments open — the swift use of the IfS (now IcSP) was successful and supported by programming whereby the scenario planning foresaw the need.
- Building in geographic flexibility in the programming was useful so support could take advantage of periods of calm.
- Setting achievable targets and keeping the level of ambition realistic was helpful, as well as ensuring a concentration of resources for impact.
- Teaming up with other actors such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the United Nations Office for Project Services ensured much greater co-ordination, coherence and impact.
- Flexible interpretation and application of processes, templates and regulations were used as and when possible (e.g. suspension clauses in calls for proposals launched prior to the adoption of a financing decision, flexibility regarding the number of days for submission of proposals/offers, etc.).



## NOTE NO 3

# Promoting democratic governance and human rights in situations of conflict and fragility

## Topic overview

In 2012, 16 % of development assistance from the EU to fragile and conflict-affected countries went to strengthening government and civil society (OECD statistics, 2014). Moreover, a lot, if not most of development assistance

*'I realise with fright that my impatience for the re-establishment of democracy had something almost communist in it; or, more generally, something rationalist. I had wanted to make history move ahead in the same way that a child pulls on a plant to make it grow more quickly.'*

*Vaclav Havel*

provided outside of the governance sector, had a direct and sometimes profound influence on democratic governance and human rights.

'Respect for human rights and democracy cannot be taken for granted' (2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy). Violations of human rights and governance shortcomings constitute

both a cause and a symptom of fragility. If addressed inadequately or too mechanistically, governance challenges risk further feeding the fragility cycle and missing the EU goals of peace, security and sustainable development.

This note aims at providing EU staff with practical guidance to define objectives, engage with relevant partners and adopt a realistic tailored approach to **promoting democratic governance and human rights in fragile situations**.

## Key issues

**Supporting partners in a fragile situation to promote democratic governance and human rights assumes taking calculated risks inherent to both fragile situations and governance support, and weighing different possible avenues of action.** There rarely is only one obvious option. For example, Burundi and Rwanda shared similar conditions (geography, social fabric, history) in the 1990s, but have taken very different trajectories to exit fragility and conflict in the 2000s. Understanding country context and priorities while engaging in in-depth political and policy dialogue in the context of EU values and obligations is the foundation for a successful and viable transition out of fragility (*The European Union: Furthering Human Rights and Democracy across the Globe*, 2007). The following steps can help to establish this foundation.

### SUMMARY

- Tailor response to needs and will to reform, and in accordance with EU values: support policies and political dialogue with all relevant stakeholders able and/or willing to reform, and identify and manage who stands to lose from reform.
- Allocate specific support to CSOs, human rights defenders and vulnerable groups, but as part of broad-based local alliances for reform to promote democracy in an effective and sustainable manner.
- Adopt a systemic but realistic approach: consider what chain of interventions is critical to enhanced democracy and pluralism, both upstream and downstream of election day — yet focus on priority needs, current opportunities in the country and areas of EU comparative strengths.

## Step 1. Define strategic but realistic objectives tailored to context, needs and will to reform

### 1.1. Assess the governance and human rights situation and compare your analysis with that of other actors

Understanding the politics and informal rules of the game conditions adequate responses and helps to prioritise action. Conducting in-country assessments (see [Note No 1](#) on analysis) is useful prior to deciding on Country Strategy Papers and Human Rights Country Strategies (see the example in Box 1). EU instruments such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (see [EIDHR Strategy Paper 2011–2013](#)) can help to set up overarching objectives to guarantee the mainstreaming of democracy and human rights.

As elsewhere — but especially in fragile situations — national ownership over governance reform and human rights protection is central to systemic change and integral to effective work on poverty alleviation and conflict resolution. Test your analysis with national stakeholders (see [Note No 7](#) on engaging with national counterparts) and other international actors.

#### BOX 1 Human rights and capacity development in South Sudan

In March 2013, a workshop brought together representatives from the EU, CSOs and the Human Rights Committee of the Parliament of South Sudan to facilitate a debate on challenges in building human rights capacity, ways to overcome these and possible avenues for EU support. The main issues identified included the impact of armed conflict on civilians and refugees, a lack of basic services and customary laws, and the weak capacity of government institutions. This workshop allowed an informed analysis of priorities and resulted in a set of recommendations for the EU to address the main capacity shortfalls in this field.

**Source:** [South Sudan: Enhancing capacities for human rights](#), Policy Department DG External Policies, 2013.

### 1.2. Define areas of intervention in close consultation with national counterparts and other international actors, and define your approach

To avoid mechanistic and inadequate responses, [learn from past EU experience](#), pick a best-fit model of intervention tailored to the country's situation and define your role as underlined in [The Role of EU Delegations in EU Human Rights Policy](#) (2013).

Define both immediate priorities and long-term objectives in a continued policy and political dialogue with a broad range of state and non-state actors willing to engage in the process, through in-country consultation, workshop and/or information-sharing activities (see, e.g. DfID's [Drivers of Change](#) guidance).

To enhance performance, two approaches are possible: conditionality and sanctions or dialogue and incentives. Evidence shows that while constraints can support the transition process, incentive-based approaches have produced more positive results as they encourage participation and commitment (Box 2).

#### BOX 2 Scaling down versus 'more for more' in Arab Spring countries

The EU often cuts back relations with countries violating human rights and imposes wide-ranging restrictive measures against repressive regimes, directing aid instead towards civil society and affected populations. This was the case in Syria, where a worsening humanitarian crisis and systematic human rights violations led to the EU suspending its bilateral financial assistance and imposing a strong package of sanctions, channelling support directly to the affected population.

More recently, the EU decided on a 'more for more principle' approach, i.e. countries that progress furthest with specific, measurable democratic reforms receive greater support. Throughout 2012, the EU implemented that response to the Arab Spring. The Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) umbrella programme gives tangible form to the principle by providing additional support to partner countries that show real commitment and progress.

**Source:** [Annual Report 2013 on the European Community's Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2012](#).



## Step 2. Identify and engage with relevant stakeholders

Policy and political dialogue is among the main EU instruments to promote democratisation and strengthen a culture of human rights protection. Smartly choosing your partners in line with their capacity and willingness to become drivers of change facilitates this process (Box 3).

### 2.1. Allocate specific support to CSOs, human rights defenders and representatives of vulnerable groups

Non-state actors including citizens and representatives of vulnerable groups, CSOs, human rights defenders and national institutions such as human rights commissions and ombudsmen have an important role in holding their government accountable, transparent and protecting of their

#### BOX 4 Women's rights in fragile and conflict-affected states

Women are not only victims of war and violence. They also play active roles as combatants, peacebuilders, politicians and activists. The equal participation of men and women in these roles is both an essential goal and a means to help prevent and resolve conflicts and promote a culture of inclusive and sustainable peace. There is a close link between the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence and the opportunities made available to women to participate politically, to achieve a sustainable livelihood, and to feel secure in their communities during and after conflict.

**Source:** Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security.

#### BOX 3 Governance in Burundi: the benefits of a participatory approach

In 2007, the EU launched the GutwaraNeza programme supporting participatory good governance in Burundi to strengthen the rule of law, support transparent and equitable public management, and support the decentralisation process. The programme adopts a participatory approach, as its beneficiaries are both institutions and populations. Both participate in programme implementation notably through recruitment decisions (members of the communities were members of the jury selecting provincial council advisors), programme activities (focus groups have been organised to reflect on judiciary support activities and decide on campaign material contents), and implementation of selected activities (such as specific subvention to an association to raise awareness on women's rights).

**Source:** Les bailleurs européens et l'approche participative dans le secteur de la sécurité et la justice au Burundi, groupe sectoriel sur la sécurité, 2010.

rights and in building proactive participatory approaches and dialogues. Among CSOs, women's organisations have a key role to play in promoting gender equality and fighting discriminatory legislation, gender-based violence and marginalisation (as per the [EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy](#)) (Box 4). Select specific support modalities among EU tools to directly support and empower local actors, such as the [European Endowment for Democracy](#).

### 2.2. Focus on broad-based local alliances for reform

Research shows that focused support on specific institutions 'can cause capacity imbalances and ignore the potential offered by broad-based local alliances for reform' ([OECD, 2013](#)). Adopting an accountability systems approach that looks at the linkages among actors and how these can be strengthened over time is a way to overcome that difficulty (Box 5). To this end, you may find the [Principles for assistance to accountability actors and institutions: Elections, political parties, the media, parliament and revenue matters](#) useful.

#### BOX 5 Accountability support in budgeting, decentralisation and education in Mali

A study of donor support for state-citizen relations with regard to the budget process and service delivery was completed in Mali in 2012, just prior to the crisis. It underlined that 'donors have tended to provide targeted support to specific institutions rather than grouping accountability actors and strengthening what could be called "communities of accountability". There was a lack of understanding about what accountability meant, and of the different roles and responsibilities of state and non-state actors in the accountability landscape. As a result, the impact chain was unclear and monitoring of accountability difficult to grasp'.

**Source:** [Accountability and democratic governance: Orientations and principles for development](#), OECD, 2013.

## Step 3. Adopt a systemic but targeted approach

### 3.1. Adopt a systemic approach

Democracy and human rights promotion is often focused on election day. While necessary, impact is greater with a more systemic approach that considers interventions both upstream and downstream of election day.

- **Upstream:** to promote inclusive policy and political process, institution-building and effective check and balances. Depending on context, this may include support to transitional mechanisms (2012 [Joint Communication: EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transitions Societies](#)), engaging with political parties and community representatives

#### BOX 6 Post-election transitions of power: EU lessons from Africa

Based on eight case studies, this policy brief examines violence around sub-Saharan African elections and identifies key recommendations on how the EU can help to reduce it. It studies factors increasing or mitigating risks of violence, drawing on diverse political contexts. Suggested general measures include identifying countries at risk and assessing danger, sustaining engagement, promoting conflict resolution and mediation activities among political parties and other relevant stakeholders, helping EU observers, looking beyond electoral assistance to support the entire election cycle, and strengthening regional capability.

**Source:** [How the EU Can Support Peaceful Post-Election Transitions of Power: Lessons from Africa](#), Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Briefing Paper, 2012.

(including traditional leaders) on a non-partisan basis; providing technical assistance for elections promoting best practices to prevent post-electoral violence (Box 6); and support for law-making based on inclusive processes.

- **Downstream:** to promote effective functioning of institutions and respect for rule of law and human rights through [support to parliaments](#), decentralised authorities, civil society and human rights organisations, other spokespersons for communities in need, the media and through the promotion of a legitimate, transparent and effective justice sector (Box 7). In some countries, this may involve collaborating with traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms (see examples in [Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences](#)). They play an important role, complementing that of formal justice institutions.

*'It was a great risk we ran by introducing multi-party systems in countries that were insufficiently integrated as nations, in a context of great poverty and illiteracy. What happened had to happen: increased tensions; ethnicism and clientelism.'*

*J.P. Ngoupandé, former Prime Minister, Central African Republic*

#### BOX 7 The added value of a comprehensive approach: the example of Tunisia

In Tunisia since 2011, the EU has supported the transition with a broad democracy package, including support to constitutional and electoral reform, political parties and the promotion of freedom and democratic values. The EIDHR was used to fund experts, train local election observers and strengthen political parties' capacities. EU budget support is part of this broad package in line with the [Council Conclusions on the Future Approach to EU budget support to third countries](#), providing financial assistance to overcome immediate economic challenges jointly with other donors during the political transition.

**Source:** [Joint Staff Working Document—EU support for sustainable change in transition societies](#), Brussels, 2012.

### 3.2. Adopt a targeted approach, focused on critical areas

Democracy and human rights promotion can entail a wide, almost infinite range of intervention areas. To avoid overstretch, note the following.

- Consider the specificities of country context to avoid doing harm and support transition processes when elaborating and implementing governance and human rights strategies. Developing these using the [EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy](#) and the [Instrument contributing to Stability and](#)

[Peace \(IcSP\)](#) allows you to ensure implementation of specific tailored programmes, mainstreaming democratic values and flexibility in EU responses.

- Focus action on the four main consolidated EU fronts in a coordinated manner with other donors: establishment of constitutional and electoral processes; strengthening of democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties, civil society and the media; and gradual development of a democratic political culture. All actions will foster child protection at all stages and include specific activities on gender equality (2011 [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a More Effective Approach](#)).

### 3.3. Think ‘quick wins’

Establish mutual trust through early achievements such as the recovery of basic rights and freedoms, and the creation of legitimate representative institutions and constitutions to help foster citizen and state commitment to further democratic developments.

## Additional resources

You can draw from EU knowledge platforms such as [capacity4dev](#), [strategic frameworks](#), relevant [studies and evaluations](#), [guidelines](#) and [reports](#) to inform your democracy and human rights programmes. Of particular note are the following:

- 2012 [EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy](#)
- 2012 Joint Communication: EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transitions Societies
- European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) ([EIDHR Strategy Paper 2011–2013](#)).

Other sources also provide practical guidance, such as the [International IDEA Handbook for practitioners](#) and DfID’s [Drivers of Change](#) guidance.

## Case study

### Democracy and human rights in Myanmar: taking advantage of windows of opportunity

<b>SOURCE</b>	Manuel de Rivera, Peter Hazdra and Vaclav Svejda, EU Delegation to Myanmar
<b>CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<p>Emerging from decades of authoritarian rule and armed conflicts between government and various ethnic groups, Myanmar has, since 2007, embarked on unprecedented political and economic reforms. President U Thein Sein has pledged to make peace a priority and has initiated an unprecedented effort aimed at achieving lasting peace with the ethnic armed groups.</p>
<b>ACTIONS TAKEN</b>	<p>The programme for promoting reform in Myanmar identified bottlenecks to reform and provided urgently needed policy advice, capacity building and skills development for Myanmar institutions in the field of electoral reform, trade and economic issues, human rights and land reform. This assistance also laid the foundation for long-term capacity development funded by the EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).</p> <p>The EU has responded quickly to the Myanmar democratisation process by mobilising funding through the IfS (now replaced by the IcSP). This support has provided urgently needed expertise on a wide range of topics, from electoral reform to macro-economics and human rights.</p> <p>The IcSP also provides comprehensive support to the peace process in Myanmar, aiming for the promotion, implementation and monitoring of ceasefires, political settlements and other peacebuilding strategies by strengthening and enabling institutional and civil society structures and peacebuilding actors.</p> <p>Specifically, this initiative foresees (i) a multi-faceted support to the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC), a new institution created by the government to foster national reconciliation and advance the ethnic peace process, and (ii) activities targeting various non-governmental actors, including NGOs, civil society and grassroots groups. The latter aim for improved and conflict-sensitive media coverage of the process through the training of journalists, support to civilian ceasefire-monitoring mechanisms, strengthening the capacities of ethnic political parties to contribute meaningfully to the peace process, providing restorative justice with regard to forced labour cases, and creating mechanisms for the better promotion of labour rights.</p> <p>With EU support, the MPC has organised numerous negotiations with ethnic armed groups, including ongoing preparations for a nationwide ceasefire agreement and its implementation arrangements. A framework for an inclusive political dialogue is expected to be rolled out in the second half of 2014. The MPC also played an important role in bringing together the government and political dissidents, such as representatives of the 88 Generation, in order to further enhance national reconciliation.</p>

A separate programme focused on civilian mine action also provides concrete support to the peace process. It aims to foster the establishment of capacity building for a national mine action centre, overseeing and coordinating all mine action activities in Myanmar and conducting systematic non-technical surveys in selected areas. As far as the political situation permits, the programme might also carry out actual mine clearing.

Recognising the need for fundamental reform of the Myanmar police and following up on requests from the government as well as the Chair of the Rule of Law Committee of the Lower House of the Parliament, the EU launched a training and capacity-building programme for the police in the areas of community policing and crowd management. The project will also provide important assistance in modernising the police's vision, updating its doctrine/manuals and legal framework, improving police accountability to Parliament, and liaison with civil society and the media.

The EU was the first donor to provide substantial support for reforming the police, focusing on community policing and crowd management — an initiative much appreciated by local counterparts. A constructive working relationship with the police has been established, and the programme has delivered early results: community policing has already started in four pilot areas in Yangon, and 3 000 police officers have been trained in crowd management in line with human rights standards and best international practices. In addition, work has begun with various stakeholders, including parliamentary committees, to bring the legal and doctrinal framework of the police into line with international standards and ensure parliamentary oversight over the police. Consultations with media and civil society took place in order to improve their capacity to coordinate with the police and hold them accountable to democratic standards, with the aim of creating liaison mechanisms between the police and CSOs as well as the media.

The nature of the actions funded under the EIDHR has shifted as the country has gradually opened and embarked on the process of reform. Initially, the EIDHR funded projects focused primarily on documenting human rights abuses and raising awareness of people's rights and freedoms. More recently, we have been able to fund projects that support civil society actors, including communities, to work closely with state authorities in helping the country to better comply with the international human rights legal framework. Democracy remains a vast field to plough. This was also confirmed by an in-country identification mission in September 2013, which immediately mobilised additional funds (EUR 2 million) for four targeted projects in support of the transition process.

## OUTLOOK

The peace process is making progress, although many interlinked challenges still need to be addressed, notably in terms of democratisation, economic development, human rights and peace, including intercommunity relations. A nationwide ceasefire agreement remains to be signed, and a comprehensive political settlement needs to be hammered out to ensure sustainable peace.



## NOTE NO 4

# Promoting resilience in situations of conflict and fragility

## Topic overview

**Definitions.** Resilience is defined as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks’ (2012 [Communication](#)). Fragile situations are those ‘where the social contract is broken due to the State’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions’ (2007 [Communication](#)). In practice, the two concepts largely overlap: with only a few exceptions, all countries deemed ‘highly vulnerable’ (see vulnerability and crisis [assessment indicators](#)) are in a conflict or fragile situation. Promoting resilience in situations of conflict and fragility means factoring in a weak or unaccountable state, and the looming shadow of armed conflict (past, present or probable).

The **value of the resilience approach** resides in (i) addressing not only the symptoms of a crisis (which can be sudden or slow onset) but also its causes and (ii) synergising across policy communities. This approach holds the greatest promise in situations of conflict and fragility, where poor government performance, a history of social exclusion and the legacy of armed conflict tend to linger — and history tends to repeat itself (one in two countries reverts to conflict within five years of a peace agreement). These are also situations where synergy across policy communities is essential to avoid doing harm and achieve lasting impact. In particular, the short-term response to emergency needs must also be designed so as not to undermine longer-term development prospects.

**A crisis can be human-made or natural, but in fragile contexts, it always combines many dimensions and makes the population (or part of the population) acutely and chronically vulnerable.**

- When a human-made crisis occurs in a context of fragility, it is often because the features of fragility combine to explode into a crisis, often triggered by one event, or a series of events — for example in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (2010–11). Then, the crisis leaves a legacy that makes fragility and conflict chronic. The resurgence of conflict in the Central African Republic and South Sudan end-2013 are cases in point, with 1 000 casualties and thousands displaced in a matter of months.


## SUMMARY

- Promoting resilience in situations of conflict and fragility means factoring in the state’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, and the looming shadow of armed conflict.
- The added value of the resilience approach resides in (i) addressing not only the symptoms of the crisis but also its root causes; and (ii) synergising across policy communities. This approach holds great promise in situations of conflict and fragility.
- Both the symptoms and the root causes of a crisis need to be addressed — this is particularly important in situations of conflict and fragility, where history tends to repeat itself.
- When identifying the causes of crisis and how they interact, process matters. It is also useful to identify areas of both risk and resilience.
- Mapping ongoing and planned interventions will help to identify gaps, contradictions, overlaps and areas for greater synergy, as well as consider their sustainability.
- Designing a resilience programme, or more generally applying the resilience approach, entails learning from past experience, addressing both emergency needs and longer-term resilience building, and factoring in risk.
- Implementing a resilience approach requires special attention to coordination mechanisms; thinking about peacebuilding and state-building issues from Day 1, even if they are long-term issues; and engaging with national counterparts according to context.



- When a natural disaster occurs in a context of fragility, the features of fragility ('state incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions', social exclusion or armed conflict) also make vulnerability acute and chronic. For example:
  - Graph 1 shows the correlation between political instability and food insecurity in Yemen;
  - Somalia, a country rife with conflict and without an effective government since 1991, has not surprisingly suffered the brunt of the 2011 food crisis in the Horn of Africa;
  - the 2010 Haiti earthquake was much more deadly than the Chile earthquake, and quickly combined with pre-existing conditions (limited state responsiveness, extreme poverty and social exclusion) and other crises (cholera).

**GRAPH 1** Correlation between political instability and household food insecurity in Yemen



Source: Ecker (2014) based on UNICEF 2012 Pilot Social Protection Monitoring Survey data.

The 2013–20 [Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis-Prone Countries](#) notes this heightened vulnerability: fragile settings are 'more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises, conflicts or natural disasters' than other contexts. Indeed, 'in fragile and conflict affected states, household vulnerability and the lack of sustainable development are closely linked to state fragility and conflict'.

**In cases of both natural and human-made crises, not only the symptoms of the crisis but also its causes need to be addressed to avoid history repeating itself.** In a situation of conflict or fragility — i.e. where there is 'state incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions', social exclusion or armed conflict — addressing the causes of crisis entails including peacebuilding and state-building as part of the intervention package. This is not without challenges, as peacebuilding and state-building can be outside the remit of humanitarian actors (not to mention the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence), and only partially within the remit of development actors. However, the [Action Plan](#) emphasises the need, in fragile states, to 'secure stability and meet basic needs for populations in the short term while at the same time strengthening governance, capacity and economic growth, keeping state-building as a central element'.

## Key issues

While guidance exists on promoting resilience (notably the 2012 [Communication](#) and 2013 [Conclusions](#) on Resilience, the Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework, and the 2013–20 [Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis-Prone Countries](#)), this note aims to **help EU staff promote resilience given fragility**, i.e. taking into account the lack of state responsiveness and/or tense social relations. Specifically, it spells out issues to bear in mind when (i) identifying risks and their causes; (ii) mapping ongoing and planned interventions; and (iii) developing and implementing a resilience approach.

The steps below follow the method outlined in the [Communication on Resilience](#) and the [Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework in the context of food security](#).

### Step 1. Analyse the nature and causes of the crisis

Analysis is the first step towards any smart engagement, as an uninformed programme can end up doing more harm than good (see [Note No 1](#) for more general guidance on analysis).



### 1.1. Set up a process that makes sense

- Identify the most relevant unit(s) for analysis of the nature and causes of the crisis at hand: regional, national and/or local. If the focus is national, remember to consider regional drivers of crisis and resilience.
- Identify who to involve in the analysis, and when, bearing in mind that different stakeholders can analyse crises in very different ways because of the wide range of risks to which people are exposed, the different degrees to which they are exposed, and data and transparency limitations in fragile settings.

### 1.2. Identify the causes and their interplay

Distinguish whether the causes are at the individual, household, community, country or regional level. Consider the political and social context. For example, in Yemen (see case study), grievances, ideologies and political interests were considered in implementing the resilience approach.

### 1.3. Identify areas of both risk and resilience

Draw from the range of EU analysis and early warning instruments, notably [conflict analysis](#), [Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment/Forgotten Crisis Assessment](#), the Index for Risk Management (InfoRM) and the EEAS [Risk Index](#). These should help to ensure that social tensions and armed conflict are identified, in addition to food crises and climate shocks: ‘When working to improve resilience in fragile and conflict-affected states, the EU will pursue an approach that also addresses security aspects and their impact on the vulnerability of the populations’ (2012 Communication). An early warning system that is common across sectors and policy communities can significantly increase its effectiveness, as the December 2013 example of South Sudan illustrates, where there was an unforeseen reversion to crisis.

Identify the most vulnerable groups. In situations of conflict and fragility made acute by crisis, it is tempting to define 90 % of the population as vulnerable, but interventions need to be targeted to the most vulnerable, as well as addressing the root causes of crisis.

It is also important to identify which groups and systems are resilient. In fragile settings, coping mechanisms have developed — sometimes over a period of years — and are almost always overlooked and therefore not built upon. No fragile state is a *tabula rasa*, even after the most dramatic crisis.

## Step 2. Map ongoing and planned interventions

Possible questions follow.

- What themes and communities do planned and actual interventions by the EU, other development partners and national/regional authorities cover?
- Do they cover priority needs (both urgent needs and important needs), or are there gaps in certain regions, social groups, sectors, etc.? In particular, to what extent are current interventions targeting the most vulnerable populations? To what extent are they addressing the root causes of the crisis?
- Conversely, are there duplications?
- Are there contradictions across the different interventions? Could there be greater synergies across them?
- Are they sustainable, given the most probable scenario?

Sources of information for this mapping include programmes and projects by ECHO, DEVCO, other development partners and national/regional authorities, and evaluations/reviews of all of the above. Following this desk review,

this mapping is best done through a joint humanitarian-development (and, if possible, multi-donor) workshop, to allow for debate.

### Step 3. Develop a resilience approach

Based on current guidance, the following are possible avenues to develop a resilience approach.

#### 3.1. Learn from experience

Fragile settings are often subject to multiple crises and multiple types of crises. It is always worth reflecting on previous and current resilience approaches.

- Were they focused on the right things?
- Were they based on assumptions that have proven correct?
- Is the current context markedly different from previously? Are there new risks and opportunities to take into account?
- If these programmes did not deliver as much as expected, what will be different in the current cycle of programming? (The assumptions? The objectives? How risks are managed? The programme design? Its delivery?)

#### 3.2. Address both emergency needs and longer-term resilience

For the short-term response to emergency needs to not undermine longer-term development prospects, the EU response should involve the partner country's state and society to, over time, improve state responsiveness and the management of social tensions. In South Sudan, ECHO and the EU Delegation to the country developed a Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework (2014) that takes a two-track approach: immediate relief interventions and longer-term strategies complement each other for resilient households and communities. In Somalia, the EU's EUR 36 million Resilience Programme includes a range and mutually reinforcing set of interventions: support to the federal government to develop a resilience strategy, support to improved agro-pastoral and farming practices and marketing, and better access to services for pastoralists and farmers.

When central government is unable or unwilling to focus on the resilience agenda — including its developmental goals — or to engage in dialogue, it is all the more beneficial to engage in dialogue, in the first instance, with local authorities, community leaders and/or regional authorities (see [Note No 7](#) on engaging with national counterparts in situations of conflict and fragility).

The link between resilience and state-building can be made, for instance, through state-building contracts (e.g. in Mali), EU trust funds (e.g. the EU trust fund in the Central African Republic will help to channel funding for interventions that are considered essential to stabilisation, including state-building; support to elections; and support to health, education and food security) or regional indicative programmes (e.g. the regional indicative programme for West Africa, which includes a specific component for capacity development).

#### 3.3. Factor in risk

The 2013 Council Conclusions on the EU Approach to Resilience call for 'a medium-to-long term perspective when planning humanitarian action and development programming'. At the same time, fragile contexts can evolve rapidly and in very different possible directions. Resilience programming should therefore be built on scenario planning (what are the best case, worst case and most plausible scenarios?) and include room for readjustments to respond to both reversals and opportunities.

Resilience programming will also benefit from a **realistic** assessment of needs, and a proactive way to manage them (see the [Yemen case study](#) in Note No 7).

## Step 4. Implementing the resilience approach

How the resilience approach is implemented matters as much as what is in it. Issues that may arise follow.

### 4.1. Pay special attention to coordination mechanisms given that national capacity is often limited and that increased resilience needs a multi-sector response

Agreeing on a set of well-defined objectives, appointing a lead donor and agreeing on a clear division of labour will help to focus the agenda on addressing the causes

*'You can't have a resilience approach all of a sudden. You need to build on existing assets, and there are always some.'*

*Sarah Bernhardt, EU  
Delegation to Yemen*

#### **BOX 1** Greater resilience in the Horn of Africa: working with and through regional partners, and with other donors

The 2010–11 drought in the Horn of Africa affected over 13.5 million people, led to famine and population displacements, and — despite massive international assistance — to tens of thousands of deaths. In the wake of this crisis, the heads of state of the region's countries pledged to end drought emergencies and asked the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to take the lead on this initiative. This commitment translated into the IGAD Drought Disaster and Sustainability Initiative, which stimulated national governments in the region to develop country-specific programmes. These national resilience programmes are complemented by an IGAD-led regional programme.

In this context, the EU developed the SHARE (Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience) initiative, with a two-pronged approach: a short-term response for emergency assistance and short-term recovery in 2011–13, and longer-term assistance to help affected communities and countries enhance resilience to face future droughts (2014–20).

Increasingly, EU assistance is being aligned to the IGAD drought initiative framework at the regional and national levels. At the same time, EU assistance for resilience in the Horn of Africa is coordinated with that of other donors, notably through the Global Alliance for Action for Resilience and Growth. Humanitarian and development partners involved in this alliance meet twice each year and hold regular telephone conferences. They also engage with IGAD and the IGAD member states in meetings at technical and strategic levels.

**Sources:** Willem Olthof (DEVCO D2); IGAD; SHARE.

of crisis and limit the burden on partner countries. To the extent possible, it is best to use (or build on) existing coordination mechanisms rather than creating new ones. Box 1 provides an example of coordination that brings together humanitarian and development actors from different donor administrations, while fostering leadership from partner countries.

### 4.2. Is the aftermath of crisis really the right time to think about the long-term issues of peacebuilding and state-building?

There is increasing recognition that the pact among the elites and the social contract between the state and citizens are usually renegotiated at times of crisis. Therefore, it might be best to anticipate how the response to crisis is likely to shape things to come. When saving lives requires EU programmes to use modalities that may undermine state-building, thought should be given to how and when you can shift to modalities that are more likely to increase state responsiveness.

### 4.3. Engage according to context

The Action Plan recalls: 'It is primarily a national government's responsibility to build resilience and to define political, economic, environmental and social priorities accordingly... It is ultimately individual countries' responsibility to progress towards resilience, meeting key development standards.' However, 'where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violence conflict, opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level will be sought'. And when the state is weak, even at the sector or regional level,

working with CSOs and directly with communities can be a third option, while involving local authorities and line ministries as much as possible.

## Additional resources

### Fragility-specific

- EU 2013–20 [Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis-Prone Countries](#) (paragraphs on fragility).
- Alexandre Marc et al., *Societal Dynamics and Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to fragile Situations*, Washington DC: World Bank, 2012.
- OECD, [Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance](#), DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD, 2011.

### Not fragility-specific

- EU, [Communication: the EU approach to resilience: learning from food security crises](#), 2012.
- EU, [Conclusions on the EU approach to resilience](#), 2013.
- EU Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework.
- Annelies Heijmans et al., [Reaching Resilience, Handbook for Aid Practitioners and Policymakers in Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation and Poverty Reduction](#).

## Case study

### Beyond the emergency: strengthening nutrition systems at the local and national levels in Yemen

#### SOURCE



Sarah Bernhardt, EU  
Delegation to Yemen;  
Andrea Pavel, DEVCO

#### CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

##### Challenges

- Yemen has been experiencing alarming levels of under-nutrition for decades. The shocks that occurred during the civil unrest of 2011 and that led, among other things, to the present nutrition crisis, overlap with the pre-existing socioeconomic and political situations that gave rise to similar crises in the past. Nearly half of all children under the age of five are chronically malnourished (47 %) and 13 % suffer from acute malnutrition. Global acute malnutrition reaches alarming levels in coastal areas, far exceeding the international emergency threshold of 15 %. The health and health service indicators that are relevant for nutrition are below the average observed in countries with a similar level of socioeconomic development.
- The generous donor support currently unfolding in Yemen is a crisis response. Curative services are organised at the periphery of the national system. Virtually no support is given to local institutions, which are by and large sidelined or used as implementation vehicles. One result is a high degree of fragmentation and dispersion. Standards are difficult to implement and non-centralised coordination efforts result in disempowered national institutions.
- A National Nutrition Strategy for Yemen was approved in 2009 but suffers from a lack of vision, relies on a weak analytical basis and makes little provision for the integration of services into a primary health care package. The government's health sector budget has so far not included funding for nutrition activities. The Ministry of Public Health and Population is struggling to maintain pre-2011 service levels. Inter-ministerial coordination is absent. Management capacities at the central as well as at governorate and district levels are scarce. Training institutions are unprepared.

##### Opportunity

- Yemen recently joined the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement, which may be seen as a first step in institutional engagement.

##### Ambivalent

- A strong emphasis on decentralisation (work with local authorities and fiscal decentralisation) offers opportunities, but also presents challenges in terms of steering the sub-sector and promoting equitable and balanced growth across the country.

## ACTIONS TAKEN

The Yemen team emphasised the need to address both immediate needs at the local level and systemic changes at the national level, and designed a programme to strengthen the resilience of nutrition systems to complement the ongoing and well-funded response to immediate needs.

### Programme objectives

This programme's goal is to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the delivery of equitable nutrition services by supporting their integration into primary health care and supporting the capacity development of the ministry at various levels. The programme therefore aims for four results:

- the institutional, leadership and governance capacities of the ministry and governorate health offices are enhanced, and the ministry is enabled to steer the subsector in full cooperation with relevant stakeholders;
- the technical capacities of a critical mass of public health staff are increased;
- an enabling environment for nutrition programmes is created through supporting legislation, information, education and communication, and active participation in inter-ministerial activities;
- an enabling environment for nutrition investments is created while responding to cogent needs in terms of micronutrients.

### Programme modalities

The programme uses a centralised approach, with the funds managed directly by the Delegation.

## NOTE NO 5

# Identifying and implementing EU modalities and instruments in situations of conflict and fragility

## MAKING THE BEST USE OF A VAST EXPERIENCE

### Topic overview

Situations of conflict and fragility are complicated and fast changing. A very large proportion of EU support is now directed to fragile and conflict-affected situations, and there is increasing recognition that modalities have to adapt to this new 'normal' situation. In response, the EU has developed — and continues to develop — a variety of modalities and instruments that, in combination, can react rapidly to situations of conflict and fragility, as well as develop the basis for long-term transition and change.

The range of modalities and instruments is presented in [Section 2.4](#) of Part I of this handbook. Modalities can be divided into **project support** and **budget support**. For both of these modalities, there are a number of instruments that can be used; and for crisis declaration countries, special flexible procedures can be invoked (see [Note No 6](#)).

This note looks at experience with using the [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#) (IcSP) and state-building contract budget (SBC) modality. The note also introduces the new possibilities of the EU trust fund.

The core instrument for ensuring a rapid response in fragile and conflicted-affected situations has been the

#### BOX 1 Situations for which the IcSP was designed

- Situations of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis
- Situations posing a threat to democracy, law and order, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, or the security and safety of individuals, in particular those exposed to gender-based violence in situations of instability
- Situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to severely destabilise the third country or countries concerned.

#### SUMMARY

- The EU has a range of dedicated modalities and instruments especially adapted for situations of conflict and fragility, making best use of a wealth of experience.
- Instruments that allow urgent short-term reaction such as the IcSP can be combined with modalities that serve long-term goals of state-building, including state-building contracts.
- The EU has launched an EU multi-donor trust fund that can bring together and harmonise the resources of many donors and reduce complications and transaction costs for states in situations of conflict and fragility.
- There is no prescription for how to use the available modalities and instruments because each case is unique. Each Delegation responding to a fragile or conflict-affected situation will need to identify an appropriate mix of modalities, and implement and adjust them according to the results obtained and the changing situation.
- It is vital to consider the security and well-being of the staff involved — not only of the Delegation but also of its contractors and partners.

Instrument for Stability (IfS), now replaced by the IcSP (Box 1). The IcSP uses a project-based modality and is particularly adapted for reacting to situations that could not have been foreseen as part of normal programming.

Since 2012, state-building contracts have been added as a potentially powerful budget support modality (Box 2) to respond to situations of conflict and fragility where the countries have a credible strategy for and commitment to building up the state and delivering basic services.

Increasingly, the EU has sought joint approaches with others in the spirit of the New Deal (e.g. the use of compacts; an example of which can be found [here](#)). More recently, a new instrument, the EU trust fund, has been set up to facilitate the pooling of EU funds with those of other donors under the lead of the EC. This is expected to improve the impact of the EU's external assistance in terms of concrete deliverables for crises and global challenges and to reinforce its credibility and visibility on the international scene (Box 3).

### BOX 3 Why the EU trust fund was needed

- The EU may lead international initiatives, where it can demonstrate its added value
- Provides increased visibility for the EU and Member States
- Reinforces accountability, control and transparency, particularly vis-à-vis European control institutions
- Facilitates donor coordination, in particular with the EU and Member States
- Brings in more resources and more flexible mechanisms.

### BOX 2 Situations for which the SBC was designed

- Where a fragile state has a credible strategy for and commitment to building the state and delivering basic services, but lacks the financial resources and capacity;
- Where there are good prospects for improving country systems by supporting and improving them from within by promoting a better and more structured public administration, a more efficient public financial management system, more transparent and accountable planning and budgeting systems, and gradually restoring macro-economic stability;
- Where fragility or transition processes require promoting development, democratic governance and human rights, including making sustainable changes in transition societies and helping to ensure the revival of vital state functions.

There is no prescription as to how to use the modalities and instruments, because each case is unique. Each Delegation responding to a fragile or conflict-affected situation will need to identify an appropriate mix of modalities and implement and adjust them according to the results obtained and the changing situation.

This note looks at the experience of using a range of modalities and instruments in a number of different cases and examples:

- **Niger:** an example of using the IfS (now the IcSP) as part of an interim response programme that uses a mix of financial and non-financial instruments;
- **Sri Lanka:** using the IfS (now the IcSP) to contribute to enhancing conflict-sensitive programming;
- **State-building contracts:** lessons learned from the first countries using this modality;
- **Engaging in multi-donor trust funds:** lessons and experience from other trust funds.

## Key issues

Issues and dilemmas that have arisen in applying the EU's comprehensive range of modalities and instruments include the following:

- **Difficulty in deciding on which instruments to use when the data and basis for decision-making are weak and the situation is constantly changing.** The use of special modality instruments such as the SBC and the IcSP, which are dedicated to responding to situations of conflict and fragility, is guided by eligibility criteria and the process of declaring crisis situations. Although this guidance is invaluable, information on local circumstances is needed to ensure that the correct judgement is made. Often, the degree of uncertainty is very great, and the risks of late reaction are high; waiting for better information is sometimes the easier, but not always the right, option.




- **Using modalities and instruments so that it is easier to work with others.** Early engagement with other donors is usually the key to good coordination because it is easier to coordinate at the planning stage than during implementation when projects are more rigid. But coordination takes time that sometimes is not available, and coordinating with others can sometimes lead to unclear decision-making and increase uncertainty.
- **Using a mix of modalities and instruments to link short-term and long-term aims.** Linking with the humanitarian efforts of ECHO is essential to get a 'contiguum' of response from relief, rehabilitation to development — bearing in mind that operations in relief, rehabilitation and development may all be ongoing simultaneously within any given country.
- **When to consider a state-building contract and what preparations are needed.** SBCs are a highly innovative and recently introduced modality. Experience is being gained in establishing and implementing them. As this experience is gained, more will be learned about the circumstances in which they are most appropriate and likely to work. SBCs provide a means for the state itself to take responsibility and gain legitimacy from re-establishing basic services while recognising and finding appropriate safeguards, given that fragile states are inherently weak in implementing and have high fiduciary risks.

## Case studies

### Niger: using the IfS as part of an interim response programme that brings in other donors and is complemented by longer-term initiatives

#### SOURCE



Erik Ponsard, Rafael Aguirre-Unceta and Juan Villa Chacon, EU Delegation to Niger

#### CONTEXT

Niger has suffered in the past from political turmoil and a number of armed rebellions. But now the problem is concentrated at Niger's borders. Instability has been growing over the last few years, not only threatening but now affecting Niger with spill-over effects.

- At the northern border, the 2011 revolution in Libya has resulted in the demobilisation of numerous former Tuareg rebels (Nigeriens and Malians alike) who had served Col. Gaddafi's regime and who eventually returned after its collapse. The uncontrolled circulation of weapons, drugs and human trafficking in the aftermath of the Libyan conflict is threatening stability in the entire Sahel area.
- At the north-western border, Niger's direct involvement in the military operation initiated by France in January 2013 resulted in spill-over effects to Niger (i.e. synchronised suicide attacks to military barracks in May 2013). The involvement of Nigeriens has not been officially revealed, although the complicity of the local population seems to have been essential in carrying out the attacks. The arrival of tens of thousands of returnees and refugees to the area escaping abuses perpetrated by extremist groups in Mali and later from military operations has added confusion, because of the likely presence of terrorist elements among these refugees.
- On the southern border, instability is rising due to Boko Haram terrorist attacks in Nigeria and the severe response of the Nigerian army, resulting in the loss of more than 3 600 lives (according to Human Rights Watch reports). Both sides of the border are populated by the same ethnic group, the Hausa, with an intrinsic risk of contagion because of ethnic solidarity and border porosity. These risks are being exacerbated by the arrival of more than 6 000 returnees and refugees escaping from the military operations in Nigeria. The presence of Boko Haram elements among these refugees cannot be excluded.

Regionally, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) have been responsible for actions in Niger since 2008. These include attacks against the Nigerien army and kidnappings, as well as the killing of several Westerners. These groups are also involved in all kinds of criminal cross-border trafficking. The presence of Mokhtar Balmokhtar's group (*les signataires par le sang*) has also been confirmed, as they claimed responsibility for the attack on Niamey's prison and the subsequent escape of Boko Haram members that brought the terrorist threat to the very heart of the capital. The announced merger of Mokhtar Balmokhtar's group with MUJWA adds a new element of threat to the Nigerien context.

## CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

A range of actions were needed to prevent the rise and intensification of conflict as well as to aid post-conflict recovery. The challenges were significant.

The root causes of the conflict were across the borders, exploiting an already fragile situation in social and economic terms. Quick measures were needed to shift the momentum away from increasing chaos; it was vital to improve security and to keep community confidence in public civilian authorities in order to allow civil society to function.

There were opportunities to provide a means of promoting the social and economic integration of young people, including former rebellion fighters, mercenaries and returnees from Libya. These opportunities included activities to provide training and services to help the youth find employment. An immediate improvement in the provision of health services in remote areas was also seen as a factor that could help stabilise the situation in the short term. In the longer term, there were opportunities for capacity building of national and local institutions involved in the peace consolidation process. Supporting religious dialogue to promote tolerance and communication was also identified as an important opportunity for preventing the escalation of tension and conflict.

## ACTIONS TAKEN

An IfS programme to support security and stabilisation in northern Niger and Mali was initiated in early 2012 to end in early 2014 (EUR 10.9 million). As the conflict and turmoil spread to Niger's other borders, a second IfS programme to support the reduction of risks related to security and instability in the north-west and south-east of Niger was initiated in mid-2013 to end in December 2016 (EUR 18.7 million).

Both IfS programmes were implemented by international organisations as well as by international and local NGOs under the overall responsibility of the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace. The involvement of national authorities helped the programmes to reach out and support the public sector; for example, the programmes sought to improve the security of the people by supporting the creation of municipal police bodies and updating national regulations for de-mining operations. The involvement of NGOs helped in direct assistance in de-mining operations and in providing assistance to the victims of mines.

The IfS programme was designed within the framework of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, a comprehensive and coherent approach to the region's complex crisis situation. The programme also complements other EU-funded initiatives, such as the IfS long-term Sahel counter-terrorism programme and EDF-funded projects (Programme to Support to the Justice Sector and the Rule of Law (PAJED)). It also ensures synergies with the CSDP European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel mission in Niger. The second IfS programme is also supported by Denmark, helping to harmonise the efforts of the EU and Member States.

## LESSONS LEARNED

- Sound, sensitive programming is required in an environment where the competition for financial resources can lead to conflict escalation.
- Involvement of all stakeholders is necessary to ensure the correct targeting of activities and beneficiaries. This will also result in a positive perception of the intervention by the local population.
- It was important to act early and to be willing to extend support into a second programme aimed at other border areas of the country that were faced with a spill-over effect.
- A range of interventions was identified in the private sector to stimulate employment, in the public sector to improve governance and in civil society to support religious dialogue and tolerance.
- The knowledge and proper assessment of potential implementing partners was key to the success of the programme.
- The programme made use of the high implementation capacity of international NGOs and facilitated harmonisation processes between implementing partners before the contracting phase.
- Linking international NGOs with local NGOs allowed the comparative advantages of both to be gained.
- Ensuring that the IfS (now IcSP) programmes were under a national authority — in this case the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace — was key.

## Sri Lanka: using the IfS and a mix of instruments to help enhance conflict-sensitive programming

### SOURCE



Karolina Hedström, EU Delegation to Sri Lanka

### CONTEXT

The two-decade-long protracted conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam began to intensify in 2005, with an escalation of hostilities in the north and east; terrorist attacks in Colombo and the south; and steadily rising numbers of civilians killed, abducted, missing and displaced. Over a period of just two years, more than 5 000 combatants and civilians were estimated to have been killed. The 2002 ceasefire agreement was constantly broken and had little deterrent effect on the escalation of violence. In 2008, the government abrogated it; and it became clear that both sides were now openly intent on a military solution, with the prospects for any renewed peace process being very bleak. The official abrogation of the ceasefire marked a clear shift in the Sri Lankan context and a heightening of the state of crisis. First, it was a clear signal of the government's intention to escalate the war effort and seek a military solution; second, it led to the withdrawal of the Nordic Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, which was mandated to monitor ceasefire violations and whose presence in the field at least provided some confidence to local populations, as well as some independent witnessing and reporting of the actions of armed actors on the ground. The new context in Sri Lanka was thus one of open war without any independent monitoring or reporting — which means that violence and violation of human rights and international humanitarian law were likely to increase. In response, international actors were focusing on saving lives, trying to mitigate the impact of the conflict, supporting vulnerable groups and preventing a deepening of the conflict and the human rights crisis.

### CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Four major challenges were identified arising from the escalation of violence and the move into direct open warfare.

- **Situation of internally displaced persons and conflict-affected communities.** In 2008, some 187 000 people were displaced. The lack of an international presence had direct negative impacts on the security of these internally displaced persons. Following the military victory in the east, the government has been engaged in a large return operation, repopulating areas recently recovered from the opposition. This has created severe intercommunity strains and tension between the communities, civil administration, armed forces and law enforcement agencies involved.
- **Deterioration of human rights protection.** In parallel with the intensification of the conflict, the human rights situation deteriorated. Both the armed forces and militant groups were able to commit abuses with impunity. No independent international human rights presence remained, only national human rights structures that were politicised, under-resourced and lacked capacity, or were constrained due to fear and intimidation.

- **Intercommunity tensions and the role of minorities.** Due to the increased tensions and the deliberate targeting of minorities in 'security measures', there was growing insecurity and alienation.
- **Shrinking humanitarian space.** The environment was not conducive for implementation of humanitarian or development work, let alone human rights activism or investigative or critical journalism. The execution-style killing of 17 employees of an international NGO received widespread international attention and, with other violations, clearly marked the shrinking humanitarian space. NGOs were suspending projects or withdrawing from particular areas, thereby depriving affected communities of support.

The opportunities were limited, but it was clear that there were possibilities for mitigating the situation for conflict-affected communities in the north and east, including internally displaced persons and their host communities, by protecting them from the worst impact of the conflict. Similarly, human rights and humanitarian law could be promoted and defended across the country by supporting the systematic exposure and documentation of abuses, improving access and security for humanitarian and development workers.

There were also opportunities for external assistance to prevent increased polarisation of communities and radicalisation of minorities, which could further exacerbate the conflict. Support could provide protection to victims of violations and help address the general sense of frustration among minority groups. It was recognised that limiting the damage to lives and well-being, broadening the space available for humanitarian and human rights work, and limiting the radicalisation of and tensions between different ethnic groups would all potentially help to improve prospects for future attempts at involving all communities in a negotiated, sustainable political settlement to the conflict. Tackling these issues early could therefore help to ensure long-term stability.

## ACTIONS TAKEN

An 18-month IfS was prepared and implemented (EUR 6.5 million). The specific objective of the programme was to create an environment where tensions were reduced, civilians affected by the conflict and associated security measures were protected, and a safer and more conducive environment was created for the implementation of development and humanitarian assistance. The main activities were grouped to respond to the challenges identified above: (i) protection of conflict-affected communities, including confidence-building and stabilisation measures; (ii) legal support to civilians affected by arbitrary detention and other human rights violations; (iii) promotion of a safer and more conducive environment for the international aid community through support to the media; and (iv) conflict mitigation through socioeconomic stabilisation measures for particularly vulnerable conflict-affected communities. Each of the four sets of activities became part of individual contracts either with UN bodies or NGOs (local and international).

To ensure that the IfS actions, as well as the other ongoing programmes in Sri Lanka, were conflict sensitive, a forward-looking evaluation was commissioned and funded under the DCI. A highly professional international NGO was contracted to assess the conflict sensitivity of various EU-funded projects and develop lessons and best practices that serve to enhance the positive impact, and reduce any unintended negative impact, of EU-funded activities in Sri Lanka (see the [Sri Lanka case study](#) in Note No 2).

## LESSONS LEARNED

- A combination of the IfS and the DCI was instrumental in ensuring high-quality support. Using a combination of instruments led to less time wasted as the IfS (now IcSP) could be used for more urgent actions while DCI programmes were still in preparation.
- It is vital to consider the security and well-being of the staff involved (not only that of the Delegation, but also of its contractors and partners). The agents of change need protection, and the IfS allowed us to finance security measures. It is imperative to ensure that security risk management costs are included in budgets.
- The design of interventions has to be flexible enough to target affected districts rather than just the narrower group of affected communities (i.e. not just tsunami-affected groups, but the whole district), if it becomes apparent that this will reduce tension and conflict.
- IfS funding allowed the Delegation to finance more politically sensitive projects, as well as to take more risks, which may be necessary in a volatile context.
- Ensuring and making budgetary provisions for EU staff, implementing partners and other donors to be trained in or at least made aware of conflict sensitivity was critical to the programme in Sri Lanka at this sensitive time.
- Ensuring that there was a draw-down facility that trusted partners could use for rapid response to sudden new conflicts was extremely helpful.
- Delegations can take advantage of the high flexibility of EU instruments. The IfS (now IcSP) is a highly flexible instrument; it can be operational within two to three months and allows direct contracting. Apart from the quick contracting, its procedures are similar to other instruments and it is highly 'do-able' and does not impose new procedural burdens on Delegation staff.

## FURTHER INFORMATION

- <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/535-conflict-sensitivity-assessment-of-eu-programmes-in-sri-lanka>
- EU, Country Strategy Paper, Sri Lanka 2007

## Overview of SBC experience

### CONTEXT

Since implementation of the Budget Support Guidelines in January 2013, several SBCs have been signed, and others are under preparation. The guidelines and 'Concept Note Streamlining the Preparation of State Building Contract Operations' approved by management in December 2012 are available on the EC intranet.

### GENERIC LESSONS LEARNED

- An SBC is provided when situations of fragility or transition require action to support transition processes towards development and democratic governance, including sustainable changes in transition societies, to help partner countries to ensure vital state functions and to deliver basic services to populations. Assessments of eligibility for SBCs focus more on forward-looking political commitment and institutional reforms than backward-looking track records, but require stronger political and policy dialogue and, if necessary, closer monitoring and possible targeting of EU funds.
- The 'Concept Note Streamlining the Preparation of State Building Contract Operations' recommends developing SBC road maps for the preparation of SBC operations that identify and address key weaknesses for the design of an SBC in a specific country. They also aim at framing the policy dialogue, including capacity development, with the partner country to allow for and strengthen the use of country systems, 'making the case' for the SBC. It is suggested that the road maps be developed under the leadership of the geographic directorates and in close collaboration with Delegations and with the participation of relevant Headquarters services.
- After more than one year of SBC implementation, it is possible to see some early results and positive effects, such as a faster preparation process, strengthened donor coordination, a more forward-looking approach and a focus on transition.



## SBC in Côte d'Ivoire

<p><b>CONTEXT</b></p>	<p>In Côte d'Ivoire, the political crisis of the last 10 years followed by the post-electoral crisis of 2010–11 clearly weakened the state and the administration. The situation was considered an exceptional shock. Tailor-made external support through a two-year SBC beginning in October 2012 has seemed adequate in helping the country restart.</p>
<p><b>CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES</b></p>	<p>The main challenges in Côte d'Ivoire were the need to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• consolidate peace and stabilisation;</li> <li>• improve internal security, justice and health;</li> <li>• improve public financial management, allowing longer-term budget support to be provided;</li> <li>• reduce the high levels of poverty;</li> <li>• trigger inclusive and sustainable growth.</li> </ul> <p>Opportunities that the SBC was designed to enhance included improving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the macro-economic framework;</li> <li>• public financial management, transparency, audit and control, and the fight against corruption;</li> <li>• internal security;</li> <li>• justice;</li> <li>• health (provision of decentralised services).</li> </ul> <p>Elements of the dialogue included progress in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the national development strategy;</li> <li>• the macro-economic framework;</li> <li>• public financial management and transparency and control of budget.</li> </ul>
<p><b>ACTIONS TAKEN</b></p>	<p>The EUR 115 million SBC (of which EUR 55 million was disbursed in 2012 and EUR 56 million in 2013) provides support fully in line with SBC objectives by supporting the implementation of the national strategy to strengthen the security and justice sectors, and improve public financial management and the macro-economic situation.</p> <p>The choice of indicators for the variable tranche is focused on consolidation of peace and stabilisation through the improvement of internal security (two indicators), justice (two indicators), public financial management (four indicators) and health (two indicators).</p> <p>Nevertheless, the initial two-year duration seemed too short to complete the rebuilding of the state and make the transition towards another type of contract. Therefore a rider was agreed upon, adding EUR 28 million to the SBC and extending it for one more year; a second SBC is in preparation.</p> <p>This SBC is a good example of a forward-looking approach that is likely to create a basis for future budget good governance and democracy and sector reform contracts.</p>
<p><b>LESSONS LEARNED</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is better to select a few indicators that are then closely monitored rather than many that are difficult to measure.</li> <li>• It will often take longer than expected to reach a stage where the SBC has reached its goals.</li> </ul>

## SBC in South Sudan

### CONTEXT

South Sudan faces huge challenges in its efforts towards state-building and transition out of fragility. It is a new country, with an administration under construction. The country is highly dependent on oil exports and afflicted by internal conflicts, as evidenced by the coup of 15 December 2013.

### CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

There are multiple challenges facing South Sudan. The main challenges the four-year SBC initiated in August 2013 focuses on are:

- the escalating social tensions caused in part by lack of basic services and exacerbated by ethnic divisions;
- inadequate provision of health and education;
- long-term food security and low agricultural productivity.

Opportunities that the SBC was designed to enhance include improving basic services in the education and health sectors by partially covering the salaries of those sectors' employees.

Elements of the dialogue included progress in:

- implementation of the National Development Plan;
- credible, stability-orientated macro-economic policy, a public financial management reform action plan, and public access to timely, comprehensive and sound budgetary information.

### ACTIONS TAKEN

The programme consisted of EUR 80 million in budget support to cover the salaries of health and education workers in the government's payroll system for two years and EUR 5 million in complementary support aimed at strengthening the public financial management capacities of local authorities in charge of the delivery of basic services.

Disbursement of the two tranches is subject to a number of conditions, including a rolling audit of the electronic payroll system; agreement on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff monitored programme and a New Deal compact, as well as adoption of legislative frameworks on public procurement and the management of oil revenues; and evidence that political, public financial management, developmental, macro-economic and corruption indicators had not deteriorated.

To date, disbursement of the first tranche under the SBC has not been accomplished due to non-compliance with the above-mentioned conditions.

### LESSONS LEARNED

- The preparation of the South Sudan SBC was an example of good donor coordination, both locally and at the capital level, with key development partners such as the IMF, the World Bank, the United States and EU Member States.
- With an outbreak of renewed conflict, a contingency plan is needed. At a minimum, arrangements are needed for making an urgent collective review of programming priorities and the continued opportunity and relevance for the SBC in South Sudan.

## NOTE NO 6

# Using flexible procedures in situations of conflict and fragility

## SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES CALL FOR SPECIAL RESPONSES

### Topic overview

Situations of conflict and fragility are complicated and fast changing. In addition to the variety of modalities and instruments that allow the EU both to react rapidly and develop the basis for long-term transition and change, there is a need for flexible procedures within these instruments and modalities — as highlighted by the EC (then the Commission of the European Communities) in its [2007 Communication](#) on an EU response to situations of fragility.

Each year and in response to emergencies, the EC establishes a crisis declaration list. For countries on the crisis list and where justified, grants can be awarded without a call for proposals, and negotiated procedures used for the procurement of services, supplies and works. In this way, the procurement of essential goods and services can be hastened and undertaken in situations where normal procedures would not work. Additional elements of flexibility can be applied (Box 1); it is also possible to apply for derogations that are available for non-crisis countries — such as rules of origin and nationality, proof of non-reimbursement of taxes, etc.

#### SUMMARY

- It is good practice to use some form of enhanced competition rather than none at all.
- Flexible procedures are used in crisis situations, but often, because of the crisis, they are not necessarily faster or less complicated than the normal procedures followed in non-crisis situations.
- The use of flexible procedures is usually more demanding rather than less demanding of expertise and familiarity with procurement and negotiation skills.
- Flexible procedures are not common even within crisis declaration countries, but when used strategically they can provide significant benefits.
- The use of flexible procedures introduces new risks and puts a decision burden on those involved.

#### BOX 1 Additional elements of flexibility for crisis situations

- **Annual programming.** In a crisis situation, grants can be made that were not foreseen in the annual programme.
- **Retroactivity.** In a crisis situation, expenditure incurred by a beneficiary before the date of submission of an application may be eligible for EU financing (although a grant may not be awarded retroactively for actions already completed).
- **Co-financing.** In a crisis situation, the demand for co-financing of grants can be relaxed if needed for the action to be carried out.

In 2012/13, 38 countries were on the crisis declaration list. During 2012, EU Delegations for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries on the list signed 1 348 contracts, of which 213 (about 16 %) used some form of flexible procedures. Contracts using flexible procedures accounted for around 22 % of the total value of contracts signed in 2012.

### Key issues

Issues and dilemmas that have arisen in trying to apply flexible procedures include the following.

- **Using flexible procedures is not necessarily quicker or simpler.** Flexible procedures do not necessarily reduce the work burden on Delegation staff. It cannot

### BOX 2 Good practice: increased competition

Although the contracting authority is entitled to apply a direct award/negotiated procedure following a declaration of crisis, the relevant authority may decide to:

- invite more than one candidate to the negotiated procedure or direct award, rather than just one — for example, in the case of grants, a restricted call for proposals is published, and, after evaluation of the concept notes is received, a negotiation process is started with the different applicants, as opposed to going to a second proposal stage;
- apply competitive negotiated procedures above the thresholds (as provided for in Points 3.4.2, 4.5 and 5.6 of the Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions (PRAG) or with additional, duly justified flexibilities, etc.);
- apply normal open or restricted procedures (as provided for in the PRAG or with additional duly justified flexibilities, such as shortest deadlines, limitation of the number of tenderers, etc.).

be expected that use of flexible procedures in crisis situations will necessarily be faster or simpler than use of normal procedures in non-crisis situations. A crisis will generally make any type of procedure more difficult and more time consuming. The advantage of flexible procedures is that they make it possible to procure contracts or award grants in circumstances where normal procedures would make their timely achievement very unlikely or even impossible.

- **A crisis declaration gives the option of using flexible procedures, but justification is still required case by case.** Flexible procedures add a justification burden to the preparation process. Declaration of a crisis situation is necessary but not sufficient; each contract needs a justification of why the specific circumstances of the country or the project do not allow an increased level of competition beyond single-source negotiation or direct award — i.e. less justification than required by normal procedures but more than the minimum allowed for under flexible procedures (Box 2). There has been a tendency to both under-respond and over-respond to this justification requirement.
- **Approval is not guaranteed and if ultimately not provided can lead to much greater delays.** As the head of the Delegation approves actions managed by the Delegation, it is prudent to check in advance whether there is agreement in principle to the use of flexible procedures before discontinuing procurement through normal procedures.
- **The documentation burden with flexible procedures might be greater.** The documentation burden can be greater because there is an additional need to document the negotiation process and make the appropriate coding in the Common External Relations Information System (CRIS). It appears from the 2013 stock-taking exercise that insufficient documentation of the negotiation process and inaccurate coding in CRIS were quite common.
- **Use of flexible procedures requires great familiarity with normal procedures.** In many ways, flexible procedures require at least, if not greater, in-depth insight into procurement practices if they are to be used swiftly and well. It can be more difficult and require greater experience to negotiate a good contract or to award a direct grant than to go through normal procedures of tender or call for proposal. Greater familiarity with the market and more judgement are needed. Flexible procedures can be more difficult to use than normal procedures for inexperienced staff. These procedures are more demanding because they require strong contract negotiation skills.
- **Use of flexible procedures introduces new risks and puts a decision burden on those involved.** The use of flexible procedures introduces risk of the wrong agent or partner being chosen because the process of selection is not as rigorous. Using flexible procedures for selection is done in the full knowledge that the risk of less rigorous selection is less than the risk arising from no action or delayed action, which would be the result of following normal procedures. This is a difficult judgement, and in some cases individuals may feel they are safer and more protected from criticism when not taking action.
- **There are potential drawbacks to using flexible procedures.** Flexible procedures can lead to low-quality contracts or grant partners with unnecessarily high budgets, especially if it is realised that there is no competition or option for the Delegation. There can also be unintentional bias in the selection. The use of some form of increased competition (see Box 2) is one way of improving quality and price. It can also be useful to place more attention on the terms of reference and task description, and to assign more resources to the monitoring of the grant or contract.

## Case studies

The following case studies shed light on some of the issues outlined above and point to specific examples where Delegations have found innovative solutions even in the most difficult circumstances.

### Sudan: Provision of technical assistance to support implementation of the Primary Education Retention Programme

SOURCE	DEVCO Stock-taking Exercise on the Use of Flexible Procedures 2013
CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES	<p>After the secession of South Sudan in 2011, the Sudanese government in Khartoum suffered a dramatic cut in its resources and had to prepare a revised budget; this made drastic cuts to transfers to the states, in particular on development expenditure and social sectors.</p> <p>The core challenge was that, unless quick remedies were introduced, many children would not go to school in 2013 and 2014, especially in states where education performance was already low (i.e. Red Sea, Kassala, Gedaref, South Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile States). Also, there was a risk of unrest resulting from limited implementation of the promised peace dividend in terms of support for basic services.</p> <p>The Delegation was funding UNICEF and Save the Children to implement the Primary Education Retention Programme (PERP) in five selected states, targeting around 440 000 children. Technical assistance was required to assist the Sudanese authorities in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• introducing evidence-based planning and management;</li> <li>• developing an understanding of the causes and risks of drop-outs;</li> <li>• preparing retention action plans.</li> </ul> <p>In terms of impact, the Delegation expected a significantly lower rate of student drop-out from P1 to P8 in areas covered by the PERP compared with other areas.</p>
ACTIONS TAKEN	<p>After protracted and difficult negotiations with the Education Ministry on implementing modalities and in view of the urgency due to government budget cuts, the Delegation decided that a full formal tender was no longer possible and decided to use a negotiated procedure instead.</p> <p>The Delegation established criteria for selection, and invited eight firms to submit an offer. The Delegation negotiated with the best provider to improve the proposal. The overall contract value was EUR 1 415 680.</p>
LESSONS LEARNED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of flexible procedures was justified on the grounds that the normal contract procurement process would take too long — even though some of the delay was due to the government itself delaying decision-making.</li> <li>• A form of improved competition can be viable rather than a pure single-source negotiation.</li> <li>• The flexible procedures had the desired impact, and up to 440 000 children who would otherwise have dropped out of school were enrolled in school in 2013 in five conflict-affected states of Sudan.</li> </ul>

## Democratic Republic of Congo: Gender-based violence initiative

<b>SOURCE</b>	DEVCO Stock-taking Exercise on the Use of Flexible Procedures 2013
<b>CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<p>The problem of gender-based violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is particularly serious and persistent, despite the signing of peace agreements and the return to some degree of stability. The United Nations Population Fund stated that around 1 100 rapes are reported every day and that, in some areas, three-quarters of the women have been attacked. It is urgent to make progress in tackling the problem, as more attacks take place every day that progress on this issue is delayed.</p>
<b>ACTIONS TAKEN</b>	<p>The EU agreed in July 2012 with the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities on a new multi-sectoral approach. In August, a formulation study began; this was concluded by October. A negotiated procedure was used to sign a contract with a specialist company for EUR 77 814 to conduct the formulation study. The recommended programme has four components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● contribute to changes in behaviour and thinking, leading to a new perception of masculinity and femininity;</li> <li>● strengthen the economic power of women, in partnership with men;</li> <li>● strengthen the capacity of state actors to intervene and coordinate action against sexual violence;</li> <li>● support security and judicial state functions in offering a more protective framework against gender-based violence.</li> </ul>
<b>LESSONS LEARNED</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● It is possible to justify launching a quick start to a formulation study; in this case, the reason was the ongoing violence against women and the need to implement both long- and short-term measures as soon as possible.</li> <li>● The time lapse from agreement with country authorities and finalisation of the study was just four months, showing the degree to which the use of flexible procedures served its purpose in hastening action.</li> <li>● The expected impact: the incidence of sexual violence was reduced in Kinshasa and Bandundu (fewer women and children were attacked).</li> </ul>

## Chad: Programme for local development and management of natural resources

SOURCE	EU Delegation to Chad
<p>CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES</p>	<p>Chad hosts the world's fifth largest population of refugees. In 2012–13, Chad was hosting over 344 000 refugees fleeing conflict in Darfur, Sudan and the Central African Republic — some refugee camps had been in place for more than 10 years.</p> <p>Chad's stability is affected by various conflicts at most of its borders. The eastern border is volatile because of the conflict in Darfur. The Libyan crisis remains a source of insecurity at the northern border, particularly in the border region with Niger where there is rampant arms trafficking and where the effect of instability in northern Mali is also felt. There is an ever-present risk that the Islamist sect Boko Haram, rampant in Nigeria (west border), will make Chad a base. The border with the Central African Republic is also unstable.</p> <p>Food/nutritional crises and epidemics (cholera, measles, meningitis) are frequent and an additional source of fragility for a large segment of the population. In some post-conflict areas (e.g. Tibesti), there are mines and other explosive remnants of war that threaten human lives and livestock.</p> <p>The situation of permanent insecurity and other sources of fragility, together with the limited capacity of the state and low capacity of NGOs, severely limits the effectiveness of external support.</p>
<p>ACTIONS TAKEN</p>	<p>Flexible procedures were used in Chad to prevent the failure of interventions due to low technical capacity, poor governance, and the poor administrative capacity of NGOs and service providers to respond to calls for proposals and tenders. Use of flexible procedures allowed the EU to do the following.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Engage partners and NGOs already in place that were known to be good performers even if they were not able to raise the normal level of co-financing — in this case, 80–90 % of financing was provided by the EU. This flexibility in co-financing extended the range of NGOs that could be engaged, which in turn enabled the EU to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ plan a smooth handover from humanitarian actions carried out under ECHO in a transition from relief, towards rehabilitation and development;</li> <li>→ ensure continuity and coordination with actions carried out by the thematic programmes — e.g. the thematic programme on food security.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Engage highly specialised NGOs on de-mining operations;</li> <li>● Purchase equipment outside of the eligible countries, thus reducing the costs and time of delivery as well as making better use of spare parts and services available on the local market (this derogation was available in practice under normal rules without resorting to flexible procedures);</li> <li>● Shorten the period for administering calls for proposals by reducing the number of steps requiring external approval and shortening the period for submission.</li> </ul> <p>An example was the direct engagement of COTONTCHAD through negotiations. This led to the speedy supply of 600 tons of cottonseed to farmers before planting deadlines and at a cost that did not exceed earlier levels.</p>

## LESSONS LEARNED

- Flexible procedures can ensure better continuity with humanitarian aid and with complementary actions carried out under thematic programmes, e.g. the food security programme.
- Under flexible procedures, it is possible to set up limited competition to ensure value for money — an example here was the careful, well-documented negotiation with a single supplier for cotton seed, which led to both quicker supply and a lower price. Another example is the issuing of a call for proposals with shortened approval stages and time for submission; such measures can significantly reduce the normal time span for such calls.



## NOTE NO 7

# Engaging with national counterparts in situations of conflict and fragility

## Topic overview

This topic is concerned with the issues and options that arise when national counterparts are weak. Weak counterparts are often the norm in states with situations of conflict and fragility within their borders. The Paris Declaration with its focus on aligning with the policies, plans and actions of national counterparts becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to implement in many fragile and conflict-affected states. In many cases, it is not at all clear who the relevant counterparts are. It is not easy to identify which counterparts have the security, capacity and legitimacy to rebuild the state. But it is not a solution to disengage with national counterparts or only work outside them, because ultimately it is those counterparts that will need to implement solutions in the medium and long term.

The OECD's [Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations](#) focus on staying engaged even where counterparts are weak. Key principles related to this topic are:

- Principle 2: Do no harm.
- Principle 3: Focus on state-building as the central objective.
- Principle 9: Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.

To fulfil these principles, the EU and its international partners need to provide concerted and sustained support that focuses on building the relationship between state and society. When political conditions deteriorate and partnerships become difficult, the donor's resolve to maintain a long-term engagement is severely tested.

As an illustration of how to work in these contexts, cases are presented on experience in working with local authorities (Yemen) and civil society (Kyrgyzstan).

## Key issues

There are many issues and dilemmas in supporting state-building and engaging with national counterparts when the situation is deteriorating. Some recommendations gathered from EU experience in supporting local authorities are given in Box 1. Key dilemmas that arise include the following.

- **How to identify the right counterparts in heavily contested national processes?** It can be helpful to distinguish three types of fragile situations, each calling for a different set of responses. There are many ways to distinguish such types, but one of the most useful is the [security-capacity-legitimacy model](#) outlined in [Part I](#) of this handbook:

### SUMMARY

- Especially where national counterparts are weak, EU support needs to provide concerted and sustained support to building the relationship between society and the state.
- Using the security-capacity-legitimacy model can help in knowing how to engage with national counterparts and with whom to engage.
- Local authorities are often relevant as partners where central authorities are weak or lack authority and legitimacy.
- CSOs have a role to play in the state-building process, usually as a temporary measure.
- CSOs can inform policy and decision-making by using their on-the-ground experience and information.

### BOX 1 Some recommendations arising from experience in supporting local authorities

1. Foster the downward accountability of all local authorities to scale up and institutionalise popular participation by:
  - choosing to work with and build on elected local governments where they exist (in Yemen, the Delegation found working at the local level to be an effective way of supporting improved health services);
  - insisting on and encouraging their creation elsewhere;
  - encouraging electoral processes that are open to independent candidates;
  - avoiding direct financial support to grassroots organisations for infrastructure and services that local governments should provide and where they have a potential to provide these, even if they are not doing so at present, as this undermines downward accountability from local authorities towards their constituencies;
  - exploring other interim solutions, such as supporting NGOs, with an exit strategy in mind where local government is dysfunctional and beyond the reach of support;
  - promoting multiple accountability measures to all institutions making public decisions.
2. Insist that non-government and traditional institutions must be accountable to representative local authorities on public decision-making matters.
  - Engagement of local communities/grassroots organisations with resources should take place within, rather than outside, the local authorities' planning and financing process.
3. Support local civil education.
  - Inform people of their rights, write laws in clear and accessible language and translate legal text into local languages. Educate local authorities on their rights and responsibilities.

Source: Jorge Rodriguez Bilbao, DEVCO.

→ **Security issues.** Some states have capacity and legitimacy, but the state has limited reach and suffers from illegal trafficking and/or chronic violence. In these cases, the state often does not have a monopoly on the use of force and has to share its authority.

→ **Capacity issues.** Some countries have legitimacy (e.g. through regular elections), but low capacity to deliver services. In these cases, local authorities or sub-national bodies might be relevant to engage with because they are able to focus on a smaller area and to coordinate better with others.

→ **Legitimacy issues.** Some countries have some capacity to deliver services, but suffer from weak legitimacy. Weak legitimacy may result from the violation of agreed rules, poor public service delivery, beliefs shaped by tradition and religion, or international action undermining national sovereignty.

Some countries have low levels on all three dimensions. It is easier to focus on capacity than legitimacy and security, as donors can often more easily find entry points within their resource skill sets that are capacity related than being able to provide support to legitimacy and security. The three elements are interlinked — a balance of support to the three elements is needed; this may vary over time depending on when opportunities arise.

- **How to stay engaged but also do no harm and not support partners that might worsen the situation?** In some cases, it will be determined that engagement should be with local authorities or civil society rather than with central state bodies. For example, engagement with the health sector in Yemen was at the local authority level, reflecting perceptions regarding its legitimacy, security and even capacity. In other cases, it will be determined that support is best channelled through NGOs; the IcSP is a potentially powerful and efficient instrument for such circumstances. In other cases, support to civil society can strongly complement support to government and thus help build the relationship between state and society from both sides. This is illustrated in the Kyrgyzstan case study.

- **How to advance policy dialogue and provide support that builds on values that are shared rather than imposed by donors and external culture?** It is not a straightforward matter to interpret where legitimacy and security lie. In ethnically divided societies or societies shaped by historical divisions, legitimacy and security might be much more local and complicated than in a stable and cohesive Western society, fragmented among different actors. In the Yemen case study, the choice of national counterparts recognised that security is rooted in tribal loyalties rather than at the national level. In some cases, it is necessary to work with the grain and not against it. In other cases, working against the grain might be the only way of doing no harm. The issues are often ethical in nature and deeply influenced by culture. For example, an issue in providing maternal health care in Yemen was determining to what extent the rights of women should be advanced in the face of local practices that appear to deny full rights.
- **How to promote interaction between CSOs and local authorities?** Where the national counterparts that are mandated to deliver basic services are very weak or entirely absent, it is challenging to define criteria as to when others such as civil society should be supported in providing basic services. The dilemma is that, on the one hand, such organisations may be the only practical means of providing services; but on the other, it is highly problematic and distorting in the long term to support organisations in providing basic services that they are not mandated to provide — in some cases, it can undermine the future legitimacy of the state. This was the case in Timor-Leste where, at one stage on the development pathway, NGOs and not the government became associated with service delivery. Support to CSOs should be addressed as part of a broader effort to reconstruct the local political space and the local political process. Where possible, other institutions involved in providing services of a public nature should be accountable to the public through the local representative authorities.
- **How to avoid the capacity trap?** Lack of capacity is seldom a good reason for bypassing local authorities, as it eliminates the opportunity for learning by doing. Beyond the capacity issues, there is the challenge in a weak context of using service delivery as an entry point to build the legitimacy of the state from below. A constructive way forward is to strengthen the capacity of local authorities as managers and facilitators of actions involving community groups and the private sector, as well as the capacity of citizens to demand to be part of the public policy-making process at the local level.

## Case studies

### Yemen: engaging with local authorities in the health sector

#### SOURCE



Sarah Bernhardt, EU  
Delegation to Yemen;  
Andrea Pavel, DEVCO

#### CONTEXT

Yemen, located at the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula, has a rich past and a troubled recent history. South and North Yemen were unified politically in 1990, but differences still persist.

The Arab Spring of 2011 saw a great mobilisation which led to the resignation of the president and the start of a transition process entailing a National Dialogue Conference (concluded in January 2014), redrafting of the constitution (ongoing) and new presidential elections now scheduled for 2015. The unstable area of the north (Sa'ada) and the governorates where the state traditionally had limited penetration (Shabwa, Marib, Al-Jawf) have long been insecure. Insecurity is spreading to other governorates in the centre and south (Al Bayda', Lahj, Abyan) where a war against Al-Qaeda sanctuaries is ongoing.

The economy is largely based on oil and natural gas, though resources will probably run dry in the next decade. Agriculture is mainly in the Tihama plain (along the Red Sea coast), and resources such as fisheries have not been effectively tapped. Yemen is a net food importer, and water is one of its most precious commodities. Main urban centres are few, and most people (70 %) are scattered in small rural hamlets. As tensions rise, roads are becoming increasingly insecure. The recent crisis has seen a severe decline in the Yemeni economy, which has increased poverty and hunger and generated additional humanitarian needs, as well as an additional caseload of Internally displaced persons. Many areas suffer from acute and chronic malnutrition.

#### CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The health system in Yemen is a baroque construction with elements modelled on Gulf State, Egyptian, Soviet Union and British systems. Over time, the Yemeni system has accommodated donations from various governments of structures, infrastructures, epidemiological priorities and human resource development that have not necessarily corresponded with the real needs of the country. For instance, despite the very high toll that malnutrition has taken in Yemen over the past 30 years (the country has the world's second-largest chronic malnutrition crisis), nutrition is not taught in universities or included in medical curricula.

Health outcomes sadly reflect the overall organisation. The habit of patronage introduced decades ago also applies to the health system where, for instance, the global number of civil servants is very high, but the category of administrative staff outweighs by far the core health professionals. A deep feeling of disempowerment from colleagues working both at national and sub-national levels is what most strikes newcomers.

At the same time, the combined impact of the Arab Spring, the national dialogue, a strengthening of local EU presence and learning from past experience has led to opportunities to work with national counterparts at both the central and sub-national levels and to engage in a different way with civil society.

## ACTIONS TAKEN

The EU has been contributing to the Yemeni health system since the late 1990s, but implementation of agreements has been chronically delayed by many factors, including a lack of capacities in the Yemeni health system, but also the fact that programmes have been followed remotely for over 10 years.

For the first decade, the EU contributed to major reforms in the health sector, but always from afar, without expertise on the ground. Though this period is still remembered as a very fertile and challenging one, very little remains of that phase. For instance, the Essential Service Package, a product of the health sector reform, has never really been rolled out, and many governorate health directors do not even know of its existence.

Since 2007–08, with expertise present in Yemen, the EU has been engaging in more policy dialogue and is expanding the service delivery component, allocating money to the central level for disbursement at the sub-national level. This decision, which seems wise when measured against parameters of good donorship, ignores an essential feature of the Yemeni administration. Since the introduction of the 2000 law on local authorities, the budget does not go to central ministries for distribution to sub-national levels, but instead goes directly from the treasury to the point of expenditure, with a consistent share directly distributed to governorates and districts. In some ways, the EU funding inadvertently gave power to the central level on issues that were a local responsibility. In 2010, the EU decided to fund in accordance with the way in which the government disbursed its budget, engaging with a number of governorates directly (six, so far, representing approximately 40 % of the Yemeni population) through the health development councils. This decision, along with training and assistance to local authorities, became the single most important factor in continuity during the Arab Spring, when the central ministry shut down for about eight months. At the periphery, although the work slowed, it did not stop: services have continued to be delivered at a rate comparable to normal times, and the health development councils have slowly but steadily increased speed and capacity.

The councils work on the basis of agreed-upon governorate health plans. The EU funds a series of activities taken from the plans that are strategically important to the improvement of health indicators, but severely underfunded by the Yemeni government budget. The underfunding that the EU is addressing covers a wide variety of areas, including life-saving drugs, the shortage of qualified midwives, transportation for emergency cases, much-needed family planning opportunities, and a means for local authorities to target areas not considered a priority by the general system. All relevant stakeholders in the governorate participate in the health development council mechanism; this includes civil society along with the private health sector and civil servants.

This approach has been conditioned by the absence of a vibrant NGO community, independent of the government and capable of demonstrating results. For the EU, this is a demanding mechanism that needs to be monitored and steered — and which ultimately needs expertise on the ground. At the same time, EU support for the central health ministry mainly addresses gaps in stewardship and governance so as to promote growth of both ends of the spectrum (the central as well as the sub-national levels). This compounds lessons from the past where the EU has alternatively supported the central or sub-national level, missing the opportunity to create consensus around reforms and changes. The failure of the 2000 health sector reform shows, among other things, that major reforms cannot be imposed anymore, but need to come from a critical mass of managers and colleagues already working in the sector.

## LESSONS LEARNED

- **Institutional reform needs consistent long-term support.** It is important to follow up and support momentum and consolidate success (e.g. the promising health reform process stalled because it was not supported for long enough, for instance by addressing a critical mass of staff). In response, the EU's new support provides more energetic and long-term support to institutional capacity building.
- **Donors need to harmonise resources effectively around reforms,** rather than follow a bilateral approach. If not, there is overlap and congestion, and the absorption capacity of central authorities is swamped, leading to long delays. Ironically, the absorption capacity at the local level can be higher. Donors should not underestimate the tendency of the central level to address issues bilaterally with each donor without sufficient coordination. Ultimately, they should invest in nurturing a culture of wide coordination in the institutions.
- **Both national and local levels need support.** In Yemen, because of the highly regional nature of legitimacy and authority, simultaneously targeting national as well as sub-national levels was found to be crucial in maintaining services through a succession of crisis events. The local level was particularly important given the absence of strong NGOs and organised civil society.
- **In-country Delegation presence strengthens the ability and quality of engagement** in meaningful policy dialogue and work with a range of national counterparts.
- **Prolonged fragility at the state level and low resilience within civil society complicates the process of building the relationship between the state and society.** After years of conflict and chaos, decision-making skills are weak. Confidence is shaken, and decision makers are disempowered by their inability to shape events. The focus is on survival rather than on the long-term planning implied by the OECD principles.
- **Evaluations are needed. Lessons from an evaluation carried out in 2011 were useful in shaping future support.** The findings from this evaluation included the following: (i) there are not enough data to evaluate in depth; (ii) the capacity of both central ministry officials and health care providers appears to have increased; (iii) utilisation of outpatient services (mother and child care) increased; (iv) effective community participation is taking root in the targeted governorates; (v) little residual impact was found, however, for the institutional component.

## FURTHER INFORMATION

- MED/2010/254-619. Final evaluation of 2 Financing agreements in support of Yemeni health sector
- DCI-MED/2010/254-063. Evaluation Study — Health Development Councils (HDC) Yemen
- MED/2013/317-722. Evaluation of the EU support to Reproductive Health services in Taiz, Lahij Al Hudaydah, and accompanying measures in view of its continuation
- DCI-MED/2014/339-106. 'Evaluation of the EU support to Yemen: Reproductive Health and Population Programme phase 2



## Civil society engagement in police reform in Kyrgyzstan with support from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

### SOURCE



Samara Papieva and Sebastien Babaud, Saferworld

### CONTEXT

In Kyrgyzstan, a police reform process started in 1998, managed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in partnership with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other international partners. While two concepts were adopted in 1998 and 2005, it is widely recognised that these processes, focusing on technical capacities rather than on changing attitudes and behaviours, were not successful in generating change in police performance and improving the public's perception of the police. The 2010 overthrow of the president following public unrest and consequent inter-ethnic clashes in the South, and the behaviour of the police against the civilian population, have further deepened public mistrust in the police, making it imperative to change the dynamic of the reform process.

### CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

There had been no meaningful experience of CSOs in the police reform process — or, more broadly, in debates on security issues in the country. Civil society involvement into policymaking in Kyrgyzstan generally has been limited; consequently, there is not much experience in constructive collaboration between the state and civil society on which to build.

CSOs lacked expertise on policing and other security sector reform issues, which limited their ability to contribute meaningfully to policy discussions and decision-making processes. Although some CSOs were trying to influence policing and other security-related issues — for example, human rights-focused CSOs able to document and publicise abuses by the police — they struggled to agree on a clear and shared strategy on how to influence the process and provide meaningful recommendations for improvement.

For these reasons, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the government were generally reluctant to involve civil society in the police reform process and not interested in their potential role and inputs.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Call for Proposal provided an opportunity to address this shortcoming and ensure that civil society could have a say in this key democratisation process. The objective of the call for proposals was to 'assist civil society in developing greater cohesion in working on human rights (political, civil, economic, social and cultural), political pluralism and democratic political participation and representation'.



## ACTIONS TAKEN

With support from the EU through the EIDHR, Saferworld has supported the establishment of the Civic Union for Reforms and Results, a network of 25 NGOs, including women, youth, ethnic minorities and other marginalised groups in Kyrgyzstan, to become involved in the police reform process. Capacity building for network members has focused on:

- improving their understanding of democratic and community policing to enhance their ability to provide relevant expertise in the process;
- research and development of a series of evidence-based recommendations, reflecting the views of the public from across Kyrgyzstan;
- strategic development of an advocacy campaign to identify the most effective approaches to influence the process.

As a result of these efforts, the Civic Union for Reforms and Results has become a well-functioning network, continuing to undertake activities and to provide inputs into the police reform process beyond the terms of EU support.

The union is now recognised as a credible and valuable actor in the police reform process in Kyrgyzstan — to the point that it now has access to and regularly meets with officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as with its international partners. Its briefings are shared broadly among all key actors involved in the process.

Thanks to the involvement of the Civic Union for Reforms and Results, the police reform process has been able to take into account the needs and expectations of the public for improved security provision — including such issues as police-public cooperation and accountability, which now feature in official policy (Government Decree on Police Reform Measures from 2013; Order on Accountability of Neighbourhood Police Officers; Law on Interaction of Police and Civil Society from 2014).

## LESSONS LEARNED

- **CSOs have a role to play in policymaking on sensitive issues such as security**, which is a key challenge in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It is also an important area of engagement for international actors supporting reforms or processes in various security and justice sectors. While security is traditionally seen as a prerogative of the state in which civil society is not considered a relevant stakeholder, this case study shows that, despite initial reluctance, a genuine collaboration was put in place which benefits the orientation of the police reform.
- **CSOs can play roles beyond serving as implementing partners of development projects, including the provision of expertise to inform policy- and decision-making.** It is important to acknowledge these other roles, especially in terms of policy- and decision-making and especially in contexts where state institutional capacity is weak. The purpose and successful outcome of this project shows that when capacity building is effectively orientated, civil society actors can become experts on an equal footing with governmental actors, making the collaboration even more meaningful.

- **Constructive engagement is a factor in success.** In tense political situations, civil society can be associated with opposition; similarly, CSOs sometimes have confrontational relationships with the institutions they are willing to change or influence. This case study shows that evidence-based analysis/recommendations and careful analysis of the advocacy context suggested that a constructive approach would be more effective than the initially envisaged confrontational one. It enabled the civil society network to become a partner rather than an opponent and to win the trust of government representatives.
- **The important role of international NGOs.** It is often challenging to identify the relevant CSOs and networks in contexts affected by conflict and fragility, or even to assess the potential of actors to achieve positive change. International NGOs that are aware of a country's CSO institutional culture and capacities, challenges and opportunities — and at the same time familiar with donor requirements — can play a useful role in bridging a serious gap. Another important aspect of the partnership between Saferworld and the civic union has been the provision and building of expertise to a high standard in order to become a trustworthy interlocutor for national and international actors.
- **EIDHR is an effective instrument in supporting civil society participation in police reform processes.** People-centred police reform is a key condition to building democracy and respecting human rights. Especially in conflict-affected and fragile contexts where the police can sometimes be abusive, it is critical that reform processes take into account people's views and concerns about police behaviour and how the police can better serve them. This case study shows that the EIDHR has been a key vehicle in achieving this approach and should be considered more frequently to support civil society engagement in security and justice sector reforms.

#### FURTHER INFORMATION

- <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/791-trust-through-public-accountability>
- <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/792-the-population-and-the-police-partnership-through-dialogue>
- [www.reforma.kg](http://www.reforma.kg)

## NOTE NO 8

# Working with international actors in situations of conflict and fragility

## TAKING ADVANTAGE OF EACH OTHER'S ADDED VALUE AND AVOIDING CONTRADICTIONS

### Topic overview

From information sharing to use of common strategic frameworks, collective action has proved both feasible and essential in situations of conflict and fragility. Where weak governance or conflict situations make alignment on government strategies difficult, donor coordination is particularly needed.

Better collaboration involves designing common analyses and strategies; effectively sharing information; dividing tasks and responsibilities among actors; maximising complementarities and synergies; avoiding gaps and

#### BOX 1 OECD Principle 8: Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors

- Coordination between international actors can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership.
- It is important to work together on upstream analysis, joint assessments, shared strategies and coordination of political engagement.
- Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labour among donors, delegated cooperation arrangements, multi-donor trust funds, and common reporting and financial requirements.
- Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities.
- In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help to set and monitor realistic priorities.

#### SUMMARY

- Coordination between international partners is particularly needed in the absence of strong national counterparts.
- Coordination is easier in those sectors where the government has the most well-defined responsibilities and clearest policies.
- Country-specific transition compacts that provide light, flexible agreements between national and international partners are proving useful for joint prioritisation and in improving aid coherence and effectiveness.
- Fragile and conflict-affected situations need a multi-dimensional response which places further demands in terms of coordinating each agency's expertise.
- Working groups organised by sector, theme or geographic area can be effective for structured discussions on coordination.
- Building on existing coordination arrangements rather than creating new ones allows for swifter reaction to crisis.

contradictions; and taking advantage of each other's expertise, experience and added value.

Principle 8 of the OECD's 10 [Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations](#) recognises the importance of cooperation (Box 1). But this principle was considered one of the four most 'off-track' in 2011, according to an [OECD monitoring survey](#).

This note looks at how to work in coordination with EU Services — DEVCO, ECHO and FPI at the EC, and EEAS (internal coordination) — as well as with EU Member States and other international actors (external coordination).

## External coordination arrangements

A brief overview of different types of coordination arrangements with other international actors is presented in Table 1. It is not meant to provide a complete picture of those processes.

**TABLE 1** Brief overview of some coordination processes

Process	Main purpose	Reference
New Deal	The New Deal sets out a framework for more effective international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations and commits its signatories to support inclusive country-owned transitions out of fragility. National actors and their international partners commit to use resources more effectively and more transparently, to invest more in country systems, to build critical local capacities and to deliver timely and predictable aid.	<a href="http://www.newdeal4peace.org/">http://www.newdeal4peace.org/</a> See also <a href="#">Section 2.3</a> of Part I
Compacts	Light, flexible agreements between national and international partners on key priorities with an explicit strategy for how, and from which instruments, implementation will be financed. Appropriate management and monitoring structures should be agreed upon, recognising the need for them to remain light and flexible.	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC(2011)41&amp;docLanguage=En">http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC(2011)41&amp;docLanguage=En</a>
Multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs)	MDTFs are generic funding mechanisms that can channel and leverage resources in an effective, predictable and coordinated way. The EU can now lead MDTFs; these are called European Union trust funds (EUTFs) for external actions.	See also <a href="#">Note No 5</a>
Post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs)/ post-disaster needs assessments (PDNAs)	Assessments that are needed after a conflict (PCNA) and after a disaster (PDNA). They are government-led exercises, with integrated support from the EU, the UN, the World Bank and other national and international actors.	PCNA; PDNA
Transitional results matrix	A planning, coordination and management tool for national stakeholders and donors that helps to set and monitor realistic priorities in countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement.	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/48634348.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/48634348.pdf</a>

## Internal coordination arrangements

Coordination arrangements are adjusted from time to time, and reference to the latest organisation charts may be needed.

At Headquarters, DEVCO's Fragility and Resilience Unit acts as a focal point for coordination efforts with both internal and external actors to address situations of conflict and fragility (Box 2). In this capacity, the unit — together with ECHO's Specific Thematic Policies Unit — co-chairs the **Transition Inter-service Group** which brings together EC service (mainly DEVCO, ECHO and FPI) and EEAS representatives to discuss developments relevant to humanitarian and development cooperation. The Transition Inter-service Group is the main internal structure in charge of supporting implementation of the Resilience Action Plan.

On crisis coordination, ad hoc **DEVCO Crisis Coordination Platforms (DCCPs)** act as an internal DEVCO coordination arrangement to ensure full coordination with other EU institutions and particularly with EEAS. The DCCP coordinates DEVCO's position for the **EEAS-led Crisis Platform**. The **EEAS-led Crisis Platform**, facilitated by the EEAS Crisis Response (CROC) and Operational Planning Department, can be convened on an ad hoc basis to provide EEAS and EC services with clear political and strategic guidance for management of a given crisis.

**BOX 2 Main missions related to coordination arrangements of DEVCO's Fragility and Resilience Unit**

- Provides support when necessary to EU Delegations dealing with major crisis and fragile situations, in coordination with geographic and thematic directorates and EEAS
- Promotes a coherent and effective 'Whole of EU' approach to crisis and fragile situations for EU instruments and policies in synergy with EEAS, CSDP and Member States, and in cooperation with outside bodies (UN, regional organisations, etc.)
- Acts as a focal point in DEVCO on actions and interventions in countries in fragile or crisis situations and facilitates coordination with ECHO, FPI and EEAS — including CSDP structures such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), EU Member States, the UN System and continental and regional bodies such as the African Union Commission — with the collaboration of all other relevant Directorates/Units

Source: Main missions of DEVCO Directorates & Units.

On the coordination between humanitarian assistance and development, the **Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework (JHDF)** methodology allows humanitarian and development actors to work from a common understanding and to define joint priorities for collective actions. The development of a JHDF is best done through a workshop, ideally organised in-country with the EU Delegation and ECHO field office — and possibly with the participation of other stakeholders (country partners, Member State agencies and other donors).

At the country level, good work practices between the Delegations and the ECHO field offices have been identified with specific reference to linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) (Box 3).

Specific day-to-day, field-level working arrangements between the EU Delegations and ECHO field offices are described in Section 2 of the [Working arrangements document, SEC\(2012\)48](#).

This note presents lessons identified in two coordination processes that led to:

- the **LRRD Bêkou ('Hope') EU Trust Fund** in the Central African Republic as an outcome of the LRRD process which included a workshop based on the **JHDF methodology**;
- the **Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework** in Afghanistan, an approach based on mutual commitments of the Afghan Government and the international community to help Afghanistan achieve its development and governance goals.

## Key issues

- **Donors sometimes have different agendas, diverging national interests and different analyses of the situation.** Joint approaches are nevertheless essential to support complex state-building processes. Joint context-specific analysis is a key starting point. For partner countries, collective actions improve the predictability of resources and minimise transaction costs. They also stimulate national actors' efforts in support of the transition out of fragility. To the extent possible, the partner government (at the central, sub-national or local level) should lead aid coordination.
- **Humanitarian and development actors usually have different priorities, working cultures, target groups, timelines, budget lines and tools to operate.** There is no linear sequence from relief to rehabilitation to development (continuum) but rather a parallel approach of complementary programmes and coexisting phases of response (contiguum). Development practitioners should be more risk-informed, taking into account possible consequences of vulnerabilities, disasters and crises. Humanitarian actors should try to identify options where alignment to longer-term objectives is possible. The resilience approach calls for more systematic interactions between development and humanitarian actors. The JHDF methodology proposes a frame to bring together these two sets of actors.

### **BOX 3** Lessons learned from a study on good LRRD practices within the Delegations and the ECHO field offices

**Knowledge of the characteristics of the two types of operations.** Exchanges between ECHO and EU Delegations are simpler and more constructive when each person has some knowledge of the main characteristics of the other's operations. For example, in the case of an urbanisation project in Haiti, ECHO staff demonstrated good knowledge of the characteristics and challenges of development work in the Haitian context. Examples of collaboration between EU Delegations and ECHO that went well were those that were able to overcome mutual preconceptions (i.e. that development actors do not focus on the most pressing problems and that humanitarians slow down development by not working with governments).

**Curiosity, motivation to better understand the global context (environment, major issues, actors, etc.) and a desire to improve the situation beyond one's own action.** Niger is an example where curiosity and the motivation to refine operations and adapt them as much as possible to contextual priorities led actors to approach other operators, or to create or join information exchange networks. This encouraged them to open up to actors outside their own institution.

**Exchange of experiences on a regular basis between emergency relief organisations and development organisations (ECHO, EU Delegation and other actors).** Regular exchanges (formal work meetings, informal discussions or experience sharing) and the sharing of reports, analyses and secondary documents that help in making relevant and contextually appropriate decisions and the design of integrated programmes (LRRD) were very useful, notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti and Niger. In Ethiopia, the EU Delegation took part in an evaluation of ECHO, which helped to increase its understanding of ECHO's operations and the constraints and challenges it faces.

**Joint analysis of the context and appropriate responses.** In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Niger, LRRD-related operations by the EU Delegation are based on joint analysis by the two bodies of the operational context and priorities to be taken into consideration. When possible, joint missions to the field are organised (initial assessment, evaluation and monitoring). In Ethiopia, the EU Delegation and ECHO are working in the same geographical areas, called '**EU Resilience Clusters**', chosen because of their high vulnerability, risk of drought and recurrent humanitarian presence. The EU Delegation and ECHO support the development of a long-term vision per cluster and a **joint monitoring and evaluation framework**. Moreover, they often work with the same consortia of NGOs; use the same coordination set-up at local, regional and national levels; and jointly work on research, exchange of lessons learned and impact assessment.

**Source:** Good LRRD practices within the Delegations and the ECHO Field offices, Groupe URD, January 2013, 'Methodological Support and Training for Project and Programme Management' Programme.

- **The more partners that are involved, the more complex the decision-making process becomes.** However, using analysis and information made available by others (e.g. donors' risk assessments and the related mitigating measures) and/or working jointly on assessments is key to making rapid, informed decisions.
- **Coordination tends to decrease speed and flexibility when reacting to a situation.** The transaction costs of coordination can be high. However, gaps in international assistance and uncoordinated activities may be harmful to peacebuilding and state-building processes. Working on existing coordination mechanisms is necessary. Generic coordination mechanisms should be adapted to the local context before a crisis occurs, and re-evaluated afterwards.

## Additional resources

- EU, May 2007, [EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy](#)
- EU, June 2009, [EU Toolkit for the Implementation of Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy](#)
- EC, 2014, [The Busan Commitments, An analysis of EU progress and performance](#)
- The DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF): <http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/>

## Case studies

In addition to the two cases on the Central African Republic and Afghanistan presented here, Somalia also represents an interesting experience regarding the Somali New Deal Compact. This process was initiated in December 2012 by the Federal Government of Somalia and the international community, with the EU taking the role of lead donor. The compact prioritises Somalia's peacebuilding and state-building goals for the next three years (2014–16), with one chapter dedicated to 'a new partnership for more effective international assistance'. The compact's primary aims are to diminish overlap and duplication of efforts, and increase government ownership as well as coordination between the EU services, the Member States and others. See more at <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/article/nuts-and-bolts-new-deal-somalia#sthash.5tIQ2f71.dpuf>.



## Central African Republic: LRRD process and the LRRD Bêkou ('Hope') EU Trust Fund

### SOURCE



Dominique Albert, ECHO; Erica Gerretsen and Théodore Vallegeas, DEVCO; and Olivier Ray, Agence Française de Développement

(Photo credit: Pierre Terdjman for the Agence Française de Développement)

### CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The Central African Republic has been a typical 'aid orphan' in the grey zone between humanitarian assistance and development. The coup d'état in March 2013 plunged the country into serious conflict during which thousands have died and close to 1 million people have fled their homes; refugees currently account for nearly one-quarter of the population. The country faces a bleak mix of governance, economic, social, humanitarian and security challenges. The transitional government is very weak, and the absence of a minimally functioning state and its confinement to the capital (Bangui) is one of the root causes of the crisis. Sub-regional problems include trafficking, poaching and agro-pastoralist clashes.

The Central African Republic endorsed the New Deal and is a member of the [g7+ group of fragile states](#). There are few donors in the country, although a strong commitment has been made by the EU, which is co-piloting the New Deal implementation with France.

### ACTIONS TAKEN

An LRRD workshop was held in February 2014 with participants from the EC (DEVCO, ECHO), EEAS, Member States (France and the United Kingdom) and a small number of external experts. The workshop built on a desk study (by Inspire consortium) and a joint EU-UN conflict analysis. The desk study and workshop were structured along three focal areas: food security, health and education.

The workshop was prepared with the [JHDF methodology](#), which was adapted to the country context. The sequencing of the steps outlined in [Note No 4](#) on resilience follows the JHDF method.

The workshop started with a [common analysis of the situation based on the conflict analysis and desk study](#): what are the root causes of the crisis and their interplay?

A [diagnostic for each sector](#) was presented and completed by the participants. Taking into account the diagnostic and the existing interventions, they identified the most vulnerable target groups and priorities for the short and medium term.

A [matrix of interventions for each sector](#) was designed in working groups. Preferred options were selected according to each option's benefits and limitations.

A [donor matrix](#) was then compiled based on what each donor has in its portfolio. This provided an opportunity to analyse intervention coverage, possible gaps and overlaps.

A final session was held on the [identification of coordination mechanisms](#). Participants agreed on the need for more practical coordination between the most active humanitarian and development actors for the identification of interventions, monitoring and evaluation.



The main outcome of the LRRD process was the **establishment of an EU trust fund**, the first time the EU will lead a multi-donor trust fund. The LRRD Bêkou EU Trust Fund is planned in three phases from the end of 2014 until 2019. It will support the Central African Republic in the LRRD process and will become the EU vehicle for LRRD.

#### LESSONS LEARNED AND NEXT STEPS

- **We should think ‘outside the box’ in crisis situations.**
- **The JHDF methodology should be adapted to the context.** It can be based on existing studies so that the first step is an agreement on what has been previously analysed. **The process of going through the methodology is more important than the final framework.**
- The sector approach has limits and was questioned by some participants, but it allowed for the identification of operational priorities in each area. It does not prevent the promotion of an inter-sectoral approach on the ground — for example, providing food security through an education project (school canteen). **It is essential for group work to focus on different sectors, thematic areas or geographic regions.**
- In the situation of the contiguity between humanitarian, security and development stakes, the LRRD Bêkou EU Trust Fund is a unique opportunity **to get fast results while building efforts over the medium and long term.** The fund will serve as a joint funding modality, as a framework for strategic coordination and as a platform for policy dialogue. A flexible approach will be used to adjust humanitarian, rehabilitation and development actions to a changing context. The continuous involvement of Central African Republic authorities is one of the trust fund’s objectives.
- **One of the challenges is to go beyond simple coordination and to act collectively:** by aligning a common technical and financial partners’ strategy on the road map of the interim government and on the transition compact; and creating mutual means, missions and expertise, as well as a portfolio of integrated projects.
- **The EU role will be to mobilise and coordinate expertise** among Member State agencies according to their comparative advantage. The EU is not supposed to be a 29th European donor. Its value added will be to organise, facilitate and encourage collective actions among Europeans and possibly more broadly, to allow for knowledge sharing.

#### FURTHER INFORMATION

- [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/central-african-republic/central-african-republic\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/central-african-republic/central-african-republic_en.htm)
- <http://www.unocha.org/car>

## The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework: mutual commitments of the Afghan government and international community

### SOURCE



Kristian Orsini, EU Delegation to Afghanistan (Kabul 2011–13)

### CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the overturn of the emirate of Afghanistan, the December 2001 Bonn Conference initiated a post-conflict state-building process. A Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board was established in 2006 chaired by the Afghan government and the international community. This is the main coordination mechanism for assistance to Afghanistan, supported by three Standing Committees (security, governance and socioeconomic development) and a permanent forum for aid coordination. Regular consultations with the international community take place through weekly coordination meetings chaired alternately by the Ministry of Finance and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). There are also two major multi-donor trust funds in the country, namely the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).

However, the Standing Committees and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board lacked focus, and UNAMA was unable to provide the necessary leadership to improve the coherence of aid.

The main challenges linked to the Afghan context were as follows.

- **The very limited government capacity to absorb aid.** Aid flows outside the national systems have been vast, and donors have rarely consulted or coordinated with the government for off-budget projects.
- **Corruption.** This was a major issue and recognised by the government.
- **Various pressure groups in-country.** This led to too many government priorities and difficulties in carrying out reforms.
- **A period awaiting political transition and dominated by electoral competition.** This transition also required the presence of many donors with conflicting priorities.
- **Aid being made subordinate to military-driven short-term stabilisation needs.** One result of this was the provincial reconstruction team, which was yet another form of bypassing and disempowering state institutions.

The strong pressure from the donors to stabilise the country through necessary reforms of governance and economic growth led to the endorsement of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF).

## ACTIONS TAKEN

At the Tokyo conference in 2012, the international community pledged to improve aid effectiveness and to support sustainable growth and development of Afghanistan throughout the transformation decade (2015–24), with USD 16 billion for the next four years, establishing a stronger foundation for partnership. In return, the Afghan government committed to important economic and governance reforms, including holding credible elections, tackling corruption and improving financial transparency; and promoting human rights — including the rights of women and girls — sustainable democracy, good governance and economic growth.

**Discussions at the creation of the TMAF included addressing the following questions.**

- Who should lead coordinating efforts, given the weak government leadership?
- How should priorities be selected from the many set by the government?
- How could an enforcement mechanism be developed that would not lead to a negative impact on the final beneficiaries or losses for development agencies?

Ultimately the last point was not agreed upon, with several donors uncomfortable with the idea of setting up a **joint conditionality enforcing scheme**. This proved to be a weakness of the TMAF in light of the slow progress of government, given the weak credibility of sanctions.

The government and the international community agreed on a set of long-term indicators to monitor progress towards meeting their mutual commitments. In addition, a set of ‘hard deliverables’ were agreed on in order to assess progress in the short term — for example, ‘by June 2013, and annually thereafter, each Development Partner routes 50 percent of its aid through the National Budget’. While five donors took the lead in interacting with the government for the international community (Australia, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, UNAMA, the United States and the World Bank), **the other donors had an advisory role on an ad hoc basis according to their comparative advantage**. Broader consultations among donors were held in the weekly donor coordination meeting, while formal discussions took place through the pre-existing structure of the Standing Committees and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board.

Achievements include the endorsement of various laws — notably, promoting implementation of the law on the elimination of violence against women with the release by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs of its baseline report, the endorsement by the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) of the laws on minerals and value-added tax, and the introduction to the National Assembly of the laws relating to anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism and the law on tax administration (the law on value-added tax was passed by the upper house (Meshrano Jirga) in June 2014) — and the Aid Management Policy, which captures the New Deal commitment for mutual TRUST. The policy prioritises transparency, risk sharing, the use and strengthening of country systems, the strengthening of capacity and the provision of timely and predictable aid. Progress has also been made with regard to local governance, elections and human rights, including women’s rights.

## LESSONS LEARNED

- The TMAF is useful as an instrument for political pressure, but ultimately it lacked teeth.
- It is a useful framework to **focus government action** on short-term deliverables rather than high-level outcomes (e.g. Millennium Development Goal indicators).
- The strong pressure from donors to trigger reform was key in the process, notably the **shared identification among donors of what should be prioritised**.
- Having an **inclusive process**, notably acceptance of the governance structure, was essential.
- Having a **clearly identified counterpart**, in this case the Ministry of Finance, was very helpful.
- Weak government, however, prevented a greater degree of aid coordination. Ultimately, donors felt that complying with pledges (how much) was enough, and did not sufficiently push the government to develop a framework about what to fund and how to fund it.
- **The TMAF was mainly an instrument for governance change and reforms.** Aid coordination occurred in a limited way through this framework and was instead the result of several years of work. This was the case in health and education, where better defined responsibilities of the government, clear policies and the limited presence of a few core donors made coordination easier.
- **Establishing a set of restricted coordination leadership helps:** in this case, having five major donors leading the coordination and negotiation processes, with decisions taken by all.

## FURTHER INFORMATION

- <http://www.g7plus.org/afghanistan/>
- [http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/TMAF\\_SOM\\_Report\\_Final\\_English.pdf](http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/TMAF_SOM_Report_Final_English.pdf)
- <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1442913.pdf>

## NOTE NO 9

# Promoting inclusive and sustainable growth in situations of conflict and fragility

## COMBATING THE DRIVERS OF CONFLICT BY STIMULATING GROWTH

### Topic overview

Growth and job creation are important elements in a strategy to address conflict and fragility. Low income, poverty and youth unemployment are major drivers of conflict. Jobs provide income but are also essential in reconstructing society, restoring confidence and breaking the cycle of violence.

An enabling environment for growth and jobs can be encouraged by the public sector, but ultimately growth and jobs are reliant on the private sector. A vibrant private sector is an important actor with much to lose in conflict and thus with much reason to prevent and avoid conflict. A recent study isolated five key factors that constrain the private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states (Box 1). External support that helps overcome these factors will tend to support inclusive and sustainable growth.

This topic note looks at the case of Niger where a number of interventions were made to integrate youth into the employment market in the country's volatile border areas.

### Key issues

Issues and dilemmas that have arisen in trying to promote inclusive and sustainable growth in situations of conflict and fragility include the following.

- **Growth and employment rely on the private sector.** It is often more difficult to help the private sector directly, especially in fragile situations where the sector is fragmented and informal. The public sector has a role in providing an enabling environment, but when the public sector is weak, it is often without sufficient capacity, legitimacy and authority to make a difference. Nevertheless, democratic local authorities can play a transitional role by providing jobs to youth through labour-intensive local infrastructure projects. The small-scale local private sector is often remarkably resilient during conflict.

### SUMMARY

- A broad range of stakeholders needs to be involved in promoting inclusive growth and jobs in situations of conflict and fragility.
- The public sector has an important role in promoting growth by supporting initiatives and creating an enabling environment.
- Providing jobs and livelihoods — even if just temporarily through public works — can build skills and prevent young men especially from joining conflicts.
- Restoring infrastructure can bring new opportunities for the local private sector to grow.
- Supporting growth and employment addresses the root causes of conflict and is part of the trajectory that links relief to rehabilitation and development.

### BOX 1 Five factors that constrain the private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states

- Instability and political risk
- Access to electricity and transport infrastructure
- Weak capacity in the public and private sector (including weak governance and a skills deficit among potential workers)
- Poor investment climate (including business regulations and land rights)
- Access to finance

Source: IEG, 2013.

- **Careful sequencing and prioritisation are needed.** Support for growth and employment needs to start early, and supporting economic activity is an ideal preventative measure. During intense conflict, there are other priorities and it will often be impossible to make meaningful contributions to growth and employment. Supporting growth and employment addresses the root causes of conflict (which are very often linked to lack of development) and is part of the trajectory that links relief to rehabilitation and development. As agriculture is a major employer, the sequence is often from food security towards agricultural development and marketing. Recovery may focus initially on emergency employment for high-risk and needy groups; a shift to income-generating activities, private sector development and microfinance; and, finally, the creation of an enabling environment (IEG, 2013).
- **Extractive industries can fuel conflict as well as provide employment.** Extractive industries are not necessarily labour intensive and usually require special measures to create jobs. If not well managed, they can fuel conflict. Specific conflicts linked to these industries might increase in an unstable and fragile situation (i.e. involving pollution, water resources, etc.).
- **Improving infrastructure — particularly access to electricity — is important to private sector growth.** Even in fragile situations, there are opportunities for improving the energy sector and transport. Blending of grants with loans can be used to reduce punitive risk premiums.
- **Crowd in rather than crowd out the private sector.** Support activities in the rehabilitation and development phases should take into account the market situation during design, avoiding interventions in already saturated markets. Improved infrastructure (i.e. feeder roads) is crucial in increasing the offer of, and demand for, goods and services.

## Case study

### Niger: multiple interventions to integrate youth into the employment market in volatile border areas

#### SOURCE



Erik Ponsard, Rafael Aguirre-Unceta and Juan Villa Chacon, EU Delegation to Niger, Niamey, Niger

#### CONTEXT

Niger has suffered in the past from political turmoil and a number of armed rebellions. But now the problem is at Niger's borders. Instability has been growing during the last few years, not only threatening but now affecting Niger with spill-over effects.

- At the northern border, the 2011 revolution in Libya has resulted in the demobilisation of numerous former Tuareg rebels (Nigeriens and Malians alike) who had served under Colonel Gaddafi's regime and who eventually returned after its collapse. The uncontrolled circulation of weapons, drugs and human trafficking in the aftermath of the Libyan conflict is threatening stability in the entire Sahel area.
- At the north-western border, Niger's direct involvement in the military operation initiated by France in January 2013 resulted in spill-over effects to Niger (i.e. synchronised suicide attacks to military barracks in May 2013). The involvement of Nigeriens has not been officially revealed, although the complicity of the local population seems to have been essential in carrying out the attacks. The arrival of tens of thousands of returnees and refugees to the area escaping abuses perpetrated by extremist groups in Mali and later from military operations has added confusion, because of the likely presence of terrorist elements among these refugees.
- On the southern border, instability is rising due to Boko Haram terrorist attacks in Nigeria and the severe response of the Nigerian army, resulting in the loss of more than 3 600 lives (according to Human Rights Watch reports). Both sides of the border are populated by the same ethnic group, the Hausa, with an intrinsic risk of contagion because of ethnic solidarity and border porosity. These risks are being exacerbated by the arrival of more than 6 000 returnees and refugees escaping from the military operations in Nigeria. The presence of Boko Haram elements among these refugees cannot be excluded.

Regionally, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) have been responsible for actions in Niger since 2008. These include attacks against the Nigerien army and kidnappings, as well as the killing of several Westerners. These groups are also involved in all kinds of criminal cross-border trafficking. The presence of Mokhtar Balmokhtar's group (les signataires par le sang) has also been confirmed, as they claimed responsibility for the attack on Niamey's prison and the subsequent escape of Boko Haram members that brought the terrorist threat to the very heart of the capital.

## CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

A range of actions was needed both to prevent the rise and intensification of conflict but also aid post-conflict recovery. The challenges were significant.

A key opportunity was to promote the social and economic integration of young people including former rebellion fighters, mercenaries and returnees from Libya. These opportunities included activities to provide training and services to help the youth find employment. An improvement in the provision of health services in remote areas was also seen as a factor that could help stabilise the situation in the short term.

## ACTIONS TAKEN

An IfS (now IcSP) programme on support for security and stabilisation in northern Niger and Mali was initiated in early 2012 to end early 2014 (EUR 10.9 million). Multiple interventions were implemented to create an enabling environment including the creation of municipal police in 15 municipalities, de-mining to make areas accessible and encourage the transport of goods, and providing better health services. These interventions to improve aspects of the enabling environment complemented two specific interventions targeted at employment and growth:

- **Supporting vocational training and career development needs.** Activities undertaken include the creation of two additional platforms aimed at helping youth to integrate into the labour market and the construction of two vocational training centres, where 205 young women and men have already been trained. Additionally, 121 elected municipal counsellors and mayors received training on local governance issues, financial management and tendering. This training helps the enabling environment and ensures that public works create equal opportunities for employment.
- **High-intensity labour initiatives and small infrastructure works at the local level.** These efforts are having a very positive impact at the social and economic level as well as from an environmental point of view. Social cohesion, local governance and access to public services have been reinforced through these projects, encouraging dialogue between communities and local authorities. In terms of peace consolidation, the community works programme funded 368 000 working hours — the equivalent of 1 400 jobs over one year — offering employment opportunities to many young people, mostly identified as being at risk. Additionally, the programme has supported the implementation of income-generating activities resulting in the creation of approximately 2 000 jobs.

As the situation in neighbouring countries (Mali, Nigeria) was aggravating insecurity in some of Niger's areas, a second IfS (now IcSP) programme on support to reducing risks in terms of security and instability in the north-west and south-east of Niger was initiated at the end of 2014 (EUR 18.7 million). This second programme is extending geographically and reinforcing the activities implemented under the first programme, and is introducing some new ones: promoting tolerance and religious dialogue, offering cultural/entertainment opportunities to youth and contributing to border post security.

## LESSONS LEARNED

Comprehensive involvement of all stakeholders is necessary to ensure correct targeting of activities and beneficiaries. This will also result in a positive perception of the intervention by the local population.





**Annexes**



## ANNEX 1

## Glossary

<b>Crisis situations</b>	Situations posing a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilise the country, and which could seriously harm: (a) the safeguarding of the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the European Union; and/or (b) the security of the European Union, peace-keeping and international security, promotion of international cooperation or development and strengthening of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 168(2) of the <a href="#">Implementing Rules of the EU Financial Regulation and of the 10th EDF</a> ).
<b>Fragility</b>	Weak or failing structures and/or situations where the social contract is broken due to the state's incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable access to power, security and safety of the populace and protection and promotion of citizens' rights and freedoms (Commission of the European Communities, 2007).
<b>Resilience</b>	The ability of an individual, household, community, country or region to withstand, adapt and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as drought, violence, conflict or natural disaster (EC, 2012).
<b>Stabilisation</b>	Actions undertaken by international actors to reach a termination of hostilities and consolidate peace; understood as the absence of armed conflict. This term is usually associated with military instruments and usually seen as having a shorter time horizon than peacebuilding.
<b>State-building</b>	The endogenous process of strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations. It recognises that state-building needs to take place at both the national and local levels. The concept of state-building emphasises the importance of inclusive political processes, accountability mechanisms and responsiveness (OECD, 2011).
<b>Structural stability</b>	Situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to violent conflict. Working towards structural stability means the targeted reinforcement of those factors that enable peaceful change (EC and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2012).
<b>Transition</b>	Includes stabilisation, societal transformation, institution building and consolidation of reforms. Situations of transition include situations of conflict and fragility (EC Handbook on Working in Transition Situations).

## ANNEX 2

## Bibliography

## A2.1 Annotated bibliography

**ADE, Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building, Main Report, 2011 (138 pp.).** This evaluation provides an independent assessment of the Commission's past support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Among its conclusions, the report found that the Commission has, since 2001, implemented a substantial shift in support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments; however, there was a gap between the Commission's policy commitment to an integrated approach for conflict prevention and peacebuilding support and the actual implementation. It also found that the ambition of Commission support often remained wedded to a developmental perspective rather than fostering a shift towards a genuine conflict prevention and peacebuilding perspective with a clear and prioritised strategy. The evaluation proposes a set of eight recommendations with a view to improving future strategies and programmes. See also the report's annexes and the preliminary study (2009) and concept study (2010) conducted by ADE prior to the evaluation.

**ADE, Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform (JSSR), Main Report, 2011 (117 pp.).** The evaluation provides an independent assessment of the EC's past support to Justice and Security System Reform. The evaluation covers the period 2001–09 and all regions. It proposes a set of eight recommendations with a view to improving current and future EC and (where relevant) EEAS strategies and programmes. See also the report's annexes.

**Commission of the European Communities, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development — An Assessment, Communication, COM (2001) 153 final, 2001 (23 pp.).** This Communication follows on from the Communication on LRRD of 1996. It analyses LRRD in different types of crisis (Section 2), identifies international coordination mechanisms (Section 3), analyses EC linkage strategy including tools and instruments (Section 4) and concludes with a range of measures that could improve the Community's contribution to international efforts in post-crisis situations. The document highlights the necessary acceptance of a higher degree of 'technical risk' in the implementation of cooperation notwithstanding the inherent political risk.

**Commission of the European Communities, Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility — Engaging in Difficult Environments for Sustainable Development, Stability and Peace, Communication, COM(2007) 643 final, 2007 (13 pp.).** The Communication proposes a strategy for an agreed and coordinated EU response to situations of conflict and fragility in third countries. The strategy is based on better use of the various instruments at the EU's disposal at the political, diplomatic, humanitarian, development and security levels. The Communication underlines the need to improve the LRRD strategic framework through better integration of governance, institutional development and security in particular. Finally, the Commission proposes a set of actions to launch the preparation of an EU response strategy to situations of fragility, *An NGO Perspective on the EU Burundi Pilot: The Implementation of the Council Conclusions on a EU Response to Situations of Fragility*. See also *Council Conclusion (2007)*:

**Commission of the European Communities, EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Developing Countries, Communication, COM(2009) 84 final, 2009 (12 pp.).** This strategy is part of the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015* introduced via the United Nations' International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. This Communication sets out an overall EU approach to the prevention of disasters. It identifies areas for action and outlines specific measures to boost disaster prevention in the short term. It was adopted in a package with the Communication on a *Community Approach on the Prevention of Natural and Man-made Disasters* addressing disaster risk reduction within the EU. It was followed by an *Implementation Plan of the EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries 2011–2014*.

**Council of the European Union, Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security, 2008 (43 pp.).** The approach recognises the close links between peace, security, development and gender equality and outlines common definitions and principles to promote the participation and protection of women in conflict situations and peacebuilding. The document ends with a set of specific measures. An annex presents EC-relevant instruments and recent indicative examples of support to actions in the area of women, peace and security.

**Council Secretariat and European Commission, The European Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), 2006 (27 pp.).** The document sets out the EU approach to DDR for future engagements, based on previous experiences and lessons learned at the international level. It indicates that DDR is more successful when part of a broader security sector reform, and thus complements the Policy Framework for EU support to security sector reform adopted by the Council in 2006. The EU concept presents key principles for EU support to DDR, including local ownership and the need for a holistic approach that integrates transitional justice,

political dialogue or human rights initiatives. Finally, the document outlines steps to enhance coordination and complementarity between EU activities, including civilian and military aspects.

**DRN, Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Including Solidarity with Victims of Repression), Main Report, 2011 (81 pp.).** The report indicates evidence of results and positive impacts in relation to both the promotion and protection of human rights. However, a deficit in the EC/EU political commitment towards implementing an effective and coherent human rights policy and a lack of related knowledge, capacities and incentives have been highlighted. As a consequence, the political status of human rights in the EC/EU external action should be upgraded so as to ensure coherent action and increase impact. See also the report's annexes.

**ECHO/EuropeAid, The Factsheet on Resilience: Learning from Food Crises, 2013 (4 pp.).** The fact sheet outlines key messages such as 'focusing on resilience ... contributes to ... boosting the impact of aid and promoting sustainable development' and provides a definition of resilience. The document presents two Commission flagship resilience initiatives: Supporting Horn of African Resilience (SHARE); and l'Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience Sahel (AGIR-Sahel). The fact sheet concludes with examples of humanitarian projects and development projects contributing to resilience.

**European Commission, Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013–2020, Staff Working Document, SWD (2013) 227 final, 2013 (24 pp.).** The action plan sets out proposals for the way forward on the implementation of the principles and priorities outlined in the Communication and the Council Conclusions on the EU Approach to Resilience. The Action Plan is articulated around three priorities: (i) EU support to the development and implementation of national and regional resilience approaches, capacities and partnerships; (ii) innovation, learning and advocacy; and (iii) methodologies and tools to support resilience.

**European Commission, The Budget Support Guidelines, Tools and Methods Series, 2012 (172 pp.).** The Guidelines reflect the new policy on budget support spelled out in the Communication 'The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries' (October 2011) and corresponding Council Conclusions (May 2012). See also the Executive Guide, September 2012 (12 pp.). The guidelines notably present the rationale of the choice between the three kinds of contracts: good governance and development contracts (GGDCs), sector reform contracts (SRCs) and state-building contracts (SBCs). It is this last kind of contract that should be used in situations of fragility or to support transition processes towards development and democratic governance. See [Annex 9](#).

**European Commission, Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector, Communication, COM(2013) 542 final, 2013 (17 pp.).** The Communication presents a set of measures to enhance the efficiency of Europe's defence and security sector. It explores ways in which the EU can support Member States in strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy and outlines proposals through an action plan for fostering innovation, growth and jobs, through the promotion of civilian/military synergies and measures to support defence-related small and medium enterprises. The action plan is articulated around seven priority areas.

**European Commission and High Representative (European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies, JOIN(2012) 27 final, 2012 (18 pp.).** The Joint Communication examines what the EU has to offer to help countries in transition achieve successful and sustainable transformations, building on its own experiences (Part I). It then sets out six concrete measures to improve EU tools and approach i.e. the way in which the EU supports these countries so that they could achieve lasting reforms and avoid backsliding: (i) Responding to partner societies' needs; (ii) Anchoring the process with early achievement; (iii) Applying incentives, constraints and conditionalities; (iv) Involving all relevant stakeholders; (v) Enhancing knowledge-sharing and development capacities; and (vi) Cooperating with Member States, other donors and organisation.

**European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Towards a Renewed EU-Pacific Development Partnership, JOIN(2012) 6 final, 2012 (11 pp.).** The Joint Communication builds on the Cotonou Agreement and experience gained in the implementation of the EU Strategy for the Pacific. The 2006 EU Strategy for the Pacific was a first step in reinforcing EU partnerships beyond a donor-recipient relationship. The Joint Communication focuses on the development aspects of EU relations with the Pacific region. It proposes a set of actions for more effective Pacific-EU cooperation — on human rights, democracy and good governance, and sustainable development. The vulnerability of the Pacific Islands made the region a foreign policy priority for the EU.

**European Commission and High Representative (European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises, Joint Communication, JOIN(2013) 30 final, 2013 (12 pp.).** The comprehensive approach is about the strategically coherent use of EU tools and instruments. After making the case for a comprehensive approach (Part I), the Communication sets a way forward for a comprehensive approach to conflict or crisis situations (Part II) through eight concrete steps (of which each includes set of actions): (i) develop a shared analysis, (ii) define a common strategic vision, (iii) focus on prevention, (iv) mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU, (v) commit to the long term, (vi) link policies and internal and external action, (vii) make better use of EU Delegations and (viii) work in partnership. The document concludes (Part III) by highlighting the shared responsibility of EU-level players and Member States — the proactive engagement of Member States is a pre-requisite for success.

**European Council, [The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, a Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2007 \(82 pp.\)](#).** The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was adopted at the EU-Africa Lisbon Summit in 2007. Its purpose is to develop a political vision and practical approaches for the future partnership between the EU and Africa, based on mutual respect, common interests and the principle of ownership. The document outlines a first action plan (2008–10) for all EU Member States aimed at supporting Africa's efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. It defines eight specific areas of cooperation, the first of which is peace and security. Since the 2010 Africa-EU Summit, the EU and Africa have been active in supporting the implementation of the second JAES action plan (2011–13) to deliver more and better results.

**European Council, [The European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003 \(14 pp.\)](#).** The document outlines the principles of the European Security Strategy. Part I identifies contemporary global challenges and security threats. Part II presents the three EU strategic objectives to defend its security and to promote its values: addressing the threats, building security in our Neighbourhood and an international order based on effective multilateralism. The third part defines policy implications for Europe. Four years after the adoption of the strategy, a review was made to examine its implementation with a view to proposing recommendations. The resulting document, the 2008 [Report of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World](#) effectively confirmed the strategy's validity.

**European Council, European Parliament, European Commission, [European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Joint Declarations \(2008/C 25/01\), 2008 \(12 pp.\)](#).** This consensus represents a strategic framework adopted following an analysis of operations carried out and consultation of the parties involved. While Part One presents the EU vision of humanitarian aid including the EU common framework to deliver EU humanitarian aid, Part Two defines how the Community will apply the common principles and good practices defined in Part One, within the framework outlined to deliver EU humanitarian aid. Part Three on final provisions identifies the next steps. The document ends with a one-page annex on principles, standards and evaluation criteria for humanitarian aid. An Action Plan (May 2008) complemented the consensus. See also: [Action Plan to the Consensus](#), [Mid-term Review of the Action Plan](#), [Examples of Good Practice \(Libya and EUFOR\)](#).

**European Parliament, Council and Commission, [The European Consensus on Development, 2006 \(19 pp.\)](#).** The first part of the joint statement sets out common objectives and principles for development cooperation. It reaffirms the EU commitment to poverty eradication, ownership, partnership, delivering more and better aid, and promoting policy coherence for development. It includes a specific section on addressing state fragility. The second part sets out the renewed European Community Development Policy, which implements the European vision. It clarifies the Community's particular role and comparative advantages. According to those, it identifies areas for Community action to meet the needs stated by partner countries. Conflict prevention and fragile states is one of them. It guides the planning and implementation of the development assistance component of all Community instruments and cooperation strategies with third countries.

**European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, [The EPLO Statement on the EEAS Mid-Term Review: An Opportunity to Strengthen the EU's Capacity to Prevent Conflict and Build Peace, 2013 \(7 pp.\)](#).** Based on the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office's previous analysis of the establishment and development of EEAS, this statement sets out how the review can be used to make EEAS and in turn the EU as a whole more effective at peacebuilding. See also the [one-page summary](#).

**Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), [The Accra Agenda for Action, 2008 \(23 pp.\)](#).** The Accra Agenda was designed to strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration. It reiterates the need for national ownership and managing for results, and points to inclusive partnerships (developing countries, donors, foundations and civil society) to accelerate progress towards the Paris targets.

**Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), [Development Assistance Committee \(DAC\) Peer Review of the European Union, 2012 \(143 pp.\)](#).** This review contains lessons learned and recommendations for EU development cooperation. It builds on the EU actions taken in response to the DAC recommendations from the previous peer review of 2007. One of the 2012 review recommendations is 'Develop joint planning and analytical frameworks for fragile contexts and disaster risk reduction, and provide operational guidance for working across the Commission on these issues'. Within the Chapter 1 discussion of the strategic framework, a section deals with making the most of EU comparative advantage in fragile states. The review also highlights (Chapter 4) that increased flexibility is needed, especially within the ICSP and for decision-making procedures. Chapter 6 deals with Humanitarian assistance.

**Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), [International Engagement in Fragile States, Can't We Do Better?, Conflict and Fragility Series, 2011 \(60 pp.\)](#).** How successfully have the 10 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations been implemented? How can the international community improve its contribution to development in fragile states? Four years after ministers of the OECD Development Assistance Committee endorsed the principles, 13 countries (Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo) decided to take stock of the quality and impact of international engagement across the areas of diplomacy, development and security. This report synthesises the main lessons learned from the ground for each principle, with recommended priority actions to improve their implementation.

- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles for Smart Aid*, 2005 (2 pp.).** The publication presents in a snapshot the commitments of over 100 developed and developing countries around five principles that make aid more effective: national ownership (developing countries set their own development strategies, improve their institutions and tackle corruption), donor alignment to national priorities and country systems, donor harmonisation (donor countries and organisations coordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication), managing and measuring results, and mutual accountability (donors and developing countries are accountable for development results). The Paris Declaration notes the need to adapt and apply aid effectiveness principles to differing country situations, particularly fragile states.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, 2007 (4 pp.).** The principles were drafted at a 2005 Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, reflecting a growing consensus that fragile states require responses that are different from better performing countries. There is operational guidance based the principles in order to sharpen donor strategies and programmes in situations of conflict and fragility (see e.g. the [DFID guidance](#)). The principles are also being used in evaluations and to review [collective donor engagement](#) in some countries.
- Republic of Sierra Leone, Development Assistance Coordination Office, *Fragility Assessment: Republic of Sierra Leone — Summary of Results*, 2013 (14 pp.).** Sierra Leone was the first country out of seven (Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste) to pilot the New Deal implementation through a country-led fragility assessment. The report summarises the main findings, which in turn feed into the Agenda for Prosperity (2013–17), Sierra Leone's third Poverty Reduction Strategy. The assessment identifies drivers of fragility and priority actions for the New Deal's five peacebuilding and state-building goals (legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundation, revenue and services). The report ends with a section on peacebuilding and state-building indicators and sources.
- Republic of South Sudan, *Fragility Assessment: Republic of South Sudan — Draft Summary Results*, 2012 (pp. 12 pp.).** The Republic of South-Sudan is one of the seven countries that piloted the New Deal implementation through a country-led fragility assessment. The report outlines concepts, progress, results, selected indicators and challenges and priority actions for each of the five peacebuilding and state-building goals. It ends with a section on common shared indicators. The overall assessment indicates that South Sudan has made sufficient progress on all five goals since independence in July 2011 to move beyond the crisis stage of the fragility spectrum. The assessment informs the design of national development plans, as well as compacts with international partners to support plan implementation.
- Timor-Leste Fragility Assessment Team at Ministry of Finance, *Fragility Assessment: Timor-Leste — Summary Report*, 2013 (44 pp.).** Timor-Leste is one of the seven countries that piloted the New Deal implementation through a country-led fragility assessment. The report is articulated around the five peacebuilding and state-building goals. Progress, challenges and recommendations are identified for each goal. The assessment found that while security has been the biggest area of progress, justice and economic foundation need more attention in the future for improvement. A fragility spectrum and short list of Timor-Leste indicators are presented in Annexes 3 and 4, respectively.
- The 2006 Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2 pp.).** Endorsed by over 100 states, the declaration is a diplomatic initiative designed to support states and civil society actors achieve measurable reductions in armed violence, in both conflict and non-conflict settings, and in order to enhance sustainable development. Its implementation, supported by a core group of signatories, is based on (i) advocacy to raise global awareness about the negative impact of armed violence on development; (ii) monitoring to improve our understanding of the scope, scale and distribution of armed violence and its negative impact on development; and (iii) programming to develop and carry out commitments enshrined in the Geneva Declaration.
- The 2003 Good Humanitarian Principles drafted by 16 donor governments, the European Commission, the OECD, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, and academics (1 p.).** The principles were drawn up to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of donor action, as well as their accountability to beneficiaries, implementing organisations and domestic constituencies, with regard to funding, coordination, follow-up and evaluation. They provide both a framework to guide official humanitarian aid and a mechanism for encouraging greater donor accountability. They informed, for example, corrections made to the initial response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake.
- The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.** The convention is the first legally binding international instrument to incorporate the full range of human rights — civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights — for children and youth. These include the right to survival; to develop to the fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse and exploitation; and to participate fully in family, cultural and social life. It also sets standards in health care; education; and legal, civil and social services.
- The 2000 United Nations Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.** The protocol establishes 18 as the minimum age for compulsory military recruitment, prohibits children from taking a direct part in hostilities, and requires support for and rehabilitation of children who have been recruited into armed conflicts.
- The 2000 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on the Impact of War on Women, and Women's Contribution to Preventing Conflict and Promoting Sustainable Peace.** This resolution acknowledges the changing nature of warfare, in which civilians are increasingly targeted, and women's continued exclusion from



participation in peace processes. It addresses not only the inordinate impact of war on women, but also the pivotal role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution and sustainable peace.

**The 2006 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians.** The resolution contains the first official Security Council reference to the responsibility to protect (paras. 138 and 139). The UN initiative on the Responsibility to Protect is founded on the premise that ‘the duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and foremost with the State, but the international community has a role that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their people’.

**The 2008 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 on sexual violence as a tactic of war.** The resolution highlights that sexual violence in conflict constitutes a war crime and demands parties to armed conflict to immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians from sexual violence, including training troops and enforcing disciplinary measures.

## A2.2 References on specific themes

### A2.2.1 Definitions and types of situations of conflict and fragility

Call, C. T. ‘Beyond the “Failed State”: Toward Conceptual Alternatives’, in *European Journal of International Relations*, 17(2): 303–26, 2010.

Carment, D., and Samy, Y., *Assessing State Fragility: A Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report*, Carleton University, Ottawa, 2012.

Grävingholt, J., Ziaja, S., and Kreibbaum, M., *State Fragility: Towards a Multi-Dimensional Empirical Typology*, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn, 2012.

### A2.2.2 Natural resource ‘curse’

Auty, R. M., *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis*, Routledge, London and New York, 1993.

Bannon, I., and Collier, P., eds., *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003.

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
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
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## ANNEX 3

## EU responsibilities for fragility and conflict\*





## ANNEX 4

## Online knowledge sharing and collaboration platform: Capacity4dev.eu

[Capacity4dev.eu](http://capacity4dev.eu) is EuropeAid's knowledge sharing and collaboration platform that offers advanced information management tools for EC staff and development practitioners from across the world, including partner countries and Member States. Join the discussion today by becoming a Capacity4dev member! It's as easy as 1, 2, 3:

1. Access <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/user/register>.
2. Enter your details (to access EC groups, you must register with a valid work e-mail).
3. Go to your inbox to confirm your account before signing in for the first time.

Capacity4dev.eu hosts more than 300 thematic groups, offering collaborative spaces for members to stay informed about and contribute to specific issues. Depending on information sensitivity, groups can be accessible to everyone, restricted to specific member profiles or invitation only. Find out more about [group types](#) and [how to join a group](#).

Once you are signed into the platform, you will find two main groups on fragility and crisis management:

- **Public Group on Fragility and Crisis Situations:** A space where members can freely exchange knowledge on fragility and crisis management with the wider community. This group is visible to everyone, but you must be a member if you wish to post information or comment on other posts. <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/>.
- **EC/EEAS Group on Fragility and Crisis Situations:** A secure space where members can exchange information, lessons learned, best practices of fragility and crisis management with internal colleagues — this group is visible to all EC and EEAS staff members registered with a valid work e-mail, as well as any of the group's invited members. <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/internal-fragility/>.

Both of these groups are administered and facilitated by DEVCO's Fragility and Crisis Management Unit. Whether you are searching for replicable contexts, lessons learned, specific guidance documents or simply wish to contribute to or exchange information on these issues, these groups can offer an opportunity to become a dynamic actor in a diverse and rich community of development professionals.

Each group comes with tools such as an informative and structured reading section under [Pages](#), a discussion space under [Blogs](#), an organised document library with specific taxonomies, an [event](#) calendar (including seminars, workshops and knowledge events), a [task management tool](#), a member gallery to see who's who and much more!

Find out more about Capacity4dev.eu and its tools by browsing the [Help & Guidance](#) section.

Any questions? Feel free to contact the [Coordination Team](mailto:capacity4dev@ec.europa.eu) ([capacity4dev@ec.europa.eu](mailto:capacity4dev@ec.europa.eu)) for further assistance.

## ANNEX 5


# Useful distinctions of situations of conflict and fragility

Besides the security-capacity-legitimacy model shown in Graph 1.1.3, other distinctions that staff find useful in categorising situations of conflict and fragility include the following.

Distinctions based on levels of violence	Distinctions based on current dynamics	Distinctions based on natural resource endowment	Distinctions based on income (low/middle)
<p>a. In situations of large-scale violence (e.g. Sierra Leone 1991–2001), emphasis should be on humanitarian assistance and establishing security, but opportunities for state-building are limited.</p> <p>b. In situations that are vulnerable to or emerging from violence (e.g. Sierra Leone 2002), it is important to identify the drivers of violence, address structural causes of violence, and support institutions and processes for conflict management.</p> <p>c. When there is a lower risk of large-scale violence (e.g. Sierra Leone 2013), there usually is sufficiently strong agreement among elites, but society can be fragmented and state-society dialogue can have broken down — issues which cause continued fragility and impede development.</p>	<p>a. In situations of prolonged crisis or impasse among key national stakeholders (e.g. Somalia 2013), state legitimacy is weak and many core functions of the state are not fulfilled, requiring emphasis on political settlement and service delivery.</p> <p>b. In deteriorating situations, vicious circles can reinforce each other, including a weakening or less inclusive political settlement, a growing predation economy, and an explosion of violence, requiring that international actors stay engaged and keep open whatever humanitarian and political space may exist (e.g. Syria 2013).</p> <p>c. In post-conflict situations (e.g. Burundi 2013), state responsiveness to the needs of ordinary citizens usually improves, and the political settlement becomes stronger; progress remains reversible, however, as trust and institutions remain fragile. International actors must remain alert to causes and manifestations of fragility, including those beyond the governance and security sectors (e.g. inclusive, job-creating growth).</p>	<p>About 11 fragile states (DAC INCAF, 2012, p. 19) depend on minerals or fuel for 75 % or more of their exports, and all of them are subject (in varying degrees) to the ‘curse of natural resources’, meaning that they have a greater chance of having a small manufacturing sector, high vulnerability to variations in commodity prices, highly unequal income distribution, unproductive rent-seeking behaviours, corruption and a higher probability of armed conflict.</p>	<p>The 2012 Communication on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies: ‘there is no uniform prescription for a successful transition process or EU response. For instance, a fragile state within the group of least developed countries, such as Burma/Myanmar, may require a somewhat different response from that of more advanced middle income countries like Tunisia or Egypt.’ While a decade ago, most countries in fragile situations were low income, now nearly half are middle-income fragile states, thanks to high and sustained (but often not inclusive) economic growth: as aid is usually a small part of the financial flows into in these countries, due to their access to larger loans and private investment, it can be difficult for aid to be a catalyst for development-orientated programmes and policies.</p>

## ANNEX 6

# Recipients of EU development assistance considered by the OECD to be in situations of fragility (2009–12)



Source: Adapted from OECD, <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>.

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