Chad Country Focus Report

The period from late 2024 to November 2025 was characterised by a post‑transition political order that consolidated executive dominance, narrowed civic space, and heightened surveillance of civil society. Despite their indispensable role in humanitarian response and community‑level resilience, civil society organisations continued to face severe limitations on their ability to advocate, monitor governance, or exercise fundamental freedoms.

Chad’s current civic environment cannot be understood without recalling the trajectory of political consolidation that began in April 2021, when the death of President Idriss Déby Itno on the battlefield enabled the Transitional Military Council (TMC) under the president’s son, Mahamat Idriss Déby to seize power, suspend the 2018 Constitution, and centralise authority through a Transitional Charter. Although the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) of 2022 was presented as a national consultation intended to steer the country back to constitutional order, extensive boycotts by civil society and opposition groups weakened its legitimacy and ultimately enabled the military leadership to maintain control while framing the process as participatory.

This sequence set the stage for the December 2023 constitutional referendum and the promulgation of Chad’s fifth constitution—both marked by controversy—which paved the way for the 2024 electoral cycle. The May 2024 presidential election, marred by allegations of violence, restricted monitoring, and opposition exclusion, reinforced executive dominance and unfolded against the backdrop of lingering impunity for past abuses, including the October 2022 crackdown. The December 2024 legislative elections, the first in more than a decade, produced a sweeping majority for the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) party and triggered opposition protests amid accusations of fraud, intimidation, and implausible turnout figures. Although a new National Assembly was inaugurated in February 2025, the concentration of political power remained effectively unchanged, heightening concerns about pluralism and institutional oversight.

Throughout this period, civic space faced significant contraction. Authorities frequently employed Ordinance No. 011/PR/2023 to block peaceful assemblies—including youth- and rights‑based mobilisations—and episodes such as the February 2024 killing of the opposition Socialist Party Without Borders leader Yaya Dillo by security forces during their attack on the party’s headquarters in N’Djamena deepened the climate of fear. Independent assessments consistently documented repression of civil society activists, arbitrary detentions, and excessive force against protesters, underscoring the state’s preference for coercive control over genuine engagement.

Meanwhile, regional insecurity and humanitarian pressures intensified. Spillover from the Sudan conflict, renewed rebel activity (including Front for Change and Concord in Chad -FACT), and worsening cross‑border instability contributed to state securitisation, further justifying restrictive governance practices. The arrival of more than 240,000 new refugees from Sudan in 2024 placed additional strain on national systems, increasing reliance on civil society actors for protection, mediation, and basic services even as these same actors operated under heightened administrative and political constraints.