Haiti Country Focus Report

Haitian civil society operates in a deeply constrained environment shaped by overlapping political, security, humanitarian, economic, and environmental crises that have intensified over the past decade. The crisis has deepened since early 2024, when armed gangs forced then prime minister Ariel Henry to resign and went on to retain control over much of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Politically, Haiti remains trapped in a prolonged and fragile transitional governance process, marked by the erosion of constitutional order, weak legitimacy of governing authorities, and the absence of stable, accountable institutions. This enduring institutional vacuum has limited effective policymaking, delayed elections, and weakened the rule of law, directly affecting civic participation and state–society relations. Elections were last held in October 2016, and the last elected president, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated in July 2021. However, in December, the country’s Provisional Electoral Council announced a timetable for the long-delayed national elections, scheduling the first round for August 2026.

The security situation has deteriorated dramatically with the expansion and consolidation of armed gangs, which now exert de facto control over large urban and peri‑urban areas, including key economic and transport corridors. Gangs have targeted civilians through killings, kidnappings, rape, and extortion, while also attacking state symbols, hospitals, schools, media houses, and cultural institutions. The near‑collapse of the police and security forces—despite international support—has left the state largely unable to guarantee public safety, enforce the law, or ensure freedom of movement, severely constraining civil society’s capacity to operate, mobilise, and deliver services. These dynamics have produced an acute humanitarian crisis, with over 8,100 killings documented nationwide between January and October 2025 and more than 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) nationwide. Displacement, widespread poverty, and restricted access to basic services have increased humanitarian needs while simultaneously limiting the reach of local civil society actors, particularly community‑based organisations operating in high‑risk areas.

Economically, Haiti has experienced six consecutive years of negative or stagnant growth, compounded by the destruction of productive infrastructure, market disruptions caused by insecurity, and declining investor confidence. The collapse of livelihoods has intensified socio‑economic grievances and reduced domestic funding and sustainability for civil society organisations, increasing dependence on external actors. Environmental vulnerability further compounds this context. Haiti remains highly exposed to natural disasters, while the physical degradation of Port‑au‑Prince—particularly the city centre—has accelerated due to violence, abandonment, and lack of reconstruction, with the legacy of the 2010 earthquake still visible in unresolved displacement and infrastructure deficits.

Within this restrictive environment, Haitian civil society has demonstrated heightened awareness of its role as a driver of democratic renewal, social cohesion, and accountability. It has articulated a vision of change centred on restoring constitutional order, promoting inclusive governance, and advancing economic recovery and national reconstruction across all ten departments and the diaspora. However, the ability of civil society to influence policy, mobilise communities, and act as a democratic counterweight remains heavily contingent on an enabling environment increasingly shaped by insecurity, emergency governance, and structural exclusion.